SSS vs Ubaña 200114 August 24, 2015

Facts: Debbie Ubana filed a civil case for damages against the DBP Service Corporation, petitioner Social Security System (SSS),
and the SSS Retirees Association before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. She applied for employment with the petitioner.
However, after passing the examinations and accomplishing all the requirements for employment, she was instead referred to DBP
Service Corporation for "transitory employment." She took the pre-employment examination given by DBP Service Corporation and
passed the same. She was told to report for training to SSS, Naga City branch, for immediate deployment to SSS Daet branch. She was
made to sign a six-month Service Contract Agreement 7 by DBP Service Corporation, appointing her as clerk for assignment with SSS
Daet branch. She was assigned as "Frontliner" of the SSS Members Assistance Section. As Processor, she was paid only P5,038.00
monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00. Her Service Contract Agreement with DBP Service
Corporation was never renewed, but she was required to work for SSS continuously under different assignments with a maximum
daily salary of only P229.00; at the same time, she was constantly assured of being absorbed into the SSS plantilla. Respondent
claimed she was qualified for her position as Processor, having completed required training and passed the SSS qualifying
examination, yet she was not given the proper salary. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment by SSS, she was forced to
resign as she could no longer stand being exploited. Petitioner and its co-defendants SSS Retirees Association and DBP Service
Corporation filed their respective motions to dismiss, arguing that the subject matter of the case and respondent's claims arose out of
employer-employee relations, which are beyond the RTC's jurisdiction and properly cognizable by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

The RTC issued an Order dismissing respondent's complaint for lack of jurisdiction since it is a clear case of unfair labor practice
falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. Respondent moved for reconsideration; issued another Order granting
respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant SSS clearly shows that the case is
one for Damages. The case against defendant Social Security System represented by its President is hereby reinstated in the docket of
active civil cases. The regular court has the jurisdiction to try this case. Petitioner sought a reversal of the RTC insisting that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction over respondent's claims for "unrealized salary income" and other damages, which constitute a labor
dispute cognizable only by the labor tribunals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Ubana's Complaint unveils that Ubana's claim is rooted on the principle of abuse of right laid in the
New Civil Code. Evidently, the determination of the respective rights of the parties herein, and the ascertainment whether there were
abuses of such rights, do not call for the application of the labor laws but of the New Civil Code.   It is not the NLRC but the regular
courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages, in which the employer-employee relations is merely incidental, and in which the
cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as tort.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has the proper jurisdiction of this case.

Held: In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner's employee, but that precisely she was promised that she
would be absorbed into the SSS plantilla after all her years of service with SSS; For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in
order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation between the parties
thereto. Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then there is no labor dispute cognizable by the
Labor Arbiters or the NLRC. There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract between respondent
and petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a
case against petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper salary due her as SSS Processor.

Aquino vs SSS 149256 2006

Facts: Petitioner's husband, Jaime Aquino, worked as grocery man for the US Navy Commissary. About 23 years after his
separation from employment, he died of congestive heart failure. Petitioner filed a claim for surviving spouse's compensation benefits
under PD 626 with respondent Social Security System (SSS). The latter denied the claim. Petitioner then appealed the case to the ECC
which affirmed SSS's dismissal of the claim on the ground that the cause of death of petitioner's husband was not attributable to the
nature of his work as a grocery man in the Commissary. He was no longer connected with the store at that time.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA seeking the reversal of the ECC's decision. There, petitioner insisted that the cause of her
husband's death was traceable to the nature of his job at the commissary store. The CA dismissed her appeal. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the CA decision2 but it was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Jaime Aquino’s ailment is compensable under PD 626.

Held: Jaime’s ailment is not compensable.

Under the law, the beneficiary of an employee is entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is (1) an illness accepted as an
occupational disease by the ECC or (2) any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same
was increased by the working conditions. Stated otherwise, a claimant must prove that the illness is listed as an occupational disease
by the ECC; otherwise, he must present substantial evidence showing that the nature of the work increased the risk of contracting it.

Under the Rules on Employees Compensation, congestive heart failure is not included. Hence, petitioner should have shown proof that
the working conditions in the commissary store where her husband worked aggravated the risk of contracting the ailment. Petitioner
should have adduced evidence of a reasonable connection between the work of her deceased husband and the cause of his death, or
that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in her husband's job as grocery man at the commissary
store.

To be compensable, the cardiovascular (or heart) disease of Jaime Aquino must have occurred under any of the following conditions:
(a) if the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
(b) the strains of work that [brought] about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24)
hours by clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship;
(c) if a person who was apparently symptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac
injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it [was] reasonable to claim a causal relationship. 8
Clearly, the circumstances of the present case do not fall under any of the foregoing conditions.

Soledad Muñoz Mesa vs Social Security 160467

Facts: Teodoro Mesa, the deceased husband, was an employee of respondent Philrock Incorporated for 32 years. In the course of his
employment, Mesa was diagnosed to be afflicted with diabetes mellitus, pulmonary tuberculosis, and ischemic heart disease for which
he was confined. Upon his discharge from the hospital, he continued to work for Philrock until he succumbed to myocardial
infarction. Close to 12 years later the petitioner claimed for employees' compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
626. The SSS denied petitioner's claim on the ground of prescription. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, alleging that the filing of
the claim was delayed because she was not aware that her husband was entitled to employees' compensation. The motion was elevated
by the SSS to the ECC.

ECC held that petitioner's claim had prescribed. The claims under said law should be brought within three years from the time the
cause of action accrued. Even if Art. 1144 of the Civil Code were applied, the ECC posed, the claim would still be barred by
prescription since the period is reckoned from the date of contingency. Petitioner appealed to the CA, contending that the three-year
period in P.D. 626 should not be construed as a prescriptive period but more of a requisite for the exercise of a right granted by law,
and pleading for the application of the social justice precepts in resolving the controversy in her favor. On petitioner's filing before the
SSS of a claim for death and funeral benefits, the appellate court held that the same did not operate as constructive notice to the ECC
for purposes of employees' compensation, hence, it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner reiterates her
contention that her claim has not prescribed and that the funeral claim served as constructive notice to the SSS/ECC to toll the running
of the prescriptive period.

Issue: Whether or not the claim for funeral benefits prescribed.

Held: The claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, which was filed after the lapse of 10 years by the petitioner who
had earlier filed a claim for death benefits, had not prescribed. The issue of prescription in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626,
or the Law on Employees' Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of the 1987 Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation both read as follows: "No claim for compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the
System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued." The exceptions states: "A claim for employee's compensation
must be filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, provided however, that  any
claim filed within the System for any contingency that may be held compensable under the Employee's Compensation Program (ECP)
shall be considered as the EC claim itself. The three-year prescriptive period shall be reckoned from the onset of disability, or date of
death. In case of presumptive death, the three (3) years limitation shall be counted from the date the missing person was officially
declared to be presumptively dead."

The claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be considered as the Employees' Compensation claim itself. This is but logical
and reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim before the
ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees' Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the
petitioner, when she filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law,  she had already notified the SSS of her
employees' compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for payment of sickness/disability/death
benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.

Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the Employees' Compensation Claims, quoted
above, also provides for the conditions when EC claims filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period may still be given due course.
Section 4(b)(2) states the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or
death should be filed within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency. In the instant case, the petitioner was able to file
her claim for death benefits under the SSS law within the three-year prescriptive period. In fact, she has been receiving her pension
under the SSS law since November 1988.

The Court reiterates its oft-repeated ruling that pursuant to the Constitutional guarantee of social justice, a liberal attitude in favor of
the employee should be adopted. Claims falling under the Employees' Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its
essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. It is only this kind of
interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code, which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.

The issue of whether Mesa's death is compensable was never, however, fully raised nor discussed in any of the proceedings below, nor
is it ventilated in the present petition, and the records are bereft of adequate evidence to enable the Court to rule thereon. A remand of
the case to the ECC for the resolution of such issue is thus in order.

GSIS vs Monteclaro

Facts: Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits under the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 ("PD 1146"). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas'
application for retirement "effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity thereafter. Nicolas died. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. GSIS denied the claim
because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed
Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on "17 February 1984."

Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship
pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS'
decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.

Issue: Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;

Held:

SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension
mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled
to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only
after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the
survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death. (Emphasis supplied)
 Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent children. The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except dependent children.
The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically or mentally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the
member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support.

The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the
dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension ("the proviso").

The petition is DENIED for want of merit. The court declared VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that "the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros
for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.

Postigo vs Phil Tuberculosis Society 155146

Facts: Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the respondent PTSI. They retired on various dates from
1996 to 1998. Upon retirement from service, some of the petitioners who were compulsory members of the GSIS obtained retirement
benefits from the GSIS. At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had been amended by Republic Act No.
7641. Rep. It granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement
with the company. As the respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution to the GSIS,
petitioners claimed from the respondent their retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641. The respondent denied their claims on the
ground that the accommodation extended by the GSIS to the petitioners removed them from the coverage of the law.

The petitioners then sought the opinion of the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) of the DOLE regarding their entitlement to the
retirement benefits provided in Rep. Act No. 7641. The BWC confirmed their entitlement. The same opinion was rendered and
submitted by the respondent's legal counsel to its Board of Directors. Despite this, respondent PTSI refused to pay the petitioners their
retirement benefits. The petitioners then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter declared petitioners entitled to
retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641. Respondent PTSI appealed to the NLRC. Instead of posting the required cash or surety
bond equivalent to the amount of the award, the respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Bond on the ground that the amount awarded by
the Labor Arbiter was erroneous. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to post the required cash or surety bond.

The respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC's decision.

Issue:  Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to thebenefits of the Retirement Pay Law.

Held: The petitioners are entitled to retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641.

Respondent's admission that although its employees are compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees are not governed
by the Civil Service Law. If the respondent is truly a government-owned or controlled corporation, and petitioners are employees in
the public sector, then, they should have been covered by said law. The truth, however, is that, the respondent is a non-profit but
private corporation organized under the Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the Labor Code and not by the Civil
Service Law. From the foregoing, it is clear to us that the petitioners are employees in the private sector, hence entitled to the benefits
of Rep. Act No. 7641. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory inclusion in the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in
the public sector, they are still entitled to the benefits of Rep. Act No. 7641 since they are not covered by the Civil Service Law and its
regulations.

The accommodation under Rep. Act No. 1820 extending GSIS coverage to PTSI employees did not take away from
petitioners the beneficial coverage afforded by Rep. Act No. 7641. Hence, the retirement pay payable under Article 287 of the Labor
Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7641 should be considered apart from the retirement benefit claimable by the petitioners under the
social security law or, as in this case, the GSIS law.

GSIS vs CA 287 SCRA 204

Facts: Private respondent started working as an emergency employee of the NHA. The private respondent was diagnosed to be
suffering from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm. After undergoing craniotomy, she was finally discharged
from the hospital however, despite her operation, she could not perform her duties as efficiently as she had done prior to her illness.
This forced her to retire early from the government service at the age of 62. She filed a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS for
the above-described ailment. GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for the period starting from December 17,
1989 to January 31, 1990 and subsequently, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for nine months starting on March 2, 1990.

She then requested the GSIS for the conversion of the classification of her disability benefits from permanent partial disability (PPD)
to permanent total disability (PTD) however, it was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and
Underwriting Department which evaluated her claim found no basis to alter its findings. The GSIS denied reconsideration which
denial was later affirmed on appeal by the ECC. She filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which reversed the ECC’s
decision.

Issue: Whether private respondent is entitled to conversion of her benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total
disability.

Held: While it is true that the degree of private respondents’ physical condition at the time of her retirement was not considered as
permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently worsened after her head operation and consequent
retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from some ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to properly sleep,
inability to walk without support and failure to regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of
her condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that private respondent was made to take her
medication for life. A persons disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial
disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.

The Court has construed permanent total disability as the lack of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful
occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life.It is, therefore, clear from established
jurisprudence that the loss of ones earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to. It is also important to
note that private respondent was constrained to retire at the age of 62 years because of her impaired physical condition. This, again, is
another indication that her disability is permanent and total. As held by this Court, the fact of an employee’s disability is placed
beyond question with the approval of the employee’s optional retirement, for such is authorized only when the employee is `physically
incapable to render sound and efficient service. The denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent
who, for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on
account of her worsening condition, would indeed subvert the salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The Court,
therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondents’ disability from
permanent partial disability to permanent total disability.