BAR

OPERATIONS 1

SUBMISSION # 5

CASE Nos. 60 - 74

Submitted by: YSABELLE M. CARDONA

LLB – IV
Palawan State University – School of Law
S.Y 2020 – 2021

Submitted to: ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS

Professorial Lecturer
 Table of Contents
60. People Of The Philippines Vs. Roger Dominguez Y Santos, Et.Al
Gr No. 229420, February 19, 2018

61. Lilia S. Duque, Et Al Vs. Sps. Bartolome D. Yu, Et Al.

Gr No. 226130, February 19, 2018

62. People Of The Philippines Vs. Augusto Gonzales Esmenio Pader, Jr. And
Marcelo Antonio
Gr No. 223113, February 19, 2018

63. People Of The Phillippines Vs. Carlos Bauit Y Delos Santos

Gr No. 223102, February 14, 2018

64. People Of The Philippines Vs. Gil Ramirez Y Suyu

Gr No. 218701, February 14, 2018

65. People Of The Philippines Vs. Ramil Galicia Y Chavez

Gr No. 218402, February 14, 2018

66. Eden Etino Vs. People Of The Philippines

Gr No. 206632, February 14, 2018

67. L.C Big Mak Burger, Inc Vs. Mcdonald’s Corporation

Gr No. 233073, February 14, 2018

68. Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) and Ternate Utilities, Inc. vs. Export Industry
Bank, Inc.
GR No. 213020, March 20, 2017
69. Republic of the Philippine, through its Trustee, the Privatization and
Management Office vs. Philippine International Corporation
GR No. 181984, March 20, 2017
70. Felix Plazo Urban Poor Settlers Community Association vs. Alfredo Lipat, Sr.
And Alfredo Lipat Jr.
GR No. 182409, March 20, 2017
71. Rodel Ortiz vs. DHL Philippines Corporation, et. Al
GR NO. 183399, March 20, 2017
72. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu
AM NO. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017
73. People of the Philippines vs. Hermie Paris y Nicolas and Ronel Fernandez
GR NO. 218130, February 14, 2018
74. Celso M.F.L Melgar vs. People of the Philippines
GR NO. 223477, February 14, 2018
60. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGER DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, ET.AL
GR No. 229420, February 19, 2018

FACTS: Venson Evangelista (victim), a car salesman, was abducted by a group of men
later pinpointed as the respondents herein. Victim’s charred remains were discovered in
Nueva Ecija. Mendila and Parulan voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and executed
extrajudicial confessions identifying respondent Dominguez Brothers as the mastermind
behind the killing. This led to the filing of an Information against Mendiola and the
respondent for Carnapping with Homicide. Two remain at large, and only Dominguez
Brothers and Miranda were apprehended.
A hearing was conducted on the prosecution’s motion that Mendiola be discharged as
an accused to become a state witness. Mendiola gave his testimony and was cross
examined by the counsel for the defense. The defense manifested that the cross-
examination was limited only to the incident of discharge, and that their party reserved
the right to a more lengthy cross examination during the prosecution’s presentation of
the evidence in chief.
Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola found dead. The RTC ruled that the
testimony of Mendiola be stricken off the record. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken of the records of
Criminal Case.
RULING: No. The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically
render his testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. Section 17, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court provides that: When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state. Evidence adduces in support of the
discharged shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for
discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will
only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the
motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already
automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal Case and admissible in evidence
pursuant to the rule.
61. LILIA S. DUQUE, et al vs. SPS. BARTOLOME D. YU, et al.
GR NO. 226130, February 19, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner Duque and her late husband were the lawful owners of the subject
property. Spouses Duque allegedly executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their
daughter, respondent Capacio who then in turn sold a portion to herein co-respondent
Sps. Yu.
Sps. Duque lodged a Verified Complaint for Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of
a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale against respondents, claiming that the
signature in the Deed of Donation was forged. Sps. Duque prayed to declare the Deed
of Donation and Deed of Sale null and void and to cancel tax declaration in the name of
respondent Yu and revive it in the name of Duque.
Respondent Capacio admitted that the signature was indeed falsified but she did not
know the author thereof. A motion for admission by adverse party was filed by
respondent requesting the admission of certain documents including Deed of Donation
and Deed of Sale. Sps. Duque failed to file a comment. By their silence, the trial court
pronounced that they were deemed to have admitted the same.
During the trial, instead of presenting their evidence, respondent Yu’s moved for
demurrer of evidence. Trial Court granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to reply to the request for admission is tantamount
to an implied admission of the authenticity and genuineness of the documents subject
thereof.
RULING: Rule 26 of the Rules of Court Section 2 provides for implied admission.
Wherein, once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material
and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15 days
within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of
the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule admits
an exception, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had
already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. In turn,
the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and,
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission. The
rationale is that the admissions by adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates
of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already
been alleged in the pleadings or else, it constitute an utter redundancy and will be
useless, pointless process which the petitioned should not be subjected to.
62. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUGUSTO GONZALES ESMENIO PADER,
JR. and MARCELO ANTONIO
GR No. 223113, February 19, 2018

FACTS: Appellant along with the accused Gonzales and Esmenio was charged with
rape in an Information. Upon arraignment appellant pleaded not guilty. Augusto and
Esmenio were at large.
AAA was on her way home when she met appellant on the road. Augusto asked her to
go with them to Uncle Viano’s house. AAA refused, so Augusto and Esmenio dragged
her to the sandpile. Then Augusto removed AAA’s clothe and Esmenio pinned her
down by holding her hands and feet. Then they raped AAA.
RTC accorded full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution, particularly
the testimony of AAA regarding how the incident happened and the specific
participation of the three accused who conspired to commit the crime against her and
the positive identification of appellant. The RTC did not accord credence to appellants
bare denials in view of the categorical and positive identification of appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: Yes. The prosecution satisfactorily established the elements of the crime of
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation. When AAA testified, she positively identified appellant as one of her rapists
and candidly narrated her ordeal. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit because when a woman, more so if she is a
minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed.
63. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES VS. CARLOS BAUIT Y DELOS SANTOS
GR NO. 223102, February 14, 2018

FACTS: In the Information, the accused appellant was charged with rape. The accused
by means of force, threat or intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of his biological daughter AAA, a minor, 12 years
old, against her will and without her consent. Accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.
AAA," a 12-year old high school student, born on September 21, 1998, is the daughter
of accused-appellant. In the early morning of July 20, 2011, while she was on her way
to the bathroom, accused-appellant suddenly held her and forced her to lie down in
their room. Accused appellant pulled down her short pants and underwear. After
removing his own pants, he placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. "AAA" felt pain in the process. She resisted but her effort was in vain. After
taking her bath, "AAA" went to school as if nothing happened. Upon the arrival of her
mother "BBB" from Cagayan, "AAA" confided to her the incident. With the help of her
aunts, the matter was reported to a barangay kagawad and then to the police station
wherein "AAA" gave her statement. After an investigation, "AAA" was sent to a doctor in
Camp Crame for genital examination.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape against "AAA," his daughter of minor age, as charged in the
Information. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of "AAA" and her positive
identification of accused appellant as her rapist. It found the testimony of "AAA"
straightforward and categorical.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: No. In the case at bar, both the trial and appellate courts uniformly found the
testimony of "AAA" in narrating the rape incident to be straightforward, clear and
convincing. We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing significant to justify
a deviation from the above-quoted general rule.
Moreover, the fact that the rooms were adjacent and divided merely by plywood and
any adjacent noise could be heard such that it was unlikely for accused-appellant to
commit the rape is of no moment. As the appellate court correctly noted: "Jurisprudence
teaches us that rape may be committed even in places where people congregate. Thus,
it is not impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated inside a room adjacent to a room
occupied by other persons, as in this case."
64. People of the Philippines vs. GIL RAMIREZ Y SUYU
GR No. 218701, February 14, 2018

FACTS: In an Informations, appellant (father of AAA) was charged with rape and
violation of RA 7610.
AAA" was born to "BBB," her mother. When "AAA" was only seven years old, and while
"BBB" was out of their house, appellant purposely made "AAA" inhale a certain
substance which caused "AAA" to lose her consciousness. Upon regaining awareness,
"AAA" noticed blood in her shorts and her underwear was no longer worn properly. She
also felt pain in her sexual organ.
On another occasion, "AAA" was at home when appellant started touching her breast
and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. "AAA" fought back but appellant was
stronger. Eventually, appellant was able to insert his penis into "AAA's" anus and
vagina. Thereafter, appellant threatened "AAA" not to report to anyone what happened;
otherwise, he would kill her and her mother. Sometime in 1991, while "AAA" was inside
their house, appellant suddenly dragged and laid "AAA" on the bed. Armed with a knife,
appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and all the members of their family if she would report
anything to the authorities. The intended rape was not consummated because "BBB"
suddenly arrived. Sometime in 1996, "AAA" was sleeping in their house when appellant
suddenly pulled her out of bed. Appellant's obvious lewd intent was not accomplished
because "AAA" was able to extricate herself from appellant's grip and run towards
"BBB" who was outside their house at that time.
For several years, "AAA" just suffered in silence because of fear for her own life as well
as that of her family.
On May 23, 2005, Dr. Annabelle Soliman y Lopez (Dr. Soliman) conducted the medical
examination of "AAA." Dr. Soliman described the hymen of "AAA" as anular, thick, wide
and estrogenized. Dr. Soliman added that there was a possibility that "AAA" could had
no injury even after sexual intercourse.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING: Yes. As reflected in the assailed CA Decision, the conclusion finding
appellant's guilt for rape was anchored on the following circumstantial evidence: "(1)
"AAA" was sleeping in their house; (2) "AAA" was awakened when [appellant] forced
[her] to smell a substance that caused her to lose consciousness; (3) "AAA" positively
identified [appellant] as the only person she saw before she lost consciousness; (4)
upon regaining consciousness. there was blood on "AAA's" shorts; (5) "AAA's" panty
was also reversed; and, (6) "AAA" felt pain in her vagina."
To the mind of the Court, these circumstances did not establish with certainty the guilt
of appellant as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was in fact
committed or that he was the perpetrator of the offense charged. Significantly, the
testimonial account of "AAA" even created a glaring doubt as to whether rape was
indeed committed and as regards the real identity of the culprit. 
65. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL GALICIA Y CHAVEZ
GR NO. 218402, February 14, 2018

FACTS: Appellant was charged with violation of Section 6 (maintaining a drug den),
Section 11, (possession), Section 12 (possession of paraphernalia) and Section 15
(use) of RA 9165.
Tugade, a camera man of the television program mission X, received an anonymous
call regarding a shabu tiangge where there was rampant selling and use of shabu. He
conducted an undercover surveillance and filmed the drug related activities he
witnessed inside the said compound.
Tugade went to the Office of the Anti-Illegal Drugs to report the rampant selling and use
of the shabu within the said compound. Tugade showed the PNP chief and other police
officers of a 15 minutes video showing several persons selling and using shabu. After
watching, police officers conducted surveillance activities and to conduct test-buy.
Since the reported selling and use of shabu were confirmed, Police Officer applied for a
search warrant.
Appellant and his wife were inside the shanty during the search. Appellant was sitting in
front of the drug paraphernalia when the team started to conduct its search. When
interviewed by the team, appellant admitted that he was the owner of Target No. 8
although the admission was made without the presence of counsel. In the course of the
search, the team was able to find and seize from the appellant plastic sachets
containing crystalline substance. The seized items were marked and inventoried and
handed by SPO2 Agbalog. Appellant was informed of his rights and thereafter arrested.
ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of maintenance of a drug den, illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, and use of dangerous drugs.
RULING: The prosecution failed to prove that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a
drug den. A drug den is a place where any dangerous drug is administered, delivered,
stored for illegal purpose, distributed, sold or used in any form. It must be establish with
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged drug den is a place where dangerous
drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the maintainer the den. It is not
enough that the dangerous drug or drug paraphernalia were found in the place.
However, with regard to the use of dangerous drugs, it is absorbed by illegal
possession of drugs. Appellant is also guilty of possession of dangerous drug and drug
paraphernalia.
66. EDEN ETINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 206632, February 14, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information.
Upon arraignment petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution’s evidence
consists mainly of the testimonies of complainant Jessierel and other witnesses. During
the trial, Jessierel testified that while walking on their way home together with his
friends, he was shot with a shotgun by the petitioner hitting the back portion of his right
shoulder and other parts of his body. Jessierel’s testimony was corroborated by his
friend and brought him to the Hospital. To prove the injuries suffered the prosecution
presented Sonza in her capacity as the officer-in-charge of the security of all the
medical records of the hospital for the reason that Dr. Garcia who treated Jessierel was
unable to testify as he is now base in General Santos City. Sonza brought the medical
records of Jessierel. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide. It ruled that petitioner was positively identified as the
perpetrator of the crime charged against him, especially so, when the complainant,
Leyble, was alive to tell what actually happened.
ISSUE: Whether the crime of frustrated homicide was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, since the physician who examined the victim was not presented in court.
RULING: No. It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful," and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.34

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the
victim would have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his
Medical Certificate35 alone, absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and
treated him, or any physician for that matter,36 is insufficient proof of the nature and
extent of his injury. This is especially true, given that said Medical Certificate merely
stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital, the location of the gunshot
wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing. 37

Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained
enters the realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of
petitioner.
Also, intent to kill was not sufficiently established. Hence, when the intent to kill is
lacking but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not
frustrated of attempted homicide but physical injuries only.
67. L.C BIG MAK BURGER, INC vs. MCDONALD’S CORPORATION
GR NO. 233073, February 14, 2018

FACTS: Respondent McDonald’s Corporation filed against L.C Big Mak Burger Inc,
petitioner, for trademark infringement and unfair competition. In the said case, the
Infringement Court, acting on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction issued an order directing petitioner to refrain from:
(a) using the food restaurant business name “Big Mak” which by colourable imitation is
likely to confuse, mislead or deceive the public into believing that the petitioner’s goods
and services originated or are affiliated with those of respondent and from otherwise
unfairly trading on the reputation and goodwill of the McDonald’s Marks, in particular
the mark “BIG MAC”.
The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of McDonald’s Corporation.
Respondent filed a Petition for Contempt against petitioner, the former averred that
despite the Writ of Execution in the Trademark Infringement and unfair competition
case, the latter continues to disobey and ignore the Judgment obligation by
continuously using, as part of their food and restaurant business the word “Big Mak”.
The petitioner then averred that the prohibition covers only the use of the mark “Big
Mak” and not L.C Big Mak Burger, Inc.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt.
RULING: No. Contempt of court has been defined as a wilful disregard or disobedience
of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to,
the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior.
The proscription in the injunction order is against petitioner’s use of the mark “BIG
MAK”. However, as established, petitioner had already been using its corporate name
instead of the proscribed mark. The use of petitioner’s corporate name instead of the
words “Big Mak” solely was evidently pursuant to the directive of the court in the
injunction order. Clearly, as correctly found by the court, petitioner had indeed desisted
from the use of “Big Mak” to comply with the injunction order.
68. PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC. (PALI) AND TERNATE UTILITIES, INC. VS.
EXPORT INDUSTRY BANK, INC.
GR No. 213020
FACTS: Petitioner PALI is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex in
Ternate, Cavite. To finance its operations and the development of Puerto Azul into a
satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with
recreational aeas, PALI obtained loans from various creditors. As security for its
obligations as borrowers, and its 3 accommodation mortgagors including petitioner
Ternate Utilities, Inc. {TUI}, executed a Mortgage Trust Indenture with Urban Bank
Incorporated (UBI). Among the properties that served as security for the loans were
TUI’s 2 parcels of land situated in Pasay City (subject properties).
Due to financial crisis and decline of the real estate market, PALI failed to keep up
with the payments of its debts and obligations. Hence, UBI filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage in order to satisfy PALI’s
outstanding obligations.
PALI filed a petition for suspension of payment and rehabilitation with RTC. The
rehabilitation court, after finding that the petition was sufficient in forms issued a
Stay Order. In the meantime, the subject properties were levied upon by the
Treasurer’s Office of Pasay City for non-payment of realty taxes. EIB filed an
Urgent Motion to order PALI and/or Mortgagor TUI/rehabilitation receiver to pay all
the taxes due. The rehabilitation court modified its Stay Order and exclude the
subject properties from its coverage.
PALI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the rehabilitation court erred when it allowed the foreclosure of the
accommodation mortgagee’s property and excluded the same from the coverage of
the Stay Order.
RULING: No. There is no reversible error when the rehabilitation court removed
subject properties from the coverage of the Stay Order, since the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation only covers the suspension of the enforcement of all claims
against the debtors, its guarantors, and sureties not solidarily liable with the
mortgagor, and is silent on the enforcement of claims against accommodation
mortgagors, such as TUI.
69. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE, THROUGH ITS TRUSTEE, THE
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) VS. PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (PIC)
GR No. 181984, March 20, 2017
FACTS: The Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and respondent PIC entered
into a Lease Agreement. In that Agreement, CCP leased to PIC a parcel of land
including its improvements. The terms of the contract is embodied as follows: The
terms of the lease shall be 25 years and renewable for a like period under the same
terms and conditions at the option of the Lessee.
8 years later, CCP alienated the subject property in favor of the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) through a Deed of Dacion in Payment with Lease. In the same deed,
PNB leased the subject property back to CCP for a period of 5 years. Accordingly,
the Transfer Certificate of Title was then issued to PNB.
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 50, it launched a program for the privatization of
certain government corporations and/or assets and created the Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). Then, PNB assigned the
subject property to the national government under a Deed of Transfer. By virtue of a
Trust Agreement with APT, PNB conveyed the leased premises in trust to the APT
for administration and disposition.
PIC then requested PNB to annotate the former’s leasehold rights. PNB refused in
view of the transfer of the subject property to APT.
PIC instituted a Complaint to compel CCP, PNB and APT to respect the terms and
conditions of the Lease Agreement. PIC also wanted the 3 to be compelled to
deliver the title of the subject property, so that the lease could be annotated thereon.
RTC ruled in favor of PIC after finding that APT already has constructive notice of
the lease, which the latter must respect. CA affirmed RTC Decision. The appellate
court likewise found that APT was estopped from denying PIC’s leasehold right
because of its acceptance of rental. The leasehold rights were successfully
annotated. But prior to the expiration of the Lease Agreement, PIC wrote APT that it
was exercising its option to renew the lease pursuant to the Lease Agreement,
which the latter denied.
When the term of APT expired, PMO was created to take over the assets of PIC.
PMO demanded PIC to vacate the subject, upon refusal of the latter, PMO filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer. MeTC ruled in favor of PIC and upheld the validity
of the latter’s renewal of lease agreement for 25 years. Upon appeal, RTC and
Court of Appeals denied PMO appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PMO is bound by the Lease Agreement.
RULING: Yes. PMO is the successor agency of APT. Consequently, it assumes the
existing obligations of APT upon the termination of the latter’s existence. One of the
existing obligation of APT upon the termination of its term was to respect the Lease
Agreement. To recall, there is a previous judgment by the RTC and CA, as affirmed
by the Supreme Court, finding that APT had an obligation to respect the lease by
virtue of its constructive notice of the same. This judgement that has lapsed into
finality.
When a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable.
70. FELIX PLAZO URBAN POOR SETTLERS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION VS.
ALFREDO LIPAT, SR. AND ALFREDO LIPAT JR.
GR No. 182409, March 20, 2017
FACTS: Respondent Lipat Sr., executed a Contract to Sell (CTS) in favor of the
petitioner. The former agreed to sell to the latter the subject properties. As
stipulated, the petitioner has 90 days to pay in full the purchase price of the subject
properties, otherwise, the CTS shall automatically expire. The period elapsed
without payment of the full consideration by the petitioner.
According to the petitioner, the 90-day period provided was subject to the condition
that the subject properties be cleared of all claims form third persons considering
that there were pending litigations involving the same. Despite the failure to clear
the subject properties from the claims of third persons, the petitioner contributed
financial assistance for the expenses of litigation.
After termination of the cases, the respondents refused to enforce the CTS on the
ground that the same had expired and averred that there was no agreement to
extend its term.
Petitioner filed a case for Specific Performance and Damages against respondent.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner. On Appeal, Court of Appeals
granted the appeal of the respondents and dismissed the action for specific
performance and damages.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing trial court’s decision.
RULING: No. The contract executed by the parties is the law between them.
Consequently, form the time the contract is perfected, all parties privy to it are
bound not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but likewise to
all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keepin with good faith,
usage and law. The obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon
the occurrence of the suspensive condition. The suspensive condition is the
payment in full of the purchase price by the petitioner prior to the expiration of the
90-day period stipulated in their CTS, which the latter failed to do.
71. RODEL ORTIZ VS. DHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, ET. AL
GR NO. 183399, March 20, 2017
FACTS: The petitioner was hired by DHL Philippines Corporation (DHL) as
courier/driver. He was promoted to the position of customs representative and was
assigned at the Ramos Business Center (RBC). Thereafter, he held the position of a
Manifest Clerk.
As a manifest clerk, the petitioner was specifically tasked to prepare manifest
documents of the cargo before the same is forwarded to its destination. He work
from 11am until 8pm. On ordinary days, he and other manifest clerks took charge of
the office business form 6pm-8pm since their manager Branch Supervisor Jubay
leaves by 6pm.
Jubay dropped by the RBC a little past 7pm and found out that petitioner was not
there. His whereabouts unknown. She waited until the petitioner returned to the
office at 8:55pm to punch out his time card. She then asked him where he went and
he told her that he had tires fixed at a vulcanizing shop. On the following day, the
petitioner did not report for work.
The RBC Branch Manager Tamondong looked for the petitioner but he was nit in his
workplace and his co-employees would not know where he was. Tamondong then
asked the security guard if he knew where the petitioner could be and the former
answered that he went home to watch PBA game. Thus Tamondong called Jubay to
investigate the matter. Jubay immediate called the office but petitioner still nowhere
to be found. On the following dat, Jubay found out that the petitioner punched out
his time card at 8:46pm on the previous day.
Petitioner received a memorandum from Jubay, directing him to explain, instead of
showing repentance and admitting his faults, he arrogantly hurled invectives at his
supervisor in front of his co-employees. During the investigation, his officemates as
well as the security guards testified against him, he threatened to retaliate by
making them lose their employment. During the confrontation, The management of
DHL denied the petitioner’s plea for lesser penalty, instead, petitioner was
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was dismissed for just and valid cause.
RULING: Yes. After a careful examination of the facts and the records of this case,
the Court finds that the petitioner's dismissal was founded on acts constituting
serious misconduct and grave dishonesty which are grounds for a valid dismissal. In
particular, he repeatedly committed the following serious violations of company
policies, to wit:
1) Grave dishonesty and fraud by allowing/asking someone to punch out your
timecard for a period of two years[;]
2) Deliberate disregard/disobedience of company rule by frequently leaving work
area prior to scheduled dismissal time without permission[;]
3) Disrespect to immediate superior by uttering offensive and lewd remarks and[/]or
misbehavior during confrontation last March 25, 1999[; and]
4) Threatening the two security guards on duty last April 9, 1999 and warning them
against testifying about violations incurred which constitute an offense against
persons
72. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU
AM NO. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017
FACTS: A motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Eliza B. Yu with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order in the decision promulgated against her
dated November 22, 2016 to wit: Wherefore, the Court finds and pronounces
respondent Judge Eliza B. Yu guilty of Gross Insubordination, Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Oppression and Conduct of
Unbecoming of Judicial Official and accordingly dismisses her from the service. And
is directed to show cause why she should not be disbarred for violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative
offenses for she was held guilty and insists on the absence of proof to support the
findings against her. She pleads that he Court reconsiders based on the following:
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez
The Respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment
because rejection was different from protesting the appointment. She merely
exercised her statutory right as a judge to question the appointment of the branch
clerk of court assigned to her sala, as she was mandated to bring to the proper
authorities the irregularities surrounding appointments.
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges
It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed misconduct
because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-
lawyer
She claims that no proof showing that she wilfully and deliberately intended to
cause public damage.
7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel
The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing
criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether removal from the Judiciary may cause her expulsion from the
Legal Profession through disbarment.
RULING: Yes. As provided in AM. 02-9-02-SC dated September 17, 2002 states
that administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, judges of regular and special courts and court officials who are
lawyers are based on ground which are likewise ground for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of Lawyer’s Oath.
The administrative case shall be considered a disciplinary action against respondent
judge.
73. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMIE PARIS Y NICOLAS and RONEL FERNANDEZ
GR NO. 218130, February 14, 2018

FACTS: In an Information, Paris and Fernandez were charged with robbery with
homicide. During arraignment both separately pleaded not guilty of the offense charge
against them. At the police station, Fernandez claimed that he was forced to admit his
participation in the crime. He claimed that three police officers had inflicted bodily harm
upon him by hitting the back of his head and his forehead. This caused him to admit his
participation in the crime to SPO1 Ysit. Although he signed an extrajudicial confession,
Fenandez denied the truthfulness of the same. He claimed that he only admitted the
crime because of fear of being subjected to more physical harm while under the
custody of the police. Fernandez claimed that he gave honest answers to questions
that pertained to the participation of Paris and his companions.
With regard to Atty. Francisco's assistance during the investigation, Fernandez claimed
that Atty. Francisco explained the extrajudicial confession only after it was already
printed out and covered only some questions asked. Fernandez claimed that Atty.
Francisco did not explain the part of the confession where he admitted joining the
culprits in plotting the crime nor the possibility of him being charged with Paris.  He
further claimed that he signed the extrajudicial confession only because Atty. Francisco
and the police promised to make him a star witness to the crime.
ISSUE: Whether Fernandez was guilty of robbery with homicide.
RULING: Yes but not as to the admissibility of Fernandez’s extrajudicial confession. It
is settled that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence against the
accused, the same must (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, (c) express and (d) in writing.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of his Miranda rights or right against
self-incrimination shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Moreover, Sec 2 of RA 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained, or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the case at bar, it
was discovered that Atty. Francisco was not an independent counsel as he is a legal
consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Atty. Francisco cannot be considered
as an independent counsel since protecting the rights of Fernandez as a suspect is in
direct conflict with his duty to the Municipal Mayor and the local government of the
Municipality.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Fernandez’ extrajudicial confession, his conviction
for the crime of robbery with homicide can still be obtained on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be
established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the authors of the
crime. These pieces of circumstantial evidence lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that Fernandez and Paris conspired to rob Anna Leizel Trading making
them the authors of the crime to the exclusion of all others. Under Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decides to commit it”. The ruled
that when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.  Thus, "[w]hen homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same." In the
present case, both Fernandez and Paris were co-conspirators who are guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

74. Celso M.F.L Melgar vs. People of the Philippines

GR NO. 223477, February 14, 2018

FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section
5 of RA 9262 (VAWC). The accused, having the means and capacity to give financial
support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse
against one AAA and her minor son BBB, be depriving them of financial support, which
caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.
After arraignment, Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA
entered into a compromise agreement. After RTC’s approval of the compromise
agreement, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed. However, 1
year later, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromised agreement and to
revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB pursuant
to their compromise agreement. RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse
against AAA and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the
property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed Melgar conviction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly uphel Melgar’s conviction for violation of Section 5 (e)
of RA 9262.
RULING: Yes. RA 9262, it defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, within or without the
family abode. The said law defines economic abuse as follows:
D. “Economic Abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes but not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except on valid, serious and moral grounds;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victim’s own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.
As may be gathered from the foregoing, economic abuse may include deprivation of
support of a common child of a man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such
common child is legitimate or not.
Under the provision of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, the deprivation or denial of financial
support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children.
Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing
offense.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section
5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a
romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his
paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter
was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent
when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among
others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.