8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

Main Search Premium Members Advanced Search Disclaimer Mobile View

Cites 11 docs - [View All]
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 2(1)(o) in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
Section 17 in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Get this document in PDF Print it on a file/printer View the actual judgment from court
Try out our Premium Member services: Virtual Legal Assistant, Query Alert Service and an ad-free experience. User Queries
Free for one month and pay only if you like it. consumer citedby:1809742
consumer disputes
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission consumer disputes redressal
Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013 commission
territorial jurisdiction
state of himachal pradesh
condonation
restaurant
bonafide
consumer dispute

BEFORE THE DISTRICT CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL FORUM-I, U consumer protection act 1986 -
consumer
consumer protection act 1986
consumer protection act
consumer protection act
citedby:1809742
who is consumer in consumer
protection act
consumer protection
consumer state commission
condonation of delay
condonation of delay filter:
consumer dispute
consumer complaints
bonafide belief

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 1/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013
Case No.

57of 2012

Date
of Institution

12.11.2012

Date
of Decision

21.01.2013

Sh.
Harsh Bhardwaj S/o Sh. Kaushal Kumar Bhardwaj, Resident of Jyoti Kunj, Khalini,
Shimla-2, HP.

--Complainant

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 2/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

Versus

1.

M/s Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation, 1441- Garinder, Ln. Lovifviville, Ay00002131914, USA.,
through its Chief Executive Officer, to be served through the American Embassy, New Delhi.

2. M/s Yum Restaurant Private Limited, Yum Brands, Inc, 12th Floor, Towered, Global Business
Part, Gurgaon, Haryana-122002 through its Managing Director.

3. M/s A.N.Traders Private Ltd. , SCO 425-426, Sector-35-C, Chandigarh through its
Manager/Incharge.

4. Union Territory, Chandigarh through its Administrator, Sector-9, Chandigarh.

--Opposite Parties Complaint U/s 17 of Consumer Protection Act, BEFORE: JUSTICE SHAM
SUNDER(Retd), PRESIDENT.

MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER.

Present:

Sh.Prantap Sharma, Advocate for the complainant Names of OP Nos.1,2 &4 struck off vide order
dated 7.1.13 Opposite Party No.3 ex parte.

PER JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER(Retd), PRESIDENT The facts, in brief, are that the complainant
happened to visit Opposite Party No.3, on 16.11.2009, at about 4.20 P.M., as a customer, and, as such,
he was a consumer as defined under the Consumer Protection Act,1986(hereinafter referred to as the
Act only). His three female friends also accompanied him, to the premises of Opposite Party No.3, for
taking food. Four of them, had finished their food by 5.20 P.M, and were just to leave, when one of the
guests of Opposite Party No.3, sitting in the restaurant, at the relevant point of time, on table No.4,
alongwith his companions, all of a sudden came to the complainant, and took up cudgels with him,
without any rhyme or reason. The said person asked the complainant, as to why, he was staring at him.
According to the complainant, no such thing happened. When the complainant tried to explain the
things, to the said person, which took about 4-5 minutes, he (said person), being in an ebriated
condition, stabbed him(complainant) with a dragger (Khukhri) causing serious injuries, on his
abdomen, head and temporal region.

2. It was stated that leaving the complainant seriously injured, the said person left the premises of
Opposite Party No.3. It was further stated that the staff members of Opposite Party No.3 were mere
spectators, at the time, when the injuries were being caused by the aforesaid person, on the person of
the complainant. It was further stated that no attempt was, at all, made by the staff members of
Opposite Party No.3, to protect the complainant or provide security to him. It was further stated that
the complainant was left in a pool of blood, in a semi-conscious condition. Even, no attempt was made
by the staff members of Opposite Party No.3, either to shift the complainant, to a nearby hospital, for
medical aid, or call the police, or note the registration number of the vehicle, in which the culprits left,
so that immediate action could be taken against him.

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 3/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

3. It was further stated that three female friends of the complainant, who were accompanying him, at
the relevant point of time, shifted him out of the premises of Opposite Party No.3, arranged a vehicle,
from the owner of the neighbouring restaurant, and took him to a nearby hospital. Thereafter, the
matter was reported to the police. It was further stated that, on account of timely intervention of the
friends of the complainant, his life had been saved, or else, he would have succumbed to the injuries,
caused on his person. It was further stated that the staff members of Opposite Party No.3, were busy in
cleaning the blood splashed, on the floor of its premises, and removing whatever evidence could be
available at the spot, which would have proved helpful in nabbing the wrongdoer. It was further stated
that the wrongdoer could not be arrested, and he had been successfully evading arrest. It was further
stated that the incident was widely reported in the newspapers.

4. It was further stated that, on account of the injuries, caused on the person of the complainant, in the
aforesaid incident, he remained hospitalized in the Intensive Care Unit of INSCOL hospital, for more
than 10 days, where he underwent a major surgery. He remained at Chandigarh for a further period 3
days in another hospital. It was further stated that, thereafter, he was shifted to IGMC, Shimla and
DDU Shimla, where he took treatment, for the injuries, caused on his person, in the aforesaid incident.
It was further stated that expenditure of more than Rs.5.00 lacs was incurred, on the treatment of the
complainant. It was further stated that, on account of serious injuries, the complainant was constrained
to drop his examination of French Language and 5th Semester examination of BCA Degree Course. It
was further stated that, on account of extension of further 6 months and payment of course fee, the
complainant suffered a financial loss of Rs.2.5 lacs more.

5. It was further stated that it was the duty and responsibility of Opposite Party No.3, to ensure safety
of the customers visiting the restaurant and provide security to them. However, they did not make any
such arrangement, as a result whereof, the incident happened. It was further stated that, by not
providing safety to the customers and making security arrangement, in the premises, by Opposite Party
No.3, it was not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. It was
further stated that even a lot of mental agony and physical harassment was caused to the complainant,
on account of the acts of omission and commission, aforesaid, of the owner, and staff members of
Opposite Party No.3. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.3, was many a time, asked to pay the
expenses incurred by the complainant, on his treatment, and compensation, but to no avail. When the
grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only) was filed.

6. The Counsel for the complainant, stated at the bar, on 7.1.2013, that he did not claim any relief,
against Opposite Parties Nos.1,2 and 4 and their names be struck off. Accordingly, the names of
Opposite Parties Nos.1,2 & 4 were struck off, vide order dated 7.1.2013, from the array of the parties.

7. Notice of the application for condonation of delay of 361 days, in filing the complaint, as also the
complaint, was issued to Opposite Party No.3, upon which, report of refusal of its Manager/Incharge
Sales was received. Refusal was deemed to be due service. No authorized representative, entered
appearance, on behalf of Opposite Party No.3. Accordingly, it was proceeded against ex parte, vide
order dated 7.1.2013.

8.. As stated above, alongwith the complaint, an application under Section 24A of the Act , read with
Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 361 days, was filed by the
applicant/complainant, stating therein that, prior to the filing of the instant complaint, he had preferred
a complaint, on the same cause of action, in the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Shimla, but the same was returned to him, vide order dated 17.7.2012, received on
6.9.2012, with the directions, to file the same before the State Commission, having territorial
jurisdiction, in the matter. It was further stated that throughout this period, the applicant/complainant
was pursuing his remedy before the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Shimla, in good faith, and under a bonafide belief that his complaint was maintainable
before that Commission. It was further stated that the applicant/complainant, at no point of time, either
conceded or gave up his claim, against Opposite Party No.3, before that Commission. It was further
stated that, it was, on account of this reason, that delay of 361 days, in filing the complaint, before this
Commission, having territorial jurisdiction, occurred. It was further stated that since the complaint was

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 4/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

being prosecuted by the complainant in good faith, and, under bonafide belief, before the wrong
Forum, having no territorial jurisdiction, the period spent by him, in those proceedings, was liable to be
excluded. Accordingly, the prayer, referred to above, was made.

9. The complainant filed his affidavit by way of evidence.

10. We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/complainant and have gone through the record.

11. First coming to the application for condonation of delay, it may be stated here, that it is to be
determined, as to whether, the complainant was pursuing his remedy, before the Himachal Pradesh
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, in good faith and under bonafide belief, that
it had territorial jurisdiction, and, as such, he is entitled to the exclusion of period, spent by him, before
the said Commission, for the purpose of computation of period of limitation, in filing the instant
complaint. Opposite Party No.3, is running its business/restaurant in SCO No.425-426, Sector-35-C,
Chandigarh. According to the applicant/ complainant, on 16.11.2009, he went to the said restaurant, for
taking food, alongwith his three female friends. The alleged incident took place, in the premises i.e.
SCO No.425-426, Sector-35-C, Chandigarh, on that date, in which the complainant allegedly sustained
injuries at the hands of another customer, who was sitting there. The FIR was lodged, copy whereof is
annexure C3, in Police Station, Sector-36, Chandigarh. According to the applicant/complainant, after
the incident, in the first instance, he was shifted to INSCOL hospital, and thereafter, to a hospital, at
Chandigarh, where he underwent treatment. The applicant/complainant, thus, very well knew that the
cause of action, if any, accrued to him, at Chandigarh and only this Commission, at Chandigarh, had
the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The mere fact, that he was, later on, shifted to
Shimla, where his parents were residing and he underwent further treatment there for such injuries, did
not confer any territorial jurisdiction, upon the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Shimla. Not only this, it is evident from annexure C8, copy of the order dated 17.7.2012
passed by the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, holding that
the Opposite Party(which is Opposite Party No.3 in the complaint) took up a preliminary objection, in
the written version, that the aforesaid Commission, had no territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and
decide the complaint, as the incident, which was alleged to have reflected deficiency in service, on its
part, had occurred, at Chandigarh, and, no cause of action, had arisen within the jurisdiction of that
Commission. Since, the preliminary objection was taken by the Opposite Party, in the written version,
filed before the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, that it
lacked territorial jurisdiction, it was for the applicant/complainant to withdraw the complaint, with
liberty to file the same, before the appropriate Commission, but he did not do so.

Under these circumstances, it could not be said that he was prosecuting his complaint before the
Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, in good faith, and, under
bonafide belief that it had got territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint. In M.I.
Plywood Industries Vs Canara Bank I(2013) CPJ 17(NC), the Revision Petitioner(Complainant) filed
Revision Petition before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, after a delay of 145
days. In the application for condonation of delay, a plea was taken up by the Revision Petitioner that it
had earlier challenged the order impugned, by way of filing Writ Petition bearing No. 29255 of 2010
before the Honble Karnataka High Court, on the legal advice, so tendered by its Counsel. It was further
stated that the Honble High Court vide order 10.2.2011, was pleased to dispose of the Writ Petition,
holding therein, that the Petitioner had an efficacious, alternative remedy under the provisions of
Consumer Protection Act,1986. It was further stated that the Petitioner bona fidely trusted the legal
advice, given to it, by the Counsel and pursued the Writ Petition, and that was why delay in filing the
Revision Petition took place. The National Commission, in the aforesaid case, held that such a plea,
taken by the Revision Petitioner for condonation of delay, was not maintainable, in view of the
decision of the Honble Supreme Court in M/s Advance Scientific Equipment Ltd. & anr. Vs West
Bengal Pharma & Photochemical Development Corporation Ltd., 2011(DLT soft)1(SC), Appeal (Civil)
Nos.17068-17069/2010, decided on 9.7.2010, wherein it was observed as under ;

We are further of the view that the petitioners venture of filing petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution was clearly an abuse of the process of the Court and the High Court ought not to have
entertained the petition even for a single day because an effective alternative remedy was available to

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 5/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

the petitioner under Section 23 of the Act and the orders passed by the State Comission did not suffer
from lack of jurisdiction

12. In view of the principle of law, laid down in M/s Advance Scientific Equipment Ltd.s case(supra) ,
it can be held that the prosecution of complaint, by the complainant, before the Himachal Pradesh State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, knowing fully well that no cause of action arose,
within the territorial jurisdiction of that Commission, as the incident had taken place at Chandigarh,
and despite the fact, that a specific objection was taken, by the Opposite Party, in that complaint, that
the said Commission, had no territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, as no cause
of action accrued, at Shimla, was nothing, but an abuse of the process of law. In these circumstances,
by no stretch of imagination, it can be said, that the complainant was prosecuting his complaint, before
the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, in good faith and
under bona- fide belief that, it had got territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint.

13.. It was held in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR 1995
Punjab & Haryana 32, a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, that
sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is
beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to
see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide,
which is not done, with due care and attention. In New Bank of India Vs. M/s Marvels ( India): 93
(2001) DLT 558, Delhi High Court, it was held as under:-

No doubt the words sufficient cause should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and
their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party.
After all sufficient cause is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given
and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether, the defendant who has suffered ex-
parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining
this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.

14.. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it was
held as under:-

There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally
so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or
want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised
judicially i.e. one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.

15.. In R.B.

Ramalingam Vs. R.B. Bhuvaneswari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Leave
Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is
whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.

16. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors, V (2010) SLT 790=III (2010) CLT 201 (SC), it was
held as under:-

The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and
control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause
is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and
attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]

17. In Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR 1977, S.C. 1221, it was held as
under:-

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 6/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a
narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one
ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a
litigation who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay

18. In Ansul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC), it was
held as under:-

It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of
delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of
expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain
highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras

19. The version set up by the applicant/complainant, that he was prosecuting his complaint, before the
Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Shimla in good faith, and under a bona fide
belief that the said Commission had got territorial jurisdiction, and, as such, the period spent by him
there, was required to be excluded while computing the limitation, for filing the instant complaint, does
not constitute a sufficient cause, as has been held above. Had the complainant been diligent and
vigilant enough, he would not have unnecessarily wasted his time, by prosecuting the complaint before
the wrong Forum. There was a complete lack of bona fides and inaction, on the part of the
complainant, in pursing the remedy before a wrong Forum.

The period spent by him, in pursing the complaint, before the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla, therefore, cannot be excluded for computation of the period
of limitation. Delay of 361 days, in filing the complaint, which is about one year beyond the period of
limitation, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be condoned.

20. The next question, that arises, for consideration, is, as to whether, even if, sufficient cause is
shown, it is obligatory on the Commission, to condone the delay. The answer to this question, is in the
negative. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it was held as
under:-

It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further
has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient
cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that
diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to
such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.

21. It is evident, from the principle of law, laid down, in Ram Lal & Ors.s case (supra), that even if,
sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire, whether, in its discretion, it should condone
the delay. This aspect of the matter, requires the Commission, to take into consideration, all the
relevant factors, and it is at this stage, that diligence of the party(s) or its/their bonafides, may fall for
consideration. In the instant case, as stated above, it was obligatory upon the applicant/complainant, to
withdraw the complaint, from the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,
Shimla, as soon as a preliminary objection was taken, in the written version, regarding lack of,
territorial jurisdiction, with liberty to file the same before this Commission, to ensure that the same
(complaint) was filed within the stipulated period, as envisaged under Section 24A of the Act. It was,
thus, a case of complete lack of bonafides and inaction, on the part of applicant/complainant. The
principle of law, laid down in Ram Lal & Others case(supra) is fully applicable to the instant case. This
is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission should exercise its discretion, in favour of the
applicant/complainant, in condoning the delay.

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 7/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

22. Coming to the main complaint, it may be stated here, that the complainant, as would be discussed
hereinafter, miserably failed to prove that he fell under the definition of consumer as defined in the
Act. For the facility of reference, the provisions of Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(o) are reproduced
hereinunder ;

2(1)(d) "consumer"

means any person who

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the
person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or
under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but
does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or

(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid
and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such
services other than the person who 'hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or
partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are
availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of
such services for any commercial purposes;

2(1)(o) "service"

means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not
limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport,
processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction,
entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the
rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service.

23. According to the complainant, he alongwith his three female friends went to the premises of
Opposite Party No.3, for taking food, and after they had finished the same, and were just about to
leave, one of the guests, sitting there, caused injuries on his(complainant) person, without any rhyme or
reason. No doubt, in the complaint, the complainant stated that, he being a customer, fell within the
definition of consumer. There is not even a fleeting reference, in the complaint, or in the affidavit of
the complainant, that he availed of the services of Opposite Party No.3 for consideration. Even copy of
the bill, if any payment was allegedly made by the complainant, to Opposite Party No.3, for taking
food, was also not produced, on record. Section 2(1)(o) clearly lays down that any service rendered
free of charge does not fall within the definition of service under Section 2(1)(o). In the absence of any
reference, in the complaint, or in the affidavit, submitted by the complainant or production of a copy of
the bill that a particular sum, was paid, for taking food i.e. for rendering service, by Opposite Party
No.3, or that the consideration was paid for purchasing food and taking the same, in the premises of
Opposite Party No.3, he did not fall under the definition of consumer as defined in the aforesaid
extracted provisions. Thus, Consumer Complaint, is not maintainable.

24. No doubt, the Counsel for the complainant, when at the time of arguments, was asked, as to why
the bill showing the alleged payment of consideration was not produced, he stated that, as the
complainant sustained injuries, there was no question of asking for the same. This statement does not
appear to be correct. The complainant was being accompanied by three female friends. Not only this, it
is a matter of common knowledge, that when a person goes to a restaurant for taking food, the moment,
he finishes the same, the waiter comes to the table, with a bill, for collecting payment of the food taken
and the services rendered. In the instant case, in para NO.3 of the complaint, it was in clear-cut terms,
stated by the complainant, that he and his three female friends had finished their food at 5.20 P.M.
whereas, they went to the premises of Opposite Party No.3 at 4.20 P.M. It was after finishing the food,
when they were about to leave, that one of the customers of Opposite Party No.3, sitting in the
restaurant, caused injuries on his person. It means that had the service been availed of by the
complainant, against payment of consideration, then the waiter would have certainly, brought the bill to
the table, around which he and his three female friends were sitting, after finishing the food. In those

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 8/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

circumstances, the complainant was bound to pay the amount/consideration and keep the bill with
himself. It was not that the alleged incident took place just before finishing the food, and leaving the
table around which the complainant and his three female friends were sitting for taking the same. Not
only this, even if, the bill had not been obtained by the complainant, at that time, one of his female
friends, immediately after getting him admitted, in the hospital, could come to the premises of
Opposite Party No.3, to collect the same, but no such effort was made. In these circumstances, the
submission of the Counsel for the complainant, to the effect, that since the incident took place, the
question of taking the bill did not, at all, arise, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands
rejected.

25. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complaint involves a consumer
dispute, or not. No doubt, it has been held above, that the complainant did not fall within the definition
of consumer, yet ,even if it is assumed, for the sake of arguments, that the complainant alongwith his
female friends, went to the premises of Opposite Party No.3, for taking food, for consideration, it is to
be determined, as to whether, the incident of causing injuries on the person of the complainant, by
another person, constituted a consumer dispute. It is not the case of the complainant that there was any
defect or deficiency in the food, which was served to him, and his female friends in the premises of
Opposite Party No.3. It is also not the case of the complainant, that he was overcharged for the food,
which was served to him, and his three female friends. Since no deficiency in the food, or service,
rendered by the staff of Opposite Party No.3, to the complainant and his female friends was alleged in
the complaint, or in the affidavit filed in support of the same, it cannot be said that the incident,
referred to above, constituted a consumer dispute. It is not the case of the complainant that the staff of
Opposite Party No.3, in any way, misbehaved with him, or his female friends. If all of a sudden, a
customer, sitting in the restaurant, caused injuries, on the person of the complainant, without any
rhyme or reason, it could not be expected of the members of the staff of Opposite Party No.3 to
intervene, at the risk of their life. There is nothing, on record, to show that , it was the duty of the
restaurant owner to provide security to the complainant, and his female friends. Since, the incident of
causing injuries took place inside the premises of Opposite Party No.3, the police was informed, and
the FIR was lodged. Even the female friends of the complainant took him to INSCOL hospital, where
he was treated. Thus, the concerned customer allegedly committed the offences, punishable under the
Indian Penal Code and/or under any other Statute for which a criminal case was registered. In the event
of his arrest, it is for the Criminal Court, to decide that Criminal Case, and to punish the guilty. The
incident, therefore, did not constitute any consumer dispute. In case, the complainant spent amount on
his treatment, in the hospital, on account of injuries, caused on his person, by the alleged culprit, he
could file a suit for damages in the Civil Court, under various heads. The Consumer Fora is only
required to decide the matters relating to deficiency, in service, or indulgence into unfair trade practice.
The incident, in question, did not constitute a consumer dispute. The Consumer Complaint is, thus, not
maintainable.

26. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the complainant.

27. For the reasons, recorded above, the application for condonation of delay of 361 days, being devoid
of merit, must fail, and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the complaint under Section 17 of the
Act, is also dismissed, being barred by time, and also on merits, with no order as to costs.

28. The complainant shall, however, be at liberty, to resort to any other legal remedy, available to him,
for the redressal of his grievance.

29. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

30. The file be consigned to the Record Room.

Sd/-

Pronounced.

(Justice Sham Sunder)(Retd) January,21,2013 President.

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 9/10
8/7/2018 Harsh Bhardwaj vs Kfc on 21 January, 2013

Sd/-

(Neena Sandhu) Member Js STATE COMMISSION (Complaint

No.57 of 2012) Dated the 21 st January,2013 ORDER Present: Sh.Prantap Sharma, Advocate for
the complainant Names of OP Nos.1,2 &4 struck off vide order dated 7.1.13 Opposite Party No.3 ex
parte.

Vide our detailed order of the even date, recorded separately, the application for condonation of delay
of 361 days, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the complaint
under Section 17 of the Act, is also dismissed, being barred by time, and also on merits, with no order
as to costs.

(Neena Sandhu) (Justice Sham Sunder)(Retd) Member President

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71706679/ 10/10