Ibn Sina's Theory of the God-World Relationship Fazlur Rabman Ibn Sina appears to be the fist philosopher to formulate ex: plicitly the concept of contingency in order to introduce a radical id not accept ivocated by orthodoxy, existence, he of existence can never bet the contingent can never shed its contingency even while it exists? How does our philoso- prima facie scems related to ion on our part whereby we can distinguish be- when you consider icin it anything else beside could exis. This being, which has no essence and is pure existence, is God. In fact, His existence is His very essence ‘But Ib Sina also presents the above argument from necessary and contingent existence as a standard Aristotelian type ofthe co mologieal argument. This argument tence must end up ina selénecessary, ‘we will have only the last effect (inthe presen) and che middle chai of cause-effect, but no First Cause, and, therefoce, no beginning.40 Faslur Rabon (On loser examination, the necessary-contingent and essence: existence argument of Ibn Sina reveals itself 10 be of the cosmological argument of Aristotle, Aristotle does not us rm ‘Necestary Being’ but after stating thatthe causal chain can- id almost innocently says that ‘end up in a First Cause. ‘Ar this stage, ed our that the cosmologi ‘appeac to conceive causation nical rerms. This modern process begins with Des- self vended to reduce all reality to geometry. Neither Ibn Sina, cartes, whe Aristotle nor ancient nd me ‘of course—believedin a Stoies, ts according co their own claims, believed verse was characterized by store and Spmpatbeia rather than by a for lbn Sina—and, indeed, for ancient and medieval pl as for Ibn Sina, God is hest ordet. Therefore, to criticize the cosmological argument on the ground that it arbi lly selects or locates a certain point in the chain of nd confers upon ic che status of First Cause is to total fundamental point of this philosophy. (More will be given on the details of divine teleology below.) In the meantime Sina, The phifosopher tells ts after all the proofs h he existence of God, “It is now clear that the First (Being) has neither genus, nor essence, nor nor time, nor @ match, nor a part- 1, not an opp There is no argument to prove Him, rather, He is the proof for everything. He can, however, be clearly pointed to by clear indica- "This quotation cleaely shows that the “proof” bn Sina has given are not strictly speaking proofs~for God is too manifest to be proved— but rather pointers to Him. Since there are things, then, such that when we contemplate them per se, existence forms no essential part of them, there isthe Being such that if we contemplate Him per se, His existence pre- sents itself co he necessary. When existence thus proceeds from God, the Necessary Being, to other beings, its nature is necessarily rap- 5 potentiality, for whereas the latter is destroyed by former continues simultancously with actu words, when the potential becomes actual, ito but when the contingent actually exists ieshll remains contingent: even if i exists eternally it remains eter- nally contingent. In a striking passage borings out the dif ference becween contingency and potentiality: I somethingis perso the enue of the etemal existence af something lsc it sits etal cause so long as is being persists. then its rence is ternal ts eect will algo be eternal. This kind of cause |s most deserving of being called "cause" hecausei imply prevents absolute non-existence from taking over the eet and besos perfec being the philosophers call ida, which means the bringing into being of a thing after ab solute non-existence. This i because the effect considered-in-iself ‘is absolute non-existence while exiszence comes toi rom its cause belongs ta thi Is prior for the mind not temporally to that which comes to from some- thing else. Hence every eects posterior toits nom being whee "pos- therefor, the way but rather the con be preceded by a since they are temporal “before” and “afee"~then nor ll effects are “originated” Rather, the eect tha is preceded by time must alo be preceded by motion and change as you know. But we donot quarrel about words. Now, © originated (effect) thet does not involve2 Faslur Rahman origination’), This the most excellent form ofthe bestoval of existence for inthis case) non-existence has ly heen prevented and existence has heen gen the sway ab ‘nit. IF, however, non-existence had found its way befor its exis tence, then its bringing ino being would have been impossible ex ‘cept through mater, and the power of eeation—I mean the bringing into being of something from anocher—could have been exercised upon ic only weally, faleringly and with a fash starts This passage of Ibn Sina divides reality or being into a four- tiered hievarchy. First, chere isthe division hetween the Necessary Being, God, and the contingent beings. Inthe contingent, existence suffers a dislocation or a suptute. The contingent beings are of three ‘categories. First are the Intelligences which are pure contingents; they are eternal but throughout their contingent existence, they remain ‘contingent. Their emanation or creation isthe best form of creation because they never sulfered nonexistence. Next come the celestial spheres which have bodies, although made of ethereal rather th of earthly matter. Now, although celestial spheres are material, their matter did not precede thei form i matter precedes ther forms, They es, they do move; but their motio perfec form af mation spheres ace ove (which constitutes their pezpetual prayer to God), and also imitare God and want co become like Flim. Ibn Sing’ Th 6 In light of this brief analysis, although we started from a four- tiered reality, i really turas out to be a three-tiered one, since Hoa Sina treats the Intelligences and the heavenly bodies as though they were on a par. The only difference is chat the heavenly bodies have 4 motion whereas the Intelligences are motionless. The motion of the heavenly bodies, however, is derivative and follows from their Jove of God and their attempt to imitate Him, Corcesponding to these three ranks or levels of being, Ibo Sina distinguishes beeween thece kinds of time: eterity (sari ality or pespetuity (dab Trligat Thm Sina tells us kinds of being, One of them is being in time ne “when” of things thar change and havea begs and an end, their beginning being different from thei end, Indeed, itis always passing aay andi aways in flow in «condition of apse wal. The second isa being This dar o€ pes his sort of bring encom passes time Such st) heaven eth ime, while the relationship ofthe stable with the stable; chi called sarmad ity which contains dabr or eternalin.? ly from passages Ibn Sina, that chese three categories of the three types of existents that he has distinguishe the Necessary Being, God, (2) the higher contingent beings—the Intelligences and the spheces, and (3) beings that are ever inthe cem- pporal Low. He also affirms repeatedly that if there were no world ‘of time, then dabr or ezernality would not be there ae separate from eternity but would be merely a part of eternity, since there would bbe no temporal flow and succession of moments. As things stand actually, however, eternality as to be sharply distinguished from lecernity as that part of eternity whichis related to the Bux of time,yy has to by and tused by and contained in joned by the development of estential- Islamic philosophy.# Here I compared and almost identified 'sconcepx of dabr with Proclus' notion of “perperaal becom- ing.”® There isa certain common factor between the two. Like Iba ina, Proclus places this perpersal becoming between eternity and nity. Whence comes The difference appears ro be c Ibm Sina's Theory of the God:World Relationship 45 s by proving | vis the infinitude of the Creator, the mainstay of his thsi inherited this controversy, al-Kindi cakes after Philoponus and opt for creationism. For al-Farabi, the world is eternal. A-Farabi seems to be unique among the Muslim philosophers in that, once he has proved a thesis rationally to his own satisfaction, he cares litle for he demands of the orthodox religion might be. bn Sina isthe first great Muslim philosopher who, while be- Philosophe the nature of ‘ontological hiatus or ruprare which is expressed in the doctrine*of necessity and contingency. God is uncaused, self-necessary, and in cternity; the Intelligences and the igh-God. Heavenly bodies ingen ives and , form, and matter. Since their matter does46 Faslur Rahman existence, they are also in ereral Ibn Sina offers many apol ‘of the heavenly bodies. Fust of ceded by their ne inco being and pass away. Secon inherent in them; life and energy upon them whereby they ae evemalized, even though per se they may not be evetnal since they have matter. Iris only the sublunary existemts which ‘move and change because their actual being is preceded by matter, Steieely three but four sphere. The Intl ough they move only in position and notin space, never- theless do move. Further, although the eternal motion ofthe heavens ‘occurs thanks t0 Divine Light, In eternal existence, th and they never becom ligences do not need these in uph their dependence upon God is perpetual ndependent beings after thie initial exis- teace. Accordingly, 1 have put God's existence in sar that ofthe Intelligences in dar (eternity), tht of dlavam or deratna peepetity), and tha of the eon tents ofthe sublunary woeld in zane To proceed with Ibn Sina’s acount of ceaton: We often know knowledge is derived and conceive ings that already exist in which ease our some cases we kaw a7 5 existences such. He knows Himself and what shy way of His consequences and He knows 1 good inthe entire existence proceeds. His then followed by the form of existence exactly (as it gible pattern that is with Him. This dacs nae (me~ chavically) occu, a= flows from fre. Rather, He knows how the system of goodness should ‘exist asa tealty and Fe knows tha all hs proceeds from Hion. He knows that Hs knowledge is such that from it proceeds al) exis tence according ro che plan which He knows 1 bea system of good." Ie must not be imagined rality in God's being by con these he inligiles produce a plu already being intel: ‘matter and are then would become known to a process of abstraction tus sce how we can conceive ofthe relationship ofthese le forms to God. His being, iple and composite and could not re- nity If we conceive of them as being posterior to ‘essential being and concomitants of His being, then He could ‘not remain the necessary being, since these forms, which are con- ingens, wll be attached to Hin as His posterior concomitant. If, thirdly, we assume these forms to be separate both from His being and from the being of any ocher being, and existing by themselves ian arranged and structured manner in the realm of His Lordshi then belief in Platonic forms will impose iself upon us. Finally, let us suppose that these forms exist in some Intelligence, so that whe ever God contemplates them they become imprinted in that Intel10 God in the sense that is, it will be the first to emanate from Him. Also, there e among them one which will be known to have been caused by God secondarily and derivatively. And so their actual existence ike their knowability a thatis,seriacint and causally arranged one after another. ‘Let us now consider the situation of these intelligible forms. Since they are effects of God, they form part of what God perceives fo knows Himself to be the cause or source of. We had previously said chat when God knows or contemplates a good, it comes into actual existence. Buta 5 out feom our present discus sion, that proposition can no longer be held. For what we have now seen to proceed from God is not the actual existence of these in- telligibes, but their bei because they have been ‘caused by God to exist inn nce or a Mind. Or, if we choose to call this existence of ibles ina Mind a real existence, then ‘we will be caught in an infnie regress, because these so-called x- tents will be objects of farther intellection a! infinitum, which is lection of the 00d as eal existents, We are saying here that when God igbles in Mind fr Intelligence) and they are not liable to another higher-order in- tellection. Further, their eal existence means no more than that chey are intellectious. This amounts to a statement to the effec that God lected them and therefore le inellected them, or that they have emanated fcom Him and have therefore emanated from Him, which is, of course, absurd." ‘The upshoc ofthis entize discussion is thatthe alternative chat relates God to a cor tives, and, above al avoided. For God's impossible. Thus, they must be regarded as His Sinas ‘Theory of the God5World Relationship 49 duce contingency into the very being of God, not to relate Him to a contingent. There fist only potential gible, and one contingent effect of God.!” In God, again, there is no separation between His knowledge, ree are existential identical. Fest of all, it isin us humans that power and will differ since our power is some- thing potential until itis actualized as will Actualized will is equiva- lent to an act. But in God there is nothing potent As for the identity of will wich knowledge in God's eas, this Bows from the fact that His knovledge is absolutely perfec. In our case, te concept and the act consisting of opposition, wish, will setting che physi apparatus of nerves, muscles, et, ito motion to work on matter, In the case of God, however, His very intllection of a thing gener ate its creation and actual existence, and there is no gap between though, as we have seen above, Gods intllection af a thing and its actual dow from Hira are not the same thing, The fact that God's creation of things presupposes Hi en becomes actualy in- ible, even though it be a Sina says: “The fcc hat these forms existeially proceed from Him is His very knowledge of them and His knowledge that they necessary proceed from Him ithe souzesofchei existential procession fora in; the face that le knows Himself ro be their source doesnot need a higher lord of second intllcion after His selt-intllection," necessary consequence with ie not the case that He fet lets Himself to be the originator (or source of exitensin the second place, so that He itlleets Hin0 Faslur Rahman ofthe exisents is heir very exis- ‘This selFintllection of God, Ibn Sina calls the identity of the inellector and the intelleceed par excellence, since the objects of His, inellection are not extrinsic but intrinsic to Him. In our ease, on the other hand, the objects of our intelletion stil keep something of their extrinsic character and therefore can never be completely identified with the subject so long as we remain in our body. Why does God cteate?®° “Because of His sheer generosity answers Ibn Sina. To describe the natute ofthe cre of God, we are in need of a tera which is motivation such that the effects some benefit for us. We most F some sort of gain, whether from His generosity. The common cosity'to describe the in return. Hence Ibn generous persons do yenefciaries or atleast ce satisfaction ives derive from their own act of geuer ndeed, in the very nature of God to create and to give generously, provided that from the use ofthe word ‘nature’ here we do not understand anything like the nature of natural objects, For cxample itis the nature offre wo bur, but fre burns withowx thought and a we have shown earlier, God works through inthe case of God, ae identical and do not imply a mental-physical process. Since itis in the very nature of God to be generous and to cre- ate, His eration must be eternal For if He did not eeate from eter- | Ibe Sinals Theory of the GodWorld Relationship SI ity this would mean chat He withheld His unimpeded generosicy i hence was the opposite of "generous." The theory of the eter- nity of the world is the hallmark of all Muslim philosophers except al-Kindi, while all theologians in Isam are voluneariss and place ther entire weight on the side of God's power and will. Iba Sina in his Topics states thac the problem of the eternity versus the tem- poral origin ofthe world is disputable and nether side of the issue can be demonstrably established. But in his Metaphysics and in all his philosophical works, he is clearly and decidedly on the side of the eternity of the world, calling theologians “weak-minded peo- ple." This theory of contingency, one which creates an irreparable 2p in the nature of being, his way of doing justice to what he perceives to be ‘mulation of the concept of contingency, with the the di id existence, h far-reaching phy and medieval Sade’ al sf al Arbate 11, . 6 alo pA ara (Istanbul, 1290/1873), p. 197, 9 Thi, p. 140. 10, The ne agiase Arsele chs has bee pl Rabe Lepag, 1599). See nore 6 above. 13. Kitab abhi, p. 363, lines 5-13,2 Fazlur Rabmen 20, Kitab abl, vol. 2, pp. 296-98 PART 0 Philosophical Developments and Divergent Theologies ion treats each may differ 4 philosophical Jewish and Ch Isus, can also be noted in contemporary refection ont ton of God to the