MAREK J~DRASZEWSKI

ON THE PATHS OF CARTESIAN FREEDOM:

SARTRE AND LEVINAS

Eleutheria is the Greek term for freedom. Eleutheria means release

from bonds. Hence, it is freedom comprehended as liberation. Libera-
tion comprises but a moment of negation: the rejection of fetters, the
throwing off of irons. That moment of negation, to this day, weighs
heavily in the colloquial comprehension of freedom. Any restraints are
rejected spontaneously in the name of man's freedom and dignity. Is
such a reaction right?
The reflections of two contemporary philosophers, namely of Jean
Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas, project an interesting light on this
problem. However, their conceptions are not to be fully understood
without reference to the philosophy of Descartes, who marked out the
paths of modern thinking concerning freedom.
The basic text dealing with the problems of freedom is a certain frag-
ment included in the fourth of his "Meditationes de prima philosophia."
Descartes finds there, in the first place, that the will, which means
freedom of decision, may be pronounced in oneself to such a degree,
that one cannot find anything greater than it. That freedom, compared
with God's freedom, seems at first sight to be something minor.
Nevertheless, when considered in itself, in a formal and accurate way, it
proves to be equal to God's freedom. It depends only on this, that we
mayor may not do something, or that we may confirm or negate
something, that intellect proposes to us and which, at the same time, we
feel that we are not forced to do either by any external power.
In this text attention is to be paid to the expression "I may." I mayor
may not do something. 1 may confirm, or deny. This concerns the
exterior side of activity. However, "I may" also refers to a much deeper
realm - there where, in a measure, man's deeds are generated where
he can, in an unhampered way, step forward to either negation or
confirmation. "I may" became a peculiar "credo" of modern man,
together with all the positive as well as negative consequences of that
conviction.
Descartes, proceeding from that "I may," formulated in his "Disserta-
tion on Method" the principles of temporary morality, which had to be
671
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol XXVII, 671-683.
© 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
672 MAREK J~DRASZEWSKI

composed of three or four principles of behavior, only. The most

ambiguous and dangerous of these seems to be the second principle,
according to which once one has undertaken a decision, concerning
some determined behavior, one should be ready to completely follow
through in its performance, even if that principle were very dubious. "I
may" led Descartes to consistency with one's own convictions as the
criterion for choices. This attitude is expressed frequently in the
formula: "I will be myself," which seems to exclude any interior
development and which may bear fruit in certain tragedy in personal
and social life, when it turns out that the chosen (and consequently
kept) principle of behavior is something fundamentally bad. This
temporary morality protects, as a matter of fact, only one value, namely
freedom itself. In this way freedom proves to be the highest value in the
philosophy of Descartes.
Jean Paul Sartre referred to this conception of freedom in his essay
"La liberte cartesienne." I Sartre imputes to Descartes a failure to follow
his logic through to its ultimate consequences (!) the result most
probably of his conformity: the author of the "Dissertation on Method"
would not share the fate of Galileo and, therefore, did not draw all the
conclusions of his doctrine.
According to Sartre Cartesian freedom is composed of two moments.
But when man enters the world of mathematical problems, he finds
himself in a situation, in which everything is already established: both
the mathematical values and the method of behavior. In solving a
certain problem, man brings neither anything new into the world, nor
enriches it by any truth. Nevertheless, by pacing out the ground of
mathematical method, he experiences the feeling of unhampered free-
dom. Hence, in the freedom of the mathematician there is a striking
peculiar paradox: his freedom actualizes (and constrains) his expression
of agreement with the truth. In Sartre's opinion the first moment of the
Cartesian conception of freedom depends just on that. This is positive
freedom, in the sense of agreement with already established truths.
However, the present existence of truth demands man's ascertainment.
In order to ascertain it, he must first project himself into that world, he
must want to seek out confirmation or negation. That is, only he, who
can say "yes", or "no." Every man is entitled to that freedom, because
the ability to correctly judge and distinguish truth and falsehood is - as
Descartes ascertained in "Dissertation on Method" - from its nature,
equal to all persons. To be free does not mean to do all that one wants
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 673

to do. It is a question of wanting that which is possible. Here we find

some limitation, but also a certain efficiency and a certain positive
aspect of freedom.
The truth we have discovered demands its introduction into life. The
existence of some truth and the very veracity of the world depends
upon man. Man must submit to the truth discovered by himself, both in
the intellectual and moral sense: he must cause the existence of truth
and live nobly. Here also - according to Sartre - begins the paradox
of Cartesian freedom. Man, by cognizing, enters the order already
established by God. His whole soul is penetrated by the interior light of
certainty, to such a degree, that he may only ascertain and acknowledge
the previously established order of the world. It happens so, because
clarity and expressiveness - the features of truth - are characters of
the order established by Being, being positiveness itself - (that means)
by God. It is the same in the case of the moral order. Clear vision of the
transcendent Good conditions man's activity in the direction of that
Good. Hence, man appears as he, who is the source neither of truth,
nor of good. He finds the already existing truth and follows the good
established by another. Hence, the question is generated: is man at all
free, considering that he depends in such measure upon God?
It is true, that in Descartes there exists also a second moment of
freedom, namely the moment of negation. Man is endowed with the
force of negation. He is able to say "no" to that which is untrue; he has
the possibility of negating falsehood, that means negating a negation.
The Cartesian methodical doubt is the expression of that force, where
Cogito doubts the existence of everything, except the certainty of that
very doubt. However - according to Sartre - that second moment of
the Cartesian theory of freedom was not followed to the end. It is
difficult to find in it the justification of that feeling of pride that results
from the fact, that mere man - and only he - is the entirely
independent author of his deeds. Descartes stopped as if half way, even
though, in his doctrine there are elements which command going still
further in the direction of negation.
But man may be free to such a degree, that is, autonomous, if he
manages to escape from God, if he manages to abandon the order
established by God. This can be done under one condition: if man
understands fully the essence of his freedom. Descartes stated in the
fourth "Meditation," that man's freedom, considered in a precise and
formal way, does not differ from God's freedom. If that be so, then
674 MAREK JJ;:DRASZEWSKI

Descartes in speaking about God's freedom spoke in unconscious

manner about man's freedom. However, the Cartesian God is God -
according to Sartre - most free among all gods. He is fully God, the
Creator, who created everything: beings, their essences, the laws of the
world, and first principles. In its essence, freedom, which is expressed
in God's freedom, comprises then the requirement of absolute auton-
omy. The free act is an absolutely new product, is the creation of a
quite new order, is the foundation of truth. If the description of God's
freedom is only a development of man's freedom, then, man's freedom,
properly understood, does not require agreement with the order previ-
ously established by God. The two ages following Descartes - the age
of crisis of Faith and the age the crisis of Science - by going further
down the roads suggested by him, saw man comprehend that creative
freedom, which Descartes still attributed to God, is to be found only
and exclusively in man.

Descartes - in Sartre's opinion - as both a dogmatic scientist and a

good Christian, allowed himself to be crushed by the order of eternal
truths and by the system of values ordained by God. This happened
because Descartes stopped half way on his march to freedom. As far as
Sartre was concerned he did not want to be crushed and therefore he
chose the uncompromising way. In L 'Etre et Ie Neant, then, he stated,
that to be man means to tend to be God, because man is, in a
fundamental sense, a desire to be God. 2
This is proved by the analysis of facticity (facticite). Freedom is
actualized only in a situation. It is composed of: the place where a man
lives, his past, things which surround him and which may become his
tools, other men, death. This situation is lightened by man's choice. In
the light of choice only, the world is presented to me in a situation:
there develops that which may threaten me and also that which may
turn out to be helpful. Hence, according to the statement from L'Etre et
Ie Neant, freedom is found in a situation only, and a situation known
through freedom alone. 3
Freedom must be, in the first place, rooted. It is Orestes, the hero of
Sartre's Flies who protests against "the freedom of yarn, which is torn
from its cobweb by the wind and sways in air, some meters above the
ground." To be a man (from) somewhere is possible only on the
condition that a man discloses as being (for) himself, that is somebody
who is not - when he discloses himself as a lack, when, after disclosing
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 675

that lack, he sets before himself a goal. When a man, at last, sets that
goal before himself, he chooses himself. In the light of that choice,
everything acquires a certain unity: the accomplished choice marshals
and explains facts, organizing them in one unity, one that it is possible
to understand. "Here," the present situation, enables our leaning
forward in the direction of "there," towards the new position, which is
the goal of the choice undertaken. Understood in such a way the
situation is a concrete and not to be repeated situation. There does not
exist any absolute point from which we can compare objectively and
evaluate each and all given situations. Every particular person actu-
alizes himself only and exclusively from his own situation. In such a way
everybody becomes his or her own gate. 4
It is not easy to be the gate for oneself. Here exists a way of life
where there is no place for any regret or remorse. Man is that being
who does not know the words "beg pardon." Whom has one to
apologize to, if one is solely responsible for the world? Man is
responsible for world because only he forms its image. God does not
exist. Man aspiring to be God takes over divine prerogatives. He, also,
decides what is good and what evil. He is absolutely free.
The first result of the conception of freedom designed in such a way,
is man's being sentenced to freedom and to carrying on his shoulders
responsibility not only for the whole world, but also for himself. This
responsibility depends on consciousness of being the unquestionable
author of some event, or thing. Man's all-embracing responsibility, is
more than responsibility for himself. Not being the foundation of his
own being, he is in a way forced to bear responsibility. Suddenly, it
comes out, that he is completely abandoned, that means lonely, in the
world, without any help or support and, at the same time, involved in
that world and responsible for it. Hence, he discovers, that he is
sentenced to responsibility. In the light of that condemnation his
freedom presents itself as exile and solitude. According to L'Etre et Ie
Neant man's freedom finds no explanation for itself.' Therefore it is
absurd freedom. Such freedom lacks all foundation for further choices.
Moreover, those further choices may prove to be the negation of the
choices just made. Man, after all, impresses us more as a creature who
wrestles with his choices, than as one who finds in them liberation. He
has no choice to which he can be faithful to the end. Only one aspira-
tion, one discovered by existential analysis, remains in him perma-
nently, namely, to become God. However, the accomplishment of that
676 MAREK J~DRASZEWSKI

purpose is impossible, because the very aim is internally contradictory.

In the end, because of this man appears to be a vain passion (passion
inutile).6
Absurd freedom leads to absurdity of freedom. But man must
choose. For Descartes freedom was expressed in the words, "I may."
Sartre's radical freedom takes another form: "I must may," "I must
choose," "I must decide." In freedom, hence, inheres a peculiar com-
pulsion: I must choose, because I cannot not choose (to be free). Hence,
the compulsion that means lack of freedom is the result of radical
Cartesian freedom.
The summit of the absurdity of freedom is the necessity of taking on
the responsibility for the absurdity. Man, being condemned to respon-
sibility, is responsible for his absurdity as a "vain passion" and a never
realized God. We may speak then of the curse of freedom itself. Free
man - because he is liberated from the rule of the gods - curses his
freedom. Electra's imprecation from Sartre's Flies is here an example.
She accuses her brother Orestes for robbing her at the cost of a free
deed - the cost of a crime - of the only treasure she had possessed -
of revery and calm.

Orestes, through crime, was born as if for a second time. The first
act of freedom, by which he determined himself and broke out of "the
freedom of yarn," was a crime - a deed aimed at another man. This
appears to be the ultimate consequence of freedom, comprehended as
"I must can." The presence of the other is but a threat to my freedom -
it alienates me. To enforce my power I must, in the first place, remove
all obstacles. However, Sartre does speak in L'Etre et Ie Neant of the
free approbation of others' freedom, of the free acknowledgement of
the limits of my freedom. Still he himself seems to be more consistent
when he orders Garcine, the hero of his play Huis clos, to say, "Hell is
other people."
Is crime to be the last word on the contemporary path ways of
freedom? According to Emmanuel Levinas, that would indeed be so, if
European philosophy were to continue on the plane of autonomous
thought. Autonomous thought cares only for the salvation of the
subject's autonomy. A subject is free in the relation to surrounding
reality, when he pays no attention to its separateness and diversity,
caring, above all, to create and preserve his own identity - to be and to
remain The Same (Ie Meme). Freedom in its solicitude for identity tries
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 677

to subdue that diversity, making it a part of its possessions. It uses

violence against diversity and, therefore, that diversity ceases to be - in
his own eyes - diversity. According to Levinas, there exists, in the
history of European philosophy, a whole current of thought, which is
the expression of this kind of freedom - restricted by nothing - the
spontaneousness and autonomy of subject. This tradition of thought
reaches as far back as Socrates' times and his conception of maieutic
truth. It attains its triumph in Descartes' times, when truth came to
depend on the expression of agreement on the part of will with some
judgement. Truth dependent upon some choice! Here there is not only
the possibility of error, but, simultaneously, is a stress on the magnitude
and independence of the human I who decides the truth. The process of
making subject to oneself the diversity of world is carried out by the
help of mediation - the use of neutral concepts. Abstraction "dilutes"
the concreteness of the cognized object, and its diversity vanishes in the
form of objective explanation concerning the generality of things. The
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who wants to describe all beings
(Seiendes) on the horizon of being (Sein), is the last - according to
Levinas - great manifestation of this very way of thinking. The
philosophy of That Same is hence connected with certain power, and -
more precisely - with the certain violence used by the subject against
the cognized diversity of the Other (l'Autre). As a possession the
freedom of the Other is not respected, rather one tries to deprive him
of his independence. Cognized (understood, comprised) things are, in
essence, "defenseless" before the arbitrary subject. And if that diversity
is an Other (l'Autrui)? The Other may oppose to my power his own
power - here is the source of wars. Here we return to Sartre's thought:
that freedom which "must may" is at the bottom of violence and war.
Hence, our question returns: must crime be the last word of the modern
road of freedom?
Descartes, in the third of his "Meditationes" analyzes the fact of the
subjects possession of the idea of God. Levinas commenting upon that
fragment of the "Meditationes" finds that a certain relationship is to be
found between the infinite God and the subject. This assessment
depends not on the subject's possession of the idea of God, and his
uniting with that idea, because the subject cannot include in itself the
Infinite, nor on possessed idea's uniting with the subject, because the
human I is radically separated from Infinite. The relation desribed is
called by Levinas - the idea of the Infinite in me, or the metaphysical
678 MAREK JJ;:DRASZEWSKI

relation. It is fundamentally characteristic of it that the radical separa-

tion of its members does not cause their decline while the same time
those members are not reduced to some totality (totalite) wherein there
is already no place for their diversity. The idea of the Infinite comprises
something exceptional, states Levinas, namely, its ideatum transcends
its idea. 7 That idea differs from all remaining ones, because human
thought tends to things which it does not comprise. Here between
thought and its content there exists a precipice, incomparable to the
distance which occurs in representations between the act of intellect
and its subject. The Infinite, is absolutely diverse.
The idea of the Infinite has to perform - in Levinas' thought - the
role of a "formal plan," or of a "formal structure" of the metaphysical
relation. Due to it the autonomous philosophy would be overcome and
the possibility of heteronomous philosophy would be opened. That
philosophy in its treatment of the Other respects to the utmost his
diversity, that means his transcendence.
But what results from a metaphysical report designed in such a way?
Well, now, he who possesses the idea of the Infinite is "more than he
himself." 8 That "more" is not derived from inside, from the very
subject. The idea derives from outside. According to Descartes the idea
of Infinite is an innate idea: the subject receives it from God. However,
Levinas maintains, that the metaphysical relation - in conformity with
its formal structure - proves to have a social character. It begins at the
moment when subject finds himself in the presence of the naked face of
the Other (l'Autrui) and of his eyes - without any cover. The dis-
closure of the face halts all of the violence of subject. To all the forces
of his spontaneous and arbitrary freedom, the face of the Other says:
"No! You cannot can." The metaphysical relation begins with a restric-
tion that has an ethical character. A "No" floats to me from the side of
the naked and defenseless face of the Other and takes the form of a
prohibition: "You may not kill!" It is true, that man may be not
obedient, for murder lies in his power. However, he over whom he
would rule, escapes - defeats - his force. In ethical prohibition the
defeat of spontaneous and arbitrary freedom of the subject is inherent.
This is not a "No" resulting from greater power than mine. It is not a
question of revealing my weakness, but of shaking of my whole power.
In confrontation with the Other the spontaneous imperialism of the
subject is checked and judged. My freedom proves to be arbitrary and
despotic. The Other is not manifested as an obstacle to be surmounted,
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 679

or a threat to my freedom, but as he who judges me. The idea of the

Infinite is for Descartes, at the same time, the idea of a perfect being, in
the light of which my whole imperfection is manifested. According to
Levinas, in the presence of the Other's naked face, my freedom displays
its imperfection. This is not a purely theoretical statement, but the
experience of shame, because freedom reveals our capacity for usurpa-
tion and murder.
Looked at in this way, the subject is not, as in Sartre, condemned to
freedom, but favored with freedom. Levinas uses here the formula "la
liberte investie" referring to the medieval institution of investiture. The
subject receives freedom from the Other in the same way that a senior
enfeeoffed vassal after receiving homage and a promise of fidelity. That
is not spontaneous freedom which degenerates, in substance, into
license, but freedom defined by the contours of moral confinement.
The ethical teaching through prohibition, which floats to me from the
side of the Other's naked face, is one direction of the metaphysical
relation. The second direction of that relation is the motion from the
side of subject, who comprises the idea of Infinite, towards the
"ideatum" of that idea, that means towards the very Infinite. This
motion is Desire (Desir), which is to be differentiated from Need
(Besoin). Need results always from some lack, which the subject wants
to gratify. Desire, however, is of an ethical character and hence is never
to be satisfied. Desire for the Infinite is not the inclination of emotional
love, but the severity of moral requirement. It brings no satisfaction, but
takes the form of goodness, and, more precisely, of responsibility for
the Other. Hence, the invested freedom does not comprise a negative
element (moral prohibition) only, but is revealed positively in the
necessity of doing good. Because, he, who comes to me from on High,
who instructs me and is my Lord, proves to be somebody who waits for
my help: "who is the foreigner, orphan, and widow. 'The relation
between subject and the Other is, in its essence, an asymmetric report,
which becomes visible in both directions of the metaphysical relation.
The Other is above me (as my Master) and, at the same time, below me
(as one in need). Between him and me there is none of the equality,
which Martin Buber postulated in his philosophy.
Is this responsible freedom, which invokes responsibility for others,
still freedom? Levinas in Tatalite et Infini introduced the differentiation
between phenomenon and being-in-itself. Phenomenon is the being
which is exhibited in its separateness - through life, use, cognition,
680 MAREK JJ;:DRASZEWSKI

home - and which remains, at the same time, absent. According to

Levinas it is not appearances but reality which lacks reality, the reality
infinitely distant from being. Y A phenomenon becomes being-in-itself,
when it enters into the metaphysical relation with the Other. The
presence of his face generates in the subject goodness and respon-
sibility, which means that he is stimulated to offer the possessed world
of things to the Other. The face of the Other urges on to goodness
rendered to the "foreigner, orphan and widow" - and hence is the
condition of achieving full humanity. One can be truly free, if one is a
true, full man. This is possible, when one answers the call of the Other
by serving him. Responsible freedom means - according to the
etymological sense of that word - giving the desirable answer. The
Other by calling me "generates" in me the full man. He also generates in
me my freedom.
Interpreting in such a way the thought of Levinas, we find ourselves
at the antipodes of Sartre's philosophy. According to him, every man
tends - through his glance - to objectify other persons and thereby to
alienate them. Wishing to be God means to be entirely a subject, and he
tries to deprive others of their own subjectivity. Hence, according to
Sartre, the relation of man to man is a struggle. One has to fight with
the other man in the name of one's own freedom, which is the absurd
actualiztaion of "vain passion." According to Levinas, the encounter
with the other is, on the contrary, a call to my freedom, in order that it
may take place. By answering that call, I become really free by
performing good.
The formula the "idea of Infinite" seems to indicate the God of the
philosophers, and, more precisely, the God of Descartes. However, the
Cartesian idea of the Infinite serves Levinas, above all, as formal
structure for the expression of the metaphysical relation, which proves
to have an ethical character. The Other teaches me to be a man by
revealing to me the moral world, that is, the world of moral duties and
- in this a way - leads me out of that world in which I am hardly a
phenomenon. However, the teaching of the Other cannot be his
teaching, because it is necessary that he be nearer to God than I myself.
This is the first evidence of moral consciousness, which Levinas defines
as the consciousness of the Other's privileges vis-a-vis me. 1o This God,
in the proximity of whom stands the Other, may be only the religious
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. This God may be only the Lord of
consciences, and this God may hardly suggest the God of philosophical
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 681

thought ceaselessly solicitous to not injure his Transcendence. The

vision of this religious God lies at the basis of Emmanuel Levinas'
philosophy.

We started down the paths of modern freedom, beginning with

Descartes. Descartes' God is the God of philosophers, who is "covered"
in the definition of the third "Meditation." In an undoubtedly close
connection with that understanding of God stands the definition of
freedom, which is comprised in the statement "I may." Sartre denuded
the dangerous ambiguity of that conception, ordering man to aspire to
be God and coming to the conception of absurd freedom, which we
have expressed in the formula "I must may." The return to God of
religion only has allowed Levinas to surmount the ambiguity of
Cartesian freedom, and to present his own conception which starts with
the ethical interdiction: "You cannot can."
Here we come back to the question put at the beginning - is
freedom to be understood as the rejection of all restraints? Does man's
freedom depend on the fullness of unconstrained power?
Both Sartre and Levinas indicate, that freedom is, already in its
roots, in some way not-free. It is but determined by the very structure
of the subject, by the presence of others (God, the other man), and by
the existence of the world of things. Among those determinations
freedom looks for a place for itself. In the course of this search there
appears first the necessity of eleutheria, the necessity of rejecting
bondage, the necessity of liberation. Freedom appears then as liberation
from (the negative moment), in order that it may come into existence a
new situation (the positive moment) in which freedom may be fully
actualized. The understanding of freedom itself depends upon under-
standing both the first and the second moment.
Sartre, in his conception of freedom, comprehended the negative
moment, the necessity of removing external obstacles. He rejected God
and challenged all other men. Finally, he admitted the absolute freedom
of man. But that freedom proved to be absurd, because man remained
a "vain passion" condemned ("I must") to undertake permanent choices.
With this absurdity was connected the curse of freedom. Man remained
terribly lonely: without God (because He does not exist), without other
persons (they are only objects), without himself (because I am only
nonentity). Freedom itself proved to be meaningless, because its value
was reduced to despair, and to the broken beauty of youth. Finally,
682 MAREK J~DRASZEWSKj

Sartre's freedom proves to be a lie, because beneath the promise of the

highest good (absolute divine prerogatives) hides nonentity (a curse and
despair).
Levinas understands the negative moment of freedom, as the neces-
sity of removing the internal obstacles of freedom. Within man there
should be questioned, before all else, the egoistical identity of the I,
which tends to dominate diversity. The moment of negation touches the
subject very deeply, right in his interior. But its purpose was only to
freely open the subject to moral standards derived from without. It was
connected with approval of the other's diversity and, at the same time,
with confusion because of the possibility inhering in the subject of
usurpation and murder. But, beginning from the necessity of that
confusion, a place was opened for freedom, as the space for performing
goodness, that is the space of ethical duty, of responsibility for the
Other. Hence, the Levinas' freedom appears to be the promise of full
humanity. In its context, liberation is reduced to full deliverance from
the bonds of the tragic solitude of subject in order to create the
possibility of building human community.
Sartre questioned the power of others (God, other people) in order
to assure to the subject absolute power. Finally, he condemned him to
war, nonentity, and absurdity.
Levinas questioned the egoistic violence of the subject, in order to
give to him the power of the duty to serve and to be responsible.
Finally, he promised him peace and goodness.
Those are the possible paths of Cartesian freedom, which, at present
- through the philosophies of Sartre and Levinas - diverge at particu-
larly sharp angles. The choice of one of them will undoubtedly decide
the shape of our humanity and of the community in which we will have
to live it out.

Poznan

NOTES

I J.-P. Sartre, "La liberte cartesienne," in Criliques lilleraires (Sill/aliol/s, I), (Paris:
1975), pp. 382-408.
, J.-P. Sartre, L 'EIre elle Nealll (Paris: 1957), 55th edition, pp. 653-654.
Ibidem, p. 569 .
.j Ibidem. p. 635.
) Ibidem, p. 642.
 SARTRE AND LEVINAS 683

(; Ibidem, p. 708.
7 E. Levinas, Totalite et Infini (The Hague: 1974, 4th edition), p. 19.
K E. Levinas, En decouvrant I'existence avec Husser! et Heidegger (Paris: 1974, 3rd

edition), p. 172.
'J E. Levinas: Totalite et Infini, op. cit., p. 156.
to E. Levinas, En decouvrant I'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, op. cit., p. 174.