CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda,
chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice
of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the
testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the
Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store
and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co.,
and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and
promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection
with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest
in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring them
forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On
the same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by
Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2
members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt
books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book,
and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in
the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner
of the documents, papers and articles seized. Immediately after
the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a
return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a
request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to
retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant
to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the
date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam
Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Occidental Negros praying that the search warrant and the seizure
effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the
articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which
motion was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar
motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27
October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an
information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI
Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and
A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655.
Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip
filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939.
The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search
warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of
Sagay and the seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal,
because the warrant was issued three days ahead of the
application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada which
is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes
the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of
Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders
58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a
search warrant for the purpose of using them as evidence in the
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29
criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because the
January 1937]
warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the
accused to testify against themselves. First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-
by the personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant, Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge
for the judge to determine probable cause in issuing the warrant. Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas,
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of
him in connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging
General Orders 58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G.
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own personal
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
money without license, charging usurious rate of interest and is
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and premises
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents,
information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts
affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the
and records, all of which are being used by it in connection with
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's
its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books
violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in
and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
his testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that
disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several
he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license
agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez's store and
and charging usurious rate of interest, because he personally
residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took
investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam
possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for
Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he
the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order
knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of
books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3
accounts and records containing its transactions relative its
bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2
activities as money lender and the entries of the interest paid by
inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit
its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries
receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2 packages of
and records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both
correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14
Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had
bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan
personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for,
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong &
turn out to be not as their were stated under oath. That the
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for and seizure
existence of probable cause had been determined by the justice
of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who
of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search warrant
stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
complained of, is shown by the following statement in the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles
warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the
had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the
complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury
search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8
Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine
June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
Army, Manila, and the witness he presented, . . . and this Court,
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in
finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared
believe, that the above described articles, relating to the activities
guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On
of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of
said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice
premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law."
thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within which to show
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On
10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury
Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said
month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized
to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order
requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and
the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by
him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a
petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and
that it had not yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return
of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized
them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be
filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, the
court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been
duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled,
and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and
must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the
Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the
unextendible period of 2 days from the date of notice of said
order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory
should not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-
Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying,
for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered
retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the
violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On October
10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed
60 days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23,
25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted
said period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the court
granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said 19
documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well
as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to
retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and
prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal
because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in
whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the
facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the
warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere
information secured from a person whom he considered reliable,
and that it is illegal as it was not supported by other affidavits
aside from that made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and
Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported
by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which
a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation
or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility
to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The
true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable
for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by
reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore,
the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice
in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant
or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require
nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to
be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is
the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause;
when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of
the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had
no personal knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]
Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took
no part
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD)
810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging
that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai
game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without
any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered
that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal
its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona,
presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is with the
court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to
quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by
the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo
U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court
made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that
documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. Mata's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he
came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari,
praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant
to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.
Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules
provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold
that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
OLAES V. PEOPLE
Olaes was indicted for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. He was believed to have in his possession marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited
and exempt narcotics preparations.
Facts:
1.AdolfoOlaes was believed to have in his possession marijuana
dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and
other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations;
thus, indicting petitioners of violation of RA 6425(Dangerous
Drugs Acts of 1972) despite failure to pinpoint specific section of
same.
2.Petitioners challenged the admission of evidence seized by
virtue of an allegedly invalid warrant issued on March. More so,
petitioners claimed that the search warrant issued by the judge
is unconstitutional because it did not indicate the specific offense
the petitioners have supposedly committed; thus, making no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the
said warrant inconformity with the Bill of Rights.
Ruling:
1. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there isno question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basisfor the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies therequirement
in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be
made of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”
 Thus, thearticles seized under the challenged search warrant
were admitted as evidence
NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge AbelardoDayrit,
for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness
(P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of
our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We
gathered information from verified sources that the holders of
said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t
licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the
premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives
and ammunitions.
 
Person to be searched in NemesioPrudente at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in
his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and
ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of
Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the
President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching
questions and answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the
search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause,
which is to be determined personally by the Judge, after
examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and
that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The
probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense
and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection which the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
-          This probable case must be shown to be personal
knowledge and of the complainant and witnesses he may produce
and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while
the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in
this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms
etc. – – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words,
the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal
possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the
Search Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-866
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
Chia vs Collector of Customs  the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied bythe
FACTS:
A verified report of a confidential informant that asserted
electronic and electrical equipment and other articles illegally
imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful
“shipside” activities (foreign goods are unloaded form foreign
ships in transit through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading
payment of the corresponding customs duties, and were found
inside the “Tom’s electronics” and “Sony Merchandising” after
valuation, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure and
detention Nos: 14925 ad 14925-A.
 
            Search Warrant:
Various electronics equipment like cassette tape recorders, car
stereos, phonograph needles, portable TV sets, imported long
playing records, spare parts of TVs and Radios and other electrical
appliances
 
ISSUE:
Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are general
warrant issued in violation of Rule 126, Sections 3 of Rules of
Court?
 
HELD:
Petition dismissed.
 
RATIONALE:
Section 2208 (Customs) – Tariff and Customs Code – Right of
Police Officer to enter in closure, a warehouse, store, or other
building or in closure used for keeping or storage or articles does
not become a dwelling house within the meaning.
 
Section 2536 (Seizure of other articles) – The Commissioner of
Customs and Collector of Customs and or any other Customs
officer, with the prior authorization in writing by the
commissioner, may demand evidence of payment of duties and
taxes on foreign articles.
 
Search of Dwelling House (Section 2209) – Upon warrant issued
by a Judge of the Court or such other responsible officers as may
be authorized by law, upon sworn application showing probable
cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.
The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were
not general warrant, as erroneously alleged by petitioner for they
identified the stores to be seized, described the articles to be
seized and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
 
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION
vs.
CA
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th
Century FoxFilm Corporation through counsel sought the National
Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of
searches and seizures inconnection with the latter's anti-film
piracy campaign. Specifically, theletter-complaint alleged that
certain videotape outlets all over MetroManila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape form which constitute a flagrant violationof Presidential
Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on theProtection
of Intellectual Property).Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI
conducted surveillance andinvestigation of the outlets pinpointed
by the petitioner and subsequentlyfiled three (3) applications for
search warrants. On September 4, 1985, thelower court issued
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the
itemsdescribed therein. An inventory of the items seized was
made and leftwith the private respondents. The lower court later
on lifted the 3 searchwarrants and ordered the NBI to return the
properties that were seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he
issuedearlier upon the application of the National Bureau of
Investigation onthe basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.The NBI agents who
acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledgeof the subject
matter of their testimony which was the alleged commissionof the
offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's
counselwho was also a witness during the application for the
issuance of thesearch warrants stated that he had personal
knowledge that theconfiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapestaken from master tapes
belonging to the petitioner. However, the lowercourt did not give
much credence to his testimony in view of the fact thatthe master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to thecourt
during the application.Witnesses in the hearing for an application
for search warrants must havepersonal knowledge of the subject
matter of their testimony as to thealleged commission of the
offense. Also, the sear warrant must contain aspecific description
of the articles to be seized. General warrants areconstitutionally
objectionable.
People vs Choi
Facts: The factual antecedents follow.
On April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of
Finance, applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 56, against respondent
Christopher Choi for violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
(a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of RA 8293,  also known as
the Intellectual Property Code.  stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the
Mario Nieto contended that Choi indeed has in his possession,
control and custody [r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red
Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red
Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains two (2) [m]aster [c]ases
of Marlboro and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50)
reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of
Section 168, par. 2 and 3 (a) and (c) in relation to Section 169 of
R.A. 8293
On the other, Choi contended that Judge Gatbalite committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the search warrant,
arguing that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the
examination conducted was not probing and exhaustive and the
warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched.
Respondent also prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao  be prohibited
from using as evidence the articles seized by virtue of the search
warrant. This was granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10,
2002
Issue: the search warrant is valid
Held: Yes.A search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. 22 The determination of the existence
of probable cause requires the following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses
personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath and
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers. 
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although
there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma.  The judge must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.  The
questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments
witnesses.  If the judge fails to determine probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, grave
abuse of discretion is committed.  HELD:
The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies,
probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.  No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for
its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light
of conditions obtaining in a given situation.  The entirety of the
questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must
be considered by the judge.  It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge
also heard the testimony of applicant Nieto.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with
Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG).
Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP.
The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of
the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a
portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be
served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG
were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and
Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-
Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it
was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because
it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search
warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general.
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS:  On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B.
Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon
City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in
possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and
which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises
described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable
any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described
properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On
February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the
PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before
the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to
SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first
contested Order which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3,
1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:The requisites of a valid search warrant are:  (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by
the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.  In the present case, the search warrant is invalid
because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod,
who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3)the place to be
searched was not described with particularity.
Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
GR No.126859, September 4, 2001
Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan
City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and
seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the
same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and
explosives.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated
Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place
searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.
They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of
Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt
for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was
not presented at the trial.
ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently
described with particularity.
HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with
vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and
legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search
made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken
thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could
not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question
specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in
the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners
allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be
seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during
the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be
beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were
described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of
the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical
description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial
similarity of those articles described as a class or species would
suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835
(1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows
that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated
items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of
violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No.1866, as
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 142295
PARDO,J  officials arrived only after the police already had finished the
FACTS: Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of
violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos. Allegedly, sometime in May 1996, the police received a
report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in
possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses.
Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group
inquired from the PNPFirearms and Explosive Division whether or
not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division
issued a certificationstating that per records in his office, the
appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind
and caliber. Armed with thesaid certificationthe police applied for
a search warrant to enable them to search the house of
appellant.Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr.
Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before
proceeding tothe residence of the appellant, the police officers
requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman AurelioPanteleon to accompany them in the
implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of
appellant, the police officersintroduced themselves to the wife of
appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique
informed him that they had asearch warrant and that they were
authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducteda search of the house.
The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with
Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B
and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56
M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4)found in the room of
appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No.
48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of liveammunition (Exhibit
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his
license to possess the firearms, the appellant failedto produce
any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject
firearms.For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license
for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the
other itemsseized during the search including the caliber .22
revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant
likewise assails themanner in which the search was carried out,
claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without
asking permission.Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay
search. However, after trialthe trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the
search warrant was illegal.
HELD:The Supreme CourtREVERSESthe decision of the Court of
Appeals andACQUITSpetitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of
thecharge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.Seizure is limited to those
items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching
officers are without discretion regardingwhat articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and excludedfor being the proverbial
"fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceedingIn this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently
and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search
in the kitchenof petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize,
was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is
illegal.True that as an exception, the police may seize without
warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that
matter,inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure
of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is
notsearching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object."52Specifically, seizure
of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:(a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are.(c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure
of evidence without further search.
People vs Francisco
FACTS: A Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-
appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed under surveillance
after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that
they were engaged in selling shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride.  SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan of
OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant
before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to
authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report[1] of
SPO2 Teneros.  It stated that Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St.,
corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of
Federico Verona’s runners in the illegal drugs operations,
allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of
Verona.[2] The search warrant[3] was subsequently issued by Judge
Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No.
122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine
months pregnant, was resting inside the second floor master’s
bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon
Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if
somebody forcibly opened the front door.  Eight policemen
suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about
an hour.  Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but
they refused to answer.  It was only at the police station where
she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2
Teneros.  The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman
MiguelitaLimpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay
64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant and
seized the following:[4]
1.  One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing
white crysthalline (sic) substance or methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu with markings by the undersigned inside
the house of subjects’ residence weighing (230) two hundred
thirty (sic) grams of methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu by
Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2.  Several plastics in different sizes;
3.  Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
4.  Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner
improvised;
5.  Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;
6.  Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;
7.  One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;
8.  Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;
9.  Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;
10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.
The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00,
a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car
documents.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in an information[5] which reads:
That about 10:30 o’clock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No.
122 SCL M. Hizon St., Kalookan City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable court, the above-named accused grouping herself
together with some other persons whose liabilities are still being
determined in a preliminary investigation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
custody and/or control, methamphetamine hydrochloride
popularly known as “shabu”, a regulated drug, with a total weight
of 230 grams, without the corresponding license and/or
prescription to possess, have custody and/or control over the
aforesaid regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search
warrant[6] asserting that she and her live-in partner Federico
Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon
Street, District 2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to
the present as certified by the owner of the apartment unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not III.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED WAS ILLEGAL AND
VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED
AFTER FINDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A
PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH
WARRANT.
RULING:ASPlainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the
reasonableness of the search conducted by the police officers at
accused-appellant’s residence.
The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that:
[10]
Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question
was served at apartment No. 120 and not at the specific address
stated therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by
itself render as illegal the search and seizure of subject stuff
seized by the operatives pursuant thereto.  While it is true that
the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural
requirements that the search warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched is to the end that no unreasonable
search warrant and seizure may not be made (sic) and abuses
may not be committed, however, this requirement is not without
exception.  It is the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify
the place intended (People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, Oct. 20,
1925).
Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2
Teneros was principally the concerned official who conducted an
active surveillance on the Accused and subject house (Surveillance
Report, Exh. “9”) and pursued this case by filing the corresponding
application for the issuance of a search warrant.  Perforce, SPO2
TENEROS was thereby placed in a position enabling him to have
prior and personal knowledge of particular house intended in the
warrant which definitely refer to no other than the very place
where the same was accordingly served.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search
was grossly infirm as the subject search warrant authorized the
police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan
City. However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City.
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity
of a person, his home and his possessions against unreasonable
intrusions of the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which reads:
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS,
HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY
PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE
PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that
there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.”  The rule is that a description
of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community.  Any designation or description known to the locality
that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional
requirement.[11]
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright
nullification of the search warrants.  The proceedings upon search
warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen.  Perhaps there is none which excites
such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect.  The warrants will always be construed strictly
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy.  No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid
of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[13]
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros
requested for authority to search specifically the premises of No.
122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was accompanied
by a sketch[14]of the area which bears two parallel lines indicated
as 10th Avenue drawn vertically on the left-hand side of the
paper.  Intersecting these lines are two other parallel lines drawn
horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon.  Above and on the left-
hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as M.
Hizon, is a square marked as “Basketball Court.”  A similar drawing
placed near the right-hand side of the upper parallel line is
another square marked as “PNR Compound”.  Beneath the lower
parallel line of the lines marked as “M. Hizon” and right at the
center is also a square enclosing an “X” sign marked as “122”,
presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
During the hearing for the application of the search warrant,
police asset Dante Baradilla described the house to be searched
as:
Bale dalawangpalapagpo, semi concrete, color cream
naangmgabintana ay may rehasnabakal at sliding at saharap ay
may terrace at may sasakyansilanaginagamitsapagdeliver ng
shabu.[15]
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area.  It
turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was a
concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred
windows and a terrace. It was owned by a certain Mr. Joseph
Ching.  The house, however, bore no house number.  The house
marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two
houses away from accused-appellant’s house at No. 120 M. Hizon
St.
On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting
of three apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the
outside as No. 120. The different units within No. 120 Hizon St.
were not numbered separately.  Accused-appellant rented the
third unit from the entrance which was supposedly the subject of
the search. The entire compound had an area of approximately
ninety (90) square meters. The second unit was located at the
back of the first unit and the third unit was at the rear end of the
compound.  Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street
was only through the first two units and the common gate
indicated as No. 120. The occupants of the premises stated that
they commonly use No. 120 to designate their residence.
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that “even a description of
the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended.”[16]The description of the building in the
application for a search warrant in Veloso as well as in the search
warrant itself refer to “the building No. 124 CalleArzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands” which was considered “sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched.”[17]
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely
different from those in Veloso.  At first glance, the description of
the place to be searched in the warrant seems to be
sufficient.  However, from the application for a search warrant as
well as the search warrant itself, the police officer serving the
warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended precisely because it was wrongly described as No.
122, although it may have been located on the same street as No.
120.  Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla
referred to that house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No.
120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance
of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers
of discretion.  Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the
actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their
alleged knowledge of the place.  The controlling subject of search
warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the
place identified by the police.[18]
It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon
St. as the subject of the actual search.  However, as indicated in
the witness’ affidavit[19] in support of the application for a search
warrant,[20]No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably
indicated.  Inexplicably, a few days after the search warrant was
issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St., SPO2
Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search
warrant[21] that the warrant “was properly served at 122 M. Hizon
St., Caloocan City, Metro Manila as indicated in the search
warrant itself.”
SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that
he thought the house to be searched bore the address 122 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.[22] But as
this Court ruled in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
v. Asuncion,[23] thus:
The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the
store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they
really intended it to be the subject of their application.  Indeed,
the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or
amplified by the police, viz.:
“x xx.  In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant.  The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from
the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind.  This
should not have been done.  It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow
police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although
not that specified in the warrant—[was] exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
their supporting evidence.  What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.  Indeed, following the officer’s theory, in the context of
the facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail’s Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant.  Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized.  It would concede to police officers
the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be
delineated in the warrant.  It would open wide the door to abuse
of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them.  The particularization of the description of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search.”
All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF THIS OR THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE
INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING.
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are
prohibited from being used in evidence.  Absent these items
presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant
for the crime charged loses its basis.
As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures.  Verily, they are the “fruits of the poisonous
tree.”  Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence.[24]
On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items
seized by the searching team in this case.  In the return of search
warrant, they admitted the seizure of cellular phones, money and
television/monitoring device – items that are not within the palest
ambit of shabu paraphernalia, which were the only items
authorized to be seized.  What is more disturbing is the
suggestion that some items seized were not reported in the
return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks, and
money.  In an attempt to justify the presence of the car in the
police station, SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a most incredible
story that the accused-appellant, whose pregnancy was already in
the third trimester, drove her car to the police station after the
intrusion at her house even if the police officers had with them
several cars.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime.[25]
It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely
committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a
mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied
with.  To quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v.
United States: “It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon.  Their motto should beobstaprincipiis.”[26]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order.  Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes declared: “I think it is less evil that some criminals
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.”  It
is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. [27]
UNILAB VS ISIP
FACTS: A UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a
place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some
photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation
was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which
thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant
in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court
issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON
multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead,
sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60
ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were
brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items
be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or
to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are
considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the
petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and
Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court,
however, granted the motion of the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which,
when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid
under the plain view doctrine.
RULING: It is true that things not described in the warrant may
be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things
not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view.
The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for
the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can
view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove
that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that
the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents.
However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were
present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the
sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes
and their contents were incriminating and immediately
apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had
personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their
contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI
agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were
opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove
that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
KATZ VS UNITED STATES
FACTS:The petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting
illegal gambling operations across state lines in violation of federal
law. In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents
placed a warrantless wiretap on the public phone booth that he
used to conduct these operations. The agents listened only to
Katz's conversations, and only to the parts of his conversations
dealing with illegal gambling transactions.
In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme
Court held that the warrantless wiretapping of phone lines did not
constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
According to the Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given
area, and not mere voice amplification (the normal result of a
wiretap), is required for an action to constitute a Fourth
Amendment search. This is known as the "trespass doctrine."
Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal
Communications Act of 1933. This Act required, among other
things, federal authorities to obtain a warrant before wiretapping
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
private phone lines. In the case of Silverman v. United
States (1961), the Supreme Court refined the Olmsteadtrespass
doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search occurs only if a
"constitutionally protected area" has been intruded upon.
At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with
these wiretaps, arguing that the warrantless wiretapping of a
public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a
"constitutionally protected area" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The federal agents countered by saying that a public
phone booth was not a "constitutionally protected area,"
therefore, they could place a wiretap on it without a warrant.
ISSUE:Does the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth
violate the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
RULING: ASDA YES, By a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with Katz and held that placing of a warrantless wiretap on a
public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The majority opinion, written
by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not address the case from
the perspective of a "constitutionally protected area." In essence,
the majority argued that both sides in the case were wrong to
think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap depended
upon the area being placed under surveillance. "For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected," the Court stated.
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty
of the Judiciary to review petitions for warrants in instances in
which persons may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep
secret, even if it were done in a public place. The Court held that,
in the absence of a judicially authorized search warrant, the
wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were illegal.
Therefore, the evidence against him gathered from his
conversations should be suppressed.
CONCURRENCE
Justice John Marshall Harlan's Concurrence: Test for
Constitutionally Protected Searches
Although he agreed with the majority opinion of the Court, Justice
Harlan went further to provide a test for what is a constitutionally
protected search. He said it was necessary to clarify when private
actions, conducted in a public place, may be constitutionally
protected. Expanding upon the general principles enunciated by
the majority opinion, Justice Harlan proposed the following two-
pronged test to address this issue: "My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior judicial decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'"
Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have looked
to this two-pronged test, and not the majority holding per se, to
determine when private actions in public places may be
constitutionally protected. In essence, this concurrence has come
to be seen as the main point of the Katz decision, and it is the test
that, typically, has been used when deciding upon the
constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December
1975]
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part
Facts:
M/V JoloLema had been under strict surveillance by the combined
team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao
prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao
City. M/V [JoloLema] was skippered (sic) by Capt.
AquilinoPantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. During
the period from the latter part of August to September 18, 1966,
the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra
and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of
Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise
from the Philippines which were exchanged and/or bartered for
copra and coffee beans and subsequently taken to Davao City.
Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September 1966. On
its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before proceeding to Davao City
where it was apprehended on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00
p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after
Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the charterer
of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came
from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined
team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of Davao,
proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao
City, to ask for said document.
Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they entered the
room. There are conflicting claims whether the manicurist
TeofilaIbañez or whether Velasco's wife, who was allegedly inside
the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to
enter; and whether the police officers "forcibly opened luggage’s
and boxes from which only several documents and papers were
found, then seized, confiscated and took away the same," or
whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the suitcases and
baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things
contained therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao
seized 1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V
motor vessel JoloLema. The seizure was declared lawful by the
Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax
Appeals (GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the
present special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus; the only question left then is whether the search
conducted by a party headed by Reynolds without the search
warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who entered into a
contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine
Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use
ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such constitutional provision.
Issue:
Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was
the occupant of the hotel room then rented by Velasco.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
Held:
There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to
counteract the force of the recital of the written statement of
TeofilaIbañez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of
one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the
person who was present at his hotel room was one TeofilaIbañez,
"a manicurist by occupation." If such indeed were the case, then it
is much more easily understandable why that person,
TeofilaIbañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person
at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified
her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances,
that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and
even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the
officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the
appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications
was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to
why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can
readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to
dispense with the need for a search warrant.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J):
Facts:
On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics
Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette
vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was
selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in
Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place
where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for
illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out
the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in
the test buys were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of
Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can
placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares
she was selling.
Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station,
Ramos executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she
swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks
confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime
Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to
be marijuana.
The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation
of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her
buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless.
She claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four
5-peso bills by one Sgt.Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same
money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she
insists was her money being saved for the rentals. She was later
brought to the Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where she signed
a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel
during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the
document at the Fiscal’s Office. Two information were filed
against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for
possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC
Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and
sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of
P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and
was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos
sought reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search
of the trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under her
control.
Held:
The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found
under the table where her legitimate wares were being sold.
Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash can.
The same was under her immediate physical control. She had
complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table
to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession
exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control
of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of
the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to
distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is only
necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control
over the contraband. These requirements are present in the
situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside
the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the
NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had
to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can
under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way
that it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The
trash can was obviously not for use by her customers.
Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in
evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of
possession is correct. 
Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]
En Banc, Paras (J):
Facts:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES

15 August 1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke’s seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. LoHo Wing). The
Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines
stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to
Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroyare husband and wife residing in
On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they enter the house. The permission granted by was for the purpose
Davao City. When Veroy was promoted to the position of
be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged “rebel”
Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System, sometime in
thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct
June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City. Their
pleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement, a room to room search once inside the house. The police officers
residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and
which was denied. The court ordered their commitment at the had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the
Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials
premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna
the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search
Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses
their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys were returned to the warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to
St. Luke’s Hospital where their physical condition remained search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the
erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against
circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to
directive for their transfer from the St. Luke’s Hospital to Camp them. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is
give her access in case of an emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt.
Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990 malumprohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof
Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided
is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
Veroy’s house in Davao City on information that the said
prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
residence was being used as a safe house of rebel soldiers. They  
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search
were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but
warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated
did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they
Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by
order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that
The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against
the search be conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. The
and prohibition. the Veroys in the criminal action against them for illegal
following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroy’s
possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a
house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by
search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of
Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed.
magazine containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an
Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
unlocked drawer in the children’s room. 3 half-full jute sacks Issue:
containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the
children’s room. A search of the children’s recreation and study
area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a
small black bag containing a book entitled “Islamic Revolution
Future Path of the Nation”, a road map of the Philippines, a Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for
telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and ascertaining thereat the presence of alleged “rebel soldiers”
religious pamphlets was found in the master’s bedroom. include the authority to conduct a room to room search once
Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made. The case was inside the house.
referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City Assistant
Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for
Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May
1990). In a resolution dated 6 August1990, the Fiscal People vs. Damaso, GR No. 93516,
recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for Held:
violation of PD1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8August Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at
1990, an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify
the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City.
was received by the Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
motion for  bail on the same day which was denied for being searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the
premature, as they have not been arrested yet. The Veroys 1987Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano,
voluntarily surrendered to Gen. PantaleonDumlao, but who must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa.
refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there
received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of
Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village.
They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45
firearm and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded to
Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba
whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the
group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they
reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by
the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new
address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the
Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the
new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again
required Morados to go with them. When they reached the
house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that
they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area.
At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested
the group to go inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who
were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow
them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14
rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard,
maps and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought
them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise
brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza)
was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated
therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was criminally charged.
Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime. The
defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of
the prosecution's evidence for being illegal for lack of a search
warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting
any evidence for the accused. The trial court rendered its
decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search of Damaso’s house is
lawful.
Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of the Constitution,
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of the relevant portion of which provides:
subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason
except upon probable cause to be determined under oath or
being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the persons or things to be seized.
being a personal one cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her. The records show that Damaso Sec. 3. (1) .
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she
was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. While the power to search and seize is It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the prohibit are unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search
warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search
authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation
warrant requirement. Among
here demanded urgency which could have prompted the
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is
by this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States
silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at
Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. 4 and Coolidge vs. New
nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house.
Hampshire.  5 Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently
falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
People vs. Evaristo, GR No. 93828 position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence. 6
Facts: Peace officers while patrol, heard burst of gunfire and
proceeded to investigate in the house of appellant where they The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted
were given permission to enter accidentally discovering the permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
firearms in the latter’s possession. Accused-appellant found guilty officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had
of illegal possession of firearms contends that the seizure of the sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for
evidence is inadmissible because it was not authorized by a valid firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house,
warrant. thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as
inadvertent and even accidental.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in
an accidental discovery of the evidence is admissible.
Held: Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for being People v. Omaweng GR 99050, 2 September 1992
incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense was committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant.
the Mt. Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction
of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford
Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed
towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and
had no passengers.
The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the
vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into
the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was
partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger
seat on the right side of the vehicle. They asked permission to see
the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to. When
they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic
packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. The
constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the
stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter
boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to
report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs
were surrendered to the evidence custodian.
The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance contained
in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be
positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the
violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC
Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his
failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an
extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had waived
his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper
court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with
the violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. After his motion for reinvestigation was
denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on
the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did
not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint
Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of
prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21
March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting
Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs.
Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates
his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be
stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior
consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted
on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC
Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or
rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own
behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or
consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is
precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the
course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs were found, it
behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was
necessary for such seizure.
People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]
Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt.
James Ayan, both members of the P.C.Mountain Province
Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for
Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt.
Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw
Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan,
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their
station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton
under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found
out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who
the owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter,
C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the
latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing
marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened
in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the
carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor
who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of
marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA
6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the
trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of
RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros
appealed.
Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the
search made in the moving vehicle, resulting tohis warrantless
arrest, constitutes a waiver.
Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or with a judicial warrant;otherwise such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby
— i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The
requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute.
There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which
relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may
lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles,
trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable
to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless
searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited
to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched
nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. The
Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in
situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the
distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics
Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP")
had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where
the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or
"tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that
prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a
particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had
received information that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his
possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
agents had received confidential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that of the accused
would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the
record that any circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony
of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the
accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who
had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao),
simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such
probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed to
have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his
warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object." To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does
not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the
constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the
carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. The "fruits" of
the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana —
should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against
Barros.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]
En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur
Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed
under surveillance by the Police Operativesfrom the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-
WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports
received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang
Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth
positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On 17
June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport
and deliver a certain quantity of drugs that night on board a
owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives, together
with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3
vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North
Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant
spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives tailed the
subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose
Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said
jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo
Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the
vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of
paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected
contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3
suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC
for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were
submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their
chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated
stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms.
The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested
without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s
house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed previously to
the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N.
Avenue, where they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an
Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @
"Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When
arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3
March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty as
charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million.
Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver ontheir part.
Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante
@ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay ySantos @ "Boy Kuba" are
precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when
they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during
the search and seizure. They never protested when the police
officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he
opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their
cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police
station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly." Further, they effectively waived their
constitutional right against the search and seizure by their
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when
they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by
participating in the trial.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and
Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routinepatrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the
jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y
Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not
answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes'
consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from
and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,
Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought
to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of
Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned
over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes
was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16
October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not
guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993,
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,
finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court
denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes
appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of
Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at thecontents of his vehicle
and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on
Caballes’ part on warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons andproperties against
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2,
Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article
III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary,
the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by
the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The
mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in
the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes'
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati
leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check.
Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves
which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact
that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do
not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his
vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately,none exists in the
present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained
the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves
much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down,
Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By
uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search
the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were
informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the
police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can
Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable
wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
PEOPLE VS ASIS
Facts: DaniloAsis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon
were charged in an Information dated 18 February 1998; the
information stating "That on or about February 10, 1998, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain
and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then
and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a
bladed instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter
take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the
amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch' one (1) gold necklace;
and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00
more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in
the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death."
When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty.
Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel
de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist
Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of
them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and
substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted
to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both accused
were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8
March 2000, held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery
with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and
robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including
the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused
definitely proved that the two (2) x xx committed the crime," and
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced
both accused to the supreme penalty of death. Hence, the
automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do
not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection
thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of
the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag
of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making
the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as
inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it
was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that
contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims
that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a
warrant.
Issue: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the
recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession
during the warrantless search.
Held: Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is
expressly authorized to doso on his or her behalf. In the present
case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at
the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered,
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being
the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have
given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of
Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not present
when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver,
it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have consented
to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not
understand what was happening at that moment. There was no
interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search
and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin,
i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law," becomes even more pronounced in the
present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed
to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained
pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In
the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence
vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely
arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to
convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the
probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise,
the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the
accused deserves acquittal
PEOPLE VS TUDTUD
Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian
asset” named BobongSolier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier
related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud,
who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana
in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1
RamilFloreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members
of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.
For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud
was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud
was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier
informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and
would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat.
At around 4:00 p.m.that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at
the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s
arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton
marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men,
PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit
Tudtud’s description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1
Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed
them that the police had received information that stocks of
illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled
Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud
obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as
his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked
Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to
the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested
Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and
brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The
confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the
confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The
plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his
companion, DindoBulong, were subsequently charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the
validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against
them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges
against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s
evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and DindoBolong assign,
among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana
leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s
statement of “it’s all right” when the police officers requested
that the box be opened) be considered a waiver
Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC
justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under
the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It
is significant to note that the search in question preceded the
arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede
the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede
the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the
police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The
long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree
of consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the
exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus,
herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers
that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as
“personal,” having learned the same only from their informant
Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and the friends of
Tudtud.Solier’s information is hearsay. Confronted with such a
dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct
their own “surveillance.” This “surveillance,” it turns out, did not
actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of
plying his illegal trade, but of a mere “gathering of information
from the assets there.” The police officers who conducted such
“surveillance” did not identify who these “assets” were or the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective
waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if
the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the
rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution
failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records
disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as
such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the
carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said “it
was alright.” He did not resist and opened the box himself.
Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure
is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As
the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no
evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting
officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al.
cannot be sustained.
People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 4 concur
Facts: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their
informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th
Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime
Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. RodelitoOblice, Sgt. Dante Yang,
Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and
Pat. DeograciasGorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around
2:30 p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo
Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to
buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la
Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz
whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when
Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of
marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one
aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants'
pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of
suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the
prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and
his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity,
converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents
and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00
marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de
la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana. Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y
Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and
Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each
to pay one-half of the costs. From this decision, de la Cruz and
Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated
3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz
on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz
was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September
1989. The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.
Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust
operation violates Beltran’s constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is
essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither
instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment
is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the
offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is
seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant,
needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search
being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the
arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught redhanded.
There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are
admissible in evidence.
People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen
SilverioQuevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the
SanFernando Police Station, together with Barangay
TanodMacarioSacdalan, were conducting surveillance
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at
Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The
surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons
who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also
on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around
9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red
traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they
confronted him. The person was requested by Patrolmen
Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the
person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana
leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo,
more or less. The person was asked of his name and the
reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name
as MedelTangliben and explained that he was waiting for a
ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The
accused was taken to the police headquarters at San
Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat.
SilverioQuevedo submitted to his Station Commander his
Investigator's Report. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, found
MedelTangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced
him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay
the costs. Tangliben appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest, even in light of the Court’s ruling in Peoplevs.
Aminnudin.
Held: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a
search warrant is a search incident to a lawfularrest. Thus,
Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case
therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless
search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v.
Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC
officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo
City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him one evening, approached him as he
descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected
the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana
leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be
admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there
was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be
procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an
informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana.
Faced with such on-the- spot information, the police officers
had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a
search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling
in Aminnudin herein. To require search warrants during on-
the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors
of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons
are associated.
People v. Kalubiran [GR 84079, 6 May 1991]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in
Dumaguete City, by Narcotics Command(NARCOM)
elements. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation
in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted asthe buyer while the other
team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-
arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant,
who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo
Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for
buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two
sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously
marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi
Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked
the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and
found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person.
The other team members, namely M/Sgt. RanulfoVillamor
and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they
boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19
sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC
Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive
results. Kalubiran contended however that one Quindo
approached and frisk him on the same night, and found
nothing on him. However, he was called back by one
Villamor, who told him at gun point to board the jeep and
taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was
released the following day with the help of a lawyer. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found
Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.
Issue;Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the
19 sticks of marijuana found in his possessionduring his
arrest.
Held: Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result
of the entrapment and so came under Section 5,Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any
person actually committing a crime. The search was made
as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under
Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the Rules, there is
abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and
seizures under the conditions established in the case.
However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two
sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act when he should also have been charged with
possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the
time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to
answer for the second offense because he has not been
impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8
of the said law.
People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the 3rd time in December 1988 as atourist.
He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In
the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City.
Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day,
he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days.
On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed
at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information
was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that
same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus
where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a
bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When
Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which was
a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt
stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier,
each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside
the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also
bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam
stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of
the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At
the investigation room, theofficers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative
samples were taken from the hashish found among the
personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to
the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which
established the objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt
claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were
not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same
bus with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An
information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: ARREST, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES

entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October

1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of
the trial court.

Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be

searched without an issued warrant.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers andeffects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. However,
where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without
a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances. Section 5
provides that “a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante
delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus,
the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.