EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
People vs. Cayat-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
FACTS:In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native
non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of
their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then
charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case
of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it
violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution.
He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark
them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection
clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites
of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not
enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that
distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be
complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests
on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.”
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as
“an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures
thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards
them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in
the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if
there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress,
with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian
brothers on the basis of true equality.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera
FACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal
case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter
was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended
the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing was
set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance
of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation
because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation
officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila,
even if construed as a province, has no designated probation
officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter
alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces
whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses
to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer,
but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed –
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue
delegation of power because it gave the option to the provincial
board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however,
the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the
provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executive’s power to grant pardon. They say
that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon.
(Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC
– ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in
provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the
Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of the
Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221,
which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated
the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in
the past without question but is now questioning the validity of
the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE: 
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly
authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a law.
Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using
an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this
note. There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act
4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply
providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to
install a probation officer, then the accused within said province
will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides
that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective
provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient
standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining
whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This
only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily
according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation.
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Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of
Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president
to commute penalties.
Ichongvs Hernandez- EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of
the Act against the transmission by aliens of their
retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it
to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.  of P100 to P200, or both.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3)
no treaty orinternational obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of
the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is
only of statutory origin.  equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizensandcountry from dominance and control. Such enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its
security and future. Furthermore, the law does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom
and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Villegas vsHiuChiong Tsai Pao Ho
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members
of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite
mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the
City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the
violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and
excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time,
rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive
and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. ]
Dumlaovs COMELEC- EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Dumlao was the formergovernor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired
from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980
local elections.  On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1
thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao
assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and
Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits
of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the
other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the
elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them
and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the
eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for
this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is
different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case
does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial
review. There are standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite
was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons
charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing
of complaints against them andafter preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age
at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to
promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective
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echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than
65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages,
say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees,
aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just
like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo),
who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Ormoc Sugar Central vs Ormoc City
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4
imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and
other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under
protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint
against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.  raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of
uniformity of taxation, were infringed? 
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions, but also to future
conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance
does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the
coverage of the tax.  order to promote the general welfare.
Basco v. PAGCOR
GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree
1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, “ to regulate and
centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was
subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government
but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public
order, among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD
1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in
that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms
are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government,
away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless
allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean
that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its
police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by
Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the
domain of the political branches of government and the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds
Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
BINAY vs DOMINGO
Facts:
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those
who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the
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amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor JejomarBinay, in the
exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal
charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the
municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred
thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said
commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen
any perceptible connection or relation between the objective
sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general
welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is
a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
Held:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise
of police power under the general welfare clause. The police
power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, “Sic uteretuo et ahenum non
laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and
“Saluspopuliest suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the
supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute
of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various
social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as
a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
NPC v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 106724 | 1994-02-09
FACTS: The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the
compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39 RA
6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior
and Local Government", which took effect on January 2, 1991.
Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system
for PNP members. Section 39 thereof reads:  at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and
"SEC. 39. Compulsory Retirement. ---- Compulsory retirement, for
officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-
six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of
chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the
Commission may allow his retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.  applies not only to some but to all local police officers.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of
retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-
six (56). 
Respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by
Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are
also covered by the 4 year transition period of Sec. 89.That term
"INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier
constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of PD
765 in 1975.
Petitioners contend that the 4-year transition period provided in
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously
retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of
Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the
retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56)
under the AFP law.  He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for
Trial Court ruled that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law
includes all members of the present Philippine National Police
ISSUE: WON it is a valid classification. Yes
HELD: The Court is merely giving life to the real intent of the
legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee that preceded the enactment of RA 6975.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that
Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force
is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid.
The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to
the following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial
distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply
equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68
Phil. 12 [1939]).
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC,
before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already retirable
governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The
distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to
enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which
would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is
merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and
effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it
It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd
that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable age from
56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any
cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers
be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other
PC officers who would retire at age 56 after such period? Such
absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat
its purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP
members.
Himagan vs People
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City.
the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day
or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from
office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the
suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation
of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection
guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning
than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.
The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial
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must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the
trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from
the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.
 
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory
word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90)
days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in
appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal   or civil
liability.  If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is
not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case.
Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July
1987]
FACTS:  MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
Canter for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude
No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring
test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
it’s calculated to improve the quality of medical education in
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
the country. The cut-off score for the successful applicants, based
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the
on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and
other admission requirements as presently called for under
5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
objectives in the following manner: 
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
ISSUE:
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in
the Philippines." 
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. 
Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:
HELD: 
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate;
imposition.
and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five
pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
of Medical Education;”
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants
public order — of the general community. An important
to medical schools: 
component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
certificate of good moral character issued by two former
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
and safety of the public. 
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.”
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MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and
economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improving the quality of medical education in the country. We
are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this
area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the
Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ
of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
16 August
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18
June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
transferring the authority to regulate jai-alai from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A
Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions
And For Other Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by
then President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers
and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License
or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse
And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and
Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree
No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-
Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection
and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative
powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality
of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of
the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being final,
cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power
under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise,
the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
227 SCRA 703
FACTS:
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as
implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of
the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition
assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purpose
 (2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage;
 (3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary
HELD:
(1) Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule
are: (1) to prevent hodgepodge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its
purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners'
contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be
an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute
on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter
of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing
section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is
silent on the subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a
former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service
system. 
(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report
on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill
was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except
in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas
and nays on the final reading of the bill). 
 (3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains
the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President
of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and
the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices
and officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed
discriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of government, including those who
do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favoured, which may or
may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The
classification was not based on substantial distinctions.
SISON vs. Ancheta 130 SCRA 654
GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984
FACTS:
Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amended the Tax Code and petitioner
Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer, alleges that "he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax
upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-
vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
individual taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character. It therefore violates both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well asof the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution while also
violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.
HELD: 
The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to
amount to the confiscation of property from abuse of power.
Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not
suffice and there must be a factual foundation of such
unconstitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Assuming that said amount represents a portion of the
75% of his war damage claim which was not paid, the same would
not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to
petitioner, the last instalment he received from the War Damage
Commission, together with the notice that no further payment
would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In the circumstance,
said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950
gross income.  In the second place, said amount cannot be
considered as a "business asset" which can be deducted as a loss
in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable
as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the generosity
and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of 1945,
there was absolutely no law under which petitioner could claim
compensation for the destruction of his properties during the
battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the payments of claims by
the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its
discretion to be exercised in the manner it may see lit, but the
non-payment of which cannot give rise to any enforceable right.
It is well known that our internal revenue laws are not
political in nature and as such were continued in force during the
period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced
by the occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax
returns were filed during that period and income tax payment
were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are
deemed to be the laws of the occupied territory and not of the
occupying enemy.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable - this requirement is met when the tax
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found." Also, the rule of uniformity does not call
for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly
unattainable." When the problem of classification became of
issue, the Court said: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means
that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority
to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation..." As provided by this Court, where "the
differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."
Nolasco v COMELEC 
275 SCRA 762
FACTS:
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
isqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-
elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are
grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code –
giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions: for committing acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount
for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their
position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc.
Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that
should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be
turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their
memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus
this petition for certiorari.  television broadcast stations in the Philippinesaffected by the
ISSUES:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of
laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
HELD:  “Comelec Time-  The Commission shall procure radio and
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the
laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence
on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that
the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable.
What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a
mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan.
It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC
that the candidate with the second highest number of votes
cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be
disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second
placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a
judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed
that the second placer would have won the elections because in
the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the
condition would have substantially changed.
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs.
COMELEC  to authorize unjust taking of private property.  According to
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to
be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other
reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual
or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.  Petitioner
GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to
bring the constitutional challenge.  Petitioner operates radio and
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which
provides:
television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations.  For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall
be procured by COMELEC free of charge.  Thus it contends that
Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again
this year.  Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of
the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is
petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air
time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands
to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. 
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit.  All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals
and images.  They are merely given the temporary privilege to use
them.  Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast
stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising
them. 
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just compensation for the
print space they may provide is likewise without merit. 
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public
funds which it does not do in the case of print media.  To require
the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC  is a
fair exchange for what the industry gets.
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the
airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.   based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that
the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized
under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and
residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and
validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits
provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court
of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied
the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
 Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1)
the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales,
and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.  Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone
would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base”
only.  It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two
components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by
the law.  It has effectively discriminated against them, without
reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal
protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that
Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority
to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.  He adds that the
issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid
classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was
equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.  If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions,
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class.
 Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution
were affirmed.
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the KuratongBaleleng
gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies,
were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in
the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
between the KuratongBaleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to
investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified
the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors,
charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where
petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank
of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify
under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase
“principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues: 
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause
of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been
introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the KuratongBaleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post
facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members
of the KuratongBaleleng was committed in relation to the office
of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s
or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the
party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the
following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class; all of which are present in this
case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
involving” certain public officials and under the
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the KuratongBaleleng cases.
The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is
not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However,
upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
SORIANO v. CA G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999
Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal protection
clause as this is imposed by law as a consequence of the
commission of a crime
FACTS: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical
injuries and damage to property after being involved in a
vehicular accident which killed IsidrinoDaluyong. His application
for probation was granted and among the terms and conditions
imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family responsibilities; (b)
devoting to a specific employment or pursuing a prescribed
secular study or vocational training; (c)indemnify the heirs of the
victim Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.A motion to cancel his
probation was filed due to his failure to indemnify the heirs of the
victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioner’s
commission of another crime while he was awaiting arraignment.
The trial court denied the motion and instead directed petitioner
to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed on
him. Based on the information provided by the heirs of Daluyong,
petitioner still failed to satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made
to explain his non-compliance and to submit his program of
payment immediately otherwise he would be cited for contempt.
For continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation
was revoked on October 1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his family
responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific employment, (c) satisfy his
civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d) cooperate with his
program of supervision. Petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals claiming that respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner
contempt and revoking his probation. The CA dismissed the
petition holding that Soriano’s “stubborn unwillingness” to
comply with the orders of the trial court “shows his refusal to
reform himself and to correct a wrong.” A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the revocation of petitioner’s probation is lawful
and proper  On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers
RULING: YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper.
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose
grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court subject to certain
terms and conditions. Having the power to grant probation, the
trial court also has the power to revoke it in a proper case and
under appropriate circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in
violating the terms and conditions of his probation, he cannot
anymore assail the revocation of his probation. Soriano claims
that his non-compliance was due to his poor financial condition
and that it was impossible for him to formulate a program as he
only relies on his parents for support and he was in no position to
comply with the same. He even questioned the constitutionality
of the requirement imposed as this harped on his alleged
poverty. –  This requirement is NOT violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Payment of civil liability is
not a condition precedent to probation. The trial court could not
have done away with imposing civil liability as it is not an arbitrary
imposition but one required by law. Petitioner may be poor, but
this is precisely the reason why the trial court gave him the
chance to make his own program of payment in contrast to the
cited Salgado case where a program of payment was already
imposed upon the petitioner therein. Petitioner also asserts that
his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court to submit
a program of payment was not deliberate as the notice was
received by his counsel and did not notify petitioner
immediately. –  NO MERIT. His refusal to comply with said orders
cannot be anything but deliberate as petitioner had notice of both
orders and refused to comply with the trial court’s directive.
Petitioner’s counsel has not been shown to be grossly
irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner’s rights. The fact
that petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration of the said
order, shows proof that he received the notice but still failed
to provide the required program of payment.
TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ABDUSAKUR TAN
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999
FACTS: 
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998
regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose
Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the
election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates
in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding
with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended
the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC
and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the
consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused
by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in
the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated
machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a
consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read
them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency
meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials
overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
petitioner TupayLoong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and
intervenorYusopJikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting
discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the
misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some
recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others
insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).  the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other
municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the
COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were
rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected
because they had the wrong sequence code.  No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to
send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation,
urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu.
6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-
1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and
the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying
down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798
laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the
PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to
invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the
case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by
the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is
unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election
for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:  history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view
the petition of TupayLoong and the petition in intervention of
YusopJikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute
Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our
status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is
not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly
suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of
intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction
of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A.
the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution
"to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to
give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as
arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the
automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the
municipality of PataThe technical experts of COMELEC and the
supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the
automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of
local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to
continue with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu
would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the
sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a
remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for
human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating
above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people
by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not
prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work.
Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC
that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated
counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a
of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the
delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenorJikiri were not denied
process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they
were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the
local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted
written position papers. Their representatives escorted the
transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to
Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from
beginning to end. 
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the
governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be
grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered
by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of
Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of
private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records
show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and
are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were
proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of
Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office
cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election
cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated
unalikes. 
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC
and not to this Court.
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),
petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity
as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO
B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent International
School. The school hires both local and foreign hires. Foreign hires
are granted with more benefits and higher salary. Respondent
says this is because of dislocation factor and limited tenure.
Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to
Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal
work, persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should
be paid similar salaries. If an employer accords the same rank and
position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here,
both groups have similar functions which they perform under
similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign hires perform
25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and
tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.
De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000
FACTS:  The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations
pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act.  The Act
prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four years.  Petitioners claim that the
act violated the equal protection clause because not all election
officials were covered by the prohibition.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
HELD:  The law does not violate the equal protection clause.  It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of
their place of assignment.  Large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity
of election officers, who are the highest representatives of
Comelec in a city or municipality.
[G.R. No. 158359. March 23, 2004]
ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ABDULLAH S.
MANGOTARA, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo the election records of SND are determinative of the final
seeking to nullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same
his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and cannot be said of the precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and Motion
for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying the Motion for
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical
Technical Examination of Voting Records. Pursuant to the 1998
examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET. In this
HRET Rules Congressional candidate Mangotara Petition of
case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of the revision
Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the technical examination of the
proceedings to grant Mangotara’s motion for technical
signatures and thumb the protested precincts of the municipality
examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporo’s motion
of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that the
unpersuasive and accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the
massive substitution of voters and other electoral
HRET merely acted within the bounds of its Constitutionally-
irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be
granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution confers full
uncovered and proven. Fromthis and other premises, he
authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of
concluded that he is the duly-elected representative of the
Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests
2ndDistrict of Lanaodel Norte. Noting that “the Tribunal cannot
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
evaluate the questioned ballots because there are no ballots but
respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
only election documents to consider” HRET granted
Mangotara'smotion and permitted the latter toengage an expert
to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conducted the 2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed Resolutions
technical examination. denied him the right to procedural due process and to present
evidence to substantiate his claim of massive substitute voting
committed in the counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state
ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal
that the HRET itself may ascertain the validity of Dimaporo’s
Protection when the latter denied his motion for
allegations without resort to technical examination. To this end,
technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of
the Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and
procedural due process or the right to present scientific evidence
other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny in the
to show the massive substitute voting committed in counter
appreciation of evidence. It should be noted that the records are
protested precincts.
replete with evidence, documentary and testimonial, presented
by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’s allegation of denial of due process is an
RULING: indefensible pretense. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protection clause.
Equal protection simply means that all persons and things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that the existence
of a valid and substantial distinction justifies divergent treatment. CENTRAL BANK V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)
According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of his
petition and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for EN BANC
revision, his motion, like Mangotara’s, should be granted. The
argument fails to take into account the distinctions extant in [G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004]
Mangotara’s protest vis-à-vis Dimaporo’s counter-protest which
validate the grant of Mangotara’s motion and the denial of CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS)
Dimaporo’s. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
First. RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s
protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’s counter-
protest as he contested the election results in all municipalities
but SND. Significantly, the results of the technical examination of
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
    On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took
effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and
created a new BSP.
    On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority,
the Monetary Board shall:
    (c) Establish a human resource management system which shall
govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or
dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral
in accordance with sound principles of management.
    A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and
wage surveys and subject to the Board’s approval, shall be
instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral’s
human resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as
possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No.
6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions
fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with
the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of
petitioner’s challenge is that the above proviso makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the
BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage
of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the
rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is “a classic case of class
legislation,” allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s
position.
    Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a.    the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the “establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended accordance with sound principles of management.”
versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 1235;
b.    subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file     The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive
employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual
eat all levels in the BSP; and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated
policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence
c.    the assailed proviso was the product of amendments within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, national government.
without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and
even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low- ISSUE:
salaried employees of the BSP;
    Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this
d.    GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of
coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws."
rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and
RULING:
e.    the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the
A.    UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
compensation and that of the BSP officers’.
   
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges
    In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable
indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned
but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection
proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional
clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A.
infirmities.
No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question
without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and
propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause
employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of
was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents’ long as the classification is not unreasonable.
implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it
has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition,
B.     THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs
transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.
FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
    Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision
does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other
    While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the
provisions of the same law, such as “fiscal and administrative
legislature’s power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent
autonomy of BSP,” and the mandate of the Monetary Board to
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched
all validity out of the challenged proviso.
    The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in
its application to another.
    A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.
    The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries.
    Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates
a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not
suffice.
    Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a
ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that
the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress,
which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by
R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP
rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
    Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the
broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis”
test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.
    But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn
duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the
rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself
or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -
particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into
such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of
courts of justice under the Presidential form of government
adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and
balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have
neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend
the Constitution - to settle it.
    In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis
of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the
lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry,
while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of
the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and
better education and opportunities for career advancement - are
given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees
consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and
limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not
the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for
the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution
"to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all.” Any act of Congress that runs counter to
this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this
Court before it can pass muster.
    To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater
concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-
and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the
private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair
labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the
politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a
political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment.
Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act.
They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination
cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s duty
to save them from reasonless discrimination.
    IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and
implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
[G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005]COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin
and prohibit the Executive Branch from allowing, and theprivate
respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-
free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and
the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare Section 5
of EO No. 80, EO No. 97-A, and Section 4 of BCDA
Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 as unconstitutional, illegal, and
void.
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
FACTS: On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing
for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of
the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into
alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones
in order to promote the economic and social development of
Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. Among the
salient provisions are as follows: ³SECTION 12. x x x The Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of
goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic
Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax
and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of
the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and
taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax
laws of the Philippines; x x x´On April 3, 1993, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued EO No. 80, which declared, among others, that Clark
shall have all the applicable incentives granted to the Subic
Special Economic and Free Port Zone under RA No. 7227.Pursuant
to the directive under EO No. 80, the BCDA passed Board
Resolution No. 93-05-034 on May 18, 1993, allowing the tax and
duty-free sale at retail of consumer goods imported via Clark for
consumption outside the CSEZ. On June 10, 1993, the President
issued EO No. 97 and subsequently, EO No. 97-A to Clarifying the
Tax and Duty Free Incentive within the Subic Special Economic
Zone Pursuant to RA No. 7227. EO No. 97-A further provides that
$100monthly and $200 yearly tax-free shopping privileges is
granted to SSEZ residents living outside the Secured Area of the
SSEZ and to Filipinos aged 15 and over residing outside the SSEZ
.I
SSUE: Whether or not the assailed issuances are unconstitutional,
illegal and void for being an exercise of executivelawmaking,
contrary to RA No. 7227 and in violation of the Constitutional
provisions, particularly the equal protectionclause, prohibition of
unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and
preferential use of Filipino labor,domestic materials and locally
produced goods?
Equal Protection of the Laws
Petitioners argue that the assailed issuance (Executive Order No.
97-A) is violative of their right to equal protection of the laws, as
enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. To support
this argument, they assert that private respondents operating
inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments
located outside, the products sold being essentially the same. The
only distinction, they claim, lies in the products’ variety and
source, and the fact that private respondents import their items
tax-free, to the prejudice of the retailers and manufacturers
located outside the zone.
Petitioners’ contention cannot be sustained. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a
reasonable classification.[27] Classification, to be valid, must  (1)
rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.[28]
Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no
violation of the right to equal protection of the
laws. First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial distinctions
lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone,
justifying the difference in their treatment.  In Tiu v. Court of
Appeals,[29] the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A was
challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In
that case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was
discriminatory in confining the application of Republic Act No.
7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the exclusion of those
outside but are, nevertheless, still within the economic zone.
Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this
Court therein found substantial differences between the retailers
inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and
reasonable classification:
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big
investors who are being lured to establish and operate their
industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present
business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are
talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs.  On
the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the
economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even
more important, at this time the business activities outside the
“secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the
purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base
to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There
is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the
benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. Additionally, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and
monitor the activities within the “secured area,” which is already
fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent importation of merchandise” or
smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not
require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual
and material differences between territories, there is no violation
of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always
avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or
business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.[30]
The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between
residents within the secured area and those living within the
economic zone but outside the fenced-off area.  Similarly, real and
substantial differences exist between the establishments herein
involved.  A significant distinction between the two groups is that
enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within
Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the
other duly-registered zone enterprises operate within the so-
called “separate customs territory.” To grant the same tax
incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses
operating outside the zones, as petitioners insist, would clearly
defeat the statute’s intent to carve a territory out of the military
reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and capital is
maintained.
The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No.
7227. As held in Tiu, the real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is
to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases
into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to
the establishments within the zone to attract and encourage
foreign and local investors.  This is the very rationale behind
Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar special economic zone
laws which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other
benefits.
The classification, moreover, is not limited to the existing
conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former
military reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining
investment center.
And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found
within the “secured area.” As ruled in Tiu, the individuals and
businesses within the “secured area,” being in like circumstances
or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of
the law, are not categorized further.  They are all similarly treated,
both in privileges granted and in obligations required.
With all the four requisites for a reasonable classification present,
there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No. 97-A for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
[G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005]COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin
and prohibit the Executive Branch from allowing, and theprivate
respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-
free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and
the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare Section 5
of EO No. 80, EO No. 97-A, and Section 4 of BCDA
Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 as unconstitutional, illegal, and
void.
15 | P a g e
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
FACTS: On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing
for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of
the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into
alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones
in order to promote the economic and social development of
Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. Among the
salient provisions are as follows: ³SECTION 12. x x x The Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of
goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic
Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax
and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of
the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and
taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax
laws of the Philippines; x x x´On April 3, 1993, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued EO No. 80, which declared, among others, that Clark
shall have all the applicable incentives granted to the Subic
Special Economic and Free Port Zone under RA No. 7227.Pursuant
to the directive under EO No. 80, the BCDA passed Board
Resolution No. 93-05-034 on May 18, 1993, allowing the tax and
duty-free sale at retail of consumer goods imported via Clark for
consumption outside the CSEZ. On June 10, 1993, the President
issued EO No. 97 and subsequently, EO No. 97-A to Clarifying the
Tax and Duty Free Incentive within the Subic Special Economic
Zone Pursuant to RA No. 7227. EO No. 97-A further provides that
$100monthly and $200 yearly tax-free shopping privileges is
granted to SSEZ residents living outside the Secured Area of the
SSEZ and to Filipinos aged 15 and over residing outside the SSEZ
.I
SSUE: Whether or not the assailed issuances are unconstitutional,
illegal and void for being an exercise of executivelawmaking,
contrary to RA No. 7227 and in violation of the Constitutional
provisions, particularly the equal protectionclause, prohibition of
unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and
preferential use of Filipino labor,domestic materials and locally
produced goods?
HELD:
Equal Protection of the Laws
Petitioners argue that the assailed issuance (Executive Order No.
97-A) is violative of their right to equal protection of the laws, as
enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. To support
this argument, they assert that private respondents operating
inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments
located outside, the products sold being essentially the same. The
only distinction, they claim, lies in the products’ variety and
source, and the fact that private respondents import their items
tax-free, to the prejudice of the retailers and manufacturers
located outside the zone.
Petitioners’ contention cannot be sustained. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a
reasonable classification.[27] Classification, to be valid, must  residents within the secured area and those living within the
(1) rest on substantial distinction,
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law,
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class. [28]
Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no
violation of the right to equal protection of the laws.
 First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial distinctions lie
between the establishments inside and outside the zone,
justifying the difference in their treatment.  In Tiu v. Court of
Appeals,[29] the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A was
challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In
that case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was
discriminatory in confining the application of Republic Act No.
7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the exclusion of those
outside but are, nevertheless, still within the economic zone.
Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this
Court therein found substantial differences between the retailers
inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and
reasonable classification:
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big
investors who are being lured to establish and operate their
industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present
business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are
talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs.  On
the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the
economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even
more important, at this time the business activities outside the
“secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the
purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base
to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There
is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the
benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. Additionally, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and
monitor the activities within the “secured area,” which is already
fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent importation of merchandise” or
smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not
require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual
and material differences between territories, there is no violation
of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always
avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or
business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.[30]
The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between
economic zone but outside the fenced-off area.  Similarly, real and
substantial differences exist between the establishments herein
involved.  A significant distinction between the two groups is that
enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within
Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the
other duly-registered zone enterprises operate within the so-
called “separate customs territory.” To grant the same tax
incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses
operating outside the zones, as petitioners insist, would clearly
defeat the statute’s intent to carve a territory out of the military
reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and capital is
maintained.
The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No.
7227. As held in Tiu, the real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is
to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases
into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to
the establishments within the zone to attract and encourage
foreign and local investors.  This is the very rationale behind
Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar special economic zone
laws which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other
benefits.
The classification, moreover, is not limited to the existing
conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former
military reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining
investment center.
And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found
within the “secured area.” As ruled in Tiu, the individuals and
businesses within the “secured area,” being in like circumstances
or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of
the law, are not categorized further.  They are all similarly treated,
both in privileges granted and in obligations required.
With all the four requisites for a reasonable classification present,
there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No. 97-A for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
Rodolfo S. Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the
16 | P a g e
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety. What may be regarded as a
denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Facts:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and
was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated
by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood
Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable
to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.” Section
23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the
phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two
(2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after
the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based
on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety.” Years prior to the passage of the
National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already
been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No.
1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of
Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.” The law, which
was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and
operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration
of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for
certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules
violate the equal protection clause
HELD:
No. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of British American Tobacco is the distributor of Lucky Strike
the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that Cigarette in the Philippines
will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
The company is questioning the constitutionality of RA 8240,
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
entitled "An Act Amending Sections 138, 139, 140, and 142 of the
capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
NIRC, as Amended and For Other Purposes," which took effect on
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
January 1, 1997
make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class. Republic Act No. The law provided a legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes
7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for introduced between the period January 2, 1997 to December 31,
the promotion of public health and welfare. Based on the 2003, such that said cigarettes shall remain in the classification
foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a under which the BIR has determined them to belong as of
situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall December 31, 2003, until revised by Congress.
be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made
between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood In effect: older brands or existing brands will have, in the long
banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for term, lower price and tax rate as inflation and price appreciation
the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial were not factored in.
distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons
and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit.
Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood -Their tax rate shall remain until Congress changes it
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Second,
the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial -Hence, a legislative freeze in the class of cigarettes
blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to
provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood New brands shall be classified according to current net retail price
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a
commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial New brands are the ones registered after January 1, 1997
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business
enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood
In 2001, Lucky Strike was introduced in the market
donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood
donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the Lucky Strike was classified as premium-priced hence was imposed
general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to the Above P10 tax rate
address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it
intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law Lucky Strike protested the P22.77M tax assessment pegged at
applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. P25/pack
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in Lucky Strike interposes that the legislative freeze is discriminatory
the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and against new brands and poses barrier to entry in the cigarette
preserve public health and safety. industry
Legislative freeze means: existing or "old" brands shall be taxed
based on their net retail price as of October 1, 1996.
Bat v Camacho
Hence, the classification based on pricing is lower for older brands
compared to new entrants
G.R. No. 163583, 20 August 2008
Facts:
17 | P a g e
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
Lucky Strike found it unfair that Philip Morris and Marlboro are
classified only as High-priced while it is classified as Premium
Priced.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Said petition sought to
enjoin the implementation of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue
Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 on the ground that they
discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation of the
equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the classification freeze provision violates the
equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the
Constitution.
Held:
No. A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.
The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided
that: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all
those belonging to the same class.
The first, third and fourth requisites are satisfied. The
classification freeze provision was inserted in the law for reasons
of practicality and expediency.
All in all, the classification freeze provision addressed Congress’s
administrative concerns in the simplification of tax administration
of sin products, elimination of potential areas for abuse and
corruption in tax collection, buoyant and stable revenue
generation, and ease of projection of revenues. Consequently,
there can be no denial of the equal protection of the laws since
the rational-basis test is amply satisfied.
The classification freeze provision has not been shown to be
precipitated by a veiled attempt, or hostile attitude on the part of
Congress to unduly favor older brands over newer brands. On the
contrary, we must reasonably assume, owing to the respect due a
co-equal branch of government and as revealed by the
Congressional deliberations, that the enactment of the
questioned provision was impelled by an earnest desire to
improve the efficiency and effectivity of the tax administration of
sin products. For as long as the legislative classification is
rationally related to furthering some legitimate state interest, as
here, the rational-basis test is satisfied and the constitutional
challenge is perfunctorily defeated.
Plessy v Ferguson
163 US 537
Facts:
The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate
railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--
who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only"
car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved
for blacks and was arrested.
Issue:
WON Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an
unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and
immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Held:
Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 14, Section 1
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The
majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown,
upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their
decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate
facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate
but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded
that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality
for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory
to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute
unlawful discrimination.
Craig v Boren
429 US 190
Facts:
Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men
and women for the consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. The
Appellant, Craig (Appellant), now alleges that this difference
violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution).
The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of “nonintoxicating”
3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under
the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?
Held:
Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded.
Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny
requirements to pass constitutional muster.
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent
dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in
analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification
must serve an important government objective and be
substantially related to the achievement of such objective.
The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be
served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not
persuaded by the Appellees’, Craig and others (Appellees),
18 | P a g e
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.
statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As
such, it is not constitutional.
**Craig v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate level of review for gender-based classification.
Intermediate scrutiny is distinguished from strict scrutiny at both
the objective and means levels. Important government objectives
(intermediate) v. compelling government objectives (strict) and
substantially related (intermediate) v. narrowly tailored (strict).
BROWN VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 347 US 483 (1955)
WARREN, C.J.
Facts: This case is a consolidation of several different cases from
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Several black
children (through their legal representatives, Ps) sought admission
to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on
race. The plaintiffs alleged that segregation was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In all but one case, a three judge federal district court cited Plessy
v. Ferguson in denying relief under the “separate but equal”
doctrine. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs
contended that segregated schools were not and could not be
made equal and that they were therefore deprived of equal
protection of the laws.
Issue: Is the race-based segregation of children into “separate but
equal” public schools constitutional?
Held: No. The race-based segregation of children into “separate
but equal” public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional.
Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of
race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the
physical facilities and other may be equal. Education in public
schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.
The question presented in these cases must be determined not on
the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in
American life today. The separate but equal doctrine adopted in
Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place
in the field of public education.
Separating black children from others solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater
when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law tends to impede the educational and mental development of
black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they
would receive in an integrated school system. Whatever may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy
v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority
and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS BOARD OF
TRANSPORATION,
G.R. No. L-59234 | 1982-09-30
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an
administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years
old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of
equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and
directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the
promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out
taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare
of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal
protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs
in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of
other places.
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right
to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced
in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi
industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that
implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
"For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the
rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its
implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only
after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only
after the date has been determined by the Board."
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of
the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT
in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of
taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro
Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other
places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT
Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of
the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded".
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that
the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification
of the object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is
the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do
not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
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 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW MORALES, GENIE C.

unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be

clear, categorical and undeniable.

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