RULE 108 A: Yes.
Professional character and in the course of
Q: X filed a petition for change of nickname before the
RTC. Can the RTC take cognizance of the case?
A: Yes. RA9048 only gives the petitioner the option to
have the correction under administrative proceedings
before the LCR that is less expensive and more
expeditious.
RA 9048
Q: Remedy:
(1) Denial of the petition; and
(2) Adverse decision
A:
(1) Appeal to the judicial courts or file a petition under
R103 or R108; and
(2) Appeal to the Civil Registry General
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Q: Is the unlawful examination of bank accounts
inadmissible?
A: No. The inadmissibility must be based on law.
(Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan)
QUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS
Q: What is tender years or tender age?
A: A child under 7 years of age
Q: Remedy for Errors or Questions on Competence
(Icutanim v. Hernandez, GR L-1709, June 08 1948)
A: Page 488
Q: Effect of Relationship
A: People v. Daen, Jr., GR 112015, 1995
Q: Any communication, priest: What if nagkita lang
kayo sa Session then you engaged or communicated
with the priest?
A: Not privileged. “Any communication” is still
qualified by the provision that the same is made in the
professional character and in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs.
Q: What if nasa loob kayo ng confession room?
A: Of course, privileged.
Q: What is nasa loob kayo ng church, under the priest’
vocational capacity, pero nakaupo kayo sa may
benches reserved for churchgoers (not sa loob ng
confession room), privileged ba?
discipline enjoined by the church.
Q: However, paano kapag may nakarinig sainyo na
other person tapos kaaway pala nung nagconfess,
pwede ba i-disclose ni third party?
A: Yes. Under the Amended Rules the communication
shall remain privileged, even in the hands of a third
person who may have obtained the information,
provided that the original parties to the communication
took reasonable precaution to protect its confidentiality.
Lawyers
Q: Is the information given to a person who
represented himself as a lawyer but not licensed,
admissible? On what grounds?
A: Privileged Communication Rule. The
disqualification under S24, R130 paragraph (b) now
covers a person who is not a lawyer, but is reasonably
believed by the client to be licensed to engage in the
practice
Q: Can a person invoke the lawyer-client privilege rule
in order to conceal his identity?
A: No. Except… (Regala v. Sandiganbayan) Page 491
Physician/Psychotherapist
Q: Who is a psychotherapist?
A: A "psychotherapist" is: (a) A person licensed to
practice medicine engaged in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, or (b) A
person licensed as a psychologist by the government
while similarly engaged. (S23c, R130)
Q: X the partner (not married) of Y, was made witness
for the issue on incompetency of Y. The adverse party
claims that X is always present on X’s mental therapy
sessions. Can X invoke privilege communication?
A: Yes. Under the Amended Rules, the privilege
communication also applies to persons, including
members of the patient's family, who have participated
in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient under the
direction of the physician or psychotherapist.
Q: Hypothetical Problems;
A: Not applicable (Lim v. CA, GR 91114) Page 492
Q: Physicians allowed to be expert
A: Provided that they do not divulged kwa (Lim v. CA,
GR 91114) Page 492
Q: Autopsical Information
A: He can only provide autopsy information but not
when he was treating the living patient
Q: Hospital Records during discovery procedure
A: Not allowed (Chan v. Chan)
Public Officers
Q: Presidential Communications Rule
A: “likely contains important evidence” (Neri v. Senate)
Page 493
Amended Rules:
1. Witnesses; Their Qualifications. (S21, R130) —
Except as provided in the next succeeding sectio n All
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
The disqualification on the child witness is no
longer relevant with the Rule on Examination of
Child Witness, which provides that every child is
presumed qualified to be a witness (Rule on
Examination of Child Witness, Sec. 6)
2. Disqualification by Reason of Marriage. (S23,
R130) — During their marriage, neither the
husband or the wife cannot testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants
Under the original Section 22, the disqualification
includes testifying in favor of, or against the
spouse. The amended rule removed the
disqualification on testifying in favor of the spouse.
This means that with or without the consent of the
affected spouse the other spouse may now testify
in favor of the former.
3. Lawyer/Counsel (S24, R130): The disqualification
under paragraph (b) now covers a person who is
not a lawyer, but is reasonably believed by the
client to be licensed to engage in the practice, as
well as any other person assisting the attorney.
The amended rule also includes exceptions to the
disqualification, such as when the
commination/advice thereon pertains to:
a. The furtherance of crime or fraud, which the
client knew or reasonably could have known to
be a crime or fraud;
b. Communication relevant to an issue between
parties who claim through the same deceased
client, regardless of whether the claims are by
testate or intestate or by inter vivos
transaction;
c. Communication relevant to an issue of breach
of duty by the lawyer to his or her client, or by
the client to his or her lawyer;
d. Communication relevant to an issue concerning
an attested document to which the lawyer is an
attesting witness;
e. Communication relevant to a matter of
common interest between two or more clients
if the communication was made by any of them
to a lawyer retained or consulted in common,
when offered in an action between any of the
clients, unless they have expressly agreed
otherwise
4. Physician/Psychotherapist: The coverage of
Paragraph (c) was amended. It now states
physician, and includes a psychotherapist or
person reasonably believed by the patient to be
authorized to practice medicine or psychotherapy.
Psychotherapist was defined as a person licensed:
(a) to practice medicine engaged in the diagnosis
or treatment of a mental or emotional condition; or
(b) as a psychologist by the government while
similarly engaged. It also applies to persons,
including members of the patient's family, who
have participated in the diagnosis or treatment of
the patient under the direction of the physician or
psychotherapist.
As with the old rule, the application of the rule is
still limited to civil cases
Under the old rule the privilege pertains to “any
advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to
act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient”. The new rule pertains to
“any confidential communication made for the
purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
physical, mental or emotional condition, including
alcohol or drug addiction, between the patient and
his or her physician or psychotherapist,”
regardless of whether the information would
blacken the reputation of the patient.
5. Minister/Priest: The disqualification under
paragraph (d) was broaden to include any person
reasonably believed to be a minister or priest. The
privilege now covers any communication, and not
just confession made to or advice given. However,
it appears that “any communication” is still
qualified by the provision that the same is made in
the professional character and in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the
minister or priest belongs.
6. (NEW) Third Person: The communication shall
remain privileged, even in the hands of a third
person who may have obtained the information,
provided that the original parties to the
communication took reasonable precaution to
protect its confidentiality.
This last paragraph was added under the revised
rule and states that the communication, even in the
hands of a third person who may have obtained the
information, provided that the original parties to
the communication took reasonable precaution to
protect its confidentiality. Thus, if there is no
reasonable precaution to protect its confidentiality
then it may be construed as waiver thereof and
hence, not covered by the privilege
7. Parental and Filial Privilege: No person shall be
compelled to testify against his or her parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants, except when such testimony is
indispensable in a crime against that person or
by one parent against the other.
The new rule incorporates Article 215 of the
Family Code, which is mandatory in character (as
compared to the directory character of the old
rule), and provides for the exception when
testimony may be compelled, i.e., when the
testimony is indispensable in a crime against that
person or by one parent against the other
8. (NEW) Privilege Relating to Trade Secrets: A
person cannot be compelled to testify about any
trade secret, unless the non-disclosure will conceal
fraud or otherwise work injustice. When disclosure
is directed, the court shall take such protective
measure as the interest of the owner of the trade
secret and of the parties and the furtherance of
justice may require
This is a new insertion. There is no similar
provision under the old rules. However, while this
provision was not under the old rule, it has long
been recognized that there are other privileged
matters that not mentioned by Rule 130. Among
them are the following: (a) editors may not be
compelled to disclose the source of published
news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose
for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits. Jurisprudence has consistently
acknowledged the private character of trade
secrets. There is a privilege not to disclose one’s
trade secrets. The Supreme Court has declared that
trade secrets and banking transactions are among
the recognized restrictions to the right of the
people to information as embodied in the
Constitution. The drafters of the Constitution also
unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
security matters and intelligence information,
trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws)
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted
from compulsory disclosure (Air Philippines Corp.
v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, 13 December
2007)
A trade secret is a process or device intended for
continuous use in the operation of the business, for
example, a machine or formula, but can be a price
list or catalogue or specialized customer list. Trade
secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor,
discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated
as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be
granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade
secret by one who obtained the information "in
confidence" or through a "confidential relationship.
(Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No.
172835, 13 December 2007)
In Cocoland Development Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 98458, 17 July
1996, it was ruled that any determination by
management as to the confidential nature of
technologies, processes, formulae or other so
-called trade secrets must have a substantial
factual basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. The
Court rejected the employer’s naked contention
that its own determination as to what constitutes a
trade secret should be binding and conclusive upon
the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said that to rule
 otherwise would be to permit an employer to label However, evidence of a conviction is not
almost anything a trade secret, and thereby create admissible if the conviction has been the
a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss subject of an amnesty or annulment of the
an employee on the pretext that the latter conviction
somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact
there be none at all to speak of. Hence, in Cocoland,
the parameters in the determination of trade
secrets were set to be such substantial factual basis
that can withstand judicial scrutiny.

However, for compelling reasons, the courts may

lift the veil of confidentiality which shields trade
secrets. (Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc.,
G.R. No. 172835, 13 December 2007)

Thus, under the new rule, a person cannot be

compelled to testify about any trade secret, unless
the non-disclosure will conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice . Even when disclosure is directed,
the court shall still take such protective measure as
the interest of the owner of the trade secret and of
the parties and the furtherance of justice may
require.

EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS

Amended Rules:

Q: Can you impeach a witness merely because he

was convicted?
A: No. Unless the witness was previously
convicted by final judgment involving: (1) a
punishable penalty exceeding 1 year, regardless of
whether the crime involves moral turpitude, or
(2) a crime of moral turpitude, regardless of the
penalty.
Q: What if there was already amnesty?
A: You can no longer impeach.
Q: What if annulment of the conviction?
A: You can no longer impeach.

1. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of

Crime. — For the purpose of impeaching a
witness, evidence that he or she has been
convicted by final judgment of a crime shall
be admitted if (a) the crime was punishable
by a penalty in excess of one year; or (b) the
crime involved moral turpitude, regardless
of the penalty.
 QUAMTO
AAA, 12 year-old victim, positively identified the
accused who is his father who molested her.
However, the physical finding that AAA did not
sustain any injury or hymenal laceration does not
impair the prosecution's case. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision.
Is the accused guilty of the crime charged
notwithstanding the uncorroborated and
incredulous testimony of the private complainant?
Yes. The foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and
not the findings of the medico-legal officer.
(Manuel Ramilo v. People, G.R. No. 234841, 2019)
AAA, who was thirteen years old and the sister of
suspect X, was sleeping in the other room when
the latter allegedly raped her. AAA did not tell
anyone about the incident because she was afraid
that no one would believe her. Appellant likewise
threatened AAA by telling her that she would be
killed if someone finds out about the incident. The
Police and the Medical Officer examined her on
separate days. X contend that the testimony of
AAA is full of inconsistencies and, hence, should
not be given credence.
Should the testimony of AAA be given sufficient
weight and credit?
Discrepancies referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the veracity or
detract from the essential credibility of a witness’
declarations, as long as these are coherent and
intrinsically believable on the whole.
Furthermore, it is an accepted doctrine in rape
cases that in the absence of evidence of improper
motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify
against the accused, her testimony deserves
credence. (People v. Elmer Moya G.R. No. 228260,
June 10, 2019)
AAA, who was then 6 years old, was looking for
playmates along their neighborhood when
appellant called her to go inside the latter's house.
Once inside, appellant forcibly had sex with AAA.
Afterwards, AAA put on her clothes and went
home but decided not to tell her parents about the
incident because she was afraid of the appellant.
However, she told her brother about what
appellant did to her. Sometime, while AAA and her
brother were having an argument, BBB, the
victim's mother, heard her son teasing AAA saying
"op-opya ah te iniyut da-ah eh Lamon," which
means "shut up because you were sexually abused
by Lamon." Upon hearing such words, BBB
immediately confronted AAA about the veracity of
her brother's statement to which AAA confessed
that she was indeed raped by the appellant.
Should the testimony of AAA be given full weight
and credit?
Yes. It must be considered that AAA was only six
(6) years old when she was raped and only nine
(9) years old when she took the witness stand.
When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only
her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which
she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. (People v.
Bay-od G.R. NO. 238176 | January 14, 2019)
King was charged with Murder for fatally stabbing
Josep. To prove the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation, the prosecution
introduced a text message, which King’s estranged
wife Yna had sent to Josep on the eve of his death,
reading: "Honey, pa2tayin u ni King. Mtgal n nyang
plano i2. Mg ingat u bka ma tsugi k."
a. A subpoena ad testificandum was served on
Yna for her to be presented for the purpose of
identifying her cellphone and the text
message. King objected to her presentation on
the ground of marital privilege. Resolve.
The objection should be sustained on the ground
of the marital disqualification rule (Sec. 22, Rule
130), not on the ground of the “marital privilege”
communication rule (Sec. 24, Rule 130). The
marriage between King and Yna is still subsisting
and the situation at bar does not come under the
exceptions to the disqualification by reason of
marriage.
b. Suppose King’s objection in question A was
sustained. The prosecution thereupon
announced that it would be presenting Jeric’s
wife Flour to identify Jeric’s cellphone bearing
Yna’s text message. King objected again on the
same ground. Rule on the objection
messages are regarded as electronic evidence, and
in a recent case (Ang v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R.
No. 182835, April 20, 2010), the Supreme Court
ruled that the Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings and administrative proceeding, not to
criminal actions

The objection should be overruled. The testimony

of Flour is not covered by the said marital
disqualification rule because she is not the wife of
King. Besides, Flour will identify only the
cellphone as that of her husband Jeric, not the
messages therein which to her are hearsay.

c. If King’s objection in question B was

overruled, can he object to the presentation of
the text message on the ground that it is
hearsay?

No, Yna’s text message in Jeric’s cellphone is not

covered by the hearsay rule because it is regarded
in the rules of evidence as independently relevant
statement: the text message is not to prove the
truth of the fact alleged therein but only as to the
circumstances of whether or not premeditation
exists.

d. Suppose that shortly before he expired, Jeric

was able to send a text message to his wife
Flour reading "Nasaksak ako. D na me
makahinga. Si King ang may gawa ni2." Is this
text message admissible as a dying
declaration? Explain. (2010 Bar)

Yes, the text message is admissible as a dying

declaration since the same came from the victim
who “shortly” expired and it is in respect of the
cause and circumstance of his death. The decisive
factor that the message was made and sent under
consciousness of an impending death, is evidently
attendant from the victim’s statement: “D na me
makakahinga” and the fact that he died shortly
after he sent the message. However, cellphone