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CONFORAIIEO COPY

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ORIGINAL FILED
1 LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES Superior Court of Californih
County of Los Angeles
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2 Scott R. Ames (SBN 146093) AUG 28 2018
Erin M. Kelly (SBN 308309)
3 Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clark of Court
1880 Century Park East, Suite 614
4 Los Angeles, CA 90064 By: Kristina Vargas, Deputy
Tel: (310) 478-2500
5 Fax: (310) 478-2501
Email: scott@scottarneslaw.com
6 erin@scottarneslaw.com
7
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 JERI GREGORY
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
11
JERI GREGORY, Case No. 8(719902
12 Plaintiff,
V. COMPLAINT FOR:
13 LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL
CHURCH OF CHRIST, a California 1. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
14 Corporation; SHINING STARS CHRISTIAN FAMILY RIGHTS ACT ("CFRA")
15 PRESCHOOL, form of entity unknown; and (Cal. Gov. Code§ 12945.2)
DOES 1-25, Inclusive, 2. VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY
16 Defendants. MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA")
(29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq)
17 3. INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE
OF CFRA RIGHTS
18 4. INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE
19 OF FMLA RIGHTS
5. RETALIATION FOR EXERCISE OF
20 CFRARIGHTS
6. RETALIATION FOR EXERCISE OF
21 FMLARIGHTS
7. VIOLATION OF THE PREGNANCY
22
DISCRIMINATION ACT (42 U.S.C.
23 § 2000e(k) et seq)
8. RETALIATION (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
24 et seq)
9. VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE
25 § 1102.5
26 10. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
27
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
28
COMPLAfNT
1 unknown, with its principal place of business located in the state of California, County of Los
2 Angeles.

3 5. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants LAICC and the

4 Preschool have common management, centralized control of labor relations, common ownership

5 and financial control, overlapping employees, common corporate headquarters, and interrelated

6 operations such that these entities operated as a single, integrated enterprise with regard to
7 Plaintiff's employment. Alternatively, Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that

8 LAICC and the Preschool were her joint employers.


9 6. The Los Angeles County Superior Court has jurisdiction over all claims plead. The

10 Los Angeles County Superior Court is also the proper venue for this action under, among other
11 reasons, California Government Code§ 12965(a) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) because the

12 unlawful practices alleged herein were committed in the county of Los Angeles, and because the
13 records relevant to these unlawful practices are maintained and administered by Defendants at their
14 corporate headquarters located in the city of Santa Monica, county of Los Angeles, and state of
15 California.
16 7. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as
17 Does 1 through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.
18 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein relevant each such
19 fictitiously named Defendant was and is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein
20 alleged, and that Plaintiff's injuries and/or damages were and are directly and/or proximately
21 caused thereby. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each such fictitiously
22 named Defendant is directly and/or indirectly liable on one or more causes of action set forth
23 herein. LAICC, the Preschool and Doe Defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as
24 the "Defendants."

25 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein
26 relevant, each of the Defendants, including each fictitiously named Defendant, was the agent,
27 servant, joint venture, authorized representative and/or employee of each of the remaining
28
2
COMPLAINT
1 Defendants, and, except as provided herein, in doing the acts and things hereinafter alleged, was
2 acting within the course and scope of said agency, joint venture, representative, servitude and/or

3 employment, consent, approval and subsequent satisfaction of each of the remaining Defendants.

4 Each of the Defendants was authorized and empowered by each of the other Defendants to act and

5 did act as the principal, employee or agent of each of the other Defendants. Plaintiff is further

6 informed and believes and thereon alleges that, except as provided herein, each Defendant was

7 acting within the course and scope of his/her/its authority in performing the acts herein alleged, and

8 that the acts of each Defendant as alleged herein were authorized and/or ratified by the other

9 Defendants.

10 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
11 9. Defendants hired Plaintiff in or around October, 2015, as a lead preschool teacher,

12 and she remained in this position until Defendants wrongfully terminated her employment on

13 January 31, 2018. Plaintiff also enrolled her daughter in the Preschool at the time she was hired.

14 Plaintiff was not married when she was hired and enrolled her daughter, nor was she married at any

15 time throughout her employment with Defendants. Plaintiff is informed, believes and thereon

16 alleges that Plaintiffs supervisors, and LAICC and Preschool management, knew at all times

17 herein relevant that Plaintiff was not married throughout her employment with Defendants.
18 10. Plaintiff received favorable performance evaluations throughout her employment,

19 including her evaluation on June 19, 2017 in which the Preschool Director and Plaintiffs

20 supervisor Stacy Williams ("Williams") described Plaintiff as follows: "Jeri is a great teacher. The

21 children and parents love her. Her room is usually neat, clean & organized . . . . I believe that she

22 really loves the children and it shows in her teaching style in the classroom."
23 11. In or around June, 2017, Plaintiff notified Williams and her colleagues that she was
24 pregnant with her second child, and that her due date was in early December, 2017. Around this

25 same time, Plaintiff was suffering from back pain and sciatica, and her symptoms caused weakness

26 and instability in her leg. Plaintiff spoke with Williams and Defendants' Assistant Director Pam

27 Mammen ("Mammen") about accommodations for her back pain and sciatica, and asked them for
28
3
COMPLAINT
1 an assistant because of these disabilities. Defendants never provided Plaintiff with an assistant
2 despite telling her they would.
3 12. On or about August 24, 2017, Plaintiffs physician wrote a doctor's note taking

4 Plaintiff off work from August 24, 2017 until January 21, 2018 because of her back pain and
5 sciatica. On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff provided this note to Defendants' Human Resources

6 Manager Cindi Whitcomb ("Whitcomb").


7 13. On August 25, 2017, Defendants provided Plaintiff with paperwork approving her

8 leave from August 25, 2017 through January 21, 2018 under the Family and Medical Leave Act

9 ("FMLA") and related leave laws. These documents included Whitcomb's August 25, 2017 letter

10 to Plaintiff, a Notice of Eligibility and Rights & Responsibilities under the Family and Medical

11 Leave Act ("Notice"), and a Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health

12 Condition under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("Notice").


13 14. On October 2, 2017, Whitcomb confirmed that Plaintiffs doctor's note had her on

14 bed rest until January 21, 2017, and Whitcomb asked Plaintiff to complete and return the Notice

15 she previous! y provided her. On or about November 16, 201 7, Plaintiffs physician signed and

16 returned the Notice to Defendants. Defendants accepted this paperwork, and never once indicated

17 that the duration of the leave was unacceptable or not approved under the FMLA or CFRA.
18 15. Plaintiffs daughter was born on December 9, 201 7. On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff

19 sent an email to her supervisor Williams that she would be released to return to work on February
20 1, 2018. She also asked Williams if she would be returning to the Lead Teacher position she held

21 prior to her approved leave. Williams responded that Plaintiff could not return to her position as

22 Lead Teacher. Instead, Williams told Plaintiff that she could return to work as a Floating Teacher

23 on a full-time basis from 9am to 6pm where Plaintiff would substitute for absent teachers, work on
24 program development in the mornings, and run a class in the evenings.

25 16. On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff sent Williams an email that she had a legal right to
26 reinstatement to the Lead Teacher position she held prior to her approved leave. She again
27 confirmed that her doctor officially released her to return to work on February 1, 2018, and that she
28
4
COMPLAINT
1 intended to return to the position she held prior to her leave. Plaintiff also confirmed that she
2 intended to return to her position on a full-time basis, as she and Williams had exchanged emails

3 about a part-time position. That same day Williams responded that she had forwarded Plaintiffs

4 email to Whitcomb, Defendants' head of Human Resources.


5 17. On January 31, 2018, the day before Plaintiffs return date, Whitcomb sent Plaintiff

6 an email with an attached letter terminating Plaintiffs employment. Whitcomb confirmed in her

7 email that she had received Plaintiffs doctor's note releasing her to return to work. Whitcomb's

8 letter states in pertinent part as follows: "While the Church commends you for carrying your baby
9 to term, ... the lifestyle decision to have unmarried sex as evidenced by a baby out of wedlock is

10 not consistent with your obligations as an employee of the Church to live in accordance with the

11 doctrines of the Christian faith. Therefore, now that your unpaid leave is coming to a close, based

12 on the facts known at this time, the Church is electing to terminate your employment for the

13 reasons stated. This termination is effective immediately and you should not report back to work

14 for any reason" (emphasis in original). A true and correct copy of Whitcomb's letter is attached

15 hereto as Exhibit "A".


16 18. At all times herein relevant, Williams, Whitcomb and Defendants knew that

17 Plaintiff was not married when they learned she was pregnant, knew that Plaintiff was not married
18 when they approved her leave, and knew that Plaintiff was not married when they discussed her

19 return to work at the conclusion of her leave.


20 19. At all times herein relevant, Defendants maintained policies prohibiting unlawful

21 discrimination and retaliation, policies providing for leaves of absences under the FMLA and

22 CFRA, policies providing for medical leaves of absences due to pregnancy, childbirth, or serious

23 health conditions, and policies guaranteeing reinstatement from leaves necessitated by a


24 pregnancy-related disability to the employee's former position or a comparable position.

25 20. On or about June 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair

26 Employment & Housing (the "DFEH Complaint") against Defendants for, inter alia, violations of
27 CFRA, FMLA, sex and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation. The DFEH cross-filed
28
5
COMPLAINT
1 Plaintiffs complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On or

2 about June 18, 2018, the DFEH and EEOC (under a separate EEOC case number) issued a Notice

3 of Case Closure and Right to Sue ("Right to Sue Letter") on said Complaint. True and correct

4 copies of the DFEH/EEOC Complaint and Right to Sue Letter are attached hereto as Exhibits "B"
5 and "C", respectively.

6 21. On or about July 11, 2018, Plaintiff served true and correct copies of her

7 DFEH/EEOC Complaint and Right to Sue Letter via certified mail pursuant to Government Code

8 § 12962.

9 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

10 VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT


11 (As Against All Defendants)

12 22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

13 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.


14 23. The California Family Rights Act ("CFRA") provides that an employer must

15 reinstate an eligible employee on an approved CFRA leave to said employee's same position, or a

16 comparable position, upon the termination of said employee's leave.


17 24. Defendants were and are a covered employer under CFRA, Government Code

18 § 12945.2(c)(2)(A). At all times herein relevant, Plaintiff was an eligible employee on an approved

19 CFRA leave for the birth of her child and a serious health condition under Government Code

20 § 12945.2(c)(3)(A).
21 25. Defendants violated the CFRA by, inter alia, refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to her

22 prior position or a comparable position, and by terminating her employment the day before she was

23 to return to work.
24 26. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered

25 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount

26 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'
27
28
6
COMPLAINT
1 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
2 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

3 27. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

4 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
5 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the

6 time of trial.
7 28. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, these Defendants, and each of them, acted
8 oppressively, maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously towards Plaintiff, with conscious
9 disregard for her known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the
10 probability of causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, these Defendants
11 intended to and did vex, injury, and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages
12 should be made against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them

13 from willfully engaging in future discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct.


14 29. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to
15 California Government Code§ 12965(b), and appropriate and effective equitable or injunctive
16 relief pursuant to California Government Code § 12965(c ).
17 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
18 VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
19 (As Against All Defendants)
20 30. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

21 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.

22 31. The Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") provides that an employer must reinstate

23 an eligible employee on an approved FMLA leave to said employee's same position, or to an


24 equivalent position, upon the termination of said employee's leave.

25 32. Defendants were and are a covered employer under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C.

26 § 2611 (4 )(A). At all times herein relevant, Plaintiff was an eligible employee on an approved
27
28
7
COMPLAINT
1 FMLA leave for the birth of her child and a serious health condition under 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A),
2 and 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l)(A),(D).
3 33. Defendants violated the FMLA by, inter alia, refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to her
4 prior position or an equivalent position, and by terminating her employment the day before she was
5 to return to work.
6 34. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
7 special damages in an amount equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary under 29 U.S.C.
8 § 2617(a)(l )(A)(i). Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages under 29 U .S.C.

9 § 2617(a)(l )(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for

10 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,
11 including employment, reinstatement and promotion under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(B).
12 35. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 29
13 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(3).
14 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
15 VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT
16 INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE OF FAMILY LEAVE RIGHTS
17 (As Against All Defendants)
18 3 6. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,
19 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
20 37. The CFRA provides that an employer must provide an eligible employee with up to
21 12 workweeks of leave to care for a newborn child. The CFRA also requires the employer to
22 guarantee the eligible employee the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the
23 leave. Plaintiff is an eligible employee under the CFRA.
24 38. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's rights under the CFRA by, inter alia,

25 terminating Plaintiffs employment during her approved CFRA leave.


26 39. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
27 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount
28
8
COMPLAINT
1 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'

2 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form oflost future earnings,

3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

4 40. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in

6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the

7 time of trial.

8 41. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,

9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her

10 known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of

11 causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex,

12 injure and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against

13 Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in

14 future unlawful conduct.


15 42. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to

16 California Government Code § 12965(b ).


17 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
18 VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
19 INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE OFFAMIL Y LEAVE RIGHTS
20 (As Against All Defendants)
21 43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

22 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.

23 44. The FMLA provides that an employer must provide an eligible employee with up to

24 12 workweeks of leave to care for a newborn child. The FMLA also requires the employer to

25 guarantee the eligible employee the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the

26 leave. Plaintiff is an eligible employee under the FMLA.


27
28
9
COMPLAINT
1 45. Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs rights under the FMLA by, inter alia,

2 terminating Plaintiffs employment during her approved FMLA leave.


3 46. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered

4 special damages in an amount equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary under 29 U.S.C.

5 § 2617(a)(l)(A)(i). Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C.

6 § 2617(a)(l)(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for

7 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,

8 including employment, reinstatement and promotion under 29 U.S.C. § 26 l 7(a)(l )(B).


9 47. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 29

10 U.S.C. § 26 l 7(a)(l )(A)(3).

11 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

12 VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT - RETALIATION

13 (As Against All Defendants)


14 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

15 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.


16 49. The CFRA also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or

17 retaliate against an employee who exercises her right to family care leave. Government Code
18 § 12945.2(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, or to

19 discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against, any individual because of ... [a]n

20 individual's exercise of the right to family care and medical leave."); see also 2 Cal. Code Regs.

21 § 11089(a)(2). Plaintiff is an eligible employee under the CFRA.


22 50. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff because she exercised her rights under the

23 CFRA by, inter alia, terminating Plaintiffs employment during her approved CFRA leave six (6)
24 days after she complained that Defendants were not returning her to the same or comparable

25 position she previously held.


26 51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
27 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount
28
10
COMPLAlNT
1 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'
2 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,

3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

4 52. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in

6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the

7 time of trial.
8 53. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,

9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her

10 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,

11 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and

12 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants

13 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future

14 unlawful conduct.
15 54. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to

16 California Government Code§ 12965(b).

17 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

18 VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT - RETALIATION

19 (As Against All Defendants)


20 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

21 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.

22 56. The FMLA also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or

23 retaliate against an employee who exercises her right to family care leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l)
24 ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with. restrain, or deny the exercise of or the

25 attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter."); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (" It shall

26 be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
27
28
11
COMPLAINT
1 individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. ") Plaintiff is an eligible

2 employee under the FMLA.

3 57. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff because she exercised her rights under the

4 FMLA by, inter alia, terminating Plaintiff's employment during her approved FMLA leave six (6)

5 days after she complained that Defendants were not returning her to the same or comparable

6 position she previously held.

7 58. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

8 suffered special damages in an amount equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary under 29 U.S.C.

9 § 2617(a)(l)(A)(i). Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages under 29 U.S .C.

10 § 26 l 7(a)(l )(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for

11 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,

12 including employment, reinstatement and promotion under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l )(B).

13 59. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 29

14 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(3).

15 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

16 VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

17 SEX/PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION

18 (As Against All Defendants)

19 60. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

20 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.

21 61. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits discrimination

22 against an employee because of pregnancy which is a form of sex discrimination.

23 62. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her pregnancy and sex by,
24 inter alia, terminating Plaintiff's employment because she was pregnant and gave birth out of

25 wedlock.
26 63. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered

27 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount
28
12
COMPLAINT
1 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'
2 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,

3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

4 64. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the

7 time of trial.

8 65. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,

9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her

10 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,

11 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and

12 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants

13 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future

14 unlawful conduct.
15 66. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42

16 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

17 EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

18 VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

19 RETALIATION

20 (As Against All Defendants)


21 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

22 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.

23 68. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from retaliating
24 against employees for engaging in protected activity.

25 69. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by opposing employment practices that

26 Plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believed were unlawful. Plaintiff's opposition included, but

27 was not limited to, Plaintiff's complaint to Williams on January 25, 2017, that she was not being
28
13
COMPLAINT
1 returned to her Lead Teacher position because of her pregnancy and pregnancy disability.

2 Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment six days after she engaged in this protected activity.

3 70. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered

4 special damages in the form oflost earnings, benefits, and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount

5 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'

6 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
7 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

8 71. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

9 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in

10 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the

11 time of trial.
12 72. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,

13 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her

14 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,

15 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and

16 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants

17 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future

18 unlawful conduct.
19 73. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42

20 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

21 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

22 VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE 1102.5

23 (As Against All Defendants)


24 74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,

25 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.


26 75. Labor Code § 1102.S(b) states in pertinent part as follows:
27
28
14
COMPLAINT
1 An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate
2 against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes
3 that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, ... to a person with
4 authority over the employer or another employee who has the authority to
5 investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, ... if the employee

6 has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or
7 federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule
8 or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
9 employee's job duties.
10 76. Defendants violated Labor Code § 1102.5 by retaliating against and terminating

11 Plaintiffs employment after she complained to person(s) with authority over her and/or person(s)

12 who have authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, about
13 Defendants' unlawful treatment of her because of her pregnancy and pregnancy disability, and

14 about Defendants' failure to return her to the same or a comparable position she held prior to her
15 approved leave of absence. Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that her complaints

16 constituted violations of or noncompliance with state or federal statutes, rules or regulations


17 regarding leaves of absences for pregnancy, pregnancy disability, childbirth, and baby bonding,

18 and/or prohibiting discrimination and retaliation in the workplace including, but limited to,
19 California Government Code§ 12945.2, Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution, 29

20 U.S.C. § 2615, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.


21 77. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered

22 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount
. ,.,
2 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'
24 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,

25 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
26 78. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
27 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
28
15
COMPLAINT
1 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
2 time of trial.
3 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

4 WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES


5 (As Against All Defendants)
6 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,
7 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
8 80. California law prohibits an employer from terminating an employee in violation of
9 fundamental public policies. California and Federal law maintain fundamental public policies
10 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy, prohibiting retaliation against
11 employees who engage in protected activity, and permitting employees to take family care leave
12 for the birth of a child, for a serious health or medical condition, and/or to bond with newborn
13 children, and then return to their previously held or comparable positions. These fundamental
14 public policies are codified under, inter alia, California Government Code § 12945 .2, California
15 Labor Code § 1102.5, Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution, 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and 42
16 U.S.C. § 2000e.
17 81. Defendants violated all these fundamental public policies in terminating Plaintiff's

18 employment.

19 82. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
20 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount

21 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'

22 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,

23 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
24 83. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has

25 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
26 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
27 time of trial.
28
16
COMPLAINT
1 84. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, these Defendants, and each of them, acted

2 oppressively, maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously towards Plaintiff, with conscious

3 disregard for her known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the

4 probability of causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, these Defendants

5 intended to and did vex, injury, and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages

6 should be made against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them

7 from willfully engaging in future discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct.


8
9 In WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment on all causes of action against Defendants

10 as follows:

11 1. For special damages, including, but not limited to, lost earnings, benefits, and/or out

12 of pocket expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial, all in an amount set forth

13 above and/or according to proof at the time of trial;


14 2. For further special damages, including but not limited to, lost future earnings,

15 benefits and other prospective damages in an amount set forth above and/or according to proof at

16 the time of trial;

17 "' .
.) For general damages in an amount set forth above and/or according to proof at the

18 time of trial;

19 4. For punitive and exemplary damages in an amount according to proof at the time of

20 trial;

21 5. For liquidated damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial;

22 6. For interest;

23 7. For injunctive and/or equitable relief;


24 8. For reasonable attorneys' fees; and

25 Ill
26 Ill

27 Ill
28
17
COMPLAINT
1 9. For costs of suit.

2
3
DATED: Augus~ 2018 LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES
4 A PROF ON ORATION
5
6
Scott R. s, s .
7 Erin M. Kelly, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeri Gregory
8
9
10
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21
22
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25
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18
COMPLAINT
1 JURY TRIAL DEMAND
2

3 Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues so triable.

4
5
LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES
6 DATED: Augu~::(, 2018 AP ON ORATION
7
8
Scott R. es, Esq.
9 Erin M. Kelly, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeri Gregory
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
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27
28
19
COMPLAINT

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