G.R. No.

161589               November 24, 2014

PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the initiatory pleading.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
1

judgment rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, in Makati City  nullifying for lack
2

of jurisdiction the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, in
Makati City. 3

Antecedents

The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City with an area of 1,068.67
square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property) through the
petitioner’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. (Century Properties). Under the terms of the
contract of lease dated January 31, 1997, the petitioner gavethe respondent possession of the subject property
under a stipulation to the effect that in case of the respondent’s default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could
immediately repossess the subject property.

On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters,
including the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, in
which they set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00, with the following terms of payment: 20%down payment
equivalent of US$684,108.00 payable within eight months; and US$85,513.00/monthly for eight months with
interestof 9.75%, commencing on the 6th month. The 80% balance was to be paid in 13 installments beginning on
March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998. The reservation agreement contained the following cancellation or forfeiture
provision, viz:

Any failure on [the respondent’s] part to pay the full downpayment, or deliver the post-dated checks or pay the
monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the petitioner], at its option, to impose a penalty interest at the
rate of three percent (3%) per month on the outstanding balance or to cancel this agreement without need of any
court action and to forfeit, in its favor, any reservation deposits or payments already made on the unit, without prior
notice. 4

After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly amortizations. An exchange of
letters ensued between Janet C. Ley, President of the respondent, or Efren Yap, Assistant to the President of the
respondent, on one hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio, ViceChairman of the petitioner, and the petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Reynaldo Dizon, on the other. In the September 23, 1997 letter,  the respondent asked the petitioner to modify the
5

terms of the reservation agreement to allow it to purchase only the subject property. In the February 5, 1998
letter,  the petitioner’s counsel reminded the respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner under the
6

terms of the reservation agreement. In another letter dated February 5, 1998,  the petitioner’s counsel informed the
7

respondent of its failure to pay its amortizations since August 1997, and demanded the payment of US$961,564.50.

Through its letter of February 17, 1998,  the respondent submitted the following proposals, namely: (1) that the
8

US$538,735.00 paid under the reservation agreement be applied asrental payments for the use and occupation of
the subject property in the period from March 1997 to February 28, 1998; (2) that the balance of US$417,355.45
after deducting the rental payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998 should be returned to it; and (3) that the
respondent be allowed to lease the subject property beginning March 1998.

The petitioner, through its counsel’s letter of March 9, 1998,  rejected the respondent’s proposals, and demanded
9

the payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondent’s unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under the
reservation agreement. The petitioner further evinced its intention to cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the
respondent for the rentals of the subject property corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March 1998,
during which no amortization payments were made.

In the letter dated February 4, 1999,  the petitioner’s counsel informed the respondent of the cancellation of the
10

reservation agreement and the forfeiture of the respondent’s payments; and demanded that respondent pay the
rentals of ₱9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.

In its letter of May 25, 1999,  the petitioner’s counsel wrote to the respondent thuswise:
11
We write in behalf of our client, Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, regarding the Reservation Agreement and/or sale
between you and our client over the latter’s unit located at the 25th Floor, Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat
Avenue corner Makati Avenue, Makati City.

We regret to inform you that inview of your continued refusal and/or failure to pay to our client the balance of the
agreed-upon purchase price of the office unit you are currently occupying, our client is constrained to make a
notarial cancellation of the Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the above-mentioned unit and to forfeit the
payments you made in favor of our client.

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject premises. Hence, final
and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount of
₱9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.

Trusting that you are guided accordingly.

On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following the respondent’s failure to
comply with the demands to pay and vacate.

The respondent resisted the complaint,  arguing that the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 had been
12

simulated or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished and/or novated by the reservation
agreement; that the petitioner had failed to observe its undertaking to allow the respondent to collect rentals from
the other lessees of the subject property; that the petitioner had unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to amend the
reservation agreement; and that the petitioner had violated the rule on non-forum shopping considering the
pendency of another case between the parties in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City. 13

Decision of the MeTC

On January 12, 2000, the MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful possession of
the property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed to
comply with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject property; and that, in any event, the reservation
agreement proved that the petitioner had held the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof.
The MeTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Ley Construction and Development Corporation and all
persons claiming rights under it to vacate and surrender the possession of the Property to the plaintiff; to pay the
sum of ₱32,456,953.06 representing unpaid rentals and other charges as of June 23, 1999; the further amount of
₱443,741.38 starting July, 1999, and the same amount every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the
continued and illegal use and occupancy of the Property, until finally restituted to the plaintiff; the sum of
₱100,000.00 for as (sic) attorney’sfees plus cost of suit.14

The respondent appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned over the possession of the leased premises to the
petitioner.

Judgment of the RTC

On June 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC’s decision on the ground of lackof jurisdiction,
holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had
no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of possession by the petitioner was the respondent’s failure to pay
the amortizations arising from the violations of the reservation agreement; that the complaint did not specifically aver
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not show how entry had been effected and how the dispossession
had started; and that the requirement of formal demand had not been complied with by the petitioner.

Decision of the CA

The petitioner appealed to the CA.

By its decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC,  declaring that the
15

respondent’s possession was not by virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which
was more of a "contract of sale."  It concluded that the petitioner’s action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind
16

of action for the recovery of possession. 17

Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present petition.
Issue

The decisive question is whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or accion
reivindicatoria.

The petitioner submits that the MeTC had jurisdiction because its complaint made out a clear case of unlawful
detainer, emphasizing that the basis of the complaint was the failure of the respondent to pay the stipulated monthly
rentals under the revived contract of lease; that even if the cause of action was upon the nonpayment of the
purchase price under the reservation agreement, the MeTC still had jurisdiction over the action because an unlawful
detainer case could also arise from a vendor-vendee relationship; and that, accordingly, the nonpayment ofrentals
or of the purchase price sufficiently established its better right to possess the subject property.

In contrast, the respondent maintains that it had not violated any existing contract of lease with the petitioner
because the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 was based on the agreement between the respondent and
Century Properties; that it had entered into the possession of the subject property as the buyer-owner pursuant
tothe reservation agreement; and that the recovery of possession should have been by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, not unlawful detainer.

Ruling

The appeal has merit.

1. Kinds of Possessory Actions

There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, namely:
accion de reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal. The first seeks the recovery of ownership as well
as possession of realty.  The second proposes to recover the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
18

civil proceeding.  The third refers to the recovery of physical or actual possession only (through a special civil action
19

either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer).

If the dispossession is not alleged totake place by any of the means provided by Section 1,  Rule 70, Rules of
20

Court, or, if the dispossession allegedly took place by any of such means but the action is not brought within one
year from deprivation ofpossession, the action is properly a plenary action of accion publiciana or accion de
reivindicacion. The explanation is simply that the disturbance of the peace and quiet of the local community due to
the dispossession did not materialize; hence, the possessor thus deprived has no need for the summary proceeding
of accion interdictal under Rule 70.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over accion interdictal. Until April 15, 1994, the
MTC had no original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions. By such date, its jurisdiction was expanded to
vest it with exclusive original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions ofaccion publiciana and accion de
reivindicacion where the assessed value of the realty involved did not exceed ₱20,000.00, or, if the realty involved
was in Metro Manila, such value did not exceed ₱50,000.00. The expansion of jurisdiction was by virtue of the
amendment by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691  to make Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 pertinently
21

provide thusly:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxxx

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 similarly revised Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the provision defining
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC over civil actions) to make the latter provision state, pertinently, thus:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

xxxx

As can be seen, the amendments have made the assessed value of the property whose possession or ownership is
in issue, or the assessed value of the adjacent lots if the disputed land is not declared for taxation purposes
determinative of jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of the realty must be found in the complaint, if the
action (other than forcible entry or unlawful detainer) involves title to or possession of the realty, including quieting of
title of the realty. If the assessed value is not found in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the allegations of the basic
pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another court. Courts cannot
take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the realty. 22

2. MeTC had jurisdiction over

the complaint of the petitioner

The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the character of the relief sought are to
be consulted.  The court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts
23

in the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless ofwhether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.  The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on
24

the facts averred, although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature of the action.  The defense contained in
25

the answer of the defendant is generally not determinant. 26

Is this present action onefor unlawful detainer?

A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of which there are two
kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a vendee or vendor, or other person
unlawfully withholding possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the rightto hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any
claim of ownership or possession de jurethat either party may set forth in his pleading."  The plaintiff must prove
27

that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.  The principal
28

issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The
summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de factoin the
interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve
ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.  On the other hand,
29

regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff’s prior
possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is
lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right. 30

In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the cause of action according to the manner set forth in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the rightto hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of demand as
prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated, suchaction by the
lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay orcomply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the complaint must allege that:
(a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (b) the defendant’s possession of the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c) the defendant
thereafter remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d)
the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. 31

The complaint herein sufficientlyalleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer, to wit: x x x x

3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management Inc.
(CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the x x x Philippines x x x
entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former a portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB
(hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY). x x x.

4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25th Floor of the PSB by virtue of a
Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.

5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization payments on the above-mentioned
purchase. x x x.

xxxx

8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and CPMI that the Reservation Agreement
be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-mentioned Contract of Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded
to such request x x x.

9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff
the rentals for the use of the PROPERTY when they fell due.

10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the aforementioned purchase and demanded that
defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.

11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and continues to refuse and fail to
peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x. 32

As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the petitioner’s counsel demanded that the respondent
vacate the subject property,  to wit:
33

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject premises.  Hence,final
1âwphi1

and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount of
₱9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.

After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-
year period from the date of the last demand.

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive
original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein,the cause of action of the petitioner was to recover
possession of the subject property from the respondent upon the latter’s failure to comply with the former’s demand
tovacate the subject property after the latter’s right to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate.
Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at its commencement, became unlawful upon its non-
compliance with the former’s demand to vacate.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved as to how entry by the
respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started might have departed from that alleged in the
complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was determined from the allegations of the
complaint, which clearly set forth a cause of action for unlawful detainer. 34

The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner as the plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence,
the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession. 35

A defendant's claim of possession de Jure or his averment of ownership does not render the ejectment suit either
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can
proceed independently of any claim of ownership.  Even when the question of possession cannot be resolved
36

without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. 37
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003 by the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58;
REINSTATE the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City;
and ORDER the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE COPNCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Special Order No. 1885 dated November 24, 2014.

 Rollo, pp. 28-34; penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (retired), and concurred in by
1

Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now
a Member of this Court).

2
 Id. at 54 - 67; penned by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

3
 Id. at 80-87; penned by Judge Cesar D. Santamaria.

4
 Id. at 109.

5
 Id. at 110-111.

6
 Id. at 112-113.

7
 Id. at 181-182.

8
 Id. at 114-115.

9
 Id. at 116-117.

10
 Id. at 118-119.

11
 Id. at 120-121.

12
 Id. at 125-126.

13
 Id. at 83.

14
 Id. at 87.
  Supra note 1.
15

 Id.
16

 Id.
17

 Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 290-291 (1906).

18

 Lagumen v. Abasolo, 94 Phil. 455, 456 (1954).

19

 Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
20

section, a person deprived of the possessionof any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

 An Act Expanding The Jurisdiction Of The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, And Municipal
21

Circuit Trial Courts, Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known As The
"Judiciary Reorganization Act Of 1980"

 Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 104, 115.
22

 Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc., No. L-30336, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 557, 561; Pasagui v. Villablanca,.
23

No. L-21998, November 10, 1975, 68 SCRA 18, 20;Arcaya v. Teleron, 57 SCRA 363.

 Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 423; Republic v. Estenzo, No. L-
24

35512, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 282, 285;

 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 57062, 205 SCRA 337, 343; Baguioro v. Barrios,77 Phil 120, 123
25

(1946).

 Chico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122704, January 5, 1998, 284 SCRA 33;Malayan Integrated Industries
26

Corporation v. Mendoza, No. L-75238, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 548, 552.

 Caparros v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 758; Alvir vs. Vera,No. L-39338, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 357,
27

361.

 Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 124292, December 10, 1996, 265 SCRA 493, 502-503; Maddammu
28

v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230 (1943); Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 658, 665-666 (1944).

 Refugia v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 118284, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 347, 364-366.
29

 German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76216 & 76217, September 14,
30

1989, 177 SCRA 495.

 Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335.
31

 Rollo, pp. 89-91.

32

 Id. at 120-121.
33

 Canlas v. Tuhil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 158.
34

 Id.
35

 Diu v. Ihajan, G.R. No. 132657, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 452, 458-459.
36

 Section 16, Rule 70, Rules of Court; see also Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
37

97637 and 98700-01, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.

G.R. No. 164402               July 5, 2010

ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, represented by ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In an action for recovery of possession of realty, who has the better right of possession, the registered owner armed
with a Torrens title or the occupants brandishing a notarized but unregistered deed of sale executed before the land
was registered under the Torrens system?

As we previously ruled in similar cases,1 we resolve the question in favor of the titleholder.

Factual Antecedents

On August 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages2 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her husband Ignacio Aguilar
(Ignacio) was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-93543 over a 606-square meter parcel of land
designated as Lot 83 situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio
allowed petitioner’s sister, Anastacia Urieta (Anastacia), mother of respondent Ederlina B. Alfaro (Ederlina), to
construct a house on the southern portion of said land and to stay therein temporarily.

In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition Lot 83. Petitioner thus asked the respondents, who took
possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate Lot 83. They did not heed her demand.

Thus, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacate subject property,
and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

In their Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses,4 respondents did not dispute that Ignacio was able to
secure title over the entire Lot 83. However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973, Ignacio and herein petitioner sold
to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of Lot 83 consisting of 367.5 square meters as shown by
the Kasulatan sa Bilihan5 which bears the signatures of petitioner and Ignacio. Since then, they and their mother
have been in possession thereof. Respondents also presented several Tax Declarations6 in support of their
allegations.

Respondents also raised the defense of prescription. They pointed out that accion publiciana or an action to recover
the real right of possession independent of ownership prescribes in 10 years. However, it took petitioner more than
25 years before she asserted her rights by filing accion publiciana. As alleged in the complaint, they took
possession of the disputed portion of Lot 83 as early as 1968, but petitioner filed the case only in 1995.

By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed that petitioner be directed to execute the necessary documents so that
title to the 367.5-square meter portion of Lot 83 could be issued in their name. They likewise prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

In her Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,7 petitioner denied having signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and averred
that her signature appearing thereon is a forgery. She presented an unsworn written declaration dated January 28,
1994 where her husband declared that he did not sell the property in question to anyone. As to the issue of
prescription, she asserted that respondents’ occupation of subject property cannot ripen into ownership considering
that the same is by mere tolerance of the owner. Besides, the purported Kasulatan sa Bilihan was not registered
with the proper Registry of Deeds. 1avvphi1

During the trial, petitioner presented the testimonies of Orlando Aguilar (Orlando) and Zenaida Baldeo (Zenaida).
Orlando testified that he has been staying in Lot 83 since 1960 and had built a house thereon where he is presently
residing; and, that his mother, herein petitioner, denied having sold the property or having signed any document for
that matter.

Zenaida also testified that in 1981, her father (Ignacio) and Ederlina had a confrontation before the barangay during
which her father denied having conveyed any portion of Lot 83 to anybody. She further testified that she is familiar
with the signature of her father and that the signature appearing on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is not her father’s
signature.

For their part, respondents offered in evidence the testimonies of Estrella Bermudo Alfaro (Estrella), Ederlina, and
Jose Tampolino (Jose). Estrella declared that she was present when Ignacio and the petitioner affixed their
signatures on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, which was acknowledged before Notary Public Juan Q. Dantayana on April
17, 1973. She narrated that her mother actually purchased the property in 1954, but it was only in 1973 when the
vendor executed the deed of sale. In fact, her father Francisco Bermudo was able to secure a permit to erect a
house on the disputed property from the Office of the Mayor of Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro in 1954.8 She was
surprised to learn though that their property is still registered in the name of the petitioner.

Ederlina corroborated the declarations of Estrella. She also alleged that her parents occupied the property in 1954
when they built a hut there, then later on, a house of strong materials.

Jose corroborated the declarations of the other witnesses for the respondents that the disputed portion of Lot 83 is
owned by Anastacia.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision9 dated September 21, 1998, the court a quo ordered the respondents to vacate subject premises and
denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches. It held that the prescriptive
period for reconvenyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title. In this case, however, it is not disputed that OCT No. P-9354 covering the entire Lot 83 was
issued to Ignacio in 1977. The trial court likewise held that respondents are guilty of laches and that the
reconveyance of the disputed property in their favor would violate the rule on indefeasibility of Torrens title.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendants, to wit:

1. Ordering the defendants and any person claiming right under them to vacate the premises in question and
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;

2. To pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as and for reasonable attorney’s fees;

3. To pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 7, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision11 reversing the trial court’s Decision and dismissing the
complaint, as well as respondents’ counterclaim. The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan since it is a
notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed. In addition, witness Estrella
categorically declared that she was present when petitioner and Ignacio signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA
elaborated that in order to disprove the presumption accorded to a notarized document, the party contesting its
authenticity and due execution must present a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which the petitioner
failed to do.

The CA likewise disagreed with the court a quo that respondents’ counterclaim should be dismissed on the ground
of indefeasibility of title. It emphasized that the Torrens system was adopted to protect innocent third parties for
value and not to protect fraud. Nonetheless, the CA did not grant the relief sought in respondents’ counterclaim
considering that not all interested parties were impleaded in the case.

The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and a new one ENTERED dismissing
the complaint and counterclaim.

SO ORDERED.12

Issue

Without seeking reconsideration of the CA’s Decision, petitioner interposed the present recourse raising the sole
issue of:

WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

VALIDITY/GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTED DEED OF SALE OF THE PORTION OF
THE LOT DESPITE THE VEHEMENT DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VENDORS.13

Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan. She alleges that she wanted to take the witness stand to disclaim in open court her purported signature
appearing on respondents’ Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but could not do so because she is too old, bed-ridden and has to
bear a tortuous five-hour drive to reach the court. Nevertheless, she executed a sworn statement declaring that she
and her husband never sold any portion of Lot 83 and that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged.
She avers that the assistance of an expert witness is not even necessary to detect the patent dissimilarities between
said forged signatures and their authentic signatures.

Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in taking into consideration the appearance and condition of the paper
where the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is written. She posits that the fabrication of an ancient-looking document nowadays
is no longer difficult. She also points to several circumstances which cast doubt on the authenticity and due
execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA inexplicably ignored

Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And while there are exceptions to the rule on
indefeasibility of title,14 she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. With regard to the tax declarations
presented by respondents, petitioner asserts that it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that tax declarations
are not necessarily proof of ownership.

In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the arguments advanced by the petitioner, however, it is
clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence on record.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari.15 It is settled that in the exercise of
the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.16 This rule, however, is
subject to a number of exceptions,17 one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of
the trial court, like in the present case.

Nature and purpose of accion publiciana.

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion,18 accion publiciana is an

ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.19 It refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.20

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.21 However, where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the
issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.22 The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.23

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential guideposts, we shall now resolve the arguments raised by the parties in this
petition.

As against petitioner’s Torrens title, respondents’ Kasulatan sa Bilihan cannot confer better right to possess.

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the
title appears.24 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.25 It is also
settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.26 Thus, in
Arambulo v. Gungab,27 this Court declared that the "age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof."

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot 83.
Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim of ownership.
Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris tantum presumption of authenticity and due
execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioner’s Torrens title. This has been our consistent ruling which we
recently reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel,28 viz:

Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would still not
bolster the petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners’ superior right to
possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of which between the certificate
of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the
better right to possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in
the name of petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed therein
that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized.

Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more
probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-à-vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in
Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof. (Citations omitted.)

As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are telltale signs
which cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:

1. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia, died;

2. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan only when
petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they neither asserted their rights
thereunder nor registered the same with the proper Registry of Deeds;

3. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto, was not presented in
court; and,

4. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President is a public officer who
has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.

Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Moreover, respondents’ attack on the validity of petitioner’s title by claiming that their mother became the true owner
of the southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354 constitutes as a collateral attack on
said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana,
not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.29 This cannot
be allowed. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to the present
action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.30 This manner of attack is to be distinguished from
a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or
enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
judgment had been disposed of.31 Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan,32 therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana.
In his defense, defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiff-appellee’s Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2004 was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected defendant-
appellant’s defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals33 we arrived at the same conclusion and elaborated as
follows:

In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised in their so-
called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which they may pursue for the
purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private respondents. That theory will not prosper.

While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic complaint in
the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and independent action in itself. In
fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as above set forth, particularly in its required relation
to the subject matter of opposing party’s claim. Failing in that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an
altogether different and original action.

It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the property in question,
which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack
which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can
only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to
claim ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed
out in a proper action.
The lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents’ counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction.

Both the trial court and the appellate court considered respondents’ counterclaim as a petition for reconveyance. In
which case, it should be treated merely as a permissive counterclaim because the evidence required to prove their
claim differs from the evidence needed to establish petitioner’s demand for recovery of possession. Being a
permissive counterclaim, therefore, respondents should have paid the corresponding docket fees.34 However, there
is no proof on record that respondents paid the required docket fees. The official receipts were neither attached to
nor annotated on respondents’ Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses35 which was filed via registered
mail36 on August 19, 1995. It has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.37 The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid.38

On a final note, and as discussed above, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of
determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of OCT No. P-9354 can
be properly threshed out.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2004 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the premises is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

1
 Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004); Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118; Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No.
156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640; Pascual v. Coronel, G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527
SCRA 474.

2
 Records, pp. 1-4. The case was raffled to Branch 46 and docketed as Civil Case No. R-924.

3
 Id. at 5.

4
 Id. at 12-16.

5
 Id. at 128.

6
 Id. at 129-138.

7
 Id. at 21-24.

8
 Id. at 139.

9
 Id. at 153-161; penned by Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan.

10
 Id. at 161.

 CA rollo, pp. 82-89; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and concurred in by Associate
11

Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Santiago Javier Ranada.

12
 Id. at 89.

13
 Rollo, p. 201.

 Such as when a land in possession of a rightful possessor in the concept of owner is fraudulently
14

registered in the name of another.

15
 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1.

16
 Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 408, 420.
17
 The recognized exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same [are] contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) when the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record. (Sering v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 467, 471-472; Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163,
1168 (1997)).

 Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Barredo v. Santiago, 102 Phil.
18

127, 130 (1957).

 Bejar v. Caluag, id.; Sps. Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil.
19

286, 291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).

 Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179; Lopez v. David, Jr.,
20

G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.

21
 Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 25 (2002).

22
 Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003).

23
 Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118, 136 (2005).

24
 See Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410 (2004).

25
 Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582, 594 (1997).

26
 Supra note 24.

27
 G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 648.

28
 G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 474, 484-485.

 Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376, 386; Caraan v. Court of
29

Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543, 550; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410
(2004) and Civil Code, Article 428.

30
 Teoville Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferreira, G.R. No. 140086, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 459, 474.

31
 Id.

32
 161 Phil. 586, 587 (1976).

33
 274 Phil. 108, 116 (1991).

34
 See Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001).

35
 Records, pp. 12-16.

36
 Id. at 20.

37
 Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280, 291 (1989).

38
 Id.
 March 12, 2014

G.R. No. 187944

VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For review in the instant Petition  is the Decision  rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5,
1 2

2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review  filed by Mr.4

and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,  and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,  of
5 6

Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,  and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case
7

No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita)
in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents

At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the
subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot
No. 1907-A,  which was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and
8

Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9

Lot No. TCT No. Heirs

1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena
Padilla, married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla
(Remedios), married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla
(Veronica);  and (4) Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to
10

Teresita Curso (Teresita)

1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents claim that
their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in
Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia,
who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion. 11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the
subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply
insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. 12

Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a
demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that
Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However, the
respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and
uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of
partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint  for 13

nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907-
A.14

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful
detainer, the origin of the instant petition.  She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno,
1âwphi1

Veronica and Dionesia,  the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the
15
same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot
and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same. 16

The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents were
ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They
were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 17

In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. 18

The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review  filed before the CA.
19

The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several
decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the
notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on
December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the
partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,  the respondents emphasized that "even if one is the owner of the property, the
20

possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the
same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."  The respondents also invoked the
21

doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag  that the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of
22

ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially
true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution
of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.

The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the complaint for
unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents
instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has
been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida
Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-
defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following year after its supposed
execution.

The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never
physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’
possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old wooden
chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an "Agreement,"  dated February 23, 1957,
23

showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document
stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan
was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings.
Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to
Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to file an
action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who
had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by
virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that
date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the
reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.

In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would be
irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in
which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s
complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.

The Ruling of the CA

On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo
and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of
Appeals,:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession
and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.

A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor
unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.
It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did not
state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the
respondents’] possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint
merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that after
[Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it
is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already.
There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’] possession of
the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, between [the respondents],
on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of
the land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita]
cannot legally assert that [the respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because
[Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take
note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-
heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he later seek[s] to
recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.

Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the
subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should
present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal
trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:

For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession
thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner
may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly
address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.  (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
24

In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration  filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by the
25

respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the
subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v.
Rivera  finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and
26

the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not
necessary.  Instead, what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of
27

jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.

In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:

Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of
action for unlawful detainer.

II

Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the
issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.

Carmencita’s Allegations

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who
were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the
subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’
refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject
lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack  and the issue of
28

ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership
of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of
action and are seeking different reliefs.29

Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA  that the registered owner of a
30

property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,  the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not
31

by its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied
promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper. 32

The Respondents’Arguments

In their Comment  to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer
33

was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by
tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents
possessed "the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises
and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners’."  In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,  the Court ruled
34 35

that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and
deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.

In their rejoinder,  the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably
36

linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is
already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.

Our Disquisition

The instant petition lacks merit.

Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the case at
bar.

"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he
must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the
conditions necessary for such action to prosper." 37

In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,  the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of
38

real property, viz:

(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning,
and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the
right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper
regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.  (Citations omitted)
39

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:

(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;

(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment. 40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and
prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.  Carmencita was
41

likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and
how and when such tolerance came about.  Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans
42

factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance
by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s
possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the
property.  It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the
43

respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on
the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.44

As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can
abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.

In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in
the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues
presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is
Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right
of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable
and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or
not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or
decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the
right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact
that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage
any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."
 xxxx

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the
ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible
entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely
to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of
enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937.
(Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts
will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the
result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of
lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we
deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.  (Citations omitted)
45

The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that
petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter
dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written,
asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang,
Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["]

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the
resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.["]

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the
petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the
determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands."  (Citation omitted)
46

We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed
hereunder.

Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in
possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the
defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as
parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been standing in the
subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of
the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer.
As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been
amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings.
Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other
hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an
issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 10-19.

 Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodil
2

V. Zalameda, concurring; id. at 21-28.

3
 Id. at 40.

4
 Id. at 65-95.

5
 With Presiding Judge Estela Alma A. Singco.

6
 With Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta.

 Entitled "Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Marilou Emboy-Delantare and Veronica P.
7

Garcia".

 A 957-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-5922.

8

 Rollo, pp. 30-31.

9

 Sometimes referred to in the records as "Veronida".

10

 Rollo, p. 22.
11

 Id.
12

 Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-30548.

13

 Rollo, p. 22.
14

 Vicente’s spouse.
14

 Rollo, p. 23.
16

 Id.
17

 Id.
18

 Id. at 65-95.
19

 320 Phil. 146 (1995).

20

 Id. at 156; rollo, p. 76.

21

 383 Phil. 486 (2000).

22

 Rollo, p. 121.
23

 Id. at 24-27.
24

 Id. at 29-38.
25

 453 Phil. 404 (2003).

26

 Id. at 410.
27

 Citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree.
28

 Citing Punio v. Judge Go, 357 Phil. 1, 6 (1998), and Silverio v. CA, 454 Phil. 750, 758 (2003).
29

 424 Phil. 544 (2002).

30

 348 Phil. 813 (1998).

31

 Id. at 825; rollo, p. 140.

32

 Rollo, pp. 55-64.

33

 Id. at 59.
34

 523 Phil. 39 (2006).

35

 Rollo, pp. 144-151.

36

 Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350, 361, citing Carbonilla v. Abiera,
37

G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461.

 Supra note 35.
38

 Id. at 45-46.40Supra note 37, at 363; see also Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011,
39

646 SCRA 328, 334-335.

41
 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

42
 Id.

43
 Please see Petition, id. at 12-13; Reply, id. at 138-139.

 Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 323, 341, citing Serdoncillo v. Spouses
44

Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, 95 (1998).

45
 Supra note 22, at 495-499.

46
 Id. at 498-499.