Overcoming Traditionalism An Analysis of Naval Aviation Tactics during the Fleet Problems By Joseph A. Cascio Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies. Carl O. Schuster Russell A. Hart Primary Reader Secondary Reader‘We Certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies. Committee Russet A Aart hd. ifs First Reader e— CAT OY T1Has- Second ReaderI thank the faculty in the Diplomacy and Military Studies program at Hawai'i Pacific University for their knowledge and guidance. Special thanks goes to Dr. Michael Pavkovic who allowed this aerospace engineer the opportunity to enroll in a Master of Arts program despite the lack of a liberal arts background. And to my readers, Captain Carl Schuster, USN (ret) and Dr. Russell Hart, whose input in the classroom and on my first draft were invaluable to producing this professional paper. I thank the United States Navy for continuing to fund my education and the United States Naval War College Library for allowing me access to the primary sources I required to complete my research. ‘This paper is dedicated to the perseverance and foresight of military and naval officers who look outside the definitions of traditional warfare and find more effective means of carrying out the mission their country has assigned them.Table of Contents Dedication Table of Contents Introduction Background The Fleet Problems Bibliographic Essay Bibliography ii 18 68 82Introduction Between World War One and World War Two, the United States Navy began a transformation from the battleship to the aircraft carrier as its capital ship. Though not fully accepted at the outbreak of war, a basic understanding of aircraft carrier tactics and the limitations on carrier operations was known by the naval officers who would command the fleets at sea. The basic tactics used during the Pacific campaign were developed during war game at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and the large scale annual exercises known as Fleet Problems throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This paper attempts to trace naval aviation tactics through this period by primarily analyzing these exercises based on secondary sources and the myriad of reports generated by commanders participating in Fleet Problems I through XXI. While carrier tactics were still in the earliest stages of development, war games at the Naval War College and the use of notional aviation assets including battleships in place of aircraft carriers during the first fleet exercises laid a foundation for the operational policies which would govern air power during World War Two. By the mid-thirties a mature view of what a carrier battlegroup should look like began to emerge in the midst of the Fleet Problems. The traditional view of a decisive battleship engagement remained an almost inviolable premise in the minds of most senior officers, includingaviators, however the changing nature of maritime dominance included the airspace over the battle. As aircraft performance, range, and payload increased, the effectiveness of airpower began to play a greater role in war planning and were reflected in Fleet Problems XVI in 1935 and most notably in War Plan Orange. During the interwar years, treaty limits, air power advocates, and institutional processes shaped naval policy and operational planning. The study of the navy during this period can focus on a multitude of topics. This essay briefly touches on some the influences on naval aviation during its “Golden Years.” The Navy’s development of carrier aviation is a study of incremental advancement in the operations, tactics, and technology by maritime forces to wage war. Navy leadership came to understand the importance of aircraft within the framework of traditional sea battles.Background ‘The advent of the airplane and its subsequent technological development gave military leaders a new dimension to exploit in their prosecution of war. While the possibilities aircraft brought to the methods of engaging enemy forces were beginning to be understood or at least studied as early as 1910, such dramatic changes also created a healthy dose of skepticism from a number of senior officers and government officials who required more than theories and projections to completely redefine how wars were fought.! ‘The question of how airpower should be and could be used in warfare has been a hotbed of debate since the before the first military aircraft was flown. The role of airpower, in its earliest stages was potentially a transformational event in the way wars could be fought, but with limited resources and no historical record to draw from, the debate raged as to the proper role and organization for military aviation, particularly during the years between the two world wars. In terms of the development of aviation, World War One was a dramatic era. As David Maclsaac states “virtually every theory, attitude, ideal, hope, dream, and debate that would mark the course of air warfare a quarter century ‘Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aireraft Carrier, 1911-1929 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), p. 6-7. As early as 1898, Theodore Roosevelt wrote to the ‘Secretary of the Navy suggesting he look into the uses of aircraft in war. In 1910, Washington Irving Chambers wanted “to determine experimentally the value of aviation to the Navy.”later had been foreshadowed.”? This includes the use of naval aircraft. During those early years of flight, maritime and army air forces developed similar roles for aircraft. Just as the first army airplanes were used as reconnaissance platforms to survey the battlefield, long range patrol aircraft and lighter-than- air craft were used for maritime missions. The need to deny the enemy the use of reconnaissance aircraft created the need for pursuit and fighter aircraft, particularly since ground or sea based defenses were inadequate at the time. ‘The Royal Navy developed ship based airplanes and seaplanes as a means of protecting its fleet and coastline from the surveillance of German Zeppelins. It was a short conceptual leap from attacking aerial units to attacking enemy surface units from the air whether it was troops, supply lines, ships, or bases. ‘The ordnance carried by these early aircraft was very small and generally ineffective, particularly against moving targets such as ships, but despite its difficulties, maritime aircraft were used extensively, even in World War One, to scout and attack small boats and ships such as submarines. With the advent of radio, aircraft could be used to spot the indirect fire of powerful artillery and naval gunfire batteries. > 2 David Maclsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 629. 3 See Thomas Wildenberg, “In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy,” The Journal of Military History 65:3 (Jul. 2001): 697-711 and also Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).World War One had at least two other lessons that would influence the major airpower theorists between the wars. The first was the advent of long range strategic bombing, only on a much smaller scale than anything seen in World War Two. By utilizing their long range zeppelins to drop ordnance on Britain over the course of the war, the German military demonstrated that aviation could be used independently to attack strategic enemy targets. This became the focus of both the British and American air forces after the war. The other lesson was the use of sea based aircraft to strike land targets.‘ This lesson was repeatedly learned and dismissed until 7 December 1941. At the end of the war, naval aviation in the United States was primarily shore based, utilizing flying boats for long range reconnaissance and anti- submarine warfare (ASW). The American naval air force lagged well behind the Royal Navy in its ability to operate with the fleet. Training exercises conducted by the United States in 1919 off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba demonstrated the limits of sea planes and flying boats operating off of battleships, tenders, and from shore. Following these exercises, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Henry Thomas Mayo recommended the development of aircraft carriers that could be used with the fleet. By the fall of that year authorization was 4 Carl O. Schuster, “The Origins of Naval Aviation in World War I,” Strategy and Tactics 199: 25. ‘The first overland raid by seaborne units was on Christmas Day, 1914 when three British seaplane carriers, the launched seven aircraft, each carrying three twenty pound bombs to attack a German Zeppelin base near Cuxhaven with abysmal results. Carl O. Schuster, “Strike Warfare, 1914.” Naval History 12: 1 (Jan/Feb 1998): 37-41given for the conversion of the collier Jupiter into the first American carrier, the Langley which was commissioned in 1922 primarily as an experimental vessel used for training and tactical development. Naval doctrine through 1942 stressed the importance of the battleship and the decisive gun-battle at sea, yet naval aviation in the United States made steady technological and tactical progression over the course of those twenty years. Whether it was outside influences or the personalities of the earliest naval aviators, this period of time saw a dramatic advance in naval air doctrine.6 The stated naval doctrine of the time seemed to dismiss the power of aircraft in a maritime battle. In fairness to naval leaders who have often been accused of being resistant to accepting naval aircraft, as a weapons system prior to 1927 airplanes were inadequate for anything other than scouting and gun spotting. The ‘out dated’ thinking of the navy was based on the measured results aircraft achieved in World War One and by the performance of aircraft versus other naval weapons. The numbers supported the battleship in nearly every category except cost, and even then depending on how you measured it, the cost of one battleship could be argued to be cheaper than the comparable 5 Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea power, (London: Peter Davies, 1970), 107, 114. The Langley ‘was commissioned twelve years after Eugene Ely first demonstrated the concept of carrier aviation in 1910 to the United States Navy. © David R. Mets, “The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought.” in Phillip S. Meilinger (Ed.) Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, 1997), 170. Mets argues that the strategic thinking of the navy was an evolutionary process that was incrementally advanced in steps.firepower of the aircraft and their carriers.” As late as 1940, Ronald Specter, an instructor at the Naval War College, calculated that it “takes 108 planes to carry as many large torpedoes as one squadron of destroyers and 1200 to carry as many large bombs or large projectiles as one battleship.”® Yet as early as 1919 it was recognized at the highest levels within the naval organization that airpower was an essential arm of the Navy. In June 1919, the General Board issued the following policy statement at the request for the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels: To enable the United States to meet on at least equal terms any possible enemy, and to put the United States in its proper place as a Naval power, fleet aviation must be developed to the fullest extent. Aircraft have become an essential arm of the fleet. A Naval air service must be established, capable of accompanying and operating with the fleet in all waters of the globe. ‘Two of the most important external influences on United States Naval aviation between the wars was the strategic bombing lobby led by Army Air Corps General William “Billy” Mitchell and the Washington. Naval Treaty in 1922. 7 Baer, 107. Into the mid-1920’s, no sea based airplane could come close to threatening the battleships and “the land-based bomber ... was a controllable threat.” Two years after the sinking of the Osterfriesland, the U.S. Navy sunk the battleship Washington, but needed a combination of bombs, mines, and gunfire. 8 Ronald Specter, The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare, as quoted in Baer, 136. Quoted in Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, p.26. The General Board also recommended the construction of six fleet carriers, though this number was subsequently reduced and construction delayed because of a lack of data on carrier operations.‘The early army and naval aviators adopted different and competing methods to incorporate aviation into their respective services. The very public Mitchell insisted on the immediate creation of an independent air force while naval aviation developed slowly as an integral part of the fleet under the leadership of such admirals as William Moffett and William S. Sims. The relatively quiet development of naval aviation has often been mistaken for an institutional refusal by the Navy to abandon the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the predominance of the battleship. The Navy’s development of carrier aviation is a study of incremental advancement in the strategy, tactics, and technology by maritime forces to wage war. While Mitchell and his supporters saw aviation as a means to wage war independently, the Navy leadership came to understand the importance of aircraft within the framework of traditional sea battles. The historian George Baer suggests that the Washington Treaty necessitated diversity and innovation in preparing for the long expected Mahanian gun battle. “What is amazing,” he argues, “is what the Navy did within [treaty] limits, not what it did not do.” An ardent believer in the Washington treaty as a catalyst for the growth of naval aviation, Baer points out that after Pearl Harbor, the United States immediately put an “offensive fleet into action without a battleship.” This was due to the planning, training, and vision of the within the constraints of the Washington Treaty.In addition to tonnage limits, the Washington Treaty had another provision that influenced the development of the aircraft carrier, in both the United States and Japan. Included in the treaty provisions was a non- fortification clause concerning American colonies across the Pacific, like Guam. Essentially, the United States could not rely on their islands as advanced bases for the battle fleet. Air power had to be included in the fleet to defend the battleships and they made their way across the long expanse of the Pacific Ocean. As War Plan Orange developed with Japan as the enemy, it became apparent that the aircraft carrier had to be an integral part of the fleet’s power Projection. With their range and potential power, the larger carriers were the only ships that could fill this role. So as Emily Goldman argues, the Washington Treaty not only provided the hulls to initially build the large, fast carriers, it also “contributed to the evolution of carrier doctrine, strategy, and tactics.”10 Following World War One, attempts were made to make sense of ‘modern’ warfare. The first true theorist for air power was the Italian general, Guilio Douhet.t! Among his key points, he maintains that modern warfare makes no distinction between combatants and civilians, that the key to decisive victory 1 Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars (University Park, PA, 1994), 186. See also p. 158-162, for further discussion on the need for carrier aircraft in a war with Japan and the effects of the Washington Treaty on its development. 1 Douhet’s seminal work is The Command of the Air Trans. Dino Ferrari, (Washington D.C.: The Office of Air Force History, 1983) originally published in 1921would be to attack the civilian morale and to do this “an independent air force armed with long-range bombardment aircraft is the primary requirement.”!? Douhet identified five targets as the “vital centers of a modern country: industry, transportation infrastructure, communication nodes, government buildings, and the will of the people.”!3 Douhet’s counterpart in America was General “Billy” Mitchell who lobbied extensively for his vision of warfare which was very similar to Douhet’s theory. By proclaiming the decisiveness of air power in all future warfare, Mitchell focused almost solely on strategic bombardment, to the detriment of other aviation roles. Because of his fixation with air power, Mitchell dismissed much of the role of the army and called the navy obsolete by 1921, though he did support aircraft carriers as floating bases for bombers until 1928 when he described the “Naval Airplane Carrier as merely an expensive and useless luxury.”'+ ‘The first principle of air power was to seize control of the air. How and where this was to be done was hotly debated. Mitchell and other bombing advocates maintained that a fleet of bombers, defended by machine guns, would always get through to their target and since the destruction of these vital 12 Maclsaac, p. 630, summarizes Edward Warner's 1943 analysis of Douhet in his essay “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare.” 13 Phillip S. Meilinger, “Guilio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory,” The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, ed. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997, p.11 14 Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Col. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997), 93 10centers was the primary strategic objective in warfare, all resources should be focused on long range, heavy bombers. This theory maintains that control of the air was achieved by the power that strikes first, and the first targets were to be the aviation infrastructure of the enemy. The ability for an aircraft to strike essentially anywhere made it impractical to defend against strategic bombing without an enormous number of fighter or pursuit aircraft, particularly since anti-aircraft artillery was seen as nearly useless by Mitchell and Douhet. And since the first target was the aviation infrastructure, air superiority could be achieved.!5 For most of the Army and the Navy, air superiority was viewed as a local condition around the battle and was therefore maintained and accomplished by a combination of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Because the goal of the army was victory in a land battle, and the Navy still saw the destruction of the enemy battle fleet as its objective, there was considerable antagonism between the services as to the focus of air operations. Mitchell’s view of air warfare was certainly enticing to a public that remembered the battlefields World War One, but to most professional soldiers and sailors, such a war was highly unlikely. The traditional army and the navy realized the importance of air superiority over the battle. They foresaw, as evidenced by the various war plans under development, a war in which the enemy’s vital centers were not in range of land based bombers. Therefore, prior 5 Meilinger, “Guilio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory,” 13-14. uMto commencing a strategic bombing campaign, land and sea forces were required to secure forward operating bases and secure logistical communications. Even if the final outcome of the war was to be decided by strategic bombing, as some argue the Pacific theater was in 1945, other forces had to secure forward bases. Bombers could not support these forces adequately at the time because they lacked the precision or armor. Even the theory that land based air power could be used exclusively to defend against maritime invasion is flawed if one looks at the performance of bombers during the Battle of Midway. But because of the high profile lobbying of General Mitchell for a single air force, as the British had done in 1917, the naval leaders were forced to react to keep their limited naval air arm during the 1920s. As Meilinger writes, Mitchell’s “inordinate and near-neurotic hatred of the Navy distorted much of his writing, confused his message ...One could certainly argue ... that because of his incessant attacks, the Navy was forced to adapt in ways it otherwise might not have.”!6 One of the unforeseen outcomes of Mitchell’s theory was to force the navy to think about aviation in the present to justify its naval arm while continuously looking to the future to redefine the role of maritime aviation as aircraft capabilities grew. Where Mitchell stressed what aircraft had the 26 Phillip S. Meiling Theory, ed. Col. Phi USAR, “Introduction,” The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997), xv. 2potential to do, the realities of the 1920s were vastly different. No matter how much he emphasized the role of the bomber, the reality was that aircraft could not carry adequate ordnance to be decisive until the late 1930s. In his narrow focus, Mitchell was willing to bypass generations of development to achieve what he perceived the future to hold. Whether he realized it or not, Mitchell seemed to be willing to limit the current military power of the nation for the possibility of future aircraft development. The trouble with such a road to innovation is that the bomber advocates neglected the development of other technologies, namely radar, and other tactics that were being developed simultaneously with aircraft. The Navy on the other hand, saw aviation as essential for what it could do to support the battle fleet as early as 1916.17 Granted there was substantial debate as to how to proceed, aircraft would be a tool of the fleet commander. The navy’s incremental progress served it well. “Largely because of the institutional culture, aviation affected the thinking of the Navy in an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary way. This statement does not suggest that a the technology of naval warfare evolved on a steady, smooth curve, only that thought about the use of the Navy as a whole to help achieve national 17 Watts and Murray, “Military innovation in Peacetime,” 390. 13objectives changed in a gradual way, with neither long periods of stagnation nor obvious discontinuities.”!8 Despite the rift between naval and army aviation between the wars there were a number of similarities between what theorists perceived as the role of aviation and how it was to be employed. The first is one that is almost so obvious today that it is taken for granted, and that is the supremacy of wheeled, heavier-than-air craft. Flying boats, sea planes, and dirigibles were all seen at different times as the best use of aviation in a maritime environment.'? Secondly, Mitchell stressed independent air operations. Looking at the early fleet experiments with aircraft carriers, and the role of carriers into World War Two, aviation officers struggled to allow their carriers (and later carrier task forces) to work independently from the main battle fleet. ‘The organizational independence of the Army Air Corps however did not translate into a separate naval air service or corps. The primary difference between land based air power enthusiasts and the naval aviators was that the navy officer, with few exceptions, included fleet support as one of their primary roles. The third similarity is that air superiority was the first objective of air power. Surprisingly both had similar views as to how to achieve this. For Mitchell and his followers the belief that “nothing can stop the attack of aircraft 18 Mets, 119. 19 Miller, War Plan Orange, 349, “the superiority of the landplane was not conclusively proved until the eve of war in the Pacific.” 14except other aircraft” saw air superiority in terms of destroying enemy aviation infrastructure as part of strategic bombing.” While the navy had a better appreciation for anti-aircraft fire from their ships, they still deemed that the primary method of achieving air superiority in battle was by sinking the enemy's aircraft carrier. Because of this focus, both the American army and navy lacked effective modern fighter aircraft at the outbreak of war in 1941. Both services subscribed to the notion that by striking first, they will have the initiative and therefore the victory. Although it was the Washington Treaty that allowed the carrier to grow, it was the battleship that ensured aircraft flying off of aircraft carriers would remain part of the fleet. By the mid-1920s the usefulness, in fact necessity of aircraft as aerial spotters for the big guns of the battle fleet could not be disputed. As the value of aerial spotting increased, so did the requirement to deny the enemy the use of their aircraft for spotting. World War One showed the need for aerial supremacy over the battlefield, likewise the need for air supremacy in a maritime engagement became a priority and the naval fighter was born.2! The decisive gun battle was still the doctrine, however, the airplane was now needed to ensure victory in the engagement, both as fighters and scouts. Naval aviation was here to stay. But the evolution of naval 20 Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions:” p. 98. Quotes used by Clodfelter from Mitchell's Winged Defense xiv, and Douhet’s Command of the Air, 25,54-55. 21 Mets, 122. 15aviation from merely supporting the fleet to engaging the enemy on their own could only be advanced with help and personalities of the early aviation leadership and the continuing technological developments that would allow the aircraft carrier to become an offensive weapon, While naval leadership, particularly Rear Admiral William Moffet battled to keep their developing air arm, naval airpower came into its own in the late 1920s and early 1930s because of a willingness by naval leadership to war game and experiment with the potential of aircraft carriers at the Naval War College and in Fleet Battle Problems (exercises) held regularly. During the 1920s there was sufficient encouragement by influential officers to allow operational and tactical theories on aviation to be debated and analyzed systematically. Beginning in 1922, the Navy began experimenting in a number of fleet exercises that included developing roles for carrier aviation. Aircraft carriers were not yet available for Fleet Problem I, so battleships were used to simulate aircraft carriers. As early as 1925 there were high ranking proponents of carrier aviation in the Navy as exemplified by Admiral William S. Sims, president of the Naval War College, who testified before Congress that “a small, high-speed carrier alone can destroy or disable a battleship alone fleet whose carriers give it command of the air over the enemy fleet can defeat 16the latter.” Lessons drawn from Fleet Problem VII utilizing the Langley (CV- 1) in 1927 included the recommendation that aircraft carriers be allowed to operate freely away from the battleship fleet to allow for speed and mobility. By 1929, with the addition of the two larger carriers Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3), demonstrations were made in Fleet Problem IX that aircraft carriers, operating independently, could achieve remarkable surprise and success against land targets such as the Panama Canal, or Pearl Harbor in 1932.23 ‘These influences provided the navy with a framework for incorporating naval aircraft within its fleet, but it was the internal development of aviation tactics that would define naval warfare during World War Two. The Naval War College and the various formal exercises conducted by the United States Navy were the principle tools that prepared and trained the Navy to fight despite the destruction of its battleships at Pearl Harbor in 1941. 22 Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 1 23 Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 17-18. 7The Fleet Problems ‘The first of the Fleet Problems took place in the vicinity of the Panama Canal in February, 1923. Though not a primary motive for the exercise, naval aviation was an integral part of the scenario. Because the Langley was less than a year in service and not ready to participate, the role of the aircraft carrier had to be simulated by two battleships. As a consequence, naval aircraft units were constructively employed from land bases with single aircraft representing entire squadrons. Lessons learned included the susceptibility of vital parts of the Panama Canal to aircraft bombs, but at the time, this was directed primarily towards land based aircraft. Sea based aircraft at the time could not carry enough ordnance to pose a viable threat therefore, no mention was made of future carrier aircraft except as scouting forces for the fleet. What is most interesting is with even limited aviation operations, the Commander-in- Chief United States Fleet (CINCUS) concluded that successful naval operations required aircraft that could operate with the fleet. Though these remarks do not necessarily refer only to aircraft carriers - battleships and cruisers could also launch aircraft - CINCUS did recommend “that the Department take steps towards...rapid completion of airplane carriers.”24 2#*CINCUS report, June 19, 1923,” Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38, p. 140. See also Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 102. 18During the following winter, the Navy planned three separate scenarios that would become Fleet Problems II, III, and IV. These exercises were planned in conjunction with the Joint Army and Navy Problem Two which simulated an attack against the Panama Canal from the Caribbean. Fleet Problem II was essentially a logistical problem with little relevance toward aviation, Fleet Problems Ill and IV in January, 1924 on the other hand were the Langley’s debut in Fleet maneuvers and deserve some discussion. She was part of the “Black Fleet” that was stationed in the Caribbean with orders to support a joint attack on the Panama Canal. The “Blue Fleet” was to transit from the Pacific in defense of this vital passage. Initial plans, as drawn up by the Black Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral N. A. McCulley had the Langley’s aircraft making the first attack on the Blue forces by bombing its fleet while it was transiting through the locks. Such a role should have been seen by the aviators on board the Langley as a chance to prove the worth of naval aviation as a weapon. However, the proposed plans had to be altered. One of the Langley’s twelve aircraft was actually lost while patrolling the Panamanian coast. The subsequent search for the pilots depleted her supply of aircraft and took her out of engagement range. She was unable to figure prominently in the initial operations of the exercise despite the war plan. With such a lack luster beginning, it is a testament to these early aviators and their leaders that Vice 19Admiral McCulley still praised the performance of his only aircraft carrier, thus: Daily the Langley was programmed to make air attacks on vital points of the Canal and on vessels in harbor and daily sent her very limited forces she continued to carry them out. Great credit is due her aviators for their effective work against so much superior air forces, and it indicates the power of the air attack even when the forces may appear insignificant, and the enemy greatly superior. The chief umpires for the event, whom for the Navy was Admiral R. E. Coontz, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, also found the performance of the air elements important to the operations, but the equipment that was used needed to be updated. The final report singled out a number of ship types that were obsolete or inadequate as designed. First on this list was the need for a modern aircraft carrier. The report went on to criticize the small number and performance characteristics of the Langley’s aircraft. “The Naval air equipment is inadequate and obsolescent ... This force should be sufficient and trained to cooperate with the Fleet during its operations.” Keeping naval aviation tied to the fleet was an important political statement in the early Fleet Problems because of the threat posed by General Mitchell and his unified and 2McCulley, N. A. "Talk on Operations of Black Forces delivered by Vice Admiral McCulley before Conference on Problem No. 3°. Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38, 21 January 1924, 5. 2*Coontz, R.E and John L. Hines, “Conclusions of the Umpires, Joint Army and Navy Problem Two,” p. 8 Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38. 20independent air force debate. Of particular note is that this statement was made in a joint Army and Navy report. Fleet Problem IV was carried out following the conclusion of the joint problem and pitted the two fleets against each other in the Caribbean in a simulated movement by the Blue fleet to an advanced island base. Both Fleet Problems II and IV were loosely conceived with the idea of studying problems posed in a naval conflict with Japan. The Langley was part of the Blue Fleet defending its forward island base from the Black force which consisted of a naval fleet and land based aircraft. She was assigned to the Screening Force and a lack of understanding of carrier operations by the commander of the Screening Force hampered the efficient use of the Langley. For example, she was ordered to fly her planes to guard a detachment of battleships and escorts while she was at anchor, which was unsafe and nearly impossible. Similarly, the need for relative wind down her flight deck was overlooked by the commander of the Screening Force when steaming which meant the Langley had to leave the steaming formation to launch aircraft, considerations the battleship captains pointed to as weaknesses of the aircraft carrier despite the Langley’s status as an experimental vessel. Yet despite the inherent limitations of the Langley as a result of her conversion from a collier, she was able to make a significant contribution to the fleet in air defense and scouting. Her first action in the exercise consisted of a1launching fighters to intercept an inbound section of bombers. The aviators made the case that the fighters were in position to attack the bombers prior to them flying over their primary target, which happened to be the Langley, therefore the bombers could not have successfully attacked. The umpires and several ranking officers argued along the lines of traditional naval engagements, a fault that would haunt both naval and army efforts to understand the importance of the fighter versus the bomber. Their theory was that because bombers had more weapons and were flying in formation, they could mutually defend each other from the more agile fighter.2” Despite this argument, the naval aviators impressed upon the fleet that the first defense against an air threat should be organic aircraft operating off of carriers. The commanding officer of the Langley, Captain S.H.R. Doyle went even further to say that while the aircraft carrier was an essential part of the fleet, it should not be tied to the battle fleet and would be most effective assigned to the screening force.?® Because of the limitations of the Langley, Captain Doyle was conservative to some extent in how he felt the carriers should be employed. As 27W. H, Gherardi, memorandum to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet 15 February 1924, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38, “CINCUS Report April 30, 1924” Enclosure W, p. 5-8. Captain Gherardi as Commander Aircraft Squadrons believed that'the bombers would have made it through the fighter screen as it actually occurred with limited aircraft on the Langley, but because of the simulated aircraft that would be on board an actual fleet carrier, the number of fighters that could be launched against the bombers would probably overwhelm their defenses. Even he thought along the lines of the size and number of guns as the primary avenue towards aerial victory. 2sDoyle, S. H. R. Memorandum to Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet 1 February, 1924, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38 “CINCUS Report, April 30, 1924" Enclosure X, p. 9-12. 22it will be seen in future exercises, the aviation officers stressed that the aircraft carrier needed to operate as the center of her own independent force to allow it the most flexibility in defending the fleet and attacking the opposing fleet. Vice Admiral McCulley noted that the rapid improvements of aviation operations throughout Problems III and IV were impressive and gave him a personal appreciation of what the Langley could do. His final report tended to side with the aviators that the Langley’s aircraft were vital to protecting the fleet from an aerial assault and that the proper place for her, at least in 1924, was with the screening force detached from the battle fleet.29 It was not just the protection of the fleet that aviation made an impact in Problem IV. During the course of the exercise, the Blue Forces simulated an assault on an enemy island in which reconnaissance from the Langley’s aircraft, including pictures of the landing area, were taken and distributed to the Landing Force. During the assault the Langley’s aircraft fought off a number of attacks from land based aircraft directed at the bombardment forces. The aerial battle in the vicinity of the island must have been impressive with the little Langley recovering and launching aircraft throughout the day on January 31, 1924 as land based aircraft were flying wave after wave of bombers at the ships and landing force. Rear Admiral W. V. Pratt, Commander 2>McCulley, N. A. “From Point X to Conclusion,” p. 8, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38 “CINCUS Report, April 30, 1924" Enclosure V. 23of Battleship Division Four in the exercise and part of the bombardment force that witnessed the attacks noted that with regard to landing on a hostile shore, control of the air “is the most important feature of all. I do not believe that, considering the great advances made in the air, we could, with safety, contemplate the seizure of an advanced base in an area which is within bombing distance of the air forces of the enemy.” There were two answers to controlling the air: either acquire friendly bases near the invasion site to cover the fleet, or develop aircraft carriers and aircraft that could provide control of the air with the fleet. By the mid 1920s that the admirals on the General Board “appreciated, more, perhaps, than any group of senior officers in the Navy, the value of aviation and the fact that it was indispensable to fleet passage west of Hawai’i.*! But, they also were students of Mahan and believed the decisive engagement would be between two fleets and despite the public success of General Mitchell against the Ostfriesland, the data from experiments with the Washington provided mixed conclusions. It was apparent that aircraft in the mid 1920s could not be counted on to reliably sink or even effectively disable an operational battleship. Though the aircraft carrier was necessary to make it across the Pacific, the final outcome of the anticipated battle would be decided ‘nV. att, ‘Reearts oo Problem 4 ty RADA VV. rat, Canmandes Bateship Dison . from Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Record Group 38 *CINCUS Report, April 30, 1924" Enclosure T: Methorn, Two-Block Fox, 108 24by the superior fleet.9? Therefore the General Board could not abandon its support for the surface fleet of battleships and cruisers and invest completely in the emerging technology of aviation. Such an act would sacrifice the capability of the Navy until aviation technology was sufficiently advanced to become decisive. The idea of maintaining a balanced fleet was the phrase the officers of the General Board used to describe their policy of ship building and appropriations. More radical opinions concerning the potential of aircraft in fleet operations though were not limited to aviators. Admiral Sims disagreed with the concept of a ‘balanced fleet’ that was neither defined nor understood. His conclusion was that a balanced fleet, as the General Board envisioned it, was a defensive policy. Such as it was, the Navy was neglecting the speed at which aircraft were improving and becoming more efficient weapon systems.“ Official naval doctrine through 1942 stressed the decisiveness of the battleship. Fleet Problem V held in 1925 did little to increase the capability of naval aviation because of their limited use. Though disappointing to the aviators, Admiral Coontz did allude to the improvements of fleet over the course of the previous year in his report on Fleet Problem No. V, 29 May 1925. He noted the marked improvement of routinely launching scout planes from battleships and 221bid. Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, 254-255. Admiral Sims made these view while being interviewed by the Morrow board in 1925. 25cruisers. Because of the danger associated with such operations, this was only constructively done, or simulated during the previous year’s exercises. His recommendations, with respect to aviation, were similar to those he stated in his report on Fleet Problem IV including the importance of completing the Saratoga and Lexington and improving the durability, dependability and range of naval aircraft. He also advocated that destroyers be assigned for duty with the aircraft carrier.3+ It was noted that in his report on Fleet Problem IV, Captain Doyle of the Langley, held a rather conservative estimate towards the employment of aviation. Captain S. E. Moses, Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, also held a conservative view advocating seaplanes as the answer to naval aviation despite the loss of performance because of safety concerns.35 He needed more data that could only be obtained after the Saratoga and Lexington were commissioned because of the inadequacy of the Langley. Such a conservative attitude as to what the Langley and her aircraft could do was replaced when Captain Reeves took command of the Langley later that year. Fleet Problem VI was similar to the exercise held the previous year except it was held in the Pacific off the coast of Baha California. The naval air force in Coontz, R.E *CINCUS Fleet Report on Fleet Problem No. 5, 29 May 1925,” Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation Record Group 38. 35 Capt S. E, Moses, “Comment by Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet on Fleet Problem No. V March 2 to March 11, 1925", p.4 Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation Record Group 38. *CINCUS Report, May 29, 1925", enclosure O, pp.15-18. 26this problem was primarily assigned to the Blue Fleet with an equal number of land based units simulating black forces. Commander, aircraft squadrons, who was Captain Reeves, had a total of 16 aircraft at his disposal on the Langley, a small but significant increase over his predecessor, in addition to 12 seaplanes on various ships in the fleet. His primary mission was scouting for the fleet and air defense. In three days the Langley launched and recovered 42 aircraft on 14 missions. His goal did not seem to be to impress upon the fleet the importance of aviation as the previous problems stressed, but rather to push the limitations of the Langley in an operational setting. His report at the conclusion of the problem included 37 comments specific to carrier operations that needed to be addressed within varying levels of the Navy Department to improve not only the Langley but future aircraft and aircraft carrier designs, tactics, and safety features.96 Little in the way of tactical improvement accompanied Fleet Problem VII in March, 1927 for aviation. The Langley however under Captain Reeves carried an unthinkable number of aircraft for her size, 37, over three times her designed capacity.3” The uninitiated observers embarked during the exercise watched the orchestrated chaos on the deck of the carrier with a bit of 36J. M. Reeves Report on Fleet Problem VI dated 18 February, 1926. Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923-1941 Roll 7 “Fleet Problem VI, CINCUS Report, Mar. 14, 1926", encl d. 37Records realting to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 Roll 8 “Fleet Problem VII, CINCUS Report, May 4, 1927", encl b. 27apprehension. His report was a bit critical of operating such large numbers of aircraft, but he failed to see the tactical advantage such numbers could bring to the battle. Captain Reeves’s experience at the Naval War College led him to an appreciation of the relationship between the number of aircraft that could be launched and the effective power of the aircraft carrier. Though aircraft of could not yet be expected to sink a battleship or even a cruiser, it was widely acknowledged based on the various battle experiments and gaming exercises at the War College, that the aircraft carrier introduced the idea that a superior fleet based solely on the number and size of large caliber guns, could be defeated because of inferior intelligence. “Victory in future engagements would depend on striking first and thus on intelligence from long-range scouting aircraft.”8 Aviators lobbied for a larger role than just reconnaissance work. Based on the recommendations of a policy board under Admiral Montgomery M. Taylor in April 1927, aircraft carriers were to engage in “scouting and offensive operations at a distance from the battle line.”8° By the eve of World War Two, the first task of carrier aircraft was to find and sink enemy carriers denying them the opportunity to gain an upper hand in the intelligence battle. But in 1927, little opportunity was given to Captain Reeves to test his theories. He was allowed to launch a single strike mission against a lone 88 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: the U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 175. 28Clark, Fast Carriers, p. 16. “© Mets, 128. 28destroyer and while his aircraft were away from the Langley, the defenseless. carrier was located and bombed by shore based aircraft. In the final report on Fleet Problem VIII, it was noted that little could be learned with respect to aviation because of the limited operations conducted within the design of the scenario which consisted of a Blue Force conducting a transit from the California to Hawaii with the Orange Force somewhere in between defending Oahu. “The air operations were confined to scouting around the formation ...Sufficient planes were launched to show that the use of planes from carriers for all contemplated operations is both practicable and feasible.” What is not mentioned is the final operation for the fleet. On April 28, Admiral Reeves was ordered to “get control of the air” as the fleet approached Pearl Harbor.*? He sent ten aircraft towards the air bases on Oahu for simulated attacks against enemy aircraft. The contemplated tasks then were not only to scout for the fleet, but offensive operations against land based aircraft to secure control of the air prior to an engagement. It was an important step for the fleet commander to realize that sea-based air power could be used against land based fighters as well as attack aircraft. The +1 Admiral LR. de Steiguer, Commander Battle Fleet, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. VIII - Report of Operations” p.8 Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923-1941 Roll 11 Target 2: Fleet Problem VIII, CINCUS Report n.d., encl e. 42 “Blue Observer chronological record” p. 16, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. VIII - Report of Operations” p.8 Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923-1941 Roll 11 Target 2: Fleet Problem VIII, CINCUS Report n.d., encl g 29aircraft carrier as an offensive weapon, though not articulated at the highest levels of command, was understood and recognized.43 Following the end of the Fleet Problem, Admiral Reeves conducted exercises in coordination with the Army to test the defenses of Oahu. Just before 0500 on 16 May 1928, the Langley turned into the wind and launched thirty-five aircraft on a mock dawn attack against Wheeler Army Air Base on Oahu. The army defenses were caught off guard and the aircraft made an unopposed attack on the installation.** This was only the first time the United States Navy conducted a “successful” aerial attack against Oahu. It is unfortunate that better lessons were not learned from these events. As a fleet asset the Langley had proven her worth, but it was up to the much larger carriers Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3) to further carrier tactics. Their first fleet exercise was Fleet Problem IX, the most extensive of the annual exercises to that point. Saratoga and Langley were placed with the Black Fleet in the Pacific, whose task was to assault the Panama Canal and prevent the Blue force, including the Lexington from transiting the Canal from the Caribbean Sea. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Reeves commanded the Blue Force aviation assets. Admiral William V. Pratt, commanding the Black Force, 49See also Wildenberg, pp 49-52, and Eugene E. Wilson “Fleet Exercises—Tactics and Strategy” Aircraft Carriers in Peace and War Ed. Joseph A. Skiera (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc, 1965) for other accounts of aviation in Fleet Problem VIII. ““Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 52. It is noteworthy that three torpedo planes happened to. sight the Langley while her aircraft were over the island and she took three simulated torpedoes. 30planned to attack the various locks within the Canal with aircraft and naval bombardment. He realized early in the planning process that control of the air would be vital for either of these operations to succeed. During the planning of each Fleet Problem, the opposing commanders wrote out their estimate of the situation taking into account what their strengths were and what they perceived their opponents strengths were. Based on this and their required mission, they would discuss their options and way the pros and cons of potential operations. The Black Force commander, Admiral William V. Pratt, with the counsel of Rear Admiral Reeves, conceived of a plan to attack a specific point in the canal, the Miraflores Locks. The attack was to come from two directions with the Lexington supported by battleships of the striking fleet, while the Langley launched what would amount to be a one way raid for its pilots who would then land in Blue territory and surrender after burning their aircraft!*> Though it is doubtful such an attack would have occurred for a variety of reasons, the opportunity never presented itself because the Langley was unable to make the journey. Regardless, when the actual orders were issued to the Black Fleet, no mention of the initial aerial strike by the Saratoga was mentioned. Admiral Pratt was concerned with the long over water transit that would be required to achieve surprise. Captain “Wiley, H.A. “United States Fleet Problem IX - Report of Commander-in-chief, United States Fleet,” March 18, 1929, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923- 1941 Roll 12 Target 1, p. 18. 31Eugene Wilson presented the statistics for naval aircraft operating over water or the previous year claiming no losses were due to mechanical failure.° Rear Admiral Reeves then suggested that the Saratoga operate independently from the battleships of the striking force, a proposal that was counter to the initial plan. He argued that the speed of the carrier was sufficient to provide protection and would allow her to stay beyond the effective range of the enemy cruisers. At sunset on the night prior to the attack, the Saratoga was to begin 300 mile high speed run at the target in order to launch her aircraft before dawn from 150 miles away. Because of the speed of the fast carrier and concerns about fuel for the destroyers, a cruiser had to be assigned as escort and plane guard for the carrier. Admiral Pratt assigned the Omaha as the Saratoga’s escort and allowed Rear Admiral Reeves to proceed with his plan.*7 Just before 0500 on the morning of January 26, 1929 the Saratoga began launching 70 aircraft from about 140 miles from Panama followed by an additional 13 aircraft two hours later for a follow on strike. By 0800, three waves of aircraft constructively bombed Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks from a single aircraft carrier. The only defenses they encountered were six army pursuit aircraft after they had bombed their target. Much to the relief of Pratt and Reeves, no pilots were lost in the mission, though one aircraft was ditched ‘8Bugene E. Wilson, “The Navy's First Carrier Task Force,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Feb., 1950), 163-165. ‘47Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, 57-58. 32near the force due to fuel troubles. Admiral H.A. Wiley summed up the mission in his report: ‘The launching of eighty-three planes from the Saratoga’s deck on the morning of 26 January is and will remain an epic in the history of aviation. No single air operation ever conducted from floating base speaks so eloquently for the advanced state of development of aviation as an integral part of the Fleet.*8 However, in the same report the Commander-in-Chief cautioned those who claimed the end of the battleship. The Saratoga’s mission was not entirely without fault. The lack of defensive preparations in the Canal Zone can be attributed to commanders under estimating a carrier’s capabilities and such targets would be better prepared. Also, on the night of the 25%, the Saratoga was unknowingly located by two Blue ships, including the cruiser Detroit who shadowed her and reported her position to Blue headquarters. A squadron of Blue land-based Navy patrol aircraft was standing by armed and awaiting orders for a night attack against the carrier once her position could be confirmed.*? Additionally, the Saratoga and Omaha stumbled upon a division of Blue battleships before launching the final 13 aircraft. The resulting battle would have sunk both Black ships. An undetected submarine also found the Saratoga after launching her aircraft and constructively fired four torpedoes at ‘OH. A. Wiley, “United States Fleet Problem 1X," p.12-13. °H.A. Wiley, “United States Fleet Problem IX,” p. 21. The squadron actually began taking-off just after 0400 from Coco Solo but was recalled after Saratoga completed her attack. 33the unsuspecting ship. Without her destroyer screen she was an easy target. To top off the vulnerability of the carrier, the Lexington launched an attack on the Saratoga while her planes were landing from their raid. Saratoga was ruled sunk at least twice and damaged another time that morning! As discussed above, command of the air over the engagement was necessary to achieve success. Pratt and Reeves must both have reasoned that surprise and the numbers of aircraft available would in effect achieve air superiority over the locks. Based on the reaction of the army aircraft and the defenses, operational surprise was achieved and the locks would have been damaged, but at what cost? Without her aircraft, the Saratoga was left extremely vulnerable to attacks from above, below, and on the surface of the ocean. The aircraft carrier could not operate without a dedicated screen of destroyers and cruisers. The question that needed to be answered was whether such a force could defeat a task force with the battleship as the central component. The answer ‘based on Fleet Problem IX was inconclusive which led the fleet to conclude that without sufficient evidence to the contrary, the battleship would remain the center piece of the Fleet. The aircraft carrier had to demonstrate the capability to first locate enemy battleships before they were in range to fire upon the carrier, and two prove they could disable battleships in combat. This second demonstration was naturally impossible to prove until World War II. Theaircraft carrier could not replace the battleship, but understanding what it could do and how it should be employed was vital to naval operations and it was this path that was taken in the fleet problems of the 1930s. ‘The first question that needed to be answered was the size of carrier. In his critique of Fleet Problem IX, Admiral Wiley advocates that carriers should be constructed to the tonnage limits allowed under the Washington Treaty, but the recommendation from the board was that the fleet needed a large number of small carriers. The primary consideration given to this recommendation was that because of the large number of aircraft and more importantly the number of personnel on board the large carriers, no commander could risk its loss in offensive operations. In the view of the Commande: -Chief U. S. Fleet, a larger number of the more economical small carriers that could operate with the fleet would suffice for the defensive role he envisioned for the aircraft carrier.S° To the aviators this was ludicrous. Though the proper tactics still needed to be developed, the advancements in payload and performance of aircraft seemed to point towards offensive operations whether against an opposing fleet or in an overland strike role. The larger decks of the Saratoga and Lexington allowed for the larger torpedo bombers to become airborne. The longer deck also gave the carrier a greater speed and the ability to launch more aircraft which if properly employed translated into better protection. In same 5OH.A, Wiley, “United States Fleet Problem IX,” p. 30. 35report Admiral Wiley noted that a properly executed dive bombing attack was nearly impossible to stop and posed the most difficult problem for anti-air defenses within the fleet. One final note on Fleet Problem IX, just as it was demonstrated the year before in Hawaii, the navy’s carrier aircraft, in particular their fighters and their pilots, bested the land based fighters in from Panama. There was a common misperception that carrier aircraft were inferior to land based aircraft. Though true in some cases, this was not always the case as evidences by the exercises in 1928 and 1929. Fleet Problems X and XI were held both held in the spring of 1930 with similar goals. Once again Black and Blue were at war in the Caribbean with the goal of the exercise to bring about a decisive naval engagement on favorable terms. Both exercises demonstrated the effectiveness of an aircraft carrier that is aggressively utilized by the fleet commander and the ship’s commanding officer. Furthermore these problems were the first time a carrier group was formally employed as part of the fleet. Problem X was held from 10-14 March 1930 with both fleets at approximately equal strength with the Langley and Saratoga part of the Blue fleet that began the problem having just completed a transit of the Panama Canal, and the Lexington as part of the Black fleet just south of Haiti. The primary difference between the two fleets was the manner in which they were 36organized. The Blue commander decided to keep his carriers tied to the main formation for the duration of the problem with little room to maneuver on their own. The Black commander however formed a carrier group centered on the Lexington with cruisers and destroyers that would work together to provide mutual defense and increase the scouting area for the fleet. This allowed the carrier group to maneuver independently when necessary for fight operations without reducing its protection. An interesting note to this organizational structure has to do with the morale of the aviators. During the first two days of the Problem, the Saratoga and Langley were unable to fly because the weather was deemed unsafe, yet the Lexington experiencing similar sea states expressed no concern with regard to launching and recovering her aircraft. ‘There was sporadic contact between the fleets’ submarine screens the first three days of the exercise, but the both fleet commanders expected to engage the enemy fleet the morning of March 14. In preparation, the Langley and Saratoga launched 67 of their aircraft just before dawn with their scouts off deck first to search for the Black carrier. The majority of fighters and bombers held station over the top of the Saratoga waiting for contact reports from the scouts. When nothing was sighted most of the aircraft landed while six scouts continued to search their designated area and five fighters maintained a defensive combat patrol over the carrier. a7The Lexington sent out her normal patrol of scouts and light bombers just before dawn and searched a larger area ahead of the fleet. At 0715 three of the planes sighted the Langley and were able to report her position before being shot down by the defensive fighters airborne. A few minutes later the other section of three aircraft from the Lexington sighted the main body of the Blue fleet. With the Blue position known, the Lexington launched her aircraft to attack the enemy carriers with follow up attacks against the Blue battleships. Within an hour, both the Saratoga and Langley’s flight decks were ruled destroyed and they became sitting ducks for the Black cruisers that were closing the force. With one strike, Black had command of the air, and as the situation unfolded, this translated into a decisive victory. The Lexington’s aircraft were able to make attacks against the Blue fleet without threat of aerial engagements, though the effects of anti-aircraft fire were probably underappreciated. Following the aerial attacks, the guns of the Black battleships were guided to their targets by aerial observers who could operate with impunity over the battle. The effective range of 1-inch guns with aerial spotting was deemed far superior and the Black fleet had their decisive victory.5! 51 William V. Pratt, “United States Fleet Problem X - Report of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,” May 7, 1939, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923- 1941 Roll 13 Target 1. 38‘The roles of the three aircraft carriers were reversed the following month for Problem XI. The Saratoga formed the center of a Black carrier group while the Langley stayed with the main Black fleet and acted as a ‘battle line carrier’ under the direct control of the fleet commander. The Lexington operated with the Blue fleet. Without going into a play by play, the Saratoga was able to inflict the first attack and subsequently the Black Fleet achieved air superiority.5? The carrier group concept had proved effective in an exercise between two fleets. Had aircraft, dive bombers in particular, been able to carry bomb large enough to be effective against battleships, perhaps a better appreciation for the aircraft carrier as an offensive weapon could have been seen. Granted the aircraft carrier would be sunk if it was within range of a battleships battery, but if its aircraft could strike with sufficient power and accuracy outside of the battleships range, the aircraft carrier would win the engagement. As both problems showed the key was control of the air. Even Admiral William V. Pratt noted that the “aggressive use of aircraft to gain superiority over the enemy” was a better tactical employment of aircraft carriers that were “tied to a cruising disposition with a more or less passive task of awaiting to defend the fleet when it is attacked.”5° Despite being critical of the current capabilities of aviation, Vice Admiral Carey Cole noted that the S2William J. Pratt, “United States Fleet Problem XI - Report of Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet,” July 14, 1930, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 Roll 13 Target 2, SsPratt, “United States Fleet Problem X,” p. 67. 39possibilities for aviation within the carrier group concept could include “operations for information...partial sea control...tactical scouting...and possibly in other ways we do not now visualize.”54 During the design of the previous fleet problems, it was assumed that opposing battleships would eventually face off. The role of aviation, though important was to support this encounter. Fleet Problem XI, held in February, 1931 investigated the possibility of multiple carrier groups defending the western approaches to the Panama Canal and a fictitious Nicaraguan Canal against an opposing force of battleships.55 The Saratoga and Lexington operated as the center of their respective groups while patrol aircraft from the tender Wright used the protective waters off the coast of Panama to conduct long range patrols. This was also the unimpressive debut of the dirigible Los Angeles in the annual fleet exercise. If the aircraft carriers, supported by their escorting cruisers and destroyers and other aviation elements could successfully impede the advance of the battle groups, the case of the aircraft carrier as a capital ship could have been made. But without a clear understanding of the effect of aerial bombs against mobile and defended war ships, the aircraft carriers never had a chance. Despite locating the invading Quoted in Pratt, "United States Fleet Problem XI. p. 66. See also Turnbull and Lord History of United States Aviation, p. 272-273. 58J.V. Chase, “United States Fleet Problem XII - Report of Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet,” April 1, 1931, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923-1941 Roll 13 Target 2, and also Tumbull and Lord, History of United States Aviation, 272-273, and also Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 90-93. 40fleet, which had separated into two convoys to attack both canals, and delivering multiple attacks against both convoys from well over 100 miles from the coastline, the battleships were only deemed slightly damaged and triumphantly steamed into their respective harbors to end the problem. ‘The aircraft carriers were left with nearly all their ammunition expended and little fuel for their aircraft. The battleship supporters deemed this proof of the superiority of the battleship to contro! the sea. Even Rear Admiral Reeves, who participated in the dual role as Commander Carrier Divisions and Commander Striking Force for the defending forces, noted that the scenario showed the naval “air force cannot stop the advance of battleships ... [and] that battleships and air force are mutually dependent.”5¢ Recognizing that the actual effectiveness of aircraft against moving targets needed to be once again assessed, experiments were carried out by dive bombers and torpedo aircraft against radio controlled ships the following summer. Three ships were configured for the test with the intention being to investigate the accuracy and the effect of aircraft armament. The dive bombers engaged a World War I destroyer, the ex-Stoddert, that was controlled by a conning officer in a ship following her. The dive bombers found the maneuvering ship difficult to hit, but when they did the effect was devastating. ‘The other two destroyers used, the ex-Marcus and ex-Sloat, were also 56 J.V. Chase “United States Fleet Problem XII - Report of Commander-in-Chief United States 4devastated by practice bombs and .50 caliber machine guns that ripped through bulkheads and decks. The conclusions were mixed with the smaller ships needing better anti-aircraft defenses to withstand an aerial assault, but the dive-bomber would still not be effective against battleships.5” More importantly, senior officers not only acknowledged the offensive capabilities of the carrier, but began to plan their operations around it. Evidence of this is demonstrated the following year. While planning and drawing up his estimate for Fleet Problem XIII conducted in March 1932, Admiral R. H. Leigh, Commander Battle Force commented that the “best offensive weapon against the cruisers is the carrier” so long as it is properly protected from close range engagements.5° Prior to the next fleet problem, the Navy and Army conducted a series of joint exercises in Hawaii. Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell, who relieved Rear Admiral Reeves as Commander, Aircraft Squadrons Battle Fleet, separated his two large carriers from the main battle fleet in what amounted to a multi- carrier task force. Utilizing similar tactics as Reeves had in 1929 for Fleet Problem IX when he attacked Panama, Yamell executed a high speed run-in to the Hawai’ian Islands during the night of 6 February 1932 and successfully Fleet,” April 1, 1931, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 Roll 13 Target 2, 35-36. 57 Tambull and Lord, History of United States Aviation, p. 274-275, and Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 94-95. 42launched the carriers’ aircraft prior to sunrise. As dawn broke on Sunday, February 7 naval aircraft made simulated dive bombing and strafing runs against army airfields on Oahu. The aerial search for the carriers by the army aircraft, which were allowed to search despite being ‘destroyed’ in the initial wave, following the attack was ineffective and the carriers succeeded in a second strike just hours later.5° Fleet Problem XIII was designed to study the effects a force of cruisers and aircraft carriers could expect to inflict on the United States battle fleet as it sailed across the Pacific. War Plan Orange assumed that the Japanese would use its carriers, cruisers, and submarines to weaken the Pacific Fleet as it steamed west towards Japanese waters where the expected decisive battle would take place between the battleships. The Fleet problems had become sophisticated enough to study these situations and the role aviation was expected to play needed to be understood. The Blue Fleet consisted of nine battleships, four cruisers and the Saratoga all of which would sortie from Hawaii east towards the coast of California whose various bays, from San Francisco to Magdalena, would simulate Black controlled atolls. The Black fleet consisted of eleven cruisers, the Lexington and the Langley, and four seaplane tenders to provide long range patrol support. 58 R. H. Leigh, “United States Fleet Problem XIII: Blue Estimate of the Situation,” 4 March 1932, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 Roll 14 Target 3, p. 11 8 Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, p. 95-96, and also Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, 18. 43Both fleet commanders created groups centered around aircraft carriers. ‘The Lexington anchored a scouting group of cruisers that was sent out to seek and inflict maximum damage against the Blue Force. The Langley, due to her limitations, was used to guard the approaches to the southern coast and did not significantly participate in the engagements. The Saratoga group was used as an offensive screen for the Blue battle force. As noted above, Admiral Leigh who was the Blue Force Commander for the exercise envisioned the Saratoga’s group to find and destroy the cruisers and aircraft carriers before they made contact with the battle fleet. Contact between the carrier groups was made in the middle of the Pacific Ocean with the aircraft carriers targeting each other first. Exchanging blows, both carriers inflicted damage on each other and their escorting vessels. Because of the difficulty navigating over water, aircraft generally stayed within 30 nautical miles of friendly ships. The resulting limited range of the carrier's scouting force allowed the two forces to close quickly and the battle would inevitably be decided by surface engagement particularly if contact was made in the evening. Despite recommendations in earlier Fleet Problems to train pilots and carrier crews for night operations, the navy still lacked sufficient training to safely land aircraft at night. The Saratoga was deemed sunk by a © Reynolds, Te Fast Carriers, discusses the lack of night carrier training U.S. pilots received prior to and during World War II. With the exception of two experiments in creating dedicated night aircraft carriers, the inability to operate at night would plague the Navy throughout the war. 44Blue torpedo during the night, while the damaged Lexington had to steam east that night to escape from the surface forces. A continuing theme through the critiques since fleet problem IX was the need for a dedicated carrier to steam with the Battle Fleet rather than relying on the catapult system of the battleships and cruisers. This was envisioned to be a small carrier that would be primarily used for scouting, including anti- submarine patrols, gun spotting, and fighter aircraft to secure the airspace above the fleet. Though initially, this was seen as the only aircraft carrier needed, it was also becoming clear that the concept of the large offensive strike carrier capable of screening ahead of the main battle force and making independent assaults against the enemy force. Admiral H. E, Yarnell who replaced Admiral Reeves as Commander Aircraft Squadrons, strongly recommended the six to eight large carriers be built for the Pacific theater while building small carriers to protect the fleet.°! Fleet Problem XIV’s scenario was the opposite of Fleet Problem XI. Rather than defending a point, the Saratoga and Lexington with their escorts of cruisers and destroyers embarked from Hawaii on a mission to raid Blue ports in California which were defended by the rest of the fleet. The results were similar to Fleet Problem XII as well with the carriers ineffective against the 1 See the comments by Admiral Yarnell in “United States Fleet Problem XII, Report of the Commander-in-Chief,” 23 May 1932, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 Roll 14 Target 1, p. 32-33. 45,battleships of the fleet. The exercise began with the Black Fleet splitting into two groups, the Lexington’s group was to attack San Francisco while the Saratoga would raid San Pedro. Poor coordination between the Lexington and her plane guard resulted in a delaying the launch of her aircraft scheduled for dawn on February 16, 1933, while steaming closer to her launching point and right into the range of two Blue battleships and heavy cruisers guarding the approach to San Francisco without any tactical awareness. The poor visibility and high winds that morning required a plane guard for the carrier to launch and recover her aircraft safely. The carrier was an easy target and was quickly knocked out of the exercise. Vice Admiral W. H. Standley who commanded the group, noted that the organizational relationships were the primary cause of confusion and tactical failure.? The carrier could not be tied to the maneuvers of another surface ship and expect to be effective because of weather and geographic constraints. The vessels assigned as part of the task force, particularly those acting as plane guard, had to be under the control of the carrier, whether it was the task group commander embarked in the carrier or the carrier's captain, and they needed to act as a unit to accomplish the mission. 62 See Admiral Standley’s remarks in “United States Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief’, p. 21-22. 46The other tactical flaw on the part of the task force was the absolute adherence to the initial plan. The weather was such that a dawn launch, even if the plane guard ship was at her proper station, would have been dangerous even in wartime. Had the task group been organized to allow the carrier control of the other units, the entire task group could have maneuvered farther away from the enemy ships and waited for more favorable conditions to launch the attack. Up until then, the only time carrier aircraft were used to attack shore based targets in fleet exercises was a dawn or pre-dawn launch with a high speed run in the night before. The Lexington’s commanding officer advocated an afternoon carrier raid with the protection of patrol aircraft and screening units to report enemy contacts if any within range of the group.® The Saratoga fared only slightly better in her mission. On the morning of February 16 she launched an attack on the Los Angeles/San Pedro area and maintained a protective combat air patrol. While she maneuvered to stay clear of the Blue battleships and cruisers defending the approaches, an “excellent surprise dive bombing attack” was made by eight Blue airplanes.** The Saratoga was subsequently engaged by Blue cruisers and would have suffered heavy damage. ‘Two related lessons were drawn from this part of the exercise. ® See Captain C. A. Blakely’s remarks in “United States Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, ” p. 24. RH, Leigh “United States Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet” 20 April 1933, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII 1923- 1941 Roll 15 Target 1, p. 10. 47The first was the need to maintain air superiority over the friendly fleet which was primarily achieved by attacking opposing carriers and air bases. But what was also deemed necessary was the need for local sea control prior to aircraft raids on enemy shore installations. The conclusion was that the enemy fleet needed to be the primary objective of any naval operation, just as Mahan wrote about at the turn of the century. The difference was that aviation-minded officers, who advocated such tactics such as Vice Admiral Yarnell, noted that a large number of fleet carriers were still needed for offensive actions against the ‘enemy scouting force and to achieve air superiority over the battle.‘> 1934's Fleet Problem XV consisted of three separate exercises held in April and May 1934 that were the culmination of the annual fleet exercises. The first of the fleet problems was designated as Exercise L and was designed to subject the majority of the United States fleet to coordinated submarine and cruiser raids as it transited over a long distance, in this case from Southern California to Panama. Because of the design of the problem which was probably the result of the theory not to divide the fleet, the aircraft carriers remained attached to the main body of the fleet and offered limited scouting for both cruisers and submarines. Exercise M was held in the Caribbean with about a quarter of the fleet switching sides to the opposing force. For the first 68 See Rear Admiral Yarnell’s comments and Admiral R. H. Leigh's comments in “United States Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet,” p. 25-27. 48time since the early Fleet Problems, the strength of both fleets were augmented by constructive forces based on projected future procurement. The Saratoga represented a division of two carriers as part of the screening force while the Lexington represented three future carriers for the opposing force, operating as a division, and used as a part of a raiding force. The final exercise provided little new towards carrier tactics. Exercise N was designed to be a battle at sea between opposing fleets of similar strength and the aircraft carriers were relegated to attacking each other while the battle fleet completed their decisive battle. For carrier tactics, the most important lesson to come these exercises was in the analysis of capabilities and limitations of carriers while performing multiple missions. To simplify these multiple missions, it is useful to describe the carrier as performing essentially two tasks for the fleet: defensive and offensive operations. The Lexington, operating aggressively in Exercise M, was able to maintain almost constant pressure against the opposing fleet inflicting substantial damage to the Saratoga and the main battle force. In seeking the enemy and initiating action, the Lexington inflicted more damage on the opposing fleet. The Commander-in-Chief’s critique of the problem noted that the large carriers were ideally suited towards offensive operations while both carriers turned in lackluster performances when tied to the fleet and utilizing 49their aircraft primarily as scouts. The critiques noted that naval aircraft needed to be capable of carrying larger and more powerful weapons, but the planes the navy had were obsolete. New planes needed to be designed and procured based on the performance requirements to operate off large deck carriers.67 Also discussed in the critique of the problem was the carrier in scouting operations. This was voiced also by Vice Admiral Harris Laning, a former War College President and the Scouting Force Commander, who commented extensively on the short comings of the screening forces as envisioned prior to the exercise.6* He argued that those officers who championed the battleship and those who argued solely for large deck offensive carriers forgot about the importance of tactical intelligence in naval battles. Both ships could utilize its weapons well beyond the visual range and it was up to the scouting force to locate the enemy to allow the offensive power of these weapons to be brought 0 bear. Cruisers equipped with seaplanes could extend their range considerably, but had to stop to recover their aircraft, a tactical mistake if the enemy was close. He argued for the addition of small deck carriers, or flight deck cruisers that could be assigned with the scouting force. He agreed with the aviators © “Report of Fleet Problem XV,” Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems Ito XXII 1923-1941 1 June 1934, Roll 16 Target 1, p. 67. 6 Scot MacDonald “Last of the Fleet Problems” Aircraft Carriers in Peace and War Joseph Skiera ed. (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 43-45, 6 “Remarks at Critique on Fleet Problem XV by Vice Admiral Haris Laning,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems FXXII 1923-1941, n.d. Roll 16 Target 4. 50that the large deck carriers such as the Lexington and Saratoga were essential elements of the fleet offensive “hitting power” and much too valuable to be used for scouting work, but smaller and more numerous flight deck cruisers as he called them were ideally suited to operating with a division of two or three cruisers to be primarily a scouting platform to detect enemy surface and submarine vessels. This lesson was incorporated into the build up at the beginning of World War II. At the United States entry into World War II, the Navy had five large carriers built with three more under construction and three small carriers. By the end of the war, the United States built 38 large deck carriers and 77 escort carriers. Fleet Problem XVI in 1935 was most interesting for its similarity to the events leading up to the Battle of Midway some seven years later. The actual problem was separated into five phases, the third of which is what matters to this discussion. The United States Fleet was split into a White Fleet, superior in both battleships and aircraft carriers, and a Black Fleet consisting primarily of cruisers, submarines, patrol aircraft, and the Lexington. As with America in 1942, country black controlled Midway and the Aleutian Islands with land based aircraft and a naval fleet which was smaller. The White forces included the Saratoga, the Langley which was now designated as OCV-1, and the newly commissioned Ranger (CV-4) which was designed as a small deck fast carrier, 51as well as the majority of the battleships. The White Fleet, with a landing force embarked, was tasked with taking Midway and neutralizing the Black Feet. ‘The White plan entailed splitting its ships into an attacking force with the large carrier, Saratoga and her supporting cruisers, and a main battle force which included the landing force, very similar to the Japanese plan in 1942. ‘The decision of the white commander, Admiral Harris Laning, for the initial attack on Midway had the cruisers attacking the sea plane tenders since no actual land based aircraft participated while the Saratoga was to support what he envisioned as a surface action by attacking the sea planes at anchor. The Black commander, Vice Admiral A. J. Hepburn, considered using the Lexington to attack the White Fleet carriers during the probable air attack on Midway, but because this left his only carrier extremely vulnerable to counter-attack, he conservatively decided to keep the Lexington back until all Black forces could attack with local superiority.” Unfortunately, the actual exercise was less interesting from an aviation perspective. On the morning of May 22, the day set for the attack on Midway by White, two patrol aircraft crashed and all exercise flight operations including the air attack was cancelled to facilitate the search for the aircraft based on its “CINCUS Report on Fleet Problem XVI" September 15, 1935 Enclosure L, p. 7 Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems I-XXII 1923-1941, Roll 19 Target 3. 7 “CINCUS Report on Fleet Problem XVI,” Enclosure M, Roll 19, Target 4. “The disposition and use of [the Lexington] involves a major decision and may prove a decisive factor in the outcome of the campaign.” 582last reported position. The resulting fleet ‘battle’ was a surface action with little in common with the actual battle fought in the same area. No information on the use of aircraft carrier in anything other than a defensive role during the transit was gained. The scenario for the following year’s exercise, Fleet Problem XVII stressed communication procedures within the fleet and long range patrol operations from seaplanes and flying boats. Though all four aircraft carriers participated, their operations were secondary and nothing was learned that could be applied towards furthering the tactical ability of naval aviation. Fleet Problem XVIII , held in May 1937 did provide a chance for aircraft carriers to at least plan for various missions. The scenario once again pitted country Black against country White in the vicinity of the Hawai’ian Islands. The Black fleet with six battleships, nine cruisers, and three aircraft carriers began the exercise just west of Midway while the White fleet with four battleships, nine cruisers, and the Ranger was spread out hundreds of miles northeast of Hawai'i.’! Country White controlled the Hawai'ian Islands including Midway and the French Frigate Shoals which were used as seaplane bases. Country Black desired a base at “Lahaina” to stage an invasion into White territory northeast of the Haw: i. For this exercise, Kauai, Oahu, and 71 The Langley was primarily used as a tender for the sea born patrol aircraft so the Black forces essentially only had two aircraft carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga. 53the Big Island were uninhabited and did not provide any useful military purpose. “Lahaina” included Molokai, Lanai, Kahoolawe, and Maui. The White territory was a fictitious island five hundred miles northest of Hawaii, The Black commander decided to simultaneously neutralize the White patrol plane bases in Midway and the French Frigate Shoals with a carrier task group each before using his entire fleet to attack Lahaina and land his troops. The Saratoga successfully captured Midway against token resistance while the Lexington’s group, which included the Langley, was able to capture the French Frigate Shoals after being subjected to a torpedo attack by White submarines. Following these preliminary operations, the two carrier task forces rejoined the main body of the Black Fleet for operations against Lahaina as planned. This was a contentious issue between Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Commander, Aircraft Battle Force and the Black Fleet Commander. Rear Admiral Horne lobbied for his two large carriers with their own task forces, to operate independently from the main battle line following the Midway and French Frigate Shoals expedition. He argued that the offensive capabilities of the aircraft carrier could be utilized best by such operations and that the aircraft carriers’ best defense against submarine, surface, or aerial attack was by using their speed and evasive tactics to elude White forces. This proposal was denied by the Black commander primarily because he felt that such evasive tactics were not practical and the weakening of the main force by 54dispatching these task forces was not sufficiently offset by any advantage the carrier task forces could bring towards the campaign plan.’? The battleships were expected to decide the outcome of the campaign in a decisive naval battle with the aircraft carriers in a supporting role. Defining these roles and allocating resources was another point of contention. By 1937, the aircraft carrier had shown its potential and capabilities and limitations, yet commanders unfamiliar with carrier operations still expected a single carrier to perform all potential missions simultaneously with little understanding that the large carriers were primarily offensive platforms with limited defensive capabilities. In his operational plan to attack Lahaina, Admiral C. C. Bloch gave his aircraft the following direction: Locate WHITE Naval Forces. Maintain continuous combat patrol against aircraft. Gain and maintain control of the air, deny WHITE plane spot, protect own spotting planes. Maintain anti-submarine patrol ... Attack WHITE vessels ... Support landing and advance of BLACK troops; attack WHITE artillery positions and troop movements...Attack beach defenses.’? It was understood that whoever controlled the airspace over the battle had a decisive advantage, for they could utilize their aircraft to strike the enemy forces from a distance and bring accurate gun fire from longer range. The 72 “Comments and Recommendations on Fleet Problem XVIII,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems LXXII 1923-1941, Roll 23 Target 4. 73 4#U.S. Fleet, WHITE, and BLACK statements of the problem, with estimates of the situation, plans, orders, instructions, and organization,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems XXII 1923-1941, Roll 22 Target 2. 585question was how to achieve that air superiority and at what risk. The aviators sought to aggressively attack the enemy carriers, sea pane tenders, and airfields. This was similar to early air power theory when General Mitchell stated that the first objective of a strategic air campaign should be the enemy’s aviation infrastructure. The battleship admirals were unwilling to risk the carrier in independent operations and therefore kept them tied to the fleet to provide aerial defense. The inevitable conclusion was that enemy aircraft operating from shore or aircraft from carriers operating away from the main fleet would make contact and be able to strike first. The Black commander believed that the defensive air patrols could adequately defend the fleet against these attacks and still provide aerial services when the main body of both fleets met, or when landing forces were to be put ashore. The resulting battle proved that theory wrong. The Ranger, operating independently for the White Fleet was able to launch a successful attack on the Saratoga despite her air patrol and put her flight deck out of operation and successfully attacked the troop transports. The Lexington, meanwhile was severely damaged by submarine and surface ships despite the protection afforded by staying with the main body. The exercise was ended before the simulated landing on Lahaina could take place. Despite the operational loss of all their carriers, the Black force was able to sink most of the White Fleet and still had half it’s battleships and most of its troop transports. Because the White fleet was essentially destroyed, 56the commanders were willing to disregard the loss of their carriers as less. important than winning the campaign. Unfortunately, these naval commanders saw the campaign ending with the naval battle and not the successful completion of the amphibious landings and campaign to take the defended island. Not until the performance and tactics of the dive bomber as developed in the late 1930s did even air-minded naval officers think the airplane could be decisive against armored capital ships.’* The difficulty of a high altitude, level bomber to hit a maneuvering target was widely known and with the advent of anti-aircraft weapons on the ships, a low altitude pass was almost suicidal. As Thomas Wildenberg argues, it was the dive bomber that allowed the aircraft carrier to supplant the battleship as the primary capital ship.’5 Dive bomber tactics were introduced in the late 1920s, but the performance of the aircraft and the payload capacity were not sufficient to pose a true threat to the armor of the battleships. The speed and surprise of the attack, diving from an altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet, higher than non-radar equipped ships could detect, coupled with the precision of their bombs enabled the dive bomber to pose a significant threat to the smaller warships, light cruisers and destroyer, as well as non-armored aircraft carriers and merchant ships. The only other 7 Mets, 123. 75 Although Wildenberg primarily looks at just one aspect of carrier operations, his arguments are quite persuasive. Without the dive bomber, the Battle of Midway would have been vastly different. 37weapon that could pose such a risk was the torpedo bomber which had to make their attacks from a very low altitude, which put their chance of defeating enemy anti-aircraft fire much lower. Even as late as 1934, Captain John Towers, one of the leaders in naval aviation, pointed out in his Naval War College thesis that the “object of Naval Strategy is to gain and maintain control of the sea. [The carrier's] missions can and should be varied, dependent upon the character of operations, but in the final battle, its primary mission should be the support of the battle line.””6 But the offensive power of the carrier continued to increase via the dive bomber and by 1940, dive bombers, carrying 1,000 Ib bombs operationally could sink a battleship, as evidenced by the events of December 7, 1941. Fleet Problem XVIII left the naval aviation community frustrated. Just as their aircraft were increasing their bomb load and becoming more effective, the large aircraft were utilized as a defensive screen for the fleet rather than as an offensive striking platform. Two new aircraft carriers, the Yorktown (CV-5) and the Enterprise (CV-6) were being built during this time and the hope expressed by the Commander-in-Chief United State Fleet was that enough ships would be commissioned that the smaller carriers could be utilized as part of the battle 7 Capt. John Towers as quoted in Mets, 146, Note 51. 38fleet while the larger carriers could be employed at the center of their own task forces.77 Fleet Problem XIX, held in March and April, 1938, was three separate exercises held in conjunction with twelve fleet exercises over the course of three months. Parts II, V, and XI actually made up the fleet problem. Part II took place off the coast of California and was primarily an exercise in scouting and reconnaissance between two black fleets and a single white fleet superior to either black fleet but inferior to the combined fleet. The aircraft carriers were allowed to operate within sectors near the battle line with orders to search and attack enemy battleships, carriers, and cruisers. The only interesting aspect of this phase was that the Lexington was ruled sunk from a surprise attack by patrol aircraft operating from San Diego. Part V is much more interesting. To avoid confusion with the previous part, the two forces that were formed were designated country Red and country Blue. The Blue force consisted of nearly the entire battleship fleet, most of the cruisers, the Lexington, Saratoga, and Ranger while the Red fleet was a few destroyers and cruisers, the Langley, patrol aircraft, and submarines based in the Hawaiian Islands. The object of the exercise was for Red to defend the island chain from a raid and invasion by the Blue Fleet. Without significant naval opposition, the Blue Fleet split its forces into three groups: a French Frigate Shoals Force consisting of six 77 MacDonald, “Last of the Fleet Problems,” p. 46. 59battleships, four cruisers, two destroyer squadrons and the Ranger, a Lahaina Force consisting of three battleships, nine cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and the Lexington, and finally an Air Striking Force consisting of the Saratoga and three destroyers.” The Air Striking Force was commanded by Vice Admiral, Ernest J. King and was assigned the task of raiding Oahu. ‘The Saratoga's aircraft caught the island asleep and coordinated their attacks against Ford Island, Hickam Air Field, Wheeler Field, and Wailupe Radio Station and returned to the carrier despite the fact that Oahu’s forces were prepared for the exercise.”® This was at least the third successful attack on the Oahu by carrier aircraft during exercises. Part XI, the final scenario of Fleet Problem XIX was conducted off the coast of California at the end of the fleet exercises. Admiral King was allowed to lead a division of carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga, though operating in separate task groups, in successful fast carrier raids against the west coast of California protected by the cruisers and battleships before a the opposing fleet could reach the area of operations.®° In a sense this was the closest the Fleet Problems would get to the actual employment used during World War Il. The 78 U.S. Fleet, Black, White, Blue, Fleet Marine Force, Red, Eastern Fleet, Western Fleet, Green, and Purple Statements of the problem, with estimates and the situation, plans, orders, instructions, and organization,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems XXII 1923- 1941, Roll 24 Target 1. 79 Macdonald, “The Last of the Fleet Problems,” p. 46. ° MacDonald, Last of the Fleet Problems,” p. 46. 60battleships essentially screened the carriers from opposing surface ships while they conducted air raids ashore. 1939’s Fleet Problem XX, conducted in the Caribbean, split the fleet into two opposing forces of similar strength. The Black force, with the Ranger, had the advantage of utilizing island bases for logistics and patrol plane operations while the White fleet simulated an expeditionary fleet with three aircraft carriers including the newly commissioned Yorktown and Enterprise as well as the Lexington. The most significant aspect of this exercise was the success of aircraft carriers operating as the center of task forces. Both the White and Black fleets operated with their respected carriers, at least for a time, away from the main battle line. The Ranger spent the first half of the exercise as part of what was essentially a scouting force, and the final four days operating with the Black battle fleet were she was located and attacked by White submarines and the Yorktown. Even as part of the main battle line, the Ranger was still part of a separate task group that was to support the action of the battle line by attacking enemy ships.*! This is an important distinction from many previous fleet problems where carriers were tasked with primarily defending the fleet and providing support for long range battleship fire in a surface engagement. The aircraft that were now being deployed were capable % Adolphus Andrews, “Fleet Problem XX Estimate of the Situation,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems XXII 1923-1941, Roll 25 Target 4. 61of carrying 1,000 pound bombs that were capable of penetrating and damaging battleships. At the end of Fleet Problem XVIII, it was noted that more carriers were needed to provide adequate support for the battle fleet in proximity to enemy ships and be able to form fast carrier task groups to raid enemy land positions. With the two new carriers participating and the success of Vice Admiral King’s Oahu attack the previous year, the White Fleet Commander created a raiding force of two carriers under King’s command and kept the Enterprise with the battle line to support the probable fleet engagement. Just as with previous land attacks, the carriers targeted the tenders and support facilities of the patrol planes with a dawn attack after a high speed run to get within range. In his report on the exercise, King commented extensively on two topics. The first was stressed in previous years: the aircraft carriers when directed by officers unfamiliar with their operations and limitations, “expected [them] to perform too many jobs at one time.”®? The other topic was fleet defense against air attack. Besides fighter aircraft, the fleet needed coordinated anti-aircraft fire to adequately defend itself. King noted that when operating with battleships the anti-aircraft defense of the formation was formidable. What could never be stated in 1940, was that the ideal mix of ships to include in a carrier task force ® B. J. King “Comments and Recommendations on Fleet Problem XX,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems I-XXII 1923-1941, Roll 26 Target 1. 62included battleship support, that is a task group with the aircraft carrier providing the primary striking power and the “battleships so disposed as to aid carrier air defense.”*? Whether King foresaw the future force disposition or not is unclear, but it is probable that his experiences in the Fleet Problems laid the foundation for the task forces employed in World War Il. Fleet Problem XXI, the final fleet problem held before World War II, took place in 1940 and consisted of two parts each with a separate scenario. The first problem was composed of enemy fleets about equal in total strength, but the Black Fleet was composed of two forces, a surface detachment of cruisers and destroyers and a covering force of six battleships and the Yorktown, separated by over 1,300 miles in the Pacific Ocean between California and Hawai'i. The Black forces goal was to rendezvous and combine before the White Fleet could decisively engage either element. The purpose was an exercise in open ocean scouting and evasion. The White fleet consisted of five battleships and two aircraft carriers, the Lexington and the Saratoga. The White commander organized his fleet into three forces consisting of a striking force with both carriers and four cruisers that would operate independently of the attacking force (three cruisers and 23 destroyers) and the main body of five battleships and escorts. The Striking force was to operate ahead of the main body with the task of locating and attacking the enemy covering force. This © Wid. 63was the first time in the fleet problems that the carriers were assigned the job of attacking the strength of the enemy fleet without operating with the traditional battle line. The Yorktown on the other hand was positioned behind the battleships of the Black covering force. As predicted by the aviation admirals after Fleet Problem XVIII, the fleet that operated its aircraft carriers as an offensive weapon, in this case White, was able to attack its opponent’s air arm first and gain a decisive advantage. The Yorktown was attacked first and though she was not ruled sunk, suffered considerable damage and was unable to defend against the aerial attacks directed the next day against the Black battleship force. The battleships never met in this phase of the problem, yet the White forces achieved their objective and the Black fleet suffered heavily. In his analysis of the problem, Admiral Blakely of the Yorktown task group acknowledged that based on the situation, the proper utilization of the aircraft carrier was to defend the fleet, however, the aircraft compliment was based on offensive operations and the Yorktown was unable to adequately perform her mission. Once again he advocated the use of the smaller fast carriers such as the Ranger and the proposed Wasp (CV-7) embark fighters and scouts in sufficient quantity to perform the role of a defensive fleet carrier with an increased compliment of pilots for continuous operations.** Rear Admiral #% “Admiral Blakely’s Speech, Fleet Problem XXI - Part II” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems XXII 1923-1941, Roll 32 Target 2. 64William F. Halsey commanded the carrier division for the White Fleet and reiterated the importance of utilizing carriers in the tactical offensive: “In adverse circumstances it might well be that a major force, compelled in all other respects to accept the tactical defensive, could, by the energetic exploitation of the carriers’ mobility and range, restore a favorable balance.”85 ‘The second scenario of Fleet Problem XXI, conducted in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. A Purple Fleet with two carriers was ordered to land an amphibious assault force on Lahaina from the east while defending against the approach of two Maroon groups from California and Panama. As in the first scenario, only three aircraft carriers were used and similar considerations as to organizing and stationing the carriers needed to be addressed. The Saratoga was utilized as a ‘battleline’ carrier with the main body of the Purple Fleet while the Lexington was dispatched as part of a screening force. It is interesting to note that the Saratoga accepted her defensive role and utilized her resources to screen the force and provide anti-submarine patrols quite successfully, but would have been almost defenseless against an aerial attack without sufficient warning from picket ships.®° #5 “Remarks of Rear Admiral W. F. Halsey, U. S. Navy on Part Il, Fleet Problem XXI,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems I-XXII 1923-1941, Roll 26 Target 1. Emphasis by Admiral Hals S°W.F, Halsey“ Fleet Problem XX, Part Vi; Summary of Comments and Recommendations,” Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems I-XXiI 1923-1941, Roll 35 Target 1. Halsey was not advocating a defensive role for carriers, only that when necessary, it is important to differentiate the task assigned to aircraft squadrons. 65‘The Maroon Commander on the other hand did not differentiate the roles assigned to his only carrier the Yorktown. He purposely stationed his carrier conservatively and behind his battle line with the orders to defend the battle line, but ready to attack the enemy force if the opportunity presents itself. The Yorktown was subsequently attacked by the Lexington, but was able to take advantage of a tactical error by the purple task force commander and counter- attack the Lexington before. The Purple task force delayed their initial attack on the Yorktown which allowed the Lexington to be located and attacked before the Yorktown was put out of action. Still, had the Yorktown not been tied to the fleet, it was speculated that she would have been able to attack the Lexington before sustaining significant damage.*” The relative understanding of naval air power achieved by 1941 is best analyzed by looking at the role aircraft were to play in War Plan Orange versus their actual role. The most obvious difference between the plan and the war is the ineffectiveness of the battleship and its vulnerability from air attacks. Aircraft were to be utilized as long range scouts, tactical support during amphibious operations, and long range strike platforms screening the main battle fleet. As the U.S. fleet extended its reach across the Pacific, aircraft were expected to slow the enemy battle fleet until a superior fleet could be brought 87 Records Relating to United States Fleet Problems I-XXII 1923-1941, Roll 33 Target 4, Roll 34, Roll 35.to battle in a decisive gun dual. Prior to engaging in this decisive fleet battle, aircraft were to gain air superiority either from aircraft carriers or advanced bases on captured islands. The plan also allowed for the devastation of Japan by dropping incendiary bombs on the mainland from large, land-based bombers in the Ruyuku islands near Japan once they were secured.8® With the Taranto raid, the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the effectiveness of aircraft against the Bismark among other ships, the aircraft carrier came to be the capital ship of the fleet. The one threat the navy dismissed completely until the outbreak of war was the submarine, and aircraft from smaller escort carriers was used to protect convoys and hunt submarines in the Atlantic. The plan for aircraft was conservative in the sense that the potential for aircraft in maritime warfare was underestimated, but the tactics, training, and vision of air power allowed the United States to immediately put an “offensive fleet into action without a battleship.”8 88 Miller, War Plan Orange, 348-349. % Baer, 138. Baer includes the submarine as well as air power when discussing innovation. 67Bibliographic Essay One of the difficulties in attacking the development of any subject in aviation is wading through the vast amounts of literature that has been written about its development. Attempting to wade through all the various books, articles, and essays is nearly impossible in a finite amount of time. Compounding this problem is the preponderance of works by aviation enthusiasts, which may provide the occasional interesting factoid, but do little to add perspective to the nature of airpower. Clark Reynolds notes the preponderance of pop-culture books on aviation that he describes as “Look, Mom, I'm flying.” Acknowledged as the first complete work on naval aviation, Archibald T. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord’s History of United States Naval Aviation, written in 1949, was the first time historians were given access to naval records and not censured by the naval authorities. ‘Though limited to those documents that were declassified following World War Il, this was the seminal work on naval aviation for over twenty years and is still cited in books today. For them, the development of aviation after World War I was hampered by those officers with limited vision. Naval aviation existed initially only to support the battle fleet and most of the non-aviation officers were obstacles in the way of progress. Only a few exceptional officers embraced aviation and forced the Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, xiii. 68slow technological progress of naval aviation in spite of the senior leadership in the Navy who could only see the battleship. Turnbull and Lord's method focused primarily on the developing administration of naval aviation and the fiscal requirements to man its squadrons and ships. The authors did touch on themes discussed by future historians: the importance of maintaining a separate naval air arm, the effects of General William “Billy” Mitchell’s campaign to unify all air services under an independent air arm, and the importance of tactical development during the fleet exercises in the 1920s and 1930s. Their conclusions though suggest that the slow development of aviation was inevitable despite the reluctance and limited vision of naval leadership. While reading most accounts of naval aviation written prior to 1968, with the noted exception above, one gets the impression that naval aviation began on December 7, 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The development of the aircraft carriers and aviation tactics was little more than a footnote, Turnbull and Lord’s conclusion were widely held among historians, that the stagnate leadership of the United States Navy (and Royal Navy as well) failed to see the potential of the aircraft carrier in war. Was the Navy filled with mainly admirals who were so absorbed with Mahan and the invincibility of the battleship, the so-called “Gun Club,” that naval aviation was not even considered? This was the conventional wisdom until 1952 when William Standley published an article in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings 69titled “Naval Aviation, an Evolution of Naval Gunfire.” In this article he argues that it was because of the support of the battleship admirals, not their disdain that naval aviation was initially allowed to develop at all in the post World War Tera. Naval gunfire was viewed at that time as the primary means of projecting power and maintaining control of the seas. Anything that did not support that was not important to the senior leadership. In 1919 during an exercise off Cuba, naval aircraft, piloted by naval officers demonstrated the tremendous advantage gained by using aircraft to guide the fire of battleships at long range. The immediate response to this was the understanding among fleet commanders that aircraft were required in any fleet engagement, something the British already knew. Debate between the type of aircraft and vessels that carried them continued for a few years, but aviation minded officers in the United States pushed the development of the aircraft carrier to support fleet operations. The airplane’s contribution to long range gunnery ensured its place in the fleet and allowed for its development. This was a new view, but the Naval Institute Proceedings was not widely read among historians most of whom still held the view that the battleship admirals stifled development in naval aviation. Conventional wisdom still maintained that the Gun Club stifled aviation’s development until 1968 when Clark Reynolds, one of the leading historians on naval aviation, argued that the development of the carrier task forces at the 70beginning of 1930 was the real beginning of naval aviation’s dominance with his book The Fast Carriers: Forging of an Air Navy. The reason the United States and Japan were far ahead of the Royal Navy in aviation development was because they maintained an independent air arm that was allowed to grow. Furthermore the administration of naval aviation in the U.S. and Japan was such that when war began, the aviators were in a position to take on more responsibility. Reynolds makes the point that certain individuals within the naval leadership in the 1920s directly effected the development of naval aviation. At a time when the battleship was supreme, these individuals, Admiral Moffett (Bureau of Aeronautics), Admiral Sims (Naval War College), and even the CNO Admiral Benson allowed the fledgling aircraft community to develop. But Reynolds primary argument was that it was the experience of the United States Navy’s first fleet carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga, and the officers who served aboard them during the annual Fleet Problems, that carrier aviation was able to develop an independent, offensive role and therefore become the capital ship of World War II. Those officers included among others Admiral Ernest King Admiral William Halsey, names synonymous with the carrier war of the Pacific. Reynolds also looks at the development of aviation in Japan and concludes that the Imperial Navy developed along a parallel path to the United States, catching up and then passing them during the late 1930s. nmBut the Japanese doctrine was based on its observations of U.S. Navy Fleet Problems. Reynolds's look at naval aviation prior to World War I, though more complete than his predecessors, was still only one short chapter in his book The Fast Carriers. The first in depth study of naval aviation from its roots at the turn of the century through World War II was made in 1970 by Arthur Hezlet in Aircraft and Sea Power. Previously, the ‘golden age of aviation’ was virtually ignored when studying naval aviation. Hezlet’s discussion of the interwar period focuses on the debate raging between the air power enthusiasts such as Italian General Guilio Douhet, Air Marshall Hugh Montague Trenchart, and General William Mitchell who lobbied for a single independent air force and those advocating that air power needed to be a dependant arm of the army or navy. The Royal Navy gave up control of her air arm in 1917 as the Royal Naval Air Service combined with the Royal Flying Club to form the Royal Air Force. Hezlet argues that this was a mistake. ‘The leadership of the United States Navy for various reasons ensured naval aviation would be an integral part of their sea control plan. Hezlet does mention that there was a distinct group of admirals that did not see any potential in aviation in spite of the advantage aircraft gave the big guns of the battleship in long range fire. He does not put as much emphasis on the personalities and back ground of individual naval leaders as Reynolds and 72other authors have done. For him, the dominance of naval aviation was a given based on the rapid technological improvements in aircraft through the 1920s and 1930s. Though the tactics that were employed during World War II were developed during the Fleet Problems of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the most important aspect for naval aviation development, particularly in the U.S. and Japan was that it remained administratively completely independent from the army or air force. Charles Melhorn published his doctoral thesis in 1974 titled Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929. His focus was the progress made following World War I through Rear Admiral Reeves raid on Panama in Fleet Problem IX. He argued there were three primary factors that shaped naval aviation in the United States. The first was the struggle by the early aviators to grasp the concepts of air power and its place in warfare as manifested primarily by the writings and lobbying of Billy Mitchell. The fact that the navy proclaimed their need of an air arm was vital. The second factor was the dwindling defense budget following World War I. This forced the navy to economize on each weapon system and prevented the hasty introduction of new vessels without extensive study. Though not as divisive as some historians claim, this did make the battle for limited funds within the navy a serious issue between those who sought a more powerful naval air force at the expense of the battleship. His final point regarded the Washington Treaty, 73specifically the non-fortification clauses. He argues that the Treaty eroded the nation’s ability to defend her interests in the Pacific and the role of the aircraft carrier became more important as War Plan Orange matured. In 1981, Brian Johnson wrote Fly Navy: The History of Naval Aviation.» Like Hezlet, he does an in depth study of aviation among the major naval powers from the turn of the century to the nuclear age, but he focuses on the aircraft and pilots more than the aircraft carriers. This method allows for a more detailed description of the development of naval aviation from a tactical perspective. The decision of the British Air Ministry to unify their air power and essentially stifle naval developments directly resulted in a lack of tactical experience at every level of command. This lack of experience among the senior officers, particularly at the flag level was detrimental to the advancement of naval aviation in Britain. Since the United States and Japan did not do this, they were easily able to supersede the Royal Navy’s edge in aviation during the 1920s. Johnson took a different approach to reach a similar conclusion as his predecessors. Like Reynolds and Hezlet, Johnson viewed the Washington Treaties as the means by which the United States was able to procure the large carriers that became dominant in World War Il. But the major difference between °1 Brian Johnson, Fly Navy: The History of Naval Aviation, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1981). 74Johnson and most other historians is his discussion of how carrier operations matured once they were commissioned. The development of naval aviation doctrine and tactics was directly effected by specific innovations used by United States carriers to increase their efficiency. Based on the Eugene Ely’s experience in 1911, arresting wires were added to the design of the Langley, the first American carrier, before she was commissioned. Additionally, and more importantly, the introduction of the Landing Signals Officer (LSO) and the safety barrier allowed the ships to reach their combat potential. This allowed the carrier wing to be an effective force during fleet operations. If it was not for these innovations, the carrier could not have performed as well as it did during the fleet problems that essentially defined aviation tactics through 1942. George Baer’s 1991 work, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 offered little new to the discussion of naval aviation, but it did discuss naval aviation in context of developments within the entire navy. For him, the Washington Treaties defined the navy during the 1920s an early 30s, including naval aviation. The battleship was the most important ship in the navy during the 1920s. The aircraft carrier’s potential power was a direct function of the effectiveness of the aircraft she carried. Baer cites from Ronald Spector's pamphlet written for students of the Naval War College titled The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare, that as late as 1940, it was accepted that it took 108 aircraft to carry as many torpedoes as one destroyer squadron 75and 1,200 aircraft to carry as much ordnance as a single battleship. Additionally until the mid to late thirties, the aircraft could do little more than harass an armored battleship. Land based aircraft, although a threat to unarmored ships was considered to be controllable because of the development of anti-aircraft artillery weapons employed on ships. Baer argues that the logical decision of the post war naval leaders was to fund the battleship and all other assets were to support the battleship fleet. Looking back through history this was a very narrow sighted approach, but given the information available at the time, and the marginal capabilities of aircraft, this was the only decision. The Washington Treaty then allowed the large hulls of two scrapped battle cruisers to be allocated towards the large fleet carrier. In order to adapt to the new treaty navy, naval leadership embraced the cost effective innovations in the aviation and submarine communities. Through the experience gained during the Fleet Problems and the development of the dive bomber, naval aviation was in a position to take the place of the battleship at the outbreak of World War II. Baer likens the development of naval aviation to the notion of “punctuated equilibrium..a slow operational evolution that accelerated in a matter of hours into a huge strategic leap.” Thomas Wildenberg goes a little farther in Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evotution of Carrier Airpower. He argues that the 76effectiveness of the aircraft carrier and the fading of the battleship were both due specifically to the development of dive bombing tactics and the specialized aircraft that were used to deliver this ordnance. His convincing arguments begin in 1925 with Admiral Moffett looking to find an offensive role for the aircraft carrier in order to increase its prestige and therefore it’s funding. In an essay written a few years later for The Journal of Military History, “In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery's Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy,” he acknowledges that gunnery saved naval aviation with many of the same arguments as Standley forty years earlier. Viewing these two works together Wildenberg concludes that the battleship admirals allowed aviation to exist while dive bombing enabled it to become decisive. ‘Two recent essays stand out with their overall treatment of naval aviation between the wars. Barry Watts and Williamson Murray essay “Military Innovation in Peacetime” shows the Navy's “incremental-but-successful evolution from battleship gunfire to carrier aircraft as the primary offensive means of defeating opposing fleets.”®? The influence of Admiral Sims at the Naval War College and the analysis of sophisticated war games were a key development that allowed the United States Navy the opportunity to answer technical and tactical issues before aircraft carriers joined the fleet. Secondly, Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet Eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 384. 7the ability to apply theses solutions in exercises, and annual fleet problems validated many of those decisions made and allowed the Navy an opportunity to conceptualize future contribution of aviation based on realistic technological advances. Another significant short work of scholarship on the development of naval aviation was written by David Mets and titled “The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of Naval Thought,” published in the Air Forces Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Published a year after Watts and Murray, Mets revisits all the major themes in the development of aviation through World War II and into the early nuclear age. His approach to the interwar years is to methodically look at all the influences on naval aviation, from the effects of the gun club and the Washington Treaty to the importance of technological and tactical development in the 1930s. Like Baer, and Watts and Murray, he argues that the thinking of the navy was an evolutionary progress; however, this was not a smooth, slow process that leapt into the spotlight in less than a day. The evolution of naval thought was more like a saw tooth graph, steadily progressing but also pushed forward in stages by outside influences like the Five Power Treaty and the unified air force debate. This was the case for the development of the navy as a whole. Aviation developed at essentially the same gradual pace as the rest of the navy. The 78