1
1. Velayo, etc. vs Shell Co., of the Philippines, et al.
ABLAO, Ada Nadeen Dimaano
Facts:
Plaintiff Commercial Airlines or CALI is a corporation engaged
in air transportation business while defendant Shell Company
is a corporation engaged in supply of fuel.
Ever since the start of CALI’s operations, its fuel needs were
all supplied by Shell.
One day, CALI hosted an informal luncheon convening all of
its principal creditors. During that meeting, CALI informed its
creditors that it was in a state of insolvency and had to stop
operations. One of CALI’s creditors is defendant Shell. In the
meeting, CALI informed them that it was planning to sell a
C-54 plane in the US in favor of PAL. They also discussed the
preferences of the claims.
A working committee was formed – part of the committee is a
Mr. Fitzgerald, credit manager of the defendant. The Creditors
agreed that it would be advantageous to strive for a fair
pro-rata division of its assets.
Afterwards, defendant sent a telegraph to its sister company
Shell Oil Co. in the US assigning to it its credit against CALI.
So Shell Oil Co. filed a complaint against CALI in the Court of
the State of California for the collection of the assigned credit.
A writ OF ATTACHMENT was issued against the C-54 plane.
CALI then filed a petition for voluntary insolvency and the
Court appointed Velayo as the assignee in the proceedings.
Velayo then filed the case at bar for the purpose of securing a
writ of injunction to restrain the Defendant from prosecuting
the case against CALI which was denied.
Issue:
W/N Defendant Shell Company, taking advantage of its
knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplaines C-54 , acted in
bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other
creditors by sending the telegraph assigning its credit to its
sister company in the US, to the detriment and prejudice.
Held:
While the court ruled that the assignment of Defendant’s
credit was not violative of the provisions of the Insolvency law,
the Defendant did take advantage of its knowledge of plaintiff’s
insolvency. And thus, schemed and effected the transfer of its
credit to its sister corporation to dispose of the property,
depriving the insolvent the opportunity to recover the plane.
Art. 19 – Any person, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith. (Abuse of Right
doctrine)
Art. 21 – any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
These provisions are catch-all provisions because legislators
cannot possibly foresee all of the moral wrongs and provide for
it specifically in statutes.

Boundary of morality and law – law draws its breath of life from
morals.
A moral wrong or injury even if it does not constitute a violation
of a statute law, should be compensated by damages.
2. Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. CA AGCOPRA, Ronna
Mae Castro
Facts:
Spouses Tadiaman, residents of Cabanatuan City, purchased
a 10-wheeler Isuzu Cargo Truck in installments from Jordan
Enterprises, Inc., in Quezon City. They executed a promissory
note worth P 196,680 payable in 24 monthly installments and
a Chattel mortgage over the said truck. Jordan Enterprises,
Inc. assigned its rights and interest over the said instruments
to Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation which in turn
assigned them to the petitioner.
The spouses defaulted in the payment of the installments due
on the promissory note, and the petitioner filed an action for
replevin and damages against them. Upon motion, a writ of
replevin was issued and the truck was seized in Isabela by
persons who represented themselves to be special sheriffs of
the court but who turned out to be employees of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the spouses filed a counterbond and the lower
court ordered the return of the truck. The return was delayed
due to the delaying tactics of the petitioner and when it was
recovered the truck was “cannibalized”. According to the report
of the sheriff the car was hidden by the petitioner, the parts of
2
the truck were completely changed with worn-out spare parts
and some parts were even missing. One employee even
stated that he will only affix his signature on the
acknowledgment receipt if the missing and replaced parts
were not mentioned in the said receipt. This led the spouses to
file a counterclaim for damages.
The lower court then ruled in favor of the petitioner for its
action for replevin and damages but the spouses won the
counterclaim. They were awarded with actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
proportionate part of the costs adjudged against the plaintiff.
The petitioner then appealed the judgment on the counterclaim
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in dismissing Filinvest's appeal from the decision of the
trial court on the private respondents' counterclaim and in
affirming in toto the said decision.
Held:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Filinvest is liable for
damages not because it commenced an action for replevin to
recover possession of the truck prior to its foreclosure, but
because of the manner it carried out the seizure of the vehicle.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court are very clear
and direct as to the procedure for the seizure of property under
a writ of replevin. In the instant case, it was not the sheriff or
any other proper officer of the trial court who implemented the

writ of replevin. Because it was aware that no other person
can implement the writ, Filinvest asked the trial court to
appoint a special sheriff. Yet, it used its own employees who
misrepresented themselves as deputy sheriff to seize the truck
without having been authorized by the court to do so.
The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess
himself of the mortgaged property with violence and against
the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the creditor's
right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of default, and
the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of
controversy. To allow the creditor to seize the property against
the will of the debtor would make the former to a certain extent
both judge and executioner in his own cause.
Upon the default by the mortgagor in his obligations, Filinvest,
as a mortgagee, had the right to the possession of the
property mortgaged preparatory to its sale in a public auction.
However, for employing subterfuge in seizing the truck by
misrepresenting its employees as deputy sheriffs and then
hiding and cannibalizing it, Filinvest committed bad faith in
violation of Article 19.
Moreover, as for the actual damages, the spouses only
incurred damages worth P 33,222, not P 50,000 so the
petitioner may only be held liable for such amount and the
award for Moral and Exemplary damages are justified due to
the total disregard of the petitioner of the Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code while returning the truck.
3
3. UE vs Jader ALBOTRA, Angela
Facts: ​Jader was a law student of the UE College of Law. For
getting an incomplete grade in his Practice Court I, he took a
removal exam for the same. Unknown to him, however, he
was given a failing grade. But still, he was included in the list
of graduates and was able to enroll at the pre-bar review
class. Later, he learned of his deficiency and thus, dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.
Jader filed an action for damages against the university and
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in his favor.
Issue: ​Whether or not an educational institution may be held
liable for a suit of abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case
Held: ​YES. Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the
result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when
he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good
faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right
under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The institution of learning involved herein is a university which
is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it
inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of
good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in
the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his
grade. It cannot feign ignorance that the respondent will not

prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It
failed to act seasonably.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students
of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire
from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected
by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.
4. Sea Commercial vs CA
ALVAREZ, Maria Arielle Samantha Tugade
FACTS​: SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of
selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products and
equipment. SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership
agreement as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of
Iloilo and Capiz and to make the dealership agreement on a
non-exclusive basis.
During the agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of
P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action
to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s fees.
In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII
contracted to sell 24units of Mitsubishi power tillers to FSDC,
which fact JII allegedly made known to SEACOM, but the latter
taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went
directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold 21 units of said
tractors with much lower prices, thereby depriving JII of
unrealized profit of P85,415.61. However, SEACOM, not
4
satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the market,
joined the competition even as the against the latter
ISSUE​: Whether SEACOM acted in bad faith when it
competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm
machineries to FSDC.
HELD​: Yes. Even if the dealership agreement was amended
to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not
exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping
with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability
under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil
Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the
succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody
certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order.” What is sought to be written into the law is the
pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.
SC accordingly resolves to affirm the award for unrealized
profits. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court failed to
specify to which the two appellees the award for moral and
exemplary damages is granted. However, in view of the fact
that moral damages are not as a general rule granted to a
corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who
testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his mental
anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM “dealt
with us behind (our) backs”, the award should go to defendant
Jamandre, President of JII​.

5. HSBC vs. Catalan BASARAN, Mariel Factoriza
Facts: ​Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to
Cecilia Catalan in the total amount of HK$3.2 million.
Catalan presented these checks to HSBC.
The checks were dishonored for having insufficient funds.
Thomson demanded that the checks be made good because
he, in fact, had sufficient funds. Catalan knowing that
Thomson had communicated with the Bank,asked HSBC Bank
to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did
not heed her.Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The
account was transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then
requested Trustee to pay her.
They still refused and even asked her to submit back to them
the original checks for verification.
Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own
expense to personally submit the checks. They still were not
honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against HSBC to collect
her HK$3.2M
Respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against petitioner HSBANK due to
HSBANK’s alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five
HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson
(Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00 ​Summons were
served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I, Ayala
Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City. HSBANK
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion
to Dismiss dated February 21, 2001. 4 Then, it filed a Motion
to Dismiss, dated March 8, 2001, on the grounds that (a) the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint; Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading
petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking
5
Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of action.
Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC
TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, dated October 29, 2001, questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it.
HSBC TRUSTEE alleges that tender of summons through
HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over
it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from
HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or
in any other place in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized
HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no
resident agent upon whom summons may be served because
it does not transact business in the Philippines.
Issues: ​Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to
pay damages to Catalan on the ground of Abuse of right under
Article 19 of the Civil Code
Held: Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the
fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a
person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith." It sets the
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties.
Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle,
three elements must concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
 6

HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the
checks notwithstanding the repeated assurance of the drawer
Thomson as to the authenticity of the checks and frequent
directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan.
Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of
HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident
failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its continued inaction
and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its
part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which
it may be held liable to Catalan for any damages she incurred
resulting therefore.
HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod
City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 01-11372 against the HSBC International
Trustee Limited, and all its orders and issuances with
respect to the latter are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED
to DESIST from maintaining further proceedings against
the HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case
aforestated

HSBANK’s actions or lack thereof, prevented Catalan from

seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery of her
claim while the latter was alive

HSBANK is not being sued on the value of the check itself but
for how it acted in relation to Catalan's claim for payment
despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to
recognize the check the latter issued.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14,

2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.

The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari ofthe
 7

6. NAPOCOR vs. CA BAUTISTA, Ronald 8. Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan CANTOLINO, Jerico Art
Facts: ​Pobre owned a resort subdivision wherein portions of Pacis
said property were leased and expropriated by NAPOCOR. Facts:
During the pendency of expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR Issues
dumped toxic wastes in their occupied portions which altered Held:
topography of the whole subdivision resort. Subsequently, the
proceedings were dismissed and the property was returned. 9. Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio Cabansag
However, Pobre claimed that the whole property was no CARRASCO, John Mark Caberto
longer fit for his business due to the dumping of wastes by Facts:
NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR on the other hand claimed that it was Issues
no longer liable since the property was returned and they only Held:
dumped on the portions occupied by them. RTC and CA ruled
in favor of Pobre. 10. Hermosisima vs. CA CECILIA, Joyce Marie Del
Rosario
Issues: ​WON NAPOCOR was liable despite return of property
and dismissal of expropriation proceedings? Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a former
Held: ​Yes. ​SC ruled that even if the expropriation proceedings highschool teacher and a life insurance agent. Petitioner, who
were dismissed and the property was returned to Pobre, the was almost 10 years younger than her, and an apprentice
latter is entitled to just compensation since the act of dumping pilot. They used to go around together and were regarded as
of toxic waste by NAPOCOR on the portions of the subdivision engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior
resort altered the topography of the whole property which thereto. Intimacy developed and one evening, after coming
resulted to it being no longer fit for business nd in turn causing from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin M/V
injury to the landowner. "Escaño," to which he was an apprentice pilot. Soledad
advised the petitioner that she was pregnant with their child,
7. Carpio vs. Valmonte BRITANICO, Christian Carlo whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Panambo Hermosisima, was born. However, subsequently, the
Facts: defendant married one Romanita Perez. Soledad Cagigas filed
Issues with said court a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
Held: child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as
well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child

and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied
having ever promised to marry the complainant.
The court sentenced the petitioner to pay such damages.
Issues: ​Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our
laws, for breach of promise to marry
Held: ​NO. ​The Supreme Court held that no moral damages
can be had in the instant case because it was the woman who
virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him
because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her
love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".
11. Ponce vs. Legaspi CORTEZ, Charisse Iva
Rodique
Facts: ​Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of
the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR).
48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter. The allegations of
petitioner states that during the time while respondent Atty.
Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred
fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers;
that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport
Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still
used the office space, equipment and goodwill of L’NOR. On
account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for
estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for
8
Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect
L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment
against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was
granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
Issues: ​WON the complaint for damages should prosper.
Held: ​NO. Generally, malicious prosecution refers to
unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include
unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious
prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A
disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character
and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for
malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable
cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case
at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in
appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled
L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect,
constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the
petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that
YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself
some of L'NOR's business, then we find that ​she had
probable cause to file the disbarment suit. The existence of
probable cause defeats the action for malicious prosecution.
Therefore, Atty. Legaspi is not entitled to damages.
12. Medel vs. CA DAWIS, Bianca Denise De Castro
Facts​: Servando Franco and Leticia Medel obtained a loan
from Veronica Gonzales in the amount of P50,000, payable in
two months. Veronica gave only P47,000 to the borrowers, as
she retained P3,000, as advance interest for one month at 6%
per month. They obtained again a loan from Veronica in the
amount of P90,000, payable in two months, at 6% interest per

month. Servando and Leticia executed two promissory notes
to evidence the loadn. However, on maturity of the two
promissory notes, the borrowers failed to pay the
indebtedness. Thereafter, Servando and Leticia secured from
Veronica still another loan in the amount of P300,000,
maturing in one month, secured by a real estate mortgage.
Like the previous loans, however, Servando and Leticia failed
to pay the third loan on maturity. Hence, together with Leticia’s
husband, they consolidated all their previous unpaid loans,
and sough from Veronica another loan, bringing their
indebtedness to a total of P500,000. They executed a
promissory note, which states that the interest rate is 5.5% per
month with additional service charge of 2% per annum, and
penalty charge of 1% per month.
On maturity of the loan, the borrowers failed to pay the
indebtedness, plus interests and penalties. Hence, Veronica
filed a complaint for collection of the full amount of the load
including interests and other charges. In their separate
answer, Leticia and Rafael alleged, among others, that the
interest rate is excessive.
The lower court declared that the interest charged by Veronica
on the loans was unconscionable and revolting to the
conscience. Hence, the trial court ruled that the legal rate of
interest of 12% per annum should be applied. The CA, on the
other hand, reversed this decision.
Issues​: Whether the rate of interest is valid
Held​: NO. Although the rate cannot be considered as usurious
because the Usury Law is now legally inexistent, the Court
9
found the interest at 5.5% per month, or 66% per annum,
stipulated by the parties in the promissory note
unconscionable, and, hence, contrary to morals, if not against
the law. The stipulation is therefore void.
Consequently, the courts shall reduce equitably liquidated
damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if
they are unconscionable. Under the circumstances, interest at
12% per annum, and an additional 1% per month penalty
charge as liquidated damages may be more reasonable​.
13. Perez vs. CA DE JESUS, Maria Cristel Cuyas
Facts:
Petitioner Juan Perez, together with Maria, Fructuosa, and
Victoria Perez, and Apolonio Lorenzo and Vicente Asuncion, is
a usufructuary of a parcel of land popularly called the “Papaya
Fishpond.” In 1975, the usufructuaries entered into a contract
leasing the fishpond to Luis Keh for 5 years and renewable for
another 5 years by agreement of the parties. Par.5 of the lease
contract states that ​the lessee “cannot sublease” the fishpond
“nor assign his rights to anyone.”
Private respondent Luis Crisostomo (a businessman engaged
in the operation of fishponds and who only reached 5th grade)
was persuaded by his friend Ming Cosim and petitioner Charlie
Lee to take over the operation of the Papaya Fishpond since
Lee and his partner (petitioner Luis Keh) were allegedly losing
money in its operation. They executed a written agreement
denominated as “pakiao buwis” whereby Crisostomo would
take POSSESSION of the fishpond from Jan. 6 to June 6,

1978 in consideration of P128K. Crisostomo paid the amount
only after he had received a copy of a WRITTEN
AGREEMENT whereby Keh ceded, conveyed, and transferred
all his “rights and interests” over the fishpond to Lee “up to
June 1985” as he was uncertain to Keh and Lee’s right to
transfer possession. Private respondent incurred expenses for
repairs/improvement of the fishpond. In 1979, petitioners
Tansinsin and Juan Perez (in the company of men bearing
armalites) went to the fishpond and presented to PR Luis
Crisostomo a LETTER (June 7, 1979) showing that petitioner
Luis Keh had SURRENDERED possession of the fishpond to
the usufructuaries. Crisostomo filed with CFI of Bulacan an
ACTION FOR INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES: due to the
THREAT of depriving him of earnings that the 700K milkfish in
the fishpond would yield AND the REFUSAL of petitioners
KEH, Juan PEREZ, and LEE to accept the rental for June 5,
1979 - June 6, 1980. He also prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining defendants Keh, Perez, and Lee
from entering the premises and taking possession of the
fishpond​. He also prayed that ACTUAL damages of 50K,
MORAL damages of P20K, EXEMPLARY damages, and
atty’s fees of 10K. The CFI granted the prayer for restraining
order. In 1980, the court LIFTED the restraining order thereby
effectively DEPRIVING PR of possession over the fishpond.
The lower court concluded that the defendants conspired with
one another to exploit the plaintiff’s naivete and educational
inadequacies, and to defraud him by INDUCING him into
taking possession of the Papaya Fishpond in their hope that,
as soon as the plaintiff (applying his known expertise as a
successful fishpond operator) shall have IMPROVED the
fishpond, they will regain possession of the premises and offer
10
the lease to OTHER interested parties at MUCH higher rental
rates.
CA AFFIRMED the decision. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari of the CA’s decision affirming RTC-Bulacan’s
decision.
Issue: ​W/N private respondent is entitled to damages after the
petitioners tried to deprive him of the possession of the
fishpond in 1979
Held: ​YES. The law supports the awards of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondent and against
the petitioners. Art. 21 states that “any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. [Exemplary damages shall likewise be
awarded pursuant to Art. 2229 of the NCC.]
In the case at bar, the petitioners had a ​conspiratorial
scheme (to utilize private respondent's expertise in the
operation of fishponds) to bail themselves out of financial
losses satisfactorily establishes a violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code and therefore private respondent should be
entitled to an award of moral damages.
Petitioner Keh himself violated the lease contract which
prohibits him, as LESSEE, from subleasing the fishpond to
private respondent who is a third party. He executed a
document transferring his rights and interests over the
fishpond to LEE. By virtue of that document, ​Crisostomo

ACCEDED to take over KEH’s rights as a lessee of the
fishpond.
Petitioner Keh ​led private respondent to unwittingly
INCUR EXPENSES to improve the operation of a fishpond​.
Pet Keh must be liable to PR for the value of the
improvements he had made in the fishpond.
14. Investors Finance Corporation vs. Autoworld
DEYTO, Maria Alyssa Beatriz Fetalino
Facts: Investors Finance Corp, then known as FNCB Finance,
is a financing company doing business with Autoworld.
Anthony Que is the president of Autoroworld and also holds
the same position at its affiliate corporation, Barretto Realty
Corp.
Anthony Que in behalf of Autoworld, applied for a direct loan
with FNCB which was denied. Later, FNCB’s Assistant Vice
President, informed Que that although it could not grant loans,
it could extend fund to Autoworld by purchasing any of its
outstanding receivables at a discount
Issues: ​Whether the transaction was moral? No. Usurious
Held: ​The law will not permit a usurious loan to hide itself
behind a legal form. circumstances confirm that the
P6,980,000.00 was really an indirect loan extended to
AUTOWORLD so that it could settle its previous debts to
petitioner.
11
In usurious loans, the creditor can always recover the principal
debt. However, the stipulation on the interest is considered
void thus allowing the debtor to claim the whole interest paid
the pari delicto rule does not apply to usury cases which entitle
the borrower to recover the whole interest paid; otherwise, the
avowed policy of discouraging usurious transactions would not
be served, for the mere invocation of the pari delicto rule
would allow the usurer to reap the benefits of his unlawful act.
15. Silvestre Pascual vs. Ramos DOLOT, Paolo Tanayer
Facts:
Respondent Ramos filed with the Trial Court a petition for
consolidation of title contending that such properties have
been sold to him by the latter through a Deed of Absolute
Sale. The Pascuals argue that the contract between them was
not a DoA but a REM. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the
spouses Pascual. Ramos filed a MR contending that the
spouses Pascual were still due to pay him ₱793,000 for the
initial sum of the loan and total interest due from 3 June 1987
to 3 April 1995 at 7% per month. The Trial Court ruled in favor
of Ramos. Herein petitioners filed for an MR, opposing the
decision of the Trial court, which was denied. The CA, during
appeal, affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
petitioners thus filed present case, which assails the CA
decision wherein they invoke the ruling in Medel v. Court of
Appeals, arguing that the 5% per month interest is excessive.

Issues:
Whether they are liable for unpaid interest from 3 June 1987 to
3 April 1995.
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the spouses Pascual can no longer
raise the issue of the validity of the interest rate at this stage
as they never opposed the same during the earlier stages of
the trial. The Court likewise held that the ruling in Medel is
inapplicable in the present case as rate of 5.5 % per month
was put in issue by the defendants in the Answer and was
likewise accompanied by other charges.
Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides that “in all
contractual, property, or other relations, if one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
In this case, there is nothing from the records and, in fact,
there is no allegation showing that petitioners were victims of
fraud when they entered into the agreement. Nor were the
petitioners at a disadvantage on account of their moral
dependence, ignorance, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, which would entitle them to the vigilant protection of
the courts. The interest agreed upon was ruled to be binding
upon them.
16. Wassmer vs. Velez ESNARA, Jessica
12
Facts:
Issues
Held:
17. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Marilou Gonzales
FERNANDEZ, Erika Mae Delos Santos
Facts:
Petitoner Gashem is an Iranian exchange student who was
taking a medical course at Lyceum in Dagupan City. He met
with respondent Marilou who he courted and proposed to
marry her. Marilou accepted his love and they agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester. Gashem visited
Marilou’s parents and secured their approval to the marriage.
Gashem forced Marilou to live with him. She was a virgin
before she began living with him. Thereafter, Gashem’s
attitude towards her change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her. For this reason, Marilou reported him to the barangay
captain causing Gashem to cancel their wedding and that he
was already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Hence,
Marilou filed this case for damages.
Issues
Whether or not Marilou may claim damages for a breach of
promise to marry?
Held:
Yes. Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong, however, where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying

her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. Article 21 states, “Any person who willfully cause
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.” In this case, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise. In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction. Gashem violated the Filipino’s concept of morality
and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for
their women. Pari delicto rule does not apply in this case
because the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
moral seduction. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." . At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
18. Pecson vs. CA GAYED, Hadiya May Domingo
Facts: ​Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a
commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on
which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For
his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to twelve thousand
13
pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the
City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who
in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents,
the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one
hundred three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).
The petitioner challenged the validity the auction sale before
the RTC, but it was dismissed; as for the private respondents’
claim that the building was included in the sale, the court ruled
that it was not the subject of litigation.
Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. In its decision, the CA held that ​“Indeed, examining
the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land —
without the apartment building — which was sold at the
auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes due thereon.”
The private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for
delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building,
citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. The RTC held that, the
respondents shall reimburse petitioner the amount he spent in
constructing the building, the petitioner shall pay respondent
rent, and that the amount shall be offset from the rents paid to
petitioner from June 1993-September 1993; during his
occupancy.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order, but it
was not acted upon by the trial court; instead, it issued a writ
of possession directing the deputy sheriff “to place said
movant Nuguid in possession of the said property.”
Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action assailing the
order of the trial court. The CA held in part the assailed

decision by pointing out that the trial court erred in holding that
Nuguid is the uncontested owner and that the petitioner should
pay him the rent. Article 546 of the Civil Code provides that
“The right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed of
the cost of the improvements, because, basically, the right to
retain the improvement while the corresponding indemnity is
not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land
on which they are built.” A right which is available to the
petitioner; the CA also held that the amount shall be
accountable for the fruits of the improvements received by him
starting on June 1993.
Hence, petitioner files this petition.
Issues: ​Whether or not Articles 448 and 556 of the New Civil
Code are applicable to the case.
Held:
19. Security Bank and Trust Company vs. CA
HERNANDEZ, Ma. Vanessa Datul
Facts:
Issues
Held:
20. Valarao v CA LAGASCA, Raynante Jr. Pulido
Facts:
Issues
Held:
21. Grepalife vs. CA LANTO, Ben Azra King
Facts:
14
Issues
Held:
22. EPG Construction et al vs. Vigilar LIMBO, Mary
Christine Maristaza
Facts: ​A housing project in a government property was
initiated by the Ministry of Human Settlement. Said Ministry
entered into a MOA with the DPWH, where DPWH undertook
to develop the housing site and construct 145 housing units.
By virtue of this, DPWH entered into contracts with the
petitioners (contractors) for the construction of the housing
units. Under the contract, the scope of the construction and
funding covered only 2/3 of each housing unit. After complying
with the said contract, then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas
requested verbally and assured petitioners that additional
funds would be available, petitioners agreed to complete the
housing units despite the absence of appropriations and
written contracts. However, payment for the said additional
constructions was not issued by the DPWH. Petitioner then
sent a demand letter to DPWH for the payment of the unpaid
balance (P5,918,315.63), to which DPWH said that their
money claim should be forwarded to COA. Upon forwarding it
to COA, COA stated that the funds must first be made
available before they can act on the money claims. In a
memorandum, DPWH Secretary De Jesus requested Sect. of
Budget and Management to release public funds for the
payment of petitioners’ money claims. The payment for the
money claims was then released. However, the DPWH Sect.
Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims stating that
the existence of appropriations and availability of funds are
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government
contracts. THUS, the absence of the corresponding

supplemental contracts and appropriate funding, the implied
contracts with respect to the additional constructions are
considered inexistent. ​This prompted petitioners to file before
the RTC a petition for mandamus but such was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issues: ​Whether or not petitioners-contractors should be
compensated for their work and services rendered.
Held: ​Yes, the SC ruled that in the interest of substantial
justice, petitioners-contractors have the right to be
compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public
works housing project despite the absence of appropriate
funding. The construction of the housing units had already
been completed by petitioners-contractors and both the
government and the public have benefitted from the housing
project. To deny payment for their work and services rendered
would permit unjust enrichment at the expense of the
petitioner-contractor.
23. PADCOM vs. Ortigas Center MAGPARANGALAN,
Andreana
Facts:
Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter
PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office
Condominium Building (PADCOM Building). The land was
originally acquired from the by Tierra Development
Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale. Among the terms
and conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that
the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become
members of Ortigas Center Association.
15
Subsequently, the said lot, together with improvements
thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of PADCOM in a
Deed of Transfer dated 25 February 1975. In 1982,
respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (hereafter the
Association) organized to advance the interests and promote
the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term
lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center.
sought the collection of membership dues per month
from PADCOM.
corporate books showed that PADCOM owed the
Association P639,961.47, representing membership dues,
interests and penalty charges from April 1983 to June 1993.
the letters exchanged between the parties through the
years showed repeated demands for payment, requests for
extensions of payment, and even a settlement scheme
proposed by PADCOM in September 1990.
The Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money due to PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its arrears
in monthly dues, including interests and penalties thereon.
The Association averred that
purchasers of lands within the Ortigas Center complex
from OCLP are obligated under their contracts of sale to
become members of the Association.
such obligation was allegedly passed on to PADCOM
when it bought the lot from TDC, its predecessor-in-interest.
The Association presented its accountant as lone
witness to prove that PADCOM was, indeed, one of its
members and, as such, did not pay its membership dues
PADCOM contended that
it is a non-stock, non-profit association, and for them to
become a special member of the Association, it should first

apply for and be accepted for membership by the latter's
Board of Directors.
no automatic membership was apparently
contemplated in the Association's By-laws.
it could not be compelled to become a member without
violating its right to freedom of association.
since it was not a member of the Association, it was
not liable for membership dues, interests and penalties.
PADCOM did not present its evidence; instead it filed a
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence.
It alleged that the facts established by the Association
showed no right to the relief prayed for.
it claimed that the provisions of the Association's
By-laws and the Deed of Transfer did not contemplate
automatic membership.
Rather, the owner or long-term lessee becomes a
member of the Association only after applying with and being
accepted by its Board of Directors.
Assuming further that PADCOM was a member of the
Association, the latter failed to show that the collection of
monthly dues was a valid corporate act duly authorized by a
proper resolution of the Association's Board of Directors.
Issues
Whether or not there was automatic membership
created through the force of contract
Whether or not there was a violation of the right to
freedom of association
16
Held:
YES. No application for membership is necessary. As
lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association.. If
at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a ministerial
function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular
member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the
automatic membership clause annotated in the Certificate of
Title of the property and the Deed of Transfer.
NO. Neither are we convinced by PADCOM's
contention that the automatic membership clause is a violation
of its freedom of association.
Under the stipulation, ​the owner of this lot, its
successor-in-interest hereby binds himself to become a
member of the ASSOCIATION which will be formed by and
among purchasers, fully paid up Lot BUYERS, Building
Owners and the COMPANY in respect to COMPANY OWNED
LOTS.
Evidently, it was agreed by the parties that dues shall
be collected from an automatic member and such fees or
assessments shall be a lien on the property.
PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It
could have avoided such membership by not buying the land
from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land when it bought the
building with the annotation of the condition or lien on the
Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM
voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition,
and thus to join the Association.

24. David Reyes vs. Jose Lim MANDOCDOC, Marc
Renzo Dimayuga
Facts:
- Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered a
contract of sell a parcel of land located in Pasay
City. Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as
lessee.
- The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed
Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the
end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng
and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by
8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the
Contract to Sell.
- The complaint further alleged that Lim connived
with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property
until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have
accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase
price of P18,000,000.
- Harrison alleged that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the
property due to their difficulty in finding a new
location for their businesses.
- Thereafter, Lim filed his answer stating that he
was ready and willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price but Reyes kept postponing their
meeting.
17
- Reyes offered to return the 10 million down
payment to Lim because Reyes was having
problems in removing the lessee from the Property.
Lim rejected the offer.
- Subsequently, Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods
Corporation. ​Lim denied conniving with Keng and
Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.
- Reyes filed before the trial court a complaint for
annulment of contract and damages against
respondents Lim and Harrison Lumber.
- During the trial, Lim, by order, requested that
Reyes be ordered to deposit the 10 million down
payment with the cashier of RTC of Paranaque.
- Reyes filed a motion to set aside the order
because the order practically granted the reliefs
Lim prayed for in his Amended answer.
- The RTC denied the motion of Reyes.
- The CA ruled the trial court could validly issue the
assailed orders in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. The court may grant equitable reliefs to
breathe life and force to substantitve
Issue: WON the CA erred in finding the trial court could issue
the questioned order on grounds of equity when there is an
applicable law on the matter which are Rule 57-61 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure. (Rule 57 to 61 of the Civil Procedure.
(Preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership,
replevin and support pendente lite)
Held:

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
NO.
This is not a case of equity overruling a positive provision of
law or judicial rule for there is none that governs this particular
case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and
the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code
expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the
"silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." This calls for
the application of equity, which "fills the open spaces in the
law."
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may
validly order the deposit of the P10 million down payment in
court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this
case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
(Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where
a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction.​24 Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.)
18
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his
amended answer, Lim is also seeking cancellation of the
Contract to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to
deposit in court the P10 million down payment that Lim
made under the Contract to Sell. Reyes admits receipt of
the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to
deposit the amount in court. Reyes contends that prior to
a judgment annulling the Contract to Sell, he has the
"right to use, possess and enjoy" the P10 million as its
"owner" unless the court orders its preliminary
attachment.
To subscribe to Reyes’ contention will unjustly enrich
Reyes at the expense of Lim. Reyes sold to Line One the
Property even before the balance of P18 million under the
Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On
1 March 1995, Reyes signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of Deeds
issued TCT No. 134767 in the name of Line One. Reyes
cannot claim ownership of the P10 million down payment
because Reyes had already sold to another buyer the
Property for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in
his Comment dated 20 March 1996, Reyes reiterated his
offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code.
This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to
procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this principle
is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
provision of law. ​Courts can extend this condition to the hiatus
in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the
pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the
provisional remedies of the Rules of Court.

Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite,
money paid by a buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of
the sale because he has subsequently sold the same property
to another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily
offers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a
seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it
equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution,
to put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was just,
equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of
the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by
Reyes at the expense of Lim.
25. UP vs. Philab Industries, Inc. MAQUILING, Ayman
Ramil Mapantas
Facts:
Issues
Held:
26. H.L. Carlos vs. Marina Properties Inc. MERCADO, Kaye
Alexandhra Musngi
Facts:
Marina Properties entered into a contract with HL Carlos Inc.
to construct Phase 3 of a condominium complex within a
period of 365 days from receipt of Notice to Proceed. The
original completion date was May 16, 1989, but it was
extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until Nov.
30, 1989. HL Carlos instituted the case for a sum of money
19
seeking the payment of various sums for costs of labor
escalation, change order and material price escalation.
Issue:
WON Marina Properties is liable for the increased labor cost
and additional work
Held: Yes. There is unjust enrichment when a building
contractor is denied payment for increased labor cost
validly incurred and additional work validly rendered with
the owner's express or implied agreement. However, since
the Contract allows escalation only of the "labor
component," the implication is that material cost
escalations are barred. A legislated wage increase
became effective after the expiration of the original
period. Respondents are, therefore, liable for this increase
in labor cost, because they allowed petitioner to continue
working on the project until April 20, 1990 (even beyond
November 30, 1989). Under the principle of quantum
meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable
value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of
a written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.
Quantum meruit means that in an action for work and
labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the
plaintiff reasonably deserves. To deny payment for a
building almost completed and already occupied would be
to permit unjust enrichment at the expense of the
contractor.
27. Tenchavez vs. Ecano MONISIT, Rosita
Facts: ​Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, without the knowledge of her

parents. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke. The following morning, the Escaño
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid
marriage, from the standpoint of the Church. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, a letter disclosing an
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita
Noel; Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged.
Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape
from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign
the petition and the case was dismissed without prejudice
because of her non-appearance at the hearing. On 24 June
1950, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application
that she was single, that her purpose was to study, that she
was domiciled in Cebu City. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the Tenchavez in
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in
and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
court by the said tribunal. In 1951
Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop
of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor. On 10
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage. On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
20
Issues: ​WON the parents of Escano is liable for damages to
Tenchavez.
Held: No. ​There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta,
out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly can not be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
28. Concepcion vs. CA and Sps. Nicolas NATANAUAN,
Jellie Anne Suarez
Facts: ​· ​Spouses Nicolas resided in an apartment owned
by Florence “Bing” Concepcion who also resided in the
same compound were the apartment is located.
· ​Rodrigo Concepcion – brother of the deceased
husband of Florence, ANGRILY ACCOSTED
Nestor Nicolas at the latter’s apartment and
accused him of conducting an adulterous
relationship with Florence.
·​ ​He shouted “HOY NESTOR, KA PA NI BING!.....”
· ​Nestor
felt extreme embarrassment and shame to
the extent that he could no longer face his
neighbors.

· ​So he filed a case for damages which was granted
and affirmed by the CA.
· ​Petitioner contended that the act imputed to him
does not constitute any of those enumerated in
Articles 26 and 2219 of the civil code.
Issues: ​W/N there is bases in law for the award of damages
to private respondents.
W/N the contention of Concepcion is correct.
Held: ​· ​violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not
exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other
similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable
for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.​12
· ​Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages
which include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable
of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.
· ​There is no question that private respondent
Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioner's abusive, scandalous and insulting
language.
21
ART. 26 Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a COA for damages,
prevention and other relief:
1.​ ​Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
2. ​Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
3. ​Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from
his friends;
4. ​Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect or other personal
condition.
29. Navarette vs. CA OBE, Lady Danica Arellano
Facts:
Issues
Held:
30. Marquez vs. Desierto PALLERA, Andrea Nicole
Caimol
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from
respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to produce several
bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative

to various accounts maintained at the bank where petitioner is
the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are
involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman. Marquez
agreed to an in camera inspection but later wrote to the
Ombudsman that she could not comply with it since the
accounts in question could not readily be identified. Marquez
asked for time to respond to the order but the Ombudsman
issued an order directing him to produce the said bank
documents and stated that her persistent refusal to comply is
unjustified and is punishable as indirect contempt. Petitioner
received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt.
Petitioner filed an opposition on the ground that it was
premature to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner
stated that she merely wanted to be clarified as to how she
would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,
particularly RA. No. 1405.
Issue: ​Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an
in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A.
No.1405).
Held: ​No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed,
there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the account must be clearly identified, and the
inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending
case. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and it may cover
only the account identified in the pending case. In the case at
bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Clearly, there was no pending case
22
in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account
for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code punishes several acts of meddling
and prying into the privacy of another as actionable torts.
It also holds public officers or employees or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal
Code and special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property
Code likewise punishes invasion of privacy.
31. St. Louis Realty vs. CA and Aramil ROMERO, Erica
Bianca Amerna
Facts:
Issues
Held:
32. Phimco vs. City of Cebu SALLIMAN, Jimael
Salam Datumanong
Facts: ​In 1960, Respondent Cebu City approved Ordinance
No. 279 which imposes a sales tax of 1% on gross sales,
receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered, exchanged or
manufactured in the city. Section 9 therein provides that
deliveries of goods or commodities stored in Cebu City, or if
not stored are sold, shall be considered as sales and shall be
taxable. Petitioner Philippine Match Co is engaged in the
manufacture of matches. It ships cases of matches from

Manila to its branch office in Cebu City for storage, sale and
distribution within the Cebu branch and the Vis-Min region.
Petitioner paid under protest to the city treasurer of
respondent, assailing the legality of the tax which the city
treasurer collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches,
specifically: (1) those sales booked and paid in Cebu City but
shipped to customers outside the city; (2) those transfers of
matches to salesmen of different agencies outside the city;
and (3) those shipments to provincial customers pursuant to
salesmen’s instructions. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint
praying that the ordinance be declared partially void, that
respondent be ordered to refund petitioner the excess sales
tax paid, and that respondent’s city treasurer be ordered to
pay damages. The lower court sustained the tax on sales
booked and paid in Cebu City although shipped to customers
outside the city, holding that the sales were consummated
inside the City because delivery to carrier in the city is deemed
delivery to customers outside the City. However, the lower
court invalidated the tax on the two other specific classes,
characterizing those transactions as “storage tax” rather than
sales tax, and that the sales were consummated outside the
city. Petitioner appealed the portion of decision upholding the
tax on sales to customers outside the city, and also the
dismissal of claim for damages against the city treasurer.
Petitioner bases his claim on Articles 19, 20, 21, 27 and 2229
of the New Civil Code, arguing that the treasurer refused and
neglected without just cause to perform his duty and to act
with justice and good faith. Petitioner faults the treasurer for
not following the opinion of the city fiscal as legal adviser of
the city.
23
Issue: ​Whether or not the city treasurer is liable for damages
pursuant to human relations provisions.
Held: ​No. Article 27 of the New Civil Code provides that “any
person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to disciplinary
administrative action. Said provision presupposes that the
refusal or omission of a public official is attributable to malice
or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said that
the city treasurer acted wilfully or was grossly negligent in not
refunding to petitioner the taxes which it paid under protest on
out-of-town sales of matches. Furthermore, in previous
jurisprudence, it has been held that an erroneous
interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it
amount to bad faith which would entitle an aggrieved party to
an award for damages. In this case, the city treasurer honestly
believed that he was justified under the tax ordinance in
collecting sales tax on out-of-town deliveries given that the
office was located in Cebu City and the orders and sales were
filled up and reported to said office. Therefore, the city
treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in
consonance with his bona fide interpretation of tax ordinance.
Ruling: Wherefore, trial court’s judgment affirmed.
33. Spinner vs. Hesslein Corporation SANCHEZ,
Honorio Jr. Narne
Facts:
Issues
Held:
 24

currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad

34. Manila Oriental Sawmill Co. vs. NLRC SANTIAGO, valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not
Emily Joie Turingan be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA
Facts: 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,”
Issues “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
Held: manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
35. Lim vs. Ponce De Leon SANTOS, Juan Carlo Levanza cigarette brands were already covered.
Facts:
Issues In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune
Held: contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
36. Rama vs. CA SERQUIÑA, Mary Jashmin Gombio process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
37. Aberca vs. Ver, et al SUERTE, Althea Manzares
38. MHP Garments, Inc vs. CA SY, Julius Victor For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that
Encarnacion respondent has no cause of action against her because she
39. Obra v CA TIBAJIA, Mary Joyce Alvaro issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function
40. German vs. Barangan TOLENTINO, Ma. Micaela and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she
Santana Geronia acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
41. Habana vs. Robles VIOLETA, Olivia Althea latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended
Estrella that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith.

42. Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco (2007)
VITORILLO, Justine Emata
Facts:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the
CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article
32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with
malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which Issues:

provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge
of the functions of his/her office
Held:
The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as
it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages
in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which,
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness
or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
25
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
43. Daywalt vs. Corporation De Los Padres Agustinos
Recoletos ABLAO, Ada Nadeen Dimaano
Facts:
- Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she
obligated herself to convey to plaintiff Daywalt a tract of
land. They agreed that a deed should be executed as
soon as a Torrens certificate is issued to Teodorica.
- They entered into another conract (deed of
conveyance) upon a court decree recognizing the right
of Teodorica to the said land.
- During an official survey of the area, Teodorica found
out that the tract inclosed in the boundaries was larger
than what was stated in the contract. So Teodorica
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the
purchaser.
- Daywalt then filed an action for specific performance
which was granted, and Teodorica was ordered to
convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to
their contract.
- Meanwhile, Defendant La Corporacion de los Padres
Recoletos is a religious corporation. They own a parcel
of land that is adjacent to the property of Teodorica.
- When defendant sold their parcel of land it was
necessary to bring the cattle off the property and so a
certain Fr. Sanz, entered into an arrangement with

Teodorica to transfer the herds of cattle to the land she
sold to Daywalt, which she still retained at the time.
- Daywalt filed an action to recover from defendant
corporation a sum of money (P24,000) as damages for
the use and occupation of the land in question by
reason of the pasturing of cattle
- RTC held that defendant was liable for damages but
fixed the amount to 2,400. Which the plaintiff appealed.
- Daywalt’s Second cause of action seeks to recover
500k as damages on the ground that the corporation
unlawfully induced Teodorica to refrain from performing
her part of the contract in the sale of the land and
withhold delivery to the plaintiff.
- CAUSE OF ACTION: derived from WRONGFUL
INTERFERENCE. [cannot be recovered from the
defendant]
Issue:
Whether or not defendant, who is not a party to the contract for
the sale of the land, may be liable for damages to the vendee
for colluding with the vendor to breach the latter’s obligation to
deliver the land. - NO
Ruling:
- The court ruled that there was no bad faith on the
part of the defendant and it did not collude with the
vendor to breach the latter’s contract.
- Art. 1902 – any person who by an act or omission
characterized by fault or negligence causes
damage to another shall be liable for the damage
so done.
26
- The court ruled that a person is liable for damages
done to another by any culpable act.
- “culpable act” – any act which is blameworthy when
judged by accepted legal standards.
- The court juxtaposed the seemingly opposing ideas
of 1902 and 1257 - contracts are only binding
between the parties. They can be reconciled by
distinguishing the two (they did not further
elaborate on this)
- One thing is for certain: The stranger cannot
become more extensively liable in damages for the
nonperformance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger
liable for damages in excess of those that could be
recovered against the immediate party would be
unjust.
- In this case, the liability of defendant corporation
cannot exceed that of teodorica.
- So the court considered the extent of the liability of
Teodorica.
- The liability of Teodorica was already decided in
the action for specific performance against her –
the damages were already claimed and exhausted
in that suit.
- But since Teodorica did not interpose the defense
of res judicata, the court did not consider such
case.
- Damages – 2 types recoverable in case of breach
of contract – ​ordinary and natural damages
(found in all breaches of contract with no special
circumstances to distinguish the case specially

from other contracts) AND ​special damages
(some other external factors should be considered)
- Before the special damages may be recovered –
plaintiff must show that these particular conditions
which made the damage a possible and likely
consequence of the breach were known to the
defendant at the time the contract was made.
- Therefore plaintiff cannot recover from defendant –
o special damages which were not within
contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made; and
o said damages are too remote to be the
subject of recovery.
- Art. 1314 “any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to
the other contracting party.
- Even if the defendant’s officials may have
advised Teodorica to not carry the contract into
effect would not constitute actionable
interference with such contract.
- Court ruled that the defendant corporation believed
in good faith that the contract between Teodorica
and Daywalt was unenforceable. Therefore any
advice they may have given to her was not
motivated by an improper motive.
- Emphasis on Art. 19 - Any person, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performances of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
44. Laforteza vs. Machuca AGCOPRA, Ronna Mae Castro
27
Facts:
A house and lot located in Parañaque, Metro Manila was being
sold by the heirs of the late Francisco Laforteza to the
respondent for P 630,000 under a Memorandum of Agreement
denominated as a Contract to Sell. The said agreement stated
that Machuca must pay P 30,000 as earnest money and the
remaining balance will be paid upon issuance of the new
certificate of title in the name of Francisco Q. Laforteza and
upon execution of an extra-judicial settlement of the
decedent’s estate with sale in favor of the buyer. It also stated
that upon issuance of the new title, the buyer shall be notified
in writing and shall have 30 days to pay the balance upon
execution of the extra-judicial settlement with sale.
Machuca then paid P 30,000 as earnest money plus rentals for
the subject property. It was only on September 18, 1989 when
the heirs notified the plaintiff about the reconstituted title and
advised him to produce the P 600,000 balance. One month
after, Machuca sent a letter requesting for an extension of 30
days or until November 15, 1989 to pay for the remaining
balance which was allowed by one of the attorney-in-fact of
the heirs. On November 15, 1989, Machuca informed the heirs
that he already had the balance covered by a Manager’s
Check from UCPB. However, the heirs refused to accept the
said balance and told him that the property is no longer for
sale. Machuca reiterated his request to tender payment but the
heirs insisted on the rescission of the Memorandum of
Agreement. Thereafter, Machuca filed an action for specific
performance to which the court decided in his favor. The
petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals which only
affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court
granting Machuca P 50,000 as moral damages.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners are in bad faith to make them liable for
moral damages.
Held:
The Court of Appeals correctly found the petitioners guilty of
bad faith and awarded moral damages to the respondent. As
found by the said Court, the petitioners refused to comply with
their obligation for the reason that they were offered a higher
price therefor and the respondent was even offered
P100,000.00 by the petitioners' lawyer, Attorney Gutierrez, to
relinquish his rights over the property. The award of moral
damages is in accordance with Article 1191 of the Civil Code
pursuant to Article 2220 which provides that moral damages
may be awarded in case of a breach of contract where the
defendant acted in bad faith. The amount awarded depends
on the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of
each case. Under the circumstances, the award given by the
Court of Appeals amounting to P50,000.00 appeared to be fair
and reasonable.
45. So Ping Bun vs. CA ALBOTRA, Angela
FACTS: ​Tek Hua Enterprises is the lessee of Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc. in the latter's premises in Binondo but it was So
Ping Bun who was occupying the same for his Trendsetter
Marketing. DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises
informing the latter of the increase of 25% and 30% of the rent
with new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that
failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be
deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part, and
agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents
28
did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts
were not rescinded. Later, Mr. Manuel Tiong asked So Ping
Bun to vacate the premises but the latter refused and entered
into formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. In a suit for
injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of
the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner, and for
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents
and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: ​Whether there was tortuous interference on the part of
So Ping Bun
RULING: Y​ES. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the
third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference
of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for
the property of others, and a cause of action may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may
pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to
violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us,
petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute
lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly,
and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three
elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in
the instant case.

46. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Leobrera
ALVAREZ, Maria Arielle Samantha Tugade
Facts​:
• Petitioner Carlos Leobrera was granted an
P800,000.00 credit facility by private respondent Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI for short)
• Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate
three-year term loan in the amount of P500,000.00
evidenced by Promissory Note
• Upon maturity of the 90-day notes BPI and Leobrera
negotiated, albeit unsuccessfully, on the terms of their
renewal. BPI demanded the full payment of the loan.
Leobrera failed to settle his loan account thus BPI
prepared to foreclose the real estate mortgages securing
the same.
• Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, petitioner
filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Complaint," attaching
thereto the supplemental complaint. Which was granted
by the RTC.
• petitioner’s main cause of action in the original
complaint concerned BPI’s threat to foreclose two real
estate mortgages securing the two 90-day promissory
notes executed by petitioner i. Petitioner alleges that this
threatened foreclosure violated the terms of the 1980
amicable settlement between BPI and petitioner.
• The supplemental complaint on the other hand
alleged acts of harassment committed by BPI in
unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in default and in
demanding full liquidation of the 1985 three-year term loan.
29
Issue​: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
STATING THAT THE MOTION TO ADMIT SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER DID NOT
CONTAIN A NOTICE OF HEARING OR THAT THE SAME IS
DEFECTIVE.
Held​: Yes. A supplemental complaint should, as the name
implies, supply only deficiencies in aid of an original complaint.
It should contain only causes of action relevant and material to
the plaintiff’s right and which help or aid the plaintiff’s right or
defense. The supplemental complaint must be based on
matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to
the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the
same cause of action. It cannot be used to try a new matter or
a new cause of action.
47. People of the Philippines vs. Relova: BASARAN,
Mariel Factoriza
FACTS: ​Manuel Opulencia was found by authorities to have
made illegal connections to obtain electricity for his business
and installed certain devices to lower the meter readings to the
prejudice of the City of Batangas. In fact he admitted to have
installed said connections and devices in his written statement.
The city fiscal then filed a case against Opulencia for having
violated a city ordinance. After entering a not guilty plea, he
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the

case has already prescribed since it was filed only after nine
months from the commission of the violation.
The trial court granted the motion. The fiscal then filed
another case, this time for theft under the Revised Penal
Code. Before entering his plea, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground that the filing of the second case violated
his right against double jeopardy.
The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy
because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the
approval and necessary authority from the City Government
which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was
dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of
electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia.
ISSUE: ​Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke
double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged
against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground
of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD: Yes. Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as
defense for the second offense because as tediously
explained in the case of ​Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give
two instances or kinds of double jeopardy.
30
The ​first would be th​at​ “No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and
the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable
by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall
bar to another prosecution for the same act”.
In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed
against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of
double jeopardy wherein it c​ontemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same ac​t. It further explains that even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first
charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second
charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the
fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same
act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus
making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense
should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the
same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against
Mr.Opulencia.
​ he Supreme Court decided in favor of the accused since
T
the first offense is substantially similar to the second one.
The Court said: “where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same statute
or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to
the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available only where

an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts
which the accused is said to have committed and which
are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to
the offense charged under a statute.”
The filling of a case against a person for violation of an
ordinance may be a bar to the filing of another case for
violation of a national law.
48. Manuel vs. Alfeche, Jr BAUTISTA, Ronald
Facts: ​Judge Alfeche convicted the editors and author of an
article alleging Delia Manuel as drug peddler for crime of libel,
however, the civil indemnity in the amount of 10 million
pesoswas not granted on the ground of non-payment of docket
fees.Manuel claimed that Judge Alfeche erred and damages
arising from defamation may proceed independently and
separately from criminal action and there is no need to pay
docket fees by non-specification of amounts of damages.
31
Issue: 1.)WON damages arising from defamation proceed
independently from the criminal action?
2.)WON payment of docket fees is still necessary?
Ruling: 1.)No.SC ruled that the damages are deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless there is waiver,
reservation, or prior institution of civil action. Here, the action
was deemed instituted since Delia Manuel actively participated
in the proceedings.
2.) Yes. SC ruled that the doctrine on non-payment of docket
fees applies only if there is no specified amount in the
pleading. The doctrine is not applicable since Delia Manuel
specified the amount of 10 million pesos in her pleading.
was not granted on the ground of non-payment of docket
fees.Manuel claimed that Judge Alfeche erred and damages
arising from defamation may proceed independently and
separately from criminal action and there is no need to pay
docket fees by non-specification of amounts of damages.
Issue: 1.)WON damages arising from defamation proceed
independently from the criminal action?
2.)WON payment of docket fees is still necessary?
Ruling: 1.)No.SC ruled that the damages are deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless there is waiver,
reservation, or prior institution of civil action. Here, the action
was deemed instituted since Delia Manuel actively participated
in the proceedings.
2.) Yes. SC ruled that the doctrine on non-payment of docket
fees applies only if there is no specified amount in the

pleading. The doctrine is not applicable since Delia Manuel
specified the amount of 10 million pesos in her pleading.
49. Reyes Trucking vs. People BRITANICO, Christian
Carlo Panambo
50. Bebiano M. Banez vs. Valdevilla CANTOLINO,
Jerico Art Pacis
51. MPI Employees vs. Velez MetalCARRASCO, John Mark
Caberto
52. Replum (Neplum Inc.) vs. Obreso CECILIA, Joyce
Marie Del Rosario
Facts:
The Trial Court promulgated in a Criminal Case acquitting the
accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the
public and private prosecutors were present during such
promulgation.
Petitioner, through a private prosecutor, received a copy of the
judgment. Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the judgment. Petitioner received the order of
TC denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed
Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. The Trial Court denied
Notice of Appeal as the judgment from the appeal had become
final because it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Issue: ​W/N there can be a motion of reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the judgment despite acquitting the accused on
the criminal case
32
Ruling: ​Yes. Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict
per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from
quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. There is no need
to reserve such independent civil action. ​Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and
independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same
act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil
Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since
they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission.
By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment
in a criminal case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt,
but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.
However, in this case, the notice of appeal was filed beyond
the reglementary period since such offended party, by his
mere presence, was actually notified. All the petitioner had to
do was to file a simple notice of appeal.

53. Hambon vs. CA CORTEZ, Charisse Iva Rodique
Facts: ​Petitioner George Hambon filed herein filed a complaint
for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses
he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped
him. Respondent alleged that the criminal case for Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence filed previously
against the respondent was dismissed by the court for
petitioner’s lack of interest and that the dismissal was with
respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent. the
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling that the civil
case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and
that petitioner is entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages on the ground
that the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted
with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case
carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages.
Issue: ​WON the civil action should be dismissed for failure to
make a reservation to file such action in a criminal case filed
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Held: ​YES. Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime
and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless
waived, reserved or previously instituted. A reservation must
be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery
of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. In other words, the right of the
injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes or from quasi-delict under
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they
will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Therefore,
33
Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute
the civil action for damages in the criminal case. Having failed
to do so, the civil case for damages subsequently filed by him
without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the
dismissal of criminal case, whatever civil action for the
recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.
54. Cojuangco Jr. vs. CA DAWIS, Bianca Denise De
Castro
FACTS​: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is a known
businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he
entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won
the races on various dates and winning prizes together with
the 30% due for trainer/grooms. Subsequently, Cojuangco
sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes due him.
And Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being
withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Hence,
the case was filed before the RTC. But before the receipt of
the summons, the PCGG advised PCSO that it poses no more
objection to the remittance of the prize winnings to
Conjuangco. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty.
Estelito Mendoza, Conjuangco’s counsel, by PCSO chairman
Fernando Carrasoco, Jr. However, Atty. Mendoza refused to
accept the prizes reasoning that the matter had already been
brought to court.
The trial court ruled that Carrasoco had no authority to
withhold the subject racehorse winnings of Cojuangco, since
no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the

PCGG. The trial court further ruled that, by not paying the
winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the
prosecution and harassment of Cojuangco and his family.
Hence, it ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary
damages. The CA, on the other hand, reversed the
above-mentioned ruling.
ISSUE​: Whether Carrascoso should be held liable for moral
and exemplary damages.
RULING​: NO. A public officer shall not be liable by way of
moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the
performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. In the case at bar,
Carrascoso’s decision to withhold Cojuangco’s winnings could
not be characterized as arbitrary, or even the product of ill will
or malice. He had only acted upon the PCGG’s statement that
the subject prizes were part of those covered by the
sequestration order.
However, Carrascoso should still be held liable under Art. 32
of the Civil Code. Under the said article, it is not necessary
that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of Cojuangco. (the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law)
55. Sarmiento Jr. vs. CA DE JESUS, Maria Cristel
Cuyas
34
Facts:
Gregorio Limpin, Jr. and Antonio Apostol, doing business
under the name and style of ‘Davao Libra Industrial Sales, filed
an application for an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit with
the Associated Banking Corp. in favor of LS Parts Hardware
and Machine Shop for the purchase of scrap irons. The
application was approved and the bank issued the letter of
credit in favor of LS Parts. A Trust Receipt was executed by
the applicants, and signed by petitioner Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr.
as surety/guarantor. However, they failed to comply with their
undertaking under the Trust Receipt. Demands were made for
them to comply with their undertaking but they failed to pay
their account. In 1986, a complaint for Violation of the Trust
Receipt Law was filed against them before the City Fiscal’s
Office. Petitioner Sarmiento, Jr. was dropped from the
information while Gregorio Limpin, Jr. was convicted. The
defendants in that case claimed that they cannot be held liable
since the 825 tons of assorted scrap iron, subject of the TR
agreement, were lost when the vessel sunk, and that the said
scrap were delivered to Davao...Sales” a business concern
over which they had no interest.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private
respondent Associated Banking Corp., ordering petitioner
Sarmiento, Jr. and Gregorio Limpin, Jr. to pay the bank. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s judgement.
Issues: ​W/N the bank’s right to institute separately the civil
case for the recovery of the civil liability is already barred on
the ground that the same was not expressly reserved in the
criminal action earlier filed by the bank

Held: ​Petition is denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
NO. The Court ruled that while the provisions on criminal
procedure show that the offended party is required to make a
reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action,
jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not
necessarily be express but may be implied which may be
inferred not only from the acts of the offended party but also
from acts other than those of the latter.
The Court cited specific cases demonstrative of the principle of
implied reservation of a separate civil action. The decision of
acquittal in the Vintola case expressly declared that the
remedy of the Bank is civil and not criminal in nature –
amounts to a reservation of the civil action. In Bernaldes case
and Jarantilla case, the Court ruled that the failure of the court
to make any pronouncement in its decision regarding the civil
liability must be due to the fact that the criminal action ​did not
involve at all any claim for civil indemnity and ​amounts to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a
separate action, ​respectively.
Furthermore, private respondent’s right to file a separate
complaint for a sum of money is governed by Art. 31 of the
Civil Code which states that when the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising from the act of omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
35
In the present case, private respondent's complaint against
petitioners was based on the failure of the latter to comply with
their obligation as spelled out in the Trust Receipt executed by
them. ​This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from
any criminal liability for "misuse and/or misappropriation of
goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents
or instruments released under trust receipts," punishable
under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115) in
relation to Article 315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being
based on an obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the
latter.
56. Padilla et al. vs CA DEYTO, Maria Alyssa Beatriz
Fetalino
Facts: ​Petitioners, by threat and violence, prevented Vergara
to close their stall in Camarines Norte and also forcibly and
brutally demolishing the stall and furnitures therein. They also
carried away goods and merchandise to abate what they
called nuisance per se.
CA convicted but SC acquitted them but held them liable for
damages nonetheless.
Issues: ​W/N civil liability is extinguished where acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt? No.
Held: There appear to be no sound reasons to require a
separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to
be proved in the civil case have already been established in

the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted.
Due process has been accorded.
Petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit
the crime. There was forcible opening and demolition. The
petitioners were acquitted because these ats were
denominated coercion when they properly committed some
other offense.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
57. Mansion Biscuit Co. vs CA | DOLOT, Paolo Tanayer
Facts:
Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Bros Corp, ordered
from herein petitioner wafer biscuits worth approx. 400k., to
which they issued four post dated checks worth 100k each as
payment. When the checks were deposited, all were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Respondents replaced
the checks upon notice of dishonor. However, when the new
checks were deposited, such were once again dishonored for
the same cause. This prompted petitioners to file an
information for violation of BP 22.
In a motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence, defendants
contend that the 2​nd batch of checks issued were not intended
to be used as payment but rather as guarantee for the
payment of their obligation. The motion was granted and the
36
defendants were acquitted. The prosecution then filed an
appeal to the CA, assailing the trial court's ruling absolving
defendants from civil liability in the criminal cases. Petitioner
contended that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal
cases did not necessarily extinguish their civil liability.
The CA dismissed the appeal, holding that civil liability sought
to be enforced was not a personal obligation of Ty Teck Suan
but a contractual liability of the Corporation of which Ty Teck
Suan was the president. Such liability was not litigated and
resolved in the criminal cases because the Corporation was
not a party thereto. The petitioners come to the SC,
contending that two (2) civil liabilities arose when Ty Teck
Suan insured them of payment of their obligations through the
dishonored checks, namely: (1) one arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) another arising
from tort or quasi-delict. When Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui were
acquitted in the criminal cases, only the civil liability arising
from crime was extinguished but the second liability remained.
Private respondents maintain that the petitioner must file a
separate civil action against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation
inasmuch as the latter is the real party in interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can enforce the civil liability
against private respondents.
Held:

No. The civil liability for non-payment cannot be enforced
against the private respondents because the said civil liability
was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, but rather, was the contractual liability of
the Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president. This
was admitted through the contract was executed by and
between Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, and Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, represented by the petitioners and the
respondents, respectively.
With respect to the issue of tortious liability, the court ruled that
such claim for tortious liability must be ventilated in a separate
action against the proper party.
It also ruled that the acquittal of respondents extinguished both
their criminal and civil liability and thus no civil liability arising
from the alleged delict may be awarded.
58. Heirs of Guaring vs. CA ESNARA, Jessica
59. Cruz vs. CA (and Umali)FERNANDEZ, Erika Mae Delos
Santos
Facts:
Lydia Umali was examined by petitioner Dr. Ninevetch Cruz
who found a “myoma” in her uterus and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation. Rowena Umali, the daughter of Lydia,
noticed that the clinic was untidy and asked her mother not to
proceed with the operation. However, on the following day, the
operation was conducted. First, the operation went smoothly
and Lydia was given additional blood. However, the oxygen
supply had run out causing the transfer of Lydia to San Pablo
district Hospital. She was then operated again because there
37
was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. Unfortunately,
Lydia did not make it and was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause. The heirs of Lydia Umali filed a case
against Dr. Cruz, Lydia’s anesthesiologist during the surgical
operation, of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, arising from the alleged medical
practice?
Held:
No, Dr. Cruz is not guilty of reckless imprudence but is civilly
liable. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury
applying Article 2176, it must be shown that the 'injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence
of the wrong done; there must be direct connection between
the negligence and the injury.
Elements of reckless imprudence
1. Offender does / fails to do an act.
2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary
3. Without malice
4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence

5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into
consideration offender’s employment, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time,
place
The fourth element is missing in this case. The plaintiff failed
to prove ​the breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well
as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of patient.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution
establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as the cause of
death, which may be caused by several different factors.
Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was
there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The
findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a
clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and
consequently, Lydia’s death. The Court has no recourse but to
rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’
allegation that the cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which
cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’ fault or negligence.
60. Sapiera vs. CA GAYED, Hadiya May Domingo
61. Manantan vs. CAHERNANDEZ, Ma. Vanessa Datul
62. Castillo vs. CA LAGASCA, Raynante Jr. Pulido
63. Bunag Jr vs. CA LANTO, Ben Azra King
64. People vs. Corpuz LIMBO, Mary Christine
Maristaza
65. Falgui vs. Provincial Fiscal MAGPARANGALAN,
Andreana
66. Isabelo Apa et al vs. Fernandez MANDOCDOC,
Marc Renzo Dimayuga
38
Facts:
- This is a special civil action of certiorari to set
aside orders of respondent Judge Remuldo
Fernandez, denying the petitioners for the
suspension of the arraignment in a criminal case.
- This criminal case is a prosecution for violation of
PD 772 aka Anti-Squatting Law.
- Petitioners moved for the suspension of their
arraignment on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in a different branch of the same
court.
- The trial court denied the motion and proceeded
with their arraignment.
Issue: WON the question of ownership of the Lot, which was
pending in another civil case, is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case of the
petitioners.
Held:
YES.
Prejudicial question is a questions involved in a civil action,
raised by the accused during a preliminary investigation or in a
criminal case, and which is of a nature that its resolution in the

civil case would be determinative of the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the
criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Rule 111, §5 provides:
Sec. 6. ​Elements of prejudicial question​. — The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners
occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to private
respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the
information alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of
the ​owner​, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
possession of a portion of "​her property" by building their
houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of ​her
land to her damage and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot
3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is
the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of
the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this
39
question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners
criminal liability for squatting.
In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying
the civil case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of
private respondent and her husband and declared the lot in
question to be owned in common by the spouses and the
petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and Rita
Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in
that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for
new trial, the point is that whatever may be the ultimate
resolution of the question of ownership, such resolution will be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the
criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in
question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because
they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the
land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her
family.
Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of
a land can be ejected from his property since the only issue in
such a case is the right to its physical possession.
Consequently, they contend, he can also be prosecuted under
the Anti-Squatting Law.
The contention misses the case is the essential point that the
owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some
reason, ​e.​ ​g​., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has
given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no
such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather
private respondent claims the right to possession based on her
claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question.
Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in
the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.
 40

Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided and Thelma Oliva was declared null and void. After trial of the
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may bigamy case, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the convicted the petitioner of the crime charged.
Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in Issue:
conflict with the provisions of this Code. Whether or not Dr. Mercado is liable for damages to Consuelo
Tan
Held:
In a criminal case against on for damage to another’s property, No. Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware
a civil action that involves the ownership of said property being
of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as
claimed by the former should first be resolved.
she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him.
We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on
the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore cannot claim damages in this
67. Beltran vs. People MAQUILING, Ayman Ramil
case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of
Mapantas
her act. She should have known that she would suffer
68. Mercado vs. Tan MERCADO, Kaye Alexandhra Musngi
humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
Facts:
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If
On April 10, 1976, petitioner Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado
there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are
contracted his first marriage with Ma. Thelma G. Oliva in Cebu
of her own willful making.
City. On June 27, 1991, the petitioner contracted his second
marriage with herein respondent Ma. Consuela Tan in Bacolod
69. Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis MONISIT, Rosita
City without his first marriage having been legally dissolved.
On October 5, 1992, herein respondent filed a complaint for
bigamy against the petitioner before the City Prosecutor's
Office in Bacolod City which eventually resulted in the filing of
an information on March 1, 1993, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 22 of Cebu City. On the other hand, on
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, GR No.
November 13, 1992, the petitioner instituted an action for
138509, 2000-07-31
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cebu City. In a
Facts:
Decision dated May 6, 1993, the marriage between petitioner

respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been
annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis... and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
an information for bigamy was filed against respondent
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in... the criminal case for
bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the
first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
case.
The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal
case
Petitioner... filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied.
Issues:
whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
41
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it...
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative... of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar
or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether
or not the latter action may proceed.
Its two essential elements are:... the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and... the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed... to
have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not
yet have rested its case. A challenge of the... allegations
in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is

in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code... requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly... the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous... bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack
of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of... the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such...
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on
bigamy.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void,... and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
42
No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of
an element is, the intervention of the courts must always
be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the
courts can render.
Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,... he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being...
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the
criminal case for bigamy.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code
, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said
to have validly entered into the second marriage.
a marriage though void still needs a... judicial declaration
of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise
the second marriage will also be void.
he reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar,... respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.[... gainst

this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent... entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question.
the petition is GRANTED
70. First Producers Holding Corporation vs. Luis Co.
NATANAUAN, Jellie Anne Suarez
FACTS: In a regular meeting of the Board of Directors of
the Producers Bank of the Philippines, a resolution was
adopted authorizing the corporation to purchase shares
of Manila Polo Club placed in the names of some of their
employees including Luis Co.
After the separation from service of Co, he was
demanded to transfer the subject certificate in the name
of the corporation but instead he registered the loss of
the said share with Manila Polo Club Inc. by executing a
false Affidavit of Loss and so he was able to secure a
replacement certificate in his name.
Despite the demand, Co continuously failed to deliver the
subject certificate to the corporation and to execute a
Deed of Assignment in favor of the nominee of the
corporation to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Hence, an information for estafa against him in the RTC
of Makati and another information for perjury was filed in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.
43
During the pendency of the criminal case, Co filed an
action for damages with the RTC of Makati. In the said
complaint, he claimed ownership over questioned Manila
Polo Club Proprietary Share.
The respondent contends that the issue of ownership of
the Manila Polo Club share, which was raised in the civil
action constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the
suspension of the criminal case for estafa. He argues
that his guilt or innocence may be determined only after
the prejudicial question was seasonably raised because
the Rules provide that it may be made “at any time before
the prosecution rests.”
ISSUE: W/N the criminal case should be suspended on
the ground that a prejudicial question exists.
W/N a prejudicial question exist in this case.
RULING: No. It is clear that it was merely a ploy to delay
the resolution of the criminal case. Also, the trial court
hearing the criminal case can resolve the question of
ownership. Significantly, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is ​impliedly instituted with the filing of the
criminal action. Hence, respondent may invoke all
defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal
action.

· ​The rules of evidence and procedure for the
recovery of civil liabilities are the same in both
criminal and civil cases. X
71. People vs. Consing OBE, Lady Danica Arellano
72. Bantoto vs. Bobis PALLERA, Andrea Nicole
Caimol
Facts: Appellant Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner of a
jeepney operated by him in Bacolod City through driver
Salvador Bobis. On 24 October 1948, through the driver's
negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl, Damiana
Bantoto, a daughter of appellees, inflicting serious injuries that
led to her death a few days later. The City Fiscal of Bacolod
filed an information charging Bobis with homicide through
reckless imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty. He was,
accordingly, sentenced to 2 months and 1 day of ​arresto
mayor and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs, herein
appellees, in the sum of P3,000.00.
By amended complaint, the appellees instituted the present
action against Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved)
and Crispin Vallejo seeking to have them declared solidarily
responsible for damages. Vallejo moved to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action against him, for the
reason that the amended complaint did not aver that the
driver, Bobis, was insolvent. The court overruled the motion to
dismiss. Vallejo appealed directly to this Supreme Court.
Issue: ​Whether or not there is a cause of action against
appellant Vallejo.
44
Held: Yes. The master's liability, under the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and
employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated
upon the insolvency of the latter. The insolvency of the servant
or employee is nowhere mentioned in Article 103 as a
condition precedent. Such insolvency is required only when
the liability of the master is being made effective by execution
levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master.
The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility
merely imports that the latter's property shall not be seized
without first exhausting that of the servant. This rule is logical,
for as between the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's
master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to
determine the resources and solvency of the servant or
employee.
73. Dionisio Carpio vs. Doroja ROMERO, Erica Bianca
Amerna
74. Yonaha vs. CA SALLIMAN, Jimael Salam
Datumanong
Facts: ​Accused Employee Ouano was charged with the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for hitting
Cañete, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty, and the trial court
found accused civilly liable for damages in favor of Private
Respondents Heirs of Cañete. A writ of execution was issued
for the satisfaction of the monetary award. However, the
accused manifested his inability to pay the civil obligation.
Private respondents then presented a motion for subsidiary
execution with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to
Petitioner-Employer Yonaha. The lower court then issued a

writ of subsidiary execution, but petitioner filed a motion to stay
and recall such subsidiary writ on the ground of lack of prior
notice and failure to establish employer’s liability. The lower
court denied petitioner’s motion and plea for reconsideration.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: ​Whether or not a writ of subsidiary execution may be
issued against the employer without prior notice and hearing.
Held: ​No. The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (1) the existence of
an employer-employee relationship; (2) the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4)
employee is insolvent. Although in previous jurisprudence the
Court has sanctioned the enforcement of subsidiary liability in
the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and
merely an incident in, the execution process of judgment,
execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter
of course. It is a measure of due process in favor of the
employer for the court to determine and resolve in a hearing
set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of
employer’s liability. The requirement is mandatory even when
it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted
employee cannot be satisfied. In this case, even if petitioner
did not aver exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and recall,
employer must be given his full day in court. To afford
45
employer due process, the court should hear and decide the
liability on the basis of the conditions required by law.
Ruling: ​Wherefore, order set aside. Petitioner shall be given
the right to a hearing on the motion for issuance of writ of
subsidiary execution filed by private respondents.
75. Basilio vs. CA SANCHEZ, Honorio Jr. Narne
76. Velayo, etc. vs Shell Co., of the Philippines, et al.
SANTIAGO, Emily Joie Turingan
77. Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. CA SANTOS, Juan
Carlo Levanza
78. UE vs Jader SERQUIÑA, Mary Jashmin Gombio
79. Sea Commercial vs CA SUERTE, Althea Manzares
80. HSBC vs. Catalan SY, Julius Victor Encarnacion
81. NAPOCOR vs. CA TIBAJIA, Mary Joyce Alvaro
82. Carpio vs. Valmonte TOLENTINO, Ma. Micaela
Santana Geronia
83. Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan VIOLETA, Olivia Althea
Estrella
84. Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio Cabansag
VITORILLO, Justine Emata
FACTS:
Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses
Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered
in the name of the Gomez spouses.. In October, 1991, he
received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander demanding
payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the
premises, as said property is owned by Purisima; failing which,
civil and criminal charges will be brought against him. This
demand letter was followed by another demand letter.
 46

According to Artemio, the demand letter caused him damages
prompting him to file a complaint for damages against
Purisima and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander
alleged that he merely acted in behalf of his client Purisima,
who contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio. Purisima
alleged that the lot was pat of an 800-sq. meter property
owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into
two parts. The 400-square meter lot was conveyed to the
spouses Gomez by virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf
of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children. Artemio is only renting
the property which he occupies. She only learned of the deed
of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the latter filed
the case for damages against her and Atty. Alexander.
Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same.
She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion
of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed
the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such
sale.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty.
Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the
necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over
the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of
his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever damages
are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Artemio and Atty. Alexander and Purisima

liable for damages, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

HELD:

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights

principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove

that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith
or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the
first place, there was ground for Nala’s actions since she
believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio