:

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019 ]
ISIDRO MIRANDA Y PARELASIO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio (Miranda), seeking the
reversal of the Decision[2] dated May 15, 2017, and Resolution[3] dated September 13,
2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38523, which
affirmed the trial court's ruling convicting him of the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

The Antecedents

On September 28, 2011, an Information was filed against Miranda for the crime of
frustrated homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of August 2011 in Barangay Binonoan of Infanta,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with [a] bolo, did then and there,
willfully, feloniously and unlawfully, assaulted and repeatedly hacked a certain
WINARDO PILO Y MORTIZ, on the different part[s] of his body thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds on the parts of his body, thus, performing all acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless do not produce the same by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused. To wit: the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the
complainant (minor) which prevented his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned on December 6, 2011, Miranda pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. During the pre-trial, he interposed self-defense, which led to a reverse trial of
case.[5]
The antecedent facts show that in the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo
Pilo (Pilo) attended the party of his niece at Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon.
After the party, he and his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way
home, they passed by the house of Miranda and threw stones at the latter's home. [6]

While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking
Pilo. He hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried
the attack with his left arm.[7]

In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso

grabbed possession of the bolo.[8]

In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed
that his acts were done in self-defense.[9] He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at
around 7:00p.m., while he was at home with his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard
a thud at their door, followed by several other thuds and stones hurled at their house.
Miranda peeped through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that
before he peeped through the door, he heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that
they could kill each other.[10] Miranda asked Pilo if something was wrong, but the
latter ignored him and continued hurling stones.[11] According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two
arms downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked
Pilo's arm with his bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's oncoming attack. [12]

At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the
latter's bolo. Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained injuries.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision[13] finding
Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC
held that Miranda's claim of self-defense is biased, self-serving, inconsistent, illogical
and contrary to the common experience of man.[14] The RTC further held that Miranda
failed to prove that his act of hacking Pilo was legally justified. [15] The dispositive
portion of the RTC ruling reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered against

[Miranda], finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide, and there being [sic] aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby imposes upon the said
accused the penalty of imprisonment which is the maximum of prision correccional in
its medium period which is Four (4) years and Two (2) months, as minimum, up to the
maximum of prision mayor in its medium period which is Ten (10) years, as
maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties, to pay private complainant [Pilo] the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as actual and/or temperate
damages, Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) as moral damages, Ten Thousand
Pesos (Php10,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Miranda filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On May 15, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision[17] affirming the conviction
meted by the trial court against Miranda. The CA ratiocinated that Miranda's claim of
self-defense had no leg to stand on, considering that the act of Pilo of hurling stones at
the house of Miranda cannot be regarded as an unlawful aggression that wan-anted the
latter's act of hacking Pilo with a bolo.[18]

However, the CA held that although the act may not be regarded as an unlawful
aggression, it may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation on the part of
Pilo, which mitigates Miranda's liability. Pilo's act of throwing stones at the house of
Miranda is sufficient provocation to enrage him, or stir his anger and obfuscate his
thinking, more so, when the lives of his wife and children were placed in danger. [19]

However, the CA held that there was no voluntary surrender on Miranda's part
considering that he did not actually voluntarily surrender to the police authorities.
Thus, the CA modified the penalty meted by the RTC unto Miranda, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision

dated January 7, 2016 of the [RTC] of Infanta, Quezon, in Criminal Case No. 2011-
150-I is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ISIDRO
MIRANDA y PARELASIO is found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay WINARDO
PILO the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as temperate damages
and Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) as moral damages. The award of exemplary
damages is hereby ordered DELETED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the
prosecution proved the guilt of Miranda for frustrated homicide beyond reasonable
doubt.

In Miranda's petition for review, he staunchly maintains that the CA erred in failing to
exonerate him, as he merely acted in self-defense.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
counters that the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of Miranda beyond
reasonable doubt. The OSG maintains that Miranda may not claim self-defense in the
absence of an unlawful aggression from Pilo. Moreover, the OSG avers that Miranda's
intent to kill Pilo was evident from the kind of weapon he used and the number and
nature of wounds the latter sustained.

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

It must be noted at the outset that in criminal cases, the factual findings of the trial
court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters,
that the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below.[21] Guided by this
principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC's factual findings,
which were affirmed by the CA.

The Prosecution Proved Beyond

Reasonable Doubt that Miranda is
Guilty of Frustrated Homicide

Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond

reasonable doubt that: "(i) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (iii) none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, are present."[22]

It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to
take his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to
exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of
mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, such as the acts
and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter.[23] Likewise, such homicidal intent may be inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location, and number of wounds
he inflicted on his victim.[24]

In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People,[25] the Court, quoting Rivera v.

People,[26] enumerated the factors that determine the presence of intent to kill, to wit:

(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused.[27]

In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and
number of wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a bolo
measuring 1 ½ feet. The hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep
fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal area.[28] Relentless in his attack, Miranda
continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while the latter was already sprawled
on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional wounds. These deep gashes
measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-inch deep in
Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso
arrived and grappled with the weapon.[29] Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the
injuries sustained show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries
cannot simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of
which, was an injury to the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely
demise, if not for the timely medical assistance.

Miranda's Claim of Self-Defense is

Unbelievable

In a bleak attempt to exonerate himself from the crime charged, Miranda claims that
he merely acted in self-defense.

The Court is not persuaded.

To begin with, when the accused invokes self-defense, in effect, he admits to the
commission of the acts for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if
proven, would exculpate him. As such, the burden of proving that his act was justified,
shifts upon him.[30] This means that the accused must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the attack was accompanied by the following circumstances: (i)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (ii) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (iii) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.[31] The accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if
the prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself
has admitted his acts.[32]

It, likewise, bears stressing that the most important element of self-defense is unlawful
aggression. This is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-
defense.[33] Significantly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements
of unlawful aggression, namely: (i) there must have been a physical or material attack
or assault; (ii) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.[34] To be sure, the accused must show that the
aggression caused by the victim in fact put his life or personal safety in real and grave
peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined threat.

Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the attack against the
accused is impending or at the point of happening. This scenario must be
distinguished from a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but
must be offensive and positively strong.[35]

Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all too apparent that
the evidence on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo employed
unlawful aggression against him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely
throwing stones at the house of Miranda. Miranda himself admitted during the trial
that Pilo did not throw stones at him, much less, utter any invectives, or threatening
words against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw merely hit Miranda's roof and
door.[36]

Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was throwing stones,
the latter did not respond but simply remained mum, and threw a stone at Miranda's
iron door. Miranda even further narrated that after throwing stones, Pilo even
approached him, which made him believe that Pilo was trying to make peace with
him.[37] This certainly belies an impending threat to Miranda's life. The following
exchange proves the absence of an unlawful aggression, viz.:

ATTY. CAYANAN:

Q: What did you do after you heard the thug (sic thud) which you felt to be caused by
stones that was [sic] thrown to your door?
A: I looked at the window to find out where those thug (sic thud) coming from and I
saw Winardo Pilo throwing stones, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you saw the private complainant throwing stones at your door, what did you
do next, if there was any?
A: I asked him why he was throwing stones at my door while the door did not commit
any mistake, sir.

xxxx

Q: After the said private complainant still continued to throw stones at your door,
what happened next, if there was any?
A: I went out of the house and asked him again why he was throwing stones at my
house, sir.

Q: What did the private complainant answer to you, if there was any?
A: He remained silent and then he approached me and I thought that he was
going to make peace with me, sir.[38]

It is all too apparent that Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never
directed against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going
to make peace with him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.

Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times,
when the latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda
constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's
attack—and is certainly unjustified. Notably, in Espinosa v. People,[39] which also
involves the continuous hacking by the accused even after the aggressor had been
neutralized, the Court stressed that "the act of the accused in repeatedly hacking the
victim was in no way a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression
allegedly initiated by the latter."[40]

Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pilo stooped down to the
ground, which Miranda perceived as a threat that Pilo was going to pick up a stone,
there is absolutely nothing life-threatening in such a situation. It must be emphasized
that imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim.[41] Undoubtedly, Pilo's act of simply stooping down to the ground was in no
way a threat to Miranda's life.

It, likewise, bears stressing that Miranda cannot seek exoneration on the simple
pretext that the attack was initiated by Pilo. Suffice to say, in the case of People v.
Dulin,[42] the Court held that the fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does
not ipso facto show that there was unlawful aggression. The Court elucidated that
although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to be the aggressor
as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the accused did thereafter is
no longer self-defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused
injured the aggressor.[43] In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after
the latter stopped throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda's act constituted a retaliation
against Pilo. Certainly at this point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful
desire of defending himself, but of the evil intent of retaliating and harming Pilo.

In addition to the fact that there was no unlawful aggression, the Court, likewise, notes
that the means employed by Miranda was not reasonably commensurate to the nature
and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. In Dela Cruz v. People, et
al.,[44] the Court emphasized that, "the means employed by the person invoking self-
defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense. The means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression."[45] Here, the victim Pilo was
armed with a stone, in contrast to the 1 ½-inch bolo that Miranda was brandishing.

More so, as correctly observed by the CA, Miranda could have stayed hidden and
protected at his house. He himself even admitted that he hid among the banana shrubs
before hitting Pilo. In fact, he waited for Pilo to come out of his house, while he was
hiding among the banana shrubs outside of the yard of their house. [46]

Miranda is Entitled to the

Mitigating Circumstance of
Sufficient Provocation

Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression,
admittedly, however, such deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite
Miranda into anger. The fact that Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable
considering that his wife and daughter were at his home, and were peacefully having
supper when Pilo threw the stones.

In Gotis v. People,[47] the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an
unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as
sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. [48] "As a mitigating
circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly
proportionate in gravity."[49] The victim must have committed a prior act that incited
or irritated the accused.[50] Likewise, in order to be mitigating, the provocation must
be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.[51]

In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although there may have been
no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed
to have given sufficient provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated.
Such acts which were deemed vexatious range from the victim's act of challenging the
accused's family while armed with a bolo;[52] or thrusting a bolo at the accused while
threatening to kill him with the lives of the accused's wife and children placed in
peril;[53] and the victim attempting to hack the accused. [54] Certainly, Pilo's act of
hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully enjoying their supper falls
within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of Miranda the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

The Proper Penalty

Article 249 of the RPC states that the penalty for homicide shall be reclusion
temporal. Considering that the crime committed was frustrated homicide, then the
penalty imposed shall be one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision
mayor in its minimum term, in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation.

Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence

shall be imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC
properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum
term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for
the offense committed.[55] Accordingly, the CA correctly meted the penalty of four (4)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

However, the Court shall modify the amount of damages awarded in order to conform
with current jurisprudence. Guided by the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,[56] the
amount of damages imposed against Miranda shall be as follows: (i) Php 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, (ii) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages. These amounts shall be subject to the legal rate of interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Court's ruling until full payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated May 15, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 38523, convicting petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification, in that Miranda is
hereby ordered to pay victim Winardo Pilo the following amounts of damages in line
with People v. Jugueta: (i) Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii) Php 50,000.00 as
moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The total amount due
shall earn a legal rate of interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until the full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Hernando, and Carandang,[*] JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212848, August 17, 2016 ]
ISIDRO COSME AND FERNAN COSME, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] assails the 29 November 2013 Decision[2] and the 5 June
2014 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33692. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the 28 July 2010 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan
City, Batangas, Branch 6, finding Isidro Cosme (Isidro), Fernan Cosme (Fernan), and
Fred Cosme (Fred) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 02-10-493, and finding
Fernan guilty of attempted homicide in Criminal Case No. 02-10-494.

The Facts

Isidro, Fernan, and Fred were charged for the crimes of Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide in two separate Informations, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 02-10-493

The undersigned Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Isidro Cosme, Fernan
Cosme and Fred Cosme of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2002, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Sampaloc, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
unlicensed long and short firearms, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and without any
justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearms one Antonio Balinado y Almendras, thereby inflicting
upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.[5]

Criminal Case No. 02-10-494

The undersigned Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Isidro Cosme, Fernan
Cosme and Fred Cosme of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249, in relation to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2002, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Sampaloc, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
unlicensed long and short firearms, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and without any
justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearms one Pablito Punzalan y Cuerva, thereby inflicting
upon the latter lacerated wound, left, occipital area, 3 cm., which required medical
attendance and incapacitated him from performing his customary work for a period of
fourteen to twenty one (14-21) days, the said accused having performed all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
which nevertheless was not produced by reason of some cause independent of the will
of the perpetrators, that is, because of the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to the said Pablito C. Punzalan, which prevented his death.

Contrary to law.[6]
Upon arraignment, Isidro, Fernan, and Fred pleaded not guilty in both cases. Joint trial
ensued thereafter.

During trial, it was found that the true name of the deceased Antonio Balinado is
Florentino Balinado. The trial court, in its Order dated 28 October 2004, [7] granted the
prosecution's Motion for Leave of Court to Amend the Information to state the real
name of the victim, and the Amended Information inserted the true name of the victim
as "Florentino Balinado y Almendras" alias "Antonio Balinado y Almendras alias
Tony" (Antonio).
The Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented six witnesses: Pablito Punzalan, Lope Punzalan, SPO2
Esmeraldo S. Manimtim, Dr. Teodoro Cabiscuelas, Pantaleon Balinado, and Anastacia
Balinado.

Pablito Punzalan testified that on 17 June 2002, at around 4:00 p.m., he was at the
house of Jose Tenorio, who was celebrating his birthday. He saw Antonio and Fernan
arguing about politics and he heard Fernan warning Antonio: "Tinoy, hindi ka na
uumagahin." Fernan left at around 5:00 p.m. while Pablito and Antonio left at around
6:00 p.m.

While walking along the national highway, Pablito heard a shot. He met a child who
told him to help Antonio. At the front yard of the Cosmes, he saw Isidro, Fred,
Fernan, and Pantaleon Cosme boxing, kicking, and beating Antonio with their guns.
Pablito shouted "tama na?" and introduced himself as a barangay tanod. When
Antonio, who was already bloodied, embraced him, he told Antonio to run away
because he might be killed. When Antonio ran away, Fernan shot Pablito, who was
later brought to the Daniel O. Mercado Medical Center for the treatment of a lacerated
wound located at the left occipital area.

Lope Punzalan testified that on 17 June 2002, he was also at the house of Jose
Tenorio. He remembered a shirtless Fernan, who appeared drunk when he arrived at
the party. Later, during a heated debate on the elections, Fernan stood up and said
"Pumirmi kayo dyan." Fernan then pointed at Antonio and said "Hindi ka na
uumagahin pa." After the party, Lope instructed Antonio to go home. Later, while
Lope was walking along the highway on his way home, he heard gunshots. When he
looked towards the direction of the gunshots, he saw two persons running toward him
and who told him that his cousin Antonio was shot. Lope proceeded to help and saw

Antonio with a gunshot wound on his back. He told Antonio to run away and they
went separate ways. Later, he saw Pablito running while holding the back of his head
which was bloodied. He then saw Antonio lying on the ground, and he instructed the
people nearby to carry Antonio inside a jeep. While inside the jeep, Antonio told Lope
that he was shot by the Cosmes. He did not ask further questions from Antonio since
he was more concerned on bringing Antonio to the hospital.

According to Lope, he executed a sworn statement dated 18 June 2002 before PO3
Ernesto Serrano Cabrera, Jr. regarding the shooting incident but PO3 Cabrera lost the
said statement.

SPO2 Esmeraldo S. Manimtim was ordered by their Chief of Police to conduct an

investigation on the case. SPO2 Manimtim testified that at 10:00 p.m. on 17 June
2002, he asked Antonio why he was at the Daniel O. Mercado Medical Center.
Antonio replied that he had gunshot wounds because he was shot by the father and
son, Pame and Edong Cosme. SPO2 Manimtim learned from PO3 Cabrera that Pame
Cosme is Pantaleon Cosme, while Edong Cosme is Isidro Cosme. When SPO2
Manimtim asked Antonio if his gunshot wound was fatal, Antonio merely replied that
he was not feeling well. SPO2 Manimtim testified that at the time he took his
statement, Antonio was already having a hard time speaking because of the gunshot
wounds. SPO2 Manimtim further testified that he also received information that
Antonio shot Pantaleon and Sonora Cosme who both sustained gunshot wounds.

Dr. Teodoro Cabiscuelas, a general surgeon at the Daniel O. Mercado Medical Center,
testified that on 17 June 2002, Antonio was brought to the emergency room of the
Daniel O. Mercado Medical Center. Antonio's vital signs of blood pressure of 60/80
palpatory indicated that he was losing a lot of blood. Antonio sustained gunshot
wounds at the right thorax and lumbar area which were fatal, and at the right arm
which was non-fatal. Antonio underwent extensive operation and his physical
condition was declared unstable.

Dr. Cabiscuelas also treated Pablito Punzalan who sustained a non-fatal lacerated
wound which would heal within 14 days or 2 to 3 weeks, provided no complication
occurs. Dr. Cabiscuelas stated that the wound could have been caused by a bullet, but
he could not really tell the real cause of Pablito's wound.

Pantaleon Balinado testified that on 17 June 2002 at around 7:00 to 7:30 p.m., his
brother-in-law informed him that his father, Antonio, was shot. He immediately
proceeded to the place of incident, where he was informed that his father was already
brought to the hospital. When he saw his father at the hospital, he asked him who shot
him. His father answered that it was Fernan, Fred, Isidro, and Pantaleon (Cosme).
Pantaleon testified that at that time, his father was in a bad condition and he could
hardly talk.

Pantaleon Balinado further testified that they spent P124,603.37 for the hospital and
doctor's fees and P143,662.89 for the medicines and burial expenses. At the time of
his death, his father Antonio was earning around P20,000 tending a nursery. He hired
a lawyer for the case and the agreed acceptance fee was P25,000, and P3,000
appearance fee for every hearing.

Anastacia Balinado, wife of Antonio, testified that on 17 June 2002, she was informed
that Antonio was shot and she immediately ran to the place of incident. She saw
Antonio already inside a jeep and about to be rushed to the hospital. She met her son
Pantaleon and they went to the hospital, where she overheard Antonio telling
Pantaleon that the ones who shot him were "apat na mag-aamang Cosme." Anastacia
further testified that Antonio was confined at the hospital for three days, and died on
20 June 2002.

The Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven witnesses: Pantaleon Cosme, Sonora Cosme, Isidro,
Fernan, Dr. Raul Desipeda, PO3 Cabrera, and Police Inspector Donna Villa Huelgas.

Pantaleon Cosme, the son of Isidro and Socorro Cosme, testified that on 17 June 2002,
at around 7:30 p.m., he and his siblings, Sonora and Fernan, were in front of their
parents' house. They were talking about the altercation between Antonio and Fernan
which happened at a birthday party when Antonio and Pablito Punzalan approached
them. When Pantaleon Cosme asked them what was the problem, Antonio replied
"Patay kayo sa akin." and then drew his gun and shot Pantaleon Cosme. Pantaleon
Cosme fell to the ground and regained consciousness three days later at the hospital,
where he learned that he sustained seven gunshot wounds. He was hospitalized for
almost two weeks. Pantaleon Cosme further testified that Antonio also shot Sonora,
who was hit at her side. At the time of the incident, his father Isidro was inside the
house watching television.

Sonora Cosme testified that at around 7:30 p.m. on 17 June 2002, she was in front of
their house with her brothers Pantaleon, Fred, and Fernan. Antonio and Pablito
approached them and she saw Antonio shoot Pantaleon several times, causing him to
fall to the ground. Sonora rushed to Pantaleon and while she was about to embrace
him, Antonio shot her. She sustained a wound on her right buttock where the bullet
entered and another on her left buttock which was the exit wound. She passed out and
regained consciousness at the hospital. At the time of the attack, her father Isidro was
inside the house. She stayed at the hospital for four days where she was interrogated
by PO3 Cabrera.

Isidro testified that at around 7:30 p.m. on 17 June 2002, he was inside his house
watching television when he heard six gunshots. Being used to gunshots in their
neighborhood, he just ignored the incident. Five seconds later, someone knocked on
the door, and when he opened it, Fernan went inside carrying an unconscious Sonora
with blood oozing from her side. Isidro also saw his other son Pantaleon, lying
bloodied on the ground less than 10 meters away. With the help of some relatives,
they brought Pantaleon and Sonora to the hospital. Isidro denied firing any firearm
during the incident. In fact, when Fred, Fernan, and he were subjected to paraffin
tests, the results were negative.

Fernan testified that on 17 June 2002, he was attending a birthday party at the house
of his neighbors Maximo and Jose Tenorio. While they were drinking, an altercation
ensued regarding Fernan's non-affiliation with Antonio's political party in the election.
Fernan denied that he told Antonio: "Hindi ka na uumagahin." When he got home,
Fernan told his siblings, Pantaleon and Sonora, about the altercation during their
conversation at the terrace. While they were still discussing the incident, Antonio
arrived. Pantaleon approached Antonio, who immediately shot Pantaleon. Pantaleon
fell to the ground, and Sonora rushed to embrace him but Antonio also fired at her.
Fernan hurriedly left to inform Isidro about the incident and they later helped carry the
unconscious Pantaleon and Sonora inside Fred's jeep. At that time, Antonio was no
longer in the vicinity.
On 20 June 2002, Fernan learned that Antonio had been shot and that he died from a
gunshot wound. Fernan claimed that it was Antonio who was angry with him.

Dr. Raul Desipeda testified that at around 8:55 p.m. on 17 June 2002, Pantaleon
Cosme was brought to the emergency room of the C.P. Reyes Hospital. He attended to
Pantaleon who was then in a state of shock due to significant blood loss as a result of
the five gunshot wounds he sustained. He also treated Sonora, who sustained a
"gunshot wound over the right buttock, thru-and-thru with exit wound over the left
buttock."

PO3 Cabrera denied taking the statement of Lope Punzalan. According to PO3
Cabrera, he only took the statements of Pablito Punzalan and Sonora Cosme, as
ordered by their Chief of Police.

Police Inspector Donna Villa Huelgas, the forensic chemist assigned at the Regional
Crime Laboratory Office in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, testified that on 19
June 2002, she conducted paraffin tests on the three accused, Isidro, Fernan, and Fred,
and a certain Andres Cosme. The results on the paraffin tests were all negative for the
presence of gunpowder nitrates. Police Inspector Huelgas stated that the absence of
gunpowder means that the person probably did not fire a gun.

During trial and prior to the promulgation of the trial court's decision, Fred died. [8]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 28 July 2010, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Isidro Cosme, Fernan Cosme, and Fred
Cosme, in Criminal Case No. 02-10-493, are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide and they are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum [and] to indemnify the heirs of Antonio Balinado a.k.a. Florentino Balinado
the following:

(1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity;

(2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages;

(3) Two Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixteen Pesos [and] Twenty-
Six Centavos (P264,816.26) by way of compensatory damages.

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 02-10-494, accused Isidro Cosme and Fred
Cosme are hereby ACQUITTED for the crime charged. Accused Fernan Cosme is,
however, found GUILTY for the crime of attempted homicide committed against
Pablito C. Punzalan of which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Based on the evidence of the defense, the trial court stated that Antonio seemed to be
the aggressor by firing several shots at Pantaleon. The Cosmes retaliated by shooting
Antonio and beating and kicking him. The trial court found that Isidro, Fernan, and
Fred all participated in beating and mauling Antonio with the use of firearms even
after he sustained gunshot wounds. The trial court concluded that it can be inferred
from their combined acts that Isidro, Fernanr and Fred had the same criminal intent
and were bent to commit the felony. Thus, it is immaterial who among the accused
shot Antonio because in their collective participation, the act of one is the act of all.

As regards the charge for attempted homicide on Pablito, the trial court only held
Fernan liable considering that there was no evidence showing that Isidro and Fred also
shot Pablito. Nor was it shown that Isidro and Fred had the same criminal intent as
Fernan who was positively identified by Pablito as the person who shot him.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and considered the statement of
Antonio to SPO2 Manimtim as an ante-mortem statement or a dying declaration
which is entitled to highest credence. Based on the circumstances surrounding the
declaration, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was clear that Antonio was
conscious of his imminent death when he made his statement to SPO2 Manimtim.

The Court of Appeals likewise considered as part of res gestae the declaration of
Antonio to Lope, Pantaleon Balinado, and Anastacia. Thus, although Antonio failed to
name all the accused to SPO2 Manimtim, the Court of Appeals noted that Antonio did
divulge to Lope, Anastacia, and Pantaleon Balinado that the perpetrators of the crime
were the Cosmes, referring to Isidro, Fred, Fernan, and Pantaleon Cosme.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals emphasized that prosecution witness Pablito
testified that he saw the accused mauling and beating Antonio, although he did not
witness the actual shooting of Antonio. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that
since there was conspiracy, it does not matter whether only one or two of the accused
had actually fired the fatal shots.

As regards the paraffin test, the Court of Appeals held that negative findings for
gunpowder nitrates do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun.

The Issue

The issue is whether petitioners are guilty of the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition without merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
ruling of the trial court that the petitioners' guilt for the crimes charged was clearly
established by the witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution.

Petitioners question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the factual
findings of the trial court. Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best
assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.[10] Factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and
conclusive unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked, which if
considered would materially affect the result of the case.[11] We find no such
misapprehension of facts in this case.

The statement of the victim Antonio after he was fatally wounded that his assailants
were the Cosmes was corroborated by the eyewitness Pablito who testified that he saw
Isidro, Fred, Fernan, and Pantaleon Cosme mauling and beating the already bloodied
Antonio with a gun. Pablito, who tried to stop the mauling, was also shot by Fernan,
but fortunately sustained only a non-fatal lacerated wound. Pablito's testimony was
further corroborated by another prosecution witness, Lope, who testified that he heard
gunshots and upon being informed that Antonio was shot, he proceeded to the crime
scene and saw Antonio, who was bleeding from a gunshot wound at his back. While
bringing Antonio to the hospital on board a jeep, Antonio told Lope that he was shot
by the Cosmes. Clearly, the identification of the accused as the persons responsible for
the crimes charged was established by the prosecution.

Petitioners claim that Antonio shot the siblings Pantaleon and Sonora Cosme but
denied any knowledge of the shooting and mauling of Antonio. Petitioner Fernan,
who was one of the defense witnesses, testified that when they were about to bring
Pantaleon and Sonora to the hospital, Antonio was no longer in the vicinity.
Petitioners' denial is belied by the positive testimony of the other victim, Pablito, that
petitioners mauled and beat the already bloodied Antonio with their firearms.
Petitioners' defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely against them. [12]

On the charge for homicide, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the accused
conspired to kill Antonio as shown by their collective act of mauling and beating
Antonio with their firearms despite the fact that Antonio was already bleeding from
gunshot wounds. The manner by which the accused attacked the victim clearly and
convincingly shows that the accused were motivated by a common intent to kill
Antonio. The actions of accused show that they were impelled by the same motive to
retaliate against Antonio for shooting Pantaleon and Sonora. Since conspiracy is
established in this case, evidence as to who among the conspirators actually fired the
fatal shots is no longer indispensable. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and
each of the offender is equally guilty of the criminal act.[13]
We likewise affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, convicting
Fernan of the crime of attempted homicide. The victim, Pablito, clearly identified
Fernan as the one who shot him when he tried to stop Fernan's group from mauling
and beating Antonio.

It should be noted that of the three accused originally charged with homicide and
frustrated homicide, only Fernan is still alive. Fred died prior to the promulgation of
the trial court's decision, while Isidro died after the Court of Appeals' decision was
promulgated. In a manifestation dated 11 January 2015, the counsel for petitioners
informed the Court that Isidro died on 10 November 2014, and a copy of Isidro's death
certificate was attached to the manifestation. Thus, in a Resolution dated 20 April
2015, the Court considered the case closed and terminated insofar as petitioner Isidro
Cosme is concerned.

Thus, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution.
However, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and compensatory damages
should earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.[14]

WHEREFORE, the 29 November 2013 Decision and the 5 June 2014 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRNo. 33692, finding Isidro Cosme, Fernan Cosme,
and Fred Cosme guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 02-10-493, and finding
Fernan Cosme guilty of attempted homicide in Criminal Case No. 02-10-494,
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that interest at the rate of 6% per
annum is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from the date of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid. However, the case is
considered CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as Fred Cosme and Isidro Cosme
are concerned due to their death prior to the promulgation of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.