G.R. No.

122216       March 28, 2001

ALJEM'S CORPORATION (LOGGING DIVISION), represented by its

President, PACIFICO V. DIZON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HILARIO I. MAPAYO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Davao City, and RUDY Y.
CHUA, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision, 1 dated April 18, 1995, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34831, affirming the approval by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Davao City, of the report of a commissioner on the
examination of the accounting records of petitioner.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Aljem's Corporation Logging Division (Aljem) was a joint venture

entered into between petitioner's representative, Pacifico V. Dizon, Jr. and
private respondent Rudy Y. Chua. Dizon served as the venture's president,
while private respondent was its vice-president. 2 The joint venture operated
from June 1988 to August 1990. The parties initially agreed upon a 55-45
sharing basis (with the higher percentage going to the petitioner), which they
later modified to 50-50.3

On August 11, 1992, private respondent sued petitioner for a sum of money
and for damages. In his complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Davao City, private respondent alleged, among other things, that according
to the financial report prepared by a certified public accountant commissioned
by him, the logging operations of the joint venture earned an income of
P3,659,710.07 from January to August 1990. 4 Private respondent alleged that
this figure was subsequently confirmed by petitioner's certified public
accountant,5 but despite repeated demands by him for the payment of his 50%
share of the income from the logging operations of their joint venture,
petitioner refused to pay him his share.6

In its answer, petitioner alleged that private respondent's auditor bloated the
joint venture's net operating income for the year 1990 to P3,659,710.07 and
that the correct amount, as found by petitioner's accountant, was only
P2,089,141.80.7 Petitioner alleged that pursuant to a partial liquidation of the
joint venture on August 2, 1990, private respondent received P2,632,719.85
which represents his share in the assets as well as in the net operation income
of the venture. What was left to be liquidated, according to petitioner, were the
disposition of undivided equipment and collection of receivables, payment of
taxes, and adjustment of private respondent's share upon the arrangement on
the value of petitioner's equipment share in the amount of P55,970.32. 8

As an affirmative defense, petitioner averred that taking into account the entire
operation of the joint venture, the amount of the joint venture's undistributed
assets from 1988 to 1990 was only P584,657.63. It claimed that private
respondent had no cause of action against it (petitioner) and that the latter's
claim was based on a fraudulent scheme.9

During the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties agreed to refer the case
to a commissioner. For this reason, Leonora B. Cainglet was appointed
commissioner by the trial court and ordered to conduct an audit of petitioner's
accounting records.10 The commissioner thereafter required the parties to
produce the records of the company, consisting of the joint venture agreement,
books of accounts from the start of the joint venture's operations up to its
liquidation, sales invoices, cash vouchers, journal vouchers, payrolls, and
other documents pertaining to business transactions, monthly bank
statements, used and canceled checks, bank reconciliations, savings
passbooks, if any, financial statements, and statement of joint venture
liquidation.11 The commissioner interviewed petitioner's representative as well
as private respondent, after which she filed her report in court, furnishing
copies of the same to the parties on March 15, 1993.

On March 26, 1993, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion, alleging that
there were discrepancies concerning sales, depreciation, and interest between
the audit report and the report of its (petitioner's) auditor. Petitioner asked for
copies of certain cash vouchers, journal vouchers, and checks covering, among
other things, repairs and maintenance, representation, fuel, oil and lubricants,
and freight and handling. It was subsequently allowed to examine the
documents in court.

On May 27, 1993, petitioner filed its comments and objections to the
commissioner's report, praying that the commissioner be directed to identify
the transactions, receipts, or documents which she disallowed, disapproved, or
excluded, covering the abovementioned variances, and be ordered to correct
the errors which she had allegedly committed. 12 The trial court conducted a
total of fourteen (14) hearings from May 29 to September 28, 1993 to clarify the
variances pointed out by petitioner.13

On December 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order confirming the

commissioner's report and adopting her findings of facts and conclusions as
those of the court.14 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending
that the commissioner did not observe the mandatory requirements of Rule 33,
§§3 and 5 of the 1964 Rules of Court15 relative to the conduct of hearings
before the commissioner and the setting of the time and place for the first
meeting of the parties, and that it was error for the trial court to approve the
commissioner's report over the objections of petitioner. 16 Petitioner contended
that instead of merely interviewing the parties, the commissioner should have
subpoenaed witnesses who could enlighten her under oath about the true
agreements, oral and written, of the parties and about the manner in which
they conducted their venture and that it was not within the power of the
commissioner to alter or modify what had been agreed upon by the joint
venturers themselves.17

On August 1, 1994, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.18 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside the orders of the trial court, but the Court of Appeals dismissed its
petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was
likewise denied. Hence this petition.

The main issue in this case is whether the order of the trial court, confirming
and adopting the commissioner's report should be set aside on the ground that
the commissioner merely based her report on her interview of the parties and
did not hold any formal hearing.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals held:
While the procedure laid down by the [Rules of Court] in the conduct of the
auditing process concerning the requirement that the parties and/or their
respective counsels should be summoned by the commissioner for a "first"
meeting, and that the persons who are summoned by the commissioner should
be placed under oath, [was] not done by the court commissioner appointed by
the respondent court, We find and so hold that under Rule 33, Section 3 of the
Rules, the order of reference may specify or limit the powers of the
commissioner, the court can direct the commission[er] to report only upon
particular issues, or to do or perform certain particular acts, or receive
evidence only, or fix the date for the beginning and closing of the hearings.
Thus, the court-appointed commissioner can act and perform the power and
authority only in accordance with, and within the limits of the very order
directly handed down by the court which appointed him. The commissioner is
obliged to work only under those constraints and within specific pre-
determined concerns.

Respondent court's order to Mrs. Cainglet was specific, "to conduct an audit of
defendant's (petitioner's) accounting records." In compliance with, and in
fulfillment of, the order, Mrs. Cainglet required the parties to submit the
relevant documents and papers, after which she examined them and on the
basis of which she prepared and submitted the audit report in the court. With
respondent's court order as frame of reference, we find and so hold that the
court commissioner performed her task within the well-defined order to the
letter. She did not hold any hearing and swore no witnesses for she was not
ordered to do so.19

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's assertion that it was not afforded the
opportunity to object to the disallowance or disapproval of certain items in the
computation of the assets of petitioner. It pointed out that, among the persons
who were interviewed by the commissioner, were petitioner's representative,
Pacifico V. Dizon, Jr., and private respondent. Petitioner, therefore, had an
adequate opportunity to inquire about the progress of the audit and challenge
the commissioner's report if there were certain items therein that in its opinion
should be disallowed, disapproved, or excluded. 20

In this appeal, petitioner contends that the commissioner should have

conducted a formal hearing as the order of the trial court directed her to
conduct an "audit" of petitioner's accounting records. It argues that the term
"audit" means "a formal or official examination and authentication of accounts
with witnesses, vouchers, etc." 21 Citing Rule 33, §2(a) of the 1964 Rules of
Court, petitioner likewise contends that as the work of the commissioner
involved the examination of along account, a hearing was necessary and that
interviews do not suffice as the parties cannot register their objections during
an interview. Finally, petitioner says that the conduct of a hearing and the
swearing of witnesses do not require a specific order from the court. Rather, it
is only when "the court specifically orders the commissioner not to hold a
hearing and swear witnesses that he/she is barred from performing such acts.
Here, the trial court's order did not specify or limit the commissioner's powers;
hence the commissioner necessarily had to swear and hear witnesses. 22

Petitioner's contentions are well taken. Rule 33 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
under which this case was decided below, provides in pertinent part:

SEC. 3. Order of reference, powers of the commissioner. - When a reference is

made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the
order of reference. The order may specify or limit the powers of the
commissioner, and may direct him to report only upon particular issues, or to
do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only, and may
fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the
commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings
in every hearing before him and to do all the acts and take all measures
necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order.
He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and
unless otherwise provided in the order of reference he may rule upon the
admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all
respects as it would if held before the court.

SEC. 5. Proceedings before commissioner. - Upon receipt of the order of

reference and unless otherwise provided therein, the commissioner shall
forthwith set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties  or their
attorneys to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the order of reference
and shall notify the parties or their attorneys.

These provisions are substantially reproduced in Rule 32, §§3 and 5 of the
present Code of Civil Procedure. The underscored portions of §§3 and 5
indicate quite clearly the necessity for a formal hearing and the swearing of
witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions
which arise in the course of his examination of the accounts. For this purpose,
the witnesses must necessarily be sworn in and offered for cross-examination
by the parties so that the truth of and question may be determined. This would
not be possible were the commissioner merely to interview the parties. Where
controversial questions are involved, such as whether certain items must be
allowed or disallowed, an adversary proceeding is particularly indicated. That is
why the last sentence of §3 says that "The trial or hearing before him shall
proceed in all respects as it would be held before the court." For the fact is that
the commissioner substitutes for the judge, and whatever the judge can or
cannot do, the commissioner also can or cannot do. Consequently, if a judge
cannot decide a question without hearing the parties on oath or affirmation,
neither can the commissioner.

Indeed, what §3 authorizes to be limited is the scope of the proceedings before

the commissioner, but not the modality thereof. Thus, the order of reference
may specify only particular issues to be determined by the commissioner. It
may direct him to do only particular acts or just to receive and report evidence.
Whichever may be the case, the requirement for the commissioner to hold a
hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.

Nor can it be maintained that petitioner waived the right to object to the
proceedings before the commissioner. Because of the lack of a formal hearing,
petitioner was denied the opportunity to object to the procedure followed by the
commissioner as well as to the disallowance by her of certain items in the
computation of the corporation's assets.

Neither can Rule 32, §10 of the 1964 Rules of Court be cited to bar petitioner
from questioning the failure of the commissioner to hold a hearing. This
provision states in pertinent part:

Objections to the report based upon grounds which were available to the
parties during the proceedings before the commissioner, other than objections
to the findings and conclusions therein set forth, shall not be considered by the
court unless they were made before the commissioner.
The objections referred to are those which a party could have made during the
hearings before the commissioner, such as those relating to the admissibility of
evidence. But this presupposes a hearing or a trial, during which the objections
should be made. Otherwise, there would be neither occasion nor opportunity
for making the objections.1âwphi1.nêt

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner raised the question of lack of hearing
before the commissioner only in its motion for reconsideration of the August 1,
1994 order of the trial court. 23 This is not correct. The records show that it
actually did so in the May 28, 1993 hearing conducted by the trial court on the
commissioner's report.24 This was the first time petitioner had an opportunity
to do so since no hearing was held before the commissioner. Moreover, since
the proceedings before the commissioner were null and void because of the
denial of due process to petitioner, the nullity of the proceedings can be raised
at any stage of case. It was error, therefore, for the trial court to approve the
commissioner's report over the objection of petitioner.25

WHEREFORE, the ORDERS, dated December 6, 1993 and August 1, 1994, of

the Court of Appeals are REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnote

1 Per Justice Artemon D. Luna, Chairman, and concurred in by Justices

Eubulo G. Verzola and B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz.

2 Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 2-3; Rollo pp. 8-9.

3 Id., p. 3; id., p. 9. See also Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 2; id., p.

26.

4 Rollo, p. 26.

5 Private respondent's Complaint, p. 3; Rollo, p. 97.

6 Id., pp. 1-2; id., pp. 97-98.

7 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 3; id., p. 3.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 4; Rollo, p. 28.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 4; Rollo, p. 353.

14 Rollo, pp. 296-301.

15 Now Rule 32, §§3 and 5 of the 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

16 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 77.

17 Id., p. 4; id., p. 80.

18 Rollo, p. 93.

19 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 35-36.

20 Id., p. 13; id., p. 37.

21 Petition for Review, p. 9; id., p. 15.

22 Id., p. 10; id., p. 16.

23 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 13; Rollo, p. 37.

24 TSN, p. 9, May 28, 1993.

25 See 1 F. D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 353 (1999).

G.R. No. 219915 April 3, 2019

WILFREDO CABUGUAS, RENATO CABUGUAS, ALEJANDRO "TABOY" CANETE

AND ELEAZAR MORTOS,* Petitioners
vs.
GALLANT S. TAN NERY,** represented by KATHERINE TAN NERY-TOLEDO,
Respondent

RESOLUTION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated March 27, 2015 and
Resolution3 dated July 9, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
04856-MIN, which granted petitioners' petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated May 20, 2010 and the
Resolution dated March 24, 2012 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, Quezon City (DARAB-Central) in DARAB Case No. 14181,
and reinstated the Decision 5 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
DARAB Malaybalay Bukidnon in DARAB Case No. X-05-1663.

Facts

The facts, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

On May 11, 2005, Gallant S. Tan Nery [(respondent)] filed a

Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Propetiy and Ejectment
before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, docketed as DARAB Case
No. X-05-1663, against Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renata Cabuguas, Taboy
Canete and Eleazar Mortus [(petitioners)], involving a parcel of land
situated in Barangay San Jose, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, with an area
of Four Thousand Two Hundred Four (4,204) square meters, more or
less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. AT-15991 with
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00318948 issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on December 22, 2000, in
favor of [respondent] and registered on April 23, 2001.

In his complaint, [respondent], represented by his sister, Eden Tan

Nery Mamawag, alleged, among others, that: sometime on August 16,
2001, [respondent], through his niece, Cecilia Ellen Mamawag, looked
for laborers to conduct the act of brushing and land preparation of
his landholding for the purpose of planting yellow corn; his niece
contacted and eventually contracted the labor services of respondent
Wilfredo Cabuguas (Wilfredo for brevity) to perform the desired land
preparation for a fee; astonishingly, after the land preparation and
after having been paid, Wilfredo, without hesitation and through
stealth and evil machination, immediately occupied the subject land
and planted it with various agricultural crops such as bananas,
cassavas, coconuts and fruit trees; Wilfredo even built a house
thereon upon his assumption that the land area is an excess, hence
untitled, and could be occupied and tilled for purposes of agricultural
production and eventually could be applied for titling; Wilfredo even
invited other persons, namely: (a) his son, co [petitioner] Renata
Cabuguas, to build a house thereon, (b) co-[petitioner] Eleazar Mortus
to build a house and sawmill, and (c) co-[petitioner] Taboy Canete to
also build a house thereon while he works at the sawmill of Eleazar;
this prompted [respondent], th[r]ough his representative, to report
and bring the issue to the Office of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) Chairman and to the DAR Legal Office of Malaybalay
City for a possible amicable settlement but all these efforts failed.

Meanwhile, on July 12, 2005, [petitioners] filed their Answer denying

the allegations in the complaint and averring that: the subject
property was previously owned by the parents of the [respondent];
however, the same was mortgaged and subsequently foreclosed by a
bank in Cagayan de Oro City; after its foreclosure, the landholding
was placed under the coverage of the land reform program by the
DAR. Surprisingly, the beneficiaries identified by the DAR are the
children of the previous owner to the exclusion of [petitioners],
especially Wilfredo, who are all actual occupants and landless
 residents of the place where the land is located; [respondent] is not an
actual occupant or resident of San Jose, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
and the CLOA issued to him will bear this out; [petitioners] have been
actually possessing, occupying, tilling and cultivating their respective
portions of the subject landholding for a long period of time and have
acquired a vested and preferential right to become farmer-
beneficiaries thereof pursuant to Section 22 of RA 6657 and as such,
they cannot be ejected therefrom as they are more qualified to become
beneficiaries than [respondent]. [Petitioners] also questioned the
jurisdiction of the DARAB arguing that the instant case necessarily
involves the administrative implementation of the land reform
program to which the DARAB has no jurisdiction. [Petitioners] then
prayed for the dismissal of the case for lack of merit and lack of cause
of action.6

In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, Provincial Adjudicator N el P. Carreon ruled

in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby

rendered as follows:

1. Directing all the respondents [petitioners herein] to vacate and

surrender the subject landholding to the complainant;

2. Directing respondents to transfer and/or demolish whatever

structures they may have built in the area;

3. Directing respondents to immediately desist from further

cultivating the subject landholding and should there be standing
crops in the area, the same are to be harvested by respondents by
giving its shares to the complainant.

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the DARAB-Central then rendered its Decision reversing the Provincial
Adjudicator and ruling that the DARAB has no juisdiction over the complaint
since it involves an administrative investigation of whether respondent's CLOA
was valid given the claim of petitioners that they were the actual tillers and
occupants of the land for a long period of time. 8 For the DARAB-Central, it was
the Secretary of the DAR that had jurisdiction. 9 The dispositive portion of the
DARAB-Central's Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated

October 18, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant case for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.10

Respondent appealed to the CA, which reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's

Decision and reversed and set aside the DARAB-Central's Decision. The CA ruled
that a reading of respondent's complaint showed that it involved an agrarian
dispute that was well within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. 11 The CA further ruled
that respondent's CLOA could not be impeached or defeated by mere allegation of
irregularity by the government agency prior to its issuance. 12 The CA also ruled
that as a CLOA holder, respondent is entitled to enjoy and possess the land and
recover it.13

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

The errors assigned by petitioners are as follows:

x x x THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION

ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2010 OF THE DARAB-
CENTRAL

x x x THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION

HAS LIKEWISE ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE DARAB HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE.14

The Court's Ruling

The Court remands the case to the CA for further proceedings.

In reversing the DARAB-Central's Decision, the CA ruled as follows:

x x x As such, the burden of proving the ineligibility or

disqualification of the awardee rests upon the person who avers it
through clear and satisfactory proof or substantial evidence as
required by law. Thus, it is incumbent upon [petitioners] to prove that
[respondent] does not deserve the government grant. [Petitioners],
however, failed to discharge such burden. Other than their bare
allegations, they did not proffer substantial evidence to prove that
they have vested and preferential right to become farmer-beneficiaries
of the subject landholding. Even during the tedious administrative
process prior to the issuance of the CLOA, [petitioners] did not make
any objections nor did they establish their right to such landholding.
Having failed to discharge the burden, it is then proper to assume
that the issuance of the CLOA was regular and correct.

While it is true that the issuance of the CLOA does not put the
ownership of petitioner beyond attack and scrutiny, respondents
should have done it in a separate action for that purpose. As held in a
plethora of cases, the issue of the validity of title, i.e., whether or not
it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. The validity of the CLOA cannot be
attacked collaterally. x x x15

Petitioners, in arguing that the CA erred in reversing the DARAB-Central's

Decision, attached a Certificate of Finality 16 dated November 23, 2010 from the
DAR Regional Office 10 which involves the same parties and what appears to be
the same parcel of land described as the 4,204-square meter land located in
Barangay San Jose, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The Certificate of Finality makes
reference to a February 9, 2010 Order of the Secretary of the DAR, the dispositive
portion of which states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partly GRANTED.

The Orders dated 17 January 2008 and 23 June 2008 are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new Order is issued thus:

1. DECLARING Galant Tan Nery not qualified to become farmer-

beneficiary of the subject land;

2. DECLARING Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renato Cabuguas, Taboy Canete

and Eleazar Mortus as the rightful beneficiaries of the subject land;

3. DIRECTING Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renato Cabuguas, Taboy Canete

and Eleazar Mortus to cause the cancellation of the CLOA issued to
Galant Tan Nery; and

4. DIRECTING the MARO and PARO concerned to issue the

corresponding CLOAs to Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renato Cabuguas,
Taboy Canete and Eleazar Mortus.

SO ORDERED."17

It appears that petitioners had indeed commenced such separate action to assail
the CLOA of respondent, and it would also appear that the action as decided in
favor of petitioners and that it has become final and executory. Nonetheless, the
Certificate of Finality attached by petitioners is n t a certified true copy. Further,
the determination of its validity and its effect on this case is a factual matter that
the Court cannot determine. Thus, as a matter of fairness and in the interest of
speedy disposition of cases, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the
CA for further proceedings.18

In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque 19 (Manotok) the Court explained the

propriety and rationale behind remanding a case to the CA for the determination
of a factual issue, thus:

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases

for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual
issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of
its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate
need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.

The [CA] generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its
conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great
respect by this Court.1âшphi1 It is a body that is fully
capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating
factual matters, including documentary evidence.

In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter

pending before it to the [CA]. In Republic v. [CA], this Court
commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the [CA] to hear and
receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine
"the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation,
and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces'
and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the
process the validity of such postulates and the respective
 measurements of the areas referred to." The [CA] therein received the
evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report"
shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the [CA] is not a deviant procedure.

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the

grant of authority to the [CA] to receive evidence in the present case.
Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu
proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact,
other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in
any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.
The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report
evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the
admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to
submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report
formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter.
The same result can obtain herein.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the Rules of Court, and consistent with
the Court's ruling in Manotok, this case is remanded to the CA in order to: (i)
allow petitioners to present proof of the status of the CLOA of the 4,204-square
meter land located in Barangay San Jose, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon; and (ii)
allow respondent to present controverting evidence, if there be any.

In view of the foregoing, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings in furtherance of the foregoing purposes and to forthwith
submit its resolution to the Court for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.

Footnotes
*
 Also spelled as "Mortus" in some parts of the rollo.
**
 Also spelled as "Neri" in some parts of the rollo.
1
 Rollo, pp. 10-21, excluding Annexes.
2
 Id. at 36-45. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras and concurred in
by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
3
 Id. at 47-48. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and concurred in by
Associate Justices Oscar V. Badelles and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
4
 Id. at 28-34.
5
 Id. at 22-25.
6
 Id. at 37-38.
7
 Id. at 25.
8
 Id. at 33.
9
 Id.
10
 Id. at 34.
11
 Id. at 41.
12
 Id. at 42-43.
13
 Id. at 43.
14
 Id. at 14.
15
 Id. at 43.
16
 Id. at 49-50.
17
 Id. at 49.
18
 The Court adopted the same course of action in the case of Republic v. Banal na
Pag-aaral, Inc., G.R. No. 193305, February 5, 2018.
19
 595 Phil. 87 (2008).
20
 Id. at 148-149, citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 565
Phil. 59, 98-100 (2007). See also IVQ Landholdings, Inc. v. Barbosa, 803 Phil. 419,
440 (2017).