CHREA vs.

CHR

MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

CHREA vs.CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No.
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to
provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request
for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-
National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of

the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe

recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR
on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing
of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1.  RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in
the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is
the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire
gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA.
The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend
the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.

2.  The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law,
but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that
compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer
the compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix
the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules
and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the
review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the
compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can
dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter.
Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors
complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation system
“conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM
must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3,
Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the
President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation,
execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that
such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously
sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the
species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only
the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are
granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on
the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be

independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and
a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish
an independent economic and planning agency.

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is
not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance
with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the
CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal
autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the
heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the
special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states
its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in
the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the
DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the
same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep.
Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there
exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide
organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president has
the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is
one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper
level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees.
This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid,
potentially entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie
otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including
those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took
cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital
Region Office. CHREA’s personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed
upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of
“providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal
rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations
Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly
provides that “no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the
CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV,
SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the
DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without
actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified
compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government
agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls
the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.

E
xport
P
rocessing
Z
one
A
uthority vs
CHR
, Valles, Aledia and OrdonezG.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992Facts:Valles, Aedia and Ordonez
filed with CHR
a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project
Engineer Damondamon along with 215
thPNP Company tried to level the areaoccupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was
reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which
was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of
injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition,
terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area
and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways to desist from doing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR
for lack of authority and said motion was dismissed.EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and
prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have 
no clear andpositive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in
entertaining the complaint.
EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from
enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to
mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue: WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violatorsof human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of.

Ruling:In Carino vs CHR, it was held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body. The mostthat may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even aquasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of acontroversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR
to"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have beenviolated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue arestraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly saidso. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by
implication.Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer toe xtrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of
injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of anycourt in which the
action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of theSupreme
Court.A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action,for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and
for no other purpose.
EPZA’s
petition is granted.

ISIDRO CARINO vs CHR

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work
and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers
were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on
December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the
service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to
the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action
for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case.
Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain
specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political
rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can
only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights
but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved
therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

BAUTISTA vs SALONGA

In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista

as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory
made the designation of Bautista permanent.  Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA)
requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by
the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito
Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not
require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated
Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered
Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded
Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the
appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left
the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be
allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and
Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints
the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art.
7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of
government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law
which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order
No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely
political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the
CHR should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of
submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA
for the latter’s approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of
submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at
that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA
confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad
interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members
of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid.
Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the
chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and
the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it
is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon
cause and with the observance of due process.

SECURITY AND CREDIT INVESTIGATION, INC. and VICENTE REYES,

JR., petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First
Division), FELICIANO MERCADO, EDGAR SOMOSOT and DANTE OLIVER
and the COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN,  J.:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), First Division, dated January 24, 1994, in NLRC Case Nos. 00-03-01791-
90 and 00-03-01886-90 which affirmed with modification the Decision, dated November 18,
1993, of Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera ordering petitioner Security and Credit Investigation,
Inc. (petitioner) to reinstate private respondents Feliciano Mercado (Mercado), Edgar Somosot
(Somosot), and Dante Oliver (Oliver) without backwages and ordering third-party respondent
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to reimburse petitioner in the amount of Twenty Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P28,500.00).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondents Mercado, Somosot and Oliver were employed as security guards by
petitioner and assigned to the CHR which was petitioners client.
Sometime in February 1990, about eighteen (18) of petitioners security guards detailed at
the CHR, including Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, filed a complaint for money claims against
petitioner.However, upon petitioners request that the security guards withdraw the complaint,
each of the complainants, except for Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, signed a Release and
Quitclaim in favor of petitioner.
Mercado averred that he was being pressured by petitioner to sign a Release and Quitclaim,
so he went on leave from work on March 22, 1990. When he called petitioners office on the
afternoon of the same day to inquire about his work assignment, petitioners officer-in-charge,
Rogelio Vecido, informed him that he was not assigned anywhere because he was suspended
from work.
Somosot likewise claimed that on March 22, 1990, Mr. Igmedio Tomenio, petitioners shift-
in-charge at the CHR, tried to pressure him to sign a Release and Quitclaim but he refused. That
afternoon, Somosot learned that he had been suspended from work. When he attempted to report
for work the next day, he was informed verbally that his employment was already terminated.
The next day, March 23, 1990, Mercado and Somosot filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and underpayment of wages, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave benefits and night differential against
petitioner. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-01791-90.
Like Mercado and Somosot, respondent Oliver asseverated that on March 27, 1990 he went
to petitioners office to reiterate his money claims and was forced by Mr. Reynaldo Dino,
petitioners operations manager, to sign a Release and Quitclaim. Because of his refusal to sign
the same, he was not given any new assignment by petitioner. He was thus surprised to receive
on March 29, 1990 a telegram from petitioner requiring him to explain his absence from work
without leave from March 27, 1990. Subsequently, Oliver filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and underpayment of backwages against petitioner, which case was docketed as NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-03-01886-90.
Upon motion of petitioner, the two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied that it dismissed Mercado, Somosot and Oliver and
alleged that the latter abandoned their employment.
Meanwhile, on February 18, 1991, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the CHR,
claiming that its failure to effect the increase in the minimum wage of respondent security guards
from July 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990, was due to the failure of the CHR to promptly pay the
increases in the wage rates of said guards pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6727[1] (R.A.
6727). The CHR approved payment of increased wage rates only from April 16, 1990. Petitioner
claimed that under R.A. 6727, the CHR was mandated to pay increased wages to the security
guards commencing from July 1, 1989.
The CHR denied that it was obliged to pay the increase in the wage rates of the respondent
guards. It averred that R.A. 6727 is not applicable to it, because it had already been paying the
respondent security guards more than P100.00 a day even before the effectivity of said law. Its
decision to increase the salaries of respondent guards effective August 16, 1990 was due only to
humanitarian reasons.
In his Decision dated November 18, 1991,[2] the Labor Arbiter found that there was neither
dismissal by petitioner of the respondent security guards nor abandonment of employment by the
latter, and that the controversy resulted from miscommunication and misapprehension of facts by
the parties. The Labor Arbiter, however, ruled that there was underpayment of respondent guards
salaries, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, overtime pay, 13th month pay and
service incentive leave benefits in the total amount of Forty Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty
Five Pesos and Eighteen Centavos (P42,635.18). Of this amount, the CHR was ordered to
reimburse petitioner an amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P28,500.00). The dispositive portion thereof stated:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent company to reinstate the complainants without backwages and to pay
said complainants as follows:

1. P33,054.18 as wage differential inclusive of holiday pay and premium pay;

2. P4,423.18 as total overtime pay differential;

3. P4,505.82 as aggregate 13th month pay differential; and

4. P652.00 as differential for service incentive leave pay;

All other claims of the complainants are denied for lack of merit.

And on the third-party complaint, the third-party respondent is hereby ordered to reimburse the
third-party complainant the sum of P28,500.00 based on the above disposition.

SO ORDERED.[3]

All parties filed their respective appeals with the National Labor Relations Commission.
In their partial appeal, respondents Mercado and Somosot argued that the Labor Arbiter
erred in not finding that they were illegally dismissed and in not awarding backwages in their
favor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the Labor Arbiter erred in not finding that
respondent security guards abandoned their employment, and that it is the CHR which should be
held liable for the monetary award given to respondent security guards.
The CHR for its part contended that the Labor Arbiter erred in not finding that R.A. 6727
does not apply to it, and in failing to appreciate the CHRs Letter dated April 16, 1990 which
stated that it was increasing the wage rates of the security guards beginning April 16, 1990.
On January 24, 1994, the NLRC rendered its Decision, [4] the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with
modification. The order of Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera on the third-party complaint that the
third-party respondent reimburses (sic) the third-party complainants the amount of Twenty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred (P28,500.00) Pesos representing their salaries from July 1, 1989 up to
April 15, 1990 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:

A. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST

DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
ABANDON THEIR POSTS.

B. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST

DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT COMPUTED THE OVERTIME DIFFERENTIAL, 13TH MONTH
DIFFERENTIAL AND THE DIFFERENTIAL FOR THE SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
PAY WITHOUT EXCLUDING THE PERIOD FOR SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 UP TO JUNE 30,
1989 DURING WHICH, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN DECLARATION, THERE WAS NO
UNDERPAYMENT.

C. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST

DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF LABOR ARBITER JOSE G. DE
VERA REQUIRING THE CHR TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER.[6]

The Court finds that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
finding that petitioner did not dismiss respondent security guards, and that the latter did not
abandon their employment.
Both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter found no clear proof that petitioner had in fact
dismissed respondent security guards. Mercado based his claim of illegal dismissal only on the
statement of officer-in-charge Mr. Vecido that he had not been assigned to any post. Similarly,
Somosot relied merely on the verbal information relayed to him that he had been
terminated. Olivers belief that he had been illegally dismissed was founded on the telegram from
petitioner requiring him to explain his absence without leave which he received on March 29,
1990. None of them exerted efforts to confirm from petitioners office whether they had in fact
been dismissed.
In the case of Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corporation vs. NLRC,[7] where private
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer after he was prevented by
the company guard from entering the company premises on the ground that he had resigned, the
Court, which held that private respondent was not illegally dismissed, stated:
xxx

The present case, which has lasted for almost four (4) years, could have been avoided had private
respondent made previous inquiry regarding the veracity of Mr. Gaviolas instruction, and not
simply relied on the bare statement of the company guard. Private respondent should have
been more vigilant of his rights as an employee because at stake was not only his position but
also his means of livelihood. x x x
 Furthermore, petitioner denied the allegation that it terminated respondent security guards
employment without just cause and even alleged that respondent guards abandoned their
employment. Thus, absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had
dismissed Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, their claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.[8]
There being no finding that respondent security guards were illegally dismissed, there is no
basis for an award of backwages in their favor. It is axiomatic that before backwages may be
granted, there must be unjust or illegal dismissal from work.[9]
Neither did the NLRC find evidence to support petitioners allegation that Mercado, Somosot
and Oliver abandoned their employment. The records reveal that their failure to report for duty
was not caused by a willful and deliberate intent to abandon their employment. Rather, such
failure resulted from their belief, though mistaken, that they had been suspended or terminated
from work. The rule is that for abandonment to exist, two elements must concur: first, the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable
reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts.[10] The filing by Mercado, Somosot and Oliver of
their complaints for illegal dismissal negates the existence of any intention on their part to
abandon their employment.[11]
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners argument that there was an error in the
computation of the amounts constituting underpayment of overtime pay, 13th month pay and
service incentive leave benefits to respondent security guards by the Labor Arbiter, which in turn
was affirmed by the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter found that Mercado, Somosot and Oliver were
not paid the minimum wage from January 1, 1988 to March 22, 1990. On the basis of this
finding, he determined that respondent security guards incurred underpayments in their wages
for the periods January 1, 1988 to August 31, 1988 and July 1, 1989 to March 22, 1990.
[12]
 However, he noted that there were no underpayments in their wages for the period September
1, 1988 to June 30, 1989.[13] The discrepancy between the minimum wage prevailing for the
periods concerned and the wages and other benefits received by the security guards also served
as the basis for the Labor Arbiters computation of underpayments for overtime, 13th month and
service incentive leave benefits.
However, in computing the underpayment for overtime, 13th month and service incentive
leave benefits, the Labor Arbiter erroneously included the period from September 1, 1988 to
June 30, 1989 in spite of his finding that there was no underpayment in wages during said period.
The period from September 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 should thus be excluded in the
computation of the underpayments for overtime, 13th month and service incentive leave benefits
of respondent security guards. Accordingly, there is a need to recompute the underpaid amounts
due to the respondent security guards with respect to their overtime, 13th month and service
incentive leave benefits in conformity with the evidence presented.
The Court also finds merit in petitioners argument that the NLRC should not have reversed
the Labor Arbiters finding that the CHR is liable for the payment of P28,500.00 representing the
differentials of respondent security guards wage, overtime, 13th month and service incentive
leave benefits for the period July 1, 1989 to April 15, 1990.
The record shows that petitioner informed the CHR regarding the increase in the wages of
the security guards effective July 1, 1989, pursuant to R.A. 6727 which mandated a Twenty Five
Peso (P25.00) increase in the daily wage rate in a Letter dated August 7, 1989. [14] In its
reply letter dated April 16, 1990, the CHR stated that it had approved the increase in the wages
effective April 16, 1990.[15]
The CHR, however, maintains that it is not liable to pay increased wages to the security
guards and claims that there is a proviso in Section 4 of R.A. 6727 [16] which exempts employees
already receiving more than P100.00 daily from receiving the P25.00 increase required under
said law. The CHR argues that since the security guards were receiving P103.56 daily for the
year 1989, it was not required to pay them the P25.00 per day increase under R.A. 6727. The
CHR further asserts that its approved increase in the security guards wages from April 16, 1990
was due only to humanitarian reasons and was not an admission of any obligation to increase the
same under R.A. 6727.[17]
It must be noted that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that there were
discrepancies in the minimum wage prescribed under R.A. 6727 and what were actually received
by respondent security guards from July 1, 1989. The rule is that the factual findings of the
Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC are accorded to great weight and respect when
supported by substantial evidence, and devoid of any unfairness and arbitrariness.[18]
Section 6 of R.A. 6727 imposes the liability for payment of the increase in wages on the
principal which in this case is the CHR, thus:

In case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and

similar services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by
the principals or clients of theconstruction/service contractors and the contract shall be
deemed amended accordingly. In the event however, that the principal or client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall be jointly and severally liable
with his principal or client. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is thus clear that the CHR is the party liable for payment of the wage increase due to
respondent security guards. While petitioner, as the contractor, is held solidarily liable for the
payment of wages, including wage increases, as prescribed under the Labor Code, [19] the
obligation ultimately belongs to the CHR as principal. The Court in Eagle Security Agency, Inc.
vs. NLRC,[20] also cited in Rabago vs. NLRC,[21] and Spartan Security and Detective Agency vs.
NLRC,[22] ruled on this issue as follows:

The Wage Orders are explicit that payment of the increase are to be borne by the principal
or client. To be borne, however, does not mean that the principal, PTSI in this case, would
directly pay the security guards the wage and allowance increases because there is no privity of
contract between them. The security guards contractual relationship is with their immediate
employer, EAGLE. As an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the payment of their
wages [See Article VII, Sec. 3 of the Contract for Security Services, Supra, and Bautista vs.
Inciong, G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665].

On the other hand, there existed a contractual agreement between PTSI and EAGLE wherein the
former availed of the security services provided by the latter. In return, the security agency
collects from its client payment for its security services. This payment covers the wages for the
security guards and also expenses for their supervision and training, the guards bonds, firearms
with ammunitions, uniforms and other equipments [sic], accessories, tools, materials and
supplies necessary for the maintenance of a security force.

Premises considered, the security guards immediate recourse for the payment of the
increases is with their direct employer, EAGLE. However, in order for the security agency
to comply with the new wage and allowance rates it has to pay the security guards, the
Wage Orders made specific provision to amend existing contracts for security services by
allowing the adjustment of the consideration paid by the principal to the security agency
concerned. What the Wage Orders require, therefore, is the amendment of the contract as
to the consideration to cover the service contractors payment of the increase mandated. In
the end therefore, the ultimate liability for the payment of the increases rests with the
principal (Emphasis supplied.).[23]

The Labor Arbiter was therefore correct in requiring the CHR to reimburse petitioner the
amount of P28,500.00 representing the unpaid wage increases of respondent security guards for
the period July 1, 1989 to April 15, 1990.
Petitioners Letter dated August 7, 1989 addressed to the CHR regarding the increase in wage
rates of its security guards pursuant to R.A. 6727 cannot be interpreted as a mere proposal for
wage increases for its employees, because the wage increase referred to therein is one mandated
by law, and as R.A. 6727 expressly provides in Section 6 thereof existing contracts for security
services between the service contractor and the principal are deemed amended by said law. There
is, therefore, no merit in the NLRCs assertion that since the CHR agreed to increase the wages of
respondent security guards only from April 16, 1990, it can only be held liable for wage
increases from that date instead of from July 1, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the NLRC in NLRC Case Nos. 00-03-01791-90
and 00-03-01886-90 is hereby affirmed with the MODIFICATION that the amounts
corresponding to the underpayment of overtime, 13th month and service incentive leave benefits
for the period September 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 as determined by the Labor Arbiter be
recomputed; and the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that the CHR is liable to reimburse petitioner in
the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P28,500.00) representing the unpaid
wage increases from July 1, 1989 to April 15, 1990 due to respondents Mercado, Somosot and
Oliver is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 115576

CRUZ, J.:
Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?
These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military commissions
during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned to die by musketry,
but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution to reclusion perpetua.
Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case of Olaguer v.
Military Commission No. 34,[1] where we held that the military tribunals had no
jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were functioning.
Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, [2] this Court directed the Department of
Justice to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts against the petitioners
within 180 days from notice of the decision.
No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they have
remained under detention.
On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto, wrote to the
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) complaining that their continued
detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[3]
In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their communication as
admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines to submit a written
explanation of their complaint within six months from the date of transmittal. [4]
The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human Rights with a
copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its Chairman Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez, wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of the
complainants unless criminal charges had already been filed against them. [5]
On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that Abaloc had
been released on September 29, 1992, and that Paquinto and Cabangunay were still
detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the intimation that it would not object
to a petition for habeas corpus that the Commission might choose to file for Paquinto
and Cabangunay.[6] This assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department
dated May 31, 1994.[7]
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on June 13, 1994. The
writ was immediately issued, returnable on or before June 22, 1994, on which date a
hearing was also scheduled.
At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their
immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of Justice to file charges
against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He stressed that their
continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of
their human rights.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent Director of
Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan v. Barrios,[8] the Olaguer decision could not
be retroactively applied to decisions of the military tribunals that have already become
final or to persons who were already serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the
circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their
applications for executive clemency.
It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions of Paquinto
and Cabangunay by the military commissions was promulgated. It has been six years
since our decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of Justice to file the
appropriate informations against the civilians still detained under convictions rendered
by the military tribunals. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only
guess at the validity of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been
burned.
The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its failure to file
the corresponding charges against the two detainees before the civil courts. It is
unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now
be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the
custodian of those records. It is illogical and even absurd to suggest that because the
government cannot prosecute them, the prisoners' detention must continue.
The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the hearing, the Office
of the Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had themselves opted to serve their
sentences rather than undergo another trial. Their ultimate objective, so it was
maintained, was to secure their release by applying for executive clemency. To prove
this, counsel submitted a letter from one Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of
Justice manifesting that Leonardo B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his
sentence so that the Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case." [9] No
mention was made of Jesus Cabangunay.
Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and
Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they had never seen nor
talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to write the letter.
Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be released on the strength of the
Olaguer decision.
The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a reexamination of the
ruling in Cruz v. Enrile[10] in relation to the case of Tan v. Barrios,[11] is necessary in view
of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the Department of Justice to file
the informations against the prisoners; the decision of the UNHRC declaring admissible
the communication No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus
suggesting the violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that it
would have no objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the Commission
on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.
The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26, 1991, it declared,
citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were convicted by military courts and who
have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentences of imprisonment for the past
many years " . . . "may be given the option either to complete the service of their
sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited
in the service of their sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon
acquittal, they should be set free."
Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with the
directive in the 'Cruz Cases' for the filing of the necessary informations against them in
the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, without prejudice to said
petitioners' exercise of the option granted to them by this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos.
85481-82, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T. Barrios, etc., et al., supra."
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its second motion
for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to decide this petition without further
delay.[12] The memorandum was admitted just the same, but we find it adds nothing to
the respondent's original arguments.
There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded.
The government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a
valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the records have been
lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law,
Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime for which
they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every
person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless
he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from
the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution
itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every
one of us as a member of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all
of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto
should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered released
IMMEDIATELY.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101207 October 1, 1993

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioner, 

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ATTY. ELIAS V. PACETE, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee since February 1, 1988 to the position of
Division Chief of Region IX of the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in
Zamboanga City, filed an application for optional retirement pursuant to Rep. Act No.
1616,1 dated June 17, 1989 effective July 31, 1989 because of failing eyesight . On July
7, 1989, however, Pacete sent a notice of withdrawal of his application for retirement.
On July 17, 1989, Pacete was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram
of the acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective July
31, 1989 and the appointment of Atty. Rodrigo Roy as his successor effective August 1,
1989.

On August 25, 1989, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) informed
private respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably
considered due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep.
Act No. 1616,2 as amended, requiring three (3) years of continuous service preceding
retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the
service to complete the said requirement.

Accordingly, Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with
back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty.
Roy. On October 18, 1989, the CHR through a resolution, denied his request and
instead formally charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance
of official duty and failure to account for public funds. 3

On May 27, 1990, Pacete, after being informed of the action taken by the CHR elevated
his case to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On August 31, 1990, the
MSPB ordered the immediate reinstatement of private respondent his former position
with payment of back wages and other benefits, allowed by law without prejudice to the
outcome of the formal charges against him. 4

Upon learning of the favorable decision in favor of private respondent, Atty. Roy
forthwith stepped down a Regional Field Officer on October 1,
1990.5

The CHR, through its then Chairman, Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed a motion for
reconsideration dated October 15, 1990. 6 On January 10, 1991, the Board affirmed its
August 31, 1990 decision.7 On February 11, 1991, petitioner appealed the decision of
the MSPB to the Civil Service Commission which affirmed the decision of the MSPB on
July 25, 1991.8

Meanwhile, because of private respondent's failure to settle his accountability as

Regional Field Officer in the amount of P114,758.60, the CHR referred this matter to the
Office of the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against him on
July 26, 1991.
Hence this petition, the issue being whether or not public respondent CSC gravely
abused its discretion in ordering therein statement of private respondent and the
payment of his back wages.

It is the argument of petitioner that the disapproval of private respondent's application

for optional retirement by the GSIS did not vest in him the right to demand reinstatement
from petitioner.9 Moreover, it is the stand of petitioner that private respondent cannot be
reinstated because it has the right to summarily remove and replace incompetent
employees under Section 40 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (The Civil Service Decree).

We affirm the decision of the Civil Service Commission.

The issue in this case revolves around the optional retirement of private
respondent. The collateral issues of his incompetence and inefficiency are
questions of fact which this court has no jurisdiction to pass upon.

We note that the charges of incompetence and inefficiency came belatedly only after
petitioner's application for optional retirement had already been approved. But was the
petitioner justified in refusing to allow Pacete to continue rendering service to fulfill the
requirements under Rep. Act No. 1616? We must refer to the law in point. Petitioner
cites paragraph (d) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186 as basis for its power of removal of its
personnel on grounds of inefficiency and incompetence:

(d) The employer concerned may request the retirement of any such
employee described in the preceding subsection who, by reason of a
disqualification, is unable to perform satisfactorily and efficiently the duties
of his position or some other position of the same grade or class as that
occupied by the employee and to which he could be assigned, but such
request shall be submitted to the Civil Service Board of Appeals only after
the said employee had been notified in writing of the proposed retirement.
No such employee, however, shall be so retired unless the Civil Service
Board of Appeals has given him a hearing and found him after
examination that he is so disqualified. The decision of the Civil Service
Board of Appeals as to whether or not the said employee shall be retired
under this sub-section shall be final and conclusive. (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the aforequoted paragraph allows an employer to request retirement of an

employee who is unable to perform satisfactorily and efficiently his duties, but such
request must first be submitted to the Civil Service Board of Appeals and only after said
employee shall have been notified in writing of the proposed retirement. The above
provision recognizes the discretion of the head of office in the approval of an
employee's optional retirement, but such discretion must be exercised without violating
the tenets of administrative due process.

We find that there was a glaring disregard of this procedure laid down in the law. In fact,
the October 18, 1989 resolution of the CHR denying him reinstatement for failure
to fulfill the three-year requirement of continuous service preceding retirement
was reached without notice and hearing. Much less was there any request for
optional retirement of private respondent from the CHR to the Civil Service Board
of Appeals based on incompetence and inefficiency. Although he was furnished a
copy of the resolution denying his application for reinstatement with the
attendant charges against him, he was not afforded the opportunity to refute
them prior to the promulgation of the said resolution. The records disclose that the
petitioner required private respondent to answer the charges of alleged incompetence
and inefficiency in the same resolution which denied his reinstatement. The attempt to
observe due process was made only after he had been separated from the
service. The refusal of the CHR to restore Pacete to his former position, being
tantamount to termination without valid cause, the MSPB decreed back wages in
private respondent's favor.

From the facts, it is clear that prior to the withdrawal of his application to retire
optionally, Pacete's separation from service was premised on his desire to retire
because of defective eyesight. With petitioner's denial of Pacete's reinstatement, it
would now appear that the latter's separation was due to incompetence and inefficiency.
Such cause was based on the alleged serious administrative charges filed against him
which were first formalized by the CHR in the form of a resolution only on October 18,
1989, 2 months and 18 days after the CHR considered him separated from service due
to its acceptance of Pacete's application for optional retirement effective July 31, 1989.
Obviously, petitioner had to devise a ground for the separation of private respondent
when it realized that its approval of his application for optional retirement failed to
separate him definitively from the service.

To aver that the real cause which precipitated the approval of the optional retirement of
private respondent was the latter's incompetence and inefficiency based on CHR's
proffere devidence and that its approval was an opportune time to separate him from
the service 10 smacks more of a subterfuge to ease him out since the charges were
leveled against him only after the GSIS had disapproved his application due to non-
fulfillment of the three-year requirement of continuous service preceding retirement.

If petitioner were sincere in its denial of reinstatement to private respondent, it should

have filed the administrative charges beforehand, not after it had allowed private
respondent to undergo the process leading to his retirement from the service. Granted
that an employee is guilty of incompetence and inefficiency, an employer should
seasonably file administrative charges against him and marshal the needed evidence
instead of springing these, on him as he is about to retire. Such a treatment is, to put it
mildly, unfair and certainly, totally unexpected and uncalled for from a government
agency whose avowed mission is to protect and promote human rights.

Consequently, since the resolution denying reinstatement was issued without

conforming to the requirements of due notice and hearing, private respondent's
dismissal from service was illegal. It constituted a blatant violation of Section 46
of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 807 which
provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process," not to
speak of a similar provision under Article IX B, Sec. 2 (3) of the 1987 Constitution
on the Civil Service Commission. 11 If petitioner wishes to dismiss private respondent
for cause, the latter must be allowed to return to his previous position so that he may
avail himself of the opportunity to refute the charges imputed to him. It should be
pointed out, however, that he may not be able to fulfill the three-year requirement if the
CHR succeeds in proving the charges of incompetence and inefficiency through a
hearing as laid down in paragraph (d) of Section 12 of CA 186.

In conclusion, petitioner argues that considering the seriousness of the charges

against,, private respondent, it is justified in summarily dismissing the latter based on
Section 40 of Pres. Decree No. 807, known as the Civil Service Decree. 12 Petitioner
can no longer seek refuge in this legal provision since the same has been repealed by
Rep. Act No. 6654. 13

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Civil Service Commission dated August 31, 1990 is
AFFIRMED in toto.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

octrine:
Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. Theyform part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to theconventions
embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general a n d
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of  rules
a n d principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
mayhave been or shall be a signatory.
Facts:
- A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order
68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947.
This is an
acte s t a b l i s h i n g   a   n a t i o n a l   w a r   c r i m e s   o f f i c e   a n d   p r e s c r i b i n g   r u l e s   a n d 
r e g u l a t i o n governing the trial of accused war criminals.- Shigenori Kuroda,
formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from1943-1944, is charged
before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the
Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed" t o   d i s c h a r g e   h i s   d u t i e s   a s   s u c h   c o m m a n d ,   p e r m i t t i n g   t h e m   t o   c o
m m i t   b r u t a l atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of theImperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".-
Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors
inbehalf of USA.- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as
prosecutorsof Hussey and Port.- Kuroda’s arguments were: (1)EO No. is illegal on
the gound that ut wiolates notonly the provisions of our constitutional law but
also our local laws; (2) MilitaryCommission has no Jurisdiction to try him for
acts committed in violation of theHague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not as i g n a t o r y t o t h e f i r s t a n d
s i g n e d t h e s e c o n d o n l y i n 1 9 4 7 a n d , t h e r e f o r e , h e i s charged with
“crime” not based on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey a n d
Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they ar
e n o t qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and
thea p p o i n t m e n t   o f   s a i d   a t t o r n e y s   a s   p r o s e c u t o r s   i s   v i o l a t i
v e   o f   o u r   n a t i o n a l sovereignty.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a
v a l i d because it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law
whichform part of our laws.](2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventionsembodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.](3)
WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case?
[Yes, they can.]
 
Ratio:
(1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution providesin its
section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
nationalpolicy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international
law
of t h e   p r e s e n t   d a y   i n c l u d i n g   t h e   H a g u e   C o n v e n t i o n   t h e   G e n e v a   C o n v e
n t i o n   a n d significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by 
the UnitedN a t i o n ,   a l l
those person military or civilian who have been guil
t y   o f   planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commissionof crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto
in violation of t h e   l a w s   a n d   c u s t o m s   o f   w a r ,   o f   h u m a n i t y  
a n d   c i v i l i z a t i o n   a r e   h e l d accountable therefor
. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No.
68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of ourConstitution. The
promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of
hispower as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in
thecase of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief
isfully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial
andpunishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of
ExecutiveOrder No. 68.(2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of andare wholly based on the generally accepted principals
of international law. In fact,these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the UnitedStates and Japan, who were signatories to the two
Conventions.
Such rule
andp r i n c i p l e s   t h e r e f o r e   f o r m   p a r t   o f   t h e   l a w   o f   o
u r   n a t i o n   e v e n   i f   t h e Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them, forour Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its
scopea n d   i s   n o t   c o n f i n e d   t o   t h e   r e c o g n i t i o n   o f  
r u l e s   a n d   p r i n c i p l e s   o f   international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been
or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committedt h e   P h i l i p p i n e s   w a s
under the sovereignty of United States and thus we wereequally
bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right
a n d obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries.(3) There is
nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel
appearingb e f o r e   s a i d   c o m m i s s i o n   m u s t   b e   a t t o r n e y s   q u a l i f i e d   t o  
p r a c t i c e   l a w   i n   t h e Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Respondent Military Commissionis a special military tribunal governed by a special law
and not by the Rules of courtwhich govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the
appointment of the two Americanattorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper
thatU n i t e d   S t a t e s ,   w h i c h   h a s   s u b m i t t e d   t h e   v i n d i c a t i o n   o f  
c r i m e s   a g a i n s t   h e r government and her people to a tribunal o
f our nation, should be allowedr e p r e s e n t a t i o n   i n   t h e   t r i a l  
o f   t h o s e   v e r y   c r i m e s .   I f   t h e r e   h a s   b e e n   a n y relinquishment
of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United
 
States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punis
h m e n t   o f   h e r enemies

Article VIII CONSTITUTION SEC 17,18,19

HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on
Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.
The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
Commission shall be provided by law. cralaw

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human
Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers. cralaw

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and
regularly released. cralaw
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and
functions: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and  cralaw

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. cralaw

Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163

DECLARING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION ONHUMAN RIGHTS AS PROVIDED
FOR IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution has been ratified by the people; WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution has
created an independent office called the Commission on human Rights; and WHEREAS, there is an
urgent necessity to constitute the Commission on Human Rights to give effects to the State policy that

"the State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."
NOW, THEREFORE, I , CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: Section 1 The Commission on Human Rights as provided
under Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution is hereby declared to be now in existence. Section 2 The
Commission on Human Rights shall be composed of a Chairman and four members who must be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment. However, a majority thereof shall be members of the Philippine Bar. The Chairman
and the Members of the Commission on human Rights shall not, during their tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall they engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of their
office, nor shall they be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its sub-divisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The Chairman and the
Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the president for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. The Chairman and the members of the Commission on human Rights shall receive the
same salary as the Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall receive the
same salary as the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, which shall
not be decreased during their term of office. Section 3 The Commission on Human Rights shall have the
following powers and functions: • Investigate, on its owner on complaint by any party all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights; • Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the rules of Court. • Provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; • Exercise visitorial powers
over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; • Establish a continuing program of research, education and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; • Recommend to the Congress
effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victim of violations of
human rights, or their families; • Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights; • Grant immunity form prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; • Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office or agency in the performance of its functions; • Appoint its officer and employees in
accordance with law; and • Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Section
4 The presidential committee on human Rights, created under executive Order no. 8 dated March 18,
1996, as modified, is hereby abolished. The Commission on Human Rights shall exercise such functions
and powers of the presidential committee on Human Rights under Executive Order No. 8, as modified,
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The unexpended appropriations
of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights are hereby transferred to the Commission on Human
rights. All properties, records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other assets of the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall be transferred to the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission
on Human Rights may retain such personnel of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights effected
under this Executive Order shall receive the benefits to which they may be entitled under existing law,
rules and regulations. Section 5 The approved annual appropriations of the Commission on Human
Rights shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 6 All laws, orders, issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. Section 7 This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of manila, this
5 th day of May, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

RA 7438 SEC 2 –On persons deprived of liberty

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers.–

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. lawphi1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to
him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the
language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation
report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or
in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by
or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
 fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt,
nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

RA 9344 Sec 8 &11- On children in conflict

with law
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the Department of Justice and placed under its
administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an undersecretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this Act and
coordination among the following agencies:

(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(b) Department of Education (DepEd);

(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);

(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);

(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)

(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.

(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);

(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);

(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and

(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention programs.

The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower than director, to be
designated by the concerned heads of the following departments or agencies:

(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);

(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)

(d) Department of Education (DepEd);

(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)

(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and

(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by the Secretary of Justice
and the other to be designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development.

The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of
Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall determine the organizational
structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC.

The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine Judicial
Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its duties and
functions, as herein provided.

SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child Rights Center of the Commission on
Human Rights shall ensure that the status, rights and interests of children are upheld in accordance
with the Constitution and international instruments on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the
monitoring of government compliance of all treaty obligations, including the timely and regular
submission of reports before the treaty bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination of
recommendations and conclusions by government agencies as well as NGOs and civil society.

RA 9262 sec 39-AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In
pursuance of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on
Violence Against Women and their children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be
composed of the following agencies:

(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

 (b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);

(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);

(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)

(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);

(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);

(i) Department of Health (DOH);

(j) Department of Education (DepEd);

(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and

(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW based on their
mandates as well as develop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to
the needs of their clients. The Council will also serve as the monitoring body as regards to VAW
initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not
lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council
meetings in their behalf, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in
accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and regulations.

RA 9372 sec 19-on approval to detain persons who violated the Human
Security Act

AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM

SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the
event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights
Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the
Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the
person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be
secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the
detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention
the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released
immediately.

RA 9372 SEC 55-on prosecutorial functions

SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall
give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of
persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall
have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who
may have violated the civil and political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism