#26

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. The Human
Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage
in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO
On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for
those from the private sector.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make
truthful declarations in her SALNs.
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate
a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno.
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
2. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the
only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
HELD:
1. A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a
clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases
and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.
2. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official
may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers:
“Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the
permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by
impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons
to account for this express provision.”
#90

Arlin B. Obiasca v. Jeane O. Basallote

G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010

Facts:
 May 26, 2003: City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso appointed Jeane O. Basallote to the position of
Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, of the DepEd, Tabaco National High School in
Albay.
 June 19, 2003: Basallote assumed the office of Administrative Officer II.
 However, Basallote received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human Resource Management Officer I of the City
Schools Division of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by
Gonzales.
 Basallote tried to obtain Gozales’ signature but the latter refused despite repeated requests.
 When Basallote informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position
of Teacher I. Basallote followed the advice.
 August 25, 2003: Oyardo appointed Arlin B. Obiasca to the same position of Administrative Officer II.
 Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from Basllote on the
status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three months. Diaz was absolved of any
wrongdoing.
 Obiasca filed a petition for certiorari in the CA claiming that the CSC acted without factual and legal bases in recalling
his appointment. He also prayed for the issuance of a TRO and a WPI.
 Obiasca relies on an overly restrictive reading of Section 9(h) of PD 807 which states that an appointment must be
submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes
ineffective:
 Basallote: Her appointment was wrongfully not submitted by the proper persons to the CSC for attestation. The
reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of Basallote’s appointment papers to the CSC — the alleged failure of
Basallote to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales — was not a valid reason because the PDF was not even required
for the attestation of Basallote’s appointment by the CSC.

Issue:
W/N there was constructive fulfillment on the part of the officials when it voluntarily prevented the timely submission of
Basallote’s appointment to the CSC. YES

Held:

Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, "[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment."
o Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in
following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any
willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment
to the CSC.
o While it may be argued that the submission of Basallote’s appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one
of the conditions for the approval of Basallote’s appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith, the
officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of
the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled.
#99

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.

G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)

Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of
Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the
Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in
all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for
decades.

Issues:

1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by
Congress jointly or separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as
Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
(3) declaration of martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Held:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must
follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which
power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned
in the Report and Proclamation.
#100

Lagman vs. Pimentel

G.R. No. 235935

Facts: The President asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31, 2018. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of both the extension and suspension. The manner that the Congress
approved the extension of martial law in Mindanao is being put into a question and characterized the same as done with undue
haste.

Issue: Did the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proc. No. 216?

Held: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b)
public safety requires the extension. A review of the facts in the case at bar similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. Events and
circumstances disclosed by the President in the present case strongly indicate that the continued implementation of martial law
in Mindanao is necessary to protect public safety.
#101

Barrioquintos et al vs Fernandez

G.R. No. L-1278

Facts:
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.  Barrioquinto had not yet been
arrested.  The case proceeded against Jimenez and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Before the period of perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez availed of Proclamation No. 8.   However, the Amnesty
Commission had their cases returned to the CFI-Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefit s
of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that neither Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and
killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Issue:
WON petitioners are precluded from availing the benefits of Amnesty as they have not admitted to the commission of the
crime.

Held:
No.  Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and pardon.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege
the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.