14.

(TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS)

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION VS. AMALIA G. IKDAL
G.R. NO. 178551 OCTOBER 11, 2010

FACTS:

Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00. Erich was deployed February 17, 2000 but was terminated on February 11, 2001
for not passing the probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. She
returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.

Echin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment in favor of Echin and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the
three months unexpired portion of the contract. ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision. NLRC
affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners contended that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment
contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law
and Regulations of Kuwait.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of
Kuwait.

HELD:

Under RA 8042:

It is hornbook principle, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or procesual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Petition is Denied.

15. (Topic: Proving foreign laws):

Edi-staff Builders International v. NLRC GR No. 145587, Oct. 26, 2007

FACTS:

EDI sent to OAB (company in Saudi Arabia) resumes from which OAB can choose a computer
specialist. Gran was selected. They agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. After five
months into his service, Gran received a termination and at the same date he was removed from
his post. He was terminated by reasons of 1) he was incompetent because he does not know the
ACAD system which is required in his line of work, 2) that he failed to enrich his knowledge
during his 5 month stay to prove his competence, and 3) that he is disobedient because he failed
to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared
that he is releasing OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
Gran returned to the Philippines and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB.
EDI  averred that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment
contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the
termination of Gran’s employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s termination due to
incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Gran’s insubordination and incompetence is
outlined in the termination letter Gran received.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD:
No. Philippine Laws should be applied.
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local
recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A
contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be
respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play.  Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours.  Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as to the
existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies
and Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be
terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a suspension
not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he
underwent the required trade test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he
is competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence
was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not proven. It was not proven
that the submission of daily track records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was
also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice rule whereby prior
to termination he should receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received one and he was
immediately terminated on the same day he received the notice.

16.  (TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS):

ASIAVEST LIMITED V. CA GR NO. 128803 SEPTEMBER 25, 1998-

FACTS:

Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the Antonio Heras praying that he be ordered to pay
the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. US$1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in
Hong Kong currency with legal interest and $80,000.00 nfor attorney's fees

Before said judgment was issued and even during trial, Heras already left for good in Hong Kong
and he already returned to the Philippines. When Asiavest filed a complaint in court seeking to
enforce the foreign judgment against Heras, he claimed that he never received any summons and
never received a copy of the foreign judgment. Asiavest contends that Heras was actually given
service of summons when a messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said summons
by leaving a copy to Dionisio Lopez.
During a pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated the following: 1) The defendant admits the
existence of the judgment as well as its amendment dated April 13, 1987, but not necessarily the
authenticity or validity thereof; 2) The plaintiff is not doing business and is not licensed to do
business in the Philippines; 3) The residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila,
Quezon City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced against Heras in the Philippines.

HELD: 
No. Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was the governing
law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, a
foreign judgment against a person rendered by a court having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by the subsequent title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in the absence of proof to
the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, is
presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment —
HERAS in this case.

There is nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law of Hong Kong
in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam, and where the
defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of
the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-
called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong
law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law. 

Since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably,
one in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The
extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong
Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be
given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily

submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.  This method of service is possible if
such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against
him.
 17. (TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS):
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. V. GUERERO GR NO. 136804,
FEBRUARY 19, 2003
FACTS:

Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or
Chemical Bank (the Bank) with the RTC. Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1)
illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a
returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized
conversion of his account.

Bank contends that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law
does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims. The affidavit of Alyssa
Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA
dismissed the petition and denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

HELD:

No. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of
the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in
particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute
proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.

The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to
prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

18. (TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS):

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE
PRESIDENT LINES IN G.R. NO. 119602 OCTOBER 6, 2000

FACTS:
Philippine Roxas (vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc) experienced some vibrations
when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring
that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. The vessel again experienced
some vibrations. The master verified that it was in the centre of the channel. The Philippine
Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a
result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.)
was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a
suit with the RTC against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and
interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.

HELD:

No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No
1 del Orinoco were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws
were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul

general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office.

And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to
processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws.
 19. (TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS):
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, VS HON. BLAS F. OPLE
G.R. NO. 61594 SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

FACTS:

PIA (foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines) executed in Manila two
separate contracts of employment for Farrales and Mamasig.  The contracts provided that (1) the
Duration of Employment is for a period of 3 years, (2) PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the employee notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the employee wages equivalent to one month’s
salary; and (3) the agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising
out of or under this agreement. After one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of
the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters to Farrales and Mamasig advising both
that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE). PIA contends that; 1) both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable
quantities of "personal effects"; 2) that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had
been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that
practice, 3) that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.

ISSUE:

 WON the provision in the contract that the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or
in connection with the agreement is to be resolved only in courts of Karachi Pakistan is valid.

HELD:

No. PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies,
firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue
for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts
of Karachi Pakistan". The court have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected
with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts
as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory
scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive
contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was
also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and
actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were
based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the
above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for
the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph
10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and
courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the
petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it
must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as
the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
 20. (TOPIC: PROVING FOREIGN LAWS):
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, VS. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR.
NO. 193707 DECEMBER 10, 2014

FACTS:

Socorro and Wilsem marriage ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen months old. Socorro and her son
came home to the Philippines. Since their arrival in the Philippines, Wilsem never gave support
to the son.

Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried. Since then all the parties, including their son, are
presently living in Cebu. Socorro sent a letter to Wilsem demanding for support but he refused to
receive the letter.

Socorro petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine law.
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

HELD:

1. Yes. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision
of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree),

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.

2. Yes. Respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly
refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son. Under the aforesaid special law, the
deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
 21. (TOPIC: EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE FOREIGN LAW IN
CONFLICT PROBLEMS)
GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO TOMAS AND THE SOLGEN GR.
NO. 186571
FACTS:

Gerbert was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
Gerbert married Daisylyn, a Filipina. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. When he
returned to the Philippines he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce

Gerbert has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. He went to
Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering
that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foreign divorce must
be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert filed a judicial recognition of foreign divorce at the RTC but was denied since he is not
the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail
the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:

No. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.