RULE 65: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS A petition for certiorari requires the concurrence of the following:
ASSOCIATION, INC VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
G.R. NO. 200670 JULY 6, 2015
MAGTOTO VS. CA
NOVEMBER 21, 2012
SAN PEDRO RURAL BANK VS PAMPANGA
OMNIBUS DEVT. CORPORATION
520 SCRA 564
PHIL. ELECTRIC CORP. VS. CA
G.R. NO. 168612 DECEMBER 10, 2014
LE SOLEIL INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS VS.
SANCHEZ
G.R. NO. 199384 SEPTEMBER 9, 2015
a) The petition is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
b) Such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
c) There is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.
HERE, THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION INVOLVED IS QUASI-LEGISLATIVE. (GENERALLY, IT IS NOT COVERED BY RULE 65, EXCEPT WHEN THE SC INVOKES ITS
EXPANDED JURISDICTION.
On a procedural ground, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being the wrong remedy because the defendant should have appealed the
judgment of the CA to the SC, instead of filing before it a petition under Rule 65. Declared the court:
“At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate.
Petitioner’s remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
IF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT GRANTED (DENIED OR DISMISSED), WHAT IS YOUR REMEDY? APPEAL. NOT ANOTHER PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
BECAUSE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS A “ASJBFASBFAB” ACT
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess
of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved
party raised factual and legal issues; or a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.
The raison d etre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision - not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision - the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari .
DIFFERENTIATE ERROR OF JUDGMENT VS. ERROR OF JURISDICTION.
An appeal raises the errors of judgment of a court tribunal or officer and normally dwells on the factual or legal merits of the case. This is not so when
one avails of a petition for certiorari which is not designed to review every error of a lower court or tribunal. The petition is narrow in scope and seek
to correct only jurisdictional errors often arising out of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
DIFFERENTIATE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND APPEAL.
The general rule is that a timely appeal is the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits. This is true even if one of the
errors to be assigned on appeal is the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the judgment over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
by said court is in excess of its jurisdiction, or the making of its findings of fact or of law set out in the decision is attended by grave abuse of discretion. In
other words, the perfection of an appeal within the reglamentary period is mandatory because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed
by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment.
IF APPEAL IS AVAILABLE CAN YOU FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, (GENERALLY)
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V.
ASTUDILLO, VS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS –
CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA. LORNA P.
DEMONTEVERDE
G.R. NO. 230953 JUNE 20, 2018
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY
OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. VS. RIEL
G.R. NO. 176508 JANUARY 12, 2015
MARILOU PUNONGBAYAN-VISITACION VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CARMELITA P.
PUNONGBAYAN
G.R. NO. 194214, JANUARY 10, 2018
Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this
rule, to wit:
a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
c) when the writs issued are null and void; or
d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE LE SOLEIL CASE?
IN THIS CASE WAS THE MONTEVERDE’s ABLE TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE? NO
WHAT IS THE CLAIM OF MONTEVERDE? CLAIM OF PUBLIC POLICY, WAS IT A VALID GROUND IN THIS CASE? No.
"Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public of against public good. It is the principle under which freedom of contract or private dealing is
restricted for the good of the community.
Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to comply with the general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal
and factual bases for its invocation. The assumption of the appellate court that Demonteverde could possibly face " a grim prospect of a lengthy appeal as
it is very likely that the resolution will not happen during her lifetime as she is already seventy-three years old " is inconsistent with the aforementioned
definition of public policy. Demonteverde failed to substantiate through clear and well-established grounds exactly how her case warrants a deviation
from the general rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party. Thus, the petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of Demonteverde was dismissed.
The respondent has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
 Without jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board or officer acted with absolute lack of authority.
 There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority.
 Grave abuse of discretion connotes such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility; and such exercise is
so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or act at all in
contemplation of law.
 Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction mean that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board, or
officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding because the conditions, which alone authorize the exercise of the
general power in respect thereof, are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right, or authority to hear determine a
cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.
WHAT IS THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?
Nevertheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits exceptions.  Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
(c) when the writs issued are null and void; or
(d) When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the interest of substantial justice warrants the relaxation of the rules and treats Visitacion's petition for certiorari as
an appeal. This is especially true considering that the same was filed within the reglamentary period to file an appeal. It is noteworthy that in the litany of
cases where the Court did not consider certiorari as an appeal, the former remedy was filed beyond the 15-day period to interpose an appeal.

BELMONTE VS. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 197665, JANUARY 12, 2016
FERRER VS. BAUTISTA
G.R. NO. 210551, JUNE 30, 2015
QUISUMBING VS. ROSALES
G.R. NO. 209283, MARCH 11, 2015
Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is warranted
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object
ANOTHER EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE, THAT WHEN APPEAL IS AVAILABLE CERTIORARI IS NOT ALLOWED. (When interest of substantial justice
warrants and filed within the 15 day period)
WAS THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED ON TIME? WHEN WAS IT FILED IN THIS CASE? (Yes, it was filed within the 15 day reglamentary period to file an
appeal)
THE FILING OF M.R. IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT OR SINE QUA NON IN FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, BUT THE SUPREME COURT MENTIONED THE
EXCEPTIONS, WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS?
 Certiorari under Rule 45, is a mode of appeal; while certiorari under rule 65 is a special civil action. The latter is an original and independent
action, not a mode of appeal.
 Certiorari under Rule 45 is but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a part of the appellate
process but an original action.
 Rule 45 is a mode of appeal, it seeks to review final judgments or final orders; while certiorari under rule 65 is usually directed against an
interlocutory order or matters where no appeal may be taken from.
 Certiorari under rule 45, as a rule, raises only questions of law. Questions of fact are not entertained.
 An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is filed within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from, while a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is filed not later than 60 days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed, and in case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, whether such motion is required or not, the 60 day period is
counted from notice of denial of said motion.
 Unless a rule provides for the contrary, certiorari under Rule 45 stays the judgment appealed from; certiorari under Rule 65 does not stay the
judgment or order subject of the petition unless enjoined or restrained.
 In certiorari under Rule 45, the parties are the original parties with the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent
without impleading the lower court or its judge, while in certiorari under Rule 65, the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions is impleaded as respondent.
 Certiorari, as a special civil action, is filed with the RTC, CA, SC or SB; whereas certiorari, as a mode of appeal, is filed only with the Supreme Court.
 As to the grounds, error of jurisdiction (Rule 65), error of judgment (Rule 45)
DIFFERENTIATE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 AND PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION?
It was held that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when she filed the petition for certiorari to assail a Show Cause Order issued by the
respondents, the Chairman of the Members of the Commission on Human Rights. The Court found that the respondents, when they referred the case to
the Ombudsman, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but
simply undertook to initiate the investigation of the allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry was not quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses

CAWAD VS. ABAD
G.R. NO. 207145, JULY 28, 2015
ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III
G.R. NO. 209287, JULY, 2014
VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. NO. 211833, APRIL 7, 2015
OSMENA III VS. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 212686, SEPTEMBER 26, 2015
CANDELARIA VS. RTC BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO,
G.R. NO. 173861, JULY 14, 2014
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA) VS. SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
621 SCRA 295
where charged, parties were heard and penalties were imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct and
different from the concept of adjudication.
The petition was declared unmeritorious since, among others, the respondents were found not to have acted in any J,QJ or M capacity in their issuance of
the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and Enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the
questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of
rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the
government. Their acts were, therefore, not proper subjects of certiorari and prohibition.
THE POWER INVOLVED HERE IS NOT QUASI JUDICIAL, IT IS QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, GENERAL RULE: IT IS NOT COVERED BY RULE 65 EXCEPT WHEN THE
SUPREME COURT EXERCISES ITS EXPANDED JURISDICTION.
Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of DAP, NBC 541 and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing DAP.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the 2 nd paragraph of Section 1.
THE FUNCTION EXERCISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THIS CASE WAS DAP.
It is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting
and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy. The Court took cognizance of the petition on the basis of the definition
of judicial power in the Philippine Constitution as pronounced in the earlier case of Araullo vs.Aquino III.
The Supreme Court also took cognizance of a petition for certiorari involving the sale by the Power Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) of a power plant, which supposedly contravened the policy of competitive bidding. The PSALM was created by law not to exercise either judicial
or quasi-judicial functions but to undertake certain mandated privatization of disposable assets of certain government entities. The basis for assuming
jurisdiction over the petition was the Constitutional mandate on the judiciary “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the Government”.
STILL THE SC TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI INVOKING ITS EXPANDED JURISDICTION AND INVOKING ITS JUDICIAL POWER.
Any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be
considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its
assessment that the evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Assuming that the RTC’s
determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not
authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in
respect of it are wanting.
Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with

JM AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC. VS. LICLICAN
G.R. NO. 208587, JULY 29, 2015
GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP.
VS. ACUNA
452 SCCRA 422
JESUS CRISOLOGOAND NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO
VS. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 196894. MARCH 3, 2014
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS,
G.R. NO. 193494. MARCH 12, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA VS. HON. CARIDAD H.
GRECIA-CUERDO.
G.R. NO. 175723, FEBRUARY 4, 2014
reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.
WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for issuance of the impugned order.
The phrase “grave abuse of discretion” amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by the
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions as to amount to lack of power.
Under the material data rule, the following material dates must be stated in the petition:
a) When notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received;
b) When a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed; and
c) When notice of the denial thereof was received.
The requirement is for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law render the judgment final and executory.
MATERIAL DATES, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY MATERIAL DATES.
Technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to
facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to and be subordinated by
the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65. Although intervention unde rRUle 19
could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have
noticed the adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs. Neither will appeal prove adequate as a
remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal. Here, Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal
as they never possessed the required legal standing in the first place.
DO THE SPOUSES CRISOLOGO HAVE OTHER RECOURSE OR REMEDY IN THIS CASE? NONE.
Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue that the
trial court committed GAOD in declaring him or her in default. Thus, should a defendant present evidence on his or her behalf, he or she must file either a
motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment.
IF THE DEFENDANT IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT, ONE OF THE REMEDIES IS THE DEFENDANT CAN QUESTION DECLARING THEM IN DEFAULT, IN A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI. HOWEVER, WHILE YOU FILE THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, STILL HE CANNOT BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE OR TO
PRESENT HIS DEFENSE. BECAUSE WHAT IS ONLY REQUIRED IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI HE IS ONLY ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OR TO ARGUE
THAT THE TRIBUNAL OR COURT WHICH ISSUED THE ORDER OF DEFAULT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes
that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

MORALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 217126-27, NOVEMBER 10, 2015
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. MACATLANG
G.R. NO. 180148, JANUARY 14, 2014
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN/
BENIGNO B. AGUAS VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it
follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To
rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very
same case. Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the
intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is
more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by
the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of
the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
DOES CTA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI? YES
Jurisprudence states that “it is the inadequacy, and not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari (or prohibition). A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a
petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a prior motion for reconsideration
before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. These are:
a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b) Where the questions raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i) Where the issue raise is one purely of law or where the public interest is involved.
WHAT FALLS AS A EXCEPTION FOR THE FILING FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The principle of judicial courtesy, to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or order from the
higher court, may still apply “if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of
the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.
GENERAL RULE: IN FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, WILL NOT STOP THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
EXCEPTION: 1ST EXCEPTION IS WHEN THE HIGHER COURT ISSUES AN INJUNCTION
2ND EXCEPTION IS THE SARA LEE CASE. (JUDICIAL COURTESY) THE SECOND EXCEPTION IS JUDICIAL COURTESY.
The exercise of this (JP) power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government cannot be thwarted by the Rules of Procedure to the contrary or for the sake of convenience of one side. This is because the Court has
the bounded constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory

G.R. NO. 220598 / G.R. NO. 220953
JULY 19, 2016
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, ET. AL. VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL./
EUFEMMIA C. CULLAMAT, ET AL VS. PRESIDENT
RODRIGO DUTERTE, ET AL./ NORKAYA S.
MOHAMAD, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 231658/ G.R. NO. 231774. JULY 4,2017
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, AND SENATOR
LEILA M. DE LIMA, VS. CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO “KOKO”
character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHAT IS THE RULE INVOLVED HERE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WHEN YOUR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE DEMURRER IS DENIED, YOUR REMEDY IS TO
CONTINUE THE CASE AND APPEAL THE DECISION. WHEN YOUR MOTION FOR LEAVE OR THE DEMURRER ITSELF IS DENIED, YOUR REMEDY IS NOT TO FILE A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. BUT IN THIS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT TOOK COGNIZANCE FOR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, NOTWITHSTANDING THE RULE
THAT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AVAILABLE WHEN MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT OR THE DEMURRER IS DENIED. THE SUPREME COURT INVOKED
ITS EXPANDED JURISDICTION.
“In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition
for Certiorari  pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari  is whether the respondent has committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to
review the sufficiency of the factual  basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review
used in a petition for certiorari,  the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
To interpret "appropriate proceeding" as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari  filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore,
contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional  safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article Vii make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis  separate and different from
those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief
Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari  is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "in its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting
them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing." In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by
the Court.
HOW DID THE SUPREME COURT DEFINE “APPROPRIATE PLEADING”. IT DOES NOT REFER TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
In this particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear
ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on
Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decision to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said
proclamation.
CAN YOU COMPEL THE CONGRESS TO CONVENE?
 PIMENTEL III, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AS REPRESENTED BY HOUSE
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ,
RESPONDENTS/
G.R. NO. 231694

FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TANADA, BISHOP

EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, BISHOP
BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R.
TOBIAS, MO. ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH
BULANGIS AND CASSANDRA D. DELURIA VS.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO “KOKO”
PIMENTEL, PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ,
SPEAKER, HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES.
G.R. NO. 231671 JULY 25, 2017
PROHIBITION
DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC VS. For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites:
ADVERTISING BOARD a) The impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
572 SCRA 455 b) The tribunal, corporation, board or person must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction
c) There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
d) Like a petition for certiorari, the petition for prohibition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject of the
petition, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in Sec.
3 of Rule 46.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION?

RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND
EDUARDO M. ANO, (SECRETARY) OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,
G.R. NO. 238467 FEBRUARY 12, 2019
GENERAL RULE: DESTILERIA LIMTAUCO. THE EXCEPTION IS THE DUTERTE CASE, CLOSURE OF BORACAY.
The petition must be subjected to the 4 exacting requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, viz.: ( A L O L )
a) There must be an actual case or controversy;
b) The petitioners must possess locus standi;
c) The question of constitutionality must be raise at the earliest opportunity; and
d) The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. Hence, it is not enough that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against
Proclamation No. 4 7 5. It is like necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the Court sustains the propriety of the recourse.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE ON PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS THAT THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE EXERCISING
JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS?

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE
AGENCY, INC. VS. PUERTO PRINCESSA CITY
G.R. NO. 181792, APRIL 21, 2014
CASTRO VS. JBC
615 SCRA 666
(DE CASTRO V. JBC)
SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTI P.
CERICOS V. NESTOR M. CANDA, ET. AL.,
G.R. NO. 160932, JANUARY 14, 2013
FROILAN DEJURAS VS. HON. RENE C. VILLA
G.R. NO. 173428 NOVEMBER 22, 2010,
635 SCRA 569
CUDIA VS. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY
G.R. NO. 211362 FEBRUARY 24, 2015
DID THE SC AGAIN EXPAND ITS JURISDICTION IN PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION IN DUTERTE CASE?
THE EXCEPTION IS WHEN THERE IS A VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. EXPANDED JURISDICTION OF THE SC IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION
IS WHEN THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. PETITION FOR MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION ARE NOT CONFINED TO RULE 65 BECAUSE WHEN
THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS THE COURT MAY INVOKE ITS JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONS FOR PROHIBTION AND
MANDAMUS.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXCEPTION EXPANDED JURISDICTION TO APPLY.
DID THE PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL STANDING? NO. ZABAL WAS A SAND CASTLE MAKER, JACOSALEM WAS A DRIVER, BANDIOLA WAS A NON-RESIDENT
INVOKING HIS RIGHT TO TRAVEL. DESPITE THE LACK OF LOCUS STANDI, THE SC STILL ACTED ON THE PETITION BECAUSE OF ITS TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE. BUT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT GRANT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS.
MANDAMUS
The principal function of mandamus is to command, not to inquire, expedite or to adjudicate. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor
will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of a petition for mandamus
should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful
neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
WHAT DO YOU MEAN A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT? ONE IN WHICH THE OFFICER DOES NOT EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION
When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one
way or the other. It is, nonetheless, available to compel action, when refused, even in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the
exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief in this case is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on the part
of both the DAR and DARAB to find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that needs to be protected and that the acts of SMPHI are violative of such
right. On this score alone, the CA cannot be faulted for its refusal to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for.
General rule: MANDAMUS COVERS ONLY MINISTERIAL ACT. EXC: CAN YOU FILE A MANDAMUS COMPELLING A DISCRETIONARY ACT. THIS IS AN
EXCEPTION
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and there should be an imperative duty on
the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI
PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA,
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND
THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 213948, APRIL 18, 2017
MMDA VS. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY
DECEMBER 18, 2008
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be
compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a
building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty
on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the
applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal
Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is
"not pap: of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park,
according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno.  Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural
property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."
DOES MANDAMUS LIE AGAINST CITY OF MANILA? NO.
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
The cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by Mandamus. Sections 17 and 20 of the Environment Code include cleaning in general.
The SC agreed with Respondents that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of
the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to
choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that
petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s
ministerial duty to attend to such services.
Petitioner’s obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandates tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to
exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
The heads of petitioner-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and aso of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line
with the principle of “continuing mandamus,” were required, from finality of the decision, to each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of
the activities undertaken in accordance with this decision.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. It thus behooves the Court to put the
heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as "continuing mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision
would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the
court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.
HOW DOES IT DIFFER WITH THE BORACAY CASE? THE SUPREME COURT MENTIONED MMDA IN THE BORACAY CASE.
MMDA THE PETITIONERS IN THAT CASE WERE STILL ORDERED BY THE SC TO DO THEIR JOBS
IN BORACAY CASE, THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF OR THE AGENCIES SPEARHEADED IN DOING THEIR JOBS.

MARICRIS D. DOLOT VS. HON. RAMON PAJE
G.R. NO. 199199 AUGUST 27, 2013
As a final note, the Court in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, called out the concerned government
agencies for their cavalier attitude towards solving environmental destruction despite hard evidence and clear signs of climate crisis. It equated the failure
to put environmental protection on a plane of high national priority to the then lacking level of bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. Hence, the Court
therein took it upon itself to put the heads of concerned department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice and to enjoin
them to perform their mandates and duties towards the clean-up and/or restoration of Manila Bay, through a "continuing mandamus."
There is an obvious similarity in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority and in the present case in that both involve the restoration of key areas in
the country which were once glowing with radiance and vitality but are now in shambles due to abuses and exploitation. What sets these two cases apart
is that in the former, those mandated to act still needed to be enjoined in order to act. In this case, the bold and urgent action demanded by the Court
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is now in the roll out. Still, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators heard during times of
inaction can still be heard during this time of full action - demonstrating a classic case of "damn if you do, damn if you don't". Thus, in order for the now
staunch commitment to save the environment not to fade, it behooves upon the courts to be extra cautious in invalidating government measures meant
towards addressing environmental degradation. Absent any clear showing of constitutional infirmity, arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion, these
measures must be upheld and even lauded and promoted. After all, not much time is left for us to remedy the present environmental situation. To borrow
from Oposa, unless the State undertakes its solemn obligation to preserve the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and advance the health of the
people, "the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come - generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life."
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right
therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also
necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable
neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz:
(1) An agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of a right;
(2) The act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty;
(3) Such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a
right therein; and
(4) There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS, WHEN IS IT AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 8 SECTION 1.
WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS? RTC EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRITORY
WHERE THE ACTIONABLE EVENT OR OMISSION
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH CA AND SC

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO VS. SCOTT H. SWIFT
G.R. NO 206510 SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE VS. CASINO
G.R. NO. 207257 FEBRUARY 3, 2015
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION,
ON BEHALF OF THE RESIDENTS OF WEST TOWER
CONDOMINIUM AND IN REPRESENTATION OF
BARANGAY BANGKAL, AND OTHERS, INCLUDING
MINORS AND GENERATIONS YET UNBORN
– VERSUS-
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
FIRST GEN CORPORATION AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES AND RICHARD DOES,;
G.R. NO. 194239 JUNE 16, 2015
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., - VERSUS –
AGHAM PARTYLIST (REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT REP. ANGELO B. PALM ONES)
G.R. NO. 209165 APRIL 12, 2016
ABOGADO, ET AL. V. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET
AL.,
MAY 3, 2019, G.R. NO. 246209
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE? FILE A VERIFIED PETITION, AND YOUR PRAYER IS THAT THE RESPONDENT BE ORDERED TO DO ACTS OR SERIES OF ACTS UNTIL
JUDGMENT IS SATISFIED AND PAY DAMAGES. ATTACH CONFS THE COURT THEN ISSUES A WOCM AND REQUIRES THE RESPONDENT TO FILE COMMENT,
HEARING, AFTER SUMMARY HEARING AND THE CASE WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR JUDGMENT.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Filing of the Petition is not a bar to the Filing of other actions
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
THE REQUISITES FOR THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF KALIKASAN.
(1) There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(2) The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
(3) The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that "when there is
lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application of said principle. This, however, is
not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the
damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the
existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of
hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the
petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
WHAT IS THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE? IT IS IN SECTION 1, RULE 20
IN THIS CASE DID THE SUPREME COURT APPLY THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE? IT WAS NOT DENIED BY THE OWNERS OF THE PIPELINE? IT DOES NOT
APPLY.
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the
(1) Environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated;
(2) Act or omission complained of; and
(3) The environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
WHAT IS THE BURDEN OF THE PETITIONER IN A WRIT OF KALIKASAN CASE?
FILING OF PETITION:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2019
Rule 66
QUO WARRANTO
Does Sec. 11 apply to the Government? No.
Prescription does not lie against the State.
As general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to
enforce public right. It is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part of the officers of the
state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its character as sovereign
The action can only be brought with the consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is to be assumed, he will not permit the
institution of such suit, if by reason of great lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for any other reason the state has ceased to have present interest
in it. The attorney general or state's attorney may file the information in behalf of the people, where the interests of the general public are involved, at
any time, and that, in conformity with the maxim, 'Nullum tempus occurrit regi,' lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding . Quo warranto
proceedings seeking ouster of public official are governmental function.  No statute of limitations is, therefore, applicable. (AMJUR)
In fact, liberal interpretation to quo warranto provisions is sanctioned given that its primary purpose is to ascertain whether one is constitutionally
authorized to hold office. One of the primary purposes of quo warranto is to ascertain whether one is constitutionally authorized to hold the office he
claims, whether by election or appointment, and we must liberally interpret the quo warranto statutes to effectuate that purpose. Indeed, when the
government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.
Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) 209 of the Civil Code, applies
in this case.
Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition? Yes
In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for  quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than Member of
the Court. The issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office is matter of public concern over which the
government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position.
Special circumstances therefor?
Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the prescriptive period. In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning
respondent's qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster. As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to
whether or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in U.P. Recall that during her application for the Chief Justice position, the JBC
required the submission of her previous SALNs.
Quo warranto vs Impeachment?
The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
Can there be forum shopping? No because Articles of impeachment has yet to be initiated
The difference between the "impeachment proceeding" and the "impeachment case" correctly cited by the respondent, bolsters the conclusion that there
can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding" before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against the respondent.
 What was the offense committed by Justice Sereno? Ilang years sya sa public office? 20 years, ilan filed> only 11, it is an impeachable offense.
Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, member of the Judiciary
who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be person of proven integrity.
Further, the failure to file truthful SALN not only puts in doubt the integrity of the officer, but such failure to file truthful, complete and accurate SALN
would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The above circumstances
betray respondent's intention to falsely state material fact and to practice deception in order to secure for herself the appointment as Chief Justice. It is
therefore clear as day that respondent failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of
integrity, honesty and probity. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent
which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. Respondent's failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs
for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application. Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate acts and
omissions demonstrating dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any claim of integrity. Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven
integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. Respondent is  de facto  officer removable through quo
warranto.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance to the Sub Judice Rule. It could readily be seen that such statements do not only "tend to" but categorically force and
influence the deliberative and decision-making process of this Court. Notably, the threatening tenor could not go unnoticed. To be sure, the Court is not
merely being unreasonably sensitive in addressing this matter, as in fact, it guarantees that it is not swayed or influenced by such attacks and maintains its
judicial independence in resolving this controversial case. However, when aggressive actions are taken against the Judiciary as an institution and clouds of
doubt are casted upon the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially so when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this Court
cannot be apathetic to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing to do is to stand and deal with it head on.

The decision is immediately executory under the fallo of the case.

In the resolution of the MR she was only reprimanded.

Divinagracia vs. Consolidated Broadcasting Is the ground of misusing your franchise a sufficient ground in a quo warranto proceeding? Yes
System, Inc.
584 SCRA 213 The special civil action of  quo warranto  is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise.  It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of   quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs
to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury." 6  A forfeiture of a
franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful
exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo warranto  is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has
offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
Corejo vs. 99Gabriel Differentiate mandamus vs. quo warranto?
41 Phil. 188
A quo warranto proceeding is brought against the holder of the office, who is the person claiming the office as against the petitioner. In mandamus, the
suit is brought against the person who is responsible for unlawfully excluding the petitioner from office, like an appointing authority.
Recall that MANDAMUS is also available when one is unlawfully excluded from the use or enjoyment of an office. While it is similar to a quo warranto
proceeding in this respect, in MANDAMUS, the suit is brought against the person who is responsible for unlawfully excluding the petitioner from office. The
RESPONDENT here does not usurp, intrude into or hold the office. (p. 269)
 Daniel MORO vs GENEROSO REYES DEL
CASTILLO, JR
G.R. NO. 184980 MARCH 30, 2011
Ra 8799
Municipality of Binan vs Garcia
180 SCRA 576
Republic of the Philippines rep by NAPOCOR vs.
Heirs of Saturnino Borbon vs Municipality of
Panay
G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015
Where did Del Castillo file quo warranto proceeding? It was filed in his name. In your name not in the Republic of the Philippines, no need for permission
of the Court. Where did Del Castillo file? April 4, 2007, months before the ombudsman?
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds
the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on
February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the
action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Rule 67
Expropriation
Meaning of expropriation or eminent domain
The power of eminent domain in particular has been described as a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or meet
a public exigency. It is also said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and, thus, inseparable from sovereignty.
Two stages
1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.   It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the Merits.   So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to
the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. 
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence
or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Initially there is public purpose but then it becomes not necessary for public purpose, what will happen? The action should be dismissed. The moment that
the court or plaintiff determines that it becomes not necessary, it should be dismissed outright. Rationale? Commit to the purpose.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what
is productive of general benefit of the public. If the genuine public necessity ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s
retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another from public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is
offensive to our laws.
 Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay
498 SCRA 113
NPC vs Santa Loro Vda de Capin
569 SCRA 648
NPC vs Jocson
206 SCRA 520
Republic vs Mupas,
G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015
MCWD v. J. King and Sons,
G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015
Power of LGU to exercise eminent domain?
While such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities, and public utilities, the exercise of such power by the delegated
entity is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations. Indeed, local government units themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power of
eminent domain delegated to local government units is in reality not eminent but “inferior” since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation
and thus, partake only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units and the latter cannot go
against the principal’s will or modify the same.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent
domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
Is right to eminent domain limited to acquisition of real property? No
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement falls within
the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.
Prior hearing is not required. Notice and defendant requirement. Exceptions.
Prior hearing is not required before the Republic of the Philippines can be granted immediate possession of the property. The defense by the owner against
immediate possession can be considered on the trial on the merits. All that is requires is notice to the owner and the deposit. HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY.
Fair market value is the general standard of value in determining just compensation. Jurisprudence broadly defines “fair market value” as the sum of
money that a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
for a property. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the
taker. While jurisprudence requires the “fair market value” to be the measure of recovery in expropriation cases, it is not an absolute and exclusive
standard or method of valuation. There are exceptional cases where the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value of the
property is difficult to determine. In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain, the court may use other just and
equitable market methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair market value of a property.
Just compensation must not extend beyond the property owner’s loss or injury. This is the only way for the compensation paid to be truly just, not only to
the individual whose property is taken, but also to the public who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner
of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
WHAT IS THE MODE OF DEPOSIT?
GR: MONEY, CASH
EXN: CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT IS AUTHORIZED BY COURT
Delegation of power of eminent domain.
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often does, delegate the
exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner (MWCD) is one of the numerous government offices so
empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No. 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of eminent domain.

Republic of the Philippines rep by DPWH vs.
Arlene R. Soriano
G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015 VIP
Yujuico vs Atienza, Jr
472 SCRA
NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay
GR No. 165828, August 24, 2011
New system of immediate payment under RA 8974.
The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if
he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception
to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated
to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.
RA 8974 SUPERSEDES DEPOSIT.
Market value.
Considered an effective forbearance, it is now subject to legal interest. Entitled to legal interest.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance
on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines ruling, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time
the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the
value of the currency over time. In the Court’s own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner
instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle land owner to recover expropriated lot.
Non-payment of just compensation does not automatically entitle the private landowner to recover possession of expropriated lots. However, in cases
where the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned
shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five year limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity.
What happened there was order of just compensation, but plaintiff did not pay defendant. Supreme Court ordered recovery of property.
Look at the facts. If yujuico case, if Just Compensation is not paid within how many years, entitled to recovery of possession. IF not same, apply GR that
recovery of possession is not entitlement but only interest.
GR: DELAY IN JUST COMPENSATION, NAAY INTEREST
EXN: YUJICO CASE, MA RECOVER ANG PROP.
Inverse condemnation proceedings
"Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. While the typical
taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation
is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings. The phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common
understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding."
Recovery of just compensation is imprescriptible. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action
for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental

National Power Corporation v. Spouses
Saludares Saludares
G.r. No. 189127, April 25, 2012
Secretary of DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. On the other hand, the latter action
seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution  while the action for
damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private
property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former
does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,  for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against
the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just
compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned
on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would
compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the
prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners
commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its
deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
Did SC apply the principle that the value of the property at the time of taking or filing whichever comes first in this case? Was the filing or taking first?
Taking first. SC did not use taking as basis for just compensation. Rationale: this court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to pay just
compensation.
The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values for Real Property for the Year 2000.
Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses’ property. Because it failed to comply with
this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present,
they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow
petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the
decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when
respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation.
Differentiate with Oroville case. NTC vs Oroville vs. NPC vs Saludares. Same instances, sangkay, tecson, saludares. In Oroville, the SC used another
principle. Why did the SC not apply the GR rule in this case? Allegation of napocor is because according to them they already paid. No intention to pay.
Computation of legal interest is in DPWH vs Republic vs tecson, the principle that the value of just compensation at the time of taking or filing whichever
comes first prevails. Exceptions are in saludares and sangkay cases mentioned in Oroville. In tecson when did the taking happen, 1940, when was the
action for recovery of possession of real property filed, 1994. But SC still said taking was done long before, M.R. decision. Legal interest may 1 1916, 6%
what was applied was 12% because of CB circular. Also SC added exemplary damages.
Clearly, the award of interest on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment is adequate compensation to respondents-movants
for the deprivation of their property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. Such interest, however meager or enormous it may be, cannot be
inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence-standards that have taken into account fairness
and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forbearance of money. Thus, adding the interest computed to the market value of the property at
the time of taking signifies the real, substantial, full and ample value of the property. Verily, the same constitutes due compliance with the constitutional

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs.
OROVILLE DEVELOPMENT CCORPORATION
G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017
National Power Corporation vs Apolonio
Marasigan, Francisco V. Marasigan, Lilia V.
Marasigan, Benito V. Marasigan, Jr. and Alicia V.
Marasigan,
G.R. No. 220367, November 20, 2017
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the
mandate on eminent domain and serves as a basic measure of fairness. In addition to the foregoing interest, additional compensation shall be awarded to
respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in view of the government's taking without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings. 
COMPUTATION OF LEGAL INTEREST.
SC followed the general rule, whichever comes first.
The rulings in Macabangkit Sangkay and Saludares are mere exceptions. These rulings, however, are exceptions to the general rule that just compensation
must be reckoned from the time of taking or filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The special circumstances of the aforementioned cases called for
the valuation of just compensation at the time the landowners initiated inverse condemnation proceedings notwithstanding that taking of the properties
occurred first. In  Macabangkit  Sangkay, NAPOCOR did not even inform the property owners of the construction of the underground tunnels. Hence, it
could be said that NAPOCOR employed stealth instead of complying with the legal process of expropriation. Further, considering that the tunnels were
constructed underground, the property owners came to know thereof only when the purchaser of the property refused to proceed with the sale upon
discovery of the underground tunnels. In this case, however, the transmission lines are visible, such that Oroville could not deny knowledge of its
construction in 1983. In Saludares, NAPOCOR refused to acknowledge the respondents' claim and insisted that it already paid just compensation because
the respondents' property was the same one involved in the Pereyra case. Thus, NAPOCOR had no intention to pay just compensation. This circumstance
does not exist in the case at bench.
The rulings  in Macabangkit Sangkay  and  Saludares  are more in consonance with the rules of equity than with the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 67 on
expropriation. Indeed, the practice of construct first, expropriate later is reprehensible and must not be countenanced. The Court, however, must not lose
sight of Section 4, Rule 67 which mandates that just compensation must be determined "as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first." This provision is, first and foremost, part of the Rules which the Court itself promulgated for purposes of uniformity,
among others.
THE GENERAL RULE THAT JUST COMPENSATION MUST BE RECKONED FROM THE TIME OF TAKING OR FILING OF THE COMPLAINT, WHICHEVER CAME
FIRST.
Exns:
1. In Sangkay noted that NPC did not have intention to pay. Did not even inform property owners. There was stealth committed.
2. In Saludares because according to the government the property is already subject of another case which was already paid just compensation.
3. NPC vs Marasigan. No allegation of the time of taking.
Did the SC follow the general principle? No because there is no proper allegation at the time of taking. The government failed to prove when taking took
place. Elements of taking. Iota of taking.
There being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the subject properties at a date preceding the filing of the expropriation complaint, the time of the
taking should be taken to mean as coinciding with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings on January 23, 2006. Hence, the value at the time
of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is
subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
GR is value of property at the time of taking or filing whichever comes first. Except sangkay, saludares, marasigan.
Can the government enter into an amicable settlement as to the value of just compensation? Yes. Pursuant to a compromise agreement. There is nothing
 Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), vs. Jose Gamir-Consuelo
Diaz Heirs Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 218732 November 12, 2018
Flores vs. Lindo, Jr.
648 SCRA 772
Marilag vs. Martinez
G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015
Rosales vs. CA
353 SCRA 179
under the rules or law which prohibits this. But in this case Supreme Court did not allow the payment of interest. Considering that there is already a
contract, it became the law between the parties. Since there is nothing in the contract providing for interest, no legal interest.
Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling seller. Provided all the requisites for its exercise are present,
a private individual cannot resist the state's exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain. Nevertheless, there is nothing that precludes the
government from entering into a negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a property to be devoted for a public purpose. In fact, expropriation
proceedings or court intervention would be unnecessary should a deed of sale be executed where the parties come to an agreement as to the price of the
property to be sold.
In sum, the award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires private property through voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases
where the state exercises its power of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation proceedings and other similar actions, in negotiated sale, there is
an existing contract that governs the relations of the parties and determines their respective rights and obligations. In turn, these contractual stipulations
should be complied with in good faith, unless they are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policies. Hence, the laws relating to
contracts should govern in case of controversy in their application.
It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and respondent does not contain any provision or stipulation for the payment of
interest. Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest.
Rule 68
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.  The mortgage-creditor has the option of either:
1. filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or
2. instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending
on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. 10 The mortgage-creditor has the option
of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. 11 An election of the first bars
recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location
of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself. 13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for
the collection of the debt, and vice versa.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her
husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate
mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner. In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate
mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Since petitioners were deprived of the full use of the ninety-day period within which to pay the judgment debt, the writ of execution and the order to sell
the properties at public auction were null and void. A judgment in an action for foreclosure of mortgage could only be executed in a manner prescribed in
the Rules. Where the order of execution was not in conformity with the Rules, the same is null and void. 27 The order for defendants to pay the judgment
 debt within ninety days, prior to the sale of the foreclosed properties at public auction, is a substantive requirement which cannot be omitted. 28
This 90-day period given in the rule is not a procedural requirement merely; it is a substantive right granted to the mortgage debtor as the last opportunity
to pay the debt and save his mortgaged property from final disposition at the foreclosure sale. It is one of the two steps necessary to destroy what in law
is known as the mortgagor's "equity of redemption," the other being the sale. It may not be omitted. As the writ of execution or the order allowing the
sale of the mortgaged property was issued without granting the mortgage debtor said 90-day period, the order for the sale of the property would be a
denial of a substantial right and void.

GSIS vs. CFI There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale, except those granted by banks or banking institutions
175 SCRA 19 as provided by the General Banking Act 

Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the general rule that there is no right of redemption after the judicial
foreclosure sale has been confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition of petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof at
the public sale. His orders dated January 19, 1976 and February 12, 1976 are null and void.

Santos vs ROD of Manila whether the redemption period of "one year from and after the date of the sale," prescribed in section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
38 SCRA 42 4118, for the redemption of property sold in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, should be computed from the date of the auction sale, in
September 1963, as contended by appellant, or from August 26, 1964, when the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Manila, as held by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his appealed resolution.

This issue has long been settled in favor of the ruling made in the contested resolution. As early as June 30, 1959, We have held that the period of
redemption "begins to run not from the date of sale but from the time of registration of the sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

Huerta Alba Resort vs CA On the distinction between the equity of redemption and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 comes to
the fore. Held the Court in the said case:
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of redemption.

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage – understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale – exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.

Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the
sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale 'when
confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights exceptionally 'allowed by law'  (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are
those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337).  These laws confer on the
 mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure —  after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.

But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking
institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court. . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption.  This is simply the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —

'. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage
debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a
period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be sold to realize the
mortgage debt and costs.'

This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period 'from the date of
service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer." 8 (Emphasis supplied)

Sulit vs CA Section 4 of Rule 64, hereinbefore quoted, merely provides that where there is a balance or residue after payment of the mortgage, the same shall be paid
to the mortgagor. While the expedient course desired by respondent court is commendable, there is nothing in the cited provision from which it can be
inferred that a violation thereof will have the effect of nullifying the sale. The better rule is that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the
sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such
surplus. 27 This is likewise in harmony with the decisional rule that in suing for the return of the surplus proceeds, the mortgagor is deemed to have
affirmed the validity of the sale since nothing is due if no valid sale has been made. 28

In the early case of Caparas vs. Yatco, etc., et al., 29 it was also held that where the mortgagee has been ordered by the court to return the surplus to the
mortgagor or the person entitled thereto, and the former fails to do so and flagrantly disobeys the order, the court can cite the mortgagee for contempt
and mete out the corresponding penalty under Section 3(b) of the former Rule 64 (now Rule 71) of the Rules of Court.

RULE 69: Partition

SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA Oral partition

MARCOS, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ISIDRO BANGI and GENOVEVA
DICCION, represented by NOLITO SABIANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 185745          
October 15, 2014
 
Reyes, J:

G.R. No. 169985               June 15, 2011

MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. CASIMERO
VALDEZ, Respondent.
BRION, J.:

SPOUSES HAYMATON S. GARINGAN AND 1st stage in action for partition: settlement of ownership
JAYYARI PAWAKI, Petitioners,
vs.
HADJI MUNIB SAUPI GARINGAN, HADJA TERO
SAUPI GARINGAN, and HADJA JEHADA SAUPI
GARINGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 144095
April 12, 2005
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 176492               October 20, 2014 MTCC has jurisdiction over real action: title, recovery, condfemnation, foreclposure.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

THIRD DIVISION Not capable of pecuniary estimation

 
G.R. No. 187524               August 5, 2015
 
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA,
DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO
substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE
RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.
 
PERALTA, J.:

RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

CECILIA T. JAVELOSA, REPRESENTED BY Type of actions; accion interdictal. Petitioner failed to prove when how and how respondent. He should have filed forcible entry.
HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MA. DIANA J.
JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. EZEQUIEL TAPUS,
MARIO MADRIAGA, DANNY M. TAPUZ, 1

JUANITA TAPUS AND AURORA MADRIAGA,

Respondents.
REYES, JR., J.
v EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, represented
by DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR. (now DR.
PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM
Vs.
SPOUSES ANASTACIO PERLABARBARONA
G.R. No. 195814
APRIL 4, 2018

MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, - versus - ANTONIO

Q. HERMANO and his wife REMEDIOS
HERMANO, G.R. No. 160914, MARCH 25, 2015

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182953 : October 11, 2010

CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES

RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO, JESUS
OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO,
BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO,
ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEÑA, EDUARDO
ESPINO, ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR
SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ,
ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO, ANITA
TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO, Petitioners, v. MANALITE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA),
Respondent.
cralaw

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205539, October 04, 2017

 VELIA J. CRUZ,, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
MAXIMO AND SUSAN CHRISTENSEN,
Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

G.R. No. 178159               March 2, 2011

 
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA
DIONISIO, Petitioner, 
vs. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:

G.R. No. 202448

JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA, JESUSA
DE LA PENA, JOHNNY DE LA PENA, JOHANNA DE
LA PENA, JOSE DE LA PENA, JESSICA DE LA PENA,
and JAIME ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FIRST DIVISION

MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA

ARCAL, and VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN &
LETTY RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE,
SANCHO and LANIE RICAFRENTE, CORA GONEZ,
SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and FLORIDA RICAFRENTE,
CARMEN TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING
ARCAL, NORA and ALEX BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC,
ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA
ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON,
BALENG and FELY ARGUSON, FIDENG and
CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO,
ENGAY and SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and
NARSING AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and
RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES,
YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER
PAULINO, CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and
PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA, BERTING and
NORMA BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE,
DELLY and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN
JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE, NENA
VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and NONONG
IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES, SONNY and
DONG REYES, and WALLY and DAISY REYES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 127850
January 26, 1998
KAPUNAN, J.:

FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, et al..
G.R. No. 169380
November 26, 2012
 BRION

G.R. No. 150633               November 12, 2003

HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR, represented by
CLETO MELCHOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIO MELCHOR, Respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J
SPOUSES ERWIN C. SANTIAGO and
MARINELA A. SANTIAGO; SPOUSES
GAUDENCIO A. MANIMTIM, JR. and EDITHA P.
MANIMTIM; SPOUSES RAMIRO C. ALBARAN
and ELVA C. ALBARAN; and CESAR F. ODAN,
Petitioners
vs.
NORTHBAY KNITTING, INC., Respondent

G.R. No. 217296

OCTOBER 11, 2017

PERALTA, J.:
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner
vs. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, Respondent
G.R. No. 196795
LEONEN, J.:

SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL AND VICTORIA

SORDEVILLA
vs.
MARIA COPRADA
 
G.R. No. 152423
December 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.:

ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA

ABAYATA, ANTONIO ALEGRE, REMEDIOS
ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS,
LOURDES BAGARESE, et al
vs.
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA AND
REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO
 
G.R. NO. 157985
December 02, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:

Sunflower Neighborhood Assoc. vs. CA 410

SCRA 318

.R. No. 136274

September 3, 2003

CORONA, J.

 
G.R. No. 156995               January 12, 2015
 
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG,
CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS
MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 217694

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.    ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIA
ANACAY GUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL
ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons
claiming authority under them, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202354
September 24, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN,

DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
FERNANDO Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v.
SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND
TERESITA PUNZALAN, Respondents

G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016

Peralta J;

G.R. No. 220389, December 06, 2017

TERESITA BUGAYONG-SANTIAGO, EARL

EUGENE SANTIAGO, EDWARD SANTIAGO,
AND EDGARDO SANTIAGO, JR., Petitioners, v.
TEOFILO BUGAYONG, Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018

PABLO C. HIDALGO, Petitioner, v. SONIA
VELASCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:

GR No 214546
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company VS
Citi Appliance M.C Corporation
October 9, 2019
Leonen, J:

22. BALIBAGO CHURCH, PHILIPPINE INC.,

FAITH BAPTIST INC.. and BAPTIST S.B.C. INC
vs. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST
CHURCH, INC. and REYNALDO GALVAN, G.R.
No. 191527 AUGUST 22, 2016
Rule 71  Contempt 
G.R. No. 190028               February 26, 2014
LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT
MAKATI CITY AND ITS PRESIDING JUDGE, JUDGE
REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV LUCITO V.
ALEJO, ATTY. SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO
J. TING, AND MR. BENITO G. TECHICO,
Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION

(NPC DAMA), represented by its President ROGER
S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS
UNION (NEWU) - NORTHERN LUZON, REGIONAL
CENTER, represented by its Regional President
JIMMY D. SALMAN, in their own individual
capacities and in behalf of the members of the
associations and all affected officers and
employees of National Power Corporation (NPC),
ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE
B. CIRIO, JR., and NECITAS B. CAMAMA, in their
individual capacities as employees of National
Power Corporation, Petitioners,
v.
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC),
NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB),
JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as Chairman of the
National Power Board of Directors (NPB),
ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President - Officer-in-
charge/CEO of National Power Corporation and
Member of National Power Board, and VINCENT
S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P.
CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L.
DOMINGO, NIEVES L. OSORIO and POWER
SECTOR ASSETS and LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
(PSALM), Respondents.
G.R. No. 156208
June 30, 2014
BRION, J.:

LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED:

RESTORING THE INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY
THE FACULTY OF THE UP COLLEGE OF LAW ON
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT

AM No. 10-10-4-SC

March 08, 2011

Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

First Case:
[A.M. NO. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY.
NOEL S. SORREDA.
GARCIA, J.
 
Subsequent Case:
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC             September 11, 2006
RE: LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2005 OF ATTY.
NOEL S. SORREDA.

MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well Nature of indirect contempt.

as in his capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI
TRADING CENTER, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ELENA EMBANG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 158971.

August 25, 2005

CORONA, J.:

PILAR BARREDO-FUENTES, LOURDES J. General requisites for filing indirect contempt

ESTRELLADO, CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR,
and FLORENDA ESTRELLADO - DIAZ,
Complainants
vs. JUDGE ROMEO C. ALBARRACIN, MTCC,
Branch 3, Davao City, Respondent.
A.M. NO. MTJ-05-1587
April 15, 2005
TINGA, J.:

G.R. No. 205956               February 12, 2014
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-
UNJIENG LA'O, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162299               March 26, 2014
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., et al, Petitioners,  Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or civil in nature. A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
vs. BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, et al, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174758
Clear and present danger rule.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in
question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat. 11
There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the
court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand,
consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
 BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, et al,Petitioners,  whose behalf the violated order is made.
vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., et al, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

(CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. 

G.R. No. 189949

March 25, 2015

G.R. No. 199825

BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA,

CIRILA N. MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA,
JOSEFINA PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND
ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS,
CAVITE, INC., Petitioners
vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent
LEONEN, J.:
G.R. No. 223046, November 28, 2019 ]
ENGRACIO U. ANG, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
SPOUSES BENJAMIN M. BITANGA AND MARILYN
ANDAL BITANGA, MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS-STOCK
TRANSFER OFFICE AND WILFRED T. SIY,
RESPONDENTS.

PERALTA, C.J.

11. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,

vs. FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES EDUARDO and
HENEDINA ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA,
MR. JO VITO• C. SORIANO, ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA,
ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO B.
DENSING, JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES,
and ATTY. ERWIN S. OLIVA, G.R. No. 216124 July 19,
2017

Related Doctrine case #25

Diri ko nalang iinsert kay dli ma insert sa column

Differences between Forcible entry and Unlawful detainer

  Forcible entry Unlawful detainer

Dikit vs Act of depriving a Act of unlawfully

Ycasiano person of the material withholding the
or actual possession of possession of a land or
a land or building or of building against or
taking possession from a landlord,
thereof by force, vendor , vendee, or
intimidation, threat, other persons after the
strategy or stealth, expiration or
against the will or termination of the
without the consent of detainer’s right to hold
the possessor possession by virtue of
a contract, express or
implied.

With Illegal at the outset Possession is legal but

respect to because his or her becomes unlawful
possession possession thereof is upon the expiration of
made against the will one’s right to possess
or without the consent the property after, for
of the former instance, the
possessor termination or
violation of a lease
contract.

In terms of a Not required by law Required

demand to before filing of the
vacate action

Additional Plaintiff must allege in Plaintiff need not have

Sumulong the complaint and prior physical
vs ca prove that he was in possession of the
 prior physical property
possession of the
property in litigation
until he was deprived
thereof by the
defendant

Prescriptive One year prescriptive One year prescriptive

period period generally period is counted from
reckoned from the the date  of the last
date of actual entry on demand to vacate
the land.

If done through stealth

– counted from the
time the plaintiff
discovered the entry.