RACEL JOYCE GEMOTO

STAT CON, 1JD-C

ATTY RANDY P. ZARATE
OCTOBER 11, 2020

JUAN TANADA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43575            
May 31, 1935

FACTS:
Juan Tañada, the petitioner, was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-
General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on December 4, 1911. He continued in that
position until September 8, 1934, when at his own request, "Pursuant to the provisions of section 206 of the
Revised Administrative Code", he was "transferred from the position of justice of the peace for the municipality of
Alabat, Province of Tayabas, of the same position in the municipality of Perez, same province", by a
communication signed by the Governor-General from which the foregoing is quoted.He reached his 65 th birthday
on October 35,1934, given that Tanada was of that age, subsequently the approval of Act no. 3899 makes a
mandatory the retirement of all justices who reached 65 years old and at that time the Act took effect on January
1, 1933.Thereupon the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, acting in accordance with instructions from the
Department of Justice, directed Tañada to cease to act as justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas.

The applicable law is found in the last proviso to section 203 of the Administrative Code, as inserted by
Act No. 3899, and in the proviso to section 206 of the same Code as last amended by Act No. 2768, which read as
follows:

SEC. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace

Provided, further, That the present justice and auxiliary justice of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes
effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and
thirty-three; and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make new
appointments to cover the vacancies occurring by operation of this Act.

The petitioner cease to his office due to the protest under Section 203 of Act No.3999 which was not
applied to him because of the proper interpretation of the law that the fact he completed and reach the age of 65
on October 5, 1934.

ISSUE:
1. Does Act. No. 3899 apply to Tanada?
2. Does the transfer denote a new appointment?

HELD:
1. No, the Act No. 3899 should not be applied to Tanada.
2. No his transfer is not considered as a NEW APPOINTMENT because there’s no confirmation that requires
an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded of the original appointment.
RATIONALE:
1. Tanada has not reached 65 when the Act was approved. The law provides that judges who are already 65
years old upon the time the Act No. 3899 takes effect should surrender their offices. In this case, Tanada
was only 64 when said Act gained approval. Although Tanada did reach 65 later, such is immaterial as the
law only includes those who have reached said date on approval and not after its approval.

2. The transfer is not a new appointment because it does not meet the elements of an appointment.
Appointments necessarily has two things: appointment by Governor-General and consent of Philippine
Senate. Transfer only needs the word of the Governor-General. As applied to Tanada, his transfer is not an
appointment because his second reassignment did not have the consent of Philippine Senate. As well, by
definition, transfer is the enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment. It
being grounded on the original appointment; no new appointment is necessary.

DOCTRINE:

The relevant statutory doctrine for this case can be seen in Ratio 1. Defense argues that the relevant
provision is “defective and does not convey the legislative intent.” Later, it was learned that the defense was
actually seeking for the insertion of a phrase in the provision which would then explicitly disqualify Tanada from
office. To address this argument, the court differentiates between liberal construction, which the court is allowed
to do, and judicial legislation, which is beyond the court’s jurisdiction. Liberal construction allows courts to find out
the true meaning of a provision through legislative intent. Judicial legislation, meanwhile, is when the court adds
certain elements/words in a provision that has been omitted. In short, the defense sought judicial legislation, an
act which courts cannot do.