CONSTI 2 DIGEST
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female
of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity
of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving
the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is
an exercise of police power.
RULING: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property,
(2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference
for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
TROPANG POTCHI
Ichong vs Hernandez treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s one class are treated alike.
economic life.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are
control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and
allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted
Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
from this Act.
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail
business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential
trade, commerce and industry. Provision against the
enemy of the State.
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action
now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
Lutz vs. Araneta
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title the Act violates
international and treaty obligations the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar
hereditary succession Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 “to stabilize the sugar
industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the United States market and the
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of
imposition of export taxes.” Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity
the laws.
as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real the Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively,
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification which in plaintiff’s opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax
adopted. may be constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by
the Court of First Instance.
RATIO:
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality
among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be
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Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is
shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose,
to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
“inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.”
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid
of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being
protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of
similar protection; but the legislature is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to a policy of “all or none.”
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC
FACTS:
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines
invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands
do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants
who are actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural
land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective
rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been
determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the DAR secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of
police power.
TROPANG POTCHI
B. Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation
provided for the CARP violates the Constitution. to the owner.
C. Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the land owner question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits
compensation. for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
D. Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
eminent domain
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of
HELD: just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
down by the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of
requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is police power but of the power of eminent domain.
judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the
provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ (G.R. NO. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with
FACTS:
finality the said determination.
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just
Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3,
compensation is money and no other what is being dealt with
1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC
here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent
Manila declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments
domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which
against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the
involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount
constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.)
of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available
it impairs freedom of contract.
at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the
nullification of the entire program.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-
beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The
CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the
explained how the law on estafa was not sufficient to cover all
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of
acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
only punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to
Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
cover prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing
obligations.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and
the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
the state because of the injury it causes to public interests.
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of
public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
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BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. The “debt” contemplated by the
constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No
one is going to prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is
punishable. This is precisely why the mala prohibita crime of
issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by
Congress. It is a valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was
enacted to punish the following acts:
…any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall
fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
And
…any person who makes or draws and issues any check on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of
worthless checks was a huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is
a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy,
the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in
commercial transactions and confidence is the primary basis why
merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any
practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the
Congress, through their exercise of police power, declared that
the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of
their previous explanation on ex delicto debts) the non-payment
of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order.
Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572,
December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a
person who has thrice failed the National MedicalAdmission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he
may not, under its rule that- Astudent shall be allowed only 3
chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student
shall not beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The
private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
FACTS:Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the
East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he
took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he
applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his application on
the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of
Valenzuela tocompel his admission to the test.In his original
petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT
scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. Theadditional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on
academic freedom, due process and equalprotection.
HELD: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission tomedical schools only
to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
TROPANG POTCHI
Ratio: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. Thisis true of
any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge toone's ambition. The State
has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are notdissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.
These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promotethe common good while also giving the individual a sense
of satisfaction.The Court feels that it is not enough to simply
invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
theConstitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of
his preparation and promise. The privaterespondent has failed the
NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the
least, it is certainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No
depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent.
It is stressedthat a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is
not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation.The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that hasnot excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It
is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality
education forthe full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliantfuture. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round
holes, of dentists who should never have left the farmand
engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants. It is time indeedthat the State took
decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to thecourse for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are anation
of misfits.
Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al.
FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O.
No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven
years old if male, and eleven years old if female). The penalty is
confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due
process.
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RULING: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it
would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an
“iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty. The
minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even
if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright
confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for
the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not
seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A
is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is
cancelled.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta Facts: City government
of Qeezon City passed an, which provides tha tat least six (6)
percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior
to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
The area so designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for.
The City Council passed a resolution City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%
space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the
Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul
Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged
that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative
Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being
purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the
rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court,
therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City
Government and City Council filed the instant petition. Petitioners
argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make
such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends
that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance in question was a valid exercise of
police power. Held: No. The police power being the most active
power of the government and the due process clause being the
broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between
this power of government and the due process clause of the
Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in
the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose
of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is
not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D),
31 October 1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that
certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
TROPANG POTCHI
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no
necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in
question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that
the same should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court
claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that
neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and,
when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the
law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the
necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case
and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is,
without question, within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising
the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to
inquire into.
Republic vs. PLDT
Facts: Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US
and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.The plaintiff
through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its
own Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas
telephone service.Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with
them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply,
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus,
prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for
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CONSTI 2 DIGEST
judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the
Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system,
and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to
restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those
severed.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to
enter into a contract with the plaintiff.
Held: No. While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of
the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court.
People vs. Fajardo
Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the
municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the
construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza.
Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.After
his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building
beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was
repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the
rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one
was destroyed by a typhoon. He was convicted and ordered to
pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due
to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits
the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited
conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion
which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the
interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above
sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general
welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the
sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be
used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just
compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property
that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain,
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243.Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. —
The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the
following discretionary powers:
x xxxxxxxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds
of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and
issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee
which shall be determined by the municipal council and which
shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one
peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the
municipal council had either established fire limits within the
municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to
be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the
ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec.
2243 (c)
Republic vs. Vda De Castell VI
Facts: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented
and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the
lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease
commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
TROPANG POTCHI
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place
when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as
lesse.
Held: No, the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must
enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period,
(3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting
it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the
government entered and occupied the property under a contract
of lease.
Amigable v Cuenca
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot.
At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no
annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in
the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote
the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in
his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo
a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines
and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.
According to the defendants, the action was premature because it
was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According
to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had
already prescribed, that the Government had not given its
consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action
against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may
properly sue the government.
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it
was held that when the government takes away property from a
5
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in
favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of
title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner
of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of
the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time
since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left
is for the government to make due compensation—price or value
of the lot at the time of the taking.
PPI VS COMELEC
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less
than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them
to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is
authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency
to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Sumulong vs Guerrero
Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority
(NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the
expansion of BagongNayon Hosing Project to provide housing
facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This
included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.)
and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the
valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. 
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Phil. Nat’l Bank, representing the “total
market value” of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No.
1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.”  enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero
issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of
land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this
petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing
the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.  the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed
under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due
process.  (4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as
Issues:(1) Whether “socialized housing” as defined in P.D. 1224,
as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not
“public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people, bereft
of public character,” hence it is not a valid exercise of the State’s
power of eminent domain. 
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the
property/properties to be expropriated. 
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. 
TROPANG POTCHI
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their
parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue
of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge. 
Held: (1) P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as, “the
construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class
members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities.” The “public use”
requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at
present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, “socialized
housing” falls within the confines of “public use.” 
(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may
be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or
gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate,
the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA’s
choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use,
has to yield to the demands of the common good. 
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential
Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found
in P.D. No.’s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitute for just compensation. 
amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate
taking of possession, control and disposition of property without
giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without
hearing.
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CONSTI 2 DIGEST
LEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA
MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila (492 square meters.) When
the parcel of land was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it
passed Resolution declaring the land to be a national historical
landmark. Which was approved.
So on on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before
theRegional Trial Court of Pasig.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land
is for the purpose of public use.
HELD: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution
in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what
public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON. CEFERINO E.
DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: Under Proclamation No. 1811, four parcel of land with an
aggregate area of 22,328 sqm owned and registered in the name
of private individuals were included for the establishment of an
export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA). The EPZA offered to purchase the land from the
private owners in accordance wit the valuation set forth in Section
22 of PD 464. Failure to agreed regarding the sale, EPZA filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to expropriate the land
pursuant to PD No. 66(empowers the petitioner to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for
the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone)
The judge authorized PEZA to to take immediate possession of the
premises. As per decision of the judge, EPZA should pay the
private owners a just compensation for the properties and order
certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the
court the just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated.
Three commissioners submitted their consolidated report at P 15
per sqm as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation.
EPZA filed for Motion for Reconsideration for the court order and
Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that PD No
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of the
Court on the ascertainment of just compensation; and such
compensation should not exceed the maximum stated in set by
PD 1533. The trial court denied the petition. The case is for
certiorari and mandamus. Grounds is excess for sjurisdiction and
with grave abuse of the discretion of the judge.
ISSUE: The question raised in this petition is whether or not
Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have
repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of
property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its
market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD:The court still have the power and authority to determine
just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree
and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
TROPANG POTCHI
The trial court correctly stated the valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shag prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Elimination of the court's discretion, under PD No. 1533, to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
is unconstitutional and void.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95,
Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint
for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two
parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed “for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged
by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project.” Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a
negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which
the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk
of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or
res judicata. On private respondent’s motion, its answer was
treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the
complaint.
Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code
(RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise
its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by
7
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a
law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
Wenceslao Pascual v Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, et al
Facts:
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public
advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely
incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
Governor WenceslaoPascual of Rizal instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No.
920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.
Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in
the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected
and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta,
situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to
the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is
public purpose because people living in the subdivision will
directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the
government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to
be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public
purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the
government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power
to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It
is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which
the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public
money.
   The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of
public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the
public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public.
Punsalan v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city,
assail OrdinanceNo. 3398 together with the law authorizing it
(Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila).
The ordinance imposes a municipaloccupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
payment of the same. The law authorizing
said ordinanceempowers the Municipal Board of the city to
impose a municipaloccupation tax on persons engaged in various
professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax
under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the
tax under protest as imposed byOrdinance No. 3398. The lower
court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of
the law authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it
constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double
taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select
what occupationsshall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all,
or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others
untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes
aside from that imposed by the National Government. That
matter is within the domain of political departments. The
argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is
widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the
requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions
thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to
the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Lladoc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated
P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate
filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued
an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal
thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
TROPANG POTCHI
Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise
taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It
does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use
made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
property used for religious purpose do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise
taxes.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of
higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its
lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said
“Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and
Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and
embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial
court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential purposes
and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property
is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of
perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for
educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935
Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty
taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use
of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the
lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing
8
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of
exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the
modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and
the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence
of the director).
Ichong vs. Hernandez, GR No. L-7995
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of
the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in
the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise
of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2)
the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property
is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of
statutory origin.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control. Such
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future. Furthermore, the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom
and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres   231 SCRA 335 (1994)
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity),
filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to
represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued
an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees.
However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-
Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and
confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their
respective position papers and to consider the amended petition
submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the
petition and directing the holding of a certification election among
the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal.
PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied;
hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the
part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
TROPANG POTCHI
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by
the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement
of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity
to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so
desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Ynotvs IAC
Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same
was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by
the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of
the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to
rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld
the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of
police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make
it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The
executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
9
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
due process.
AlontevsSavillano
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLynPunongbayan with
accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that
Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The
case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and
the prosecutorlater moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on
with the case and thechange of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had
ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of
her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his
right to due process when he did not cross examineJuvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape
and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due
process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from
further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and
the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The
standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not
be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not
shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court
for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Aniag vs COMELEC
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
TROPANG POTCHI
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was
using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the
SerrapioTaccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot
firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set
petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a aside.
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the
180 SCRA 218; G.R. 84818
order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a
Facts:
security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving
No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner
telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that
and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for
were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission.
running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
“gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons”
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
hearing.
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on
Issue:
the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the
elections.
Held:
Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the
fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
judicial rather than quasi-
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the
legislative. But respondent’s
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his
contention that notice and hearing are not required since the
car
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and
temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public
Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission,
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant
upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to
issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search
fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to
is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether
search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s
the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the
these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched
present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and
the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano,
the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the
Facts: TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather
PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of
10
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not
valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in
Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is
dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU
wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as
they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before
in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of
NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process. They are;
(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
(6)     The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)     The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
 
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO
CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner
University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical
Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which
was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on
the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said
notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they
failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements
and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of
the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent
students were then required to file their written answers to the
formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo
Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among
the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board
left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati
a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO
was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students
Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the
respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of
due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students
was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent
students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly
procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice
and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a
position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that
they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is
accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
TROPANG POTCHI
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; 
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: 
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them 
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and 
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
PEOPLE v. VERA
FACTS:Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed
for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he
is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The
IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that
the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands.
The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and
this also constitutes undue delegation of power because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer
may have a system of probation within their locality. This would
11
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer
is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
There is no difference between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits such denial. A law may appear
to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits
of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibition.
Ichongvs Hernandez
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s
economic life.
- a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly
or indirectly in the retail trade
- aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May
15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of
juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the
Act or until the expiration of term.
- Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
- provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the
retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
- provision against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
- Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships affected by
the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional
for the ff: reasons:
- it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process
- the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
- the Act violates international and treaty obligations
- the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of
the laws.
TROPANG POTCHI
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real of P100 to P200, or both.
and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
adopted.
Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the
RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been
equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall
cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time,
rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
one class are treated alike. deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. ]
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and
Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction
between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the J. Melencio-Herrera
Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
Facts:
rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
 Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor
to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential
in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
enemy of the State.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien
now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who
emergency. has received payment of theretirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
Villegas vs HiuChiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
against him, and that the classification provided therein is based
programs of the government and another country, and members
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite
mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the
City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the
12
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for
candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that
there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by
respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53,
on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of
office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4;
Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In
order to determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition
has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a
hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement?
No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the
necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and
procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public
interest involved and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject
to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations,
one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or
may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be
encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has
already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for
the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The
need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does
not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does
not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to
all those belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger
blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if
at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred
by theoretical inconsistencies.
TROPANG POTCHI
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have
been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as
to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have
been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run
for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and
present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's
petition was meritorious.
PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon
[GR L-81958, 30 June 1988]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI)
is a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It challenged
the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s Department Order 1 (series
of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure
is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of
the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII
of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy
13
CONSTI 2 DIGEST
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as
contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It
also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause,
in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May
1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor
and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.
In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against
women.
Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. ‘Equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to
existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class. The classification made — the preference for
female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid
tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even
rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling
that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men
abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament.
Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the impugned
guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas workers,
not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary,
due to the fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select
person or group of persons within an existing class, to the
prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons. Where the
classification is based on such distinctions that make a real
difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young,
the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for
favorable treatment.
TROPANG POTCHI
Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
Mapayo arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory
Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90)
Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil
or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case.
from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation
of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection
guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning
than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.
The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial
must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the
trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from
the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.
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