Professional Documents
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ConstiII Case List
ConstiII Case List
power is validly exercised if: 5. Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a Progressive
system of taxation. [Sec. 130, Local Government Code]
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and Equality and uniformity in local taxation means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate within the
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authority or local government unit and
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon not necessarily in comparison with other units although belonging to the
individuals same political subdivision. In fine, uniformity is required only within the
geographical limits of the taxing authority. [Punzalan v. City of Manila, G.R.
No. L-4817, May 26, 1954]
A city can validly tax the sales to customers outside the city as long as the
EMINENT DOMAIN orders were booked and paid for in the company's branch office in the city. A
different interpretation would defeat the tax ordinance in question or
Essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of encourage tax evasion by simply arranging for the delivery at the outskirts of
eminent domain: the city. [Philippine Match Company v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. L-30745 January
18, 1978]
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private Power to Adjust Local Tax Rate
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or Local government units are authorized to adjust the tax rates as prescribed
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. herein not oftener than once every 5 years, and in no case shall such
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, adjustment exceed 10% of the rates fixed under the Local Government Code.
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. [Sec. 191, Local Government Code]
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. Power to Grant Local Exemptions
TAXATION: Local government units, may through ordinances duly approved, grant tax
exemptions, incentives or reliefs under such terms and conditions, as they
Sources of power to tax of LGUs: may deem necessary. [Sec. 192, Local Government Code]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
Tax exemptions shall be conferred through the issuance of a non- Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921
transferable tax exemption certificate. Judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
The power to grant tax exemptions, tax incentives and tax reliefs shall not 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
apply to regulatory fees which are levied under the police power of the local power to hear and decide the matter before it.
government unit.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
Guidelines for the Granting of Tax Exemptions, Tax Incentives and Tax Reliefs thedefendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
[Art. 282 [B], Rules and Regulations Implementing theLocal Government
Code] 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
1. On the grant of tax exemptions or tax reliefs: 4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
DUE PROCESS
C. Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
Procedural Due Process
HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES
A. Publication Requirement
a). Proof beyond reasonable doubt
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
b). Clear and convincing proof
PITC v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996)
c). Preponderance of Evidence
Republic v. Extelcom, G.R. 147096, January 15, 2002
d). Substantial evidence
B. Judicial Proceedings
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged
receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that respondent is
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is
but the evidence must be "substantial." inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must
begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
f. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations procedure."
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority Government of the United States v. Purganan, GR 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with 5 POSTULATES OF EXTRADITION
the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such 1. Extradition = cooperation with other states to suppress criminals
statutory authority. 2. Requesting State will accord due process (Accept and Trust)
3. Sui Generis = in a class by itself (summary in nature)
g. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, 4. Compliance = Good Faith, implementation to serve natural interest
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can 5. Flight Risk = will undergo proceedings to other state; remain in the
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. requested state
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a
due process is untenable. hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs
Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523 would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,
The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the
the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our entire banking community.
jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on
Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it It should also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt reconsideration of the various orders of respondent DECS and its motions
classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and
others granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection
therewith, it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the essence
D. Deportation Proceedings of procedural due process and that any defect is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration
Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756
1. No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific G. Termination Proceedings
grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004
Immigration. (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an
2. The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284,
language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a and due process was observed;
proper judgment. (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was
3. The warrants of arrest must be in accordance with the rules on observed;
criminal procedure. (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due
process; and
Domingo v. Sheer, 421 SCRA 468 (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not
observed.
E. Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot, G.R. No. 151378, 28 March 2005
If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect,
respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving initiated by an act imputable to the employee; and if the dismissal is based
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply
Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
petitioner. dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative.
Globe Telecom v. NTC 435 SCRA 110
The Court is convinced that prior to the promulgation of the assailed
Order Globe was never notified that its authority to operate SMS was put in Substantive Due Process
issue. There is an established procedure within NTC that provides for the
steps that should be undertaken before an entity such as Globe could be United States v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85
subjected to a disciplinary measure. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must
appear (1) that the interest of the general public requires it and
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS
A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI- hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR appellant’s property without just compensation
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
NOTICE AND HEARING. “Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
F. Closure Proceedings
Ermita-Manila Hotel 7 Motel Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA 849
CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 The precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
The law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and
liabilities. They are: Ynot v. ICA 148 SCRA 659
(a) an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because
(b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and the method to confiscate carabaos was oppressive.
(c) prima facie showing that its continuance in the business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be
heard or his defense and punished immediately.
Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
NDCNA v. PVB 192 SCRA 257 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, Nov. 19, 2001
A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a "...the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or,
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. Criminal statutes
should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means employed are on the other hand cannot be a party to such a rule.
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly "One to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
oppressive upon individuals. attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 be unconstitutional"
The objective is public safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD
207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s. Bother
possess relevance in applying rules with the declaration of principles in the ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
Constitution. In addition, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC 238 SCRA 190 Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates
In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
execution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of
the petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to work the validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
private respondent under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to her clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
dismissal or, at the petitioner's option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255 GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441
An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. first be conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. simply whether the government’s act is reasonable and not oppressive. The
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though
6) It must not be unreasonable. desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no
government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its
Dans v. People 285 SCRA 504 residual powers because it will be tied up conducting studies.
The announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was enacted,
which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag – 529 SCRA 654
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that The record shows that the petitioners were given more sufficient notice and
the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or opportunity to be heard before they were removed from the list of
corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and prospective beneficiaries and that even after they were delisted, they were
corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt given a new deadline for them to submit requirements and were sent notices
Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved informing them of the consequences of noncompliance.
would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.
BF v. City Mayor – 515 SCRA 1
Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141 That while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
Right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people." Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-
attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
part test:
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an other applicable constitutional guarantee.
expectation of privacy; and
(2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as Carlos v. DSWD – 526 SCRA 130
reasonable. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment
In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by of property rights in the process.
which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the
law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is Perez v. LPG – 531 SCRA 431
fair, reasonable, and just." For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following
must concur:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, L-23794, Feb. 17, 1968
Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
People v. Ventura and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and
The State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or a classification is reasonable where
tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions;
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law
3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council conditions substantially identical to those present; and
The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
on the same plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when: A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not
its application. be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central for the coverage of the tax.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct
to avoid Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law,
muscle. provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations different rules shall operate.
may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as
subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups
may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators,
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Requisites of Valid Classification
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; NPC v. De Guzman, 229 SCRA 801
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; The distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. usual because of the new law.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538
the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives legislative discussions.
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649
the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera
There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the
officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking
accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
Probation Law. government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where
there is no substantial distinction between those favoured, which may or
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The classification was not
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their based on substantial distinctions.
rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
Also, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392 equality, because this is hardly unattainable." When the problem of
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to classification became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and uniformity in
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation..." As provided Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
by this Court, where "the differentiation" complained of "conforms to the Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform." E. Conditions for a valid warrant
SP, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004 Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
Prudente v. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres, G.R. 132527, July 29, 2005 Chia v. Coll. of Customs, 177 SCRA 755 (1989)
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988)
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material People v. Choi, G.R. No. 152950, August 3, 2006
differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
clause. PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
Yousef Al Ghoul v. CA, GR No.126859, September 4, 2001
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 25 November 2005 Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001.
BAT v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, 20 August 2008 People v. Francisco, GR 129035, Apr. 22, 2002
Plessy v. Fergusun, 163 US 537
Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 Objects of Seizure
Brown v. Secretary of Education, 347 US 483; 349 US 294
Unilab v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005
Katz v. United States, 389 US 347
III. Arrests, Search and Seizure
F. Valid Warrantless searches
Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3(2)
Valid Waiver
A. When is a search a “search”?
Lopez v. Comm. Of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
Valmonte v. General de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA People v. Ramos, G.R. 85401-02, June 4, 1990
665 Veroy v. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992)
People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992
B. Purpose and Importance of the guaranty People v. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992)
People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil 637 (1946) People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998)
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 5,
C. To Whom Directed 2002
People v. Asis, et. al., G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) People v. Tudtud, et. al., G.R. No. 144037, September 26,
2003
D. Who May Invoke the Right?
Incident to lawful arrest
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
Roldan v. Area, 65 SCRA 320 (1975) People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)
People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000 Lack of Urgency
People v. Canton, GR 148825, Dec. 27, 2002
People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003 People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
“Stop and frisk”
IV. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996) Art. III, Sec. 3(1)
Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7,
1997 Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997) Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005
Search of moving vehicles
Exclusionary Rule
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
People v. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980) Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991
Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 146706, July 15, 2005 In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
Gutang v. People, GR 135406, July 11, 2000
Emergency circumstances KMU v. Dir. - Gen. of NEDA, 487 SCRA 623
People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994) V. Freedom of Speech and Assembly
Gen. De Villa v. Valmonte G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 Prior Restraint
Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 (2000) Near v. Minnesota, 238 US 697
People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51
New York Times Co. v. US, 403 US 713
G. Valid Warrantless arrests Alexander v. US - 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441
INC v. CA, GR 119673 July 26, 1996
Rebellion as Continuing Offense David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160
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Art. III, Sec. 5 City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919)
Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)
Non-establishment of region
Taking
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510 Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
School District v. Schempp, 10 L 2d 844 City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 Napocor v. Jocson – 206 SCRA 520
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236 Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US 672
Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 57 LW 504 Public use
Zobrest v. Catalina, No. 92-94 June 18, 1993
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette & Ku Klux Klan – U.S. No. Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)
94-780 June 29, 1995 Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
Islamic Da’wah v. Executive Secretary, GR 153888, July 9, 2003 Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)
Taruc v. de la Cruz, 453 SCRA 123 Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001
Free exercise of religion Reyes v. NHA, GR 147511, Jan. 20, 2003
Didipio v. Earth Savers v. Gozun 485 SCRA 586
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEWER MORALES, GENIE C.
Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953) People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992)
Ortigas & Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
Tiro vs. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697 (1983) XIII. Right to Bail
Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, 201 SCRA 13
Caleon vs. Agus Development Corp., 207 SCRA 748 (1992) Art. III, Sec. 13
Meralco v. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750 (1999)
Bail Defined
XII. Custodial Investigation
Rule 114, Section 1, ROC
Art. III, Sec. 12
Kinds of Bail
Miranda vs. Arizona , 384 US , 436 (1966)
Rule 114, Sections 10, 11, 14 & 15
Custodial Investigation
When right may be invoked
People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001
People v. Del Rosario G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992) People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997
Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000
Administrative Investigations Government v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. 148571, December 17,
2002
People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316 Procedure for bail
(1997)
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005 Paderanga v. Drilon, 247 SCRA 741, (1995).
Go v. Bongolan. A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999
Police Lineup People v. Gako, G.R. 135045, December 15, 2000
XIV. Rights of the Accused People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204 (1989)
People vs. Baluyot, 75 SCRA 148 (1977) Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan ; 159 SCRA 70 (1988)
Right to Lawyer of Choice
XVI. Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Libuit v. People, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
Art. III, Sec. 17
Deprivation of Right to be Heard
Compulsory testimonial incrimination
Moslares v. CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)
United States vs. Tan Teh, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)
c. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)
People vs. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 (1950)
Lack of Arraignment Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
People v. Dy, G.R. 115236, January 29, 2002 Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)
People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994)
Sufficiency of the Information People v. Rondero, GR. No. 125687, December 9, 1999
People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000.
People v. Valdesancho, G.R. 137051, May 30, 2001
People v. Alcaide, G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002 In what proceedings available
People vs. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
d. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
XVII. Involuntary servitude
Speedy trial
Art. III, Sec. 18
Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924)
Dacanay vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 (1995) Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979)
Identity of Offenses ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS CULTURE AND
SPORTS
People vs. City Court, 154 SCRA 175 (1987)
Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 (1990) SECTION 5.
People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992) Garcia v. Faculty Admission, 68 SCRA 277
BME v. Judge Alfonso - 176 SCRA 304
XX. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder Lupangco v. CA - 160 SCRA 848
University of San Carlos v. CA - 166 SCRA 570
Art III, Sec. 22 Capitol Medical Center v CA - 178 SCRA 493
Reyes v. CA – 194 SCRA 402
Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970) Tan v. CA – 199 SCRA 212
People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994)
ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP
I. In general
Paragraph (3)
Loss of citizenship
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