CASE COMMENT ON HEYDON’S CASE

7.1: Principles of Legislations and Interpretation of Statutes

Submitted by
ADITYA SWARUP SINGH
UID: UG2017-12
4rd Year-7th Semester
Academic Year: 2020-21

Submitted to
Prof. (Dr.) Shirish L. Deshpande
PROFESSOR OF LAW

Ms. Debarsree Debnath

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

April, 2020
MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................................ii

 Table of Abbreviations..............................................................................................ii
 Cases Referred...........................................................................................................ii

Introduction................................................................................................................................1

 Aim and Objective.....................................................................................................1

 Research Methodology..............................................................................................2
 Research Question......................................................................................................2

Facts of the Case........................................................................................................................2

Issue in the Case.........................................................................................................................2

Judgment....................................................................................................................................2

Significance of the Case.............................................................................................................3

Mischief Rule.............................................................................................................................3

Applications of Mischief Rule in landmark judgement.............................................................4

Analysis of the Heydon’s Rule..................................................................................................7

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................8

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES...................................................................................i

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Table of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Expanded Form

AIR All India Reporter

Int’l International

ILR International Law Review

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Weekly Reporter

UOI Union of India

v. Versus

Vol. Volume

Cases Referred

 Anderton v Ryan, (1985) 2 All ER 355.

 Bengal Immunity Co v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.
 Elliot v Grey [1960] 1 QB 367.
 Lalit Mohan Pandey v Pooran Singh, (2004) 6 SCC 626.
 New India Sugar Mills Ltd v Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207.
 Pepper v Hart, (1993) 1 All ER 42.
 RMDC v. UOI AIR 1957 SC 628.
 Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279.
 Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax 1957 AIR 832.
 Smith v. Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.
 The  State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd 1953 AIR 252.

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Introduction
The mischief rule is one of three rules of statutory interpretation traditionally applied by
English courts. The other two are the "plain meaning rule" (also known as the "literal rule")
and the "golden rule".
The main aim of the rule is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in
question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would "suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy". In applying the mischief rule, the court is essentially asking what part of the law
did the law not cover, but was meant to be rectified by Parliament in passing the bill.
Heydan’s case is the most celebrated case in dealing with the Interpretation of Statutes.
This case gave laid down the concept of the Mischief Rule. As approved by the Supreme
Court in the case of Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v Management of Dimakuchi Tea
Estate, AIR 1958 SC 35 that the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning,
are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonies with the subject of the
enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so
much in a strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular
use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained”.
The courts have declined “to be bound by the letter, when it frustrates the patent purposes of
the statute”. In the words of Shah J, “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that
expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best
harmonies with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature”.1
In this research paper, the author has tried to present the case comment of the Heydon’s case
with the analysis of the mischief rule and also tried to present the significance of the
Heydon’s case in the theory of interpretation of statute.
Aim and Objective
The researcher had certain aim and objective during the completion of this project. The
researchers aim was to give the best analysis of the Heydon’s case and to present the rule
given in this case with the reference of different judicial pronouncement. The objective of
this project is:-
 To analyse the Heydon’s Case
 To discuss the mischief rule given in the heydon’s case
 To discuss the application of mischief rule in different judicial pronouncement
 To analyse the use of mischief rule by the judges.

1
New India Sugar Mills Ltd v Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207.

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Research Methodology
The researcher has folowed the doctrinal method of research for the completion of this
project. That is; the researcher has refereed different books, articles present online and offlie
and other secondary material available to complete this project.
Research Question
Whether mischief rule is able to detect the mischief and is capable of removing the
fallacy present in the legislature?
Facts of the Case
Basically this case is related to construction of leases, life estates, and statutes. Ottery
College, a religious college, gave a tenancy in a manor also called Ottery to a man (named in
the case report simply as "Ware") and his son, also referred to as Ware. The tenancy was
established by copyhold. Copyhold tenure was a form of customary tenure of land common
in England from the Middle Ages. The land was held according to the custom of the manor,
and the mode of landholding took its name from the fact that the "title deed" received by the
tenant was a copy of the relevant entry in the manorial court roll. A tenant – or mesne lord –
who held land in this way was legally known as a copyholder.
Ware and his son held their copyhold for their lives, subject to the will of the lord and the
custom of the manor. The Wares’ copyhold was part of a parcel also occupied by some
tenants at will. Later, the college leased the same parcel to another man, named Heydon, for a
period of eighty years in return for rents equal to the traditional rent for the components of
the parcel.
Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, Parliament enacted
the Suppression of Religious Houses Act 1535 (Act of Dissolution). The statute had the effect
of dissolving many religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost its lands and rents
to Henry VIII. However, a provision in the Act kept in force, for a term of life, any grants
that had been made more than a year before the enactment of the statute.
Issue in the Case
The issue in the case was regarding the validity of the leased given to Heydon after the
enactment of the Religious Houses Act 1535 which has dissolved the leased rights of the
many religious places and colleges.
Judgment
Reported by Lord Coke and decided by the Barons J. of the Court of Exchequer, the
court found that the grant to the Wares was protected by the relevant provision of the Act of
Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.

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Significance of the Case
The ruling was based on an important discussion of the relationship of a statute to the pre-
existing common law. The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to cure a
mischief resulting from a defect in the common law. Therefore, the court concluded, the
remedy of the statute was limited to curing that defect. Judges are supposed to construe
statutes by seeking the true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed to be pro bono
publico, or intent for the public good.

Mischief Rule
“The mischief rule of statutory interpretation is the oldest of the rules. The mischief
rule was established in the present case. In Re Sussex Peerage, it was held that the mischief
rule should only be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. Under the mischief
rule the court’s role is to suppress the mischief the Act is aimed at and advance the remedy.”
“Mischief rule is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned.
It is often referred to as the “rule in Heydon’s Case.” The court laid down the four rules for
the true interpretations of all the statutes which may have restrictive or enlarging meaning,
which must be considered to surpass the mischief or the ambiguity present in the statute.
These rules are as follows:
 “What was the common law before the passing of the Act?
 What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
 What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”
 The true reasons for the remedy.”

The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in the Bengal Immunity Co v
State of Bihar2 by SR Das CJI as follows, “It is a sound rule of construction of a statute
firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case was decided that for
the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered the
four rules stated above and stated that the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to

2
Bengal Immunity Co v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.

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add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act, pro bono publico.
The rule was more briefly stated by Lord Roskill. He stated that the statutes should be
given what has become known as a purposive construction, that is to say that the courts
should identify the “mischief” which existed before passing of the statute and then if more
than one construction is possible and should favor which will eliminate the mischief so
identified.3 In the words of Lord Griffith, the courts should adopt a purposive approach which
seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much
extraneous material that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted.4
Applications of Mischief Rule in landmark judgement
The English as well as Indian Courts has used the mischief rule in numerous instances to
remove the fallacy and to decide the case in the manner it will provide justice and to
determine the case with the best suitable interpretation with the help of the applications of the
mischief rule. Some of the important and landmark judgements have been discussed below
and the author has tried to discuss the applications of the Mischief rule applied by the
Hon’ble judges and how they have used this rule to detect the mischief and remove the
fallacy on the basis of this rule.

1. Smith v. Hughes5 
“The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39
Curzon Street, London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November
4, 1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street,
for the purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the
balcony being some 8–10 feet above street level).” The defendant’s method of soliciting the
men was
 “to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal
object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and”
 “having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside
the premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at
the same time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.”
The sole question here was whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in
a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959 Act are in this

3
Anderton v Ryan, (1985) 2 All ER 355.
4
Pepper v Hart, (1993) 1 All ER 42. Also refer Lalit Mohan Pandey v Pooran Singh, (2004) 6 SCC 626.
5
Smith v. Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.

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form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public
place for the purpose of prostitution’.
“The court said that the act does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the
soliciting must be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who
receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. The judge applying the
mischief rule stated that the act was intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk
along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes and I each
circumstance her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the
street.”
2. Royal College of Nursing v DHSS6
The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the
involvement of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861
makes it an offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided
that it would be an absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to
carry out abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science
meant surgical abortions were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common
for these to be administered by nurses it was Held: It was legal for nurses to carry out such
abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away with back street abortions where no medical
care was available. The actions of the nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of
1861 and within the contemplate defence in the 1967 Act.
3. Elliot v Grey7
The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed.
He was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured
vehicle on the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it
was not drivable. The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on
the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of
an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to
the hazards created by others.
4. Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax8
By section 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, which states ‘In computing the total
income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of

6
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279.
7
Elliot v Grey [1960] 1 QB 367
8
Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax 1957 AIR 832.

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the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly’, the
“court observed that the legislature was guilty of using an ambiguous term. There is no
knowing with certainly as to whether the legislature meant to enact these provisions with
reference only to a male of the species using the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such individual’
in the narrower sense of the term indicated above or intended to include within the
connotation of the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such individual’ also a female of the species.”
“Holding the words ‘any individual’ and ‘such individual’ as restricted in their
connotation to mean only the male of the species, the court observed that the evil which was
sought to be remedied was the only resulting from the widespread practice of husbands
entering into nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers admitting their minor
children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. This evil was sought
to be remedied by the Income-tax Act. The only intention of the legislature in doing so was to
include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total
income of the male assessee, the husband or the father as the case may be for the purpose of
the assessment.”
5. RMDC v. UOI9
“In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize
competition act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no
substantive skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required
were exempt from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the
aforementioned case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to suppress
the mischief was intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered
prize competitions where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.”
6. Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar10
“In the Indian context, the rule was best explained in the case of Bengal immunity co. v
State of Bihar. The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business
of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its
registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the
district of 24 – Perganas in West Bengal. It was registered as a dealer under the Bengal
Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is S.L. 683A. Its products had extensive
sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The goods were dispatched from Calcutta by
rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutta. The

9
RMDC v. UOI AIR 1957 SC 628
10
Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661

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appellant company do not have any agent or manager in Bihar also they don’t have any
office, godown or laboratory in that State.” On the 24th October, 1951 the Assistant
Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which
concluded as follows :-
“Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales
Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury at
an early date under intimation to this Department”.
“The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by
the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner
mentioned in its petition is liveable by the State of Bihar. This was done by construing article
286 whose interpretation came into question and the meaning granted to it in the case of
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd 11 was overruled. It raises a question of
construction of article 286 of the Constitution. It was decided that Bihar Sales Tax Act,
1947 in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of inter-
State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void.”
“The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express
terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared
wholly ultra vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do
forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-state dealers in respect of sales or
purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though
the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption in
Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the court below.
Bhagwati, J. had agreed to the above interpretation.”
Analysis of the Heydon’s Rule
“As we have already seen that the mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that
attempts to determine the legislator's intention. Originating from a 16th century case
(Heydon’s case) in the United Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the "mischief and
defect" that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively
implement this remedy. The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory
interpretation in order to discover Parliament's intention. It essentially asks the question: By
creating an Act of Parliament what was the "mischief" that the previous law did not cover?”
“This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain
meaning rule, in that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only

11
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd 1953 AIR 252.

7
when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent is
determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review
articles and corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in
cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.”
“This rule means that in the interpretation of statute, the court should determine the
mischief which the legislature intended to correct in the legislation by going into a voyage of
discovery to determine the history of the legislation. However, it should be noted hat not
every legislation is made to correct a mischief. Also, how deep should the judges go in
making a voyage of discovery? It would be difficult if the particular judge is not well versed
in history.”
“In Akerele vs Inspector general of police, the court was faced with the interpretation of
the meaning of the word “accuse” in S.210 (b) of the criminal code 1948. It rejected the
argument per Ademola J (as he then was) that the word meant swearing under oath. He said
that by going into a short history of that section, its intention was to prohibit the practice of
indiscriminate accusations of witchcraft and trial by ordeal.”
Conclusion
“Within the context of law, the mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that
attempts to determine the legislator’s intention. Originating from a 16th century case in the
United Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in
question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
When material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly
established rule for construction of such words “of all statutes in general” is the rule laid
down in Heydons case also known as mischief rule. This rule is also known as purposive
construction. The rules lay down that the court should adopt the construction which shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”
“As it can be seen from the case, mischief rule can be applied differently by different
judges. It is mainly about the discretion and understanding of the person applying it. Though,
it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules.
It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing but it also seen to be out of date as it
has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was the primary source of law and
parliamentary supremacy was not established. It gives too much power to the unelected
judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often
draft acts on behalf of the king and were therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was
meant to remedy.”

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 “This is not often the case in modern legal systems. The rule can make the law uncertain,
susceptible to the slippery slope. Therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form
of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine
cases. The purposive approach is an approach to statutory and constitutional
interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a statute, a part
of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it was enacted.”

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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

Article
 S. E. Thorne, “Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case” , 31 ILL. L. REV. 202 (1936-
1937).
 Subhyanka Rao, “Mischief Rule of Statutory Interpretation” www.lawoctopus.com
Books
 Justice G P Singh, “ Principles of Statutory interpretation” 14th Edition, Lexis Nexis.
Databases
 Hein Online.
 JStor.
 Manupatra.
 SCC OnLine.
 SCC OnLine Blog.