G.R. No.

L-8957             April 29, 1957 G.R. No. L-42288             February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-

vs. appellee,
ANDRES O. FERRER, defendant-appellee. vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208 January 26, 1995
JACINTO MAPPALA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISPULO A. NUÑEZ, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, respondent.
G.R. No. 94521 October 28, 1991
OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSIONER HAYDEE B. YORAC OF THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 94626 October 28, 1991
OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER ON ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C.
BINAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 87743 August 21, 1990 G.R. No. 115962           February 15, 2000

ROBERT F. ONG, petitioner DOMINADOR REGALADO, JR., petitioner,

vs. vs.
MARIA TERESITA HERRERA-MARTINEZ, THE CITY COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
COUNCIL OF MANILA and THE CITY TREASURER OF PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MANILA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 211789-90               March 17, 2015
DR. REY B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:
On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC),issued PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010
(reassignment order)5 directing the reassignment of several PHIC
officers and employees.
On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the
PHIC’s intranet service, to all PHIC officers and employees,
including the following: (1) Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-
President (VP); (2) Masiding Alonto, PHIC Regional VP; and (3)
Khaliquzzaman M. Macabato, PHIC Assistant Regional VP.
On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the
reassignment order.
In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard
A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman of the Board of PHIC and
former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the
COMELEC on January 18, 2010, a complaint against Aquino and
Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive VPand
Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
8737in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. The case was docketed
as E.O. Case No. 10-003.
On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition10 before the
COMELEC reiterating his request and maintaining that PhilHealth
SO No. 16-2010 is beyond the coverage of Resolution No. 8737.
The COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the appropriate
information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881; it dismissed, for lack of merit,
the complaint against Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.
The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of BP
881 when he directed the transfer/reassignment of the PHIC
officers and employees within the declared election period without
its prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h) considers an
election offense for "any public official who makes or causes the
transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in the
civil service x x x within the election period except upon prior
approval of the Commission."
On December 7, 2012, Aquino sought reconsideration15 of the
COMELEC’s October 19, 2012 resolution.
The COMELEC agreed with the complainants’ position and ruled
that the word "whatever" in Section 261(h) of BP 881 expanded the
coverage of the prohibition so as to include any movement of
personnel, including reassignment, among others. In fact, to dispel
any ambiguity as regards Section 261(h)’s prohibition, Resolution
No. 8737 defined the word "transfer" as including any personnel
action.
The COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.
ISSUE : WON  the COMELEC validly found prima facie case
against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to
Section 261(h).
HELD : COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid
A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these
provisions is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the framers of
the Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with
powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase
"transfer or detail whatever" found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as
including any personnel action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino
questions this COMELEC interpretation as an unwarranted
expansion of the legal prohibition which he argues renders the
COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.
the Court already clarified the interpretation of the term whatever
as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in relation to the terms
transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General’s
position, this Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are
modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same
office or agency, during the election period is covered by the
prohibition.
Read in the light of this ruling, we affirm the COMELEC’s
interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we
find the Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative
intent
Thus, to reiterate and emphasize – the election law’s prohibition
on transfer or detail covers any movement of personnel from one
station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency
when made or caused during the election period.
As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days
before and ends thirty (30) days after the election date pursuant to
Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881.
This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these same
provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from setting a period
different from that provided thereunder.
G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60             February 17, 2003
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs.
HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for
Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor
Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a)
and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261
(a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s
Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the
Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations
for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC
en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99
were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph
of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal
prosecution to persons who voluntarily give information and
willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling.
The Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the
Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus,
Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.
Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of
vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of
immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote
was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following
paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor,
recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as
principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said
paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly
testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or
proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony
were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt
such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false
testimony.
2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-
buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to
warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could
be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the
truth.
3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are
exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the
proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time
when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed
sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying.
It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given
information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified
in Crim. Case No. 7034-99.
4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all
Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are,
however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC
to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving
election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be
revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its
judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect
the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good,
or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can
be done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect withdrew the
deputation granted by the COMELEC.
G.R. No. 157950               June 8, 2005
LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION;
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); DR. NILO L.
ROSAS, Regional Director, DECS-NCR; ATTY. RICARDO
T. SIBUG, Superintendent of Schools, Pasay City; MRS.
ALICIA G. BENZON, Principal IV, Coordinating
Principal, South District, Pasay City; MRS. MYRNA
TEVES, Teacher, Gotamco Elementary School, Pasay
City; and MRS. AIDA RUMBAOA, Teacher, Villanueva
Elementary School, Pasay City, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has
been occupying the position of Teacher III since September 1,
1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is
currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in
Pasay City.
On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools
Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division
Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-
Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent
Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both
schools are in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-
passed, petitioner Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest
contesting such designation. The latter, however, denied the
protest. The petitioner then brought the matter to respondent Dr.
Nilo L. Rosas, Regional Director of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) for National Capital Region (NCR)
who, likewise, denied the protest.
Issue: Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error when
it upheld the findings of the Civil Service Commission that protest
will not lie in absence of appointment/promotion.
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security
of tenure on the person named.

Ruling: Yes. Indeed, there is a marked difference between

an appointment and a designation. The Court had the occasion to
expound the distinction in this wise:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority

vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent
official - . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment

because it, likewise, involves the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
G.R. No. 199139               September 9, 2014 G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018

ELSIE S. CAUSING, Petitioner, ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION

vs. ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY. JOHNIELLE KEITH P.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, NIETO, Respondents.
SR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 209387
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Dela Cruz was charged with illegal possession of firearms, proved
with the following elements: "(a) the existence of the subject
firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
it does not have the license or permit to possess the same;
Dela Cruz argued that when he arrived at the Domestic Port of
Cebu on May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a porter to buy a
ticket, claiming that someone must have placed the unlicensed
firearms inside his bag during the period he was away from it.
Hence, this petition contending that his Constitutional rights to
privacy was violated
ISSUE: Whether or not herein Petitioner's contention is valid
RULING: The Petition is DENIED.
The Court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the
accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as
evidence against [the] accused.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to be
unreasonable. However, this court lays down the exceptions where
warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search
of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The
trial court’s findings show that petitioner presented his bag for
scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-
ray machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily G.R. No. 190779               March 26, 2010
submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities.
ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments

among family members, and families are entitled to protection by
the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they are free to choose and enjoy
their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends,
cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends
that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State
policies. As a response, COMELEC defends that constitutional
freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be abridged to
some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in

including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
“firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?

RULING:
NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its JUANITO R. RIMANDO, Petitioner,
ordinary sense and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that vs.
the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA O.
MAGNO, Respondents.
what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general
words shall be understood in a general sense. The term “firearm”
in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun ban
during the election period. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the
term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban
is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear,
intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary
citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an
airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether
brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which
is sought to be averted.

G.R. No. 176364               September 18, 2009

G.R. No. 223505

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND

PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO),
REGION 7 CHAPTER, INC., Petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND/OR ITS
COMMITTEE ON THE BAN ON FIREARMS AND
SECURITY PERSONNEL (CBFSP),, Respondents