Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-1

CHAPTER 10

Screening Level Risk

Analysis (SLRA)
Basis
Formulates a list of hazards and generic hazardous situations by considering characteristics
such as materials processed, operating environment (high pressure, etc.), equipment,
inventories, and plant layout.

Purpose
Identification of hazards - provide ranking of hazards

When to Use SLRA

Anytime in plant life or design phase.
Often early in the development of a process.
When there is limited information available.
To assist with preliminary layout and siting studies.

SLRA Methodology

This methodology can be used for new designs at the conceptual stage in order to assist with
layouts, etc. and for existing facilities where some level of prioritization is needed prior to more
detailed hazards analysis. The SLRA methodology may include:

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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-2

1. A list all substances that are both stored as well as processed at the facility together
with hazardous properties of those materials including:
Toxicities
Flash points
Upper and lower explosive limits
Vapor pressures
Corrosive nature
Interactive properties with other substances
Auto-ignition temperatures
Any tendencies for auto decomposition
Any other harlnful properties: refer to MSDS sheets (if available)

2. List inventories of materials and where they are contained, by location.

3. List interactive points such as sources of ignition, e.g.,.fi/rnnces, boilers.

4. List vulnerable locations, such as adjacent office blocks, housing, main highways.

5. List possible release type scenarios. These should typically include:

Leaks or ruptures of vessels
Leaks or ruptures of storage tanks
Leaks or ruptures of critical lines, fittings, vents, drains, blowdown, etc.
Leaks or ruptures from seals of pumps and compressors, other prime movers

6. Estimate consequences in broad tenns, from minor to severe and describe the nature of
the consequences and qualitatively estimate their severity in terms of impact on
employees, environment, capital equipment, and production.

7. Qualitatively estimate likelihood (frequency) of the hazardous events based on best

judgment or historical records (if available).

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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-3

8. Based on severity of consequences and likelihood, make a qualitative risk ranking of

each hazardous event on employees, environment, capital equipment, and production

9. List existing safeguards that are present which can prevent or control the potential
hazardous events. These should include:
a. Safeguards against the cause or failure in the first place, e.g., interlocks and trips
b. Detection and remedial action, e.g., pressure safety valves, instrumentation
c. Mitigation of the consequences, e.g., flammable gas detectors, fire suppressions
systems
d. Post-incident response, e.g., emergency response plans, evacuation equipment and
procedures

10. If existing safeguards are found to be inadequate, develop recommendations for further
measures to prevent or control potential hazardous events

11. If there are areas of vulnerability identified, how best can these be handled so that risk
is minimized?

12. All the hazardous events will be risk ranked using a risk matrix, which assigns risk
levels, from highest to lowest

Results
Ranking of hazards on a plant by plant basis
Allows identification and resolution of high risk events
Consequence and frequency
Quantitative

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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-4

Table 10-1: Example of SLRA Worksheet

rawing: A - 135

I
Design ConditionsiPara~neters:Chlorine stored as a liquefied gas under 1
pressure in 1 ton containers 'c

Hazards &
Source
i Consequences 1
I
Existing Safeguards 1 S ' L ; RR
/ i I
I
/
Recoln~nendatlon
d
L
':

-1
I
---" - - - ---- - - -- - - -
"" -*
$ - - -- - -
1. Accident I. I. Release of I. I. High wall plus dltch i I. Provide an enclosed offloading area
during toxic chlorlne I would trap chlorine vapors, for t r ~ ~ c supplying
ks 1 ton chlor~ne
delivery and vapor cloud 1 especially under "F" contamers Both offloadng and storage
offloading of from 1 ton
1 ton chlorine container
stab~lltycondltlons. Some
niltigation under other, I area should be connected to a proposed
new chlorlne scrubb~ngsystem .
containers. more turbulent, weather
conditions.
_ __ I - -. - --
L2. ~ n s n &e If

1.2. Onslte personnel have

offsite toxic gas 1 SCBA (Self Contained
2. Provide a wet scrubbing system that
can absorb a major chlorine release and
bn

cloud hazard 1 Breathing Apparat~ls). neutralize using caustic soda solution. d

The scrubbing system should be A:
h
switched on prior to offloading of
chlorine and also scrubber to be !
* I

Interlocked with chlorine detectors to

switch on with chlorine release.
p8
I
.- 5
2. Internal or 2.1. Release of 2.1. Chlorine detectors 3. Provide an emergency deluge syste1ns:i
,$
external fire toxic chlorine inside building in the chlorine handling area. Also both ! j
- - - -- - -
' raises vapor cloud 1- i inside and outside of the building first
2.2. High wall PIUS ditih
temperature
above 160F
from one or
more 1 ton
would trap chlorine vapors, / aid fire lighting sho~lldbe provided. 4
* *
especially under "F"
ca~~sing containers
- .-- . stablllty conditions. Some
' fi~sibleplugs
2.2. Onsite & mitigation under other, I
to melt on 1
offsite toxic gas more turbulent, weather
ton
cloud h a ~ a r d conditions.
I
I
container(s) - --- - - 1 I
causing 2.3. Onsite personnel have
release of SCBA (Self Contained
chlorine. Breathing Apparatus).
I
- --
3. Rupture of j 3.1. Release of 3.1. Chlorine detectors 6 / 2 . ~ r o v i d ea wet scrubbing system that 4
Ilne from toxic chlorlne inside building i canabsorb a major chlorine release and /:
chlorine vapor cloud neutralize uslng caustlc soda solution. (
cyllnder due to from 1 ton The scrubbing system shoilld be a i
excessive container 'switched on prior to offloading of <t
forceihuman 1 chlorine and also scrubber to be &
error, causing interlocked with chlorine detectors to !p
release of I switch on with chlor~nerelease. 6
$$
chlorine. V
- - -*- - - "
I 3.2. Onsite personnel have 4. Confirm rigorous hook-up and !7

~%~ah,%~&:~;)d k m m ~ bw~%&",
A -st.:: % * 2 k
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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-5

3.2. Onsite & SCBA (Self Contained
offsite toxic gas Breathing Apparatus).
cloud hazard --
3.3. High wall plus ditch
would trap chlorine vapors,
especially under "F"
stability conditions. Some
mitigation under other,
more turbulent, weather
conditions.
4. Fractured 4.1. Release of 4.1. Onsite personnel have
manifold leads toxic chlorine SCBA (Self Contained
to release of vapor cloud Breathing Apparatus).
' chlorine. from one or
4.2. High wall plus ditch
more 1 ton
section across rail track
containers
section would trap chlorine
through
vapors, especially under
manifold
"F" stability conditions.
Some mitigation under
other, more turbulent,
weather conditions.
- -
i
inspection procedures in place when
connecting up chlorine containers.
----
5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
handling areas must be adequate at all
times for unloading and hooking up of
chlorine containers and other chemicals
(so as to minimize the potential for
human error).
---
4 2. Provide a wet scrubbing system that
2 2 can absorb a major chlorine release and
neutralize using caustic soda solution.
'
The scrubbing system should be
switched on prior to offloading of
chlorine and also scrubber to be
interlocked with chlorine detectors to
switch on with chlorine release.

4.2. Onsite & 4.3. Chlorine detectors

offsite toxic gas inside building
cloud hazard I

4.4. Emergency shut-off

I valve.

Chemical: 1.2. 100 drums of 98% red fuming nitric acid / Drawing: A - 136
Type: 100 drums of 98% red fuming nitric acid
I
Design ConditionsIParameters:Fuming 98% red nitric acid stored under
atmos~heric~ressure/temueratureconditions I

Hazards & Consequences Existing Safeguards RR Recommendation

Source
1. Spillage of 1.1. Release of 1.1. High wall plus ditch 6 6. Provide diking to contain spillage of
a drum of nitrogen dioxide would trap NO2 and NO 98% fuming nitric acid.
nitric acid. and nitric oxide vapors, especially under
fumes. Both "F" stability conditions.
NO2 and NO are Some mitigation under
very toxic and other, more turbulent,
NO can weather conditions.
accelerate
1.2. Onsite personnel have
burning in the
SCBA (Self Contained
fire situation.
Breathing Apparatus).
(Release is
through
diffusion into
the atmosphere,
as opposed to
flashing off).

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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-6

-" - - -- --
2 . - V e h i a e r - 1 2.1TReleaseoT 2.1. High wall plils ditch 5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
truck impacts 1 nitrogen dioxide section woi~ldtrap NO2 handling areas inust be adequate at all
a stack of and nitric oxide and NO vapors, especially times for unloading and hook~ngup of
drums (e.g., fumes. Both under "F" stability chlorine containers and other chemicals
nitric acid. /
on pallets) of NO2 and NO are
very tonic and
NO can
conditions. Some
mitigation under other,
more turbulent, weather
(so as to ininiinize the potential for
himan error).
!!
i

/ ac.celerate I conditions. 1 6. Provlde d ~ k ~ to

n gcontain spillage of
1 burning- in the ! - --
98% fuming nitric a c ~ d .
- - 4:
1
I firesitllation j i2T0nsite personnel have i
- *
4

/'
7. Provide bollards, curbing etc. to
(Release is SCBA (Self Contained
I

prevent vehicles impacting drums of

$
through !, Breathing Apparatus). II
$,

filming nitrlc acid, thereby causing b,

1 diffusion into spillage
the atmosphere, --
as opposed to / 8. Provide adequate water spray/dllution *?3
flashing off). 1 available In the vicinity to reduce fj
I filming nitric acid hazard, in event of ",
r
I spillage. r;
! I i _ _ I I - 1.. -_ _ - - (9
'
3. Gasollne 3.1. Coplous 19. Prov~desegregation of flammable
leak and other release of
flammable nitrogen d ~ o x ~
, solvents away from storage area for
j filming nitric acid.
8q
I
I solvents and nitric oxide
causing fire fumes. Both
to impact the and Noare
nitric acid and NO vapors, especially
I very toxic and
I
drum storage 1 NO will
,
under "F" stability , dry chemical or water spray.
I conditions. However, hot
area. accelerate
j vapors could rise and
burning. Nitric
br~dgethis H ~ g hwall. Some
1
acid fumes (NO2 1
! mitigation under other,
I
& NO
' more turbulent, weather
1 conditions.
r&- r n * W
2 & @ * ~ ~ ~ * ~ % ~ ? & * - t ~ ? t&a W ~
M~%&L+%%'&B k b &s%&&Ls
*?&ha~u~&b~~@~:~~&~d%~&%~*~ d %. f6&&M%.&&&&&Z*

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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-7

-- -
Chemical: 1.3. 40 drums of 50% caustic soda solution. Drawing: A - 137
I------
---
Type: 40 drums of 50% caustic soda solution.
r-
Design Conditions/Parameters:50% caustic soda stored in warm
environment to prevent freezing
Recommendation
-
1.1. High wall plus ditc 5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
section would trap NO2 and handling areas must be adequate at all
NO vapors released as a times for unloading and hooking up of
secondary effect of boil-off chlorine containers and other chemicals
through caustic contacting (so as to minimize the potential for
nitric acid, especially under human error).
"F" stability conditions.
Some mitigation under
other, more turbulent,
weather conditions.
11. Store the 50% caustic away from the
SCBA (Self Contained fuming nitric acid and also from any
Breathing Apparatus). flammable solvents or other combustible
substances.

-
Drawing: A - 138

Recommendation
------
15. Provide segregation of hydrochloric
acid storagelhandling from caustic soda
storagelhandling.

I caustic. hydrogen
chloride.
SCBA (Self Contained
I 1 Breathing Apparatus). / I /

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 Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-8

Type: 5. External 10 ton propane bullet feeding file1 to fiunace inside

pressure
Hazards & , Conseqi~ences j Existing Safeguards
i
Source
.. -
I
-" ,
. - j ... - . - .- .. .- . .. . -.- "..-" ---, - 1 . .. - . -. -
I . Propane 1.1. Potential 1 1.1. Regular predictive 2 2 14 i 16. Provide flammable gas
leakage inside explosion within maintenance schedule : inside building with automated file1
I

building building due to

/ I
l shutoffiventing
j
ignition by I ; ,
furnace
--
1.2. Onsite
I
explosion !
hazard II
-

gasoline or
-- -- -

! in possible
----
?2. If there is a 2.1. Could result 12.1.
--
one- I 1
I located on a sloped concrete pad (so that 1;
brush fire this / BLEVE spills of flammables will not pond
coilld serioi~sly' explosion of
impact the ' propane bullet
integrity of the and missile
1
;1
i
beneath bullet). Surroi~ndshould be

!' iI
' propane bullet. generation.
, I i ' 13. Fence propane billlet in compound, @
/ I I
w ~ t hvideo surveillance, that provides Ci'ri
L
I j security and limits access. /$
~ ~ ~ ~ ; $+~ ~ ~ f
a:&&?;~~ti~$Gw&& ~g3&pa+4Arigy&&G
~ ~
',2,..s.:' ~

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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-9

SUGGESTED READING (Note: URLs current at date of publication)

"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" by AIChE, CCPS, 1st edition, 1985
www.aiche.or~/publications/reprints.ht~n
MIL-STD-882, Military Standard System Safety Program Requirements, January 2002
htt~://store.1nil-standards.co1deproducts/doclist/MIL%2OCD%2OPower%2OUser.pdf
"Preliminary safety analysis" by G.Wells, J.Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1993, Vol6, No. 1, pages
47 to 60
www.elsevier.nl/locate/ilp

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