Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kadriya Bakirci - Ifşa - Makale
Kadriya Bakirci - Ifşa - Makale
www.emeraldinsight.com/1359-0790.htm
International,
Work-related whistle-blowing in EU and
democratic societies context Turkish law
Abstract
Purpose – Turkey is required by the international and EU instruments and domestic law to address the
issue of whistle-blowing and the protection of whistle-blowers. The purpose of this paper is to analyse
Turkish legislation which is applicable to work-related whistle-blowing, the conflict between the worker’s
right to “blow the whistle” and the obligation to loyalty and confidentiality. The consequences of groundless
or deliberate false disclosures are considered. Comparisons are made with international conventions, the COE
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 and the Proposed EU Directive on the Protection of Whistleblowers and
ECtHR precedents.
Design/methodology/approach – In the first part, this paper reviews the definition of whistle-blowing
and whistle-blower. The second part outlines the impact of international and EU Law on Turkish legislation.
The third part reviews the Turkish legal framework applicable to whistle-blowing.
Findings – Whistle-blowing in the public interest is suggested as a tool to combat corruption worldwide.
There is no doubt that some whistle-blowers have been beneficial to society. However without democratic
structures to take into account the assessment of the quality of the information, the type of the disclosure and
the category of the reporting person, there are downsides to excessive whistle-blowing. Therefore, whistle-
blowing should be discussed in the context of democratic societies, and a balanced approach should be
adopted to ensure the position of not only whistle-blowers but also the people affected by the reports.
Originality/value – The paper offers new insights into the limits of work-related whistle-blowing within
the context of freedom of expression and the right of employees and public officials to petition. The protection
of whistle-blowers and the consequences of groundless or deliberate false disclosures under Turkish Law
from a comparative perspective are considered.
Keywords COE Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7,
Obligation of workers to loyalty and confidentiality,
Proposed EU directive on the protection of whistle-blowers, Protection of whistle-blowers,
Turkish law on whistle-blowing, Work-related whistle-blowing
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Definitions of whistle-blowing are different across societies, situations and periods of time.
Whistle-blowers can be seen as altruistic, selfless individuals who take action at
“extraordinary personal cost”. Whistle-blowers can also be shunned or seen as the official
and unofficial informants of management.
Because what is intended for by whistle-blowing, how it is used and to whom it is
available mark the difference, whistle-blowing is not a fundamental right to be defended
Journal of Financial Crime
Vol. 26 No. 4, 2019
pp. 1165-1202
This research is supported by the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council’s © Emerald Publishing Limited
1359-0790
international post-doctoral research grant. DOI 10.1108/JFC-09-2018-0090
JFC across any regime or any society. Whistle-blowing can only be regarded as a freedom of
26,4 speech if society is based on democratic principles[1] and international human rights
standards.
Incidences of organisational wrongdoing is a notoriously secretive activity and it is
usually only those engaged in corrupt deals or those who work with them that are aware of
it. Insiders are among the few people who are able to report cases of wrongdoing (past or
1166 ongoing) and identify the risk of future wrongdoing. By helping to detect wrongdoing,
whistle-blowers play a critical role in converting a vicious cycle of secrecy into a virtuous
cycle (Transparency International, 2010). However reporting or refusing to take part in
suspected wrongdoing can come at a high price: whistle-blowers often expose themselves to
great personal risks to protect the public interest. As a result of speaking out, they may lose
their jobs, dampen their career prospects and even put their own lives at risk. Therefore, to
provide a safe alternative to silence, legal measures should provide effective legal protection
of whistle-blowers against retaliation (Transparency International, 2010)[2].
On the other hand, not every work-related disclosure is true, not all whistle-blowers are
saints; not every concerned person is a legal entity or an employer, and groundless/baseless
or deliberate false accusations violate the fundamental rights of the people concerned by the
reports. Therefore full respect and protection of the rights of those concerned should also be
ensured.
As Levine points out, once accusations of malfeasance have been made, false or true, the
overseeing authorities have no choice but to take accusations seriously and investigate.
Unlike the universal principle of presumption of innocence, the accused is often presumed
guilty, if not by the investigating committee, then by the court of public opinion. When the
processes of reporting or anonymous accusations become an accepted part of the
organisational culture, the prevailing community spirit can be eroded. Instead of a culture of
sharing and cooperation, the result might be one of suspicion and mistrust (Levine, 2016).
A proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Persons Reporting on Breaches of Union Law (hereinafter “Proposed
Directive”), which was proposed by the European Commission on 17 April 2018 to provide
increased protection for work-related whistle-blowers in the European Union (hereinafter
“EU”), states that, it is necessary to protect public disclosures taking into account
democratic principles such as transparency and accountability, and fundamental rights
such as freedom of expression and media freedom, whilst balancing the interest of the
concerned persons (such as protection of employers to manage their organisations and to
protect their interests) with the interest of the public to be protected from harm, in line with
the criteria developed by the international human rights standards, in the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”) and EU fundamental rights and
rules.
The Proposed Directive pursues a balanced approach to ensure not only the position of
whistle-blowers but also of the people concerned by the reports. Article 17 of the Proposed
Directive provides for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties which are necessary:
on the one hand, to ensure the effectiveness of the rules on the protection of reporting
persons, so as to punish and proactively discourage actions aimed at hindering reporting,
retaliatory actions, vexatious proceedings against reporting persons and breaches of the
duty of maintaining the confidentiality of their identity, and, on the other hand, to
discourage malicious and abusive whistle-blowing which affects the effectiveness and
credibility of the whole system of whistle-blower protection, and to prevent unjustified
reputational damage for the persons concerned.
2. The definitions of whistle-blowing and whistle-blower International,
The terms “whistle-blowing” and “whistle-blower” are subject to a multitude of definitions EU and
and do not translate well into many languages such is into Turkish.
What is common to all possible definitions of whistle-blowing is that whistle-blowing is
Turkish law
always about individuals disclosing information. Why, how, about what and to whom
might differ according to the chosen definition, but there is always a communication going
on. The whistle-blower “speaks” – although he/she sometimes writes – information. That
information can be warnings of risky practices, accusations of illegalities or undue diligence, 1167
or even expressions of concern. But, the whistle-blower speaks out a judgement of a
situation (Vandekerckhove, 2006).
The definition of whistle-blowing used by Transparency International (hereinafter “TI”)
is the disclosure of information related to corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or hazardous activities
being committed in or by public or private sector organisations (including perceived or
potential wrongdoing) – which are of concern to or threaten the public interest – to
individuals or entities believed to be able to effect action (TI, 2013).
In 2014 the Council of Europe (hereinafter “COE”) Committee of Ministers to Member
States adopted a Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 on the protection of whistle-blowers
[hereinafter “Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7”]. According to the purposes of the
Recommendation and its principles “whistle-blower” means any person who reports or
discloses information on a threat or harm to the public interest in the context of their work-
based relationship, whether it be in public or private sector (Principle a); “disclosure” means
making information public (Principle d).
Article 3 of the Proposed Directive states that for the purposes of the Directive
“disclosure” means making information on breaches acquired within the work-related
context available to the public domain; “reporting person” means a natural or legal person
who reports or discloses information on breaches acquired in the context of his/her work-
related activities.
The proposal draws upon the case law of the ECtHR on the right to freedom of
expression enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter “ECHR”), and the principles developed on this basis by the Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)/7, as well as further international standards and good practices, and EU
fundamental rights and rules such as the right to private life, the protection of personal data,
the presumption of innocence, the rights of defence, the freedom to conduct a business
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “CFREU”) Articles 7, 8,
47, 48 and 16 respectively)[3].
The ECtHR has dealt with several whistle-blowing cases that have developed the legal
framework on this matter. In Guja v. Moldova[4], Heinisch v. Germany[5] and Bucur and
Toma v. Romania[6] in determining the proportionality of an interference with a right to
freedom of expression (whether an interference with freedom of expression in relation to the
actions of a whistle-blower who makes disclosures in the public domain was “necessary in a
democratic society”), the ECtHR established a number of factors which the Court must have
regard to: whether the applicant had alternative channels for making the disclosure; the
public interest involved in the disclosed information; the authenticity of the disclosed
information; whether the applicant acted in good faith; whether the public disclosure so
important in a democratic society that it outweighs the detriment suffered by the employer;
and the severity of the sanction imposed on the applicant who made the disclosure and its
consequences.
The rights provided by the ECHR should be regarded as a “floor of right” therefore
reliance on Convention rights should not restrict reliance on other legal rights or freedoms or
JFC principles which may be ensured under the other international instruments or EU law or
26,4 national laws (ECHR Article 53).
In all these definitions, there are four elements that make up the conditions for offering
protection to the whistle-blower:
The actor element (who can blow the whistle): There is no limitation of the actors in
the definition by TI and United Nations (hereinafter “UN”) Convention against
1168 Corruption.
The definition by TI covers any person who draws attention to a situation which is of
concern to or threatens the public interest.
Article 33 of the UN Convention against Corruption states that each State Party shall
consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide
protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on
reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established
in accordance with this Convention.
This protects all types of persons and is not restricted to those who raise concerns from
within an organisation. Therefore, anyone who tries to throw light on a corrupt, illegal,
fraudulent or hazardous activity internally or outside the organisation is a whistle-blower
and should be entitled to protection from retaliation.
The definitions by TI and UN Convention against Corruption is broader than the
definition in the COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption; the Recommendation CM/Rec
(2014)/7 and the Proposed Directive on the Protection of Whistleblowers.
The COE Civil Law Convention protects only employees. It states that each Party shall
provide in its internal law for appropriate protection against any unjustified sanction for
employees who have reasonable grounds to suspect corruption and who report in good faith
their suspicion to responsible persons or authorities (Article 9).
A wide definition of the work-based relationship, where whistle-blowers may require
protection has been provided by the Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 and the Proposed
Directive.
According to the Proposed Directive “work-related context” means current or past work
activities in the public or private sector through which, irrespective of their nature, persons
may acquire information on breaches and within which these persons may suffer retaliation
if they report them (Article 3/10).
Under Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 all individuals working in either the public or
private sectors, irrespective of the nature of their working relationship and whether they are
paid or not (Principle 3) and individuals whose work-based relationship has ended and,
possibly, where it is yet to begin in cases where information concerning a threat or harm to
the public interest has been acquired during the recruitment process or other pre-contractual
negotiation stage (Principle 4) are whistle-blowers.
Article 2 of the Proposed Directive sets forth the personal scope of the Directive.
According to the Proposed Directive protection should, firstly, apply to persons having the
status of “workers”, within the meaning of Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU. Based on the
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7, it extends the protection to the persons, who, by virtue of
work-related activities (irrespective of the nature of these activities and whether they are
paid or not), have privileged access to information about breaches that can cause serious
harm to the public interest and who may suffer retaliation if they report, as well as to other
categories of persons who can be assimilated to them for the purposes of the Directive, such
as shareholders, volunteers, unpaid trainees and job applicants (European Committee on International,
Legal Co-operation, 2014). EU and
Therefore, both public and private sector workers and those outside the traditional
working relationship such as job applicants, trainees, volunteers and individuals whose
Turkish law
work-based relationship has ended should be entitled to protection from retaliation.
Limiting the scope of whistle-blowing protection to work-related disclosures by the
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 and Proposed Directive, as opposed to extending across-
the-board protection to any member of the public, is justified by the fact that although 1169
members of the public can also experience reprisals if identified as whistle-blowers, workers
require stronger legal protection as their institutional connection to their employer makes
them especially vulnerable (Chêne, 2009). The underlying principle of recommending
protection to whistle-blowers being their position of economic vulnerability vis-à-vis the
person on whom they depend for work:
Character of the wrongdoing being disclosed: According to TI, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)/7 and Proposed Directive wrongdoing (including perceived or
potential wrongdoing) being disclosed must concern or threaten the public interest
(directly or indirectly), as opposed to interests which are merely personal or private
(Bowers et al., 2010).
The concept of “public interest” is generally understood to refer to the welfare or well-being
of the general public or society (COE, 2015). Although in the above instruments the
definition of whistle-blowing is limited to disclosures which have a public interest
dimension, the line between public interest and personal interest is a fine one. Some matters
can evolve into broader public interest issues if not addressed – such as when chronic
mismanagement deteriorates to the point where a safety risk is introduced into the equation,
or when financial disputes reveal broader patterns of fraud.
According to the Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 “public interest report or disclosure”
means the reporting or disclosing of information on acts and omissions that represent a
threat or harm to the public interest (European Committee on Legal Co-operation, 2014).
Definitions make reference to the types of conduct that may be disclosed; namely,
information related to wrongdoing, including, but not limited to corruption; criminal
offences; breaches of legal obligation; miscarriages of justice; specific dangers to public
health, safety or the environment; abuse of authority; unauthorised use of public funds or
property; gross waste or mismanagement; conflict of interest; and acts to cover up any of the
above (TI, 2013).
According to the Proposed Directive effective detection and prevention of serious harm
to the public interest requires that the information reported which qualifies for protection
covers not only unlawful activities but also abuse of law, namely acts or omissions which do
not appear to be unlawful in formal terms but defeat the object or the purpose of the law
(Preamble Paragraph 29).
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 states that whilst it is for Member States to determine
what lies in the public interest for the purposes of implementing these principles, Member
States should explicitly specify the scope of the national framework, which should, at least,
include violations of law and human rights, as well as risks to public health and safety and
to the environment (European Committee on Legal Co-operation, 2014).
The purpose of the Proposed Directive is to protect those reporting violations of EU law,
which undoubtedly falls within the Union’s powers. Article 1 of the Proposed Directive lists
the areas where, according to available evidence, whistle-blower protection is necessary to
strengthen enforcement of the EU rules where breaches can cause serious harm to the public
JFC interest. The whistle-blowing systems to be implemented under the Proposed Directive
26,4 broadly cover illegal activities or abuses of rights – real or potential – which contravene
public procurement rules, competition rules, legislation on financial services, money
laundering and terrorist financing, safety of products placed on the union internal market,
food safety, transport safety, nuclear and radiation safety, protection of the environment,
animal health and welfare, public health and consumer protection, protection of privacy and
1170 personal data and security of networks and information systems. The proposal would also
protect whistle-blowing involving breaches of corporate tax rules and arrangements that
aim at obtaining a tax advantage and evading legal obligations, insofar as they are likely to
harm the proper functioning of the Union internal market through “unfair tax competition”
and “extensive tax evasion”.
The Proposed Directive states that effective prevention of breaches of EU law requires
that protection is also granted to persons who provide information about potential breaches,
which have not yet materialised, but are likely to be committed. For the same reasons,
protection is warranted also for persons who do not provide positive evidence but raise
reasonable concerns or suspicions. At the same time, protection should not apply to the
reporting of information which is already in the public domain or of unsubstantiated
rumours and hearsay (Preamble Paragraph 30).
One of the criteria used by the ECtHR for determining whether retaliation against
whistle-blowers making public disclosures interferes with freedom of expression in a way
which is not necessary in a democratic society, is whether the disclosure is in the public
interest. In Guja v. Moldova the ECtHR held that the information related to “very important
matters in a democratic society which the public has a legitimate interest in being informed
about and which fall within the scope of political debate”[7]. In Heinisch v. Germany the
ECtHR noted that the information disclosed by the applicant was in the public interest and
of “vital importance” to prevent abuse, taking into account the particular vulnerability of the
patients in the employer’s nursing home who are often unable to draw attention themselves
to shortcomings in the provision of their care. The Court held that the public interest in
receiving information about the care in the nursing home outweighed the rights of the
employer and the dismissal of the applicant was “disproportionately severe”:
The recipient element (to whom must the whistle be blown): Whistle-blowing covers
reports to private or public employers (managers, directors or other responsible
persons); national authorities (such as regulatory or supervisory bodies and law
enforcement agencies), as well as disclosures to the public (most typically via web
platforms or social media, the media, elected officials, civil society organisations,
trade unions or professional/business organisations).
The definition by TI refers to the fact that disclosures are made to individuals or entities
believed to be able to effect action.
Article 33 of the UN Convention against Corruption refers to the competent authorities.
The COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption refers to the responsible persons or
authorities (Article 9).
Article 3 of the Proposed Directive refers to the “competent authority” in relation to the
external reporting, and the “public or private legal entity” as regards the internal reporting.
It states that “competent authority” means any national authority entitled to receive
reports in accordance with Chapter III (on external reporting) and designated to carry out
the duties provided for in the Directive, in particular as regards the follow up of reports
(Article 3/14).
Third parties may also be authorised to receive reports on behalf of private and public International,
entities, provided they offer appropriate guarantees of respect for independence, confidentiality, EU and
data protection and secrecy. These can be external reporting platform providers, external
counsel or auditors or trade union representatives (Preamble Paragraph 43):
Turkish law
Types of whistle-blowing: Although there may be considerable variations in the
actual ways by which workers might blow the whistle, studies have distinguished
four types of whistle-blowing – identified vs anonymous and internal vs external 1171
(Dworkin and Baucus, 1998; Oh and Teo, 2010).
However, a disclosure might only be protected if the disclosure is made to certain recipients
under certain conditions.
Identified whistle-blowing is a worker’s reporting of wrongdoing using his/her real name
(or in some other form giving information which might identify him/her), whereas in
anonymous whistle-blowing the worker gives no information about himself/herself and
might use an assumed name (Park et al., 2008).
Under the definition by TI, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 and the Proposed
Directive there is no requirement for disclosure being identified or anonymous.
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 and the Proposed Directive distinguishes between
internal and external alert systems, and disclosures directly to the public[8].
“Internal reporting” means provision of information on breaches within a public or
private legal entity; “external reporting” means provision of information on breaches to the
competent authorities (Proposed Directive Article 3/6 and Article 3/7 respectively).
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 Principle 9 states that Member States should ensure
that there is in place an effective mechanism or mechanisms for acting on public interest
reports and disclosures. In Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 internal disclosure has been
encouraged (Principles 15, 16, 17, 24) (European Committee on Legal Co-operation, 2014).
The Proposed Directive sets out the obligation of Member States to ensure that legal
entities in the private and public sectors establish appropriate internal reporting channels
and procedures for receiving and following-up on reports (Articles 4, 5). However in the
private sector, entities employing fewer than 50 employees and those having an annual
turnover or a balance sheet of less than EUR 10 million are exempted from the obligation to
establish internal channels and procedures for reporting and follow-up of reports (unless
their activities give rise to specific risks) (Article 4/3 (a) (b)). No exemption is provided for the
financial services sector, or for companies “vulnerable to money laundering or terrorist
financing” (Article 4/3 (c)). In the public sector, all state, regional and departmental
administrations; municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants; and “other entities
governed by public law” are affected by the implementation of such mechanism under the
Proposed Directive (Article 4/6).
Articles 6-12 of the Proposed Directive obliges Member States to ensure that competent
authorities have in place external reporting channels and procedures for receiving and
following-up on reports and sets out the minimum standards applicable to such channels
and procedures. It is for the Member States to identify the authorities competent to receive
and give appropriate follow up to the reports on breaches falling within the scope of the
Directive.
The Proposed Directive states that protection from retaliation as a means of
safeguarding freedom of expression and media freedom should be provided both to persons
who report information about acts or omissions within an organisation (internal reporting)
or to an outside authority (external reporting) and to persons who disclose such information
to the public domain (Preamble Paragraph 32; Article 13). However, as a rule, reporting
JFC persons should first use the internal channels at their disposal and report to their employer.
26,4 If these channels do not work or could not reasonably be expected to work, they may report
to the competent authorities, and, as a last resort, to the public/the media. This requirement
is necessary to ensure that the information gets to the persons who can contribute to the
early and effective resolution of risks to the public interest as well as to prevent unjustified
reputational damage from public disclosures. At the same time, by providing for exceptions
1172 from this rule in cases where internal and/or external channels do not function or could not
reasonably be expected to function properly, Article 13 provides the necessary flexibility for
the reporting person to choose the most appropriate channel depending on the individual
circumstances of the case.
In other cases, internal channels could not reasonably be expected to function properly,
for instance, where the reporting persons have valid reasons to believe that they would
suffer retaliation in connection with the reporting; that their confidentiality would not be
protected; that the ultimate responsibility holder within the work-related context is involved
in the breach; that the breach might be concealed; that evidence may be concealed or
destroyed; that the effectiveness of investigative actions by competent authorities might be
jeopardised or that urgent action is required (for instance because of an imminent risk of a
substantial and specific danger to the life, health and safety of persons, or to the
environment). In all such cases, persons reporting externally to the competent authorities
and, where relevant, to bodies, offices or agencies of the EU shall be protected. Moreover,
protection is also to be granted in cases where EU legislation allows for the reporting person
to report directly to the competent national authorities or bodies, offices or agencies of the
EU, for example in the context of fraud against the EU budget, prevention and detection of
money laundering and terrorist financing or in the area of financial services (Proposed
Directive Preamble Paragraph 63).
Persons making a public disclosure directly should also qualify for protection in cases
where a breach remains unaddressed (for example, it was not properly assessed or
investigated or no remedial action was taken) despite having been reported internally and/or
externally following a tiered use of available channels; or in cases where reporting persons
have valid reasons to believe that there is collusion between the perpetrator of the breach
and the competent authority is reasonably suspected, that evidence may be concealed or
destroyed, or that the effectiveness of investigative actions by competent authorities might
be jeopardised; or in cases of imminent and manifest danger for the public interest, or where
there is a risk of irreversible damage, including, inter alia, harm to physical integrity
(Proposed Directive Preamble Paragraph 64).
Both Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)/7 and the Proposed Directive provide for the
reporting of whistle-blower alerts in diverse forms. According to the Proposed Directive
provided the confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person is ensured, it is up to each
individual private and public legal entity to define the kind of reporting channels to set up,
such as in person, by post, by physical complaint box(es), by telephone hotline or through an
online platform (intranet or internet) (Preamble Paragraph 42)[9].
The ECtHR found in Guja v. Moldova that the applicant did not have any effective
channel through which to make his disclosure as neither Moldovan legislation nor the
internal regulations of the Prosecutor General’s office provided for worker reporting. In
Heinisch v. Germany in applying the requirement of pursuing alternative channels for
making the disclosure the ECtHR noted the applicant had raised her concerns on numerous
occasions with her employer to no avail. It also made reference to the Resolution 1729 (2010)
of the COE Parliamentary Assembly on the protection of whistle-blowers which stipulates
that where internal channels cannot reasonably be expected to function properly then International,
external whistle-blowing should be protected. EU and
Turkish law
3. The impact of international and European Union law on Turkish legislation
In the Turkish language, there is no such word as “whistle-blowing” or an equivalent for the
meaning of the term whistle-blower, acquired in English-speaking countries. The language
used in Turkish law are, “reporting to public authorities”, “notifying/informing the 1173
authorised bodies”, “notifying/informing the competent authorities” and “making a
complaint” about wrongdoings which must concern or threaten the public and/or private
interest.
There is no consolidated and comprehensive whistle-blowing framework. Whistle-
blowing is regulated by a diffuse series of different laws which apply different obligations to
public and private entities and different levels of protection for different categories of
whistle-blowers.
In the absence of specific legal regulations on this issue, it is necessary to refer to the
international conventions which are ratified by Turkey and briefly discuss the impact of
international conventions and EU measures.
The Turkish Constitution provides the highest legislative authority for the fundamental
principles.
It states that where a conflict between ratified international conventions and domestic
law exists, international conventions shall prevail (Article 90).
The provisions of the Constitution are fundamental legal rules binding upon legislative,
executive and judicial organs, and administrative authorities and other institutions and
individuals (Article 11).
Turkey ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
“ICCPR”), the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter
“ICESCR”), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (hereinafter “CEDAW”), the ECHR, the COE Revised European Social
Charter (hereinafter “RESC”), the COE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter “CPPD”), the COE Convention
on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (hereinafter
“Istanbul Convention”), the International Labour Organisation (hereinafter “ILO”)
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No.111)
and the Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer (No.158).
Turkey is a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter “UDHR”),
the UN Convention against Corruption, the COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the
COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, the COE Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (hereinafter “OECD”) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions.
All these international conventions have the force of law. The provisions of these
Conventions related to whistle-blowing, protection of whistle-blowers and concerned
persons are binding upon the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, the administrative
authorities, and other institutions and individuals.
The UDHR, ECHR[10] and ICCPR provides the right to freedom of expression (Articles
19, 10 and 19, respectively) and the right to respect for private and family life (Articles 12, 8
and 17, respectively). The CPPD protects personal data.
JFC The UDHR and ICESCR guarantee the right to work (Articles 23 and 6, respectively), and
26,4 just and favourable conditions of work (Articles 23 and 7, respectively).
Articles 1, 2, 4, 7 of the UDHR, Article 26 of the ICCPR, Articles 2/3 and 3 of the ICESCR,
Article 14 of the ECHR, Articles E and 20 of the RESC, CEDAW, Istanbul Convention, ILO
Conventions (No.111) and (No.158) prohibit discrimination.
Article 26 of the RESC guarantees the right to dignity at work, and Istanbul Convention
1174 provides protection for women against physical, sexual, economic and physiological
violence.
They all have relevance for whistle-blowers.
On the other hand Resolution 1729 (2010) of the COE Parliamentary Assembly on the
Protection of Whistleblowers, and Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 are non-binding
(Puppinck, 2012) but set guiding principles or long-term goals.
As a candidate for membership of the EU, Turkey should comply with the EU acquis
communautaire. Turkey has to harmonise its existing legislation in line with the principles
of the CFREU and in particular its Articles on freedom of expression and right to
information (Article 11), the right to fair and just working conditions (Articles 30, 31), the
right to human dignity (Article 1), protection from unjustified dismissal (Article 30), the
right to effective remedies (Article 47), the right to respect for private life, protection of
personal data, healthcare, environmental protection, consumer protection (respectively,
Articles 7, 8, 35, 37, 38), and the general principle of good administration (Article 41); EU
legislation on equal treatment, which provides for protection against victimisation in
response to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with this principle
and on protection against harassment at work[11]; and the Framework Directive 89/391/
EEC on safety and health of workers at work[12] which provides that workers or workers’
representatives may not be placed at a disadvantage because they consult or raise issues
with the employer regarding measures to mitigate hazards or to remove sources of danger.
Workers and their representatives are entitled to raise issues with the competent national
authorities if they consider that the measures taken and the means adopted by the employer
are inadequate for the purposes of ensuring safety and health (Article 11) (Commission
Communication on Safer and Healthier Work for All, 2017).
With respect to protection of concerned persons Turkey has to comply with the
provisions of the international conventions and EU law on the protection of the rights of the
person, the right to confidentiality, the provision of an effective remedy, and a fair trial as
well as the presumption of innocence and the right of defence, including the right to be heard
and the right to access their file, the fundamental liberties of the employer in accordance
with the UDHR, the ICCPR, ICESCR, ECHR, CFREU and the Proposed Directive.
This regulation does not provide full protection to whistle-blowers because it does not
1188 provide reinstatement of the employee who is dismissed in bad faith. Also the burden of
proof of the employer’s intent is on the shoulder of the employee.
CC (Articles 24-25)[47] and OA (Articles 49, 58)[48] provide civil remedies such as
compensation for economic loss in the case of invalid or abusive dismissal, as well as
damages for any injuries or suffering:
Unjustified dismissal[49]: On the other hand the EA Article 25/II (a) states that if the
employee levels groundless accusations against the employer in matters affecting
the latter’s honour or dignity or conducts other similar immoral, dishonourable or
malicious behaviour the employer may terminate the employment contract, whether
for a definite or indefinite period, before its’ expiry or without having to comply
with the prescribed notice periods.
Therefore if the employeès accusations are groundless in matters affecting the employer’s
honour or dignity then he/she can be immediately dismissed based on a just cause[50]. The
EA does not mention the need for intent by the employee.
This provision conflicts with the COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the UN
Convention against Corruption, ECtHR precedents, Recommendation CM/Rec(20 14)7 and
the Proposed Directive.
The COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Article 9), and the UN Convention against
Corruption (Article 33) require protection of employees who have reasonable grounds to
suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible persons or
authorities (TI, 2009).
One of the criteria established in Guja v. Moldova and Heinisch v. Germany by the ECtHR
for the finding of an interference with the right to freedom of expression is good faith on the
part of the whistle-blower.
On the other hand under the Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 and the Proposed
Directive there should not be sanctions for misguided reporting if the whistle-blower had
reasonable grounds to believe in its accuracy at the time of the disclosure[51].
4.3.1.1.2.2 Protection of employees against negative certificate or failure to furnish
the certificate on due time. Retaliation might take the form of giving a negative
reference for future employment.
The EA Article 28 states that the employer must furnish the employee leaving
employment with a certificate stating the nature and duration of employment. The employee
who suffers a loss or the new employer who has recruited him/her may claim compensation
from the previous employer for the latter’s failure to furnish the certificate on due time or for
the incorrect information contained in the certificate.
Under the EA Article 99 the employer or his/her representative who violates the
obligation to arrange a work certificate in accordance with Article 28 or writes incorrect
information on this certificate, shall be liable to a fine of 150 liras for each employee in this
category[52].
4.3.1.1.3 Protection of employee’s personal rights. Under the Turkish Constitution
(Articles 17, 20)[53], OA, EA, PPDA, OHSA, CC, CA and RAIA an employer has the
obligation to safeguard/care for his/her employees which means that an employer should International,
take all steps which are reasonably possible to ensure their wellbeing. Requirements under EU and
an employer’s duty of care are wide-ranging and may manifest themselves in many
different ways such as to respect and safeguard the employee’s personality rights, to treat
Turkish law
them fairly and to protect them against any kind of violation.
Under the CC, any violation of personal rights is considered unlawful unless justified by
private or public interest, or undertaken by a lawfully empowered authority, or with the
consent of the related person (Article 24)[54]. 1189
The OA Article 417 provides that within the employment relationship, the employer is
obliged to safeguard and respect the employee’s personality rights, and to maintain an order
in the workplace which is in conformity with the principles of equity. In particular he/she
must take all measures which are necessary to ensure that employees are not sexually or
psychologically harassed and that any victim of sexual or psychological harassment suffers
no further adverse consequences.
Under the EA (Article 25/II) the employer is obliged to take necessary action to prevent
employees from exposure to mobbing and sexual harassment or any other maltreatment[55].
The HREIA also prohibits mobbing, and psychological and sexual harassment in the
workplace (Article 2)[56].
Under the OA (Article 417) and the OHSA the employer is obliged to take all necessary
measures to ensure health and safety in the workplace.
On the other hand under the OA (Article 419), EA (Article 75), PPDA, CA, CC, RAIA
(Article 21) employers are under the obligation of protecting their employees’ personal
information/data.
Under Turkish law retaliation against reporting employees constitutes the breach of the
employer’s obligation to safeguard employees.
In this case the reporting employee has the right to refrain from working (OA Article 97)
or to terminate his/her employment contract based on just cause (EA Article 24/II), and/or to
claim civil remedies and to appeal for administrative monetary fines and criminal sanctions.
4.3.1.1.3.1 Right of employees to refrain from working. Under the OA Article 97 a party
to a bilateral contract may not demand performance until he/she has discharged or offered to
discharge his/her own obligation, unless the terms or nature of the contract allow him/her to
do so at a later date.
This principle applies to employment contracts and gives the employee the possibility of
enforcing his/her rights, in cases of serious violation of the duties of the employer, without
having to go to court. Therefore when the employer is in arrears with his/her obligation to
safeguard his/her employee and retaliates against the employee, the employee may refuse
performance until the employer has stopped retaliating against his/her.
The employee retains his/her right to wages even during the period of such refusal and is
not obliged subsequently to make up the work not performed.
Dismissal on the ground of justified refusal to work is unlawful.
4.3.1.1.3.2 Right of employees to terminate the employment contract. According to
Article 24/II(b) and (c) of the EA, the employee may terminate the employment contract
immediately if the employer is guilty of any speech or action constituting an offence
against the honour or reputation of the employee or if he/she harasses the employee
sexually or, if the employer assaults or threatens the employee, or commits an unlawful
action, or commits an offence against the employee which is punishable with
imprisonment, or levels serious and groundless accusations against the employee in
matters affecting his/her honour or for other immoral, dishonourable or malicious
conduct or other similar behaviour.
JFC The employer must also protect whistle-blowers from colleagues who make allegations
26,4 damaging the honour and respect of the whistle-blower in the workplace. According to
Article 24/II (d) of the EA, the employee may terminate the employment contract
immediately in cases where the employee was sexually harassed by another employee or by
third persons in the establishment, if adequate measures were not taken although the
employer was informed of such conduct or informed of other immoral, dishonourable or
1190 malicious conduct or other similar behaviour.
4.3.1.1.3.3 Civil remedies for employees. An individual who has his/her personal rights
unlawfully violated is entitled to request protection from a judge, or to seek compensation
for the violation.
The CC and OA provide remedies such as compensation for physical and moral damages
in the case of harassment, mobbing, etc. (CC Articles 24-25; OA Articles 49, 58). According to
the OA Article 49 any person who, by his/her fault and unlawful behaviour causes damage/
loss to another is obliged to provide compensation. Even when there is no law prohibiting
the damaging behaviour, a person who wilfully causes damage to another in an immoral
manner is likewise obliged to provide compensation. The OA Article 417/3 states that the
compensation for damages regarding the death, impairment of bodily integrity or breach of
the private rights of the employee, owing to the conduct of the employer which is against the
law and the contract, including the foregoing provisions, shall be subject to the provisions
for responsibility originating from inconsistency with the agreement[57].
Under the CC the claimant may also demand that the judge takes action to prevent
assault, to eliminate such threat and to assess the unlawful consequences of the assault even
though the assault is discontinued. In addition to such action, the claimant may also request
publication or notification of the recovery of damages or the judgement to third parties
(Article 24)[58].
4.3.1.1.3.4 Administrative monetary fines in violation of employees’ rights. The EA
(Articles 98-108) provides monetary fines against the employer or his/her representative
who violate the provisions of the EA in relation to the obligation to arrange a work
certificate in accordance with Article 28 or writes incorrect information on this
certificate[59]; the provisions as to wages, on annual leave with pay, on the organisation of
work and on health and safety.
Administrative penal fines are also foreseen in the OHSA against the employer or his/her
representative who violates the health and safety provisions of the OHSA (Article 26).
4.3.1.2 Protection of public officials. Under public (administrative) personnel laws, senior
officials are under the obligation of safeguarding the public officials.
To protect whistle-blowers in the public sector from retaliation and retribution by
their superiors, the Regulation on Complaints and Appeals of Civil Servants requires
that civil servants who have performed the obligation to report a crime should not be
subjected to disciplinary sanctions or retaliation which may aggravate their working
conditions (Article 14).
Nevertheless, public officials may also face considerable difficulties. Most of the time
they can be subjected to harassment, mobbing, disciplinary actions, loss of promotion
opportunities, punitive transfers.
Under Turkish law civil servants (permanent public officials) are better protected by
public (administrative) personnel laws mainly by the CSA. They are permanent workers and
they have full job security.
The situation for public officials working under administrative contracts is a more
complex issue compared to civil servants and private law employees. They work mainly on
yearly contracts. No provisions for job security exist and the body of jurisprudence that has
been developed by the administrative courts and Conseil d’etat (Highest Court in International,
administrative law) about this group is conflicting (Bakirci, 2016; Bakirci, 2017). EU and
However, public officials may appeal to the relevant administrative authority and can
object to disciplinary sanctions such as warnings, reprimands and deduction from salary, or
Turkish law
suspension of grade advancement.
In addition, disciplinary decisions including dismissal from public service are subject to
judicial inspection (the Turkish Constitution Article 129; CSA Article 135).
Remedies are available through the administrative courts and include annulment of 1191
unlawful decisions such as a disciplinary sanction, damages and costs as well as
reinstatement and back pay.
Monetary fines are available under the HREIA which prohibits discrimination, mobbing,
psychological and sexual harassment in public workplaces (Article 2)[60].
4.3.1.3 Protection of employees and public officials against retaliation in the form of
discrimination. Under the Turkish Constitution (Article 10), the EA (Article 5), CSA Article
10 and the HREIA protection is available against retaliation if it takes the form of
discrimination as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings.
Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution states that everyone is equal before the law
without distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief,
religion and sect, or any similar grounds
According to the EA Article 5, no discrimination based on language, race, sex, political
opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sex or similar reasons is permissible in the
employment relationship. Differential remuneration for similar jobs or for work of equal
value is not permissible. If the employer discriminates against the employee in the execution
of the employment relationship, the employee may demand compensation up to his/her four
months’ wages plus other claims of which he/she has been deprived[61].
The reporting employee also has the right to refrain from working (OA 97)[62] or to
terminate his/her employment contract based on just cause (EA Article 24/II)[63].
The employer or his/her representative who acts in violation of the principles and
obligation foreseen in Article 5 of the EA shall be liable to a fine of 150 liras for each
employee in this category (EA Article 99).
CSA Article 10/2 states that senior officials shall treat the civil servants in their charge
equally and fairly. They shall use the authority of their superior position within the
principles described in laws, regulations and statutes. Discrimination by the senior officials
might result in disciplinary actions against the senior officials, and/or remedies through the
administrative courts.
On the other hand the HREIA prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, colour,
language, religion, sect, philosophical and political opinion, ethnicity, wealth, birth status,
marital status, health, disability, and age in both private or public sector (Article 2). Under
the HREIA victimisation as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing
compliance with the equality principle is also considered to be a type of discrimination.
Article 4/2 states that if persons who have started or participated in administrative or legal
proceedings in respect of the principle of equality, and the prevention of discrimination, are
subjected to prejudicial treatment because of those proceedings, then such prejudicial
treatment is considered to be a type of discrimination. The Human Rights and Equality
Institution is a public legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy. It is affiliated
to the Turkish Prime Ministry. Natural persons and legal entities can file complaints of
discrimination. The Human Rights and Equality Board investigates discrimination upon
complaint and ex-officio and fines people and public/private legal entities in cases of
discrimination.
JFC 4.3.1.4 Protection of employees and public officials by penal sanctions. Penalties are
26,4 necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the rules on whistle-blower protection.
The Proposed Directive Article 17 states that Member States shall provide penalties
applicable to natural or legal persons that hinder or attempt to hinder reporting; take
retaliatory measures against reporting persons; bring vexatious proceedings against
reporting persons; breach the duty of maintaining the confidentiality of the identity of
1192 reporting persons.
The Turkish Constitution Article 49 states that everyone has the right and duty to work.
The State shall take the necessary measures to raise the standard of living of workers, and
to protect workers and the unemployed to improve the general conditions of labour, to
promote labour, to create suitable economic conditions for the prevention of unemployment
and to secure labour peace. According to the CA Article 117/1 any person who violates the
right to work and freedom of occupation by using violence or threats or by performing an
act contrary to the law, can be sentenced to imprisonment from six months to two years or
the imposition of a punitive fine upon complaint of the victim.
The CA also provides penal sanctions against retaliatory acts such as offences of bodily
harm (Articles 86-89), torture (Article 94), torment (Article 96), sexual harassment (Article
105), threat (Article 106), blackmail (Article 107), prevention of the use of trade union rights
(Article 118), hate crime and discrimination (Article 122), prevention of communication
(Article 124), defamation (Article 125), violation of communicational secrecy (Article 132),
tapping and recording of conversations between individuals (Article 133), violation of
privacy (Article 134), recording of personal data (Article 135), unlawful delivery or
acquisition of data (Article 136) etc.
The CA makes it a criminal offence to destroy, delete, conceal, change or corrupt the
evidence to hide the truth (Article 281); and to facilitate an offender in the avoidance of his/
her investigation, arrest or conviction (Article 283).
In addition, a variety of penal sanctions are set out in the CA for miscellaneous offences
by public officials. Among these are the neglect to perform a control duty (Article 251),
exceeding the limits of authorisation for use of force (Article 256), misconduct in office
(Article 257).
Prosecution of public officials for alleged offences is subject, except in cases prescribed
by law, to the permission of the administrative authority designated by law (the Turkish
Constitution Article 129; CSA Article 24; PPA). The aim of subjecting public officials to a
special criminal investigation procedure is to protect civil servants against any allegations
concerning their duties and to provide them with the security envisaged by the Constitution
(Articles 128-129) and CSA (Article 25).
4.3.2 Protection of employees and public officials against indirect retaliation. There are no
special sanctions provided for actions taken against the whistle-blowers’ relatives who are
also in a work-related connection with the whistle-blower’s employer. However, the
legislation which can be applied to whistle-blowers against retaliation is also applicable to
the whistle-blower’s relatives where relevant.
On the other hand according to the EA Article 24/II (a) and (b), the employee may
terminate the employment contract immediately based on just cause if the employer is guilty
of any speech or action constituting an offence against the honour or reputation of a member
of the employee’s family and/or if the employer assaults or threatens a member of the
employeès family with an illegal action, or commits an offence against a member of the
employeès family which is punishable with imprisonment or for other immoral,
dishonourable or malicious conduct or other similar behaviour.
4.3.3 Interim relief for whistle-blowers. Recommendation (Principle 26) and Proposed International,
Directive (Article 15) require that retaliation in any form be prohibited and sets out further EU and
measures that Member States should take to ensure the protection of reporting persons,
including interim relief pending the resolution of legal proceedings, in accordance with the
Turkish law
national framework. Interim relief can be in particular necessary to stop threats, attempts or
continuing acts of retaliation, such as harassment at the workplace, or to prevent forms of
retaliation such as dismissal, which might be difficult to reverse after the lapse of lengthy
periods and which can financially ruin the individual (a factor which can seriously 1193
discourage potential whistle-blowers).
Interim relief for public officials pending the outcome of administrative proceedings is
available under some conditions (PAJA Article 27). This could be in the form of a
provisional measure ordered by a court to prevent forms of retaliation that might be difficult
to reverse after the lapse of lengthy periods, such as disciplinary sanction or dismissal.
Interim relief pending the outcome of civil proceedings is not available under Turkish
Law (such as for employees with a private law employment contract). However, employees
subject to assault on his/her personal rights may claim protection from the judge against the
individuals who made the assault. The claimant may demand that the judge takes action to
prevent assault (such as mobbing or physical intimidation) and elimination of such threat
under CC Article 25.
Non-judicial bodies are not empowered to take temporary measures to protect the
whistle-blower.
4.3.4 Guarantee of confidentiality for whistle-blowers. While reporting openly and
without fear is ideal, experience shows that legal protection alone is not reassurance enough
for an individual who comes across wrongdoing in the course of their work and is unsure
whether or to whom to report it or is worried about their position. For these reasons,
confidentiality, should be offered and guaranteed to the individual disclosing the
information to reassure them and ensure that the focus remains on the substance of the
disclosure rather than on the individual who made it (European Committee on Legal Co-
operation, 2014).
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 (Principle 18) and the Proposed Directive require that
Member States should ensure that competent authorities have in place adequate protection
procedures for the processing of reports of infringements and for the protection of the
personal data of the persons referred to in the report.
The Proposed Directive states that internal (Article 5) and external (Articles 6, 9)
reporting channels and procedures should ensure the confidentiality of the identity of every
reporting person (Preamble Paragraphs 55, 58)[64].
In Turkish law legal provisions on confidentiality are sporadic.
Under the CPA the indictment prepared by the public prosecutor may contain the
identity of the whistle-blower in cases where there is no danger of disclosure (Article 170/e).
In some special laws, for instance under the Anti-Terror Act (No.3713), Tax Procedure
Act (No.213), DABCA, PPA, Act on Judges and Prosecutors (No.2802), Anti-Smuggling Act
(No.5607); Police Duties and Entitlements Act (No. 2559); Prevention of Offences Against
Law and Order Act (No.1481) the identity of whistle-blowers cannot be made public without
their consent. However, when the denunciation is valid, the identity can be made public at
the request of the prosecuted person.
Under the CPA, except for those mentioned in the CPA, it is not possible to refrain from
taking the witness stand (Article 46). Article 58 states that the witness shall be asked first
about his/her name, family name, age, occupation and domicile, the address of his/her
workplace or where he/she is residing temporarily, if any, his/her telephone numbers. If
JFC deemed necessary, questions related to the reliability of his/her testimony shall be asked, to
26,4 inform the judge, especially about his/her relationships with the suspect, accused or the
victim. If there is a fear of gravely endangering the witness or his/her relatives if the
witness’s identity is revealed, necessary precautions shall be taken to keep the identity a
secret. The witness, whose identity shall not be revealed, is obliged to explain the grounds
and occasion of obtaining knowledge of the facts about which he/she is going to testify. The
1194 personal data about the witness shall be kept with the public prosecutor, judge or the court,
to keep his/her identity a secret. If there is a probable grave danger for the witness in being
heard in the presence of others, and if there is no other means of preventing this danger, or if
other measures would endanger the aim of revealing the factual truth, the judge is
empowered to hear the witness in the absence of others who would have the right to be
present. However, this confidentiality is only applicable for crimes committed within the
activities of an organised crime gang.
The Anti Terror Act, the Prevention of Offences Against Law and Order Act and the
Witness Protection Act (No.5726) includes some protection for whistle-blowers and
witnesses. However, this protection is used only in extreme circumstances. The Anti-Terror
Act and Prevention of Offences Against Law and Order Act provide protection for the
identity of the whistle-blowers. The Witness Protection Act provides protection for
witnesses to crimes if they appear as a witness in a criminal prosecution. Measures include
having correspondence sent to a different address, a change of identity (both in
identification and physical appearance) and other witness protection mechanisms. It may
only apply during the duration of the criminal proceedings.
On the other hand the Regulation on the Principles of Ethical Behaviour of Public
Officials and Application Procedures and Essentials states that “Senior officials of
institutions and organisations should keep confidential the identity of the public official
whistle-blowers and take necessary steps to avoid any harm” (Article 12/2).
OmA Article 17 provides that applications to the Ombudsperson shall be kept
confidential upon the request of applicants.
Under the Turkish Constitution, PPDA and the CA both public and private law
employers are under the obligation to protect the personal data of the workers.
Although there is no express confidentiality clause for private sector internal reporting in
terms of the EA, under the general provisions of the Turkish Constitution, civil laws,
criminal laws, PPDA and the employer’s obligation to safeguard/care for his/her employees
an employer is required to avoid causing stress or the violation of the personality rights of
employees by revealing the allegation and identity of the reporting person.
The Proposed Directive also requires the confidentiality of reporting persons when they
use the reporting channels. Although in principle it is up to each individual private and
public legal entity to define the kind of reporting channels to set up, reporting channels
should not be limited to in-person reporting and complaint box(es), which do not guarantee
confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person[65].
Under Turkish law all disclosures or complaints either for public or private interest
should include the identity of the applicant. Unless the information given is credible and
supported by the evidence an anonymous application will not be processed[66].
4.3.5 Reversal of the burden of proof. Retaliatory measures are likely to be made
indirectly and it can be very difficult for reporting persons to prove the link between
informing and retaliation. Retaliators may have greater power and resources to document
the action taken and the reasoning. Therefore, Recommendation (Principle 25) and the
Proposed Directive (Article 15) require that once the reporting person demonstrates prima
facie that he/she made a report or disclosure and suffered a detriment, the burden of proof
should shift to the person who took the detrimental action. They should then demonstrate International,
that their action was not linked in any way to the reporting or the disclosure. EU and
In legal proceedings about damage suffered by a whistle-blower, is for the employer to
prove that any measures taken to the detriment of a whistle-blower were motivated by
Turkish law
reasons other than the whistle-blower’s disclosure. The reversal of the burden of proof is
important for a whistle-blower to show that he/she has suffered retaliation.
Under the CC unless a contrary provision is stipulated in the law, every one of the parties
has to prove the existence of the facts upon which he/she bases his/her right (Article 6). 1195
This provision applies in the case of a civil claim, and an unjustified or abusive dismissal
claim.
To claim abusive dismissal the employee must not only prove that a disclosure of
wrongdoing was made, but also that the employer terminated the employment relationship
because of this – something that may be difficult to establish in practice. This is an
important obstacle in Turkish Law (Bakirci,2010/2011).
To claim unjustified dismissal the employee must prove that the disclosure was based on
the truth.
However, the burden of proof in discrimination and invalid dismissal cases has been
reversed in the EA.
Article 5 of the EA states that the burden of proof in regard to the violation of the equal
treatment provision rests on the employee. However, if the employee shows a strong
likelihood of such a violation, the burden of proof that the alleged violation has not taken
place shall rest on the employer.
To claim invalid dismissal the EA Article 20/2 states that the burden of proving that the
termination was based on a valid reason shall rest on the employer. However, the burden of
proof shall be on the employee if he/she claims that the termination was based on a reason
different from the one presented by the employer.
On the other hand in public (administrative) personnel law the burden of proof is on the
state or public employer (public legal entity). Therefore, if a public official proves that a
disclosure of wrongdoing was made and he/she was subjected to retaliation because of this
claim it will be for the public employer to show that the retaliation was not because of the
whistle-blowing.
In criminal proceedings, the burden of proof always rests with the state prosecutors.
4.3.6 Financial assistance to whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers and employers are not
on an equal footing (in terms of financial resources, the availability of advisers,
leverage, etc.). A significant cost for reporting persons is incurred in contesting
retaliation measures taken against them in legal proceedings. Although they could
recover legal fees at the end of the proceedings, they might not be able to cover them up
front, especially if they are unemployed and blacklisted. Therefore it might be useful to
set up a mechanism for providing compensation or financial assistance to whistle-
blowers to help them pay legal fees and more generally to help them protect themselves
against possible reprisals.
There is no special regulations to provide financial assistance to whistle-blowers in legal
proceedings in Turkish law.
Notes
1. Democracy needs strong, accountable and transparent institutions of governance, based on
the rule of law, and including an accountable executive, an effective legislature and an
independent and impartial judiciary, efficient and inclusive public administration, as well as
an informed, empowered and politically active civil society and population. See United
Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy, www.un.org/en/pdfs/
FINALpercent20Guidancepercent20Notepercent20onpercent20Democracy.pdf
2. The fear of suffering retaliation has a chilling effect on potential whistle-blowers. Answering
to the 2017 Special Eurobarometer on corruption, 81per cent of respondents said that they did
not report the corruption that they had experienced or witnessed. Similarly, 85per cent of
respondents to the Commission’s 2017 public consultation expressed the view that workers
very rarely or rarely report concerns about threat or harm to the public interest. Fear of legal
and financial consequences was the reason most widely cited for that why workers do not
report wrongdoing (See European Commission Directorate General for Justice and
Consumers (2018), Factsheet on Whistleblower Protection, file:///C:/Users/SONY/Downloads/
Factsheet_on_Whistleblower_Protectionper cent20(1).pdf).
3. According to the CFREU Article 52/3 “in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond
to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as
those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing
more extensive protection”.
4. ECtHR, Guja v. Moldova, Application No. 14277/04, 12.2.2008.
5. ECtHR, Heinisch v. Germany, Application No. 28274/08, 21.6.2011.
6. ECtHR, Bucur and Toma v. Romania, Application No. 40238/08, 8.1.2013.
7. The Court in Guja v. Moldova noted that in a democratic system the acts or omissions of
government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial
authorities but also of the media and public opinion. The interest which the public may have in
particular information can sometimes be so strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of
confidence.
JFC 8. Disclosures to the public, for example to a journalist or a member of parliament is more likely to
26,4 be seen as reasonable where there are no safe alternative routes to reporting such concerns or
when they do not work and the wrongdoing is on-going or covered up. It is important to recall
that protecting wider public disclosures of wrongdoing to the media, for example, is essential for
accountability and transparency in a democracy based on the rule of law (European Committee
on Legal Co-operation, 2014).
1198 9. See Subsection 3.4.
10. See ECtHR, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 6841/01, 15.2.2005; Guja v.
Moldova, Application No. 14277/04, 12.2.2008; Heinisch v. Germany, Application No. 28274/08,
21.6.2011; Bucur and Toma v. Romania, Application No. 40238/08, 8.1.2013.
11. Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities
and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast);
Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services; Directive 2000/78/EC
of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation; Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
12. Directive 89/391/EC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements
in the safety and health of workers at work; Autonomous framework agreements signed by the
European social partners, respectively, on 26 April 2007 on harassment and violence at work and
on 8 October 2004 on work-related stress.
13. Mandatory mediation is not applicable to claims involving pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages that arise from occupational accidents and illnesses (LCA Article 3/3).
14. See Subsection 1.2.
15. ECtHR, Surek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, Application No. 23927/94, 8.6.1999; See also ECtHR, Steel
and Morris v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 6841/01, 15.2.2005.
16. See Subsection 3.1.3.
17. The CSA prohibits political activity (Article 7) and collective actions and activities (Article 26) of civil
servants because public service requires political neutrality from the staff. Article 7 states that civil
servants shall not become affiliated to political parties, or conduct themselves in any manner aimed at
providing advantage or disadvantage for any political party, person or group; they shall not
discriminate on the basis of language, race, sex, political ideology, philosophical belief, religion or
religious doctrine; they shall not under any circumstances make any declarations and pursue a course
of action with political and ideological aims or participate in such actions.
18. See note 43.
19. Article 40 states that everyone whose constitutional rights and freedoms have been violated has
the right to request prompt access to the competent authorities.
20. Turkish Constitutional Court, Ilter Nur Judgement, Official Journal, 14.6.2016, No.29742.
21. See also CFREU Article 52/2.
22. See Subsections 4.2.1.1 and 3.1.1.2.1.
23. See e.g. Court of Cassation, 9th Division, 2.2.2005, 92049/2901.
24. See Subsections 4.2.1.1 and 3.1.1.2.1.
25. See ECtHR, Guja v. Moldova, Application No. 14277/04, 12.2.2008; Heinisch v. Germany,
Application No. 28274/08, 21.6.2011; Bucur and Toma v. Romania, Application No. 40238/08,
8.1.2013.
26. See Subsections 4.2.1.1 and 3.1.1.2.1. International,
EU and
27. For example the Higher Education Act, No.2547; the Judges and Public Prosecutors Act, No.2802;
the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Act, No. 926. Turkish law
28. Under the CA disclosure of information relating to public security and political interests of the State
(Article 329); disclosure of confidential information, especially about the public security or domestic
and foreign political interest of the State (Article 330); exploitation of State secrets and disloyalty in
State services (Article 333); disclosure of restricted information (Article 336) constitute crimes. 1199
29. See also ECHR Article 17.
30. See Subsections 1.2.1; 3.1.1.2.1; and 4.2.1.1.
31. See for example Court of Cassation 9th Division, 31.3.1998, 3213/6233.
32. In some laws, reporting a crime (as an obligation or voluntary external disclosure) and giving
testimony by anyone is encouraged, rewards and bonuses are provided for. However, legal
provisions are disparate on this issue. For instance see the Conservation of Cultural and Natural
Property Act (No.2863); the Anti-Smuggling Act (No.5607); the Police Duties and Entitlements
Act (No.2559); the Prevention of Offences Against Law and Order Act (No.1481).
33. See Subsections 1.2.1.2; 2.2; and 2.3.
34. It does not cover independent authorities such as ombudsperson.
35. See Subsections 1.2.1 and 1.2.1.2.
36. See note 28.
37. For example see Court of Cassation 9th Division, 11.6.2007, 2006/32353, 2007/18337.
38. TI suggest that to provide a safe alternative to silence, legal measures should provide effective
legal protection of whistle-blowers against retaliation with full compensation in case of reprisals;
adequate mechanisms in public, private and not-for-profit organisations to ensure that
disclosures are properly handled and thoroughly investigated; public research, data collection,
information and training to inform about the public benefit of whistle-blowing (Transparency
International (2010).
39. See Section 2 (iv); Subsection 1.2.2.
40. See Subsection 3.4.
41. See Subsections1.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.1.
42. See Subsections 1.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.1.
43. Turkish law provides for special dismissal protection for shop stewards, trade union members
and participants of trade union activities. TUCAA Article 24 states that an employer shall not
terminate the employment contract of shop stewards unless there is a just cause for dismissal
and s/he indicates this clearly and precisely. Shop stewards have absolute reinstatement rights.
According to the Article 25 of the TUCAA no employee shall be dismissed or discriminated
against on account of his/her membership or non-membership in a trade union, his/her
participation in the activities of trade unions or employees’ organisations outside his/her hours of
work or during hours of work with the employer’s permission. Where it has been determined
that the contract of employment has been terminated for reasons related to trade union
activities, anti-union compensation [not less than an employee’s annual wages) shall be
ordered (See note 18; See also EA Articles 5 and 18(3)(a)]. The PTUCA provides protection for
trade union members and trade union officials. Public officials cannot be subjected to
different treatment or cannot be removed from the office due to participation in the activities
of trade unions or confederations, outside the working hours or within the working hours
JFC with the permission of the employer. Public employers cannot discriminate between members
or non-members of trade unions. A public employer cannot relocate a workplace trade union
26,4 representative, provincial and district representative and branch manager unless the reason
is clearly and precisely indicated (Article 18).
44. See Subsections 1.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.1.
45. See e.g. Court of Cassation, 9th Division, 13.12.2006, 14045/32850; 11.06.2007, 2006/32353, 2007/
1200 18337; 01.02.2007, 2006/17547, 2007/1767; 16.01.2012, 2011/25631, 2012/193.
46. For example see Court of Cassation 9th Division, 30.9.2004, 4860/21081.
47. See Subsections 3.1.1.3; 3.1.1.3.3; 4.2; and 4.2.1.2.
48. See Subsections 3.1.1.3; 3.1.1.3.3; 4.2; and 4.2.1.2.
49. See Subsections 1.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.1.
50. See Court of Cassation 9th Division, 8.4.1988, 2513/3945; 2.5.1989, 2074/4174.
51. See Section 2(i).
52. See Subsection 3.1.1.3.4.
53. See Subsection 1.2.1.
54. See Subsections 3.1.1.2.1; 3.1.1.3.3; 4.2 and 4.2.1.2.
55. See Subsection 3.1.1.3.2.
56. See Subsections 3.1.1.4.
57. See Subsections 3.1.1.3; 3.1.1.2.1; 4.2; and 4.2.1.2.
58. See Subsections 3.1.1.3; 3.1.1.2.1; 4.2; and 4.2.1.2.
59. See Subsection 3.1.1.2.3.
60. See Subsections 3.1.1.3 and 3.1.1.4.
61. Relevant article of the TUCAA is reserved. See notes 18 and 43.
62. See Subsection 3.1.1.3.1.
63. See Subsection 3.1.1.3.2.
64. See Subsection 4.1.
65. See Subsection 4.1.
66. See The Turkish Prime Ministry Circular Concerning the Exercise of Right to Petition and
Access to Information, No. 2004/12, Official Journal, January 2004, No.25356.
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Corresponding author
Kadriye Bakirci can be contacted at: kadriy_e@yahoo.co.uk
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