LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

References:
1987 Constitution of the Philippines
Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991

Recommended textbooks:
Gatmaytan, Dante B., Local Government Law and Jurisprudence 2014; or
Santiago, Miriam D., Local Government Code Annotated 2000

Part I. Introduction: History and Basic Concepts

Basic Laws:
● Article X, 1987 Constitution
● Administrative Code of 1987, Title XII, as amended
● Republic Act No. 7160 (1992)
● Republic Act No. 6975 (1990),
● §§ 4-12 Republic Act No. 8551 (1998)
● Republic Act No. 9263 (2004)

Local government, decentralization, autonomy

1 DE LEON v. ESGUERRA, 153 SCRA 602 (1987)

J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: In 1982, petitioner Alfredo De Leon was elected as Barangay

Captain in Brgy. Dolores in Taytay, Rizal. However in 1986 he received
an antedated Memorandum from the OIC Governor by authority of the
Minister of Local Government designating one Florentino Magno as Brgy.
Captain, dispensing with the results of the election.

Petitioners initiated an original action praying that the Memoranda be

declared null and void. Petitioners relied on Sec. 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg 222)1. On the other hand, respondents relied
on Sec. 2, Art. III of the Provisional Constitution. 2

Issues: W/N local elected officials have security of tenure

Ruling: Yes. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on

February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by

1 Their terms of office shall be 6 years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified [June 7, 1988]
2 "SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986."
 petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially

considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of
the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 2 Similarly,
the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of
political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the
President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4
Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x"

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor

on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ
of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from
proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of
this Petition. Without costs.

J. Teehankee, J. Cruz concurring; J. Sarmiento dissenting

2 SAN JUAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DBM, Cecilia Almajose 196

SCRA 69 (1991)
J. Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer post became vacant in Rizal. Being
the Acting PBO and then the Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal,
Dalisay Santos was San Juan’s top pick. However, the DBM IV Director
endorsed the appointment of Cecilia Almajose being the most qualified
based on “comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers.”

San Juan wrote a letter-complaint to the DBM Secretary contesting the

appointment Almajose. The DBM Bureau of Legal & Legislative ruled that
the letter-protest is not meritorious because DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up contested positions since none of the nominees
met the prescribed requirements.

San Juan wrote CSC protesting the appointment; however, it was

rejected; hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N LGU has the sole right and privilege to recommend
nominees to LGU positions (LOCAL AUTONOMY)- YES
Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned

resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The
appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department
of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the
Provincial Governor.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the

Constitution. It called for a local government code defining more
responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation,
merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done
except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval
by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes
was specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the

present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

“SEC. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local

governments.”

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate

earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local
autonomy more meaningful.

Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

“SEC. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local

autonomy.

SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.”

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power

of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter
and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy.
3 GANZON v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

J. Sarmiento

Facts: Mayor Ganzon was the subject of 10 administrative complaints

involving abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. He served two successive suspension (120
days).

He filed an action for prohibition against Secretary of Local Government

before RTC and CA.

Issues: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the

President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials - YES.

Ruling:

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini- states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of
America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have
compared municipal corporations euphemistically to “small republics”. 26
Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star,
though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility
under the Constitution—and as the “supervision clause” itself suggest—is
to wean local government units from overdependence on the central
government.

--

“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify

or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
test of the latter.” 36 “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.” 37 As we held, 38 however, “investigating” is not
inconsistent with “overseeing”, although it is a lesser power than
“altering”.

---

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means “a more

responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization.” 53 The Constitution, as we observed, does
nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government
over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to
“liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila.”

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership

and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The
 Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other
purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are

DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.
The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that
the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve
future suspensions on account of any of the remaining
administrative charges pending against him for acts committed
prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to
consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor
Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera

Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Compare Control (altering) vs. Supervision (overseeing, investigation)?

Decentralization of Administration vs. Decentralization of Power?

4 BASCO v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)

J. Paras

Facts: Petitioners seek the annulment of the PAGCOR, which claimed

responsible gaming, for allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
because it affected the LGU’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which
violates local autonomy.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of
Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is
violative of the principle of local autonomy.

Issue: W/N the law violates local autonomy - NO.

Ruling: The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always
subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law.

Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until “amended, repealed or revoked”

(Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its “exemption clause” remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of
local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means “decentralization” (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.”
As to what state powers should be “decentralized” and what may be delegated
to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It
is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

J. Padilla concurring, but against all forms of gambling

5 MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC., 234 SCRA

255 (1994)
J. Cruz

Facts: When PAGCOR expanded its operations in Cagayan de Oro, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro issued ordinances prohibiting, cancelling business
permits, and penalizing establishments allowing casinos to operate in their premises.

When the Pryce Property Corporations successfully assailed the hostile ordinances
before the CA, the Cagayan de Oro City elevated the decision to the Supreme Court for
review under Rule 45.

Issues: W/N the Congress retains control of the LGUs

Ruling: Yes.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

● It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

● It must not be unfair or oppressive.
● It must not be partial or discriminatory.
● It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
● It must be general and consistent with public policy.
● It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
 the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superiorial to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
---
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy.

Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains
control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute.
By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It
is so ordered.

Local governments, administrative regions, autonomous regions

● See Republic Act No. 7227 (1992), §§ 12 (i), 14

6 ABBAS v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

J. Cortes

Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that “[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.” Petitioner contends that the tenor of
the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if
only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the
Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2)
which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on
the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent
units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the
same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.”

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving
the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote
requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood
by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

7 CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to
create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on
known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the
authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the
President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued
E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions
in Mindanao.

Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is

unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President
by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regions
or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
that the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. They also
challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by
RA 6734 to the President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to
reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard
to guide the President’s discretion.

HELD: No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative

determination the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern
set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972.

The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the
country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law
requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial
and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are
"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.

The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v.
Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no
more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of
 local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services

8 CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COA, 181 SCRA 495 (1990)

Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations.

A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states
that they are to:

Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law
by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera
Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said
order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to
provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region
created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First
Congress had not yet convened.

Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government
in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the
existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies.
They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region
signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which
completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.

Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

9 ORDILLO v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)

FACTS: January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in
a plebiscite.

Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the
rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as
such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.

February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the
Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating
COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably –
then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”

March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on
first Monday of March 1991.

Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a

memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.

March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that
the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than
one constituent unit.

Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the
Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the
purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another
organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is
duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
region.

HELD: No. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.

a. The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities,

municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much
as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used
in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.

b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.

- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region.

- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a
set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in
the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA
6766)

- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)
(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the
Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V
sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)

- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and
illogical.

10 BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G.

Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No.
9371.

It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of
May 2007, CDO’s voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence.

On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act.
Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371
and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC
cannot implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division and conversion of a local govt. unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a
city, involve the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a
plebiscite

RATIO DECIDENDI: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely
increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this
case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required.

The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only increased the
representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under
 Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite while legislative
apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no
change in CDO’s territory, population, income and classification.

11 THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, 568 SCRA 402 (2008)

Facts: On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by
the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE),
to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of
the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power
to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the
GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further
provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.

Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to
disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public
consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent
petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their
agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Issues and Ruling:

1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.

YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes
shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional
as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional
amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is
implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the
course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty.

2. W/N there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern
 (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public
consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the
peace agenda:

a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete
with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;

b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment;

c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICC/IP).

3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.

NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way
to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in
the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.

W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.

NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public
scrutiny.

Carpio-Morales, J.

The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.

The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands.

The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to
the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of
its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes
the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral
declaration only when the following conditions are present:

1. the statements were clearly addressed to the international community,

2. the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and

3. that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the
security of international intercourse.

Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. Effectivity of the

Code, §§ 5(d), 536

12 EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Evardone is the mayor of Municipality of Sulat. Herein respondents filed a petition
for recall with the Office of the Local Election Registrar (LER) in said municipality against said mayor.
The respondent COMELEC issued a resolution, approving the recommendation of the LER, to hold the
signing of the petition for recall. On July 10, 1990, Evardone prayed for a TRO which was favorably
issued on July 12, 1990. On the same day, July 12, the TRO was received by the central office of
COMELEC. But it was only in July 15 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the
telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be
temporarily stopped by the TRO. Thereafter, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process
held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court. The COMELEC
held that the critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990
upon the principal i.e. the Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. Evardone
however argued that the resolution earlier issued by respondent is null and void as he maintained that
Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be
enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government
code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on
the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the adoption of the 1987 Constitution abrogated the provisions of BP 337, and therefore,
COMELEC indeed has no basis in conducting the recall.

(2) WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall
held pursuant to the questioned resolution.

HELD:
(1) No. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. RA
7160 providing for the LGC 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals
BP 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the LGC 1991 will take effect only on 1
January 1992 and therefore the old LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior
to the enactment of the new LGC, the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus, the COMELEC was vested the power to
promulgate the questioned resolution.

(2) No. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took
place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado,
et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and
its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this
Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat,
Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary,
there is no turning back the clock. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern
Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of
B.P. Blg, 337, which states: (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's
assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

NB: Petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

13 SECRETARY OF HEALTH v. COURT OF APPEALS, 241 SCRA 688 (1995)

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against private respondent Fe Sibbaluca, the
Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan, for grave misconduct, dishonesty;
etc. As a consequence of the administrative case, private respondent was placed under preventive
suspension for ninety [90] days by herein petitioner Secretary of Health.

Private respondent sought the lifting of her suspension. Pending resolution of her said motion, private
respondent instituted an action for prohibition mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tuguegarao (Branch 1). Her action is anchored on her contention that when the New Local
Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his disciplinary
power and authority over her, considering that such power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial
Health Office is now vested in the Provincial Governor.

RTC found merit to the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent so it issued a temporary
restraining order.

Issue:
WON the Secretary of Health has jurisdiction over the respondent

Ruling: Yes. The pertinent provision of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Sec. 536. Effectivity Clause. — This code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-
two, unless otherwise, provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of
general circulation.
It is explicit in the abovestated law that the local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on
January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature
should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action (Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).
In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before petitioner
department in 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the
suspension order was issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of
the commencement of the administrative action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of
1987 and Executive Order No. 119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control,
direction and supervision over his subordinates, which include private respondent. Consequently,
since jurisdiction has been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent
before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final
disposition of the administrative case.

This Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case
remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary.

Part II. Book I: General Provisions

Title One: Basic Principles

A. Policy and Application Rep. Act No. 7160, §§ 1-4

Rules of Interpretation, § 5 LCG

14 GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MUNICIPALITY OF

BALANGA, 239 SCRA 436 (1994)

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land, situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of Balanga,
Province of Bataan. Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the
Camacho family, which donated the present site of Balanga Public Market to the Municipality.
The lot in dispute is behind the said market. Petitioner discovered portions of the property had
been “unlawfully usurped and invaded” by the Municipality, which “allowed/tolerated/abetted”
construction of shanties and market stalls, while charging market fees and entrance fees from
occupant and users of the area.
Petitioner applied for a permit to operate a business, which was revoked soon by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga.

Petitioner then filed a case, praying for the reinstatement of the permit, or a prohibitory
injunction on the revoking of the said permit. Respondents argued that the Mayor may issue,
deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. The revoking of the permit was a legitimate
exercise of local legislative authority, therefore making it not tainted with any grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner argued that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no
reason to revoke the Mayor’s permit. Petitioner alleged that the respondent violated due
process in revoking the permit, and challenged the legality of the collection of market and
entrance fees.The revoking of the permit was based on a Civil Case, pertaining to the
subdivision of the property into nine lots. The property was originally owned by Camacho,
donated the land to her daughter Aurora, which donation was canceled and was transferred to
the petitioner.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED and Executive Order
No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issued, respectively, by respondents Mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, Bataan are NULLIFIED for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion; and (2) the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or
maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to
acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land
(Province of Rizal v. San Diego, 105 Phil. 33 [1959]; Republic v. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461
[1955]). Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police
powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg.
337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]). But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders
and traders cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the
stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal
government.

Indeed, the claim that the executive order and resolution were measures "designed to
promote peace and order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too
amorphous and convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts (Villacorta v.
Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986]).

Moreover, we find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed
petitioner's right to due process (Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 51 [1988]). The alleged
violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of
revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until the Rejoinder was
filed in the instant case. In fact, with all the more reason should due process have been
observed in view of the questioned Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.

If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and
Resolution No. 12, s-88, the Mayor's arbitrary action can be annulled.

In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the owner of Lot 261-B-6-
A-3, then there is no legal basis for it to impose and collect market fees and market entrance
fees. Only the owner has the right to do so.

Be that as it may, the Mayor's permit issued on January 11, 1988 cannot now be reinstated
despite the nullity of its revocation. The permit expired on December 31, 1988.

15 TANO v. SOCRATES, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from
January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary
restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach (CUB) of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.
To doubt is to sustain.

After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners
claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the
former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.

Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an
individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter
or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family .
It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within
these definitions.

Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently
provides:

SECTION 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. - (a) Municipalities shall have the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rentals, fees
or charges therefore in accordance with the provisions of this Section. (b) The Sangguniang
Bayan may: (1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic
beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it:
Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen
shall have the preferential right to such fishery privileges: Provided, further, That the
Sangguniang bayan may require a public bidding in conformity with and pursuant to an
ordinance for the grant of such privileges: Provided, finally, That in the absence of such
organizations and cooperatives or their failure to exercise their preferential right, other parties
may participate in the public bidding in conformity with the above cited procedure. (2) Grant
the privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other
species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal
fishermen free of any rental, fee, charge or any other imposition whatsoever. (3) Issue for the
operation of fishing vessels of three (3) tons or less for which purpose the Sangguniang bayan
shall promulgate rules and regulations regarding the issuances of such licenses to qualified
applicants under existing laws. Provided, however, That the Sanggunian concerned shall, by
appropriate ordinance, penalize the use of explosives, noxious or puissance substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing and prescribe a criminal penalty
therefore in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, finally, That the
Sanggunian concerned shall have the authority to prosecute any violation of the provisions of
applicable fishery laws.

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed
the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right.

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare
Clause, expressly mentions this right:

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of
the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units
in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by

the Constitution. Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that
[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution
of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned,

Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),
and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances
cannot be doubted.

B. General Power and Attributes,

● -§§ 6-24 Creation of Local Government Units

● Constitution, Art. X,
● §§ 1, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19 LGC
● §§1 6-10, 385-386, 441-442, 449-450, 460- 461 Republic Act No. 7878 (1995)
● Republic Act No. 8371 (1997),
● § 18 Republic Act No. 9009 (2001)
● Republic Act No. 9054 (2001),
● article IV, § 19 See Republic Act No. 10170 (2012)
Creation

16 SEMA v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700 (2008)

Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what
was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.
Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution

No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to

adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
“Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”

Issue:
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits –

 (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).

Held:
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio:
The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or
barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must
not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress”
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x.”

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also
be created without a legislative district.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion

legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

In view of certiorari and mandamus.

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the
writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to
perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner
in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election.
Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as
the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato
City for representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be
included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for
us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in
these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),
creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional
for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province
and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number
of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the
present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by
Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district.
Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.

Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000,
and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of
250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic
Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of
the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that
the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

17 TORRALBA v. SIBAGAT, 147 SCRA 390 (1987)

Facts:

BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged
as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. Petitioners are residents and
taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public
officials of the new Municipality. According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code
must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality,
or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date
BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not BP 56 is invalid. NO

Held :

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3,
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no
requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much
the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a
LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid
down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the
people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality
of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The
officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing
their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the
power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of
any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential
for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of
Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec
and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged
statute was enacted on 3 December1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the
Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters
in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the
plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides
for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area
for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the
creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended
the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on
the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course
of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.

18 PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)

FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November
10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under
the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan

ISSUE:
W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the
time of and prior to said transfer.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative
function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby
arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by
creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power
to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control
denied to him by the Constitution.

Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
above referred to. It is so ordered.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
above referred to. It is so ordered.

19 PADILLA v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (1992)

Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted and the voters rejected
its creation. The governor questioned the result and challenged the inclusion of the voters of
the mother municipality in the plebiscite.

Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected—Section 10, Article X, 1987
Constitution.

Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province
of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its
approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all
the voters of the Municipality of Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court
to set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not include the parent political unit—the Municipality of
Labo.

Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?

Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units
directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units
which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the
parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

What will happen to the considerations in Sec. 7, LGC?

20 CAWALING v. COMELEC, 368 SCRA 453 (2001)

https://www.scribd.com/document/457858760/Cawaling-v-COMELEC-Digest-with-issue-ng-
kambal-case

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

21 CAGAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013

CASE DIGEST: MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

represented by its CHAIRMAN ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES JR. and the PROVINCIAL
ELECTION OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, represented by ATTY. MA. FEBES BARLAAN.
(G.R. No. 209185; October 25, 2013).

FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur,
filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the
same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao
Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360),
the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this
Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in
a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations
for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously
with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.

Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to
amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who
can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?

HELD: The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall."

The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections. The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections."

The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or
plebiscites.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5
February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on
13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013
as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in
the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections. The logistic and
financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is
unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps
covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province
of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would
have the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC
abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of
these tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National
and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its
manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local
Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all
plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360. DENIED.

22 LATASA v. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 601 (2003)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
https://www.scribd.com/document/396576720/Case-Digest-Latasa-vs-COMELEC

Title: Latasa vs. COMELEC

Topic: From Municipal Mayor to City Mayor

Citation: G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in
the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.

During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be
known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic
Act No. 8798 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province
into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos" or the Charter of the City of Digos.

This event also marked the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.

However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a
hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos.

Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.

On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May
14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is
now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in
the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa.

Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.

On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false
representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had
served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he
argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14,
2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

Accordingly, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different
treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.

However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Accordingly, the petitioner averred that there was substantial differences do exist between a
municipality and a city. For one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights
of the local government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly,
these changes affect the people as well.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor
of the Municipality of Digos?

HELD:
No. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose
those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule,
in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. The present elective officials of the Municipality of
Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a time that a new
election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their
offices.

As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes
and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by the Municipality of Digos.

This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to
exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. True,
the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality.

This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor.

As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality.

Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal
mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May
1998 elections.

Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the
conversion of Digos from municipality to city?
This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.

However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as
city mayor.

Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit.

He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to
the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result
of a prolonged stay in the same office.

To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.

This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

Infine, Latasa is barred from running for another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos.

The court held that, in any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession.

23 LACEDA V. LIMENA, G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_182867_2008.html

https://www.scribd.com/document/392680439/25-Laceda-vs-Limena-Digest
WHEREFORE, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr.'s Motion for Reconsideration 18 dated July 25,
2008 assailing this Court's Resolution dated June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.

Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government Code from which it
was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates
who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the
prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he or she
has fully served three consecutive terms.16

24 NAVARRO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011

● RA 9355 (Act creating Province of Dinagat Island; Petitioners

● On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9355.6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.7
● Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del
Norte, filed another petition for certiorari 8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that
when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only
and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.—

Issues: Can the province of Dinagat be created despite not reaching the requirement of
LCG of 200 sq. m.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and
filed on October 29, 2010;

2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article
9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and

4. The petition is DISMISSED.

De Facto Corporations

25 MALABANG v. BENITO, 27 SCRA 533 (1969)

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while
the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the
councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a
part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by
Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1 of the
latter municipality.

The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to
restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective
office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva. 3

Issue: And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto
corporation

HELD:

As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which seem
to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:

I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may
be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

 2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time
by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation
can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by
the general laws or constitution of the state.

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a
de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.

III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of
which is apparent on its face.

IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure
corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.10

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact
that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on
the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation,
as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.
 26 CANDIJAY v. CA, 251 SCRA 530 (1995)

December 28, 1995

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, ACTING THROUGH ITS SANGUNIANG

BAYAN AND MAYOR, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents

PANGANIBAN, J.:

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision

SUMMARY: Mun. of Candijay filed a case for the settlement of boundary dispute
against Mun. of Alicia over Barrio Pagahat. When the CA ruled in Mun. of Alicia’s favor,
Mun. Candijay attacked the juridical personality of the Mun. of Alicia on the ground that
E.O. 265, which created the latter municipality, is void since Sec. 68 of the RAC from
which the E.O. derives authority constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers
to the President and has been declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Auditor Gen.
HELD: Reiterated the ruling and principles in Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez
which held that Mun. of San Andres is not only a de facto but is already a de jure
municipality by virtue of the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality (i.e. reclassification into a fifth class municipality, establishment of MTC,
apportioning seats in Congress). Mun. of Alicia’s situation case is similar to that of the
Mun. of San Andres having been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated and having been recognized by in the same manner by the
State. It should likewise benefit from the effects of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, henceforth,
considered also as a regular, de jure municipality.

DOCTRINE: A municipality created under a void executive order does not lose its
juridical personality merely on such basis. Peculiar circumstances, such as continued
recognition of its existence by the State without any judicial declaration of its legality,
allows its attainment of a status approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto
municipal corporation. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC, is also a curative law which converted
the status of municipal corporations created by E.O.s and other issuances prior to its
enactment into de jure municipalities.

FACTS:

· Mun. of Candijay, Bohol filed a case in the RTC Br. 1 of Tagbilaran for the
settlement of boundary dispute and quieting of title over Barrio Pagahat against
Mun. of Alicia, Bohol.

· RTC: Barrio/barangay Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the

municipality of Candijay, Bohol. Said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory,
therefore, belonging to said municipality".

o It permanently enjoined the municipality of Alicia "to respect Mun. of

Candijay’s control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat
and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the
same barrio"
 · CA: Reversed RTC. Barrio Pagahat is NOT within the territorial jurisdiction of
the municipality of Candijay." It dismissed the complaint (ruling for defendant Mun.
of Alicia) on the basis of equiponderance of evidence bet. the 2 parties.

o The boundary line being claimed by Mun. of Candijay is not proper since it
would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat, part of Barrio
Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of
Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of Mun.
of Candijay."

o Said municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also
of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part
of the Mun. of Mabini.

o Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial
jurisdiction under the law creating her.

o RTC erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for Candijay],

because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La
Hacienda within the jurisdiction of Candijay when said barrios are
undisputedly part of Alicia’s territory under E.O. No. 265 creating the latter"

o Both of the respective survey plans of Candijay and Alicia are inadequate
insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay
and the Mun. of Mabini (not a party to case) as declared by the Provincial
Board of Bohol.

o Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as

one of the barrios constituted as part of Mun. of Alicia. Neither do they show
that Barrio Pagahat forms part of Mun. of Candijay."

§ This was concluded on the basis of E.O. 265 (which created the
municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of
Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission (which set forth
the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and
Candijay).

· Hence, Mun. of Candijay filed this petition alleging that:

o Mun. of Alicia lacks juridical personality, as a result of having been

created under a void executive order

o CA improperly applied the principle of "equiponderance of evidence", for

having based its ruling on documentary evidence which are void

o CA Decision does not solve the problem of both towns but throws them
back again to their controversy

ISSUE # 1: Whether the Mun. of Alicia lacks juridical personality as a result of having
been created under a void executive order? (NO)

RATIO # 1:
 · Mun of Candijay: Mun. of Alicia has no juridical personality since E.O. 265
issued by President Quirino on Sept. 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is
null and void ab initio.

o Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. on which said E.O. was based, constituted
an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines,
and was therefore declared unconstitutional, per Pelaez vs. Auditor General.

o FOOTNOTE 3 on Pelaez v. Auditor General: Whereas the power to fix a

common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature -- involving,
as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature.

§ Sec. 68 of the RAC (insofar as it grants to the President the power to

create municipalities) does not meet the requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.

§ Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, said

Sec. 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on Mar.
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
1935 Constitution, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with
said statutory enactment."

· SC: Mun. of Alicia is similar to the municipality under consideration in the

case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr:; hence, the ruling in
said case also applies here. Mun. of Alicia should henceforth be considered as not
merely a de facto municipality, but already a regular, de jure municipality.

Mun. of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr:

· Mun of San Narciso: The enactment of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code)
may have converted the Mun. of San Andres into a de facto municipality. However,
since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law,
Mun. of San Narciso municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the
nullification of E.O. 353 (creating the municipal district of San Andres).

o Any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of R.A. 7160 (see below) to the petition
would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

· SC: Untenable. Case to annul the E.O. was not seasonably brought. It was
only after 30 years from enactment of E.O. 353 that the municipality of San Narciso
challenged its legality.

o In the meantime, the Municipal district, later the Mun. of San Andres,
began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created
LGU.

o A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political

subdivision must be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
o Granting that E.O. No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Mun. of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation.

o Created in 1959 by virtue of E.O. 353, Mun. of San Andres had been IN
EXISTENCE for more than 6 years when, on Dec. 24, 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated.

§ The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 353 but it was not to be the case.

o On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's

recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres.

§ After more than 5 years as a municipal district, E.O. 174 classified

Mun. of San Andres as a 5th class municipality after having surpassed
the income requirement laid out in R.A 1515.

§ Under Sec. 31 of BP Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

in connection with Admin. Order 33 and PD 537, the Mun. of San
Andres had been covered by the 10th Mun. Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for Quezon province.

o At present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality

must be dispelled.

§ Under the Ordinance apportioning the seats of the HoR, appended to

the 1987 Constitution, the Mun. of San Andres has been considered to
be one of the 12 municipalities composing the 3rd District of the
province of Quezon.

§ Under Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts "organized

pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities."

· No pretension of its unconstitutionality per se is proffered.

§ The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Sec. 442(d)
in the Code.

§ Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at

giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly
accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.
 § The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province
of Quezon must now be conceded."

· CASE AT BAR: Mun. of Alicia’s situation is strikingly similar to that of the

Mun. of San Andres.

o It was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949, or 10 years ahead of the

municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of 16
years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated.

o Various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's
recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof.

§ Under Admin. Order 33, the Mun. of Alicia was covered by the 7th
Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol.

§ Under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Mun. of

Alicia is one of 20 municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.

§ It should likewise benefit from the effects of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC
and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.

ISSUE # 2: Whether CA improperly applied the principle of "equiponderance of

evidence", for having based its ruling on documentary evidence which are void? (NO)

RATIO # 2: The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the CA involves the

appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by SC unless
shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.

27 JIMENEZ v. BAZ, 265 SCRA 182 (1996)

Jimenez v. Baz (1996)

Mendoza J.

FACTS:

In 1949, pursuant to E.O. 258 of then President Quirino, the Municipality of Sinacaban was
created. Said order provided a technical description[1] of Sinacaban’s metes and bounds,
according to which the Municipality would cut into the southern portion of the Municipality of
Jimenez.

· 1988: Pursuant to said technical description, Sinacaban laid with the Provincial Board a
claim to a portion of particular barrios. However, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding
that under E.O. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, asserted jurisdiction over the
same areas on the basis of an agreement it had entered into with the Sinacaban.
 o Said agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77 which provided that barrios Macabayao,
Sitio Adorable and site as part of Jimenez.

· The Provincial Board declared the disputed area part of Sinacaban.

o HELD: The resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities

was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries as fixed in
E.O. 258.

Jimenez files a petitioner for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with the RTC.

· Following the Pelaez v. Auditor General doctrine, Jimenez contends that “the
power to create municipalities is essentially legislative, and consequently, Sinacaban,
which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to
assert a territorial claim.

· RTC ruled in Sinacban’s favor.

o That Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized

itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty
years before the existence was questioned;

o That Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reversed to the State in quo warranto proceedings;

o That Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of

Sinacaban after having entered into an agreement with it;

o That any question as to Sinacaban’s legal existence has been cured by Sec
442(d) of the LGC, which provides: Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.

WoN Sinacaban legally exists (Yes, as a de facto corporations)

Though, as ruled in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the creation of municipal corporations is

essentially a legislative matter and cannot be created by the executive, the court has since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
recognized, its creation can no longer be questioned.

· In the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr, the SC took into
consideration the following factors:

1. The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality
had never been challenged;

2. The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
 question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality;

3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality in
the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.

4. That the Sec. 442(d) of the LGC was curative.

o The same factors exist to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de

facto municipal corporation.

· It must be kept in mind that Sinacaban was created in 1949, and it has therefore been
in existence for already 40 years before it was questioned.

o This is emphasized given that Rule 66(16), on quo warranto suits against a
corporation, must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act
complained of was done.

o On the contrary, the State and Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacaban’s
existence.

§ Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: Sinacaban is constituted as part

of the municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

§ Jimenez-Sinacaban Agreement- Speaks for itself.

§ Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution: Apportioning legislative

districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the
Second District.

o Moreover, indeed, Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is deemed to have cured whatever
doubts there may have been to Sinacaban.

WoN Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is invalid in failing to conform to the constitutional and statutory
requirement of plebiscite in the creation of new municipalities (No)

· First of all, the requirement only applies to new municipalities created under the 1987
Constitution.

· Secondly, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took
effect.

· Thirdly, the requirement of plebiscite was fist introduced in the 1973 Constitution which
took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations
created before, such as the municipality of Sinacaban (1949).

WoN the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban (No)
· The barrios enumerated in E.O. 258 are not necessarily exclusive. “Sinacaban
contains…” may include others.

· Whether or not the agreement entered into by Jimenez and Sinacaban is valid will be
determined by the result of the survey.

o Pelaez v. Auditor General: Power of provincial boards to settle boundary

disputes is "of an administrative nature.” Thus it is limited to implementing the
law, and not amending it.

o If any alterations of boundaries were made, Resolution 77 cannot be said to

be merely administrative, nor valid. In gist, if Resolution 77 is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez
as basis for opposing the claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

[1] Technical Description: On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the
lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 840 30’W., 7,250 meters to point 2 which is on the bank of
Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan River branch 2,400 meters southwesterly 'to
point 3, thence a straight line S 870 00’ W, 22,550 meters to point 4, where this intersects the
Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by the present Misamis Occidental-
Zamboanga boundary; and on the south by the present Jimenez-Tudela boundary; and on the
east, by the limits of the municipal waters which the municipality of Sinacaban shall have
pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code, (Description based on data
shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion of Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).
Plebiscite
28 TOBIAS v. ABALOS, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Tobias vs. Abalos

G.R. No. 114783 / December 8, 1994 / Bidin, J./LOCGOV-General Power and Attributes;
Plebiscite JMQAquino

NATURE Petition to render RA7675 unconstitutional

PETITIONERS Robert V. Tobias, Ramon M. Guzman, Terry T. Lim, Gregorio D.

Gabriel, Roberto Tobias, Jr.

RESPONDENtS Hon. City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, City Treasurer William

Marcelino, Sangguniang Panglungsod, all of the City of Mandaluyong

SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the constitutionality and validity of

RA 7675 “An Act converting Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City”. The law provided for the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts. Petitioners argue, among others, that the plebiscite
should have included the residents of San Juan.

DOCTRINE. The inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of

the congressional district together with Mandaluyong, were
properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the matter of
separate district representation was only ancillary thereto

FACTS.

· Feb 9 1994: Ramos signed RA 7675[1] “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong”

· April 10 1994: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was
held asking the people of Mandaluyong whether they approved of the conversion of the
municipality into a city.
 · The turnout was 14.41% of the voting population. 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911
voted “no”. RA 7675 was deemed ratified by virtue of these results

· Petitioners now assail the constitutionality and validity of RA 7675 on the grounds
that:

o Art VIII, Sec 49 of RA 7675[2] violates the one subject-one bill rule[3]. The inclusion of
which in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second is not
germane to the subject matter of RA 7675 since the title expresses the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a city.

o The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution[4].

o Furthermore, said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. There is no
mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts

o Sec 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) of the Constitution[5]

o [RELEVANT] The people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district.

o RA 7675 has resulted in “gerrymandering” (practice of creating legislative districts to

favor a particular candidate or party)

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON RA 7675 is unconstitutional- NO

a. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject

separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a city but is a natural and logical
consequence thereof. The title of RA 7674 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject
treated under Sec 49 on the creation of a separate congressional district.
The creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is in compliance
with the “one city-one representative” in Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution, which reads: “x x
x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Moreover, we ruled that the one subject-one bill rule should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

b. A reading of Art VI, Sec 5(1)[6] shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. It provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” Thus, the present composition of Congress
may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

c. That there was no mention in the assailed law of any census does not suffice to strike
down the validity of RA 7675. It enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws from the legislature contain all relevant data considered by Congress
in their enactment.

d. The argument that Sec 49 preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
district borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress
itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

e. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary to the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite, which was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they
had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

f. Argument that the law resulted in gerrymandering is incredible. It should be noted that
Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

DECISION. Petition Denied

[1] Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, incumbent congressional representative of the legislative district to
which the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged, sponsored the bill which
eventually became RA 7675

[2] “As a highlyurbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of
this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall
become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the
same election.”

[3] Constitution, Art VI, Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof

[4] Constitution, Art VI, Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

[5] Constitution, Art VI, Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.

[6] supra
 29 PASIG v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179 (1999)

Pasig vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 125646/ Sept. 10, 1999 /Ynares-Santiago, J./LOCGOV-Plebiscites/MBDELACRUZ

NATURE Certiorari and Prohibiton

PETITIONERS City of Pasig; Municipality of Cainta, RIzal

RESPONDENTS COMELEC

SUMMARY. 2 petitions question the propriety of the

suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of
the issue of boundary disputes between the Cainta and Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan
while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico.
Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while
the Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached
upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

DOCTRINE.

1. Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute

between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.

2. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial

jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries.

FACTS.

· Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its
mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted and separated
 into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig
passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in
Pasig City. Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay
Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscites were scheduled accordingly.

· Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the plebiscites scheduled, and filed TWO
Petitions with the COMELEC. In both Petitions, Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement
of boundary dispute. Cainta claimed the proposed barangays involve areas included
in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have
been finally decided by the court.

· 1 st petition: COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay

Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the
boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by
the City of Pasig.

· 2 nd Petition: The COMELEC dismissed the Petition for being moot in view of the
holding of the plebiscite where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved
by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute
between the two local governments? YES. The plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute
between Pasig and Cainta by the Antipolo RTC. In the same vein, the plebiscite held to ratify
the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
SC: in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42- in the interest of good order, we can very
well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.

· Pasig claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico are within its territory yet portions of the same area are included in the boundary
dispute case pending before the Antipolo RTC.

· WON the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Cainta or Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico.

o A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial

jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or
less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless
such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of
the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that,
we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.

The SC did not agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the
case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has
already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico
are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

· Tan v. COMELEC: Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for
non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and
a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic.

DECISION.

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED.

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED.

 30 MARIANO v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)

Mariano v. COMELEC

Facts:

Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati, petitioned for prohibition and
declaratory relief. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive
term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law

(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in

accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.

Sec 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-

urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
 Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)

Issue: WON judicial review is indispensible to substantiate the constitutionality of the sections
2, 51 and 52 of the R.A. No. 7854 :An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati/ whether or not the RA is valid

Held: NO

Rationale:

At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order
to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other
words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment
of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of
a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may
or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not
also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. To hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.

section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least
one congressional representative. 14

Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject.

31 MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, 314 SCRA 603 (1999)

JOSE MIRANDA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALEXANDER AGUIRRE

Facts:

On 1994, R.A. 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent
component city. The people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On 1998, R.A.
8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it downgraded the status of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. However, R.A. No. 8528
lacked provision for the ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. The
OSG argued that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city, hence, it does not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," thus, a plebiscite
of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite?

Ruling: YES.

The Court holds that the Constitution requires a plebiscite, as per section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in
the political units directly affected."

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial.
For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will
be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.

It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions — first, the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria
fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the
law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."

In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the
said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These
requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income,
population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. The people's
plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose.
With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city
of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of
Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both
were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time.
 32 SAMSON v. AGUIRRE, 315 SCRA 53 (1999)

Samson v. Aguirre G.R. No. 133076 | September 22, 1999 Quisumbing, J.

Petitioners: Moises S. Samson - Councilor, 1s* District of Quezon City Respondents: Exec.
Sec. Alexander Aguirre, COMELEC, and DBM

SUMMARY: Petitioner Samson challenges the constitutionality of RA 8535 (which created the
City of Novaliches) signed into law by Presdident Ramos. He avers that the enactment of the
law did not comply with the requirement of the LGC that certifications be issued showing that
the proposed city reached the threshold for annual income, population, and land area. The
Court dismissed the petition and found that RA 8535 had complied with all the requirements of
the LGC, ruling that the attestation of certain officials before Senate proceedings regarding
Novaliches' income and demographic statistics amounted to compliance.

FACTS:

• Feb. 23, 1998: Pres. Ramos signed RA 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City. • Petitioner filed this petition before the Court seeking to enjoin the
Executive Secretary from implementing RA 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for
the creation of Novaliches City, and the DBM from disbursing funds for the said plebiscite.

• Petitioner's arguments:

RA 8535 failed to conform to the requirements of Sec. 7, LGC and Art. 11(b)(1),(2) of the IRR.
According to these provisions, for a certain geographic unit to become a city, it must have an
annual income of at least P20 million and a population of at least 150,000 or a contiguous
land area of at least 100sq.km. (except when the proposed city is composed of islands) These
parameters should be certified by the DOF (as to its income) and the NSO (as to its
population) or the DENR (as to its land area). The law also requires a certification from the
affected LGU stating that the creation of the new city from its territory would not adversely
affect that LGU.

According to petitioner, there was no certification presented from the DOF and NSO or DENR
during the Senate deliberations for the passage of RA 8535, as evidenced by the minutes.

However, he was silent as to the House of Representatives deliberations. He also claims that
Quezon City, the affected LGU, never issued a certification as required by law.

The law also failed to provide for a specific seat of government as required by Sec. 11 (a),
LGC. RA 8535 was violative of the 1987 Constitution insofar as the ordinance appended to it
states that Metro Manila shall be composed of 17 cities and municipalities; thus, in creating a
new city, the law will amend the Constitution.

• Respondents' arguments:

Petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations with convincing proof. As every statute is
presumed valid, he failed to discharge the burden of proof to overcome the presumption that
Congress considered all the requirements under the LGC in passing RA 8535.
ISSUES + RULING:

1. W/N RA 8535 complied with the requirements of the LGC in the creation of Novaliches City.
YES

· Representatives from the DOF, DBM, NSO and DENR, acting in their official capacities,
attested before the Senate to the compliance of Novaliches, using official statistics, with the
parameters required by the LGC. Their official statements could serve the same purpose
contemplated by the law requiring certification
o Income: The average combined income for 1995 and 1996 of the 13 barangays
to be extricated from Quezon City to form Novaliches was P26 million.
o Population: The population of the proposed city was already at 347,310.
o Land Area: To inquire about the land area is unnecessary since the Local
Government Code requires compliance with the income requirement, and either one
of the population or land area requirement.

· Moreover, it is also inaccurate to allege that Quezon City did not issue a certification
when its Mayor, Ismael Mathay, was present in the Senate proceedings. It is true, as claimed
by Samson, that Mathay was only present to ensure that the plebiscite would include all
Quezon City residents. However, as Mayor, he could have manifested any adverse effect by
the law on Quezon City, which he did not do.

· That the Quezon City Council was not issued a copy of the petition of barangays calling
for the creation of Novaliches also did not invalidate RA 8535. The purpose of that
requirement is to inform the city council of the move to create another city. The city council
cannot deny that it was not informed when the matter has been widely publicized in the mass
media.

· As for the requirement to set up a government center, the LGC allows for its provision
after the creation of the new city.

2. W/N RA 8353 is unconstitutional. NO

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union: A statute is (liberally) presumed to be

constitutional. A person who attacks it must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt.
When there is reasonable basis that supports the statute, the Court must uphold it.

Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality enjoyed by RA 8535.

The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner's contention.

The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere in the Constitution
does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Abolition

33 SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 334

SCRA 379 (2000)

SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN v.

COMELEC and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN

G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000

BUENA, J.:

CASE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the
Order issued by the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct"

FACTS:

On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book
of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji
Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the
precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for
certiorari.

On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to
the respective BEI of the questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian
Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of book of
voters.

On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani,
herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the
23 barangays, filed an "Answer in Opposition" which included the affidavits of the barangay
chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of
voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the
bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the
COMELEC issued an Order dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law
Department for appropriate investigation.

The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998
directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del
Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter
submit a report on the investigation conducted." Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK
FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing
Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular
inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao
Del Sur."

On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts. It was
found out that:

(1) in Barangay Padian Torogan, there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with
no roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that
no single human being could possibly reside in these two structures.

Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So
this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying
that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285.

(2) In Barangay named Rakutan, the ocular inspection was stopped by the Madalum
Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun

On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998
reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were
uninhabited.

On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:

Xxx
(2) finds Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and shall be excluded from the special election to
be conducted in Madalum.

(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu, to immediately resume the investigation, the
remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to the Commission with
dispatch, allowing it to submit partial findings if necessary.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. NO.

HELD: The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the
one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not
mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be
clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election precinct
in the said place.

The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the
voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-
honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to
investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said
place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a
fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is
not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people
migrate.
 A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does
not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the
case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be
done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the
mandatory requirement of a plebiscite 16 conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.

The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari

particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the
case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means
available to it.

The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in
the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand.

Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no

such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered
when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise.

Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not
otherwise disqualified by law.

On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and
credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will"
would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should
give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.

FOOTNOTES:

The Commission shall establish all election precincts.

The precincts actually established in the preceding regular elections shall be maintained, but
the Commission may introduce such adjustments, changes or new divisions or abolish them,
if necessary; Provided, however, That the territory comprising an election precinct shall not be
altered or a new precinct established within forty-five days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election or a referendum plebiscite.

Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 7160.

Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when
its income, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national
agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or the sanggunian concerned, as the
case may be.

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged.

Sec. 10, R.A. 7160.

Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Election
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

Art. V, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.

Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

34 SALVA v. MAKALINTAL, 340 SCRA 506 (2000)

SALVA V MAKALINTAL

FACTS: Feb 23, 1998. Officials and residents of Brgy. Rafael, Calaca Batangas filed a class
suit against the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan and
COMELEC before RTC for the annulment of Ordinance No. 5 and Resolution No. 345, and
Resolution No. 2987 with prayer for preliminary injunction/tro.
 A. Ordinance No. 5 declared the abolition of Brgy San Rafael and its merger with
Brgy Dacanlao (municipality of Calaca). It instructed COMELEC to conduct plebiscite as
provided under Secs. 9 and 10 of LGC.
B. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 5, thereby
overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas who said that it is ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under Sec 9 in relation to
Sec. 7 of LGC referring to the certifications of DOF, NSO, and LMB of DENR were
obtained.
C. Pursuant to Ord5 and RN 345, on Feb 10, 1998, COMELEC promulgated
RESOLUTION NO 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct
of the required plebiscite to decide the issue of the abolition of the merger.

SIMULTANEOUS with the filing of the action for tro, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion
for issuance of tro to enjoin respondents from enforcing 5, 345, and 2987.

TRIAL COURT: denied ex parte motion for lack of jurisdiction. The tro sought is directed
only to COMELEC 2987. RULED that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.

FEB 27, a day before the plebiscite, petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari and issuance of
TRO to enjoin Comelec from holding plebiscite.

In a resolution, the Court directed parties to maintain status quo.

Solicitor-general filed a manifestation and motion declaring that he concur with the petitioner.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS:

Petitioners submitted the ff issues: Does RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin comelec from
implementing 2987 pending the determination of the civil case for annulment of 5 and 345.

a. FIRST, petitioners contend that the order of RTC encourages multiplicity of suits
and splitting a single cause of action, contrary to Sec. 3 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. Since
2987 was issued only in pursuance to 5 and 345, its validity is dependent only upon the 2
and considering that the jurisdiction of RTC to determine validity of 5 and 345 is
undisputed, the order directing them to go to Supreme Court for the tro, advances
multiplicity of suits.

b. SECOND, petitioners said that when COMELEC exercises it quasi-judicial

 functions under Sec 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the
exclusive review of the Supreme Court; BUT WHEN COMELEC PERFORMS A
PURELY MINISTERIAL DUTY, SUCH ACT IS SUBJECT TO THE SCRUTINY BY THE
RTC. Citing Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer thus: "It cannot be
gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on
Elections may either be classifi1ed as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in
character.
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that the conduct of plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply
ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance
and Resolution, citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, thus: To rule otherwise would surely
burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the
RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

c. LASTLY, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has
already been conducted, the petition is not yet moot and academic claiming that the
actual holding of the said plebiscite cannot validate an otherwise invalid ordinance
and resolution, that there are still substantial matters to be resolved. ASSUMING
ARGUENDO, that petition is moot, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review. FINALLY, they maintain that this Court has
resolved to require to maintain the status quo. SOLICITOR GENERAL CONCURS,
issuance of 2987 is a ministerial duty of COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative function, hence Sec 7 Art. 9-A of Constitution is inapplicable.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:

COMELEC, on the other hand, submits that the power to review or reverse COmelec R.
2987 solely belongs to SC citing different cases.

a. For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may
review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to
understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in
point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: It is easy to realize the chaos that would
ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto
itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission
on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence.
 b. The COMELEC further argues that if a Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited
above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public
Service Commission, Social Security Commission, National Electrification Administration
and Presidential Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such
jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent body
expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial functions and
tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a democratic government.
c. Finally, the COMELEC contends that the temporary restraining order sought by
petitioners has been rendered moot and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite
sought to be enjoined.

The appeal is meritorious. Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in
part that:

"SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

In Garces vs. Court of Appeals and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer:
What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."

In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the Constitution and
the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character.

As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC
ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of
barangaySan Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be
held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
7160.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel
of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the
part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-
litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of
the election laws.

Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution
may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the power to
review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not
in point.

a. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In
the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer election laws.

b. Luison vs. Garcia refers to this Courts power to review administrative decisions,
particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy
null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution.

c. In Macud vs. COMELEC, we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an

election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC
sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court.

In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve scant consideration.
PETITION IS GRANTED. ORDER OF RTC SET ASIDE.

Income
 35 ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA, 252 SCRA 695 (1996)

Alvarez vs. Guingona

31 January 1996 | Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr | En Banc

STATEMENT OF FACTS

· The petitioners, led by Sen. Heherson Alvarez, seek to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 7720, which was an act converting the municipality of Santiago, ISABELA to an
Independent Component City, because:

1. The Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives, as mandated by Article 6, Sec. 24 of the Constitution;

2. The Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average income
required under Sec. 450 of the LGC to be converted into a component city.

· R.A. 7720 (May 1999 enacted into law by President Ramos became such after the
following processes:

1. On 18 April 1993, House Bill 8817, principally authored by Cong. Abaya, was filed in the
HRep.

2. On 5 May, 1993, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Governments
and House Committee on Appropriations.

3. Three public hearings were subsequently held by the committee and by 9 December
1993, the committee submitted a favourable report.

4. On 13 December, the bill was passed on second reading, and on 17 December, was
approved on third reading.

5. On 28 January 1994, the bill was transmitted to the Senate.

6. Concurrently with the HRep, a Senate Bill was also filed in the Senate on 19 May 1993,
by Sen. Vicente Sotto III. This was introduced shortly after the first reading of the House bill.

7. On 23 February 1994, the Senate conducted public hearings on the Senate Bill. On
March 1, the committee submitted a favourable report saying that House Bill 8817 was the
same with the Senate bill anyway. Sen. Alvarez was one of those who approved the report as
member of the Committee of Local Governments.

8. On 3 March 1994, the senate bill was passed on second reading, and on 14 March, was
approved on third reading. After this, the HRep approved the amendments made by the
Senate.

9. On 12 April 1994, the enrolled bill was submitted to the President, and was signed by the
Chief Executive on 5 May 1994 as R.A. 7720.
10. On 13 July 1994, a plebiscite was held and a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favour of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

ISSUES:

The issues as to the validity of R.A. 7720 enacted in May 1994 by President are:

1. Are the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of converting it into an independent
component city?

2. Considering that the Senate passed its own version of the House Bill, can RA 7720 be
considered to have originated from the House?

HELD:

1. The annual income of an LGU includes the IRA.

2. RA 7720 was compliant with Art. 6, Sec. 24 of the Constitution.

RATIONALE:

· Petitioners contend that Santiago could not qualify as a component city because its
average annual income for the last 2 consecutive years based on the 1991 constant
prices, fall below the required annual income of P20M to be converted into a city.

- They computed Santiago’s average annual income by adding the total income of
Santiago for 1991 and 1992, deducting the IRA for both years, and then dividing the result by
two to get the average of the two years. The computation resulted with P13M. This is below
the requirement for component cities.

- Petitioners contend that the DOF’s certification saying that Santiago’s income is P21M
is allegedly not accurate because in their computation, the IRAs were not excluded. (Note:
The income must be duly certified by the DOF)

- Petitioners insist that IRAs are not income but are transfers and/or budgetary aid from
the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors
such as population, land and equal sharing.

· SC: The petitioners are wrong. IRAs are part of an LGU’s income.

- To resolve this, the SC defined IRAs vis-à-vis the notion of income of an LGU and the
principles of autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified
empowerment of the local government system.
- An LGU is a political subdivision of the State. It is constituted by law, and possessed
of substantial control over its own affairs. It remains to be an intra-sovereign subdivision of
one sovereign nation, but it is not intended to be an imperium in imperio.

- An LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,

responsibilities and resources. Power is deconcentrated, enabling peripheral LGUs to develop
not only at their own pace and discretion, but also with their own resources and assets.

- At the practical side of a decentralized local government system is matters of financial

resources. With more power and responsibility, an LGU operates on a wider scale, and thus,
more expenses are entailed. Thus, more resources are needed for it to discharge its function.
To avail such resources, an LGU is vested with:

1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue

2. The right to be allocated with a just share in national taxes (the share being the
IRA)

3. The right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.

- Funds from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth proceeds accrue to the general fund
of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
spending as specified in the LGC and its IRR. For example, not less than 20% of the IRA must
be set aside for local development projects.

- With all these in mind, for purposes of budget preparation, IRAs and the share in
national wealth proceeds are considered items of income. Besides, income is defined in the
LGC as “all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds
of the LGU.”

- IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of funds of the
LGU. IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further
action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income with the LGU can rely upon for
funds. The DOF included the IRA in their computation of the LGU’s average annual income
and it was right.

- Futhermore, Sec. 450(c) of the LGC provides that the average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-
recurring income. IRAs are regular and recurring. It is not a special fund. It has its own
meaning in the LGC (“funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
GOCCs”) making it distinct from special funds or transfers.

- Therefore, the DOF Order certifying the income of Santiago by including the IRAs, and
excluding non-recurring receipts such as national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sale of fixed assets, etc is correct. The order must be accorded with great weight.

· As to how RA 7220 was passed, it was compliant with the Constitution

- The House bill was filed first than the Senate Bill. The House Bill initiated the
legislative process, so there was violation of Sec. 24, Article 6. Besides, when the Senate Bill
was dependent on the House Bill. The Senate held in abeyance any action on the Senate Bill
until it received the House Bill.

- Filing a substitute bill in the Senate in anticipation of the receipt of the bill from the
house does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate from the House, for as long as the Senate does not act upon it until it receives a
House bill.

- This issue was already addressed in Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, which

involved the E-VAT Law which originated as a revenue bill which must come from the House.
In the case, the court emphasized that the bill from the House may undergo extensive
changes in the Senate such that an entirely new bill may be produced. To insist that the
statute should be substantially the same as the House bill is to deny the Senate's power not
only to concur with amendments but to propose amendments.

- What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing bills of local
application must come from the House on the theory that members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to local needs and problems, since they are elected from
districts. Senators, on the other hand, are expected to approach the problem from a national
perspective.

· Besides, every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality. For RA 7220
to be nullified, there must be an unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Its unconstitutionality
must be clearly established. In this case, petitioners failed to overcome the presumption.

36 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC, G.R. 176951, June

28, 2011

League of Cities vs COMELEC

Facts

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.

Issue” Whether or not the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional

Ruling” The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact
that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during
the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government
Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court
should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent
and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by
the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher
income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
 “The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by
the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th
Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities
covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even
so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th
Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it.
Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and
were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were
also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption
clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA
No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but
by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of
local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant
national growth.

Population

37 AQUINO III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 18973, April 7, 2010

FACTS: ThIs seeks nulliFIcation of Republic Act No.9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent
Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps
relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or
Afteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation. 1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconFIguring the existing first and second legislative districts
of the province prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated
to have a population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts
RA 9716 will result to the reconstituted first district to comprise of less than 250000 people
which will run against Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.. Particularly “ Each legislative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable,contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred Fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative”

Contention of the plaintiff:

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain
and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with
respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000 minimum
population is only a requirement
for the creation of a legislative district in a city. In sum, the respondents deny the existence of
a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province
of Camarines Sur,
should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.

RULING: RA 9716 is not unconstitutional

“Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The 250,000 minimum
population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation
by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.”
“There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of
its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certiAed by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or iii) a population of not less than
two hundred Fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

38 ALDABA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

FACTS: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic

Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan,
for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city. The bill was initiated in 2007.

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certi;cation of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics O>ce (NSO) as authority that the
population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010”. This is the basis of
the claim congressional bill which created RA 9591.

ISSUE: Can a projection for a population be a basis for the creation of a new legislative
district?

RULING: RA 9591 is unconstitutional.

First, certications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared o>cial by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certi;cations
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying o>cer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle
of every year.

Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 8 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos provides:

SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certi;cation of Population sizes Pursuant to

Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local Government Code.
(a) The National Statistics O>ce shall issue certi;cation on data that it has collected and
processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.
(b) For census years, certi;cation on population size will be based on actual population census
counts; while for the intercensal years, the certi;cation will be made on the basis of a set of
demographic projections or estimates declared o>cial by the National Statistical Coordination
Board (NSCB).
(c) Certi;cation of population census counts will be made as of the census reference date,
such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of
every year.
(d) Certi;cation of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the
true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high
population projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certi;cation on population size may be issued will
be the barangay for census population counts, and the city or municipality for intercensal
estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census, during off-census years,
approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical
supervision of NSO from planning to data processing.
(f) Certi;cations of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census O>cers or by the Regional Census O>cers. Certi;cations based on
projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer .

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections
he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also
show that the Certi;cation of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections
declared o>cial by the NSCB. The Certi;cation, which states that the population of Malolos
"will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic
projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that
Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying
officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such o>cial designation,
only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.
Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This
projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive
Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certi;cation of Population Sizes), which
states:
xxx xxx xxx

(d) Certi;cation of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the
true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high
population projections.
xxx xxx xxx

(f) Certi;cations of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census O>cers or by the Regional Census O>cers. Certi;cations based on
projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer

Sub-Provinces
Constitution, Art. XVIII, § 9 Rep. Act No. 7160, § 462

39 GRIÑO v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672 (1992)

FACTS: Simplicio Griño. Griño was also the oCcial candidate of the party for the
position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian, claimed to be a
registered voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo.

It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by the
Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain any space
or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo, of which the sub-
province of Guimaras was a part. On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election
was conducted, herein petitioners @led the instant petition far certiorari. Petitioners
alleged in substance that respondent Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from
voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that
when R.A. 7160 was passed providing speci@cally for the creation of existing sub-
provinces into a full-Fledged province, it do not speci@cally provide that the voters of
the sub province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial oFFIcials who, in
case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to
represent said sub-province. Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed
to inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement. On May 14, 1992,
We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission on Elections and
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City to cease and desist from canvassing
and proclaiming the results of the election for the oCce of the governor, vice-governor
and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We also ordered the public
respondents to file their comments.

On May 29, 1992, public respondents @led their comment through the Code of the
Solicitor General. On June 9, 1992, the petitioners @led their reply to the public
respondent's comment.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of the
1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). It provides in full: "SEC. 462. Existing
Subprovinces. — Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces
upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-
provinces and the original provinces directly affected.The plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Comelec simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of
this Code. "The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the
original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created until their own
representatives shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and
qualified. "The incumbent elected oFFIcials of the said sub-provinces converted into
regular.provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy
occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected oFFIcials, or resulting from
expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite results,
shall be @lled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold oFFIce until
their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the
 plebiscite mentioned herein and qualfied. After effectivity of such conversion, the
President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through
appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and
shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office until their successors shall have
been elected in the next regular local elections and qualified. "All quali@ed appointive
oFFIcials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of
their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in office in accordance with the
civil service law, rules and regulations."

RULING: The Yes Votes win and the sub-province of Guimaras became a regular
province where the President appointed the Governor and Vice-Governor. The issue
has become moot and academic

Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, § 11

40 SAMSON v. AGUIRRE, 315 SCRA 53 (1999)

40 SAMSON v. AGUIRRE, 315 SCRA 53 (1999)
FACTS: On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic
Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.
Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the ;rst district of Quezon City,
is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner falso seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the
implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation
of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of Budget and Management from
disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, through a motion we duly noted. LibLex
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
"a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local
Government Code particularly, Section 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of
income, population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being
a
city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article
11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay
resolution; and "b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution."

ISSUE: W/N RA 8535 is constitutional

RULING : Challenged is the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 8535 creating the
City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City on grounds that no
certi;cations as to income, population and land area was presented to Congress
during its deliberations, failure to specify seat of the government of the proposed city,
and that it would result in the amendment of the Constitution as to the composition of
legislative districts.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner, who has the burden of proof
 to
overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements
under the Local Government Code in passing R.A. 8535, failed to substantiate his
allegations. He even failed to attach to his petition any pertinent supporting papers.
Records disclosed that the bill originated in the House of Representatives and that
during its public hearings, representatives from the Bureau of Local Government,
Finance, National Statistics O>ce, the DBM and DILG declared that the income,
population and land area requirements were complied with. The Supreme Court,
;nding that petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations, ruled that every statute is
presumed valid and a person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his
allegations clearly and unmistakably, and that mere allegations cannot substitute for
proof; that failure of R.A. No. 8535 to provide a seat of government is not fatal to the
validity of the law as a seat can be established after its creation under Section 12 of
the Local Government Code; and that the proposed creation of the city of Novaliches
cannot be considered an amendment to the Constitution regarding the number of
seats of the House of Representatives as the Constitution does not provide a
permanent composition of legislative districts.

Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units, §§ 5 (d) & 15

41 LIDASAN v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 (1967)

FACTS:

ISSUE: The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections 1 is this: Is

Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," but which includes barrios located in another province
-Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill? " Comelec's answer is in the a@rmative. Offshoot is
the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. On June 18, 1966, the Chief
Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

"SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,

Kigakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung,
in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of
the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

SECTION 2. The Erst mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall
be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval." It came to light later that
 barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and
not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967,
the pertinent portions of which are:"For purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that
pursuant to R.A. 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise
the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the
barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato,the
barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of
Cotabato."

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios - in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato — are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, on
September 7, 1967, the O@ce of the President, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019
Through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

RULING: Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible and it is accordingly null and void in its
totality.

1. Where the title of the statute reads "An Act Creating The Municipality of Dianaton, in
The Province of Lanao del Sur" which projects the impression that solely the province
of Lanao del Sur is affected by such creation although, in fact, the two-pronged
purpose is to create such municipality purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns
of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, and to dismember at the same time two
municipalities in Cotabato, different from the province of Lanao del Sur, such title is
misleading and deceptive, because (1) it did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; (2) it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory was
being taken away from their towns and province and being added to the adjacent
province of Lanao del Sur; and (3) it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which weigh
heavily against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

Respondent's stance that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in
the substantial diminution of the territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely the
incidental legal results of the deFInition of the boundary of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to said diminution need not be expressed in the title of
the law, such posture but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing
down the title of the bill, as transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province
to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the Erst
and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the
creation of a municipality; yet, the title failed to reflect this fact.

Although the general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced; yet, where parts of the statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each
other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them.

it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any
citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

42 TORIO v. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599 (1978)

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal
Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, resolved to celebrate the town <esta and created a
"Town Fiesta Executive Committee" to undertake, manage and supervise the festivities.
The Executive Committee created a sub-committee on "Entertainment and Stage",
which constructed two stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for "cancionan."
During the program people went up the "zarzuela" stage and before the play was over
the stage collapsed, pinning underneath one of the performers, resulting in his death.
The heirs of the deceased sued the municipality and the councilors for damages.
The municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that the holding of a town fiesta
was an exercise of its governmental function from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents. The councilors maintained that they merely
acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of a <nding that the petitioners exercised
due diligence and care of a good father of a family in selecting a competent man to
construct the stage and if it collapsed it was due to forces beyond the control of the
committee on entertainment and stage.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that petitioners were guilty of
negligence when they failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the mounting of
onlookers on the stage resulting in the collapse thereof.
ISSUE: W/N the Municipality is liable as a corporate body

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the holding of a town <esta though not for pro<t
is a proprietary function for which a municipality is liable for damages to third persons
ex
contractu or ex delicto; that under the principle of respondeat superior the principal is
liable for the negligence of its agents acting within the scope of their assigned tasks;
and that the municipal councilors have a personally distinct and separate from the
municipality, hence, as a rule they are not co-responsible in an action for damages for
tort or negligence unless they acted in bad faith or have directly participated in the
 commission of the wrongful act.
Appealed decision affirmed with modification.

PRINCIPLES:
1. Municipalities are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised
by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in
their proper corporate name, they may inter alia, sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.
2. A municipal corporation proper has a public character as regards the
state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private insofar as it is to
promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community
Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly <esta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe
one.
3. The municipality cannot evade responsibility for the death of a stage performer arising
from faulty construction of the stage by the chairman of the entertainment and stage
committee appointed by the municipal council, in connection with a town <esta,
because under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a municipality is responsible or
liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

43 CITY OF MANILA v. IAC, 179 SCRA 428 (1989) LOST BONES CASE
"Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. was this action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva
of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and
Joseph Hebmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial
grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.
"Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto.Domingo and
father of the litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971 and buried on June 6, 1971 in Lot
No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene
Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No.
61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh.
A-1). Full payment of the rental therefor of
P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart
from the aforementioned receipt, no other document was executed to embody such
lease over the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of
Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not
reJect the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.

"On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed
by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject
burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr.,placed the bones and skull
in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery.
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when
the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and
dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone
marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a
sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the oKcer-in-charge
of the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her
 late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question which was given to another
lessee. The lower court ordered that the city government look for the bones of the
deceased and bury it in a substitute lot in the same cemetery for the remaining amount
of time of the original lease

ISSUE: W/N the new ordinance covered the contract between the aggrieved petitioner and
the Cemetery

RULING:
1) Municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu
2) With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the
class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the
law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1987]). Therefore,
a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for
such breach is prescribed in the contract.
3) the receipt is in itself a contract of lease.
4) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of
Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the
duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered
by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for
five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative
order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SHERYL’S VERSION

Facts:

Brought on by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. was
this action for damages against the City of Manila and officer-in- charge of the of the
North Cemetery owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. Domingo, Sr.
was buried the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene for a 40 years
period.

"Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5,

Series of 1975, that the lot was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, and
should be ready for exhumation. "On the basis of such certification, the authorities of
the North Cemetery then exhumed and removed from subject burial lot the remains of
the late Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in
the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was
rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All
Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear
departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the
tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding, Irene lost no time in
inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari,
and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.

She was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband
in the warehouse of the cemetery But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to
do was simply unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to locate the
remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of
sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of
bones. She was even offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too
aggrieved that she came to court for relief

The trial court ordered the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of
another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years four
(4) months and eleven (11 ) days, corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid
lease sued upon. The CA affirmed with modification.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a corporate
or proprietary function of the City of Manila.

The resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of the liability for damages
of the petitioner city. LibLex

Ruling:
Yes. Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and
as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and
through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It
may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.

Its powers are twofold in character- public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are
those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers
on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.

In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal

corporation proper has . . . a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it
is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local
necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
[1978]).

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184
(1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916). prLL

The Court further stressed:

"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. . ..

Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the
operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages
when the requisite elements of liability coexist

The Court added:

". . . while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports
among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary
character." (Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952,
954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra).
 With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is
within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and
lessee remains as the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 11 [1987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v.
Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]). Cdpr

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner

City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify
and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city
that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6,
1975 of the City of Manila for 􏰀ve (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not
meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases.

Respondeat superior embodies the general rule that an employer is

responsible for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees. Under
respondeat superior an employer is liable for the negligent act or omission of
any employee acting within the course and scope of his employment (1).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is

hereby AFFIRMED.

44 MACASIANO v. DIOKNO, 212 SCRA 464 (1992)

Facts:
The respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located
at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market... thereon.
the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council
of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of
 the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas
thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked
distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the
reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls
Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days
to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition
and mandamus with damages and prayer... the trial court issued an order upholding the
validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner
Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service and are therefore public
properties;
Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for another
public purpose
Petitioner also submits that assuming that the respondent municipality is authorized to close
streets, it failed to... comply with the conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
for the approval of the ordinance
Issues:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is
valid.
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use,
Article 424 of Civil Code states:
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or... municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public... service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress (
"There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls
are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case no. C-
12921. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of... man (Arts.
420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or other contract
"As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the
public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to
them. Such leases or licenses null and void for being contrary to law. The... right of the public
to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are... under legal
obligation to protect.

General Welfare Clause

§ 16, 391, 447, 458, and 468 Republic Act No. 8369 (1997),
§ 8 and 11 Republic Act No. 8425 (1997),
§ 12 Republic Act No. 8435 (1997),
§§ 90, 99, 101 Republic Act No. 8550 (1998),
§§ 16-25 Republic Act No. 8975 (2000),
§§ 3, 11, 13 Republic Act No. 9275 (2004),
§ 20 Republic Act No. 10121 (2009), § 11-12

45 U.S. v. SALAVERIA, 39 Phil. 103 (1918) (rummy card game case)

39 Phil. 102

MALCOLM, J.:

The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on February 28, 1917, an ordinance which,
among other things, prohibited the playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal
holidays, and penalized the violation thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of not less
than P10 nor more than P200, and by jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less than P5 nor
more than P200. The justice of the peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into effect, was
Prudencio Salaveria, now the defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his official station, on
the evening of March 8, 1917, not a Sunday or a legal holiday, seven persons including the
justice of the peace and his wife were surprised by the police while indulging in a game of
panguingue in the house of the justice of the peace. The chief of police took possession of the
cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, and P2.07 in money, used in the game.

This ordinance in part reads:

"Resolution No. 28.
*******
"Whereas, this Council is vested with certain powers by sections 2184 and 2185 of the
Administrative Code;
"Whereas, it is the moral duty of this body to safeguard the tranquillity and stability of the
Government and to foster the welfare and prosperity of each and all of the inhabitants of this
municipality; therefore,
"Be it resolved to enact, as it hereby is enacted, the following ordinance:
"Ordinance No. 3.
*******
"Third. The games known as 'Panguingue,' 'Manilla,' 'Jung-kiang,' 'Paris-paris,' 'Poker,' 'Tute,'
'Burro,' and 'Treinta-y-uno' shall be allowed only on Sundays and official holidays.
*******
"The following penalties shall be imposed upon those who play the above games on days
other than Sundays and holidays:
"For the owner of the house: A fine of from Ten to Two hundred pesos, or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one peso a day.
"For the gamblers: A fine of from Five to Two hundred pesos each or subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency at the rate of one peso a day."
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is valid and the justice of the peace is guilty of violating the law.
The presumption is all in favor of validity. The inhabitants of a municipality are in themselves
miniature states. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly, set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject,
and necessitate action. T
he local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people. Who is in a better position to say
whether the playing of panguingue is deleterious to social order and the public interest in a
certain municipality the municipal council, or the courts? The answer is self-evident. The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative "action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
The Philippine Legislature has granted to municipalities legislative powers of a dual character,
one class mandatory and the other discretionary. Of the first class is the provision of the
Administrative Code which makes it the duty of the municipal council, conformably with law,
"to prohibit and penalize * * * gambling." (Sec. 2188 [j], Adm. Code of 1916; sec. 2242 [j],
Adm. Code of 1917.) This is a more restricted power than that found in the original Municipal
Code which authorized a. municipal council to "provide against the evils of gambling,
gambling houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort." (Act No. 82, sec. 39 [u].) The
present municipal law, since making use of the word "gambling," must be construed with
reference to the Insular Law, Act No. 1757, relating to the same subject. Act No. 1757 in
section 1 defines "gambling" as "the playing of any game for money or any representative of
value or valuable consideration or thing, the result of which game depends wholly or chiefly
upon chance or hazard, or the use of any mechanical inventions or contrivance to determine
by chance the loser or winner of money or of any representative of value or of any valuable
consideration or thing." In the United States vs. Hilario ([1913], 24 Phil, 392), the Supreme
Court went into the subject of the meaning of "gambling" in this jurisdiction, and found that it
includes those games the result of which depend wholly or chiefly upon chance or
hazard, and excludes those games the result of which depend wholly or chiefly upon
skill, with the result that sections 621 to 625 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila (734-738 of the Revised Ordinances of 1917) were found to prohibit only games
of chance or hazard.
The ordinance of Orion, Bataan, merely prohibits the playing of panguingue on certain days,
without describing it. Further, although this court has considered the method by which many
other games are played, it has never as yet authoritatively decided whether panguingue
was a game of skill or hazard. Nor was any evidence on this point introduced in the present
case. However, a reading of the decision of the trial court and of official opinions of two
Attorneys-General, of which we can take judicial cognizance, warrants the deduction that
panguingue is not a game qf chance or hazard and is not prohibited by Act No. 1757 . (See
The Philippine Legislature, as before intimated, delegated to municipalities certain legislative
powers of a discretionary nature. Many of these powers are named specifically. But in
addition, and preceding both the specific powers of a mandatory and discretionary character,
is the general power of a municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations. It is this
grant that the preamble of the ordinance of Orion assigns as authority for its enactment. Said
section 2184 of the Administrative Code of 1916 (sec. 2238, Adm. Code of 1917) reads:
"The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant
to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."
The general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is
much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law.
It authorizes such ordinances "as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or. policy of the State. The ordinance of the
municipality of Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious, or unreasonable or
discriminatory. Its purposes evidently are to improve the morals and stimulate the industry of
the people. A person is to be compelled to refrain from private acts injurious both to himself
and his neighbors. These objects, to be attained by limiting the pastime to definite days, do
not infringe any law of the general government.
For the suppression of such an evil, coordinate and harmonious action must concur between
the three departments of Government. A law or ordinance enacted by the legislative body
must exist. Such an ordinance is before us. Vigorous executive enforcement must take place
to make the law or ordinance a reality. Such activity by the police has brought this case to the
courts. And finally the Judiciary, having full respect for the legislative action of the municipal
council and for the prosecution by the executive officials, must, by judicial construction,
equally as progressive and constructive, give effect to the action of the other two powers.
Wherefore, although panguingue is not named in the general law on gambling, and although
not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper subject for regulation by municipal
authorities acting under their delegated police power, whose laudable intention is to improve
the public morals and promote the prosperity of their people, their action should be upheld by
the courts. Ordinance No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.
The culprit in this case is himself a member of the Judiciary. Instead of enforcing the law, he
has scorned it. His example to the people of Orion has been pernicious in its influence. If
gambling is to be suppressed, not only the weak and ignorant must be punished, but those
with full knowledge of the law and the consequences of violation. We would accordingly
suggest to Courts of First Instance that in all cases arising under the Gambling Law or
ordinances, except for unusual circumstances, a prison sentence should be imposed, if
permitted by the law or ordinance. We further suggest that, where the defendant has been
found guilty and is a man of station, he be given the maximum penalty.
Applying the foregoing in this instance, it results that the defendant and appellant must be
found guilty of a violation of ordinance No. 3 of the municipality of Orion, Bataan; and, in
accordance therewith, shall be* sentenced to the maximum penalty of the payment of a fine of
P200, or to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the costs of all three instances
against him. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

46 VIRAY v. CALOOCAN, 20 SCRA 791 (1967) CADAVER CASE

G.R. No. L-23118

Policarpio Viray, et al

RESPONDENTS

City of Caloocan, et al

SUMMARY.

The Municipal Board of the City of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962 which
imposed an entrance fee on cadavers coming from places outside the City of Caloocan,
sought to be buried in private cemeteries within the City of Caloocan. The plaintiffs the said
fees to bury their dead relatives in La Loma Cemetery, but later on demanded from the City
Treasurer the refund, which the City Treasurer refused to do. The issue to be resolved was
whether the City of Caloocan is empowered by Rep. Act 3278 (the Charter of the City of
Caloocan) or by such other pertinent laws to enact that portion of Ordinance No. 94, series of
1962 imposing the entrance fee in question. SC held that the cadaver transfer fee is not
sanctioned by within the power of the municipal board to regulate the use of cemeteries ( ultra
vires ).

DOCTRINE.

An ordinance imposing a cadaver transfer fee which is distinct from the burial permit fee, is
void. It is not sanctioned by the power of the municipal board to regulate the use of
cemeteries. Also, the provision of the Local Autonomy Act, empowering cities and
municipalities to impose license fees and taxes on persons engaged in any occupation or
business or exercising privileges does not sanction the levy of a cadaver transfer fee. The
transfer and burial of a cadaver is not an occupation or business or the exercise of a privilege.

FACTS.

On September 18, 1962, the Municipal Board of the City of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No.
94, series of 1962 which among others imposed an entrance fee on cadavers coming from
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Caloocan, sought to be buried in private
cemeteries within the City of Caloocan. The entrance fees imposed by the said Ordinance:
Php 5.00 if the deceased is below 14 yrs. old and Php 10.00 if the deceased is 14 yrs. old or
above.

Macario Asistio, the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, approved Ordinance No. 94, series of
1962 on September 22, 1962. On March 8, 1963, Policarpio Viray and Antonio Cajote paid
Php 5.00 each, and Leopoldo Prieto paid Php 10.00 for the burial of their respective relatives
at the La Loma Cemetery (private cemetery within the City of Caloocan). Amado Oliveros, the
Treasurer of the City of Caloocan, through his deputy, collected the said entrance fees from
the mentioned

Plaintiffs. On March 28, 1963, the plaintiffs demanded from the City Treasurer the refund of
the corresponding entrance fees by means of a formal letter of demand.

Despite such demand, the City Treasurer refused to refund the entrance fees.

The issue to be resolved is solely a question of law: Whether the City of Caloocan is
empowered by Rep. Act 3278 (the Charter of the City of Caloocan) or by such other pertinent
laws to enact that portion of Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962 imposing the entrance fee in
question.

Respondents averred general grant of taxation to chartered cities by Republic Act 2264, CD
Technologies Asia, Inc. otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act and as a valid exercise
of police power.

RULING: Respondent City endeavors to justify the fees prescribed by the ordinance in
question as a proper exercise of the police power claiming that it "involves the assignment of
police oAcers to insure that the funeral procession . . . is orderly so as not to cause great and
serious inconvenience to the public. During the procession traffic has to be re-routed at times;
policemen have to use the city's motorcycles or cars; the streets and other City property have
to suffer certain degree of depreciation."
While undeniably the above-described activity of city oAcers is called for by every funeral
procession, yet we are left without explanation why the Ordinance should collect the
prescribed fees solely in the case of cadavers coming from places outside the territory of
Caloocan City for burial in private cemeteries within the City. Surely, whether the corpse
comes from without or within the City limits, and whether interment is to be made in private or
public cemeteries, the City police must regulate traAc, and must use their City cars or
motorcycles to maintain order; and the City streets must suffer some degree of erosion.
Clearly then, the ordinance in question does unjustifiably discriminate against private
cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, a defect adequate to
invalidate the questioned portion of the measure.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the questioned portion of Ordinance
No. 94, series of 1962 of the City of Caloocan, is declared ultra vires and void. Costs against
the respondents. So ordered.

47 BALACUIT v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed an ordinance penalizing any
person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or
other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of
age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge
only one-half of the value of the said tickets.

The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, filed a complaint

before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing
the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640..

The RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan
constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:

YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance
must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach
upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the
due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage
their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners
for even if we could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable,
from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted
and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

48 BINAY v. DOMINGO 201 SCRA 508 (1991)

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60

which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the
Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for
the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it
violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.
Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari
praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,

which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for
the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding
to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it
is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police
power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies
to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social
justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor
is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably

classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of
our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating
the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for
the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
 should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent,
or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic
orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

49 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,

petitioners,vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As
such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

Himlayang Pilipino filed with the CFI-QC a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the ordinance for being
contrary to the Constitution, the QC Charter, Local Autonomy Act and Revised Administrative
Code.

CFI DECISION:The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the
burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and
resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.”

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held: No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals
and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out
of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all
matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not
exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions
to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries
of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.

50 PATALINGHUG v. CA, 229 SCRA 554 (1994)

ALFREDO PATALINGHUG v. CA, GR No. 104786, 1994-01-27

Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363. otherwise known as
the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City." Section 8 of which states:
"Section 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in the Expanded
Zoning Map) - AC - 2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial
uses as provided hereunder:
3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space (see parking
standards of P.D. 1096) and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters
from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings."
Building Official Demetrio Alindad issued Building Permit in favor of petitioner for the
construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at
Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the
construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance 363 since it was allegedly
situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia Ni Kristo Chapel and several residential...
structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that "the
nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south.
Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued to
construct his funeral parlor
Consequently, private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullity of a building
permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the
trial court.
After conducting its own ocular inspection the lower court, in its order dismissed the complaint.
Hence, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court by annulling building permit... issued in favor of
petitioner.
It ruled that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and Iglesia Ni Kristo were beyond the
50-meter residential radius prohibited by Ordinance 363, the construction of the funeral parlor
was within the 50-meter radius measured from the Teppot’s building.
is residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes,
Issues:
whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a
particular district or zone in Davao City.
Ruling:
We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of the lower court that petitioner did
not violate Section 8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363.
In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building
was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was
conducted.
But while its commercial aspect has been established by the... presence of machineries and
laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes
as such, was not fully substantiated.
a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.
A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone.
A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate
taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination... of a property for zoning purposes.
A tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact,
a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor,... for under Sec. 22 of the Real
Estate Tax Code,[9] appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of
"any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's
declaration.
A piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city
assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.
Even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local
government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes
must prevail.
While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the
ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate
their claim that where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as
gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an
exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.
Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with...
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes
has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the
area covered thereunder.
WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REINSTATED.

51 TAYABAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 517 SCRA 488 (2007) TINOC

PUBLIC MARKET CASE

ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007
By: Zyldjyh P. Portuguez

Facts:
The project proposal of then Mayor Tayaban of Tinoc Ifugao to the provincial
governor for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market was approved to be funded
by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). The contract was awarded to Lopez
Pugong with the CEB as the project owner. Actual construction commenced on June
1989 and on August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution
No. 20 agreeing to have the ongoing constructions of the building stopped and
demolish the erected structures because it was being erected on the wrong site.
The said Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of August 15, 1989, after the
subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the same day. The contractor
filed the civil suit for based on Section 3 e of RA 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 20 is valid and whether the
demolition was a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative.
 Petitioners acted in bad faith in passing Resolution No. 20 having been passed only
after the demolition and their memorandum addressed to the laborers of Pugong
directing the stoppage of the construction was not to be considered as an evidence
of good faith because the project owner was the CEB, thus, it should have been the
latter who should be duly notified. No evidence would show that petitioners informed
the CEB or the Governor of the alleged mistake in the location. By causing undue
injury to the government in demolishing the structures and with evident bad faith, the
court ruled that the petitioners are guilty of violation of the provisions of Sec. 3(e) of
RA No. 3019.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner’s claim that the adoption of Resolution No. 20 by the Sangginiang Bayan
was a valid exercise of police power because Pugong failed to obtain the required
building permit pursuant to PD 1076 and Letter of Instruction No. 19, is not
persuasive because the said resolution did not mention such violation. A careful
reading of the resolution shows that the only basis for the demolition was the alleged
mistake in the location of the building construction.
Petitioner testified that it was Tayaban himself who pointed out the location of the
public market. The location plan of the public market was finalized on August 1989
while the market started construction on June 1989.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the land (constitution), or an act of the legislature, or unless it
is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been
established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle
applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Petitioners should have made known their concerns to the CEB or to the Governor
since the CEB is the owner of the project.
The assailed decision was affirmed.
DISPOSITIVE RULING
The penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as provided under
Section 9 of the same law, is imprisonment for not less than six years and one
month nor more than 15 years, perpetual disqualifIcation from public oJce, and
confIscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful
income of the accused. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is
punished by special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum Ixed by said law
 and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same.
48 In the present case, the Court Inds no error in the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan, except that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office should also be imposed. It bears to reiterate that the injury suffered by the
Government consists in the fact that it had already disbursed the amount of
P134,632.80 for the purpose of commencing the construction of the Tinoc Public
Market which was reduced to nothing by reason of petitioners' destruction of the
structures built and the eventual stoppage of the project. On this basis, the Court
agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to reimburse the said
amount lost by the Government.

SHERYL’S VERSION

Facts:

Petitioner Robert Tayaban (Tayaban) was the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao and His
co-petitioners, were Municipal Councilors of the same municipality.

Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial

governor Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently,
Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved and that the
project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). 3 Subsequently, a
bidding was conducted and private complainant (Pugong) won the contract for the
construction of the said public market. Actual construction of the public market was
commenced

On that same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded
to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced
thereon. petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the Petitioners. Hence, this Petition.

Issue :

Whether or not the Petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition.
Ruling:

Yes. Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on the
same day that it was adopted without due notice of the planned demolition given to the
CEB and the private contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the Municipal
Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified that the said Resolution was passed
only in the afternoon of August 15, 1989, after the subject demolition was conducted in
the morning of the same day.

Proof of petitioners' bad faith is also shown by Pugong's testimony, which was
given credence by the Sandiganbayan, that the site where his laborers began
construction of the demolished public market was pointed out by petitioner Tayaban
himself when the former asked the latter where they were going to erect the said
market. At the least, petitioners should have furnished the CEB or the Governor, in his
capacity as a regular member of the CEB,a copy of the above-mentioned letter and
memorandum. But they never did.

The letter and memorandum were not even addressed to Pugong and there is no
proof to show that he was informed of the contents thereof. Moreover, even if Pugong's
men had received the letter and memorandum, they may not be totally blamed for
ignoring the letter and the memorandum because under their contract, the owner of the
project is the CEB and there is nothing therein which requires them to comply with
whatever directive the Mayor or the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc may issue.

In fact, the contract signed on March 1, 1989 specifically states that the
contractor shall construct the Tinoc Public Market as per plan and specification
provided by the CEB technical staff.

The following admissions made by petitioners bolster Sandiganbayan's finding of bad

faith on their part:

First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the project proposal
for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market, he did not indicate the exact location
where the market should be put up saying that he shall specify the location when the
budget for the project shall have been approved. However, despite meeting the
Governor twice in 1989, and being informed by the latter that the project had already
been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not suggest to the Governor nor mention
to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the
public market erected. Worse, when the construction was commenced and petitioners
discovered that the public market was being built allegedly in a place where it should
not be, petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the Governor of such
fact.

Second, Tayaban admits that they never bothered to check with the CEB where
the latter intended to put up the public market. There is no evidence to show that, when
the construction was commenced, petitioners informed the CEB of the alleged mistake
in the location of the project. In fact, petitioner Tayaban testified that it was only in the
first or second week of August, 1989 that he informed the CEB regarding the supposed
error, even when he came to know the exact site where Pugong intended to build the
market as early as April 1989.

Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to
nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim
that the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of schoolchildren if it
were built on the place being contested. However, petitioners never made known their
supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law
into their own hands and precipitately demolished the subject structures that were built
without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which in
this case is the CEB.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of theSandiganbayan are

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The additional penalty of perpetual disquali􏰁cation
from public office is imposed upon petitioners.

Abatement of nuisance
LGC, §§ 447 & 458 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), §§ 52-53
52 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA, 193 SCRA 147 (1991)
- ULING CASE

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and

export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private
respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation
of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with
him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building
permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

ISSUE: W/N THE CLOSURE ORDER WAS VALID

RULING:: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

The ruling was based on the following:

a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc.,prepared
by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and recommendation read:"Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from
the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of
the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the
proper air pollution device is installed and operational."
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing signatures
of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan, Governor of the
Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988, complaining about the smoke
coming out of the chimney of the company while in operation.

To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the
maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if
not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now
the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid
injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of
petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor
"not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
and it was required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit; (2) Mayor's permit; and (3) Region III-Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents
of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor
through channels. 4 The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in the
four-page petition were written by one person, 5 appears to be true in some
instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole
the many signatures appear to be written by different persons.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses
and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria,
but instead presented a building permit issued by an o@cial of Makati on March 6,
1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the
then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit
was good only up to May 25, 1988.
7 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to
install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of
the residents of the community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the
trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.

53 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA, 201 SCRA xi (1991)

-do-

54 TATEL v. VIRAC, 207 SCRA 157 (1991) ABACA WAREHOUSE CASE

FACTS:
Respondent is the owner of an abaca processing plant and foul odor are being emitted
from the plant. Also the risk of fire is high since the warehouse stores raw abaca fiber.
Municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties
by accidental fire.

ISSUE: w/n the Ordinance issued applies to petitioner's warehouse and can be
considered as a nuisance within the meaning of Article 675 of the Civil Code and
whether Ordinance No. 13, s. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and
void.

RULING:
We find no merit in the Petition. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. It is a settled principal of law that municipal corporations
are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government
and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general
welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:
"The municipal council shall enact such ordinance and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein."
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statue (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance
No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the
ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by
the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, reads:
"AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION
OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF
PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT".
Section 1 provides:
"It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form by any person, persons,
entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline,
petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not
within the distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios to avoid great losses of properties including lives by fire or accident."
Section 2 provides: 7
"Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said
warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those
warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the
above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of time given for
the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouse shall be
exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further,
that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-
inflammable products and materials warehouses."
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such
warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the
construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property
in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligations of government.

ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY. — For an ordinance to

be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to
enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and
must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
 general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

SHERYL’S VERSION

Celestino Tatel, a businessman against the Municipal Council of Virac,

Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No.
29 of the Council based on Ordinance No. 13 s. 1952, declaring the warehouse of
petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a
more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. LexLib \

On the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on
March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing
machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of
the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine,
a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter.
The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and
the surroundings residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the
warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and
properties of the people within the neighborhood. LLjur

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on

April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal
officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance
No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of
200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire.

Petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due

process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not
having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of

Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality
of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Ruling:

Yes as to nuisance and No as to unconstitutionality of the ordinance.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have
not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government.
No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of
the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far
as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been
conceived by the municipal government.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac
in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates
from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:

"The municipal council shall enact such ordinance and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."

Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29,

1952, reads:
 "AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR
BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY
AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT".

Article 694 of the New Civil Code (NCC) of the Philippines defines nuisance as
“any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else
which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends
the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;
or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.”
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

55 ESTATE OF FRANCISCO v. CA, 199 SCRA 595 (1991)

FACTS: The quonset building was ordered demolished by the Mayor via Ordinance
No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977, and relied upon by respondents, is entitled
"An Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality
of Isabela . . ." It is not disputed that the quonset building, which is being used for the
storage of copra, is located outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in the
Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be relocated. And in the event
that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Section 16 of the
Ordinance provides: "A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses
shall be applied for by the owner or agent of the property involved within twelve (12)
months from the approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the non-conforming use may be
condemned or removed at the owner's expense."

ISSUE: The focal issue for determination is whether or not Respondent Mayor could
summarily,without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building
because of an ordinance

RULING: The enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance

resides with the Zoning Administrator (Article VII, Secs. 1 and 2, Ordinance No. 147).,
not the mayor. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the
necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance (id., Sec. 2,
ibid.). And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding
the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals.

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN; CANNOT DECLARE A PARTICULAR THING AS A

NUISANCE PER SE AND ORDER ITS CONDEMNATION. — While the Sangguniang
Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec.
149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
 "[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extra
judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature,
situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of
law. In the present case, the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry .If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal."
(Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 471 [1913]).
3. CIVIL LAW; NUISANCE; RULE IN ABATING THEREOF. — Respondents can not
seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1928]).
The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it
can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
4. ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY TO DEMOLISH BUILDING; MUST BE WITH JUDICIAL
ORDER. — Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of
trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to
decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public
officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating
summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property
without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was
subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of
Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority
to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

SHERYL’S VERSION

Facts:

Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Basilan, which was
ordered demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia for which
reason they are also impleaded.

The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San,
surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building
stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was
using the quonset for the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San
by mails to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of
the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the
"clear-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong
Boulevard."

Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor

ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989. Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of
Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the Regional Trial Court. The Trial
Court upheld the power of respondent Mayor to order the demolition without judicial
authority. Petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished.

The Court of Appeals reversed itself.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process,

order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.

Ruling:

No. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to

avail of extra- judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes
upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the
violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]). dctai

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v.
Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a
permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was
effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was
entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the
quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law.

For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to just

compensation, the amount of which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are not
inclined to grant petitioner damages, however, as it simply ignored the demand to
remove or relocate its quonset building. cdll

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review of respondent Court of Appeals, dated

13 June 1990, is SET ASIDE; its original Decision, promulgated on 25 January 1990, is
REINSTATED; and this case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Basilan, Branch 2, for the determination of the just compensation due petitioner for the
demolition of its quonset building.

56 ASILO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159017-, March 9, 2011

FACTS: On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion's late mother Marciana Vda.
De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna
(represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a
lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property
comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez
Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent's mother for a period
of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for
another 20 years. The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could
build a ;rewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and
in case of modification of the public market, she or her heirs would be given
preferential rights. Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in
1984. 9 From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor's
permits. 10 Sometime in 1986, af ire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon
Visitacion's request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B.
Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, 11
Regional OHce No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood
strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of
Nagcarlan. CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the ;re until 15 October 1993. On 1
September 1993, Visitacion received a letter 12 from Mayor Comendador directing her
to demolish her store within ;ve (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies
of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156 13 dated 30 August 1993 and a
Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of
Laguna. The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states

On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang

Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo
and Angeles supervising the work..
ISSUE: W/N A Resolution issued by the Sangguniang Bayan can validly order a
demolition of a property.
RULING:
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private
property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public oFFIcials should have accorded
the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil
Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as
already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court in a
number of decisions 51 held that even if there is already a writ of execution, there must
still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court
before the oFFIcer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the
contested property. 52 The pertinent provisions are the following:

Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order,
hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides: “(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the
property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The above-stated rule is clear and needs
no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion ;led
and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition.

This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been
litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no
case was even filed by the municipality.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the

Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION .
The
Court affirms the decision ;nding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T.
Comendador guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the
finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles
as the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador
pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives.

57 AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, G.R. No. 211356, September

 29, 2014

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014 CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF

MALAY, AKLAn G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,

Respondent.

VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s
Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the issuance and
implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition
of his hotel establishment.

FACTS: Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay,
Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal
Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131. Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued
by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011,
the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances
followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West
Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging
that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion

Contentions of West Cove: 1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a
nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. 2)
Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with
the demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the
removal of illegally constructed buildings

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari
can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.

ISSUE:Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can
order the closure and demolition of the property in question.

HELD:The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se
which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident,
its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had
it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the
necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still
a nuisance per accidens.

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because,
in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments.

FALLO: Petition is denied

Republic Act No. 8749, §§ 7-11, 16, 20, 24, 36, 37, 39 Republic Act No. 9003 (2001), §§
10-13, 16- 22, 43-47 Republic Act No. 8550, §§ 16-25

Basic Services and Facilities, § 17

58 TANO v. SOCRATES, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City effective for ifve years. To implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa
City issued O?ce Order No. 23 dated January 23, 1993, ordering inspections on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from air and sea. Likewise, on February 19,
1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
 Provincial Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2,
series of 1993, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years.

Petitioners challenged the aforementioned ordinances and office order on the grounds
that it deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
the practice of their trade.

The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code. There
is no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.

The Local Government Code vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor. The
Sangguniangs are directed to enact ordinances that protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing. One of the devolved powers under the Code is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. In
light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution and the powers granted therein
to local government units under the General Welfare Clause and those which involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. The
ordinances find full support under R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environment
Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992 which adopts a comprehensive
framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and
enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province.

The dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, series of
1992, as the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975,
and the ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) under P.D. 704. But BFAR is no longer under
the Department of Natural Resources (now DENR), but under the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food and converted into a mere staff agency thereof. The approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However, the requirement of
approval by the Secretary has been dispensed with.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS; SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS; AGRARIAN

AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM; SUBSISTENCE FISHERMEN; DISTINGUISHED
FROM MARGINAL FISHERMEN. — Since the Constitution does not speci>cally provide a
de>nition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen, they should be construed in their
general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose
margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely
sufficient to yield a pro>t or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman
is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the
LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in
subsistence farming or >shing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a >nding that any petitioner falls within these
definitions.

ID.; ID.; ID.; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL

FISHERMEN TO THE USE OF MARINE RESOURCES IS NOT AT ALL ABSOLUTE.

— Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the
ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to
the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also
for the generations to come. The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the >rst paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration,
development and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."
Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation as necessarily
recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of
enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or

marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-
described as "a private association composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim
and Virginia Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of the petitioners claim to be "fishermen,"
without any qualification, however, as to their status.

SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. — . . .

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant >shery privileges to erect >sh corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds
or bangus fry areas, within a de>nite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it:
Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal
>shermen shall have the preferential right to such fishery privileges . . .

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3 dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government prescribed guidelines concerning the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk
relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve
such fishery right.

The questioned ordinances may also be struck down for being not only a prohibitory
legislation but also an unauthorized exercise of delegation of powers. An objective, however
worthy or desirable it may be, such as the protection and conservation of our >sheries in this
case, can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a >eld. The purpose
can be achieved by reasonable restrictions rather than by absolute prohibition. Local
governments are not possessed with prohibitory powers but only regulatory powers under the
general welfare clause. 9 They cannot therefore exceed the powers granted to them by the
Code by altogether prohibiting >shing and selling for >ve (5) years all live fishes through
Ordinance No. 15- 92 and coral organisms through Ordinance No. 2-93 involving even lawful
methods of fishing.

These prohibitions are tantamount to the establishment of a closed season for >sh and
aquatic resources which authority is not among those powers vested by the Local
Government Code to the local government units. For the authority to establish a closed
season for fisheries is vested upon the Secretary of Agriculture by virtue of P.D. Nos. 704 and
1015 and in the Secretary of Environment and Natural resources pursuant to P.D. No. 1219 in
relation to coral resources. The power of the local governments is con>ned and limited to
ensuring that these national fishery laws are implemented and enforced within their territorial
jurisdictions. Hence, any memorandum of agreement which might have been executed by the
Department of Agriculture or Department of Environment and Natural Resources granting
additional powers and functions to the local governments which are not vested upon the latter
by the Local Government Code because such powers are covered by existing statutes, is an
undue delegation of power and, consequently, null and void. The majority also cites R.A. No.
7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, as proof
of the power of the local governments of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City to issue the
assailed ordinances.

Although the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 and of the ordinances are one and the same,
i.e., the protection, conservation and development of natural resources, the former does not
grant additional powers to the local governments pertaining to the environment. In fact, the
law adopts a comprehensive framework which shall serve to direct and guide local
governments and national government agencies in the implementation of programs and
projects affecting Palawan. With the enactment of this Act, the local governments are
mandated to coordinate and align their developmental plans, projects and budgets in accord
with the framework of the SEP. It can be said that this is another limitation on the exercise of
police power by the local governments of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City because the
governance, implementation and policy direction of the SEP shall be exercised by the
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) which is under the Office of the
President. Finally, I find unreasonable Resolution No. 2-93 of Palawan and Ordinance No. 15-
92 of Puerto Princesa City. The prohibitions set forth are not germane to the accomplishment
of their goals. Ordinance No. 15-92 is aimed to free effectively the marine resources of Puerto
Princesa from cyanide and other obnoxious substances. But the means to achieve this
objective borders on the excessive and irrational, for the edict would absolutely ban the
shipment of live fishes and lobsters out of the city for a period of five (5) years without
prohibiting cyanide fishing itself which is professed goal of the ordinance. The purpose of
Resolution No. 2-93, on the other hand, is to protect and preserve all marine coral-dwelling
organisms from devastation and destruction by illegal fishing activities, e.g., dynamite fishing,
sodium cyanide fishing, and the use of other obnoxious substances. But in absolutely
prohibiting the catching, gathering, buying and shipment of live >shes and marine coral
resources by any means including those lawfully executed or done in the pursuit of legitimate
occupation, the ordinance overstepped the reasonable limits and boundaries of its raison
d'etre. This I cannot help viewing as plain arbitrariness masquerading as police power. For the
consequent deprivation of the main source of livelihood of the people of Palawan can only be
regarded as utter depravation of this awesome power of the State.

For all the foregoing, I vote to grant the petition.

 Kapunan, J ., I join Justice Bellosillo in his dissenting opinion.

Hermosisima, Jr., J ., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Bellosillo.

Tano vs Socrates

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an

ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that
the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the
ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that
the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the
Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of
Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called
“preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state
and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the

enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry
out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein
to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

at 8:29 AM

The ordinances in question in this case are conservation measures which the
local governments of Palawan have adopted in view of the widespread destruction
caused by cyanide fishing of corals within their territorial waters. At the very least, these
ordinances must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence to show that the
necessary factual foundation for their enactment does not exist. Their invalidation at
this point can result in the untimely exoneration of otherwise guilty parties on the basis
of doubtful constitutional claims. Petitioners' challenge to the validity of the ordinances
does not rest on the claim that the ordinances are beyond the power of local
governments to enact but on the ground that they deprive petitioners of their means of
livelihood and occupation and for that reason violate the Constitution of the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 2 and Art. III, Secs. 1 and 7 of the Constitution refer to the duty of the
State to protect the nation's marine resources for the exclusive use and enjoyment of
Filipino citizens, to the preferential right of subsistence fishermen in the use of such
communal marine resources, and to their right to be protected, even in offshore fishing
grounds, against foreign intrusion. There is no question here of Filipino preference over
aliens in the use of marine resources. What is in issue is the protection of marine
 resources in the Province of Palawan. It was precisely to implement Art. XII, §2 that the
ordinances in question were enacted. For, without these marine resources, it would be
idle to talk of the rights of subsistence fishermen to be preferred in the use of these
resources. It has been held that "as underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No evidence has been presented by petitioners to overthrow the factual basis
of the ordinances — that, as a result of the use of cyanide and other noxious
substances for fishing, only 5% of the coral reefs in Palawan was in excellent condition,
that 75% had been heavily destroyed, and that because of the thriving market for live
fish and lobster here and abroad there was rampant illicit trade in live fish. Nor has it
been shown by petitioners that the local legislation here involved is arbitrary or
unreasonable. It has been held: "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . . With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the
adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both
incompetent and unauthorized to deal. . . ." Indeed, the burden of showing that there is
no reasonable relation between the end and the means adopted in this case is not on
the local governments but on petitioners because of the presumption that a regulatory
statute is valid in the absence of factual evidence to the contrary. As held in United
States v. Salaveria (39 Phil. 102, 111 [1918]), "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. . . . The councilors must, in the very nature of things be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people. . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation."

59 FILINVEST LAND v. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF MERITVILLE

ALLIANCE, 529 SCRA 790 (2007)

FILINVEST LAND, INC. V. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF

MERITVILLE ALLIANCE, Represented by GABRIEL DELIM and VICTOR RAQUIPISO
G.R. No. 165955, August 10, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:

Facts:
Filinvest Land, Inc. (FILINVEST) is a domestic corporation engaged in realty development
business One of its ventures is the Meritville Townhomes Subdivision (Meritville), the first
low-cost townhouse project in Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City, having its project site near Naga
River. 54 homeowners, respondents , purchased their Meritville housing units from Filinvest.
Subsequently, the Filinvest developed the Meritville area and built new subdivisions built with
elevations higher than that of Meritville causing Meritville to become a “rains catch basin”
during the wet season especially everytime the Naga River overflows.
Due to perennial flood, the 54 homeowners’ townhouses suffered severe damages. As such,
they sent letters demanding Filinvest to address the problem.
In response, Filinvest installed in the area a pumping station with a capacity of 6,000 gallons
per minute and improved the drainage system but these measures were not enough.
Homeowners then filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
complaint against Filinvest praying that Filinvest be ordered to upgrade the elevation of the
affected areas and repair the units from Block 17 to 25. In the alternative, they asked Filinvest
to transfer them to its other flood-free housing projects so that they could allow them to "sell-
back" their affected units. Filinvest contends, however, that they already took appropriate
measures to prevent flooding of Meritville, as approved by Las Piñas City local government.
HLURB decided in favor of the homeowners, ordering Filinvest to upgrade the area and pay
P25,000 damages to each affected homeowner.

Issue: Whether or not Filinvest is liable for damages

Held: No. Filinvest is NOT liable for damages. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
“those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.” Further,
negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do." In this case, there was
no showing that flooding was due to the negligence of Filinvest.
In addition, prior to developments, there was no flooding in the subdivision. The flooding was
caused by Naga river, a public property, hence, it is the Las Piñas City government which has
the duty to control the flood in Meritville Townhouse Subdivision and should address the
problem and not Filinvest. Republic Act No. 7924 (An Act creating MMDA) also provides that
“Flood control and sewerage management” is one of the services to be provided by the
individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila.

60 LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. L OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013

CASE 2013-0009: LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, -VERSUS-

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND HON. ANGELO T.
REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF DENR (G.R. NO. 175368, 11 APRIL 2013,
PERALTA J. SUBJECT/S: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
SMALL SCALE MINING ACT (BRIEF TITLE: LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS. DENR).

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE?

AT ISSUE IS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17 (B )(3)(III) OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND SECTION 24 ‘OF R.A. NO.7076.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IF THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE IS BEING QUESTIONED, WHAT IS THE

PRESUMPTION?

THAT IT IS VALID.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS PRESUMPTION?

THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WHICH ENJOINS THE COURT TO

OBSERVE COURTESY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN THEREFORE WILL A COURT DECLARE A STATUTE INVALID?

WHEN PETITIONER HAS SHOWN A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE

CONSTITUTION, LEAVING NO DOUBT OR HESITATION IN THE MIND OF THE COURT.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch
of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-
honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts.21 This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a
petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no
doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

HAS DENR CONTROL OVER SMALL-SCALE MINING IN THE PROVINCES?

YES.

IT IS GRANTED UNDER THREE STATUTES: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, THE

PEOPLE’S SMALL SCALE MINING ACT AND THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is

granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2)
R.A. No. 7076 or the People’s Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE DENR SECRETARY DECLARED THE APPLICATION FOR EXPLORATION PERMIT

OF AMTC VALID AND CANCELLED THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS GRANTED
BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. WAS THE DECISION OF THE DENR SECRETARY
VALID?

YES. HIS DECISION EMANATED FROM THE POWER OF REVIEW GRANTED TO THE
DENR SECRETARY UNDER R.A. NO. 7076 (PEOPLE’S SMALL SCALE MINING ACT).

Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for
Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the
power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE DENR TO DECIDE ON THE ISSUE
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SMALL-SCALE MINING
PERMITS?

IT IS A QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION OF

WHAT THE LAW IS, AND WHAT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES
ARE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY AND, ON THE BASIS
THEREOF AND THE FACTS OBTAINING, THE ADJUDICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
RIGHTS.

The DENR Secretary’s power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on
the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves
the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties
are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THEN, IS THE ACT OF THE DENR SECRETARY A SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT OF

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OR CONTROL OVER HIM?

NO. IT IS JUST THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF AMTC.

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes,
conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR
Secretary can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting
claims based on the law.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CRITERION IN DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF A

STATUTE?

THAT ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE.

In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by )Jeltran
v. The Secretary of Health, which held:

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the
petition must fail. 55

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 ‘of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said
provisions of law.

61 PIMENTEL JR. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July

17, 2012

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, GR No.

195770, 2012-07-17

THE CASE: For the Court's consideration in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the General Appropriations
Act [GAA] of 2011 1 which provides a P21 Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash
Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development
(DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa and
DSWD Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman from implementing the said program on the
ground that it amounts to a "recentralization" of government functions that have already been
devolved from the national government to the local government units.

Facts:
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as
target beneficiaries. Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino" it was pre-pilot tested in the
municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the... municipalities of Lopez
Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities of Pasay and
Caloocan[3] upon the release of the amount of P 50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management.

On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16,
s. 208),[5] setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang
Pilipino Program " (4Ps), upon the following stated objectives, to... wit:

To improve preventive health care of pregnant women and young children

To increase enrollment/attendance of children at elementary level

To reduce incidence of child labor

To raise consumption of poor households on nutrient dense foods

To encourage parents to invest in their children's (and their own) future

To encourage parent's participation in the growth and development of young children, as well
as involvement in the community

Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized a coordinated inter - agency
network among the Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH),
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Anti - Poverty Commission
(NAPC) and the local... government units (LGUs), identifying specific roles and functions in
order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the CCTP . As the DSWD takes on
the role of lead implementing agency that must "oversee and coordinate the implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of... the program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is
particularly tasked to... a. Ensure availability of the supply side on health and education in the
target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program implementation...
c. Coordinate the implementation/operationalization of sectoral activities at the City/Municipal
level to better execute Program objectives and functions...
d. Coordinate with various concerned government agencies at the local level, sectoral
representatives and NGO to ensure effective Program implementation...
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns regarding Program implementation and submit to
the Regional Advisory Committee, and...
f. Hold monthly committee meetings
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with funding
under the GA of 2008 in the amount of Two Hundred Ninety - Eight Million Five Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos ( P 298,50,0.0).
This budget allocation increased tremendously to P 5 Billion Pesos in 2009, with the amount
doubling to P 10 Billion Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the
GA of 2010 at Twenty One Billion One Hundred Ninety - Four Million One Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Pesos ( P 21,194,17,0.0).
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio Tadeo, incumbent
President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and
Nelson Alcantara, incumbent Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City,
challenges before the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the
CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.
Issues:

THE P 21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN THE GA FY 2010
VIOLATES
ART. II, SEC. 25 SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. &
ART. X, SEC. 3 SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION
TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1981 BY PROVIDING FOR THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC
SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.

SECTION 17 OF THE LGC

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. 8
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved
to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) For a Barangay: (i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials
distribution system and operation of farm produce collection and buying stations; (ii) Health
and social welfare services which include maintenance of Barangay health center and day-
care center; (iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation,
beautification, and solid waste collection; (iv) Maintenance of Katarungang Pambarangay; (v)
Maintenance of Barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems (vi) Infrastructure
facilities such as multi- purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and other
similar facilities; (vii) Information and reading center; and (viii) Satellite or public market, where
viable;
(2) For a municipality: (i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to
agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings,
and other seeding materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal
plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms;
quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution channels,
preferably through cooperatives; inter -Barangay irrigation system; water and soil resource
utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves; (ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry
projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management
and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers;
establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects; (iii) Subject
to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the
implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and
communicable and non-communicable disease control services; access to secondary and
tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to
carry out the services herein enumerated; (iv) Social welfare services which include programs
and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women's welfare,
welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for
vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug
abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services;
(v) Information services which include investments and job placement information systems,
tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library; (vi) Solid waste
disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to
general hygiene and sanitation; (vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks
including freedom parks, playgrounds, and sports facilities and equipment, and other similar
facilities; (viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of
the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to,
municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and
secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out
health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects 10 and other similar
projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply
systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road
signs; and similar facilities; (ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal
enterprises; (x) Public cemetery; (xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including
the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and
security services for such facilities; and (xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations
and the municipal jail;
(3) For a Province: (i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which
include the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms,
livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance
in the organization of farmers' and fishermen's cooperatives and other collective
organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (ii) Industrial research and
development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (iii) Pursuant to
national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of
forestry laws limited to community based forestry projects, pollution control law, small scale
mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric
projects for local purposes; (iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code,
health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services; (v) Social welfare
services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief
operations; and, population development services; (vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails,
freedom parks and other public assembly areas, and other similar facilities; (vii) Infrastructure
facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province and which are funded
out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-
municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems;
reclamation projects; and similar facilities; (viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing
and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System (SSS),
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably
allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population; (ix)
Investment support services, including access to credit financing; (x) Upgrading and
modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of computer
hardware and software and other means; (xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services,
subject to national policy guidelines; and (xii) Tourism development and promotion programs;
(4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition
thereto, the following: (i) Adequate communication and transportation facilities; (ii) Support for
education, police and fire services and facilities. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities funded by
the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned
is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and
services. (d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of
equipment and materials from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of
the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local government unit
concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines. 12 (e) National agencies or
offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of
basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the
effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which
the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units
to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (f) The national government or the next
higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities
assigned to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not
made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its
inhabitants. (g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from
the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues
and funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government
owned or -controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain such
services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall
be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in subsection (b)
hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
(h) The Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to local
government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from the approval
of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be
necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance to local government
units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be
distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and
regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code. (i) The devolution
contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices, corresponding to
the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or
offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose
areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the
said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to
civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, Further, That regional
directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said
regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the
national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure. (j) To ensure the active
participation of the private sector in local governance, local government units may, by
ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned
by them in their proprietary capacity. Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic
services or facilities enumerated in this Section.
Ruling:

The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local
governments[14] and even devotes a full article on the subject of local governance[15] which
includes the following pertinent provisions:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,... allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications , election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the... organization and
operation of the local units.

xxx

Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar
bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non - governmental organizations within the...
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the
region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop
them into self - reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals,
[16] Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs... the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be
self - reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and... responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and... effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions , paragraph
(c)... of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally -
funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under
the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive... orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.

(Underscoring supplied)

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless
an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general... appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing

basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the..
formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions
under the GAA of 2011.

The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national
government itself but implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve
the common national goal... development and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.

Principles:

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing

basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

62 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU, G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012

CASE DIGEST: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DR. AGNES OUIDA P.

YU (G.R. No. 189041; July 31, 2012)

FACTS: In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution

program pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, (The Local Government Code of 1991),
which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government
agencies.

Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo (hereinafter Dr. Castillo) held
the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the DOH Regional
Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr.
Yu), on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO
I).

Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor

Gerry Salapuddin (Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as
the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the local
government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the
Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. She retired in 1996.

Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution

program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.

On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, otherwise known as ―An Act
Converting the Basilan Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela,
Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full Administrative
and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing the
Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor,‖ was
passed into law whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the
local government unit of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the
DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan
General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief
of Hospital II.

While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-
nationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her
original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of
Chief of Hospital II.

Aggrieved, filed a letter protest before the CSC claiming that she has a
vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II. The CSC denied the
protest. On appeal, the CA reversed the CSC.

ISSUES: Is the PHO II position previously occupied by Yu a devolved

position?

May Dr. Castillo be considered to have abandoned her position for

consistently failing to assert her rights thereto?

HELD: As defined, “devolution is the act by which the national government

confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.”

To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503,
otherwise known as the ―Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer
of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government
Agencies Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local Government
Units And For Other Related Purposes, which laid down the following
pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer of personnel: “The
absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which
case, the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected
personnel except when it is not administratively viable.”

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to

absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata
Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word “shall”
both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No.
503, which connotes a mandatory order. The only instance that the LGU
concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption
is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result in duplication of
functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national
government.
 Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she
was not without recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case
to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail.
Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.
***
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In
order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must
be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will
infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs
from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are,
therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to
abandon and, second, an overt or 'external' act by which the intention is
carried into effect.

By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo's seeming lackadaisical

attitude towards protecting her rights be construed as an abandonment of
her position resulting in her having intentionally and voluntarily vacated the
same.

We rule, therefore, under the attendant circumstances of the case, that with
Dr. Castillo's re-absorption by the DOH which appears to bear the former's
approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant.
Thus, we hold that Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in
1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified
designation – Chief of Hospital II.

DENIED

63 PLAZA II v. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (2004)

Facts:

The City of Butuan, passed a resolution entitled "Resolution Authorizing the City Mayor,
Honorable Democrito D. Plaza II, to Sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of
the DSWD to the City of Butuan."

The MOA entered into between the City of Butuan, through then Mayor Democrito
Plaza II, petitioner, and the DSWD, the latter's services, personnel, assets and liabilities, and
technical support systems were transferred to its city counterpart.

By virtue of the same MOA, Mayor Plaza issued Executive Order (EO) No. 06-92
reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding
thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon, Social Welfare
Officer V. Mayor Plaza designated her Officer-in-Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO. The
CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion,
Social Welfare Officer IV. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize
petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that
the issuance of EO No. 06-92 by Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as
Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal.

Mayor Plaza issued a memorandum to the City Legal Officer directing him to conduct
an administrative investigation against respondents. They then submitted their respective
explanations. Thereafter, they were charged administratively for grave misconduct and
insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days. This prompted them to file with
the Civil Service a complaint against Mayor Plaza for violation of the Civil Service Law.
However, their complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.

The CSC informed the Mayor that respondents could be dropped from the rolls. Mayor
Plaza issued an Order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the said CSC
Memorandum Circular. Forthwith, respondents appealed to the CSC and the appeal was
dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the dropping of respondents from the roll of the was legal and without
prior notice.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court found without merit the contention of the appellants that they
were denied due process for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard before they were
dropped from the rolls. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-
disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing.

As provided in the "CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 dated
September 10, 1993 provides as follows:

'Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without
approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be
dropped from the service without prior notice. ITcCSA

'A notice or order of the dropping from the rolls of an employee shall be issued
by the appointing authority and submitted to the CSC Office concerned for record
purposes.'

Based on the above-quoted provision, it is undeniable that the appointing authority has
the legal right to drop from the rolls a civil service officer or employee. Hence, contrary to the
first contention of the appellants, Mayor Plaza acted in conformity with the law when he
ordered the dropping from the rolls of herein appellants.

Further, Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of

personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national
government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term "devolution" refers to
the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
 As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, Executive Order enacted by
then President Corazon C. Aquino to govern and ensure the efficient transfer of
responsibilities to the local government unit concerned. Section 2 (g) provides:

"The local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions. He may
delegate such powers and functions to his duly authorized representative whose
position shall preferably not be lower than the rank of a local government department
head. In all cases of delegated authority, the local chief executive shall at all times
observe the principle of command responsibility."

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 14, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED. The CSC Resolution No. 94-4626 dated August 22, 1994, and Resolution No.
94-6243 dated November 17, 1994 dropping private respondents from the rolls are
AFFIRMED.

64 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, 251

SCRA 42 (1995)

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities

assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have
the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees
or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to
establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation
and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of
March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force
for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and

(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-
A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issue: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or
the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over
the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?

Held: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.

The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of
the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.

Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein
and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

65 LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. CITY OF BUTUAN, 322 SCRA 805 (2000)

Facts:Respondent city of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by the
local government code is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to collect registration
fees or charges along with, its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or
permits for the driving of tricycles. Relying on the provisions of the local government code, the
sangguniang panlungsod of Butuan, on August 16, 1992 passed SP Ordinance no. 916-42
entitled “An Ordinance Regulating The Operation Of Tricycles-For-Hire, Providing Mechanism
For The Issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit and Imposing Penalties For Violations
Thereof and for Other Purposes.”

The ordinance provided for among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of
the franchise of tricyles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the
issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of
the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the
franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the land transportation franchising and regulatory
board but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue
qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

Issue: Whether or not respondent city of Butuan may issue license and permit and collect fees
for the operation of tricycle.

Held: No. LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire
and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. “To regulate” means to fix, establish or
control; to adjust by rule, method or established made; to direct by rule or restriction; or to
subject to governing principles of law. A franchise is defined to be a special privilege to do
certain things conferred by government on an individual or corporation and which does not
belong to citizens generally of common right.

On the other hand, to register means to record formally and exactly, to enroll, or to enter
precisely in a list or the like, and a driver’s license is the certificate or license issued by the
government which authorizes a person to operate a motor vehicle. The devolution of the
functions of the DOTC, performed by the LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the
solicitor general is aimed at curbing the alarming in on case of accidents in national highways
involving tricycles. It has been the perception that local governments are in good position to
achieve the end desired by the law making body because of their proximity to the situation
that can enable them to address that serious concern better than the national government.

It may not be amiss to state nevertheless, that under article 458 (a) [3-VI] of the local
government code, the power of the LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant
franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. In
compliance therewith, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued
guidelines to implement the devolution of LTFRBs franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire
to local government units pursuant to the local government code.

The reliance made by the respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units,
specifically under section 133 of the local government code, is tangential. Police power and
taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the state might
share with local government units by delegation or given under a constitutional or a statutory
fiat.

All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities
just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its
case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence
and carry out its legitimate objectives.

Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not necessarily
carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are by tradition and jurisprudence separate
and distinct powers, varying in their respecting concepts, character, scopes, and limitations.

To construe the tax provisions of section 133 (1) instinctively would result in the repeal to that
extent of LTOs regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise,
the law could have just said so in section 447 and 458 of Book III of the local government
code in the same manner that the specific devolution of LTFRBs power on franchising of
tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not favored. The power over tricycles
granted under section 458 (8) (3) (VI) of the local government code to LGUs is the power to
regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The government’s
exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of section 133 (1) of the local government
code must be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express powers of LTO to cause
the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of license for the driving thereof. These
functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police
power of the state, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road
worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by RA 4136. Not
insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in
harmony with the extent body of laws.

66 MANGUNE v. ERMITA, G. R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016

Topic(s): Validity of administrative issuances, requisites

FACTS: On July 25, 1994, R.A. No. 7842 was enacted establishing, under the administration
and supervision of the DOH, the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital (TPDH). On September 8,
2006, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the administration and supervision of
TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig.

E.O. No. 567 provided that it was issued pursuant to the LGC and the President’s continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under the executive department. Thus, the City of Taguig
issued E.O. No. 053 to formalize the plan for the City of Taguig’s takeover of the operations of
TPDH.

However, petitioners expressed their objections to E.O. No. 567, averring that it contradicts
with the constitutional principle of separation of powers as: (1) it amends the LGC, particularly
its Section 17(e), which limits devolution of basic services and facilities to LGUs to only six (6)
months after the effectivity of the LGC; and (2) it violates the DOH-issued IRR of the LGC
which provides that district health offices in the NCR, including its district hospitals, are
exempt from devolution.
Is E.O. No. 567 Constitutional?

YES. E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the requisites for an administrative issuance to be valid, to
wit:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

(4) It must be reasonable.

First, E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
expressly devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic services and facilities,
including health services.

Second, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the
government are presumed to be valid, and there being no objection from the respondents as
to the procedure in the promulgation of E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the executive
issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law.

Third, the Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision directing the DOH
to promulgate implementing rules and regulations on the devolution of health services. Even
assuming that the DOH was directed to promulgate a subsequent IRR, and that the DOH
issued the IRR, said IRR does not exempt district health offices, including hospitals in the
NCR from devolution.

Fourth, E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of Taguig the
genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an effective and efficient partner in
the attainment of national goals and providing basic health services and facilities to the
community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions of the Constitution and the Local
Government Code on creating a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.

Power to Generate Revenue, § 18 To be discussed as part of Part II Eminent Domain, §

19 See Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

67 SUGUITAN v. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, 328 SCRA 137 (2000)

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners[1] pray for the reversal
of the Order dated July 28, 1998 issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED
and an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION is hereby issued declaring that the plaintiff, City
of Mandaluyong, has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with
existing improvements thereon more specifically covered by Transfer Certificate Of Title
No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II for the public use or
purpose as stated in the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation.

Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the parties are hereby directed
to submit to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent
appraisers from which the Court t will select three (3) to be appointed as
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.[2]

It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994[3] authorizing then Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto
Sugui located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an
area of 414 square meters and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended
purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering
to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.[4] Consequently, on March 13, 1995,
the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint[5] for expropriation with the Regional Trial
Courtof Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875.

Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss[6] the complaint based on the following grounds -(1)
the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is
no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of
Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just
compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the
payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property
is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use.
Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On October 24, 1995, the
trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.[7]

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court
issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of
Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market
value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property.
On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject
property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995.
[8] On July 28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order of expropriation.

Petitioner assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7160,[9] and not by means of a mere resolution.[10] Respondent contends,
however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant
to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a
resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court, was
explained, thus:[11]

...in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a
"resolution" empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and
thereafter when the court has already determine[d] with certainty the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the
Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of the expropriated
property. Admittedly, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.[12]

Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the
initiation of expropriation proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to
appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation, explaining that the
resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative
authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court and to
represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the
necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section
19 of the Code.[13]

The petition is imbued with merit.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare.[14] It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare.[15] Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains
to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition.[16]
The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking
of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government,
but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit.[17] Thus, our own Constitution
provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."[18] Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses[19] act
as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private
property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and
liberty,[20] the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of
Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila we said:[21]

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case
is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws
more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases
cited [73 Am. Dec. 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the
most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous
scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which
all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict
observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of
the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. (Dillon on Municipal
Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22
Phil., 411.)

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled,

however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other
public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power
is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised
in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.[22]

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is
section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for
the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the
duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised
in accordance with the delegating law.[23] In fact, the courts have adopted a more
censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated
power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the
national legislature.[24]

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been
complied with by the local government unit concerned:

An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.

There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.[25]

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent
domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first
requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code
requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation[26]regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that
1998 case we held that:

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to

appropriate funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize
the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of
eminent domain is already being exercised.

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are
comprised of two stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.[27]

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is
indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage
of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by
the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of
condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether
or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the
right to enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the
court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated.[28] Therefore, an ordinance
promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise
the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint
with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just
compensation to which the defendant is entitled.

Neither is respondent's position improved by its reliance upon Article 36 (a), Rule VI of
the IRR which provides that:

If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.

The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR,
which is more apparent than real, in Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty
Corporation,[29]which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,
because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which
merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of
the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising
the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an
ordinance.

Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local

 autonomy, we cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its
delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such
power.

It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not preclude the City of
Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting
expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with all other legal
requirements.[30]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch
155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

(Heirs Of Suguitan vs. Mandaluyong G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000)

68 JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. v. MUNICIPALITY

OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, 466 SCRA 235 (2005)

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW

CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and
Definite Offer)

FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision of declaring respondent
municipality (now city) as having the right to expropriate petitioner’s property for the
construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer
made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to
purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to
expropriate.

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite
offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to
be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property
needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

69 BARANGAY SAN ROQUE v. HEIRS OF PASTOR, 34 SCRA 127

(2000)
Facts:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu
(Branch 1) 3 a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents.
In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that " [e] eminent domain
is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain,
therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such
power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is
merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
with this Court.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that
an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the
value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the
case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the
action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the
subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this
wise: "The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the
current Tax declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is
only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant
to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where
the property involved is located. "The instant action for eminent domain
or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or
possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the
property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That
the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real property is
included in a real action affecting title to or possession of real property,
is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, 'Real actions are
those affecting title to or possession of real property. These include
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on, real
property. . . . '"

ISSUE:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent
domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject
property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

RULING:
"A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is
in the municipal courts or in the courts of First instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of First instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of courts of First instance, which were the
lowest courts of record at the time that theFiCrst organic laws of the
Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901)." In the present case, an expropriation
suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and
right to take private property for public use. In National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings
have two phases: "'The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.' An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it
finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the
Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, 'no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.' "The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of 'the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.' This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
Court regarding the issue. . . .'" It should be stressed that the primary
consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any
of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation
suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be
expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound
to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined
only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that
"condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case
was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which,
like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of Crst instance
had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." 15 The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.To emphasize, the question in the present
suit is whether the government may expropriate private property
under the given set of circumstances. The government does not
dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not
a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not
even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its
inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public necessity,
convenience or welfare may demand." 17

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR
the case. No costs.

70 CITY OF CEBU v. COURT OF APPEALS, 258 SCRA 175 (1996)

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

One of the basic tenets of procedural law is a liberal interpretation

of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. 1 Time and again,
this Court has stressed that the primordial concern of rules of
procedure is to secure substantial justice. Otherwise stated, they
are but a means to an end. Hence, a rigid and technical
enforcement of these rules which overrides the ends of justice
shall not be countenanced. Substance cannot be subordinated to
procedure when to do so would deprive a party of his day in court
on the basis solely of a technicality. 2 The case before us
illustrates how a stringent application of procedural rules, when
uncalled for, can result in a contravention of the foregoing
principle and the consequent subversion of justice.

FACTS: The antecedent facts are undisputed. Private respondent

Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of
2,019 square meters located at Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 116692. On
February 25, 1992, the petitioner, City of Cebu, filed a complaint
for eminent domain against private respondent with Branch II of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City seeking to expropriate
the said parcel of land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to
Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418, dated February 17,
1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the
City Mayor to expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of
providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-
income city residents. 3

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on

the ground of lack of cause of action. She asseverated that the
allegations contained in paragraph VII of the complaint, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to

have the aforementioned property purchased by the plaintiff
through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but
said negotiations failed." do not show compliance with one of the
conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by a local government unit as enunciated in Section 19 of
R.A. 7160 which provides in part that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain . . .; Provided however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner sought to establish compliance with the abovecited

requirement by alleging in its "Comment and Opposition" to
private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the following
facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"7. To further pursue its desire to acquire the property concerned,

the plaintiff made on October 28, 1991, another offer to Mrs.
Cardeno, through her lawyer? Atty. Omar Redula, for the purchase
of her property in the amount of Four Hundred Seventy Eight
Thousand (P478,000.00) Pesos. . . .;

"8. The said offer was again refused, thus the resort by the
plaintiff to expropriation." 6

The RTC nevertheless dismissed the complaint and ruled as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The allegations in the complaint which is (sic) relevant to the

seemingly or apparent compliance of (sic) that condition
precedent is found in paragraph VII thereto (sic) which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to

have the aforementioned property purchased by the plaintiff
through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but
said negotiations failed.’

"The import or meaning of the said allegation in paragraph VII of

the complaint aforequoted to the mind of the Court does not
convey or connote the same meaning or import or even
approximate, the condition precedent required,

‘Unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner and such offer was not accepted.’

"The Court is of the opinion that the City of Cebu has not
complied with the condition precedent, hence, the complaint does
not state a cause of action.?" 7

Furthermore, in disregarding petitioner’s allegations in its

"Comment and Opposition", the RTC invoked the oft-cited rule
that where the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no
cause of action, its sufficiency can only be determined from the
facts alleged in the complaint and no other. 8

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari

before the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the above
ruling of the RTC. According to the Court of Appeals, an allegation
of repeated negotiations made with the private respondent for the
purchase of her property by the petitioner, "cannot by any stretch
of imagination, be equated or likened to the clear and specific
requirement that the petitioner should have previously made a
valid and definite offer to purchase" 9 It further added that the
term negotiation" which necessarily implies uncertainty, it
consisting of acts the purpose of which is to arrive at a
conclusion, may not be perceived to mean the valid and definite
offer contemplated by law. 10

Petitioner’s contention that it could have presented evidence in

the course of the trial to prove full compliance with Section 19 of
R.A. No 7160 had the RTC not dismissed the case outrightly, fell
on deaf ears. 11 The Court of Appeals declared it procedurally
unacceptable to ascertain the existence of a cause of action from
any source other than the allegations in petitioner’s complaint.

An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for review on

certiorari which has essentially become a battle of semantics
being waged before this Court. While petitioner reiterates that
paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently states compliance with
the requirement of "a valid and definite offer", private respondent
insists that the term "negotiations" is too broad to be equated with
the said requirement. 12 Elaborating, private respondent posited
that by definition, "negotiations run the whole range of acts
preparatory to concluding an agreement, from the preliminary
correspondence; the fixing of the terms of the agreement; the
price; the mode of payment; obligations of (sic) the parties may
conceive as necessary to their agreement." 13 Thus,
"negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the foregoing and
does not automatically mean the making of "a valid and definite
offer" .

At the outset, it must be said that without necessarily delving into

the parties’ semantical arguments, this Court finds that the
complaint does in fact state a cause of action. What may perhaps
be conceded is only the relative ambiguity of the allegations in
paragraph VII of the complaint. However, as We have previously
held, a complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity,
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated therein
for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a
bill of particulars. 14 And,

". . . though the allegations in the complaint are ambiguous,

indefinite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a cause of action can, in
any manner, be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover in any aspect of the facts or any combination of
the facts alleged, if they were to be proved, then the motion to
dismiss should be denied.’’ 15

ISSUE:
In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the
complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any
state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged
therein. 16

The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals in

holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action stems
from their inflexible application of the rule that: when the motion
to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the issue should
only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint.
17 However, this rule is not without exceptions. In the case of Tan
v. Director of Forestry, 18 this Court departed from the
aforementioned rule and held that,." . . although the evidence of
the parties were on the question of granting or denying the
petitioner-appellant’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the
resolution of the motion. to dismiss." 19 Likewise, in Marcopper
Mining Corporation v. Garcia 20 we sanctioned the act of the trial
court in considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings
submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. This Court
deemed such course of action but logical where the trial court had
the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer
with counterclaim, the petitioner’s answer to the counterclaim and
its answer to the request for admission. 21 The same liberality
should be applied in the instant case where an examination of
petitioner’s "Comment and Opposition" to private respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss leaves no room for doubt that petitioner had
indeed made ‘’a valid and definite offer" to private respondent as
required by law.

Furthermore, a closer scrutiny reveals that even on the face of the

complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action. Petitioner avers
in paragraph I thereof that,

". . . Under R.A. 7160, Sec. 9 thereof, the City of Cebu is legally
vested with the power of eminent domain and pursuant thereto is
filing this petition/complaint as authorized by Ordinance No. 1418
passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on February 17.1992, a
photocopy of which is herein attached as Annex "A’’, and made an
integral part of this complaint. . . ." 22 [Emphasis supplied.]

All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and

genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant,
must be considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon. 23 Additionally, the general rule is
that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint. 24 Thus, Ordinance No. 1418, with
all its provisions, is not only incorporated into the complaint for
eminent domain filed by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted by
private Respondent. A perusal of the copy of said ordinance which
has been annexed to the complaint shows that the fact of
petitioner’s having made a previous valid and definite offer to
private respondent is categorically stated therein. Thus, the
second whereas clause of the said ordinance provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the city government has made a valid and definite

offer to purchase subject lot(s) for the public use aforementioned
but the registered owner Mrs. Merlita Cardeno has rejected such
offer."25cralaw:red

RULING:
The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn argument
over the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
There is no longer any room for doubt that as alleged in the
complaint, and as admitted by private respondent, the petitioner
 had in fact complied with the condition precedent of "a valid and
definite offer" set forth in Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160.

And as a fitting finale to this controversy, the principle enunciated

in both the Tan and Marcopper cases is here
reiterated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,

technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are
merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of
justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of
the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot he
countenanced." 26

The aforequoted doctrine finds compelling application in the case

at bench. For as correctly averred by petitioner, nothing else was
accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint for eminent
domain but a considerable delay in the proceedings. The
dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from filing
another eminent domain case and from correcting its alleged error
by the mere expedient of changing paragraph VII thereof. Indeed,
precious time has been wasted while the salutary objectives of
Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cebu have been put on hold by a
quarrel over technical matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision

appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered
remanded to the RTC which shall proceed to the hearing and final
determination thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

71 THE CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO, 381 SCRA 754 (2002)

G.R. No. 142971. May 7, 2002
Art. 1315 – Contracts perfected by mere consent.
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 - Just compensation shall be determined as of the
time of actual taking.

Petitioner – The City of Cebu

Respondents –Sps. Apolonio & Blasa Dedamo

Facts:
· The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against the spouses
 Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, alleging that it needed their two parcels of land for a
public purpose, i.e. for the construction of a public road.
· The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an
assessed value of P1,786,400.
· The City of Cebu deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount
representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner
to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.
· Dedamo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because of the following
reasons:
(a) That the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for
public use, but for benefit of a single private entity;
(b) That the price offered was very low; and
(c) That they have no other land in Cebu City.
· A pre-trial ensued, but the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an
Agreement to partially settle the case.
· Thereafter, the trial court directed the City of Cebu to pay the Dedamo the just
compensation of P24,865,930.00 based on the recommendation of the appointed
commissioners. But the said compensation was amended to P20,826,339.50,
excluding an area which was not subject to expropriation.
· The City of Cebu elevated the case to the CA, asserting that the value of just
compensation should be based on the date of the filing of the complaint. But the
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
WoN just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
No, the Court holds that just compensation shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property in accordance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, a substantive law that
must prevail over procedural law.
Under Art. 1315 also, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from
that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
In the case at bar, the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between
the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in
good faith. Since the petitioner did not interpose a serious objection during the
hearing, it is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation.
 Thus, the petition is DENIED.

SHERYL’S VERSION

Facts:

A case for eminent domain, which fixed the valuation of the land of the
Respondents on the basis of the recommendation of the commissioners appointed by
it. Petitioner questioned the land valuation asserting that just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not at the time the property
was actually taken in 1994

A pre-trial was thereafter had. the parties executed and submitted to the trial
court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case.
Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to
determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. the
commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments
of and recommendation as to the valuation of the property.

On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation thereon, the
trial court rendered its decision.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the

commissioners' report was inaccurate. the commissioners submitted an amended
assessment. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the
trial court. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the

filing of the complaint.

Ruling:
 No. Eminent domain [PR1] is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government
must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.

In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the
determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.
The Section reads as follows:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property.

More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission
and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has
the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. Article 1159
and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment
 the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may
be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a
serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now
without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais[PR2] arises when
one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought
to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED. CcSTHI

72 FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 284 SCRA 716

(1998)

FACTS:

Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in

Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment
suit against the occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of land on
the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals.
The ejectment suit became final and executory as no further action was taken
beyond the CA.

During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a

complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of
Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing
Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means of certain
parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No.
7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part
of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were sold and distributed to
qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City
of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain
seeking to expropriate lands in Antonio Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of
Possession in favor of the City.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of
possession. The motion to dismiss was premised on the following grounds:
no valid cause of action; the petition does not satisfy the requirements of
public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution
issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit; violation of the
constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and contract;
price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation provision
of the constitution.

The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA which dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and
substance, aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the
petition are blurred and unreadable.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the
existence of a final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to
vacate the lots.

YES. Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the
properties and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private
respondents ordering the latter’s ejectment from the premises.

Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged

supervening event which has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights
moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the City of Manila
over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private respondents. For
its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power of eminent domain
within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in

favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents
from the properties subject of this dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to
assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and
executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable
right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right
to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under
Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100 of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila further empowers the city government to expropriate private
property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. The
city’s right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a
final and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated had already
been previously upheld by the court in the case of Philippine Columbian
Association vs Panis:

“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express
power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home
lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and
low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to
provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore

confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no
moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the
half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).

2. WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.

NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a
paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban
areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a
serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority
when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to
these problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just
compensation for the expropriation of private property must be complied
with. Other laws have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, to wit:

• Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the

provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

• Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides
an order of priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with
private lands listed as the last option.

• Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when

other modes of acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping,
donation to the government, etc. have been exhausted, and, where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
shall be exempted.

Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory

because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of
private property to DUE PROCESS when their property is expropriated for
public use.

There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila
complied with the above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated
and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that
resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have
proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s right to
due process.
 It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising
its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of
the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always
takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we
must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process
extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. (Filstream
International Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125218 Jan. 23, 1998)

73 CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO, 359 SCRA 231 (2001)

Facts:
On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833,
authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in
Tondo... which are to be sold... and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the
Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C... is covered
by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of Feliza
De Guia.[1] After her death, the estate of
Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement,
which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court
In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De Guia, died,... as a result of which
his estate, consisting of his share in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned
among his heirs. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto
De Guia.[3] On April 15, 1994, Edgardo De Guia was... issued TCT No. 215593, covering
Lot 1-C.[4] On July 29, 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in
whose name TCT No. 217018 was issued.
The property was subsequently sold on January 24, 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom
TCT No. 226048 was issued.
On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for
expropriation... with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed
owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201,... 105202,
and 138273, which included herein respondents... all surnamed Serrano.[7] On
November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that
their mother, the late
Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona
fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation
of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them
by their... deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation
because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only
about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that judgment be
rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt... from expropriation and ordering the cancellation
of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048,[8] regarding the pendency of
Civil Case No. 94-72282 for eminent domain filed by petitioner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998,
directing petitioner to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed
value of the properties.[10] After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court...
issued another order, dated December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of petitioner.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot 1-C is
not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which
is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279.
However, it held that... in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[13] the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of
the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation.
As... petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment
for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C.
Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has
been ordered condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the trial court,
dated December 15, 1998, merely authorized the issuance of a writ of possession and...
petitioner's entry into the property pursuant to Rule 67, §2. At that stage, it was
premature to determine whether the requirements of R.A. No. 7279, §§9-10 have been
complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the trial court.
Ruling:
This contention is well taken.
a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by
the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject
to expropriation.
Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial.[22] In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore,
it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements laid down in §§9-10 of R.A. No. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream ruling.
This is error. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of
condemnation... had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the
judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not
gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to
determine whether or not... petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided
in R.A. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that
petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition
enumerated in §10 of the... law.
Principles:

74 CITY OF MANDALUYONG v. AGUILAR, 350 SCRA 487 (2001)

City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar [GR 137152, 29 January 2001] First Division,
Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N.
Aguilar, constructed residential houses several decades ago on a portion of the 3
lots located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The
Aguilars had since leased out these houses to tenants until the present. On the
vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential structures which
they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution 125 of the
Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council as an Area
for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation 1967 and 2284
of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the tenants and
occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from the Aguilars, but the latter
refused to sell. On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium
for qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly
sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per
square meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation, seeking to expropriate 3
adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the
names of the Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of just compensation at the fair
market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except
Eusebio who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer
to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary
and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their only
real property and are too small for expropriation, while the City has several
properties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, the
Aguilars prayed for damages of P21 million. On 5 November 1997, the City filed an
Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar
and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City also
excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to
be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636
square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on 18
December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing
the Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property owners"
whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279. The court also
found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for the City's failure to
present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) landless and
homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for reconsideration. On 29
December 1998, the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the City has exhausted all means to
acquire the land under the hands of private persons, but which is within the Areas
for Priority Development (APD). Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban
 Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in 1978. The decree
adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from blight,
congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization,
the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare. Pursuant to this
law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro Manila as
Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in
1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and
specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban
Land Reform Zones. The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed
by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for
socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government
lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or
idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD),
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and (6) privately owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single
provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must
be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing
under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the
following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or
consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of
expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned
by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. The acquisition of
the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set
forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be
acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
Herein, the City claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land
acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in
the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state
with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9
of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states
"expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted." The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated
purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the
Aguilars but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no
mention has been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the
expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to
acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture
agreement under Section 9 of the law.

75 BARDILLON v. MASILI, 402 SCRA 440 (2004)

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003 DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, PETITIONER,
VS. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly,

it falls within the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the
value of the subject property.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the January 10, 2001 Decision and the
February 5, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR
SP No. 61088. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit."[3]

The assailed Resolution[4] denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Facts
The factual antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"At the root of this present [P]etition is the controversy surrounding the two (2) [C]omplaints
for eminent domain which were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a
ONE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot
4381-D situated in Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna and owned by herein petitioner under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383605 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation the said lot pursuant to a
Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by and between the former and the latter on
October 7, 1996.

"The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 3648 and entitled Brgy.
Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A. Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E. Bardillon,'
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (MTC') on February 23, 1998,
following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the
purchase offer of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation of
Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for
the use and benefit of its constituents.

"On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 for lack of
interest' for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in
its Order dated May 3, 1999, denied [respondent's] [M]otion for [R]econsideration thereof.

"The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 2845-99-C and
entitled Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Devorah E. Bardillon,' was filed before Branch 37 of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (RTC') on October 18, 1999. This [C]omplaint
also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of
Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by
alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that [respondent's] cause of
action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

"On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction
over the said expropriation proceeding.

"With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261 on July 10, 2000, and
the submission thereof in compliance with [the] Judge's Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring
herein respondent to produce the authority for the expropriation through the Municipal Council
of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of
Barangay Masili x x x and, on August 16, 2000, the corresponding order for the issuance of
the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381-D."[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37)[6] did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second
Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No. 2845-99-C) was not
barred by res judicata. The reason is that the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint for eminent domain (Civil
Case No. 3648), had no jurisdiction over the action.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
"A. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied and dismissed petitioner's appeal;

"B. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it did not pass upon and consider the pending Motion for Reconsideration which was
not resolved by the Regional Trial Court before issuing the questioned Orders of 4 and 16
August 2000;

"C. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
taking the total amount of the assessed value of the land and building to confer jurisdiction to
the court a quo;

"D. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ignoring the fact that there is an existing multi-purpose hall erected in the land owned by
Eugenia Almazan which should be subject of expropriation; and
"E. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
failing to consider the issue of forum shopping committed by Respondent Masili."[8]

Simply put, the issues are as follows: (1) whether the MTC had
jurisdiction over the expropriation case; (2) whether the dismissal of
that case before the MTC constituted res judicata; (3) whether the CA
erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises; and (4)
whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction Over Expropriation
Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the
MTC had jurisdiction over the case.[9]

On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of
the property was P28,960.[10] Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was
beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.

Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and
right to take property for public use.[11] As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.
[12]

This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of

Francisco Pastor:[13]

"It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the
necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of
an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

"True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the
court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is
satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation."

"Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance,' the forerunners of the
regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation.' The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents."[14]

To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC

regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is
the government's exercise of eminent domain -- a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Second Issue:
Res Judicata
Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of the first Complaint for
eminent domain was with prejudice, since there was no indication to
the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of
the second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed
on account of res judicata.

Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or

decided, or settled by judgment.[15] It provides that a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand
or cause of action.[16]

The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment
must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action.[17]

Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the

doctrine of res judicata finds no application even if the Order of
dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

Third Issue:
Legality of Entry Into Premises
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC's Writ of
Possession over her property, issued despite the pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint. We are not
persuaded.

The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an

expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section
2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] On the part of
local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of
the Local Government Code.[19] Accordingly, in expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as
follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15
percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated
based on its current tax declaration.[20]
 In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of
respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and
deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied
with the foregoing requisites.

The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly

addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If
petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she
should say so in her Answer to the Complaint.[21] The RTC has the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
[22]

Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioner claims that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, because it
scouted for another forum after obtaining an unfavorable Decision from
the MTC.

The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present in two or more pending cases,
such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.[23]

Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been
dismissed when the Complaint was filed before the RTC. Even granting
arguendo that both cases were still pending, a final judgment in the
MTC case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the former
had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales,

JJ., concur.

76 FRANCIA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, 549 SCRA 53

(2008)

Facts:
respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for expropriation[1]
against petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P. Francia and Benjamin P. Francia[2]
in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan
Respondent needed petitioners'... idle property at the junction of the North Expressway
It planned to use it to establish a... common public terminal for all types of public utility
vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in
fact developed[5] and there were plans for further development. For this reason,
respondent's offer price... was too low.
the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose. The construction of a
common terminal for all public utility conveyances (serving as a two-way loading and
unloading point for commuters and goods) would improve the flow of vehicular traffic
during rush... hours.
the CA rendered a decision[8] partially granting the petition. Finding that petitioners
were deprived of an opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations, the appellate
court nullified the order of expropriation except with regard to... the writ of possession.
According to the CA, a hearing was not necessary because once the expropriator
deposited the required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ of possession
became ministerial.
Issues:
prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides:
Section 19. Eminent Domain.
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of... just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of
the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of
the property... based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated;
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to
be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the
property's fair... market value based on its current tax declaration.[11] The law does not
make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a
writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Principles:

77 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. GO PUCO, 462 SCRA 544

(2005)
RESPONDENT:
Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No.
72 consisting of 995 square meters located in the vicinity of the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
13061-T. The Lahug Airport had been turned over by the United States
Army to the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 through the
Surplus Property Commission, which accepted it in behalf of the
Philippine Government. In 1947, the Surplus Property Commission was
succeeded by the Bureau of Aeronautics, which office was supplanted
by the National Airport Corporation (NAC). The NAC was in turn
dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
3 Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the owners of the various lots
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that
the government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.
Some landowners were convinced to sell their properties on the
assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these
would no longer be used by the airport. Others, including Gopuco,
refused to do so. Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for the expropriation of
Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1881. On 29 December 1961, the CFI promulgated a Decision, AaSTIH
1. Declaring the expropriation of [the subject lots, including Lot No. 72]
justified and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain; 2.
Declaring . . . a balance of P1,990 in favor of Apolonio Go Puco, Jr.
with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully paid. . . .; After
the payment of the foregoing Financial obligation to the landowners,
directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer
CertiFIcates of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation
of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel
the same and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title
in the name of the plaintiff. 4 No appeal was taken from the above
Decision on Lot No. 72, and the judgment of condemnation became
final and executory. Thereafter, on 23 May 1962, absolute title to Lot
No. 72 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
No. 25030. 5 Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport
commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino in a Memorandum of 29 November 1989.
6 Lot No. 72 was thus virtually abandoned. 7 On 16 March 1990,
Gopuco wrote 8 the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager
of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offering to return
the money previously received by him as payment for the
expropriation. This letter was ignored.

ISSUE:
When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that
particular public use is abandoned, does its former owner acquire a
cause of action for recovery of the property?

RULING: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of

Appeals,"the terms of the judgment (in Civil Case No. R-1881) are
clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to
the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the
effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN
had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used
other than as the Lahug Airport." 25 Moreover, we held that although
other lot owners were able to successfully reacquire their lands by
virtue of a compromise agreement, since CHIONGBIAN was not a
party to any such agreement, she could not validly invoke the same.

The respondent would have us revisit this ruling for three reasons.
First, because he claims there is no showing that the government
benefited from entering into compromise agreements with the other lot
owners; second, because such a doctrine supposedly discriminates
against those who have "neither the wherewithal nor the savvy to
contest the expropriation," or agree to modify the judgment; and third,
because there exists between the government and the owners of
expropriated realty an "implied contract" that the properties involved
will be used only for the public purpose for which they were acquired in
the first place. As to respondent's Erst and second arguments, we have
time and again ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid
contract which is the law between the parties. 26 It is a contract
perfected by mere consent, 27 whereby the parties, making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
It has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties, 28 and
courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed,
simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise. 29 Note that
respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements
were in any way tainted with illegality, irregularity or imprudence.
Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot
be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it. 30 Since Gopuco
was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally
invoke the same. 31 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019
Eminent domain is generally described as "the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State. 32 Also often referred to as expropriation and,
with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a
public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even
in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. 33 In
fact, "all separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the
highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or
in the aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they
 have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it." 34 The ubiquitous character of eminent
domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conFLicting interest in the property. Thus, by Eling the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in
the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking. 35 The only direct constitutional
qualiFIcation is thus that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." 36 This prescription is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well
the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced. 37 In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking
and the adequacy of the compensation received have long become
final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment
granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore,
pursuant to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National
Housing Authority, 38 no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied,
have been retained by the herein respondent.
Neither has Gopuco, in the present case, adduced any evidence at all
concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.
The trial court was thus correct in denying Gopuco's claim for the
reconveyance of Lot No. 72 in his favor. However, for failure of the
petitioners to present any proof that this case was clearly unfounded or
Eled for purposes of harassment, or that the herein respondent acted
in gross and evident bad faith, the reimposition of litigation expenses
and costs has no basis. It is not sound public policy to set a premium
upon the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as
in the present case. 42 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 49898 dated 28
February 2001, and its Resolution of 22 May 2003 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of RTC-Branch X of Cebu
dated 20 May 1994 in Civil Case No. CEB-11914 is REINSTATED with
the modification that the award of exemplary damages, litigation
expenses and costs are DELETED.

Reclassification of Lands, § 20 Administrative Order No. 363 (1997) Republic Act No. 8435
(1997), § 9, 11 Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 1 (1999), III (f) and
(k), 10 NAR 398

78 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v.

THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 183409, June 18,
2010

CASE DIGEST: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS

ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
FACTS:

Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural
Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural
lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988.

March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion
of Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1)
those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and
other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of
which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use
other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be
converted to such uses.

The 2 earlier AOs were further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use.

The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly

addressing land conversion in times of exigencies and calamities. To
address the conversion of lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR
suspended processing and approval of land conversion through DAR
Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of housing projects
because of such stoppage

ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?

HELD: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or

suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural
or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.

However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified

as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are
 considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution,
or otherwise.

This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing in Section 65 of

Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the
DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or
reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.

Also, it violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not
provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion
procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local
autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law

because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within
DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or
restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties.
More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased
in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.

DISMISSED.

Closure and Opening of Roads, § 21

79 DACANAY v. ASISTIO, 208 SCRA 404 (1992)

This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in
accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the
streets of Caloocan.
January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of
streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a
case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon
and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor
(Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets
as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls
in their street
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or
resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve
such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because
it is going to be contrary to the general law

Corporate Powers, § 22
80 CITY OF MANILA v. IAC, 179 SCRA 428 (1989)
259 Phil. 30

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the Decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals[1] promulgated on May 31, 1984 in
AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al. v. City Court of Manila et al.,
modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII[2] in Civil
Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants (herein petitioners) to give plaintiffs (herein private
respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the North Cemetery corresponding to the
unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs; and
(b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the case are as
follows:
"Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo,
Sr. was this action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangelina Suva of the City Health
Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the
latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the
City Government of Manila.

"Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father of
the litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971 and buried on June 6, 1971 in Lot No. 159, Block
No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the
period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No. 61307 dated June 6, 1971
(see Exh. A) with an expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1). Full payment of the rental
therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face.
Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no other document was executed to embody such
lease over the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila
North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect the term
of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.

"Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975,
dated March 6, 1975, of the City of Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing uniform
procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No. 159 of
Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was
leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on January 25,
1978 as ready for exhumation.

"On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed by
defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the
remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack
and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot
in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot
on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear
departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb.
Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in
inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari, and was
told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question which
was given to another lessee.

"Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased
husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different
burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties.
But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to do was simply unacceptable. According
to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late husband in a depository
containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the
risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. She was even offered another lot but was never
appeased. She was too aggrieved that she came to court for relief even before she could
formally present her claims and demands to the city government and to the other defendants
named in the present complaint." (Decision, Court of Appeals pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)

The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the
right to make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three
(43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days, corresponding to the unexpired term of the
fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up and with the use of all means humanly
possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury the
same in the substitute lot to be chosen by plaintiffs pursuant to this decision.

"For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 31)

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a
decision (Rollo, pp. 33-40) modifying the decision appealed from, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED (is hereby modified) and another one is hereby entered:

"1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of
plaintiffs hereunder;

"2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00 for
breach of contract;

"3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for
moral damages;

"4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for
exemplary damages;

"5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as

and for attorney's fees;

"6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the foregoing
amounts legal rate of interest computed from filing hereof until fully paid; and

"7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of suit.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 40)

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.
The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:
I
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD
FAITH AND THEIR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE
SKELETAL REMAINS OF THE LATE VIVENCIO STO. DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE
SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.

II
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS
HEREIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409 (REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES
FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES,
IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE.

(Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)

In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public
cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. The
resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of the
petitioner city.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public
use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of
Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its
governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public
officers and subordinate employees. Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of
Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.
Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract
of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto.
Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any violation of the contract of
lease.
Private respondents' contention is well taken.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed
with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government
in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the
one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In Mc Quillin on Municipal Corporation, the
rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has . . . a public character as regards the
state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to
promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85
SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire
property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New
Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties
(Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities, all other property is
patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions
the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu
(Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de
Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).
The Court further stressed:
"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

"The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the
negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by
which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the
conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly,
to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist. x x x
(Underscoring supplied)

The Court added:

"x x x while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterworks,
slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries.
Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also
recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. (Dept. of Treasury v.
Coity of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N. E. 2nd 952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla,
supra) (Underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is
a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal
Board on August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the
Ordinances of the City of Manila). The administration and government of the cemetery are
under the City Health Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid.,
Sec. 319), the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the
purification of the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and
guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery
through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion, there is,
therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of
Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the
burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. (Henson v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed
in the contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc. 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience of private
respondents and their wounded feelings upon discovery that the remains of their loved one
were exhumed without their knowledge and consent, as said Court declared:
"It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their lowly
station in life have found great consolation in their bereavement from the loss of their family
head, by visiting his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but particularly on All Saints
Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino tradition of revering the memory
of their dead. It would have been but fair and equitable that they were notified of the intention
of the city government to transfer the skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to
give them an opportunity to demand the faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to
prepare and make provisions for said transfer in order that they would not lose track of the
remains of their beloved dead, as what has actually happened on this case. We understand
fully what the family of the deceased must have felt when on All Saints Day of 1978, they
found a new marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to locate their beloved
dead among thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration and an impossible
task. Even the lower court recognized this when it stated in its decision thus:

'All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate
happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their
deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual
basis. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs can ask for
is the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North
Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city
government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25,
1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed
from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull
of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in
favor of plaintiffs hereunder.'"
(Decision, Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195
of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly
stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by
the city government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion
of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in
itself a contract of lease. (Decision, Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of
Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the
duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered
by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for
five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative
order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

81 PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, 22 SCRA 1334

(1968)
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

 REVENUE,defendants-appellants.

Facts:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be

the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which
the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be
acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General.”

Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high
school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga
into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and
obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties
and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between
the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.”

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga.”

This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be
declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due
process and just compensation.

Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of

its private properties.

ADVERTISEMENT
REPORT THIS AD
Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del

Norte of its private properties.

Held:

No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public
property.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The
principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public
and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which
it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that
obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the
properties in question?

Civil Code

The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for
public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All
other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots
used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the
former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,
and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They
would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that
under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate
use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of
Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

Law of Municipal Corporations

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the
law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are
devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this
norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations
— State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and
devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that
would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru
adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to
consider those properties as ordinary private property.

Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining
under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence,
the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes
as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.

(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del
Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter
out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and

(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
balance remains of plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated
March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally
adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No
costs. So ordered

82 RABUCO v. VILLEGAS, 55 SCRA 656 (1974)

Rabuco vs Villegas 55 SCRA 656

Facts

The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the City of
Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and
alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and disposal to the LTA to
be subdivided into lots and selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments
constitutes a deprivation of the City of Manila of its property by providing for its sale
without the payment of just compensation.

Issue

Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without paying just
compensation to the City of Manila?

Held

The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question are
owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore
public property over which Congress has absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial property owned by it which cannot be deprived from the City without just
compensation and without due process. RA 3120 expressly provides that the
properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its
conversion into disposable and alienable lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide
occupants. It has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to
classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on
such power of the state.

83 SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN v. GARCIA, G.R. No. 174964, October

5, 2016

Facts:
Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC
(collectively, the respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC of
Balanga, Bataan against the Governor and the petitioner.
Initially, the Board of Trustees of the BPSC was impleaded as an unwilling plaintiff but was
eventually included as co-petitioner in the civil suit pursuant to Resolution No. 14, Series of
2000 of the BPSC.[6]In their Comment, the Governor and the petitioner took issue with the
standing of the respondents, arguing that they were not the real parties in interest who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. They
asserted that the subject properties were owned by the Province of Bataan and not the State,
for them to be simply transferred to the BPSC by virtue of the law.
Issues:
The petitioner proffers an alleged novel argument that R.A. No. 8562 infringes on the State's
underlying policy of local autonomy for its territorial and political subdivisions, found in Article
X of the 1987 Constitution (formerly Article XI, 1973 Constitution) and now fleshed out in a
landmark legislation, R.A. No. 7160, better known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). Thus, for this Court to still sustain its ruling in Salas would render the State's policy of
local autonomy purely illusory
Ruling:
The Court [in Salas] reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or
classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own
funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the
benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such
lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the
municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the
property and puts it to a different use" and stressed that "the property, as has been previously
shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary
capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be
deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of
the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation

84 MUNICIPAL BOARD v. CTA, 12 SCRA 645 (1964

MUNICIPAL BOARD, in representation of the City of Cebu, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

TAX APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, Cebu City and AGUSTIN JEREZA,
for and in behalf of the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, Respondents.

Jose S. Amadora for petitioner.

Ramon Duterte for respondent Agustin Jereza.

Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

In letters to the City Assessor of the City of Cebu dated June 17, 1959 and January 29, 1960,
the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, through its president, Mr. Agustin Jereza,
applied for inclusion in the list of real estate exempt from real property taxation the following
parcels of land which it leased from various persons for school purposes:

L Owner
ot
N
o.
ch Agustin
a Jereza
nr
o
bl
es
vir
tu
al
la
w
lib
ra
ry
3
1
3

3 " "
1
7

3 " "
3
9

3 " "
4
0

4 " "
9
3

4 " "
9
5
A

4 " "
9
 5
B

3 Heirs of
4 Filomena
1 Duterte

3 " "
4
2

4 Soledad D.
6 Sanson
0
A

4 " "
6
0
B

In reply, the City Assessor informed the University of Southern Philippines Foundation that the
aforesaid lots were considered exempt from real property taxation except Lots Nos. 313, 317,
340, 341, 342 and 460 B, rentals of which were paid their owners at P40.00, P50.00, P50.00,
P85.00, P85.00 and P50.00 per month, respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Not satisfied with the letter-decision of the City Assessor, the University of Southern
Philippines Foundation appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Cebu.
After hearing, said Board rendered its decision granting exemption to Lots Nos. 313, 340, 341,
342, and 460-B. From this decision, the Municipal Board, in representation of the City of
Cebu, appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

On July 20, 1961, after issues were joined and the case was submitted for decision on a
stipulation of facts, the Court of Tax Appeals, declining from passing upon the merits of the
other issues raised by the parties, dismissed the case on the ground that the City of Cebu,
represented by its Municipal Board, cannot appeal from the decision of the Board of
Assessment Appeals citing the decisions of this Court in Collector of Customs vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, et al. (L-8811, Oct. 31, 1957) and Ursal vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al. (L-1025
& L-10355, April 26, 1957). The conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals is premised
on the theory that the Board of Assessment Appeals is merely the instrumentality of the City of
Cebu and the latter being a governmental agency is not among those who may appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals enumerated in Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Municipal Board for and in representation of the City of Cebu appealed to Us from the
judgment of the Court of Tax of Appeals, dismissing the
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The question to be resolved is whether or not the City of Cebu can appeal from the decision of
the Board of Assessment Appeals under Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 1125. The pertinent
portion of said provision states:

SEC 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. - Any person, association or
corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment
Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling. (Emphasis supplied).

The City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate created by a special charter
(Commonwealth Act No. 58), endowed with the powers which pertain to a municipal
corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and be sued. It is authorized to levy
real estate taxes for its support. For instance, Section 75 of its charter provides, "One-fourth of
all moneys realized from the real estate tax herein provided for shall be devoted exclusively to
the support of free public primary schools of the City, and to the erection and maintenance of
suitable school buildings."chanrobles virtual law library

In the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City exempting the lots in
question from the payment of real property tax, no entity is more adversely affected than the
City of Cebu, for it stands to lose a yearly income equivalent to the realty tax: seven-eights of
one per centum on the assessed value of said lots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

This question before Us is not new, for in the recent case of the City of Manila and the City
Assessor of Manila vs. The Board of Assessment Appeals, et al. (L-18784, April 30, 1964),
We ruled that the City of Manila is a corporation adversely affected by the decision of the
Board of Assessment Appeals. The city charters of Manila and Cebu have similar provisions
in respect to benefits derived from the collection and levy of real property taxes. We find no
reason to deviate from this ruling in the present case. Accordingly, We hold that the City of
Cebu may validly appeal from the decision of the City Board of Assessment
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As to the personality of the Municipal Board to represent the City of Cebu in this suit, suffice it
to my that Sec. 58 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 expressly vests in the Municipal Board the
authority to appeal from the decision of the City Assessor to the Board of Assessment
Appeals. This indicates legislative intent to lodge in the Municipal Board the right to represent
the City in an appeal from an adverse decision of the Board of Assessment
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
Court of Tax Appeals for further proceedings. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

 ) Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants, § 23 Liability for Damages, § 24 New
Civil Code, Articles 34, 2180, and 2189 Republic Act No. 8749, § 43

85 SAN FERNANDO v. FIRME, 195 SCRA 692 (1991)

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for
damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third
Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig.
Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State.
After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.

ISSUES: 1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and
be sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to
show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on
his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability.

86 MENDOZA v. DE LEON, 33 Phil. 508 (1916)

G.R. No. 9596, February 15, 1916 ]

 MARCOS MENDOZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO DE LEON
ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION
TRENT, J.:

This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal
council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of
an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act
No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a little more than one year, the
plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both
governmental and corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of
regulations against fire and disease, preservation of the public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class
are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the construction
and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-
breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or
township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding
five years as may have been previously approved by the provincial board of the province in
which the municipality or township is located.
The twofold character of the powers of a municipality under our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is
so apparent and its private or corporate powers so numerous and important that we find no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such
entities to private individuals as enunciated in the United States are applicable to it. The
distinction between governmental powers on the one hand, and corporate or proprietary or
business powers on the other, as the latter class is variously described in the reported cases,
has been long recognized in the United States and there is no dissent from the doctrine.
In Wilcox vs. City of Rochester (190 N. Y., 137), it was said:
"The broad general doctrine of the Maxmilian case (Maxmilian vs. Mayor, etc., New York, 62
N. Y., 160), which is certainly not now open to question in the courts of this State, is that 'two
kinds of duties are imposed on municipal corporations, the one governmental and a branch of
the general administration of the state, the other quasi private or corporate;' and 'that in the
exercise of the latter duties the municipality is liable for the acts of its officers and agents,
while in the former it is not.' (Cullen, J., in Lefrois vs. Co. of Monroe, 162 N. Y., 563, 567.)"

The Maxmilian case is quoted with approval in Bond vs. Royston (130 Ga., 646).
In Co. Comm's of Anne Arundel Co. vs. Duckett (20 Md., 468, 476; 83 Am. Dec., 557), it was
said:
"With regard to the liability of a public municipal corporation for the acts of its officers, the
distinction is between an exercise of those legislative powers which it holds for public
purposes, and as part of the government of the country, and those private franchises which
belong to it, as a creation of the law; within the sphere of the former, it enjoys the exemption of
the government, from responsibility for its own acts, and for the acts of those who are
independent corporate officers, deriving their rights and duties from the sovereign power. But
in regard to the latter, it is responsible for the acts of those who are in law its agents, though
they may not be appointed by itself."

This case was quoted with approval in Trammell vs. Russellville (34 Ark., 105; 36 Am. Rep.,
1); and in Mcllhenney vs. Wilmington (127 N. C, 146; 50 L. R. A., 470).
In Cummings vs. Lobsitz (42 Okla., 704; L. R. A., N. S., B, p. 415), it was said:
"A distinction is made between the liability of a municipal corporation for the acts of its officers
in the exercise of powers which it possesses for public purpose and which it holds as agent of
the state, and those powers which embrace private or corporate duties and are exercised for
the advantage of the municipality and its inhabitants. When the acts of its. officers come within
the powers which it has as agent of the state, it is exempt from liability for its own acts and the
acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent of the city are for the special benefit of the
corporation in its private or corporate interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of
the city, but where the act is not in relation to a private or corporate interest of the municipality,
but for the benefit of the public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are deemed to
be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit."

The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations (5th ed.)
sections 38 and 39.
As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the municipality is not liable for the acts of
its officers or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs
do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments.
Nor does the fact that such duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for
convenience, the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve
the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so on is to administer
government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local
organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the
administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality
in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
"The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation, be sued for injuries
resulting from an act done in the exercise of its lawful governmental powers and pertaining to
the administration of government. * * * Municipal corporations are agents of the state in the
exercise of certain governmental powers. The preservation of the health and peace of its
inhabitants and fire protection afforded the property owner, are governmental functions."
(Burke vs. City of South Omaha, 79 Neb., 793.)

In Nicholson vs. Detroit (129 Mich., 246; 56 L. R. A., 601), it was said:
"It is the well-settled rule that the state is not liable to private persons who suffer injuries
through the negligence of its officers and the rule extends to townships and cities while in the
performance of state functions, imposed upon them by law. This subject is fully discussed in
Detroit vs. Blackeby (21 Mich., 84; 4 Am. Rep., 450). It was there held that cities are
governmental agencies, and that their 'officers are in no such sense municipal agents; that
their negligence is the neglect of the municipality; nor will their misconduct be chargeable
against them, unless the act complained of be either authorized or ratified.' And in a large
number of cases it has been held that there is no such liability on the part of such
governmental agency unless it has been imposed by statute, and in such case it is necessarily
limited by the statute."
In Claussen vs. City of Luverne (103 Minn., 491; 15 L. R. A., N. S., 698), it was said:
"It is elementary that neither the state nor any of the subdivisions, like a municipality, through
which it operates, is liable for torts committed by public officers, save in definitely excepted
classes of cases. The exemption is based upon the sovereign character of the state and its
agencies, and upon the absence of obligation, and not on the ground that no means for
remedy have been provided. 'The government,' said Mr. Justice Story, 'does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest.' (U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720; 6 L. ed., 199;
Beers vs. Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L. ed., 991.) This general exemption has been applied
to municipal corporations in so far as the acts complained of were, in the language of the
memorandum of the trial court, 'done in exercising powers for the public at large as a
governing agency.' While so acting, the city cannot be held liable for misfeasance; and * * *
the rule of respondeat superior has no application."

Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental
duties which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of
their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the
express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If they exercise their honest judgment in
the performance of their duties, their errors cannot be charged against them. (People vs.
May, 251 111., 54; Salt Lake County vs. Clinton [Utah, 1911], 117 Pac., 1075; Comanche
County vs. Burks (Tex. Civ. App., 1914), 166 S. W., 470; Monnier vs. Godbold, 116 La., 165;
5 L. R. A., N. S., 463; Ray vs. Dodd, 132 Mo. App., 444; Johnson vs. Marsh, 82 N. J. L., 4;
Gregory vs. Brooks, 37 Conn., 365; Lecourt vs. Gaster, 50 La. Ann., 521.) So it may be said
that in so far as its governmental functions are concerned, a municipality is not liable at all,
unless expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their duties
honestly and in good faith. The most common illustration of both phases of this rule is the
action for false imprisonment so often brought either against a municipality or s municipal
police officer. (Bartlett vs. City of Columbus, 101 Ga., 300; 44 L. R. A., 795; Peters vs. City of
Lindsborg, 40 Kan., 654.) So, in Field vs. City of Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575), it was held that
a municipality, acting under authority given it by the central government to destroy houses in
the path of a conflagration, was not liable in damages in the absence of a statute expressly
making it so.
From what has already been said, it should be clear that 4 municipality is not exempt from
liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In
the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or
individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts,
validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its
officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the
principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality is made
liable to suits in the courts.
"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. In a previous
chapter we have considered at length the authority of such corporations to make contracts,
the mode of exercising, and the effect of transcending the power. This leaves but little to add
in this place respecting their liability in actions ex contractu. Upon an authorized contract that
is, upon a contract within the scope of the charter or legislative powers of the corporation and
duly made by the proper officers or agents they are liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as private corporations or natural persons." (Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
5th ed., sec. 1610.)

The same author says in section 1647:

"The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the
negligence or want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by
which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations, under the
conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly,
to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist. To create such
liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act done which is injurious to others must be
within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or positive enactment (the
extent of which powers all persons are bound, at their peril, to know); in other words, it must
not be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the corporation to
act in reference to it under any circumstances. If the act complained of necessarily lies wholly
outside of the general or special powers of the corporation as conferred in its charter or by
statute, the corporation can in no event be liable to an action for damages, whether it directly
commanded the performance of the act or whether it be done by its officers without its
express command; for a corporation cannot, of course, be impliedly liable to a greater extent
than it could make itself by express corporate vote or action."

It often happens that the same agent or agency has both a governmental and a corporate
character. Such, for instance, are a municipal water system designed both for protection
against fire (a governmental function) and to supply water to the inhabitants for profit (a
corporate function). (Omaha Water Co. vs. Omaha, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 736; 77 C. C. A., 267;
147 Fed., 1; Judson vs. Borough of Winsted, 80 Conn., 384; 15 L. R. A., N. S., 91); a
municipal light plant both for lighting the streets (a governmental function) and for furnishing
light to the inhabitants at a profit (a corporate function) (Fisher vs. New Bern, 140 N. C, 506;
111 Am. St. Rep., 867); an agent who is at the same time a police officer and a caretaker of a
municipal toll bridge (Woodhull vs. Mayor, etc., of New York, 150 N. Y., 450). It is, also,
sometimes the case that considerable difficulty is experienced in determining whether a
particular municipal duty is governmental or corporate.
But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar. Here it is clear that the leasing of
a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a governmental but
a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the
lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. The matter is thus summed up by Dillon on
Municipal Corporations (5th ed., sec. 1306):
"Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or legislative authority, containing grants to
water and light companies and other public service corporations of the right to use the streets
for pipes, mains, etc., upon the condition of the performance of service by the grantee, are,
after acceptance and performance by the grantee, contracts protected by the prohibition of the
Federal Constitution against the enactment of any State law impairing the obligation of
contracts."

Again, this author, adopting the language of the court in In re Fay (15 Pick. [Mass.], 243),
says, in section 277:
"If a municipal corporation, seized of a ferry, lease the same, through the agency of the mayor
and aldermen, with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, this covenant will not restrain the mayor
and aldermen from exercising the powers vested in them by statute, to license another ferry
over the same waters, if in their judgment (which cannot be reviewed by the courts) the public
necessity and convenience require it On such a covenant the city may be liable to the
covenantees; but the powers vested in the city officers as trustees for the public cannot be
thus abrogated. If, however, the city in its corporate capacity is the legal owner, of an
exclusive franchise, its grantees or lessees would hold it, notwithstanding any license to
others, whether granted by the mayor and aldermen or any other tribunal."

It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the Municipal Code and Act No. 1634,
above referred to, the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in
question for the period of his lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be
patent that a judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be
proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex
delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities. But the present action
is against the members of the municipal council personally, and the question arises: Are they
liable? In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private corporation. In
disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may be used, such as the fishing and ferry
rights, etc., they must exercise considerable judgment. It requires some considerable amount
of business acumen to compel performance on the part of lessees of these privileges in
accordance with the terms of their leases and in a manner which will not cause the property to
deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which are not expressly provided for in the
contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in a manner that will preserve the just claims
of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that on occasion the councilors may
have reason to believe that a particular contract has been rescinded by the other party or has
never been legally entered into, in both of which cases, decisive steps must be taken to
safeguard the interest of the municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan (21
Phil. Rep., 184), the lessee of a municipal fishery was evicted for failing to pay his quarterly
rents. The municipal authorities rightly held that the contract was rescinded but forcibly evicted
the lessee instead of resorting to the courts. Hence, in an action by the municipality against
the lessee and his bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowed the lessee on
his counterclaim for the loss caused by the forcible eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think the
councilors could have been held personally liable for their error in resorting to forcible eviction
of the lessee. Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest mistake on their part as to the
rights of the municipality in the premises. We think the rule of personal liability should be with
municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary
private corporation.
"Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, it follows naturally that
they are not liable for the mismanagement of the corporate affairs where such
mismanagement is a mistake of judgment. The wisdom of this rule is not only approved by
common experience but by law writers and all courts. A rule so rigid as to hold directors
personally liable for honest mistakes in corporate management would deter all prudent
business men from accepting such positions. The remedy of stockholders in all such cases is
by a change in the directory. * * * The rule is that courts will not interfere even in doubtful
cases. But directors and managing officers may be liable for mismanagement to warrant the
interposition of a court either as against the contemplated action of the directors, or a majority
of the stockholders, or to give relief by way of damages after the action has been taken; a
case must be made out which plainly shows that such action is so far opposed to the true
interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could
have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests, but that he must have
acted with an intent to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the
corporation, and in a manner inconsistent with its interests." (Thompson on Corporations,
 sec. 1298.)

In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any justifiable reason for
forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. On the contrary, the defendant
councilors attempted to justify their action on the ground that the ferry which he was operating
was not the one leased to him; this, in spite of the fact that the vice-president had personally
placed him in possession of it more than a year before, and the fact that he had operated this
ferry for over a year, evidently with the knowledge of the defendants. The evidence is so clear
that the ferry of which the plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he had leased that no
reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, we cannot
say that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to
an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting
for the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the defendants are
liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his
contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question. In reaching this conclusion, we have not
failed to take into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs. The Moro Province (R. G.
No. 8173, March 28, 1914; not reported), nor the distinction made by the courts in the United
States between the liability of a municipal corporation, made such by acceptance of a village
or city charter, and the involuntary quasi corporations Known as counties, towns, school
districts, and especially the townships of New England. Upon the question of the amount of
damages sustained, we accept the findings of the lower court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

87 QUEZON CITY v. DACARA, 460 SCRA 243 (2005)

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and ENGR. RAMIR J THOMPSON, Petitioners

vs.

FULGENCIO DACARA Sr, Respondent

G.R No. 150304, JUNE 15, 2005

Panganiban, J.:

FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988, Dacara Jr’s car turned turtle after it rammed against
a pile of earth/ street diggings at Matahimik Street, Quezon City, which was then repaired by
the Quezon City Government. As a result, Dacara Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and
his vehicle was extensively damaged. Fulgencio Dacara Sr, in behalf of his minor son, filed a
claim for damages against the Local Government of Quezon City and Engr. Ramir J.
Thompson before the RTC. The LGU contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU
have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable. The petitioners
appealed to the higher court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be
held liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr?

HELD:

Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City
Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by
Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU subsidiarily liable for the damage
incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were not negligent insisting that they placed all the
necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside construction, but none were
presented , gave a more substantial support to the report of the policeman who responded to
the scene of incident that no precautionary signs were found on the said place of incident.
Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its instrumentality were held negligent in the
execise of their functions where as capsulized under Article 2189 of the New Civil Code that
Local Government and its employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance
roads/ streets but also for the safety of the public. Hence, compensatory damages was
awarded to the respondent.

88 PILAR v. SANGGUNINANG BAYAN NG DASOL, PANGASINAN, 128 SCRA

173 (1984) 213 Phil. 160

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an original action for mandamus to compel the Sangguniang Bayan and
the municipal treasurer to pay the salary due petitioner Hon. Expedite B. Pilar, in
his capacity as the Vice Mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan, as provided for by Batas
Pajnbansa Big, 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint Commission on
Local Government and Personnel Administration and to recover actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.
Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. Elected with
him were Lodovico Espinosa as the municipal mayor and the following members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, to wit: Avelino Nacar, Luz Jimenez, Gerardo Rivera, Juan Bonus,
Apolonio G. Abella, Jaime Abella, Laurentino Balaoing and Elifas Vidal. All of them assumed
office on March 1, 1980. Later on, the following also became members of the Sangguniang
Bayan: Linda Bustria, Abraham Balaoing and Ceferino Quinitio.
On March 4,1980, the Sangguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. l which increased the
salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum
respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor
despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual salary of P16,0440.00[1] (Circular
No. 9-A).
Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sangguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the
payment of his salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter
and asking that something should be done to correct it. The proper provincial[2] and national
officials[3] endorsed compliance with Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local
Government and Personnel Administration in giving the revised rate of salary for petitioner. In
fact, the mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the Commission advising him
that the Municipality should pay the Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the
Municipal Treasurer per Circular No. 15.
On December 12, 1980, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the
amount of P500.00 per month as the salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to
P774.00 per month in December, 1981.[4]
On October 26,1982, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount
of P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to
December 31, 1982. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the
filing by the petitioner of this petition for a writ of mandamus on February 16, 1983.[5]
In their comment, the respondents alleged that:
(1) The filing of the petition is premature because the petitioner did not exhaust all
administrative remedies contending that petitioner should have lodged his complaint first with
the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development; (2) that the petition involves
a question of fact and, therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case because
the right of the petitioner to receive a salary depends on the availability of municipal funds and
lithe availability or non-availability of municipal funds is a factual issue which is not cognizable
by the Supreme Court"; and (3) that the petition is now moot and academic because on April
20, 1983, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted an appropriation ordinance which among others
appropriated an amount of P29,985.00 as payment of salary differentials of the petitioner
pursuant to the Supplemental Budget No. 3 Gen. Fund, C.Y. 1983.
Petitioner in his reply argues that: (1) There is no violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies because only the writ of mandamus offers him an adequate and
speedy remedy to his legal problem, and the said doctrine can be dispensed with if the issue
involved is a legal one and the issue to be resolved in this case - on whether the appropriation
of a salary of a vice mayor is a discretionary act or ministerial act - is a legal issue. (2) The
only factual issue involved in this case is the ascertainment of damages inflicted to the
petitioner due to the failure of the respondents to pay him his lawful salary. The existence of
municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be appropriated is not a factual
issue anymore due to the certification of the municipal treasurer as to the existence of such
funds, and (3) The issue has not become moot and academic because there is no guarantee
that even though a resolution appropriating the salary of the Vice Mayor has been enacted,
actual payment shall be made to the petitioner.
On June 1, 1983, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
Petitioner admitted that at the time he submitted his memorandum, he has been fully paid of
his salaries as provided for by Batas Pambansa Big. 51 and implemented by Circular No. 9-A
of the Joint Commission for Local Government and Personnel Administration.[6]
Since petitioner's claim for salaries has already been provided for and paid, the case has
 become moot and academic;
Nevertheless, We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to damages and attorney's fees
because the facts show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary
which was unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
(Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).
That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible
for the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause
on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the
petitioner.[7] While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by
respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner
when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the
salary of the petitioner could be paid.[8] Respondent Mayor's refusal, neglect or omission in
complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of
Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed
salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public
good, respondent Mayor is liable personalty to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective
damages.
Petitioner is likewise entitled to actual damages and costs of litigation which We reduce from
P13,643.50 to P5,000.00 and for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, We hold that petitioner is entitled to
P5,000.00 as moral damages.
All the above sums as damages including attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 shall be
paid personally by respondent Mayor Lodovico Espinosa from his private funds.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby considered moot and academic but respondent Mayor is
hereby ordered to pay petitioner from his private and personal funds actual damages and
costs of litigation the amount of P5,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P5,000.00; and attorney's fees in the
amount of P5,000.00.
Costs against respondent mayor.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Acting C.J.), Conception Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J. (Acting Chairman), concurs in a separate opinion.

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and ENGR. RAMIR J THOMPSON, Petitioners vs. FULGENCIO
DACARA Sr, Respondent G.R No. 150304, JUNE 15, 2005

Panganiban, J.:
FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988, Dacara Jr’s car turned turtle after it rammed against
a pile of earth/ street diggings at Matahimik Street, Quezon City, which was then repaired by
the Quezon City Government. As a result, Dacara Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and
his vehicle was extensively damaged. Fulgencio Dacara Sr, in behalf of his minor son, filed a
claim for damages against the Local Government of Quezon City and Engr. Ramir J.
Thompson before the RTC. The LGU contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU
have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable. The petitioners
appealed to the higher court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be
held liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr?

HELD:

Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City
Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by
Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU subsidiarily liable for the damage
incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were not negligent insisting that they placed all the
necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside construction, but none were
presented , gave a more substantial support to the report of the policeman who responded to
the scene of incident that no precautionary signs were found on the said place of incident.
Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its instrumentality were held negligent in the
execise of their functions where as capsulized under Article 2189 of the New Civil Code that
Local Government and its employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance
roads/ streets but also for the safety of the public. Hence, compensatory damages was
awarded to the respondent.

89. GUILLERGAN v. GANZON, 17 SCRA 257 (1966)

123 Phil. 1102

CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by respondents, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, writ of mandamus is hereby granted
against the respondents who are hereby ordered to restore the items corresponding to the
salaries of the petitioners in the budget; to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions,
and to pay their salaries during their separation from service, with costs against the
respondents."

Petitioners herein are laborers or employees in the unclassified service, assigned as market-
sweepers of the City of Iloilo, in which capacity they have been working for some time, ranging
from nine (9) to twenty-five (25) years. On July 12, 1955, petitioners herein, together with 13
other laborers and/or employees of Iloilo City as market sweepers, slaughterhouse laborers
and market cleaning capataces, commenced civil case No. 3764 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo against the Mayor, the Treasurer and the Veterinarian of Iloilo City, to compel these
officers to reinstate said petitioners to their aforementioned positions, from which they had
been allegedly separated or dismissed illegally. In their answer, the respondents in said case
alleged that respondent Mayor had the right to remove or separate the petitioners therein from
the service because they were not civil service eligibles and were paid on a daily basis. In clue
course, judgment was, on March 15, 1956, rendered in said case, which is already final and
executory, against the respondents and in favor of the petitioners therein—excluding three of
them, as to whom the case was dismissed at their own request, but including the eleven (11)
petitioners herein—who were declared permanent employees and/or laborers of Iloilo City and
ordered reinstated to their respective positions as such. However, their items were not
included in the budget approved by the Municipal Board of Iloilo City for the fiscal year 1960-
1961. Petitioners asked the Secretary of Finance to declare said abolition of their positions
inoperative, but the request was denied by said officer upon the ground that the issue could
be determined only by courts of justice. Hence, petitioners instituted the present action for
mandamus against the city mayor, the municipal board, the city treasurer and the City of Iloilo,
to compel said respondents to restore the aforementioned items in the city budget, to reinstate
petitioners to their former positions, and to pay their salaries during their separation from the
service, with costs.
In their answer, respondents alleged that the abolition of said items had been decreed for
reasons of economy, to balance the budget and to meet the free elementary education
program of Iloilo City, apart from the alleged inefficiency of the petitioners. Respondents,
likewise, averred in their answer that the city was contemplating to place the cleaning of the
markets under contract with private individuals.
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered the decision appealed from, finding
against the foregoing allegations of fact of respondents herein; that said allegations "are
devices conceived in order to smoke screen the real cause of the elimination of the items of
the petitioners in the budget for the year 1900-1961, which J3 political exigency;" that said
elimination of petitioners' items was "politically inspired, so that the positions they vacated
could be filled up by the followers of the respondents;" and that, in fact, after the abolition of
said items, "new men or laborers were placed by the respondents to take the places vacated
by the petitioners;" and, consequently, holding said abolition of items illegal and void.
The appeal taken by respondents herein raises only one question, namely, whether or not the
lower court erred in holding the City of Iloilo jointly liable with the other respondents for the
back salaries of petitioners herein. Respondents-appellants maintain the negative upon the
ground that municipal corporations enjoy the same immunity as the state in the administration
of strictly governmental functions, unless expressly made liable by statute, and that pursuant
to Section 4 of the Charter of Iloilo City (Commonwealth Act No. 158, as amended) :
"* * * The City shall not be liable for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from
the failure of the Municipal Board, or any City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this Charter,
or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence on their part while carrying out or enforcing
said provisions".

Respondents' pretense is untenable. To begin with, the Charter of Iloilo City (Sec. 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 158), expressly provides that the City of Iloilo may
"sue and be sued". Secondly, the operation of a market, in the cleaning of which petitioners
herein are engaged, is not strictly a governmental function.[1] Thirdly, we have already
decided in a number of cases that municipal corporations may be held liable for back pay or
wages of employees or laborers illegally separated from the service, including those involving
primarily governmental functions, such as those of policemen.[2]
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against respondents-
appellant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.

90 FERNANDO v. CA, 208 SCRA 714 (1992)

G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
1. November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
2. November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.
3. The bodies were removed by a fireman.
4. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there.
5. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic
tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market
master. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be
the ones who did the re-emptying.
6. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" -
diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
7. November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order

RTC: Dismissed the case

CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and
the indigent

ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can
be liable for damages

HELD: NO. Affirmed CA.

Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:

1. Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
 conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law

Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its consequences

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

■ Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover
■ Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil
Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public

While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements

accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not
been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the
attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this
kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and
that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident.

proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.
Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

91 OSMEÑA v. COA, G.R. No. 188818, May 31, 2011

OSMENA VS. COA
Good Law
EN BANC G.R.No. 188818, May 31, 2011 TOMAS R. OSMENA, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY, PETITIONER, VS.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by Tomas R. Osmeña, former
mayor of the City of Cebu, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The petition seeks the
reversal of the May 6, 2008 Decision[2] and the June 8, 2009 Resolution[3] of the
respondent Commission on Audit (COA), which disallowed the damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses awarded in favor of two construction companies in the
collection cases filed against the City of Cebu, and made these charges the personal
liability of Osmeña for his failure to comply with the legal requirements for the
disbursement of public funds.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The City of Cebu was to play host to the 1994 Palarong Pamhansa (Palaro). In
preparation for the games, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc.
(WTCl) and Dakay Construction and Development Company (DCDC) to construct and
renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. Osmeña, then city mayor, was authorized by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the City and to
execute the construction contracts.

While the construction was being undertaken, Osmena issued a total of 20

Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI, amounting to P35,418,142.42 (about 83% of the
original contract price), and to DCDC, amounting to P15,744,525.24 (about 31% of the
original contract price). These Change/Extra Work Orders were not covered by any
Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior authorization from the Sanggunian.
Nevertheless, the work proceeded on account of the "extreme urgency and need to
have a suitable venue for the Palaro."[4] The Palaro was successfully held at the Cebu
City Sports Complex during the first six months of 1994.

Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in
the construction and renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member,
Councilor Augustus Young, sponsored a resolution authorizing Osmeña to execute the
supplemental agreements with WTCI and DCDC to cover the extra work performed, but
the other Sanggunian members refused to pass the resolution. Thus, the extra work
completed by WTCI and DCDC was not covered by the necessary appropriation to
effect payment, prompting them to file two separate collection cases" before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Civil Case Nos. CEB-17004[5] and CEB-
17155). The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the
extra work performed. The RTC likewise awarded damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,514,255.40 to WTCI[7] and P102,015.00 to DCDC.
[8] The decisions in favor of WTCI and DCDC were affirmed on appeal, subject to
certain modifications as to the amounts due, and have become final. To satisfy the
judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation ordinances.

During post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of
litigation expenses, damages, and attorney's fees to WTCI and DCDC.[9] The City
Auditor held Osmeña, the members of the Sanggunian, and the City Administrator
liable for the P2,514,255.40 and P102,015.00 awarded to WTCI and DCDC,
respectively, as damages, attorney's fees, and interest charges. These amounts, the
City Auditor concluded, were unnecessary expenses for which the public officers
should be held liable in their personal capacities pursuant to the law.

Osmeña and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration of the

disallowance with the COA Regional Office, which, through a 2nd Indorsement dated
April 30, 2003,[10] modified the City Auditor's Decision by absolving the members of
the sanggunian from any liability. It declared that the payment of the amounts awarded
as damages and attorney's fees should solely be Osmeña's liability, as it was him who
ordered the change or extra work orders without the supplemental agreement required
by law, or the prior authorization from the Sanggunian. The Sanggunian members
cannot be held liable for refusing to enact the necessary ordinance appropriating funds
for the judgment award because they are supposed to exercise their own judgment and
discretion in the performance of their functions; they cannot be mere "rubber stamps" of
the city mayor.

The COA Regional Office's Decision was sustained by the COA's National Director for
Legal and Adjudication (Local Sector) in a Decision dated January 16, 2004.[11]
Osmeña filed an appeal against this Decision.

On May 6, 2008, the COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of
disallowance.[12] Osmeña received a copy of the Decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen
days after or on June 10, 2008, Osmena filed a motion for reconsideration of the May
6, 2008 COA Decision.

The COA denied Osmena's motion via a Resolution dated June 8, 2009.[13] The Office
of the Mayor of Cebu City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June
29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmeña left for the United States of America for his
check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his office only on July
15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmeña filed the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COA's Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of
June 8, 2009.

THE PETITION

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the review of judgments and
final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the COA. Section 3 of
the same Rule provides for a 30-day period, counted from the notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, to file the petition for certiorari. The Rule
further states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the said judgment or final
order or resolution interrupts the 30-day period.

Osmeña filed his motion for reconsideration, of the COA's May 6, 2008 Decision, 18
days from his receipt thereof, leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against
the COA ruling. He argues that the remaining period should be counted not from the
 receipt of the COA's June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City
on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially reported back to his office on July 15,
2009, after his trip abroad. Since he is being made liable in his personal capacity, he
reasons that the remaining period should be counted from his actual knowledge of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he needed time to hire a private
counsel who would review his case and prepare the petition.

Osmeña pleads that his petition be given due course for the resolution of the important
issues he raised. The damages and interest charges were awarded on account of the
delay in the payment of the extra work done by WTCI and DCDC, which delay Osmeña
attributes to the refusal of the Sanggunian to appropriate the necessary amounts.
Although Osmeña acknowledges the legal necessity for a supplemental agreement for
any extra work exceeding 25% of the original contract price, he justifies the immediate
execution of the extra work he ordered (notwithstanding the lack of the supplemental
agreement) on the basis of the extreme urgency to have the construction and repairs
on the sports complex completed in time for the holding of the Palaro. He claims that
the contractors themselves did not want to embarrass the City and, thus, proceeded to
perform the extra work even without the supplemental agreement.

Osmeña also points out that the City was already adjudged liable for the principal sum
due for the extra work orders and had already benefitted from the extra work orders by
accepting and using the sports complex for the Palaro. For these reasons, he claims
that all consequences of the liability imposed, including the payment of damages and
interest charges, should also be shouldered by the City and not by him.

THE COURT'S RULING

Relaxation of procedural rules to

give effect to a party's right to appeal

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. [Emphasis ours.]

Several times in the past, we emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in
the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized
exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn
obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. Every plea
for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation
of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the
requested liberal construction.[14] Where strong considerations of substantive justice
are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of
procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.[15]

Osmeña cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas
after his cancer surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay in filing his petition for
certiorari. Due to his weakened state of health, he claims that he could not very well be
expected to be bothered by the affairs of his office and had to focus only on his medical
treatment. He could not require his office to attend to the case as he was being
charged in his personal capacity.

We find Osmeña's reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the
service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009
through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City,[16] we consider July
15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective date when he was actually
notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to
rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of his right to appeal the Decision of the
COA, despite the merits of his case.

Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be
verified, and a verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before an
authorized officer that he has read the petition and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that Osmeña was out of the country to
attend to his medical needs, he could not comply with the requirements to perfect his
appeal of the Decision of the COA.

While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioner's counsel who
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading, this was an alternative
not available to Osmeña, as he had yet to secure his own counsel. Osmeña could not
avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the latter is authorized to represent city
officials only in their official capacity.[17] The COA pins liability for the amount of
damages paid to WTCI and DCDC on Osmeña in his personal capacity, pursuant to
Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (PD 1445).[18]

Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition
should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date Osmeña had actual knowledge of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the COA and given the
opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto before the Court. The present petition,
filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary period.

Personal liability for expenditures of

government fund when made in violation of law

The Court's decision to adopt a liberal application of the rules stems not only from
humanitarian considerations discussed earlier, but also on our finding of merit in the
petition.

Section 103 of PD 1445 declares that ''[e]xpenditures of government funds or uses of

government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the
 official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor." Notably, the public
official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made
in violation of law. In this case, the damages were paid to WTCI and DCDC pursuant to
final judgments rendered against the City for its unreasonable delay in paying its
obligations. The COA, however, declared that the judgments, in the first place, would
not be rendered against the City had it not been for the change and extra work orders
that Osmeña made which (a) it considered as unnecessary, (b) were without the
Sanggunian's approval, and (c) were not covered by a supplemental agreement.

The term "unnecessary," when used in reference to expenditure of funds or uses of

property, is relative. In Dr. Teresita L. Salva, etc. v. Guillermo N. Carague, etc., et. al.,
[19] we ruled that "[circumstances of time and place, behavioural and ecological
factors, as well as political, social and economic conditions, would influence any such
determination, x x x [T]ransactions under audit are to be judged on the basis of not only
the standards of legality but also those of regularity, necessity, reasonableness and
moderation." The 10-page letter of City Administrator Juan Saul F. Montecillo to the
Sanggunlan explained in detail the reasons for each change and extra work order;
most of which were made to address security and safety concerns that may arise not
only during the holding of the Palaro, but also in other events and activities that may
later be held in the sports complex. Comparing this with the COA's general and
unsubstantiated declarations that the expenses were "not essential"[20] and not
"dictated by the demands of good government,"[21] we find that the expenses incurred
for change and extra work orders were necessary and justified.

The COA considers the change and extra work orders illegal, as these failed to comply
with Section III, C1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree
No. 1594,[22] which states that:

1. Change Orders or Extra Work Orders may be issued on a contract upon the approval
of competent authorities provided that the cumulative amount of such Change Orders
or Extra Work Orders does not exceed the limits of the former's authority to approve
original contracts.

2. A separate Supplemental Agreement may be entered into tor all Change Orders and
Extra Work Orders if the aggregate amount exceeds 25% of the escalated original
contract price. All change orders/extra work orders beyond 100% of the escalated
original contract cost shall be subject to public bidding except where the works involved
are inseparable from the original scope of the project in which case negotiation with the
incumbent contractor may be allowed, subject to approval by the appropriate
authorities. [Emphases ours.]

Reviewing the facts of the case, we find that the prevailing circumstances at the time
the change and extra work orders were executed and completed indicate that the City
of Cebu tacitly approved these orders, rendering a supplemental agreement or
authorization from the Sanggunian unnecessary.

The Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC), upon the recommendation
of the Technical Committee and after a careful deliberation, approved the change and
extra work orders. It bears pointing out that two members of the PBAC were members
of the Sanggunian as well - Rodolfo Cabrera (Chairman, Committee on Finance) and
Ronald Cuenco (Minority Floor Leader). A COA representative was also present during
the deliberations of the PBAC. None of these officials voiced any objection to the lack
of a prior authorization from the Sanggunian or a supplemental agreement. The RTC
Decision in fact mentioned that the Project Post Completion Report and Acceptance
was approved by an authorized representative of the City of Cebu on September 21,
1994.[23] "[a]s the projects had been completed, accepted and used by the [City of
Cebu]," the RTC ruled that there is "no necessity of [executing] a supplemental
agreement."[24] Indeed, as we declared in Mario R. Melchor v. COA,[25] a
supplemental agreement to cover change or extra work orders is not always
mandatory, since the law adopts the permissive word "may." Despite its initial refusal,
the Sanggunian was eventually compelled to enact the appropriation ordinance in order
to satisfy the RTC judgments. Belated as it may be, the enactment of the appropriation
ordinance, nonetheless, constitutes as sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the law. It serves as a confirmatory act signifying the Sanggunian's ratification of all the
change and extra work orders issued by Osmeña. In National Power Corporation
(NPC) v. Hon. Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, etc., et. al., the Court considered the
compromise agreement between the NPC and the construction company as a
ratification of the extra work performed, without prior approval from the NPC's Board of
Directors.

As in Melchor,[27] we find it "unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the expenditure

when the government had already received and accepted benefits from the utilization
of the [sports complex]," especially considering that the City incurred no substantial
loss in paying for the additional work and the damages awarded. Apparently, the City
placed in a time deposit the entire funds allotted for the construction and renovation of
the sports complex. The interest that the deposits earned amounted to P12,835,683.15,
more than enough to cover the damages awarded to WTCI (P2,514,255.40) and the
DCDC (P102,015.00). There was "no showing that [the] petitioner was ill-motivated, or
that [the petitioner] had personally profited or sought to profit from the transactions, or
that the disbursements have been made for personal or selfish ends."[28] All in all, the
circumstances showed that Osmeña issued the change and extra work orders for the
City's successful hosting of the Palaro, and not for any other "nefarious endeavour."[29]

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we hereby GRANT the petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The respondent's Decision of May
6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009 are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,

Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on official leave.
93 BALUYOT v. COURT OF APPEALS, 311 SCRA 29 (1999)

G.R. No. 122947. July 22, 1999.

Art. 1311 – Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.

Facts: Petitioners, residents of Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City, and

members of the Cruz-na-Ligas Homesite Association, Inc, claimed ownership of 42
hectares of lands owned by UP by reasons of occupation from time immemorial and of
continuous possession.

The U.P. Board of Regents approved the donation of said land of about 9.2 hectares,
later increased to 15.8 ha, directly to the residents. However, the donation failed
because the residents demanded an area bigger than 15.8 hectares. Later, when the
Association proposed to accept the donation for the benefit of the residents, the UP
backed out and resumed to negotiate the donation through Quezon City Government
under the terms disadvantageous or contrary to the rights of the bonafide residents.

The Association filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
UP, later impleading QC Government in the amended complaint, with a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain UP from donating the area to the QC Government.

The RTC Quezon City granted the writ of preliminary injunction, but later lifted the
Order after the UP assured the Association that the donation to the QC Government
will be for the benefit of the residents of Cruz-Na-Ligas. The Association manifested its
willingness on the condition that the area to be donated through QC Government be
subdivided into lots to be given to the qualified residents together with the certificate of
titles. However, UP had continuously and unlawfully refused to comply with the terms
and conditions of the said donation. Instead, it revoked the donated property to be
reverted to UP without judicial declaration.

The Association prayed a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary

restraining order be issued, but the RTC denied the application on the ground that the
plaintiffs are not parties to the deed of donation between UP & QC Government, and
there was nothing to enforce because such deed was already validly revoked by the
UP.
The CA overruled the trial court but dismissed the case because of the valid revocation
of the deed of donation that rendered the Association’s primary cause of action
inexistent.

Issue: WoN the petitioners have the right seek enforcement of donation on the basis
that they are the intended beneficiaries of the donation to the Quezon City government
although they were not parties to the deed of donation.
Held: Yes, the Court holds that the petitioners have the right to seek enforcement of
donation.

Art. 1311, second paragraph, of the Civil Code provides: If a contract should contain
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly
and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

In the case at bar, all the elements of a cause of action contained in the amended
complaint of petitioners. The allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to
bring petitioners’ action within the purview of the cited provision on stipulations pour
autrui.

Thus, the CA decision is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for
trial on the merits.

92 TUZON v. COURT OF APPEALS, 212 SCRA 739 (1992)

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No.
9. Said resolution authorized the municipal treasurer to enter into an agreement with
all thresher operators who apply for a Permit to Thresh Palay to donate 1% of all the
palay threshed by them. Thereafter, Jurado offered to pay the license fee for thresher
operators. Municipal Treasurer Magapu refused to accept payment and required him
to first secure a Mayor’s permit. Mayor Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply
with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued.
Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan for mandamus, and another
with the same court for judgement against the said resolution. CFI upheld the
Resolution, and dismissed the claim for damages. CA affirmed the validity of the
Resolution and found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith
when they denied Jurado’s application.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable in damages for having withheld Mayor’s
permit and license because of respondent’s refusal to comply with said Resolution.

Ruling: NO. Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to
perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence.

There was no evidence offered to show that petitioners singled out respondent for
persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from
refusing to issue the mayor’s permit and license. Moreover, the resolution was
uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without preference. A public
officer is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed
within the scope of his official authority and in line of his official duty. In the absence
of a judicial decision declaring said Resolution invalid, its legality would have to be
presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it.
An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor amount to bad
 faith.

---MIDTERM EXAMS COVERAGE (MCQ)

Chapter 3: Intergovernmental Relations—National Government and Local Government
Units Executive Supervision
Constitution, Art. X, §§ 2 and 4, Constitution, Art. XI, § 25 LGC, § 25

94 HEBRON v. REYES, 104 Phil. 175 (1958)

95 DRILON v. LIM, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.

MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER

ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA,
respondents.

The City Legal Officer for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).

Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.

L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.

CRUZ, J.:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government
Code reading as follows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt
of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null
and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked
the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated
in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. 2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment
of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with
Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the
challenged decision.3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true
copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the
issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil
cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a
law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon
the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned
act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be
prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure
was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by
them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is
to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review
tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between
control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6 His conclusion
was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in
his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on
the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a
basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may,
in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except
to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did
precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of
mere supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the
jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which
provided in its Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance
shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority
to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt
by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy
policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance
shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period
the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto,
or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part
or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local
legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the
suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if,
in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not
merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been
observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the
same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or
legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein
of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code is another matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public
hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the
obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved
posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government
Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and
disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b)
of the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not
been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and
called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of
these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed
been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by
Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the
Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was
published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue
of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval
of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and
not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity
has not been raised in issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment
of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

96 GANZON v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

97 RAMA v. MOISES, G.R. No. 197146, December 6, 2016
Rama, et al. vs. Moises, et al. Case Digest
Hon. Michael L. Rama, et al. vs. Hon. Gilbert P. Moises, et al.
G.R. No. 197146. December 6, 2016

Synopsis
A law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution, like a presidential decree, is presumed to
be valid and constitutional on the theory that it was carefully studied by the Legislative
and Executive Departments prior to its enactment, and determined to be in accord with
the Fundamental Law. However, the presumption of validity and constitutionality is
overturned and the law should be struck down once it becomes inconsistent with the
present Constitution and the later laws.

Facts
On May 25, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 198
(Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). By virtue of P. D. No. 198, Cebu City formed the
Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in 1974. Thereafter, the Cities of Mandaue, Lapu-
Lapu and Talisay, and the Municipalities of Liloan, Compostela, Consolacion, and
Cordova turned over their waterworks systems and services to the MCWD. From 1974
to 2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board of
Directors in accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198, to wit:

(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board
of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and
population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five
percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are
within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be
the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the
appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the
district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the
boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the
power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial
appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service
connections exists. (emphasis supplied)

In July 2002, Cebu Provincial Governor Pablo L. Garcia wrote to the MCWD to assert
his authority and intention to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors.'
He stated in his letter that since 1996, the active water service connections in Cebu
City had been below 75% of the total active water service connection of the MCWD;
that no other city or municipality under the MCWD had reached the required
percentage of 75%; and that, accordingly, he, as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, was
the appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors pursuant to
Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198.

Later on, the MCWD commenced in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City (RTC) its
action for declaratory relief seeking to declare Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198
unconstitutional; or, should the provision be declared valid, it should be interpreted to
mean that the authority to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors
belonged solely to the Cebu City Mayor. The RTC (Branch 7) dismissed the action for
declaratory relief.

To avoid a vacuum and in the exigency of the service, Provincial Governor Gwendolyn
F. Garcia and Cebu City Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña jointly appointed Atty. Adelino Sitoy
and Leo Pacana to fill the vacancies. However, the position of Atty. Sitoy was deemed
vacated upon his election as the Municipal Mayor of Cordova, Cebu in the 2007
elections.

Governor Garcia commenced an action for declaratory relief to seek the interpretation
of Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 198 on the proper appointing authority for the members of
 the MCWD Board of Directors.

On February 22, 2008, however, Mayor Osmeña appointed Yu as a member of the

MCWD Board of Directors.7 Accordingly, on May 20, 2008, the RTC dismissed the
action for declaratory relief on the ground that declaratory relief became improper once
there was a breach or violation of the provision.

On June 13, 2008, Governor Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the
appointment of Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors (docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-34459), alleging that the appointment by Mayor Osmefia was illegal;
that under Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, it was she as the Provincial Governor of Cebu
who was vested with the authority to appoint members of the MCWD Board of Directors
because the total active water service connections of Cebu City and of the other cities
and municipalities were below 75% of the total water service connections in the area of
the MCWD.

On November 16, 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed judgment declaring the
appointment of Yu as illegal and void and ruled that the court has not been able to find
any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree
No. 198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.

Mayor Osmeña and Yu jointly moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion. Hence, the petitioners have instituted this special civil action for certiorari.

Issues

1. Whether Yu's expiration of term renders case moot and academic.

2. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 was void on its face for violating the
constitutional provision on local autonomy and independence of HUCs under Article X
of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
Rulings

Yu's expiration of term did not

render case moot and academic
We note that respondent Yu's term as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors
expired on December 31, 2012. However, this fact does not justify the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of its being rendered moot and academic. The case should still
be decided, despite the intervening developments that could have rendered the case
moot and academic, because public interest is involved, and because the issue is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

For sure, the appointment by the proper official of the individuals to manage the system
of water distribution and service for the consumers residing in the concerned cities and
municipalities involves the interest of their populations and the general public affected
by the services of the MCWD as a public utility. Moreover, the question on the proper
appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors should none of
the cities and municipalities have at least 75% of the water consumers will not be
definitively resolved with finality if we dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is already superseded

The Court opines that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for
being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and
for being inconsistent with R.A. No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code) and related
laws on local governments.

The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the enactment on
December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the Elective or
Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes) and
antedated as well the effectivity of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1,
1992. At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component
city of Cebu Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the
Philippines based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which
immediately meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu
Province. In accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities that
are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of
the province, but the voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials. Later on, Cebu City, already an HUC, was further effectively
rendered independent from Cebu Province pursuant to Section 29 of the 1991 Local
Government Code.

Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised
through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained
power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and independent component cities
pursuant to and in accordance with Section 252 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a
law enacted for the purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution.

Article X of the 1987 Constitution guarantees and promotes the administrative and
fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The foregoing statutory enactments enunciate and
implement the local autonomy provisions explicitly recognized under the 1987
Constitution. To conform with the guarantees of the Constitution in favor of the
autonomy of the LGUs, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court to declare and
pronounce Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 as already partially unconstitutional.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for

violating the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause
We opine that although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided for substantial distinction
and was germane to the purpose of P.D. No. 198 when it was enacted in 1973, the
intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu into an HUC and the subsequent
enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code rendered the continued application of
Section 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and unfair. Clearly, the
assailed provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because, firstly, it
ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the provincial government;
secondly, it failed to consider that the MCWD existed to serve the community that
represents the needs of the majority of the active water service connections; and,
thirdly, the main objective of the decree was to improve the water service while keeping
up with the needs of the growing population.

Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true. objectives of the decree to still leave
to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor had
administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for
16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD. In comparison, the City of
Cebu had 61.28% of the active service water connections; Mandaue, another HUC,
16%; and Lapu Lapu City, another HUC, 6.8%. There is no denying that the MCWD
has been primarily serving the needs of Cebu City. Although it is impermissible to
inquire into why the decree set 75% as the marker for determining the proper
appointing authority, the provision has meanwhile become unfair for ignoring the needs
and circumstances of Cebu City as the LGU accounting for the majority of the active
water service connections, and whose constituency stood to be the most affected by
the decisions made by the MCWD's Board of Directors. Indeed, the classification has
truly ceased to be germane or related to the main objective for the enactment of P.D.
No. 198 in 1973.

Under the foregoing circumstances, therefore, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
upholding Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198. It thereby utterly disregarded the clear policies
favoring local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and effected by the 1991
Local Government Code and related subsequent statutory enactments, and for being
violative of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari; ANNUL and SET ASIDE the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-34459 on November 16, 2010 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Cebu City; and DECLARE as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 to the extent that it
 applies to highly urbanized cities like the City of Cebu and to component cities with
charters expressly providing for their voters not to be eligible to vote for the officials of
the provinces to which they belong for being in violation of the express policy of the
1987 Constitution on local autonomy, the 1991 Local Government Code and
subsequent statutory enactments, and for being also in violation of the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Consultations § 2 (c), 26 and 27 Memorandum Circular No. 52 (1993) Republic Act No.
8975 (2000), § 7

98 BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK v. LANZANAS, 405 SCRA 530 (2003) 99

PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 477 SCRA 436 (2005) 100
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, G.R. No. 196870,
June 26, 2012
101 ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES INC., G.R. No. 162243, December
3, 2009 102 PAJE v. CASIÑO, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015.

Relations with Philippine National Police, § 28 Republic Act No. 6975 (1990), as amended
by Republic Act No. 8551 (1998) Republic Act No. 8551 (1998), §§ 62-65 See Executive
Order No. 292 (1987), Book IV, chapter 7, § 38(3)
103 CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 206 SCRA 290 (1992) 104
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE, 323 SCRA 312 (2000); 351 SCRA 659 (2001)
105 ANDAYA v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 319 SCRA 697 (1999)
106 PEOPLE v. VELARDE, 384 SCRA 646 (2002)
107 RODRIGUEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, 386 SCRA 492 (2002)

Inter-Local Government Relations, §§ 3 (e), 29-33 Relations with Peoples' and Non-
governmental Organizations, §§ 34-36 Local Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee, §§ 37-38 Title Two: Elective Officials, §§ 39-75 Qualifications and Elections, §
39-43 Members of the Sanggunian
Republic Act No. 7160, § 41 Republic Act No. 6636 (1987) Republic Act No. 7166
(1991) Republic Act No. 7887 (1995) Republic Act No. 8553 (1998) Republic Act No.
10156 (2011)

108 HERRERA v. COMELEC, 318 SCRA 336 (1999)

Qualifications
Republic Act No. 9164 (2002), §§ 6-7
Republic Act No. 8171 (1995)

109 SALCEDO II v. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447 (1999) 110 CIPRIANO v.

COMELEC, 436 SCRA 45 (2004)
111 BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 414 SCRA 299 (2003)
112 MARUHOM v. COMELEC, 594 SCRA 108 (2009)
113 MATUGAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION, 420 SCRA 365 (2004) 114
JAPZON v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331 (2009)
115 CORDORA v. COMELEC, G.R. No.176947, February 19, 2008
 116 FRIVALDO v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)
117 LABO v. COMELEC AND ORTEGA, 211 SCRA 297 (1992)
118 MAQUILING v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
119 ARNADO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015
120 JALOSJOS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012
121 TAN v. CRISOLOGO, G.R. No.193993, November 8, 2017
122 ALTAREJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 441 SCRA 655 (2004)
123 TORAYNO v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 (2000)
124 COQUILLA v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002)
125 JALOSJOS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012
126 JALOSJOS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013
127 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS
DUMPIT MICHELENA, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005

Disqualification
Republic Act No. 8295 (1997), §§ 4-5 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), §§ 11, 15, 27-28,
36 (g) Republic Act No. 9225 (2003)
Republic Act No. 10121 (2009), § 20
Republic Act No. 10368 (2013), §§ 25, 31

128 DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC, 590 SCRA 149 (2009)

129 PANADERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. Nos. 215548, April 5,
2016 130 MAGNO v. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 495 (2002)
131 MORENO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006 132 RISOS-
VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
133 JALOSJOS, JR. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012
134 REYES v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996)
135 LINGATING v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 629 (2002) 136 GREGO v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, 274 SCRA 481 (1997) 137 RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC, 259 SCRA
296 (1996)

138 KARE v. COMELEC, 428 SCRA 264 (2004)

139 MALINAO v. REYES, 255 SCRA 616 (1996) 140 MERCADO v. MANZANO,
307 SCRA 630 (1999)
141 AGUSTIN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015

142 MATURAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227155, March 27, 2017

143 ALBANIA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017

Term of Office, § 43 Constitution, Art. X, § 8 Republic Act No. 6679 (1988) Republic Act No.
8524 (1998) Republic Act No. 9006, § 14 (2001) Republic Act No. 9164 (2002), § 2 Rep. Act
No. 10923, October 15, 2016

144 DAVID v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997)

145 BORJA v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)
146 ARATEA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012
 147 TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
148 LATASA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 417 SCRA 601 (2003)
149 ABUNDO SR. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
150 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v. CRUZ, G.R. No. 186616, November 20,
2009 151 MONREAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 184935,
December 21, 2009 152 MONROY v. COURT OF APPEALS, 20 SCRA 620 (1967)

Vacancies and Succession, §§ 44-47

153 DAMASEN v. TUMAMO, G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010

154 VICTORIA v. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269 (1994)
155 FARIÑAS v. BARBA, 256 SCRA 396 (1996)
156 NAVARRO v. COURT OF APPEALS, 355 SCRA 672 (2001)
157 GAMBOA v. AGUIRRE, 310 SCRA 867 (1999)
158 MIRANDA v. CARREON, 401 SCRA 303 (2003)
159 CAMPOL v. BALAO-AS AND SIANEN, G.R. No. 197634, December 28,

2016 Local Legislation, §§ 48 – 59, 188, 511 See implementing rules

160 HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION v. MUNICIPALITY OF

HAGONOY, BULACAN, 376 SCRA 376 (2002)
161 MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS AND EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. 189185, August 16, 2016
162 MALONZO v. ZAMORA, 311 SCRA 224, 243-244 (1999) 163 CASINO v. CA,
204 SCRA 449 (1991)
164 ZAMORA v. CABALLERO, 419 SCRA 384 (2004) 165 DE LOS
REYES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 281 SCRA 631 (1997)
166 MODAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, 268 SCRA 586 (1997)
167 VICENCIO v. VILLAR, G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012
168 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. LIM, G.R. No. 187916, November 25, 2014
169 SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v. QUEZON CITY, G.R.
No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Disciplinary Actions Republic Act No. 6770 (1989)

170 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010
171 ALEJANDRO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013

§§ 58, 60-68 Administrative Order No. 23 (1992) as amended by Administrative Order

No. 159 (1994) and Administrative Order No. 66 (1999)

172 DON v. LACSA, G.R. No. 170810, August 7, 2007

173 ESPIRITU v. MELGAR, 206 SCRA 256 (1992) 174 FLORES v.
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, 452 SCRA 278 (2005)
175 JOSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 290 SCRA 279 (1998) 176
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS, 212 SCRA 768 (1992)
177 CARPIO-MORALES v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 217126-27, November
10, 2015 178 CALINGIN v. COURT OF APPEALS, 434 SCRA 173 (2004)
 179 BERCES v. GUINGONA, 241 SCRA 539 (1995) 180 VALENCIA v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 433 SCRA 88 (2004)
181 GARCIA v. MIRO, 397 SCRA 41 (2003)
182 GARCIA v. MOJICA, 314 SCRA 207 (1999) 183 GANZON v. CA, 203 SCRA
399 (1991)
184 PEOPLE v. TOLEDANO, 323 SCRA 210 (2000)

The Ombudsman

185 HAGAD v. GOZO-DADOLE, 251 SCRA 242 (1993) 186 CASTILLO-CO v.

BARBERS, 290 SCRA 717 (1998) 187 LAPID v. COURT OF APPEALS, 334 SCRA
738 (2000) 188 COA-Regional Office XIII v. Hinampas and Cabanos, 529 SCRA 245
(2007)

The Courts

189 BUNYE v. ESCAREAL, 226 SCRA 332 (1993) 190 RIOS v. THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, 279 SCRA 581 (1997) 191 MIRANDA v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 464 SCRA 165 (2005) 192 JUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 322 SCRA 125 (2000) 193 LLORENTE, JR., v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
322 SCRA 329 (2000) 194 ESQUIVEL v. OMBUDSMAN, 389 SCRA 143 (2002) 195
BARRIGA v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 457 SCRA 301 (2005) 196
INDING v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 434 SCRA 388 (2004)
197 RODRIGUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 424 SCRA 236 (2004)

Removal

198 PABLICO v. VILLPANDO, 385 SCRA 601 (2002)

199 AGUINALDO v. SANTOS, 212 SCRA 768 (1992)

Recall, §§ 69-75
Republic Act No. 9244 (2004)

200 EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (1991)

201 PARAS v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49 (1996)
202 ANGOBUNG v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245 (1997)
203 CLAUDIO v. COMELEC, and PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY v.
COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388 (2000)
204 AFIADO v. COMELEC, 340 SCRA 600 (2000)
205 GOH v. BAYRON, G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014
206 MARMETO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 213953, September 26, 2017

Human Resources Development, §§ 76-97

Republic Act No. 6713 (1989)
See also §§ 469-490
207 SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES v. COURT
OF APPEALS, 284 SCRA 276 (1998)
208 MATHAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, 320 SCRA 703 (1999)
 209 FLORES v. DRILON, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
210 DEBULGADO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 237 SCRA 184
(1994) 211 DIMAANDAL v. COA, 291 SCRA 322 (1998)
212 MATHAY v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 312 SCRA 91 (1999)
213 DE RAMA v. COURT OF APPEALS, 353 SCRA 94 (2001)

See Republic Act No. 10923, October 15, 2016

214 PASTOR v. CITY OF PASIG, 382 SCRA 232 (2002)

215 CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI CITY v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
376 SCRA 248 (2002)
216 GARCIA v. PAJARO, 384 SCRA 122 (2002) 217 MACALINCAG v. CHANG,
208 SCRA 413 (1992)
218 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. TINAYA, 451 SCRA 560 (2005)
219 LAMEYRA v. PANGILINAN, 322 SCRA 117 (2000)

Prohibited Interests, § 89

220 TEVES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 447 SCRA 309 (2004)

Practice of Profession, §§ 31, 90

221 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. LINA, 574 SCRA 462 (2008)

222 CATU v. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
223 JAVELLANA v. DILG, 212 SCRA 475 (1992)
224 REPUBLIC v. RAMBUYONG, G.R. No. 167810, October 4, 2010

The Local Boards

Local School Boards, §§ 98-111

225 OSEA v. MALAYA, 375 SCRA 285 (2002)

226 COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU v. PROVINCE OF
CEBU, 371 SCRA 196 (2001)

Local Health Boards, §§ 102-105 Local Development Councils, §§1 106-115 Republic Act
No. 7368 (1992), § 6 Local Peace and Order Council, § 116 Autonomous Special Economic
Zones, § 117 Republic Act No. 7916, The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 (1995), § 44
Republic Act No. 7903, The Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 (1995)
Other Provisions Applicable to Local Government Units Settlement of Boundary Disputes,
§§ 118-119 IRR §§ 15- 19

227 PASIG v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179 (1999)

228 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE v. PROVINCE OF QUEZON, 367
SCRA 91 (2001)
229 MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA v. MADRONA, 402 SCRA 330 (2003) 230
MUICIPALITY OF PATEROS v. COURT OF APPEALS, 589 SCRA 130 (2009) 231
PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE v. CALABOCAL, G.R. No. 209146, June 8, 2016 232 SN
ABOITIZ POWER-MAGAT, INC. v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALFONSO LISTA,
 IFUGAO, G.R. No. 198647, November 20, 2017

Local Initiative and Referendum, § 120-127, 398

See Republic Act No. 6735 (1989)
233 GARCIA v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279 (1994)
234 SBMA v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492 (1996)

Book II: Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters Local Government Taxation

Constitution, Art. X, §§ 3 (d), 5, 6, and 7 Republic Act No. 7643 (1992), § 2 Republic Act
No. 7716 (1994), § 11, 17 Republic Act No. 8241 (1996) National Internal Revenue Code,
§§ 117, 283 and 287 As Amended by Republic Act No. 8424, The Tax Reform Act of 1997
(1997) Republic Act No. 8245 (1996) Republic Act No. 7942 (1995), § 82 Republic Act No.
7916, § 24, as amended by Republic Act No. 8424 (1999) Republic Act No. 8975, (2000) §
7
Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), § 51

235 BASCO v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991) 236 ESTANISLAO v. COSTALES,

196 SCRA 853 (1991) 237 FLORO CEMENT v. GOROSPE, 200 SCRA 480 (1991)
238 FIGUERRES v. COURT OF APPEALS, 305 SCRA 206 (1999) 239 THE CITY
OF OLONGAPO v. THE STALLHOLDERS OF THE EAST BAJAC-240 BAJAC
PUBLIC MARKET OF OLONGAPO CITY, 343 SCRA 705 (2000) 241 BERDIN v.
MASCARIÑAS, 526 SCRA 592 (2007) 242 OLIVARES v. MARQUEZ, 438 SCRA
679 (2004)

Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units

243 PALMA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALANGAS,

413 SCRA 572 (2003)
244 CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF CAGAYAN DE
ORO, G.R. No. 191761, November 14, 2012 245 BULACAN v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 299 SCRA 442 (1998) 246 FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, 300 SCRA 661 (1998) 247 BATANGAS
POWER CORPORATION v. BATANGAS CITY and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, 428 SCRA 250 (2004) 248 PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF AGUSAN
DEL SUR V. FILIPINAS PALM OIL PLANTATION, INC., G.R. No. 183416, October 5,
2016 249 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. AMBANLOC, G.R. No.
180639, June 29, 2010
250 FERRER v. BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015

Franchise Taxes, §§ 137, 193, 534

251 CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R.
No. 192945, September 5, 2012
252 MERALCO v. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, 306 SCRA 750 (1999)
253 PLDT v. CITY OF DAVAO, 363 SCRA 522 (2001)
 254 SMART v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008
255 DIGITAL v. PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, 516 SCRA 541 (2007)
256 QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008||

Amusement Taxes Rep. Act No. 7160, (1991) §§ 140, 141, 150 Rep. Act No. 9167 (2002), §§
13-
15
257 PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION v. PROVINCE OF BENGUET, G.R.
No. 183187, April 10, 2013
258 PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, 337
SCRA 358 (2000)
259 MINDANAO SHOPPING DESTINATION CORPORATION v. DUTERTE, G.R.
No. 211093, June 6, 2017.

Real Property Taxation, §§ 197-283

260 TY v. TRAMPE, 250 SCRA 500 (1995)

261 CALLANTA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 285 SCRA 648 (1998) 262
LOPEZ v. CITY OF MANILA, 303 SCRA 448 (1999) 263 NAPOCOR v. PROVINCE
OF QUEZON, 593 SCRA 47 (2009)
264 YAMANE v. BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, 474 SCRA 258
(2005) 265 CAPITOL WIRELESS INCORPORATED v. PROVINCIAL TREASURER
OF BATANGAS, G.R. No. 180110, May 30, 2016.

Rep. Act No. 10149, § 3(m), (n), (o) & (p)

266 MCIAA v. MARCOS, 261 SCRA 667 (1996) 267 MANILA

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. CITY OF PASAY, G.R. 163072,
April 2, 2009
268 PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS,
528 SCRA 706 (2007)
269 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CITY TREAURER, G.R.
No. 186242, December 23, 2009 270 LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
QUEZON CITY, 433 SCRA 119 (2004)
271 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS 342 SCRA 692 (2000)
272 PHILRECA v. SECRETARY, 403 SCRA 558 (2003) 273 PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR OF MARINDUQUE v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155491,
September 16, 2008 274 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. ILOILO, G.R. No.
172267, August 20, 2008 275 REPUBLIC v. PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012
276 CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, G.R.
No. 184203, November 26, 2014

Violations of tax ordinances, §§ 516-519 Internal Revenue Allotment, §§ 284-288

277 ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA, 252 SCRA 695 (1996) 278 PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE,
336 SCRA201 (2000) 279 THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO, 429
SCRA 736 (2004) 280 ACORD v. ZAMORA, 459 SCRA 578 (2005)
Share of Local Government Units in National Wealth, §§ 289-294
Republic Act No. 7076, § 19 Credit Financing, §§ 295-303

Local Fiscal Administration, §§ 304-354

281 ATIENZA v. VILLAROSA, 458 SCRA 385 (2005)

282 QUISUMBING v. GARCIA, G.R. No. 175527, December 8, 2008 283
SISON v. PEOPLE, G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010

Republic Act No. 8185 (1996) Property and Supply Management in the Local Government
Units, §§ 355-383
284 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. THE PROVINCE OF
TARLAC, 417 SCRA 60 (2003)

Part III. Local Government Units

The Barangay, §§ 384-439

Republic Act No. 8441 (1997) § 4
Republic Act No. 9178 (2002)
Republic Act No. 9285 (2004), § 53

285 PEOPLE v. RECTO, 367 SCRA 390 (2001) 286 DAVID v. COMELEC, 271
SCRA 90 (1997)
287 ALQUIZOLA v. OCOL, 313 SCRA 273 (1999)

Katarungang Pambarangay, §§ 399-422, 515 Supreme Court Administrative Circular

No. 1493 Republic Act No. 9285 (2004), § 35

288 MORATA v. GO, 125 SCRA 444 (1983) 289 UY v. CONTRERAS, 237 SCRA
167 (1994) 290 PANG-ET v. MANACNES-DAO-AS, G.R. No. 167261, March 2,
2007 291 BOLEYLEY v. VILLANUEVA, 314 SCRA 364 (1999)
292 AGBAYANI V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012 293
VERCIDE v. JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, 330 SCRA 49 (2000)
294 MENDOVA v. AFABLE, 393 SCRA 390 (2002)
295 AQUINO v. AURE, 546 SCRA 71 (2008)
296 ZAMORA v. HEIRS OF IZQUIERDO, 443 SCRA 24 (2004)
297 IDOLOR v. COURT OF APPEALS, 351 SCRA 399 (2001)
298 ABAGATNAN v. SPOUSES CLARITO, G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017

Sangguniang Kabataan, §§ 423-439

Republic Act No. 7808 (1994) Republic Act No. 8044 (1995), § 10 Republic Act No. 9164
(2002) Republic Act No. 9340 (2005) Republic Act No. 10742 (2016)

299 ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS v. LETRONDO, 237 SCRA 621 (1994) 300
MIGUEL v. COURT OF APPEALS, 230 SCRA 339 (1994) 301 MARQUEZ v.
COMELEC, 313 SCRA 103 (1999) 302 GARVIDA v. SALES, 271 SCRA 767 (1997)
303 ZARATE v. COMELEC, 318 SCRA 608 (1999) 304 BAYTAN v. COMELEC, 396
 SCRA 703 (2003) (third issue) 305 SAMBARANI v. COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319 (2004)

See Commission on Elections Resolution No. 00-0046, January 19, 2000 The Municipality,
§§ 440- 447, § 444 (b) (3)
306 OLIVAREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 248 SCRA 700 (1995) 307 UNITED
BF HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION v. CITY MAYOR, 515 SCRA 1 (2007)
§§ 443, 481

308 ALINSUG v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 225 SCRA 553 (1993)

309 PILILLA v. CA, 233 SCRA 484 (1994)
310 RAMOS v. CA, 108 SCRA 728 (1981)
311 RAMOS v. CA, 269 SCRA 34 (1997) 312 MANCENIDO v. COURT OF APPEALS,
380 SCRA 419 (2000)
313 NATIVIDAD v. FELIX, 229 SCRA 680 (1994)
314 MONTUERTO v. TY, G.R. No. 177736, October 6, 2008

The City, §§ 448-458

Republic Act No. 9009 (2001)

315 CANET v. DECENA, 420 SCRA 388 (2004)

316 AGUIRRE v, DE CASTRO, 321 SCRA 95 (1999) 317 SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY v. ATIENZA, 517 SCRA 657 (2007) 318 ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY
v. COURT OF APPEALS, 329 SCRA 314 (2000) 319 GORDON v. VERDIANO II,
167 SCRA 51 (1988) 320 LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, 387 SCRA 149 (2002) 321
MATHAY, JR. v. FELT FOODS, INC., 311 SCRA 658 (1999) 322 CITY OF
CALOOCAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, 489 SCRA 45 (2006) 323 DADOLE v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 393 SCRA 262 (2002) 324 NEGROS ORIENTAL II
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. v. SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG
DUMAGUETE, 155 SCRA 421 (1987)

The Province, §§ 459-468

325 CARAM v. COMELEC, 225 SCRA 731 (1993)

326 THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. ZAYCO, G.R. No. 182574,
September 28, 2010

Appointive Local Officials Common to All Municipalities, Cities, and Provinces, §§

469-490 327 JACA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166967, January
28, 2013 328 RAPISORA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 228 SCRA 622 (1993)
329 DBM v. LEONES, G.R. No. 169726, March 18, 2010
330 LA CARLOTA CITY v. ROJO, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012

Leagues of Local Government Units and Elective Officials, §§ 491-510

331 THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY v. PAREDES, 439 SCRA 130
(2004) 332 VIOLA v. ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997)
333 GALAROSA v. VALENCIA, 227 SCRA 728 (1993) 334 MIGUEL v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 230 SCRA 339 (1994) 335 BITO-ONON v. FERNANDEZ, 350 SCRA 732
(2001)
 Part IV. Miscellaneous and Final Provisions

Provisions for Implementation, §§ 511-525 Transitory Provisions, §§ 526-533 Application of

the Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions, § 526 The Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao Constitution, Article X, §§ 1, 15, 16, 18, 20, and 21 Republic Act
No. 6734 (1989) Republic Act No. 8746 (1999) Republic Act No. 9012 (2000)
Republic Act No. 9054 (2001)

336 DISOMANGCOP v. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, 444 SCRA 203 (2004)
337 LIMBONA v. MANGELIN, 170 SCRA 786 (1989)
338 ABBAS v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989) 339 PANDI v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 380 SCRA 436 (2002)

Cordillera Administrative Region

Executive Order No. 220
See Republic Act Nos. 6766 and 8438
340 ORDILLO v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990) 341 BADUA v.
CORDILLERA BODONG ASSOCIATION, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)
342 CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COA, 181 SCRA 495 (1990)
343 ATITIW v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 143374, September 30, 2005 The Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority Constitution, Art. X, § 11, Art. XVIII, § 8 Republic Act No.
7924 (1995)

344 MMDA v. GARIN, 456 SCRA 176 (2005) 345 MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, 328 SCRA 836 (2000) 346 MMDA v. TRACKWORKS RAIL
TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING, AND PROMOTIONS INC. 474 SCRA 331
(2005) 347 FRANCISCO V. FERNANDO, 507 SCRA 173 (2006) 348 MMDA v.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., 530 SCRA 341 (2007) 349 MMDA v.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, 574 SCRA 661 (2008)