CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
G.R. No. L-976             October 22, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,  Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, all public officers being
vs.
MAXIMO ABAD, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: The defendant is a former insurgent officer.
Assuming, for the purposes of the present motion, that the
defendant is guilty of the offense, there is no evidence in
the record showing that it was committed pursuant to
orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary
authorities, or that it grew out of internal political feuds or
dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards of the Spanish
authorities, or that it resulted from internal political feuds
or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is
covered by the amnesty it must be because it is embraced
within the words employed in the proclamation to
designate the first class of offenses amnestied, namely,
"offenses of treason and sedition.
In the present case the act by which the defendant is
found by the court below to have violated the oath was
that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the
existence of certain rifles, which had been concealed by
his orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and
of the existence and whereabouts of which he was
cognizant at the time of the denial.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellant should be held liable
HELD:There are a variety of offenses in the criminal codes
of all countries which are not directed primarily against
individuals, but rather against the existence of the state,
the authority of the government or the general public
tranquility.
G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006
PEDRO S. GIRON, JR., LETICIA GUJILDE-CRIZALDO, and
FELIXBERTO B. ARREZA, Petitioners,  is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:The present petition involves alleged irregularities
in the construction of a two-kilometer road connecting
Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del
Sur.
The accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias,
then District Engineer, Civil Engineer Aide II, Chief,
Construction Section, and Supervising Civil Engineer I,
respectively, of the Office of the District Engineer of
Surigao del Sur, conspiring together and with accused
Felixberto B. Arreza, of the same office who was the
project engineer of the road project treated herein, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the
crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
Physical Status Report of Projects costing P2.0M and
Below under CY 1988 Infrastructure Program as of January
1989, an official document required for submission to the
XIth DPWH Regional Office, by stating on page 14 thereof
that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project at
Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was fully completed as of January
25, 1989, a matter the truth of which accused was under
obligation to disclose, when in truth and in fact, as accused
fully well knew, the said road project as of said date was
not yet finished as the road surfacing materials for use
therein were not yet delivered then and were only
delivered on March 18-21, 1989, thereby making an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused took advantage of their
official position to falsify a document.
HELD: No. The offender takes advantage of his official
position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the
document, or he has the official custody of the document
which he falsified.
There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as they
were employees of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) at the time of the questioned act. There
Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually took advantage of his
official position. The offender takes advantage of his
official position when he has the duty to make or to
prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of
the document, or he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies.
Giron testified that:
In preparing these reports, the project engineer reports to
the Construction Section the degree of work they had
accomplished with respect to the project assigned to
them. The reports of the project engineers were to be
consolidated into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status
Report. These reports were being submitted every 25th of
the month and it takes the Office of the District Engineer
three (3) to five (5) days to prepare the said report.14
The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked
by Cedro, and submitted by Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr.
Cedro, who supervised the preparation of the Monthly
Status Report and checked the same, was acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan because "he never signed the subject
reports."15 Salang was also acquitted by the Sandiganbayan
because "his participation [was] seemingly limited to the
acts before the actual construction of the project."16
Crizaldo’s item was that of a General Construction
Foreman but she was not assigned to the project
site.17 Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was tasked to
type the Monthly Status Report. The prosecution never
proved that Crizaldo had knowledge of the actual status of
the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project at the time she
prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could have
merely relied on field reports submitted to her, precluding
her from making, on her own, untruthful statements at the
time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo
could not have conspired with any other party because the
Sandiganbayan found that "there is reasonable doubt as to
the existence of conspiracy on the part of the accused
herein to falsify the subject reports."18 The Sandiganbayan
ruled that "any criminal liability should be based on their
individual participation in the questioned act."19
Giron’s testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be
used against him because he did not sign the Monthly
Status Report. Giron’s facsimile signature was merely
stamped on the Monthly Status Report. The stamped
facsimile signatures of Giron do not establish his personal
participation in the preparation of the Monthly Status
Report. To use this portion of Giron’s testimony to
establish his personal participation is to extrapolate and
speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal action, which
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction.20
Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project. However, like Giron and Crizaldo, the
prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in
the questioned reports. The Sandiganbayan found that
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Arreza "had no participation in the preparation and
execution of the said document[s]."21 The Sandiganbayan
also found that Arreza "did not take advantage of his
public position,"22 and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle
172 of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a private
document. In the dispositive portion of its Decision of 9
May 1997, however, the Sandiganbayan adjudged Arreza
guilty as charged in Criminal Case No. 17352, which was
for falsification of a public document.
In sum, we acquit Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza for failure of
the prosecution to satisfy the requisites for the conviction
of the crime of falsification of public documents. All are
public officers, however, the prosecution has failed to
prove their criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza
took advantage of their positions to make a false
statement in a narration of facts in a public document.
WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the Resolution
promulgated on 4 October 2000 of the Sandiganbayan
are SET ASIDE. Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo,
and Felixberto B. Arreza are ACQUITTED based on
reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. L-7447            January 2, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
NICASIO CAPULE, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to
himself a tract of coconut land without the knowledge or
consent of the owners thereof, the married couple Aniceto
Maghirang and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation
with the notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died,
prepared and drew up a document setting forth the sale in
his favor of the said land, pretending that it was made and
executed by the said owners of the tract, stating in the
document that they had made the declaration that they
had sold said land for the sum of 550 pesos paid at the
time of the sale to the vendors, and Jacinto Peñaflor and
Jorge Tolentino appear in said document as witnesses of
the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo
Guia as the signers of the deed of sale, because the alleged
vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded at the
bottom of the document was their ratification of its
contents in the presence of said notary, before whom the
said married couple appeared. The defendant Capule
exhibited said document later, although he had been
assured that it was false, in a trial before the justice of the
peace of that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged
right to the said piece of land.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable
HELD: Yes. Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and,
moreover, as he is accused of the crime of falsification of a
notarial document of official character equivalent to a
public document the principle laid down in said decision is
totally inapplicable in his favor.
Further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of a
public document in itself constitutes a crime, morally and
legally punishable, even though to date the penal law with
respect to falsification of a public document committed by
public officers, in lieu of said article 300 of the code, has
not yet been promulgated; but article 301, applicable to
the present case, has not been repealed and subsists in all
its force.
A person who, taking advantage of the occasion when a
power of attorney is presumably being drawn up, prepares
instead thereof, contrary to the wishes of the interested
parties and with malice aforethought, an instrument of
sale in his own favor, using deceit as to the parties and the
witnesses, and afterwards induces a notary to certify
falsely that the supposed vendors actually appeared and
ratified such instrument, is guilty of the falsification of a
notarial or public document.
People vs. Quasha, GR L-6055, June 12, 1953
FACTS:
• William H. Quasha
o a member of the Philippine bar, committed a
crime of falsification of a public and commercial document
for causing it to appear that Arsenio Baylon, a Filipino
citizen, had subscribed to and was the owner of 60.005 %
of the subscribed capital stock of Pacific Airways Corp.
(Pacific) when in reality the money paid belongs to an
American citizen whose name did not appear in the article
of incorporation,
 to circumvent the constitutional mandate that
no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public utility in
the Philippines unless 60% of its capital stock is owned by
Filipinos.
o Found guilty after trial and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment and a fine
• Quasha appealed to this Court
• Primary purpose: to carry on the business of a
common carrier by air, land or water
• Baylon did not have the controlling vote
because of the difference in voting power between the
preferred shares and the common shares
• ART. 171. Falsification by public officer,
employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
• ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine
of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter
of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document.
ISSUE: W/N Quasha should be criminally liable
HELD: NO. Acquitted.
• falsification consists in not disclosing in the
articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere trustee
( or dummy as the prosecution chooses to call him) of his
American co-incorporators, thus giving the impression that
Baylon was the owner of the shares subscribed to by him
• For the mere formation of the corporation such
revelation was not essential, and the Corporation Law
does not require it
• The moment for determining whether a
corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when
it applies for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for that purpose.
o that can be done after the corporation has
already come into being and not while it is still being
formed
• so far as American citizens are concerned, the
said act has ceased to be an offense within the meaning of
the law, so that defendant can no longer be held criminally
liable therefor.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PO GIOK TO
FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant
appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of
falsification. He misrepresented to the City Treasurer of
Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his place of birth
is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino. From such
misrepresentation of facts the City Treasurer issued him a
residence certificate.
The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the information does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the crime of falsification. The City Fiscal
opposed the motion to quash claiming that the
information alleges all the integral elements of the offense
charged as defined by the statute. The lower Court,
however, found the motion to quash meritorious and
ordered the amendment of the information.
Hence, this appeal by the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information in question should allege
the following facts in order to be sufficient to convict the
defendant of the crime of falsification:
1) That the accused had the obligation to
disclose the truth in the document
allegedly falsified;
2) That the accused had the wrongful intent
to injure a third
HELD:
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element
allegedly lacking in the information, that is, the obligation
on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the
facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is
inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document.
Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 provides:
"that the residence certificate for persons shall
contain the full name, place and date of birth,
citizenship, civil status, length of residence in
the city or municipality where the certificate is
issued, occupation or calling”.
Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to
whom the certificate is issued must state to the officer
who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear
therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function of
recording thereon the facts as supplied by this person. And
to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly
identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required by
Sec. 3 above to sign the document and affix his right hand
thumb mark thereon.
There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the
duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of
birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who
issued his residence certificate and such duty being
inherent in the transaction, there was no need for the
criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty.
Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the
information in question, the law is clear that wrongful
intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person
is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of
public document.
Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of
the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer,
employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. —
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following
acts:
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts.
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified documents. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any
of the falsifications enumerated in the next
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
preceding article in any other kind of
commercial document.
On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the
crime falsification of private document,
provides:
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third
party, or with intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceeding article.
The distinction made by the law between falsification by
private persons of PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS IS CLEAR.
The first (FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed by the mere
performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Art. 171
While the second (FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed not
only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171 but it must likewise be shown that
such act of falsification was committed to the damage of a
third party or with intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain in the case of People vs. Pacana
that in the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradiction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in
confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint
of the accused would not correspond to that of the person
whose personal circumstances are recited in the
certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently operates
to the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and
direct result of the criminal act charged, the accused must
be presumed to have intended it.
Side issue: It is argued for the defendant that there being a
special law with respect to residence certificates expressly
punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465),
this special law, and not the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, should apply in this case. RPC can still apply
since under Art. 10 of the RPC has supplementary
application to all special laws, unless the latter should
provide the contrary, and CA No. 465 makes no provision
that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence
certificates.
Thus the information was sufficient, and its dismissal for
insufficiency by the Court below was improper and
erroneous.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36345             November 25, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,  said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond
vs.
PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO
CABAGSANG, defendants-appellants.  codefendant in making said falsifications in order to meet
BUTTE, J.:
FACTS: The defendant WenceslaoCabagsang was the chief
of police and the defendant Pedro Montano was the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Tanza in the
Province of Cavite, in the month of September, 1930,
when the crimes for which they were convicted occurred.
It appears from the evidence that on September 5, 1930, a
criminal complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano for the
crime of qualified seduction was filed with the said justice
of the peace. The justice, apparently to favor Soriano,
delayed the preliminary investigation until the offended
woman on September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion
demanding immediate action and calling his attention to
the fact that his delay was a violation of the circular of
instructions of the judge of the Court of First Instance of
said province. The case was then set for hearing on
September 22, 1930. Thereafter administrative charges
against the justice of the peace were filed with the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, alleging that the delay in the
preliminary investigation was a violation of the circular of
the Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928,
requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all
preliminary investigations within ten days from the date
on which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.lawphil.net
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior
to the hearing of said administrative case, the defendants,
in order to make it appear that there had been no
violation of the said instructions to the justices of the
peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and
falsified the municipal police blotter and the book of
records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest
and Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show that the
said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the
13th day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in
fact, as said records showed before said falsification, the
on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the defendant
Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his
the administrative charges then pending against him.
HELD: The court below rejected the defense of the
accused that said alterations were made in good faith and
corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no
issue of law raised in the assignment of errors. We have
made a careful review of the evidence and have come to
the conclusion that the judgment of the court below
should be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
People vs Felix Manansala
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Facts: Manansala was accused of altering the duplicate
copy of the Traffic Violation Report (TVR) previouslyissued
to him as a temporary driver’s permit. He erased the
originally written figure ―III‖ and the word―three‖ after
the words ―pending cases,‖ and superimposed thereon
number ―I‖ and the word ―one.‖ Thealterations made
changed the meaning of the document. It was made to
appear that he has only one pending case of traffic
violation. The practice was proved to be to arrest a driver
who commits a fourth traffic violation instead of merely
issuing to him a TVR, which is usually done for the first,
second and third violations. The accused had in his
possession the falsified TVR and had been using it as a
temporarydriver’s permit from its issuance to the time he
was caught committing the fourth traffic violation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsifying an
official document.
Ruling: It is an established rule that when a person has in
his possession a falsified document and makes use of the
same, the presumption is justified that such person is the
forger. The circumstances that the accused made use of
and benefited from the falsified TVR is a strong evidence
that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be
falsified.
Us vsalejandromateo
Facts: Falsification of cedula; erroneous conviction;
defendant acquitted.
Mateo being required in October, 1911, for the purposes
of an affidavit, to present his cedula for the year 1911 to a
justice of the peace, produced also his cedula for the year
1910; on reading the cedula for the year 1910, something
which he had not done before, mateo discovered that his
age was stated incorrectly therein and he, fearing the
result of presenting to a public official a cedula which
contained an incorrect statement regarding his own age,
changed his age, making it 25 instead of 23; the change
having been discovered by the justice of the peace on the
presentation of the cedula, mateo, without hesitation,
detailed the part he had taken in the change and the
reason therefor; it is admitted that the age in the cedula
was incorrect and that the change made the cedula give
his true age; mateo was tried for falsification of a cedula
and was convicted.
Held: In the case in hand, the change did not affect in the
remotest degree the privileges or immunities which the
accused could enjoy under the cedula. The judgment is
reversed and the accused acquitted.
LeonilaBatulanon, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 139857 – September 15, 2006
Criminal case: Falsification of private documents and
Estafa
FACTS: Petitioner LeonilaBatulanon was employed as
cashier/manager of Polomok (Polomok) Credit
Cooperative Inc. from May 1980 up to December 1982 (so
that’s two years). She was in charge with the receiving of
deposits and releasing loans to members of the said
cooperative (Polomok).
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain
irregularities were found out. Thereafter, four
informations of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against herein petitioner.
1. Criminal case 3625 – petitioner Batulanon falsified
CASH/CHECK VOUCHER of PCCI in the name of ERLINDA
OMADLAO, making it appear that latter was granted loan
where in truth and in fact said person never received,
never granted a loan and never signed such document.
2. Criminal case 3626 – same situation as above stated but
this time in the name of GONAFREDA ORACION.
3. Criminal case 3453 – Batulanon falsified commercial
documents namely Individual deposits and ledger of
FERLYN ARROYO making it appear that the said person
made a fixed deposit and was granted a loan where in
truth and in fact ARROYO never made such deposit and
never received such loan.
4. Criminal case 3627 – same situation as the next
preceding case but this time in the name of his son Dennis
Batulanon.
In all cases, accused did then and there release to herself
the same and received the loans and thereafter
misappropriated and converted them into her own use
and benefit. Also in all cases, she refused to bring back the
same despite demands.
These informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
Prosecution presented its witnesses:
Modallo – (posting clerk) testified that Batulanon released
4 cash vouchers. He also said that Omadlao, Oracion and
Batulanon were not eligible and not members of Polomok
Cooperative. Moreover, according to him, although Arroyo
was a member but there was no proof that she applied for
a loan. He also said he witnessed Petitioner Batulanon
signed Oracion and Arroyo in cash vouchers.
Jayoma – (Vice chairman of the PCCI Board of directors)
testified that laons to Omadlao and Oracion never passed
through the PCCI board of directors.
Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She
contended that she did not sigh vouchers of Omadlao,
Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her are nonetheless
members of the cooperative. Lastly, she said that it’s been
an accepted practice that she can release loan in the
absence of GopioJr who is in charge with such
responsibility.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought it to Court of Appeals (CA)but the latter
affirmed with modifications the ruling of RTC. CA
modification is that petitioner is guilty of falsification of
PRIVATE documents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied it.
Petitioner brought it up to the Supreme Court (SC) and
contended that:
1. Best witness is person whose signature is forged
2. Requires prejudice to 3rd person
3. PCCI not prejudiced by loan transactions because loans
are accounts receivable by cooperative
HELD:
SC: Petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged is estafa through falsification
of commercial documents, appellant could be convicted of
falsification of private documents.
Elements of falsification of private document are present
in this case:
1. She made it appear that Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo
were granted loans
2. She made it in private document
****(cash/check vouchers are not public documents
because they are not notarized and not documents used
by merchants to promote trade nor regulated by Code of
commerce)
3. It caused damage to the cooperative.
Regarding best witness – SC cites sec. 22 of Rule 132
according to this rule handwriting may be proved by any
person who believes it to be belonging to such person; or
who acquired knowledge of such handwriting
Regarding prejudice to Polomok – such loans could have
granted to other members but weren’t because of illegal
acts done by Batulanon such constituted damage or
prejudice to Polomok
On complex crime of estafa through falsification:
Falsification – committed as means to commit estafa
Estafa– may be carried out even without falsification
SC ruled that 1st, 2nd, and 3rd criminal cases herein fall
within the purview of falsification of private documents
but the 4th criminal case (with Dennis Batulanon) falls
within the ambit of the crime of estafa. The latter having
no untruthful statements but there was conversion and
misappropriation; hence elements of estafa are present in
the last criminal case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC 
G.R. No. 68203 September 13, 1989
METUROGAN L. SAREP, petitioner,  the error and directed him to prepare another
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:Petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, appeals from the
decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan. That on or about
December 30, 1977, or sometime prior thereto, in the City
of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being then employed as
Soil Technologist II under the Bureau of Soils, Region XII,
Cotabato City, with a Temporary Appointment,did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take without
permission from the records of said Office the appointment
paper proposed in his name dated January 19, 1976, which
appointment paper was replaced due to an incorrect entry,
by another one bearing the same date; and theaccused
once in possession of said appointment paper, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously change, alter
and falsify the date, figures and words written thereon,
thus changing its meaning and attributing to the person
who caused the preparation of the same, statements other
than those in fact made by him; that the falsification and
alteration were committed for the purpose of converting
the Temporary Status of his appointment to a Permanent
Status, and which accused succeeded by having said
falsified appointment paper attested by the Civil Service
Commission in Manila without the knowledge of the Civil
Service Commission, Region XII, who has the jurisdiction
and authority to attest appointments under Region XII. 2
petitioner appealed to this Court, after his motion for
reconsideration was denied.
On 19 January 1976, Director KundoPahm of the Bureau of
Soils, Region XII, extended an appointment in favor of
Meturogen L. Sarep (herein petitioner) to the position of
Soil Technologist II (Exh. "C"). After signing the
appointment paper, Pahm noticed an error in the item on
civil service eligibility. The entry therein read "First Grade
Unassembled" instead of "Unassembled Examination"
which was the appropriate eligibility for the position of Soil
Technologist; whereupon, Director Pahm called the
attention of the acting personnel officer, Usman Salic, to
appointment paper (Exh. "B") which Pahm signed after
noting the correction made by the personnel officer. The
appointment was approved by the Assistant Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as
"temporary."
It was ruled that there can be no conviction for falsification
of a public document in the absence of proof that the
defendant maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful
intent of injuring third person. 6
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Finally, petitioner invokes good faith in his defense. He
claims that after the personnel officer handed him the
questioned document, which bore the erasures and
alterations as well as the Director's signature, he brought
it to the Civil Service Commission in Manila upon
suggestion and with the permission of the personnel
officer.
The Court does not accept petitioner's defense of good
faith. He admitted that he knew that Director Pahm was
not only uninclined to extend him a permanent
appointment due to his lack of civil service eligibility but
he also did not authorize him (Sarep) to follow up his
appointment with the Civil Service Commission in Manila.
More importantly, he knew that if the falsified document
had been presented before the CSC Regional Office, it
would have surely been attested as temporary only.
Hence, he purposely avoided filing the appointment paper
with the CSC Regional Office, which is the practice and
standard procedure in the regional office of the Bureau of
Soils and, instead, personally brought it to Manila where
somehow he was able to have it stamped approved as
permanent.
The Court also rejects Sarep's argument that there is no
falsification, as the alleged falsified document bears the
correct item number and appropriate eligibility. We agree
with the respondent court that "(I)t is falsification, and not
a correction, which the law punishes (People vs. Mateo, 25
Phil. 324; Arriola vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 730)." Likewise,
"(I)n the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officials or by private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradiction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 23,
1885, cited in People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 56)." 9
Since petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by
the falsification of the document that was found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of
the falsification. Petitioner has failed to convince the Court
that a person other than himself made the erasures,
alterations and superimpositions on the questioned
appointment paper (Exh. "C").
The Sandiganbayan in qualifying the offense and arriving
at the penalty imposed on the petitioner held:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein
with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of
injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since
he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his
having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer
(Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment
were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position,
then he should only be held liable for falsification through
reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937,
People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18
Phil. 399).
HELD:The Court finds no reversible error in the
Sandiganbayan's decision finding petitioner, Meturogan L.
Sarep, guilty of the crime of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence. However, the
penalty imposed should be imprisonment of THREE
MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO ONE YEAR, SEVEN MONTHS
AND TEN DAYS, instead of imprisonment of THREE
MONTHS under the appealed decision, since the period of
the penalty imposed, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisioncorreccional in its medium period is four
months and one day to four years and two months
reduced by appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
KOH TIECK HENG VS PEOPLE
FACTS:Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P.
Flores was charged of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document in the following manner: after
opening a savings account with SBTC under the name
Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally obtained a PBC
check issued by one F. Dycaico, accused making or causing
alterations and changes in a genuine document w/c
changed its meaning and thereby affixing his signature at
the back of the check, which check was cleared by the PBC.
On the second instance, accused did not perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
estafa thru falsification of a commercial document by
reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, by timely discovery made by
officials/employees of said bank of the forgery and
falsification made on the aforesaid check before payment
could be made which led then and there to the
apprehension of said accused. Under the two
Informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the
accused is that of having erased and altered the dates and
amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing
over the original dates and amounts, thereby making
alterations and changes in genuine documents which
changed their meaning. Accused misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and
benefit checks in various amounts.
ISSUE:Did accused committed the crime of attempted
estafa in the absence of deceit and damage?
HELD: Yes. The fact that appellant was the possessor and
utterer of the checks in question and having benefited
from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having
attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount
thereon. The use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or
deceit. The appellant made use of and benefited from the
falsified document is a strong evidence that he either
himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified, he
being criminally responsible in either case. Since Heng is
the only person who stood to be benefited by the
falsification of the document that wasfound in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of
such falsification.
LOPEZ VS PARAS
FACTS: In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P.
Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of the
spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin (Special
Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia
Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad
T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three
parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate.
Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the
contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months
later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-
8344) for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross
and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and
the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the
Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against
petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of
Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171, paragraph 4,
of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary
examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of
Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information
charging petitioners with the crime of falsification of a
private document upon the allegation that they made it
appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora
M. Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor George L.
Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the
"guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth
and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of
said minors on the date of the execution of the document
(Criminal Case No. C-2268).
ISSUE: whether or not there is a commission of art.172?
and when and where is the offense of falsification of a
private document deemed consummated or committed?
RULING:YES but the court of angeles has no jurisdiction
over the criminal act, but the importance of this case is
when and where a falsification of document comes in.
In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners — a claim
supported by the record — that Angelina M. Lopez and
Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document wherein
they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact,
the first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and
the second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon
City, both within the province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the question of when and
where is the offense of falsification of a private document
deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We
have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil.
146, that the crime of falsification of a private document
defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code
(now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
is consummated when such document is actually falsified
with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal
use for which it was intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the
information was defective, in that it fails to set forth
expressly the place where improper and illegal use was
made of the falsified document, an allegation which
counsel for appellant insists was absolutely essential for
the proper determination of the court clothed with
jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the
definition of the crime of falsification of a private
document as set forth in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the
offense is consummated at the time when and at the place
where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with
the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether
the falsified document is or is not put to the improper or
illegal use for which it was intended. It is evident,
therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is
the place where the document is actually falsified, and
that the improper or illegal use of the document
thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of
the crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .
Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would
appear that if the private document subject of the
information was falsified by the persons therein charged,
the act of falsification — the signing of the document and
the coetaneous intent to cause damage — was committed
and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private
document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use
for which it was intended, or was signed by the other
contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential
element of the crime of falsification of the private
document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the
act of falsification charged was committed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City
Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense
charged is beyond question.
ALFELOR SR. VS BONIFACIO
Jurisprudence sited in this case to serve as a guide for
art.172
FERNANDO, J.:
The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of Court 2 set forth with
clarity the jurisdiction of a municipal court over crimes.
That was the point stressed by petitioners to respondent
Judge. 3 It did not avail, their motion to dismiss a
falsification charge against them having been denied. They
did point out that in the very complaint itself it was
admitted that it was in another municipality where such
alleged falsification took place. Respondent Judge was not
persuaded; he accepted the view set forth in the objection
to the motion to dismiss that the municipal court of
Tigaon, his station, was vested with jurisdiction as it "is
one of the intervening municipalities where the jeep
carrying the ballot box (the contents of which were
allegedly falsified) passed through." 4 He maintained that
falsification is a continuing offense. He did not budge,
notwithstanding his attention being called to authoritative
decisions that affirmed the contrary. Clearly then, there is
merit to this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
The principal petitioner, Felix O. Alfelor, and respondent
Felix A. Fuentebella were congressional candidates in the
second district of Camarines Sur in the 1965 elections,
with the latter being proclaimed as winner resulting in the
filing of an electoral protest by the former. 5 Respondent
Fuentebella in turn charged his opponent and the other
petitioners in the municipal court of Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, presided by respondent Judge, with falsification of
public or official documents contained in the ballot box of
a precinct in Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal
act having taken place in still another municipality, Iriga,
Camarines Sur. 6 There was on the part of petitioners a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
situs of the alleged falsification being in another
municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 7 Respondent Judge in
the challenged order issued on April 29, 1967 denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that falsification was a
continuing offense. 8 A motion for reconsideration was
filed. It was denied. 9 Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
As noted at the outset, the petition merit.
1. Reference was previously made both to the
Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court as to the jurisdiction of
municipal courts to try criminal cases being confined only
to such offenses committed within the limits of the
territories appertaining to their position. 10 In the latest
case in point, Lopez v. City Judge, 11 Justice Dizon, as
ponente, restated the basic rule thus: "It is settled law in
criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense
was committed not only determines the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. v.
Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of
Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts
have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction."
12 As was pointed out by him, such a doctrine goes back to
U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13 a 1905 decision. Beltran v. Ramos,
14 Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of Tubod, 15 People v.
Yumang 16 and People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise be
cited on this point.
2. That much, as was pointed out by Justice Dizon,
is settled law. It is to be assumed that respondent Judge
would not deliberately ignore what it commands. His
persistence can be ascribed to his view that falsification is
a continuing offense. He was led to conclude, therefore,
that an ingredient thereof took place within his
jurisdiction. Here his stand is decidedly opposed to what
this court has uniformly and consistently held. Again,
Lopez v. City Judge 18 points the way: "We now come to
consider the question of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed consummated
or committed? Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and
definitely in U.S. v. Infante, ... that the crime of falsification
of a private document defined and penalized by Article
304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such
document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a
third person, whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended."
19 United States v. Infante 20 was decided as far back as
1917, almost sixty years ago. Less than a month later that
same year, United States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke to the
same effect, was promulgated. As was pointed out by
Justice Carson who likewise penned the Infante opinion:
"It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is
committed is the place where the document is actually
falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the
document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential
element of the crime of falsification of a private
document; and even if it were otherwise, the charge that
the crime was committed in a specific place would seem to
be a sufficient allegation that all of the acts necessary to its
consummation were in fact done at the place indicated."
22 There is also this opinion of Chief Justice Avancena in
People v. Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of these
six money orders committed separately by means of
different acts constitutes independent crimes of
falsification. (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and
the appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by
the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes of
malversation." 24 All of the above cases explicitly ruled on
the specific point at issue. It does not admit of doubt
though that while no such categorical statement may be
found in other decisions of this Court, it has always been
assumed that falsification is not a continuing offense. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the
order of respondent Judge of April 29, 1967 and the order
of May 25, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration
are reversed, nullified and set aside and declared to be of
no force and effect. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted, respondent Judge being enjoined to desist from
taking any further action on the complaint for falsification
of public and/or official documents filed against
petitioners in his sala except for the purpose of dismissing
the same. No costs.
PEOPLE VS DIZON
FACTS; That in or about the month of January, 1922, at
Camp Stotsenburg, in the province of Pampanga,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this Court
of First Instance, the above-named defendant Jose S.
Dizon, at that time assistant bookkeeper of the Post
Exchange of said Camp, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally, and with intent to defraud said Post Exchange,
altered and falsified the entries on the books kept by him,
and destroyed and rendered unless certain documents and
papers relative to the accounts of said Post Exchange,
succeeding, through such fraudulent means, to swindle
away the amount of three thousand nine hundred and
sixty-four pesos and ninety-one centavos (P3,964.91),
equivalent to 19,824 pesetas, belonging to the Post
Exchange, said defendant having embezzled said amount
to the prejudice of said Post Exchange, and in violation of
law.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused committed acts of
falsification. And estafa
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
RULING:
Yes,A thorough study of the evidence shows that the
accused, Jose S. Dizon, during the period from October,
1920, to January, 1922, was in the employ, as assistant
bookkeeper at the Post Exchange of Camp Stotsenburg, an
army post in the Province of Pampanga; that during the
time of his employment he brought on credit various
articles from the several stores of the Post Exchange, for
which he signed chits (vales) showing the nature and value
of the articles so brought; that said chits as well as chits
signed by other customers were recorded in the books of
the corresponding stores from which the articles were
bought; that every morning all of the chits of the
preceding day were turned over to the office of the Post
Exchange, also to be recorded in the books of said office,
including the ledger (personal accounts) of the customers;
that said chits were kept in the office of the Post Exchange,
and were returned to the customers only upon payment of
their account; that Jose S. Dizon, as such assistant
bookkeeper, was the employee in charge of recording the
sales of the several stores, in cash as well as on credit, in
the books of the office of the Post Exchange, and also of
the keeping of the said chits and the recording thereof in
the personal accounts of the customers; that he
voluntarily did not record in his personal account most of
the chits signed by him for articles bought on credit,
amounting to P3,964.91 (Exhibit J-2), except a few of them
amounting only to P653.77, which latter amount he paid,
leaving only a balance of P29.43 (Exhibit J-1); that all the
chits for the said amount of P3,964.91 have disappeared,
and that only a few chits amounting to P199.99 were
found properly kept in separate envelopes (Exhibits I to I-
4).
The foregoing facts clearly show that the accused
voluntarily falsified the ledger (personal accounts) of the
office of the Post Exchange, which was a commercial
document, by not recording in his own personal account
the chits for articles bought by him from the stores of the
Post Exchange amounting to P3,964.91, thereby violating
article 301 in relation with No. 4 of article 300 of the Penal
Code, evidently for the purpose of evading the payment of
said amount. The same facts also lead us to the conviction
that the accused maliciously destroyed those chits, for the
same purpose, and also to obliterate, to some extent, the
traces of his indebtedness, which act constitutes a
violation of paragraph 9 of article 535 of the Penal Code.
(U.S. vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil., 38; U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31 Phil.,
371.)
The evidence clearly establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the findings of facts of
the lower court are in full harmony therewith. The fifty
thousand errors attributed to the lower court by counsel
for appellant could not be found in spite of our careful and
painstaking study of the whole record. The only error of
said court noted by us is the finding, that in the
commission of the crime of estafa the accused violated
article 534 instead of article 535, No. 9, of the Penal Code.
This error, however, is immaterial as far as the appellant is
concerned, in view of the fact that under the provisions of
either article the penalty remains the same.
US VS PONTE
FACTS: That on or about the 6th day of September, 1909,
the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded employee of
the provincial and municipal government of Calabanga,
Ambos Camarines, and as municipal treasurer of said
pueblo had in his possession and in his charge the sum of
P3,795.53 and safe valued at P50. The defendant Pedro
Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury
of Calabanga, and Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban Verata were
municipal policemen of said pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos
Camarines, and as such officers had committed to them
the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury of
Calabanga, where the said sum of P3,795.93 and the safe
containing it were kept.
That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did maliciously,
criminally and unlawfully misappropriate and make
personal use of the said sum of P3,795.93, and refused
and failed to render account of the same, as well as of the
safe containing it.
That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban
Verata, did, each and every one of them, maliciously,
criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in
this malversation by taking said safe with the said amount
from the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of
Inarian: in violation of law.
Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban
Verata, demurred to the information on the ground that as
to these defendants the facts set out in the information
did not constitute the crime with which they were
charged. The grounds upon which they base this
contention are stated by counsel as follows:
The crime with which the above-named defendants are
charged is provided for and penalized by a special Act, No.
1740, which has repealed such provisions of the Penal
Code relating to malversation and misappropriation as
conflict with the provisions of said Act.
According to the information cited, the above-named
accused were municipal policemen of Calabanga, where
the crime was committed, and their sole participation
therein was that they directly aided Rufino Ponte, the
municipal treasurer, in said malversation by taking the safe
with the sum misappropriate and carrying it from the
municipal treasury to the sitio of Inarian.
ISSUE: whether or not Public malversation extends to
those who aid the prinicipal
RULING:
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
YES, Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of the
Spanish Penal Code, which is substantially identical with
article 390 of the Philippine Code, says that:
Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless, regarding
the definition of the crime and of the penalty to be
imposed upon the private party who abstracts funds with
the consent of the officer charged with their custody. Shall
the person so doing be guilty of the crime of malversation
here provided for, and shall he suffer the same penalty as
the unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only to the crime
of theft and undergo the punishment he deserves
therefor?
Without overlooking the force of the arguments we have
just cited, we are inclined to take the first point of view.
We are led thereto by the consideration that in contending
for the imposition of the same penalty upon the private
party who abstracts public funds as upon the employee
who gives his consent thereto we recognize the
differentiation with which crimes are always described and
penalized in the code. In the action which the text
describes as a crime there is perfect unity: the private
party does not act independently from the public officer:
rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get
possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying
to abstracts them by circumventing the other's vigilance
he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's unfaithfulness
seeks and finds the most reprehensible means for
accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as
its moral instrument assumes the character of a social
crime. If the article were not so interpreted, it would be
necessary to agree that the act, in spite of its evident
unity, would constitute not one but two distinct crimes,
and the persons participating therein, although they acted
together throughout, would be guilty of two different
kinds of wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of article 80,
which prevents extension from some culprits to others of
the responsibility that arises from their personal qualities,
is restricted by fundamental principles and by the article
itself, wherein it is applied to the consideration of the
extenuating and aggravating circumstances which may
affect the persons respectively responsible for the crime,
and it neither can nor must influence in any way the
characterization of the facts. One who helps a son kill his
father is an accomplice of parricide: one who plans with a
servant to commit a theft (hurto), and does commit it, is
guilty of hurtodomestic. When the law clearly defines a
crime, as it has here defined the crime of malversation,
those who in any way participate therein must be
principals, accomplices or abettors thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)
Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article, says:
Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-
perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of
malversation of public funds, committed by a public
officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed upon
him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some
jurists and commentators (among others the learned
Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively,
for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already
advanced in Question I of the commentary on article 314.
French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the
same way on the ground that the person guilty of the
crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which
constitute the crime.(Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 652.)
The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their
views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a
public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the
provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that
crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United
States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty
prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official
who took part with another in the malversation of public
funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly
appeared, that those funds were not in his handy by virtue
of his office, though it did appear that they were in the
hands of his coprincipal by virtue of the public office held
by him
People v Villalon
Facts:
Mariano and SeveroCarrerra were owners of a
parcel of land in Pangasinan. As the Attorney-in-fact of
Mariano Carrera, De Guzman forged his signature on the
special power of attorney to use it to mortgage Carrera’s
parcel of land and obtain a loan from the mortgage bank.
He got a loan worth P8,500.00. Both documents, the
power of attorney and the mortgage were later registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The mortgage
foreclosed and the land was sold to Ramon Serafica and
ViletaQuinto. Carrera found out about it when an action
for ejectment was filed against him by the new owner. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant stating that
the crime charged would not lie because Mariano testified
that it was his brother, Severo, who asked him to sign the
Special power of attorney to authorize De Guzman to
mortgage one half of their land. Mariano’s testimony was
intended to show that the authority to mortgage only
extended up to the half portion pertaining to his brother’s
share and not his.
Issues:
Whether or not the charge of estafa thru falsification of a
public document has sufficient basis to exist in law and in
fact
Held:
Yes. Falsification is only the means necessary to
commit the estafa because before the falsified document
is used to defraud another, the crime of falsification was
already consummated. The damages were caused by the
commission of estafa.
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People v FerminMarasigan
Facts:
On March 24, 1927, in the Barrio of
Managalang, Municipality of Sariaya, Province of Tayabas,
Philippines Islands, there was a feast at the house of
Agapito de Silva because it was the baptism of his child.
FerminMarasigan and Pedro de Chaves were there. The
latter offered Marasigan some wine which he declined
saying the he was not used to taking wine and besides he
already had his share during the meal. De Chaves was
disappointed but drained the cup of wine and became
flushed. Marasigan silently slipped away because he did
not want any trouble at the party and thus went home.
But he was prepared that De Chaves would follow him
therefore he armed himself with a club and his pen knife.
De Chavez caught up to him and both men were engaged
in a fist fight. Marasigan stabbed De Chaves several times
and they both fell to the ground. A few moments later,
they got up and separated. De Chaves had scarcely taken a
few steps when he fell to the ground
dead.FerminMarasigan then was charged with the crime
of homicide. Trial Court found the accused guilty but he
alleges that the trial court erred making its decision. The
accused argued that not all the witnesses had the chance
to give their testimony and there were false accusations
against him.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of some witnesses
favorable to the defense raises the presumption that their
testimony would be unfavorable to him?
Held: this is untenable. The testimony of other persons
who witnessed the act would have been cumulative
evidence and as such, its suppression or omission cannot
give rise to the presumption that it would have been
unfavorable to the prosecution. It was held in US v
Gonzales that:
When an act has been witnessed by
several persons, the prosecution is not obliged
to present all such witnesses, but only a
sufficient to prove the occurrence of the
alleged act. The presumption prescribed by
paragraph 5 of section 334 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to the effect that when proof is
suppressed it shall be deemed to be
unfavorable to the party suppressing it, does
not arise from the mere fact that the
prosecution fails to present all the
eyewitnesses to an act.
Samson v CA
A couple alleging to be EspiridionLascaño and Rosalinda
Paras were processing their claim papers as benefieries of
Felipe Lascaño, who is the son of Espiridion and who died
during World War II. In October 2, 1948, Amado L. Cruz
with the couple, asked the help of his former classmate
Rufino T. Samson to get the checks of the claimants in
Camp Murphy. Samson relied on the assurance of Cruz and
the presented residence certificates presented by the
couple and assisted the couple in obtaining their checks
through the following means: (a) He asked Lt. Manuel
Valencia to be the guarantor to secure the claimants
checks, for which Valencia asceded because he knew
Samson; (b) facilitated the encashment of the checks since
the teller of the bank also relying on the representation of
Samson; (c) at the front of the checks Samson signed as
witness and at the back as endorser. It was later found
that the couple identities were not true. Samson was
jointly charged with Cruz and BonifacioVergara and two
others involve with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of the two checks. The CFI of Manila found
them guilty. They appealed and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the same.
Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime
through gross imprudence. Samson petitions the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Samson is guilty of the complex
crime of falsification through gross imprudence.
RULING: The court affirms the decision appealed on the
following rationale: 1. Acts of appellant constitute in each
case the crime of estafa through falsification of a
mercantile document by reckless imprudence, because of
his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of
identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to
said checks and their proceeds, constituted a written
representation that the true payees participated in the
indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in
truth and in fact the true payees had no direct
intervention in the proceedings Even if such indorsement
and identification were extraneous to the official duties of
appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as a private
person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. 2.
Supreme Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the
crime of falsification by imprudence since in falsifying
public or mercantile documents the element of intent to
cause damage is not required because what the law seeks
to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in
these documents.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO REYES
(ROBBERY)
G.R. NO. 135682. MARCH 26, 2003
Facts:
This is an appeal for the decision rendered by the RTC.
On October 12, 1997 in Navotas City, the herein appellant
was charged of robbery with homicide. And that he
conspired, confederated and mutually helped one
another, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation employed upon the person of
one DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring, one
wristwatch, all of an undetermined value, and a wallet
containing unspecified amount of cash owned by and
belonging to DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS to the
damage and prejudice of the latter, and that on the
occasion of or by reason of the said robbery the said
accused, conspiring with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab
with a bladed weapon, the said DONALDO SALMORIN, JR.
inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court erred in convicting him
notwithstanding the fact that his guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
No. The court did not err in its decision.
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of
the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property
with violence or intimidation against persons or with force
upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c)
the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain);
and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The
offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the
victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
Accused-appellant’s contention that the animus lucrandi
was not sufficiently established by the prosecution is
devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an
internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the
crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is
circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal
a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The
intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful
taking.1[6] In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim’s
wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while
accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him
sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
US VS. PIO CASTILLO (FALSIFICATION)
G.R. NO. 2829 SEPTEMBER 19, 1906
Facts:
1
It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning of the
2d of December, 1905, the appellant Pio Castillo,
presented a check for the sum of 56 pesos, Philippine
currency, to Chinese merchant named Lim Ponso; that the
said check was made payable to bearer and purported to
be drawn by one James J. Watkins; that the amount of the
check was paid to Pio Castillo; that the signature of the
drawer upon said check was a forgery made in imitation of
the genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the
city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins
never signed or issued the said check; that the blank upon
which the check was written was stolen from a book of
blank checks between the hours of 12 noon on the 1st of
December, 1903, and 11 a. m. on the 2d of December,
1903, when the check was presented for payment; that
this blank check book was kept in a drawer in the office of
the said James J. Watkins, and that Pio Castillo was one of
three clerks employed by Watkins in the office; that
Castillo was in the office on the evening of December 1
and early in the morning of December 2, and that he was
the last person let alone in the office on the evening of
December 1, he having locked the office after all the other
clerks had gone.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification
Held:
The court held that the evidence is not enough to render
the accused guilty of falsification but found the accused
guilty of the crime of knowingly using with intent to gain a
falsified mercantile document as defined and penalized in
article 302 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to five
months imprisonment (arresto mayor) with the accessory
penalties.
In Massachusetts, wherein it has been held that the mere
fact of uttering is not proof of forgery (Com. vs.Parmenter,
13 | P a g e
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
5 Pick., 279, 1827), it has been decided, nevertheless, that
"possession of a forged instrument by a person claiming
under it is strong evidence tending to prove that he forged
it or caused it to be forged." (Com. vs. Talbot, 84 Mass. (2
Allen), 161.) In several jurisdiction it has been held that
one found in the possession of a forged order issued in his
own favor is presumed either to have forged it or procured
it to be forged. (Hobbs vs. State, 75 Ala., 1; State vs. Britt,
14 N. C. (3 Div.), 122.)
For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold,
and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused
uttered the check in question is proof of the fact that he
also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold
that the utterance of such an instrument, when
unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish the
fact that the utterer either himself forged the instrument
or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken
together with the further evidence set out above and
brought out on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of
the accused of the crime with which he was charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is urged on appeal that the information filed in this case
is fatally deficient because it charges the accused with
falsification and further alleges that he received the sum of
money realized as a result of said falsification, and it is
contended that the accused was thus charged as principal
and as accessory after the fact. It is sufficient answer to
this connection to say no objection was raised on this
ground at the trial; and it is further to be observed that
this allegation was not in fact or intention a charge against
the accused as accessory after the fact, and appears to
have been set out in the information merely to fix the civil
responsibility upon which the court is required to pass,
under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.
ONG HOCK LIAN ALIAS JULIAN ONG VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-21197             MAY 19, 1966
Whether or not the accused violated the anti-alias law
Facts:
Held:
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental which purposes, no person shall use any name different from the
granted the petition for naturalization of Ong Hock one with which he was christened or by which he has been
Lianalias Julian Ong. known since childhood, or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1,
Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock
Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the
Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no
Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used to reside in
evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter
Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been
name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or
living in Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan KoKiem, also
that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee
known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national, by whom he has
has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.
three children, two of whom are school age and are
enrolled at the St. Paul's College, Dumaguete City, an
educational institution recognized by the government, not
limited to any particular race or nationality and where
subjects on Philippine history, government and civics are
THE UNITED STATES VS FRANCISCO JURADO
part of the curriculum. Appellee himself finished his first
year high school education at the Zamboanga Chinese High
School, Zamboanga City. He speaks the English, language G.R. NO. 10719 G.R. NO. 10719
and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A merchant by
occupation, he has a store in Colon Street, Dumaguete City
where he sells rice, corn and general merchandise. He has
two cargo trucks worth P17,000 and office equipment
worth about P200. His net income was P5,939.36 in 1958; Facts
P4,114.49 in 1959, and P5,659.30 in 1960. To prove that
he has none of the disqualifications enumerated in the This is an appeal by the accused on the decision rendered
Naturalization Law, he presented tax and police which convicted him guilty of the crime of perjury.
clearances; clearances from the Philippine Constabulary,
the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court of On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of Cebu,
Dumaguete City; and a medical certificate of the City DionisioJacosalem, proceeded to investigate the matter of
Health Officer. the robbery of some tins of opium, committed in the
house of Francisco Jurado by Alejandro Albao, a municipal
policeman, through threats and intimidation and by
Issue: availing himself of his office. This opium belonged to
Vicente Lizarraga who had taken it to the said house to sell
it to some residents of the town. Lizarraga, the owner of
the drug, stated that Francisco Jurado was present, among
others, at the time of the robbery; but when Jurado was
14 | P a g e
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied
that he was at home on the night of the robbery, as he
was then in a cinematograph with his family. He further
testified that he did not know either Vicente Lizarraga or
Alejandro Albao. Such was his testimony given under oath
before the provincial fiscal Jacosalem, but in the
proceedings brought against CiriacoSingson for robbery,
commenced on September 24, 1913, Jurado, testifying as a
witness for the defense, stated under oath that he had
known Vicente Lizarraga since the month of June, 1913,
and that he was already acquainted with Alejandro Albao
on the date of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of perjury
Held:
No. The testimony of Juradois not contradicted by any
evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient proof of the
falsity of that statement by the owner of the house, the
defendant Jurado, for it was not proven that it was false
and, as he certainly was in his own house on the said night
of the robbery, it cannot be held that, in testifying as he
did, he perjured himself.
Moreover, the testimony of the witness does not
determine whether or not the defendant's testimony,
alleged to be false, was material and important in its
bearings on the said testimony of the other witnesses
given in connection with the said crime of robbery.
In order that a witness, in testifying under oath before a
public official authorized to administer same commit the
crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed by
section 3 of Act No. 1697 , it is necessary and
indispensable that he testify to and declare under oath
with regard to some material matter which he does not
believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend to
establish something which conflicts with the truth of an
essential or important fact which has been proven by the
evidence; because, if the false testimony of the witness is
not important, essential, or material to the principal
matte under investigation, it can not properly be held
that the crime of perjury has been committed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990
REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VI, San Fernando,
Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the
crime of Falsification of Official Document committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the
Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then
a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and,
therefore, a public employee, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official
documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of
the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a
Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official
document, stating and malting it appear therein that he
was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at
the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which
document is a requirement for his reappointment as
School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos
High School and wherein the academic requirement to
said Position is at least a fourth year college
undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused
well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach
the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and
consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of
facts, his appointment to the said position was approved
by the Civil Service Commission.
All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)
After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment,
petitioner was found guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court
finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz guilty as charged of the
crime of falsification of official document penalized under
Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and
he is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
15 | P a g e
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction
to the Intermediate Appellate Court, said appeal being
docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the
respondent court modified the trial court's decision by
increasing the maximum of the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment in the event of non-payment of the fine due
to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction in all
other respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of
respondent court's decision read:
The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official
document committed under Article 171, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to
exceed P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be
imposed on the appellant applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as
minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of (prision
mayor) as maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of
P1,000.00 due to insolvency, the appellant should be
subject to subsidiary imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the
penalty and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, the decision appealed from is affirmed
in all other respects with costs against accused- appellant'
(P. 68, Rollo)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence,
the present recourse.
It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an
acquittal because—
1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the
respondent intermediate Appellate Court that he was not
a fourth year A-B. College student is contrary to the
evidence presented.
2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely
commuted an error of law in convicting him as he did not
have any legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he
was a fourth year college student.
3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in finding that the transcript of records
(Exhibit I) is spurious.
Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, to have been
sufficiently and satisfactorily established by the evidence
on record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a
senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative
Assistant I of the same school and as one of the
requirements for appointment to said position, filled up
the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service
Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of the data
and information therein furnished by him before the
proper administering officer. As one of the required
informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest
educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts)
allegedly pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and
Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to
1954 inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended an
appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh.
"B"). His personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together
with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as
to the availability of funds for the position (Exh. "C") and
the resolution of the Provincial Board of Pampanga
creating the position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the
Civil Service Commission for the approval of petitioner's
appointment.
But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest
educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. which he
allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian
Colleges during the years 1950 to 1954, he was never
enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became
the Abad Santos Educational Institution and still later the
Ortanez University-at any time during the period covering
the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by
the Registrar of Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D.
Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the
Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first quarter of
school year 1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by the
school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap.
Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at
the Harvardian Colleges in San Fernando, Pampanga after
he finished his secondary course in the same school in
June 1950, as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty.
Arnulfo Garcia.
Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the
enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then
Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education
by the Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga
and at Tondo, Manila, during the period during which
petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing
is true with the list submitted by the Cosmopolitan
Colleges to the said bureau.
The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only
presented in evidence an alleged transcript of record (Exh.
1) purporting to show that he took up collegiate courses at
the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila,
beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-
1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-1954
which transcript of record was allegedly signed by Mrs.
Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then
President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia
Yap, testifying for the prosecution disowned the said
signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript
is a printed notation reading — this is only valid with the
college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit
"I" lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature
of President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating
piece of evidence was presented by petitioner.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid
and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove that he was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate.
It was clearly established that the statement made by the
accused — that he reached fourth year A.B. and that he
studied for this course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan
Colleges and the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-
1954, is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges do
not at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any
time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His
name does not appear and could not be found in the
enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools
by these colleges.
While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged
transcript (Exh. purporting to show that he took up
collegiate course at the Philippine Harvardian College in
Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the
school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of the school
year 1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent
court correctly disregarded said transcript as having
emanated from a spurious source. The transcript
presented lacks the authenticating marks-the imprint of
the college seal and the signature of the President of the
college.
As correctly observed by the trial court —
It is also quite significant to note in this score that the
accused in his defense failed to present any corroborating
piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed
enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges from the
first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he had
enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was
positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in
his possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy
for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the
testimony of any of his classmates or teachers in the
different subjects that he took to support his claim that he
studied and passed these collegiate courses at the said
school. But this he failed to do despite all the
opportunities open to him and in the face of damning
evidence all showing that he had not really enrolled in this
school or in the other school mentioned by him the
personal information sheet that he filed up as requirement
for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo)
Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of
People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil.
255 and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing
facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion
of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter. The said article
provides —
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being included in
the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in
lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods
mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this
section shall suffer respective penalties provided therein.
In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B.
Cruz failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No.
2) for the patrolman examination. He stated therein that
he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation
of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when
in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he had been
prosecuted and tried before the Justice of the Peace of
Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was
signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of
Cainta, Rizal.
This Court in that case held:
This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the
Philippine Commission, which was formerly the law
punishing perjury. Under said section 3 of that Act, this
Court, in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina (29
Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under oath in his
application to take police examination that he had never
been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he
has previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in
that case are almost exactly analogous to those in the
present, and we find no reason, either in law or in the
arguments of the Solicitor General to modify or reverse
the conclusion of this Court therein. More so, because all
the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183
of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.
The elements of the crime of perjury are —
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a

lesser penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and
aggravating circumstance the penalty should be imposed
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1)
day of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the

decision appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime

of perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code; and

(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty

of from four (4) months of arrests mayor as minimum to
one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum. SO ORDERED.

People v. Capistrano, 40 Phil. 902

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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FACTS: Accused-appellant Barbara Capistrano stated under oath
two contradictory statement: one before the Assistant prosecutor
who conducted the preliminary investigation before filing the
information against her father Alejo Capistrano for Rape,
statement whereby she was accusing the latter of the said crime;
and another before the Court of first instance at the hearing of
the same cause for rape, saying that the one call Juan Sol, and
that for her fear to the latter who had threatened her, she made
the former statement before the fiscal imputing the commission
of the crime to his father. In view thereof, the fiscal filed a case
against her for the crime of perjury.
ISSUE: WON the two contradictory sworn statement are enough
to convict the accused of perjury.
HELD: The Court ruled that in order to hold the accused guilty of
the crime of perjury, it was necessary to prove that she did not
believe said testimony as true or, what amounts to the same
thing, that which she testified to before the CFI was not true.
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the
contradictory sworn statement of the accused, but the
prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and
must show that statement to be false by other evidence that the
contradictory statement. One who is thus accused for having
given under oath a statement contradictory to the one given in a
former examination, has the right to prove that the statement
formerly given by him was induced by threats and duress.
DIAZ vs. PEOPLE,191 SCRA 86
Facts: Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Document beforethe Court of first Instance
of Pampanga. He was found guilty as charged. On appeal, the
court modified its decision increasing the penalty of the accused.
Hence this petition. The facts of thecase are as follows:Reolandi
Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School in San
Fernando Pampanga.He sought appointment as School
Administrative Assistant I, and as one of the requirements tosaid
appointment, he filled up Civil Service Form 212 and swore to the
truth and veracity of thedate and information therein that
his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.(Liberal
Arts) allegedly pursued at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian
Colleges. On that basis, he was appointed to the position. But
contrary to the claim of petitioner, he was never enrolled at the
Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its Registrar, neither was he a
student at the Harvardian Colleges, certified by the school’s
president. The name of the petitioner was not also included inall
CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST
the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then
Bureau of Private Schools.
Issues: Whether the accused is guilty of falsification.
Held: The court held that the crime committed was not
falsification but Perjury, which is the willful and corrupt assertion
of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter. The elements of which are;
a) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter; b) that the statement or affidavit
was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; c.) that the statement or affidavit, the accused
made a deliberate assertion of a falsehood; d.) that the sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose. All the elements enumerated therein
are present in the case at bar, thus the accused is guilty
of perjury. The decision of Court of Appeals was modified, finding
the accused guilty of perjury, imposing the corresponding penalty
therein and not of falsification.
OUANO vs. CA, 188 SCRA 799
Facts: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of
land registered under RFC (DBP). Said property was offered for
bidding for the second time because the first bidding was nullified
due to Ouano’s protest. It appears that prior to the second
bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez
would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide
the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure
success of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only
other party known to be interested in the property-a group
headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid.  They
broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed
to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's
wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.
Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction
punishable under the RPC.
Held: These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has
stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the
property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining
from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to
cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay
away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of
the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony
of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article
185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record,
as is the fact that thereby only one bid that of Echavez was
entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually
acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character,
the parties not only have no action against each other but are
both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their
agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the
criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari
delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
US vsKyburz, 28 PHIL 475
FACTS: Kyburz, the defendant and appellant in this case, was
convicted in the court below of a violation of section 6 of Act No.
666 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes
the fraudulent use of trade-marks and trade names, and was
sentenced to pay a fine P200. The information charges the
commission of the alleged offense, Kyburz, with intent to defraud
the public and the firm of GreilsammerHermanos, did then and
there unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously use the word Meridian
on cards placed on in connection with his watches, for the
purpose of selling the same as genuine Meridian watches, at his
place of business, the said Manila Jewelry Store and with the
intention of the making purchasers believe that the said watches
thus offered for sale and sold by Kyburz, were genuine Meridian
watches when in truth and inn fact they were watches of some
other make, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
GreilsammerHermanos. The first contention of counsel for
appellant is that the trial court in holding Kyburz criminally
responsible for the acts of his employees in the Manila Jewelry
Store in offering for sake and in selling watches under the trade
name of Meridian watches. It is urged that the trial court erred in
holding that Kyburz directed or authorized the action erred in
holding that Kyburz directed or authorized the action of his
employees in the Manila Jewelry Store, in view of the positive
denials of that fact by both Kyburz and the clerk who made the
sale. Counsel insists that since defendant did not place the trade-
mark or trade name on the watches sold by him, he cannot be
held liable for an infringement of the penal provisions. It is further
contended that the evidence does not disclose a violation of the
penal provisions of section 6 of the Act because it does not appear
that the public was in fact deceived as to the quality of the
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

watches purchased form the defendant, the watches sold by the

defendant and the complaining company having been made by
the same manufacturer, and being in fact of exactly the same
standard and quality. It is to be observed, however, that the
statute penalizes the use of trade-marks and trade names with
intent to defraud either the public or the owner of such trade-
mark or trade name

ISSUE: WON defendant should be liable for selling watches under

the trade of Meridian watches

HELD: Trade names are protected against use or imitation upon  

the ground of unfair competition, and an examination of the
statute clearly indicates its purpose to protect the manufacturer
or dealer as well as the public. Nothing that has been said should
be construed as a holding that GreilsammerHermanos have ab
exclusive right to sell watches of the make or standard of those on
which they engrave their trade-mark, and which are thereafter
sold by them under the trade name of Meridian watches. There is
nothing in the record which would indicate that, by contract with
the manufacturer or otherwise, they have acquired any such
exclusive right in and to this make of watches or in and to their
sale. We hold only that no person is entitled in these Islands to
sell watches, whether of the same make and quality as those of
the defendant or of any other make and quality, under the trade
name of Meridian watches, which by adoption and user has
become the property of GreilsammerHermanos. With the infinity
of distinguishing names, marks and signs which are subject to the
use and appropriation of makers and dealers in watches, the use
of the trade name Meridian by any other firm than
GreilsammerHermanos can have but one reasonable explanation,
and that is the intent to take advantage of the favorable opinion
formed by the public of the quality and standard of the watches
sold by that firm under the trade name adopted by it for
advertising purposes, and as a guaranty to the public that such
watches have passed through its hands and are up to the
standard set by it for watches advertised and sold as Meridian
watches.

PEOPLE vs PADOL, 68 PHIL 365

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

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