LAURETO A.

TALAROC, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO D. UY, respondent-appellant.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Justiniano R. Borja for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on
November 13, 1951, brought the instant action of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of that
province. The petitioner was Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office, and
the grounds of the petition were that the respondent is a Chinese national and therefore ineligible. The
court below found the petition well-founded and declared the position in question vacant.

RULING: YES. HE IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN

Article IV, entitled "Citizenship", of the Constitution provides:1âwphïl.nêt

SECTION 1. The following are the citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

xxx     xxx     xxx

On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a full-fledged Philippine
citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when  jus soli  had been the prevailing doctrine.

It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to Chinese ipso
facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise and that there after her minor
children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother's. This rule was not changed by the
adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into effect
in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for regaining Philippine citizenship
by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed
Ursula Diabo had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro D. Uy had been of age 3 years, and that the
new law carries the provision giving it retroactive effect
 Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino
citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar. Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co were defeated in the election

ISSUE/s:

1.)    Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

2.)    Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.)    WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:

1.)    Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial
of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
2.)    Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino
citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine
years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the
Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the
issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.)    Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which regarded it
as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile
of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.  Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently
proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED

TECSON v COMELEC

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31
December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections.

In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able
to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of
Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that
he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.

Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt
that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen.

And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,

Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate.

Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,

Facts:

Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who acquired Philippine citizenship by

naturalization on February 10,1978.

Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on July 20, 1986.

Being a naturalized Filipino, he signed commercial documents stating his citizenship as

Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate Philippine consul. He was then
detained by the CID for obtaining a foreign passport while having a Filipino citizenship.

Yu then filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en Banc. The Court en Banc denied the petition. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for restraining order but it was denied. After denial, he filed a
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order.

On December 7, 1988, the temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued. The respondent filed
a motion to lift the said TRO, contending that Yu was in full knowledge and Legal capacity when
he applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes,
identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to
maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and its
succeeding consequences should they be violated

ISSUE: Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship?

Ruling:

Yes, considering the facts stated, the court ruled that the Petitioner’s acts constitute an
express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Express
naturalization means renunciation made known distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is
implied.

After acquiring Philippine citizenship, with full knowledge, he resumed his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and representing
himself as a Portuguese in official and commercial documents.

The court found that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of his Philippine
citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

LI YAO VS. CIR

FACTS:

Petitioner is a naturalized Filipino of Chinese parents, the eldest son of a prosperous

local businessman by the name of Li Chay Too, who died sometime in 1948. In 1945
petitioner organized the Li Yao & Company and made himself managing partner;
from 1948, to February 1955 he was president of, and owned shares in, the Li Chay
Too & Sons, Inc.; and in 1950 he organized a corporation known as the Far East
Realty & Investment Co. of which he was also stockholder and president.

Petitioner filed his income tax returns for the years 1945 to 1951. However, a deficiency
income tax in the amount of P5,470.98 was assessed against him, which he paid.

In 1952 the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) believing that petitioner had not reported
his true incomes for the previous years, appointed a team to examine his books, an
additional assessment of P899,794.02 was made against.
A second team of investigators was appointed and this team recommended a deficiency
income tax assessment of P2,722,030.33. This team employed what is known as the net
worth or inventory method. A third team was appointed, this team recommended an
assessment of P1,505,768.54 against petitioner; the inventory method was also used in
making this assessment.

Demand was made for the collection of said assessment so petitioner herein presented a
petition with the CTA for the review of the said assessment. CTA found that the amount of
the income tax deficiency due from petitioner is P424,536.77.

Petitioner Li Yao sought to reconsider the decision and the assessment, alleging that the
sum of P5,470.98 paid by him as additional tax for the years 1945 to 1947 should be
credited against his deficiency income taxes, so that instead of P424,536.77 the -sum due
should be only P411,294.12. The court approved this petition for recoupment and reduced
the assessment to P411,293.80.

Both petitioner and respondent appealed from the decision of CTA. Petitioner Li Yao
raised the questions on the validity of the net worth method of inventory used
against him, and assails the CTA’s refusal to grant petitioner’s request that the deficiency
income assessed be distributed evenly over the taxable years

ISSUE: Whether the contention of petitioner should be allowed.

RULING:

NO. The taxpayer has the means of proving the existence of the obligation and it is he that
must produce such proof. The procedure followed by the CTA is that laid down by the rules
on evidence; that is, that the taxpayer who alleges that an obligation still exists must prove
the existence thereof by preponderance of evidence. The obligor or taxpayer has the means
of proving that the obligation does not exist or has been paid; the Government collecting
the tax cannot be expected to find the evidence itself, because it is natural that the taxpayer
would try to suppress such evidence as may prove that the obligation still exists.

After reading the arguments presented by petitioner and considering that the witnesses for
petitioner herein are his father-in-law and his wife and their testimonies failed to convince
the judges of the court below, the Court finds no potent reason why the findings of the
court below that heard the evidence should be disturbed.

The use of the inventory method is authorized under Section 15 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, which authorizes the CIR to assess taxes due a taxpayer from
any other available fact or evidence. If a taxpayer commits a violation of the law, hiding his
income to evade payment of taxes, the Government must be permitted to resort to all
evidence or sources available to determine his said income, so that the tax may be collected
for public purposes. There is and there should be a presumption of regularity accorded this
action of the CIR in assessing the tax on the best evidence obtainable, otherwise it, would
be impossible to assess taxes due from a dishonest taxpayer.

In the case at bar the existence of assets or properties appearing in the name of the
taxpayer or in the name of his dummies or friends, without the taxpayer being able to give
a definite reasonable explanation for their existence justifies the CTA and this Court to
resort to the inventory method of assessment, such being necessary and at the same time
just and equitable.

The last legal question raised is petitioner’s claim that the unreported incomes which
appeared during the last years of the period of assessment should not be considered as
having been earned during the years in which said incomes appeared, but should be spread
throughout the whole period covered by the assessment, that is, from 1945 to 1951.

Petitioner does not claim that the amounts appearing in the last period of the assessment
were acquired through savings or accumulated savings or any slow and continuous
process, such that the income cannot be distributed to any particular year of the period of
assessment.

Section 39 of the National Internal Revenue Code requires the taxpayer to report yearly to
the CIR the income that he gets during the year from whatever source and include the same
in the taxable year in which the income was received by him. It is to be presumed that the
income was earned at the time that it appeared in the possession or control of the taxpayer,
in accordance with the rule that the law has been followed.

If Petitioner’s contention is to be followed, a taxpayer would be encouraged to hide his

income because in any case, if his unreported income would be discovered afterwards the
said income, although appearing in one year, would be distributed over a period of years. In
other words, we will have a rule, as advocated by petitioner’s counsel, that would not
discourage the hiding of taxable income because any discovery of any unreported income
could always be allowed to be distributed over a period of years.

In the case at bar, the distribution over a period of years demanded by petitioner would
bring about a reduction of the tax assessed by the Court of Tax Appeals from P424,536,77
to P232,416.59, or about one-half of the assessment made by the CTA. We are not prepared
to permit such unauthorized reduction in public taxes favorable to a dishonest taxpayer
and prejudicial to the interests of the State.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

REPUBLIC v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS, GR No. 183110, 2013-10-07
Facts:
Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization[5] of respondent
Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9[7] of CA 473 had been complied with,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss[8] on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is... engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.[9]
Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena's evidence was then set on May 18,... 2004
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence,
Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly,
the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive
Azucena's evidence.[11] During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG
appeared despite due notice.
Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas[18] (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino
citizen.[19] They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel
James.[20] All... of them studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three of
whom are now working abroad.[
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine National
Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation.[27] She also
presented her Health Examination Record[28] declaring her as physically and mentally fit.
To further support Azucena's Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition.
In its Omnibus Motion,[30] the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch
Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473,[31] as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization
cases.
Rejecting this argument... he RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization
proceedings and was free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only
officers authorized... by law to appear on behalf of the State, which represents the public. Thus, when the
OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the reception of evidence ex-parte, there was
already a sufficient compliance with the requirement of a public hearing.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA... contending that Azucena failed to comply with the
income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail
Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or... indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot
possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a "lucrative trade"
within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in
order to provide for... adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The
OSG likewise disputed Azucena's claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from
owning lands in the country.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public hearing"
as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that the
State was denied its day in court because the RTC... immediately allowed the proceeding to be
conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample opportunity to be present.
In dismissing the OSG's appeal,[35] the CA found that Azucena's financial condition permits her and her
family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent
with the demands of human dignity.
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the
law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.
hus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e.,
the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473.

Issues:The alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473.
Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139
A third option, called derivative naturalization,... which is available to alien women married to
Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have... to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization.
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:... that under
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not... disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that... she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino
citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien
woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her... alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition,... which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.[... ecords however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. 030705[41] by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena's husband is a Filipino citizen[42] as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his... citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization based on CA 473.
While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is
nothing that prevents her from seeking... acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular
naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization
under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under
the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the
CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband's citizenship
was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization
proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds... to deny her of Philippine
citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
As the records before this Court show, Santiago's Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven.
However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA
473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and
received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications... to acquire Philippine citizenship,
has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court
The OSG... had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing
scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear
in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence... before the Clerk of
Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice,
again failed to appear. The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons
stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the... findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should
this issue further delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life,
in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family.
n the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest
in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and
the
Provincial Prosecutor's office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under
CA 473