19. Lopez v. Ramos AC 12081 Nov 24 2020 .
22
What’s Inside? (Until Canon 5)
1) Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, 12
July 2016 .................................................. 1
2) Malecdan v. Baldo, A.C. No. 12121
[Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322], 27 June
2018 ........................................................ 2
3) GARRIDO vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO
and ROMANA P. VALENCIA .......................... 3
A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010 ................. 3
4) Heenan v. Espejo, AC 10050 Dec 3 2013 .. 4
5) Perez vs. Catindig .................................. 4
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2013 .................... 4
6.) Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868,
26 January 2016 ........................................ 6
7. Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172, 12 April
2016 ....................................................... 10
8) Ma. Cecilia Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo
Advincula ................................................. 10
9). Tumbaga v. Teoxon, A.C. No. 5573, 21
November 2017 ........................................ 11
10) MICHELLE YAP vs. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI
A.C. No. 11156. March 19, 2018. Formerly
CBD Case No. 12-3680 .............................. 13
11. Fabugais vs. Faundo, [G.R. No. 10145 June
11, 2018] ................................................ 13
12. Gubaton v. Amador, A.C. No. 8962, 9 July
2018 ....................................................... 15
13. AAA vs De Los Reyes A.C. No 10021
September 18 2018 .................................. 16
14. Ceniza v. Ceniza, A.C. No. 8335, 10 April
2019 ....................................................... 18
15. Venzon v. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, 20
August 2019............................................. 19
16. Chan v. Carrerra. A.C. 10439. September
3, 2019 ................................................... 19
17. JOSE R. REYES, JR. vs ATTY. SOCRATES R.
RIVERA .................................................... 20
A.C. No. 9114. October 6, 2020 .................. 20
18. Dap-og v. Atty. Mendez ........................ 21
A.C. No. 12017. October 14, 2020 .............. 21
20. Kimteng, et. al. vs. Young ....................22
21.) Palencia v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 10557
[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962], 10 July
2018 .......................................................24
22. PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO G.R. No. 207041,
November 09, 2015 ...................................28
23. CERILLA VS, LEZAMA A.C. No. 11483,
October 3, 2017 ........................................28
24. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III,
A.C. No. 10525, 1 September 2015 .............29
25. VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR. vs. ATTY.
ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ A.C. No. 10911. June 6,
2017. ......................................................30
1) Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, 12
July 2016
Topic: Qualifications for the Bar;
Assumption of another identity
Facts:
Complainant Patrick and Respondent Richard
are siblings. Complainant obtained a degree in
Business Administration at the University of
Makati. On the other hand, Richard, after being
discharged from the Philippine Military Academy
never went back to college to earn his degree.
Complainant subsequently learned that
respondent enrolled in a law school and passed
the Bar Examinations using complainant’s
name and college records from the University
of Makati. However, he still did not confront his
brother.
Sometime in 2009, his presence was requested
by the NBI because of respondent’s involvement
in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by
one of the principal sponsors at respondent’s
wedding. He then took it upon himself to inform
other people that he is the real Patrick Caronan
when he realized that respondent was using his
name to perpetrate crimes and especially that
more crimes came into light.
Hence, complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against Respondent for purportedly assuming
complainant’s identity and falsely representing
that the former has the required educational
qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and
be admitted to the practice of law.
IBP’s Recommendation
IBP found respondent guilty for illegally and
falsely assuming the complainant's identity and
academic records. IBP recommended that the
said name be dropped and stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys and the name Richard A. Caronan
be barred from being admitted as a member of
the bar.
Issues:
Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that
(a) the name Patrick Caronan be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name Richard A
Caronan be barred from being admitted to the
bar
Ruling:
No. First, since the real Patrick A Caronan never
took the Bar Examination, the IBP correctly
recommended that the said name be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.
Second, the IBP was also correct in ordering
that Richard A. Caronan be barred from
admission to the bar because Section 6, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court states that no
application for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed a
pre law course.
Furthermore, respondent exhibited dishonesty
and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity,
and school records of his own brother, and
dragged the latter into controversies. Good
moral character is essential in those who
would be lawyers.
2) Malecdan v. Baldo, A.C. No. 12121
[Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322], 27
June 2018
Topic: The language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory
in barring lawyers from appearing before the
Lupon. Violation of P.D. 1508 falls squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
Facts: Complainant Celestino Malecdan filed an
administrative complaint against Respondent
Atty. Simpson T. Baldo for the alleged violation
of Section 9 of P.D. 1508 known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law that prohibits
the participation of lawyers in the proceedings
before the Lupon. The complainant stated that
he filed a letter of complaint against Spouses
James and Josephine Baldo before the Punong
Barangay. During the hearing of the subject
complaint, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel for
spouses Baldo. Atty. Baldo admitted that he was
present during the proceedings before the
Punong Barangay and explained that he was
permitted by the parties to participate in the
said hearing. However, Malecdan insisted that
he vehemently objected to his presence.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the
language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar
lawyers from appearing before the Lupon and
recommended that Atty. Baldo be given a
warning. The IBP Board of Governors reversed
and set aside the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and
recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
Issues: Whether or not Atty. Baldo violated P.D
1508. If yes, whether or not his violation is
within the prohibition of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. The language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in
barring lawyers from appearing before the
Lupon. Atty. Baldo’s violation of P.D. 1508 falls
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1 clearly mandates the
obedience of every lawyer to laws and
legal processes. Rule 1.01, on the other hand,
states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to,
or prohibited, or unauthorized by, or in defiance
of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is
unlawful.
Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and
participated in the proceedings before the
Punong Barangay in violation of Section 9 of
P.D. 1508. He therefore violated Rule 1.01 of
the CPR in connection with Section 9 of P.D.
1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses
James and Josephine Baldo in a hearing before
the Punong Barangay. Therefore, he is liable for
violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
and is hereby reprimanded.
3) GARRIDO vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO
and ROMANA P. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maelotisea Sipin Garrido, second wife
of Atty. Angel Garrido, filed a disbarment case
against his husband as well as his alleged
mistress, Atty. Ramona Valencia. She alleged
that her husband has an illicit relationship with
Atty. Valencia, which produced an offspring. In
addition to this, she also purported that ever
since respondent left their conjugal home, the
latter failed to provide financial support.
Respondent Garrido denied all the allegations
hurled against him and asserted that the
marriage between him and Maelotisea is void ab
initio as he was still married with Constancia, his
first wife. He also pointed out that those
transpired before his admission to the bar.
In the course of the hearings, respondents filed
a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings in view
of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity (of marriage) Atty.
Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. Respondent filed the same motion
after the RTC declared the marriage between
Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea “an absolute
nullity.” All were dismissed by the IBP.
Petitioner herself filed a motion for the dismissal
of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to
maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido but
the same was dismissed. IBP proceeded with
the respondent Garrido’s disbarment. Hence,
respondent seeks relief to the Court.
ISSUES:
1.WON laws dealing with double jeopardy or
with procedure apply in the determination of a
lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.
2.WON respondent Garrido’s act prior to the
admission to bar should be imputed against
him.
3.WON both respondents’ act also constitute
gross immoral misconduct.
RULING:
1.NO, it does not apply.
The Court have so ruled in the past that
admission to the practice of law qualifications
are also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. In
the same light, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law,
like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this
Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose
interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly
his or her own; effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court.
Thus, laws dealing with double jeopardy or with
procedure—such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits
of desistance by the complainant—do not apply
in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.
2. YES.
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not
material in considering the qualification of Atty.
Garrido when he applied for admission to the
practice of law, and his continuing qualification
to be a member of the legal profession.
It is not important that the acts complained of
were committed before Atty. Garrido was
admitted to the practice of law.
3. YES.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community's
sense of decency.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from
the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral
conduct that warrants his disbarment, violating
his lawyer's oath, Section 20 (a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the
land.
Meanwhile, measured against the definition of
gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia's
actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so
corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she
married a man who, in all appearances, was
married to another and with whom he has a
family.
WHEREFORE, Attys. Angel E. Garido and
Romana Valencia are DISBARRED.
4) Heenan v. Espejo, AC 10050 Dec 3 2013
Facts
Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her
godmother, Corazon. Following the
introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty.
Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and
wanted to borrow 250k from her (Victoria).
Victoria agreed. To secure the payment of the
loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and
turned over to Victoria a check dated Feb. 2
2009 for 275k covering the loan amount and
agreed interest. In July 2009, Victoria received
an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in
the amount of 50k representing the interest
which accrued due to the late payment of the
principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said
check but the check bounced due to
insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay
despite Victoria's repeated demands. Victoria
thereafter became more aggressive in her
efforts to recover her money. When Atty. Espejo
still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal
complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18,
2009 for violation of BP22 and Estafa under
Article 315 of the RPC.
Issue: Did Atty. Espejo violate Canon 1 Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for issuing worthless checks?
Ruling: Yes. In Wilkie v. Limos, the Court
reiterated that the issuance of a series of
worthless checks shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her
oath, for which she may be disciplined.
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and
issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of
no moment. As held in several cases, a lawyer
may be disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a
lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may
be justified in suspending or removing him as
an attorney where his misconduct outside of the
lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in
character as to show him morally unfit and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer.
5) Perez vs. Catindig
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2013
Parties:
- Complainant: Dr. Elmar Perez
- Respondents: Atty. Tristan Catindig and
Atty. Karen E. Baydo
Facts
Atty. Tristan Catindig (Tristan) and Dr. Elmar
Perez (Elmar) were once friends and
schoolmates in the University of the Philippines.
After graduating, they lost touch but their paths
crossed again (Char, tadhana), at which point
Tristan started to court Elmar.
Tristan admitted that he was already married to
a certain Lily Gomez (Lily), after he impregnated
her, for fear that Lily might create a scandal and
jeopardize his Harvard Law School Scholarship
if he did not. (Hala uy, murag script sa
telenovela.) Tristan then told Elmar that he was
in the process of getting a divorce from Lily
abroad, and assured her that once the divorce
decree was granted, there would no longer be
any impediment to their getting married
(Nothing's gonna stop us now lol)
In 1984, the Dominican Republic granted a
divorce decree to Tristan, dissolving his
marriage to Lily. In the same year, Tristan and
Elmar married in the USA, and were blessed
with a son. Years later, however, Elmar
discovered that her marriage to Tristan was
actually null when she learned that foreign
divorces were not recognized by Philippine law.
She confronted Tristan about it, but the latter
assured her that he would eventually legalize
their union by obtaining a declaration of nullity
of marriage against Lily, and that he would
adopt their son.
In 2001, Elmar received an anonymous letter in
the mail informing her that Tristan was having
a scandalous affair (Hala ka, World of the
Married vibes!) with Atty. Karen E. Baydo
(Karen). She also found a love letter written by
Tristan for Karen, where he professed his love
and promised to marry her once his
"impediment is removed."
Apparently, Karen had earlier issued an
ultimatum to him, threatening to end their affair
if he did not annul his prior marriage. Tristan
then filed a petition to declare the nullity of his
marriage to Lily, and moved out of the house he
shared with Elmar and their son. He moved into
an upscale condominium, where Karen was
frequently seen (Lee Tae-Oh, is that you? World
of the Married gyud diay!)
In the annulment proceedings, Tristan admitted
that he married Lily in 1968 and that,
immediately after their wedding, Lily showed
signs that she was incapable of complying with
her marital obligations. In particular, he cited
that she had serious intimacy problems, even
though they had 4 children. He also averred that
because of their irreconcilable differences, he
and Lily each executed an SPA addressed to a
Judge in San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig
likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual
consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court. He and Lily also filed a Joint Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership, which was
granted by the RTC.
He also claimed that Elmar knew that their
marriage was a sham, and that he only married
her to lend a modicum of decency to their love.
He further denied that he left Elmar because of
Karen. He said that although he was attracted
to Karen, the latter in fact rejected him and
resigned from his farm. For her part, Atty. Karen
denied that she had an affair with Tristan. She
claimed that he began courting her while she
was employed in his firm. She however rejected
his romantic overtures; she told him that she
could not reciprocate his feelings since he was
married and that he was too old for her. She
said that despite being turned down, Tristan still
pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.
IBP-CBD
Recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig
for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On the other hand,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the charge against Atty. Karen Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Elmar
Perez failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence in support of the alleged affair
between the respondents.
IBP Board of Governors
Adopted and approved the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue: Did the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment?
Ruling: On the part of Tristan Catindig, yes; on
the part of Karen Baydo, no.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession,
but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity. Good moral character is
more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve
not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because "vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with
his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed
or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia,
for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor." Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. The
Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence
of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced
by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a
pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is
not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew
that the divorce decree he obtained from the
court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez
were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that
he cannot marry anew unless his previous
marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be
void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously
taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety
and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful
disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the
Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew
that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr.
Perez in the USA for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into
the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty.
Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The
fact still remains that he resorted to various
legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr.
Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the
highest degree.
On the part of Karen Baydo, the evidence only
showed that Tristan Catindig had written her a
love letter, but that was not proof enough that
they were in an affair.
6.) Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No.
10868, 26 January 2016
Topic: Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case
and using a forged signature in a pleading merit
the penalty of disbarment.
Facts:
Cheryl e. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-
Tamaray), filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the
IBP alleging that respondent, Atty. Deborah
Daquis (Atty. Daquis), filed, on her behalf, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
without her consent and forged her signature on
the Petition. The petition also stated that Atty.
Daquis was the counsel for complainant Vasco-
Tamaray.
Vasco-Tamaray presented the affidavit of
Maritess Marquez-Guerrero (Maritess) to prove
that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but was
that of her husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray
(husband).
In the affidavit, it stated that Maritess
accompanied complainant Vasco-Tamaray to
East Café at Rustan’s Makati to meet with the
husband. There, the husband introduced them
to his lawyer, respondent Atty. Daquis. The
husband then said that the reason for their
meeting was because he decided to file a case
to annul his marriage with complainant Vasco-
Tamaray. The second time Maritess and Vasco-
Tamaray met was when they went to
McDonald’s Greenbelt. There, respondent Atty.
Daquis tried to convince complainant Vasco-
Tamaray not to oppose the husband’s decision
to have the marriage annulled.
On December 2006, respondent Atty. Daquis
informed complainant Vasco-Tamaray that a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
On February 2006, respondent Atty. Daquis
asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Muntinlupa City.
On March 5, 2007, complainant Vasco-Tamaray
appeared before the City Prosecutor’s Office and
met respondent Atty. Daquis. There,
complainant Vasco-Taramay asked respondent
Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition of
Nullity of Marriage filed, but Atty. Daquis
refused.
Later on, complainant Vasco-Tamaray was able
to obtain a copy of the Petition for Nullity of
Marriage at the RTC of Muntinlupa City. There
she was surprised to see that the petition was
allegedly signed and filed by her.
Complainant Vasco-Tamaray alleged the
following matters:
(1) She did not file the petition;
(2) Her signature was forged by respondent
Atty. Daquis;
(3) Her purported community tax certificate
appearing on the jurat was not hers because she
never resided in Muntinlupa City (to prove this,
she attached 2 certifications: (a) certification by
the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan
Muntinlupa City stating that she was never a
resident of Muntinlupa City; (b) certification by
Barangay Talipapa that she has been a resident
thereof from the year 2000 up to the present);
(4) The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was respondent Atty. Daquis’ idea,
consented to by the husband;
(5) She never received any court process. The
address in the petition was her husband’s
address, and the return slips were received by
the relatives of the husband.
Respondent Atty. Daquis filed an answer and
alleged the following matters:
(1) That her complainant Vasco-Tamaray
was her client, and not the husband.
(2) That complainant Vasco-Tamaray knew
of the Petition as early as October 2006, and
not December 2006.
(3) With regard to the Community Tax
Certificate, respondent Atty. Daquis alleged
that the communicate tax certificate
number was supplied by complainant
herself, Vasco-Tamaray (respondent Atty.
Daquis presented a joint affidavit of her
staff Purawan and Lorena to prove this
allegation, as well as the allegation that
complainant Vasco-Tamaray was the client
of respondent Atty. Daquis, and that there
was no forging of signature involved).
(4) That complainant Vasco-Tamaray
wanted her to call and demand money from
the husband, but she refused to do so.
(5) That complainant Vasco-Tamaray had a
copy of the Petition. It was only on March 5,
2007 that complainant Vasco-Tamaray
asked for another copy of the Petition, but
she was unable to grant the request since
she did not have a copy with her at that
time.
(6) That Vasco-Tamaray conceived an
illegitimate son named Charles Dino Vasco,
with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda, and that
the latter signed the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity
portion of the birth certificate.
The Commission on Bar Discipline ruled in favor
of respondent Atty. Daquis, and recommended
the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
complainant Vasco-Tamaray to prove her
allegations; that she should have questioned
the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she
never filed any petition, but she failed to do so.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted an
approved the Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Issues:
WON respondent Atty. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that
she is counsel for complainant Vasco-Tamaray
and for the alleged use of a forged signature on
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent Atty. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for having violated
Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 1.
By pretending to be counsel for complainant,
respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to
uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any falsehood in court
as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent merely denied
complainant's allegation that she was the
husband’s counsel but was unable to rebut the
other allegations against her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant
in October 2006, but did not refute the
statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's
Affidavit that the husband introduced her as his
lawyer. Likewise, respondent admitted that she
met with complainant subsequently, but did not
refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement
that in one of the meetings, she tried to
convince complainant not to oppose the
husband’s decision to annul their marriage.
Respondent argued in her Answer that she was
the counsel for complainant. Yet, there is no
explanation how she was referred to
complainant or how they were introduced. It
appears, then, that respondent was contacted
by the husband to file a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's
Affidavit, "Leomarte (husband) told Cheryl that
the reason for that meeting and the presence of
Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file
a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl."
Based on this, it seems the husband intended to
file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, respondent made it appear
that complainant, not her client Leomarte
Tamaray (husband), was the petitioner. There
is a probability that respondent did not want the
husband to be the petitioner because he would
have to admit that he entered into a bigamous
marriage, the admission of which may subject
him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was
respondent's client, then there appears to be no
reason for respondent to advise her "not to
oppose the husband’s decision to have their
marriage annulled."
The records of this case also support
complainant Vasco-Tamaray’s allegation that
she never received any court process because
her purported address in the petition is the
address of the husband. The Certificate of
Marriage of complainant Vasco-Tamaray and
the husband are different. The husband’s
residence is at Muntinlupa, while complainant
Vasco-Tamaray’s residence is at Tondo, Manila.
Assuming that complainant Vasco-Tamaray
lived with her husband after they were married,
she most likely did not receive the court
processes because she left their home before
the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage – as written in the Minutes of the
meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in
1993 through his secretary. They became
sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as
steadies lasted until 1996;
During the 3 years of their union, petitioner
knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in
their house; Theirs was also a long distance
relationship as respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines
they got married in Feb. 1996. They had no
children, as respondent immediately left for
Japan on March 11, 1996;
Respondent returned to the Philippines but
unfortunately he brought another woman. As a
result, petitioner left their house. (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her
failure to inform the prosecutor that she did not
file any petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage because during the meeting on March
5, 2007, complainant had no knowledge that the
Petition was filed in her name. She obtained a
copy of the Petition after the March 5, 2007
meeting.
When respondent led the Petition as counsel for
complainant when the truth was otherwise, she
committed a falsehood against the trial court
and complainant.
Violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon
10, Rule 10.01 when respondent Atty.
Daquis allowed the use of a forged
signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized.
Complainant alleged that her signature on the
Petition was forged. Respondent merely denied
complainant's allegation.
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The
records of this case show that complainant has
used two signatures. In her identification cards
issued by the University of the East, she used a
signature that spelled out "CVasco." In her
Complaint-Affidavit against respondent,
complainant used a signature that spelled out
"CTamaray."
A comparison of the signatures appearing on the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and on complainant's identification cards show
a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and
"o." Further, complainant's signatures in the
documents attached to the records consistently
appear to be of the same height. On the other
hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter
"c." Hence, it seems that complainant's
signature on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that
respondent forged complainant's signature, the
fact remains that respondent allowed a forged
signature to be used on a petition she prepared
and notarized. In doing so, respondent violated
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
These canons state:
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr., Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty
of violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted
the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court
decision "in a non-existent court proceeding.”
This court discussed that:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his
part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given
the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of
continuing as a member of the Bar.
In a similar manner, respondent's act of
allowing the use of a forged signature on a
petition she prepared and notarized
demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged
signature on a petition filed before a court is
tantamount to consenting to the commission of
a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon
10.
Violation of Canon 17.
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the
interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her
client Leomarte Tamaray (husband), in the
same case.
No violation of Canon 15.
This court notes that respondent may have
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she
entered her appearance as counsel for
complainant 68 even though she was engaged
as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray (husband).
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte
Tamaray (husband) to be his counsel. When the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was filed, respondent signed the Petition as
counsel for complainant. If respondent was
indeed engaged as counsel by complainant,
then there is conflict of interest, in violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03.
However, there is nothing on record to show
that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that
respondent did not commit conflict of interest.
Respondent, Atty. Daquis, was found
guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
penalty of disbarment was then imposed upon
her.
7. Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172, 12
April 2016
Topic: Canon 1 - Duty to uphold the
constitution and the laws
Facts: Complainant alleged that respondent
issued a check in his favor for the payment of
the latter’s debt. When he presented the check
for payment, it was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Respondent failed to
comply despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands. Petitioner filed a criminal complaint
for violation of BP 22 against respondent and
also filed an administrative case. The
Commission on Bar Discipline recommend
respondent to be suspended for 6 months for
violation of the CPR and guilty of moral
turpitude. The IBP Board modified the
punishment suspending the respondent for a
perid of 2 years.
Issue: Whether Atty. Paulma is guilty.
Ruling: YES. The issuance of worthless checks
in violation of BP 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on him, shows such lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes
a ground for disciplinary action.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of
the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01
thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's
oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law
and an indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice. As such, he can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional
or private capacity, which renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court.
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity. Any transgression of
this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the
public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.
In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the bar, for which he must suffer the
necessary consequences.
8) Ma. Cecilia Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo
Advincula
A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016
Topic: Canon 1 -Duty to uphold the
constitution and the laws
FACTS:
Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula
committed unlawful and immoral acts; that
while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he
had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma.
Judith Ortiz Gonzaga; that the extra-marital
relations bore a child in the name of Ma.
Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula; that Atty.
Advincula failed to give financial support to their
own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina,
Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his
having sufficient financial resources; that he
admitted in the affidavit of late registration of
birth of Alexandria that he had contracted
another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga; that even
should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration
in the affidavit of late registration of birth was
motivated by some reason other than the fact
that he truly entered into a subsequent
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such
a declaration was in itself still unlawful; that
siring a child with a woman other than his lawful
wife was conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer; that
contracting a subsequent marriage while the
first marriage had not been dissolved was also
an unlawful conduct; that making a false
declaration before a notary public was an
unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and that the failure of Atty.
Advincula to provide proper support to his
children showed his moral character to be below
the standards set by law for every lawyer. Dr.
Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be
disbarred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent must be disbarred.
RULING:
No. The good moral conduct or character
must be possessed by lawyers at the time
of their application for admission to the
Bar, and must be maintained until
retirement from the practice of law. It is
expected that every lawyer, being an officer of
the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the Court is required not only
to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also,
in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
The requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
Although his siring the child with a woman
other than his legitimate wife constituted
immorality, he committed the immoral
conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The
degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave
than if he had committed the immorality when
already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even
so, he cannot escape administrative liability.
Taking all the circumstances of this case
into proper context, the Court considers
suspension from the practice of law for
three months to be condign and
appropriate.
Atty. Advincula manifested in his
compliance dated February 26, 2013 that
he had immediately accepted the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
suspending him from the practice of law
for two months as final and executory; that
he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI
for two months starting in November and lasting
until the end of December, 2012; and that such
leave from work involved refraining from
performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the
NBI. A lawyer like him ought to know that
it is only the Court that wields the power to
discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of
Governors did not possess such power,
rendering its recommendation against him
incapable of finality.
It is the Court's final determination of his
liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point
for the service of sanctions and penalties. As
such, his supposed compliance with the
recommended two-month suspension could not
be satisfied by his going on leave from his work
at the NBI. Moreover, his being a
government employee necessitates that
his suspension from the practice of law
should include his suspension from office.
A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so
considering that his position mandated him to
be a member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing. The suspension from the practice of
law will not be a penalty if it does not negate his
continuance in office for the period of the
suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise
of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court
is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery
because he can continue to receive his salaries
and other benefits by simply going on leave for
the duration of his suspension from the practice
of law.
9). Tumbaga v. Teoxon, A.C. No. 5573, 21
November 2017
Topic: Canon 1 – Duty to uphold the
Constitution and the laws
Facts:
Tumbaga claimed that after consulting with
Atty. Teoxon, he visited her often and brought
gifts to her son. He assured her that although
he was already married to Luzviminda Balang,
his marriage was a sham because their marriage
contract was not registered after moving
together, she became pregnant with Billy John.
Atty. Teoxon rarely visited them, thus
Tuumbaga sought the assistance of the Office of
the City Fiscal. Atty. Teoxon gave Tumbaga an
affidavit of support and told her there was no
need for him to appear at the conference. He
reneged on his promise of support, and
executed a promissory note, which he also failed
to honor. After Tumbaga moved out of the
Puncia Apartment, Atty. Teoxon raided her new
residence, accompanied by three SWAT
members and his wife. He drunkily demanded
the return of the personal belongings that he left
in their previous apartment unit.
Atty. Teoxon asserted that Tumbaga merely
wanted to exact money from him. He denied
being a father to Billy John since Tumbaga
supposedly had several live-in partners. He
denied that he lived together with Tumbaga at
the Puncia Apartment since he was already
married.
Atty. Teoxon also claimed that Tumbaga
falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Billy John so he filed a complaint for the
cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. He
also contended that complainant forged his
signature in the Affidavit of Support.
Tumbaga filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Teoxon, charging him with gross
immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct,
and gross misconduct. The IBPCBD issued its
Report and Recommendation, finding that Atty.
Teoxon maintained an illicit affair with Tumbaga
and that he should be meted the penalty of
suspension for a period of two (2) years. In a
Resolution, the IBP-BOG increased the
recommended period of suspension to three (3)
years
Issue: Whether or not the CPR is violated?
Yes. The good moral conduct or character must
be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must
be maintained until retirement from the practice
of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer,
being an officer of the Court, must not only be
in fact of good moral character, but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer
of the Court is required not only to refrain
from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but also to conduct himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.
If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct
that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. To be
the basis of disciplinary action, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years effective
upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be punished with a more
severe penalty.
10) MICHELLE YAP vs. ATTY. GRACE C.
BURI A.C. No. 11156. March 19, 2018.
Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3680
Topic: (based sa syllabus) Rule 1.01 — A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Facts: Complainant Michelle Yap was the
vendor in a contract of sale of a condominium
unit, while Atty. Grace C. Buri was the vendee.
Buri made an offer to purchase the property but
asked for the reduction of the price from
P1,500,000.00 to P1,200,000.00. After
consulting with her husband, Yap agreed. Of the
total amount of purchase price of
P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00 remains unpaid.
Because she trusted the respondent, Yap gave
Buri the full and immediate possession of the
condominium unit upon completion of the
P1,000,000.00 despite the outstanding balance
and even without the necessary Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, when Yap finally asked
for the balance, Buri said she would pay it on a
monthly installment of P5,000.00 until fully
paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would
just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also
started threatening her through text messages,
and then later on filed a case for estafa against
her. Said case was later dismissed.
Yap then filed an administrative complaint
against Buri for the alleged false accusations
against her.
When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed
to comply. She did not even appear during the
mandatory conference. Thus, the mandatory
conference was terminated and the parties were
simply required to submit their respective
position papers. However, only Yap complied
with said order.
Issue: Whether or not Buri should be
suspended by the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP?
Ruling: YES. Buri indubitably swept aside the
Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. She also took
for granted the express commands of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the CPR.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a
lawyer, an enduring high sense of responsibility
and good fidelity in all her dealings and
emphasize the high standard of honesty and
fairness expected of her, not only in the practice
of the legal profession, but in her personal
dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself
with great propriety, and his behavior should be
beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.
Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the
condominium unit, Buri opted to simply
threaten her and file a criminal case against her.
Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap
and prevent her from collecting the remaining
P200,000.00.
Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation
despite frequent demands clearly reflects her
lack of integrity and moral soundness; she took
advantage of her knowledge of the law and
clearly resorted to threats and intimidation in
order to get
away with what she wanted, constituting a
gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.
11. Fabugais vs. Faundo, [G.R. No. 10145
June 11, 2018]
Topic: Death of complainant – effect; Code
of Professional Responsibility – Canon 7
Facts: Oliver Fabugais filed a complaint against
Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. for gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit and
immoral relations with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B.
Fabugais.
It was alleged that then 10-year old girl Marie
Nicole Fabugais, daughter of Oliver, saw Atty
Faundo (whom Marie Nicole call as “Tito
Attorney”) in the same bed with her and her
mother, Annaliza, and that she saw the lawyer
embracing her mother while they were sleeping
during their stay at his house.
Marie Nicole further recounted that the next
morning, while she was watching television
along with her mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada,
Atty. Faundo who just had a shower, and clad
only in a towel or “tapis,” suddenly entered the
room; that she (Marie Nicole) along with her Ate
Mimi and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside
the room, while her mother and Atty. Faundo
remained inside the room.
Atty. Faundo denied that he had had any
immoral relations with Annaliza. He insisted that
he was incapable of committing the misconduct
imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit:
because he is a good father to his three children,
because he is a respected civic leader, and
because he had never been the subject even of
a complaint with the police. He claimed that
complainant tiled the instant complaint simply
“to harass him from practicing his legitimate
profession, and for no other reason.”
IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa found Atty. Faundo guilty of violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-Board of Governors, in its Resolution,
adopted and approved the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Meanwhile, complaint’s counsel Atty. Mario Frez
filed a Notice, Manifestation, and Motion for
Withdrawal from this case, stating that
complaint had passed away.
ISSUES:
A) Whether the case will still proceed despite the
death of death of the complainant.
B) Did Atty. Faundo in fact commit acts that are
grossly immoral, or acts that amount to serious
moral depravity, that would warrant or call for
his disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law?
C) Whether Atty. Faundo should be held
administratively liable.
Ruling:
A) It bears stressing that this case can
proceed in spite of complainant’s death and the
apparent lack of interest on the part of
complainant’s heirs. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they
are intended and undertaken primarily to look
into the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to
determine whether they are still fit to exercise
the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold
them accountable for any misconduct or
misbehavior which deviates from the mandated
norms and standards of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which are needful and
necessary to the preservation of the integrity of
the legal profession.
B) Going by the eyewitness testimony of
complainant’s daughter Marie Nicole, raw or
explicit sexual immorality between Atty. Faundo
and complainant’s wife was not established as
a matter of fact.
“Immoral conduct” has been defined as that
conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the
community. This Court has held that for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be “grossly immoral, that is, it must be
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.”
It is not easy to stale with accuracy what
constitutes “grossly immoral conduct,” let alone
what constitutes the moral delinquency and
obliquity that renders a lawyer unfit or unworthy
to continue as a member of the bar in good
standing.
C) Yes. It can in no wise or manner be argued
that Atty. Faundo’s behavior was par for the
course for members or the legal profession.
Lawyers are mandated to do honor to the bar at
all times and to help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession under all
circumstances. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.”
Rule 7.03 of the Code or Professional
Responsibility further provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life.
Fallo:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty.
Faundo Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) month, reckoned from receipt of a copy of
this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more
careful and more circumspect in all his actions,
and to be mindful of the kind of example he
holds up, especially to impressionable young
people, lest he brings upon himself a direr fate
the second time around.”
12. Gubaton v. Amador, A.C. No. 8962, 9
July 2018
TOPIC: Canon 1 – Duty to uphold the
Constitution and the laws
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from an affidavit-
complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Jildo A. Gubaton against respondent Atty.
Augustus Serafin D. Amador.
Complainant alleged that respondent, a former
Assistant Prosecutor at the City Prosecutor's
Office in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having
an illicit romantic relationship with his wife, Ma.
Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton
The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette
was known to other people as well such as the
complainant’s sister, Carlos Delgado (Delgado),
Chief of Barangay Public Safety Office in
Poblacion, Malaybalay City, and one Edgar
Navarez (Navarez), an employee of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and a resident of
Casisang, Malaybalay City who executed
affidavits
In defense, 12 respondent denied all the
allegations against him.
IBP:
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended the dismissal of the affidavit-
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The information supplied by complainant and
Bernadette's house helper, Bernadette's clinic
secretary, and complainant's sister, Nila, about
the alleged illicit affair were purely hearsay.
This was reversed by the IBP Board of
Governors who suspended respondent from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was
denied
ISSUE:
Whether or not grounds exist to hold
respondent administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent should be held
administratively liable with modification,
however, as regards the penalty to be imposed.
The quantum of proof in administrative cases is
substantial evidence which is that amount of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise.
As per complainant's own account, he saw
respondent and Bernadette together on various
intimate occasions. In fact, he attempted to
confront them at one time when he saw them
kissing inside a vehicle, although respondent
was able to evade him. The Court is inclined to
believe that complainant's imputations against
respondent are credible, considering that he had
no ill motive to accuse respondent of such a
serious charge — much more a personal scandal
involving his own wife — unless the same were
indeed true.
Complainant's statements were corroborated by
the affidavit executed by Navarez, who works in
BIR who stated that respondent and Bernadette
have been carrying on an illicit affair while
complainant was in the USA, and further
averred that he had seen them together on
different intimate occasions. Notably, it must be
highlighted that Navarez is a neutral and
disinterested witness and hence, his
declarations deserve ample consideration.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out
that complainant offered in evidence love
letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette
to respondent to prove the existence of their
illicit relationship. The authenticity of these love
letters/notes, although not expressly shown to
be written by Bernadette or received by
respondent, were not refuted. Consequently,
they lend credibility to complainant's claim.
Finally, it should be clarified that while the
information supplied by complainant and
Bernadette's house helper and Bernadette's
clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair
constitute hearsay, the same should not be
completely disregarded. Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, only the
fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial
The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary
administrative proceedings against judges and
justices where bribery proceedings are involved
is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been
advocated in the Separate Concurring Opinion
of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative
case of justice Ong before this Court.
For his part, respondent only proffered a bare
denial of the imputed affair.
All told, the Court finds that substantial
evidence — which only entail "evidence to
support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise" — exist to prove complainant's
accusation of gross immorality against
respondent
Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
13. AAA vs De Los Reyes A.C. No 10021
September 18 2018
FACTS: Two administrative complaints filed by
complainant AAA seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes
(respondent Atty. De Los Reyes) on the grounds
of sexual harassment and gross immoral
conduct.
[AAA] became a permanent employee with a
plantilla position of private secretary on a co-
terminus status with respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes. She later learned that it was [respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes] who facilitated her rapid
promotion to her position soon after becoming
his secretary.
Much as she wanted to pursue her plan to
resign, [AAA's] financial position at that time left
her with no choice but to continue working as
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes'] secretary. She
became his sex slave who was at his beck and
call at all times for all kinds of sexual services
ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual
intercourse in his office. She could not even
refuse him without risking physical, verbal and
emotional abuse.
AAA’s Contention: According to AAA,
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed baseless
charges against her and her sympathetic
officemates before the Office of the
Ombudsman, and sought their preventive
suspension without affording them due process
through an initial administrative investigation at
the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). She added that because
of what respondent Atty. De Los Reyes did to
her, she suffered from various illnesses,
insomnia, listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was
diagnosed as suffering from Major Depressive
Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Atty. De Los Reyes Contention: In his
defense, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied
AAA's allegations relating to the alleged sexual
harassment and gross immorality for lack of
factual and legal bases. He avers that the
complaints for disbarment filed by AAA against
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes were purely in
retaliation since he was conducting
investigations against AAA and her two friends
at the NHMFC. Atty. De Los Reyes asserted that
assuming the alleged grounds for disbarment
regarding the claim for sexual harassment were
true, the same had already prescribed since
they occurred in 1999 or more than three years
prior to the institution of the complaints.
Findings of the IBP: Commissioner found
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty
of one (1) year suspension. Moreover, the
Commissioner opines that while there could be
a prescriptive period under the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law, there is no prescriptive
period for grave misconduct in disbarment
proceedings and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Disbarment proceedings are
sui generis.
IBP Board of Governors: Adopted and
approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner finding Respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes is
hereby SUSPENDED.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes committed acts amounting to sexual
harassment and gross immoral conduct in
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which would warrant his
disbarment.
HELD: YES.
The pertinent provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility read:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
In Valdez v. Dabon, we explained that the
possession of good moral character is both
a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the
bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.
Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the
highest degree of morality and integrity not
only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their career in order to safeguard
the reputation of the legal profession. Any
errant behavior, be it in their public or
private life, may subject them to
suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that
members of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended for any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of their oath.
In Ventura v. Samson, we explained that
immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. It is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community's
sense of decency.
ICAB, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of
"sextortion" which is the abuse of his position or
authority to obtain sexual favors from his
subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling
victim who was not in a position to resist
respondent's demands for fear of losing her
means of livelihood. The sexual exploitation of
his subordinate done over a period of time
amounts to gross misbehavior on the part of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes that affects his
standing and character as a member of the Bar
and as an officer of the Court. All these
deplorable acts of respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes puts the legal profession in disrepute and
places the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, thus warranting disciplinary
action from the Court.
It bears emphasizing that an administrative
case for disbarment is sui generis and not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members
for the protection of the public and of the courts.
It is an investigation on the conduct of the
respondent as an officer of the Court and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we,
however, consider the recommended penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law
not commensurate with the gravity of the acts
committed by respondent Atty. De Los Reyes.
In Ventura v. Samson, this Court has reminded
that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment
should not be imposed where a lesser penalty
may accomplish the desired goal of disciplining
an erring lawyer. In the present case, however,
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions
show that he lacks the degree of morality
required of him as a member of the legal
profession, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is
disbarred for his gross misbehavior, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as
it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Antonio N. De Los Reyes GUILTY of gross
immoral conduct and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law.
14. Ceniza v. Ceniza, A.C. No. 8335, 10
April 2019
Topic: (based sa syllabus) Canon 1, Rule
1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Rule
7.03
Facts: Amalia Ceniza was married to Atty.
Eliseo Ceniza Jr. with two children. He said he
would attend a seminar in Manila but agreed to
forego the trip after hearing that she had some
business to attend to elsewhere. Upon coming
back, she found out her husband already moved
out, taking his car and personal belongings.
Members of his staff suspected him of having an
extra-marital affair with Binoya, and he was
found to have been living with her. He denied
committing any wrongdoing upon being
confronted by his wife and daughter.
The husband pleaded for her to agree to the
nullification of their marriage by alleging the
wife’s psychological incapacity, but she refused
and pleaded with him to stop displaying his kabit
in public. Such pleas fell on deaf ears.
The wife then brought a complaint for
immorality against respondent in the Office of
the Ombudsman and sent a letter to President
Arroyo stating that her husband had abandoned
her and her children which was forwarded to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Her husband
argued that Binoya was merely a business
partner and moved in with her because his wife
had become unbearable. The Ombudsman
decided against the husband, penalizing him
with suspension for six months which was
confirmed by the CA. The IBP recommended the
dismissal of the case but with a warning because
the act must be grossly immoral. The IBP Board
of Governors adopted the recommendation but
deleted the warning imposed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent should
be disciplined for actions attributed to him by
the complainant?
Ruling: The Supreme Court (SC) disagreed
with the IBP Board of Governors’
recommendation. The Commissioner
(Hababag) failed to discharge his responsibility
as fact finder and did not properly appreciate
the facts in relation to the laws and canons of
ethics. The respondent merely denied the
charges but did not disprove substantial
evidence (e.g. photographs of him in Binoya’s
house, three aunts of Binoya’s said she had a
new husband, Galvan testimony saying that his
car was parked in Binoya’s house for long
periods of time and was seen having dinner half-
naked, Jadraque’s testimony about surveillance
over Mr. Ceniza living in Binoya’s house with his
red car parked, Certificate of marriage was
shown that Binoya was a married woman,
daughter’s testimony against her father)
against him.
The court will not deviate the findings of the
Ombudsman as affirmed by the CA. It is morally
reprehensible for a married man or woman to
maintain intimate relations with another person
of the opposite sex other than his or her spouse.
It is a violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03.
There is no question that a married
person's abandonment of his or her spouse
to live and cohabit with another
constitutes immorality, especially when it
leads to the wife’s depression and child’s suicide
attempt out of despair. The Court has pointed
out that when the integrity or morality of a
member of the Bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he or she denies the charge,
for he or she must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence presented on the
charge. He or she must present proof that he
or she still maintains the degree of integrity and
morality always expected of him or her.
Atty. Eliseo Ceniza Jr. is guilty of gross
immorality and is disbarred from the
practice of law.
15. Venzon v. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, 20
August 2019
Topic: Canon 1 – Duty to uphold the
Constitution and the laws
Rule 1.01 Duty not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Facts: Complainant here is Venzon, a woman
who engaged the services of Atty. Peleo III (the
respondent) in relation to her petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with her
husband. The complainant and the respondent
started a relationship and resulted in the birth
of a child even though the respondent was still
married with his wife. Initially, Peleo responsibly
acted as a family man even purchasing for
Marife and their son a two-storey apartment in
Sampaloc, Manila. They also jointly purchased a
lot and built a house on it in Facoma, Brgy.
Labangan, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Peleo,
however, later on no longer visited her and their
son and stopped giving financial support. He
also reneged on his undertaking to give the
Manila and Mindoro properties to them and
continued to ignore her pleas for support,
forcing her to seek assistance from the IBP.
Through the IBP, they met and signed a joint
undertaking, but Peleo also did not honor the
same. The respondent denied that he was not
giving child support. The CBD-IBP found the
respondent liable for gross immorality and
violation of Canon 1 of the CPR for Lawyers.
Respondent was found to have failed to live up
to the exacting standards of the legal profession
by having sexual relation with a woman other
than his wife, aggravated by his utter refusal to
give support to the child he fathered with his
paramour. 2 years suspension was
recommended. the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt the CBD-IBP's Report and
Recommendation pertaining to respondent's
liability for gross immorality. Disbarment was
recommended.
Issue:
WON Atty Peleo violated Canon 1.
Ruling:
Yes, the SC noted the following transgressions:
he maintained sexual relation with Marife while
still lawfully married to his wife; falsified entries
in the birth certificate of his son when he
claimed to be legally married to Marife;
repeatedly failed to give child support to his
minor child; misused the legal process by filing
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
without any serious intention to prosecute it;
seriously disrespected the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)’s authority and dignity when
he disregarded an agreement brokered by the
IBP between him and Marife; and deceived the
government and private businesses by
continuously availing of the Senior Citizens’
discount by misrepresenting himself as a senior
when in truth, he was not yet 60 years old.
Indeed, public confidence in law and lawyers
may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
Hence, every lawyer is duty bound to act and
comport himself or herself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Respondent’s
conduct does not help in that regard, but worse,
directly encourages people to entertain
themselves with jokes about lawyers and the
legal profession as the butt of their unflattering
jokes.
Peleo was found GUILTY of GROSS
UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST and DECEITFUL
CONDUCT in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
ORDERED DISBARRED.
16. Chan v. Carrerra. A.C. 10439.
September 3, 2019
Topic:
Facts
Chan, who was abandoned by her husband for
another woman, met Carrera at Max’s
Restaurant. The latter introduced himself as a
widower. Carrera showed interest in Chan and
eventually supported Chan’s daughter and they
subsequently lived together. However, Chan
discovered that Carrera was in fact not a
widower as his wife was confined in an
institution, and because of this she wanted to
leave him. Unfortunately, she discovered that
she was pregnant with his child. When Chan
decided to stay, their relationship was no longer
harmonious as Carrera continued his
womanizing ways and emotionally abused
Chan.
Hence, Chan filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging Carrera with Gross Misconduct.
IBP Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors recommended
Carrera’s suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
Issue
Was Carrera guilty of Gross Immorality?
Ruling
Yes. The Court has ruled that a married person’s
abandonment of one’s spouse in order to live
and cohabit with another constitutes
immorality. As a basis of disciplinary action,
such immoral conduct must be so corrupt as to
virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
In the case at bar, both parties acknowledged
their undeniable love affair and they even
openly and deliberately cohabited despite
knowledge of their status. Carrera’s level of
knowledge and experience should have alerted
him of his duty to keep with the standards of
morality imposed on every lawyer. Hence, he
has violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR to
wit:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Chan’s Withdrawal of the Complaint
The Court denies Chan’s request because (1)
Chan was not represented by counsel when she
sought the withdrawal of her complaint and (2)
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
provides that no investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same.
17. JOSE R. REYES, JR. vs ATTY. SOCRATES
R. RIVERA
A.C. No. 9114. October 6, 2020
TOPIC: Rule 1.01 of the CPR commands that
"as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing."
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed
by Jose R. Reyes against respondent Atty.
Socrates R. Rivera for allegedly falsely
representing that a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was filed before the RTC
when in reality none was filed, and for drafting
a fake court decision. Complainant sought the
assistance of Atty. Rivera in filing a case for
dissolution of marriage and the latter agreed to
handle the case for a fee of P150,000.00 to be
paid on installment basis. Atty. Rivera prepared
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and asked complainant to sign. The complainant
was furnished a copy of the said Petition, which
appeared to have been filed before Branch 215
of the RTC.
At one point, complainant gave Atty. Rivera the
additional amount of P70,000.00. When Atty.
Rivera furnished complainant with the Decision
purportedly rendered by the Presiding Judge of
Branch 206 of the RTC which granted
complainant’s Petition, complainant had doubts
since he never attended a single hearing of the
case and the petition was filed before Branch
214 while the Decision was rendered by Branch
206. Complainant later learned that Branch 215
does not exist and no such case was filed with
Branch 206. Atty. Rivera argued that it was his
former driver who assured him that the Petition
had already been filed and that he had no
intention of deceiving the complainant since he
instructed their common friend to inform the
complainant that the decision he received was
spurious.
The Commissioner found Atty. Rivera guilty of
Gross Misconduct and breach of lawyer-client
relations and recommended that Atty. Rivera be
suspended indefinitely. The IBP Board of
Governors found Atty. Rivera guilty of Gross
Misconduct and resolved that the appropriate
penalty to be imposed was disbarment. The
Office of the Bar Confident recommended that
Atty. Rivera be disbarred and his name stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rivera is guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
CPR.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Rivera is guilty of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. Rule 1.01 of the
CPR commands that "as officers of the court,
lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."
In this case, Atty. Rivera undoubtedly fell short
of such standard when he committed a series of
fraudulent acts not only against the
complainant, but against the courts as well.
He misrepresented that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed when
none was in fact filed and even simulated the
stamp of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC to make it appear that it received the
petition. In addition to Branch 215 not existing,
he made a fake court decision purportedly
penned by the Presiding Judge of Branch 206 of
the RTC. The Court upholds the
recommendation of the IBP and the OBC that
Atty. Rivera is guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR and is hereby disbarred from
the practice of law and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return the P100,000.00 which shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from his receipt of the Decision
until full payment.
18. Dap-og v. Atty. Mendez
A.C. No. 12017. October 14, 2020
FACTS:
Roger Dap-og was at the compound of the
CENRO, DENR XI, Davao City, to accompany his
brother to attend a hearing/conference in a case
where Roger's wife, Gemma was one of the
respondents. Atty. Mendez represented the
Protestants in the case while Atty. Ladaga was
Gemma's counsel.
During the hearing, the parties agreed that
some of the impleaded respondents therein,
including Gemma, be dropped as parties to the
case after establishing that they were not
occupying the subject lot.
After the hearing, Roger, went to the canteen to
photocopy some documents. The parties had
conflicting versions as to what transpired next.
Complainant:
Atty. Mendez approached their table. Roger
then shook hands with Atty. Mendez. However,
Atty. Mendez suddenly called him a demon.
Atty. Mendez, who was sitting then, stood up
from where he was seated and tried to grab
Roger from across the table. Roger managed to
move back but Atty. Mendez still managed to
scratch his neck. Atty. Mendez then slapped
Roger's left cheek.
Roger suffered bruises for several days and his
right shoulder was fractured. He also felt
humiliated and psychologically tormented after
the incident. He averred that he is now
constantly in fear and anxious for his personal
safety due to the death threats hurled at him by
respondent's group.
Respondent:
Atty. Mendez denied Roger's allegedly malicious
accusations against him.
He alleged that Roger interrupted his
discussions about the case with his clients,
including his client Rodolfo.
Atty. Mendez then asked Roger why he is siding
with the other parties. Roger shouted invectives
at them and was later joined by Ruben.
However, Roger was never threatened or
physically harmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendez should be
held administratively liable based on the
allegations on the Complaint.
RULING:
Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) further provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The records of this case show without a shadow
of doubt that Atty. Mendez exhibited Gross
Misconduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.
The Court finds Roger's version to be more
credible as the same is supported by substantial
evidence.

Atty. Mendez clearly did not meet the lofty
standards reposed on lawyers. There is no
excuse for respondent's unlawful and
dishonorable behavior.
In imposing the penalty of suspension on Atty.
Mendez, we take note of the fact that
respondent's mauling of Roger, coupled with the
use of verbal insults and threats, happened in
broad daylight and in front of other people,
including respondent's fellow lawyer Atty.
Ladaga.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Luel C.
Mendez GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath
and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective immediately.
19. Lopez v. Ramos AC 12081 Nov 24 2020
Facts:
In Lopez's complaint-affidavit, he avers that
1) respondent prepared two (2) deeds of sale;
one for P130,000.00 and another for
P30,000.00, with the purpose of helping the
alleged seller minimize the payment of taxes
and
2) respondent was grossly negligent in the
performance of his duties as a notary public
when the latter failed to exercise prudence in
ascertaining that the identity of the persons who
signed the deeds before him were the same
persons who executed and personally appeared
before him. According to Lopez, respondent did
not attempt to identify the impostor beyond
asking and getting the latter's alleged residence
certificate number.
Issue:
Did Atty.Ramos violate the CPR and RNP when
he notarized the other deed of sale to avoid
taxes?
Ruling:
Yes. The second deed indicated an amount
lower than the actual price paid for the property
sold, respondent abetted in depriving the
Government of the right to collect the correct
taxes due. Respondent violated Rule 1.02,
Canon 1 of the CPR.
Respondent assisted the contracting parties in
an activity aimed at defiance of law, and
displayed lack of respect for and made a
mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment. When the respondent
notarized an illegal and fraudulent document,
he is entitling full faith and credit upon the face
of the document, which it does not deserve,
considering its nature and purpose.
Despite knowledge of the illegal purpose of
evading the payment of proper taxes due,
respondent proceeded to notarize the second
deed of sale. Instead of accommodating the
request of his client, Benjamin, respondent,
being a member of the legal profession, should
have stood his ground and not yielded to the
request of his client. Respondent should have
been more prudent and unfaltering in his
solemn oath neither to do falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any.
Respondent is suspended from the practice of
law for 2 years.
20. Kimteng, et. al. vs. Young
G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015
Parties:
● Petitioners: David Yu Kimteng; Mary
L. Yu; Winnie L. Yu; Vivian L. Yu; Rosa
Gan; Lilian Chua Woo Kimteng; Santos
Yu; Marcelo Yu; and Sin Chiao Yu Lim
● Respondents: Walter T. Young,
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.; Atty. Jovito
Gambol; and Atty. Dan Reynald R.
Magat, practicing law under the Firm
name, "Young Revilla Gambol & Magat"
(YRGM); and Judge Ofelia Calo of
Branch 211 of RTC Mandaluyong City
Facts: David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L.
Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo
Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin
Chiao Yu Lim are the majority stockholders of
Ruby Industrial Corporation. In the case of
Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial
Corporation vs. Lim, et al., the court ordered the
liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation (RIC)
and transferred the case to the appropriate RTC
branch to supervise the liquidation.
YRGM appeared in the liquidation proceedings
as the counsels for the liquidator. The
Petitioners filed an Opposition against the
appearance of YRGM on the ground that Revilla
was disbarred in 2009. The firm replied to the
Opposition, stating that they had retained
Revilla's name in the firm as an act of charity.
Petitioners cite the case of San Luis vs. Pineda
and United States vs. Ney, et. al. to support
their argument that the use of a disbarred
lawyer's name in the firm is tantamount to
contempt of court. To this, Attorneys Young and
Magat reasoned that they did not intend to
deceive the public and that in addition, that the
non-deletion of Revilla's name in the firm name
is no more misleading than including the names
of dead or retired partners' names in the firm
name.
They also point out that the Balgos Law Firm is
derailing the liquidation of RIC because Balgos
resents the fact that its nominee was not elected
as the liquidator. Respondents also raise the
issue of forum shopping because the petitioners
allegedly filed a disbarment complaint against
them, and one of the grounds for disbarment
cited by them was the use of Revilla's name in
their firm name.
In a separate comment, Atty. Gambol argued
that from the time that Revilla was disbarred,
he no longer practised law and that as a junior
member of the firm, he had no power and
authority to decide who should be removed from
the firm's name. He also added that in all the
cases he handled after Revilla's disbarment, he
omitted Revilla's name from the firm name in
the pleadings that he signed.
Issue:
(1) Are Attys. Young and Magat are in contempt
of court when they continued to use the name
of Atty. Revilla in the firm name even after the
latter was disbarred?
Yes.
Rule 71, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing.— After charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of
a court, and acting as such without authority;
The court has defined contempt of court as: a
willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority; a disobedience to the rules or orders
of a legislative or judicial body. In this case, the
respondents committed acts that are considered
indirect contempt under the said Section.
In addition, they also disregarded the Code of
Professional Responsibility when they
retained the name of respondent Revilla in their
firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:
Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false,
misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased
partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased. Respondents argue that
the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no
more misleading than including the names of
dead or retired partners in a law firm's name."
This Canon only allows the use of a deceased
partner’s name as long as there is an indication
that the partner is deceased, to ensure that the
public is not misled into thinking that such
partner is still authorized to practice law.
Furthermore, a lawyer who allows a non-
member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a
lawyer and practice law is guilty of violating
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01. The pertinent rules
state:
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily
or habitually holding oneself out to the public as
a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown
by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself
as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law. Such acts constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
(2) Is Atty. Gambol in contempt of court?
No. He filed a separate Comment, explaining
that he dropped Revilla’s name from the firm
name in the pleadings that he filed in several
courts, and this is supported by the Comments
filed by Attys. Young and Magat. The Court
recognizes the effort to avoid misleading the
public by removing Revilla’s name in the
pleadings he filed.
(3) Is Judge Calo in contempt of court when she
held that Atty. Young can appear in court as
long as it is under the name “Young Law Firm”,
which is a non-existent firm?
Yes.
From petitioners' allegations, it appears that
respondent Judge Calo committed an error in
judgment when she allowed respondent Atty.
Young's appearance under the Young Law Firm.
However, this Petition to cite respondent Judge
Calo in contempt is not the proper remedy.
Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese discussed the
remedies available to litigants as follows:
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies
against errors or irregularities being committed
by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or
legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a
judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect
of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change
of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are
prerequisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil
or administrative liability may be said to have
opened, or closed.
21.) Palencia v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 10557
[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962], 10 July
2018
Topic:
Canon 2, Rule 2.03 – A lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Facts:
Complainant Jerry M. Palencia
(complainant) was an overseas Filipino worker
seafarer, while respondents Atty. Pedro L.
Linsangan, Atty. Gerard M. Linsangan, and
Glenda Linsangan-Binoya, are his alleged
lawyers.
When complainant was still working as
a seafarer, he was seriously injured during work
when he fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel
he was employed in. After initial treatment in
Singapore, he was discharged to the and flown
to the Philippines to continue his medical
treatment and rehabilitation. While he was
confined at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, a
paralegal named Jesherel L. Millena (Jesherel)
approached him and convinced him to engage
in the services of the respondents’ law office in
order to file a suit against his employers for
indemnity. After several visits from the
paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro
Linsangan, the complainant executed the
following: (1) Attorney-client contract; and (2)
Special power of attorney.
After the execution of the contract, the
respondents were able to collect the amount of
US$60,000 from the employer of the
complainant, as well as US$20,000 under the
collective bargaining agreement. From these
amounts, respondents charged complainant
attorney’s fees of 35%.
Respondents, as well as Gurbani & Co.
(a law firm based in Singapore; also hired by
the complainant through the respondent), filed
a tort case against the owners of the vessel
before the High Court of Singapore. For this
case, the respondents engaged the services of
the following:
1. Papadopoulos, Lycourgos, & Co. – a law
firm based in Cyprus, to draft a written opinion
on the issues involving Cyprus law, among
others.
2. Retired Justice Emilio Gacayco (Justice)
for his expert opinion regarding various issues
raised by the vessel’s lawyer and
representatives.
Thereafter, negotiations led to a
settlement award in favor of the complainant in
an amount of US$95,000. Gurbani & Co.
remitted to the respondent lawyers the amount
of US$59,608.40. From the amount of
US$59,608.40 remitted by Gurbani & Co., the
respondent lawyers further deducted the
following amounts: (1) US$5,000 as payment to
Justice Gancayco; (2) their attorney’s fees
equivalent to 35%; and (3) other expenses. The
total amount left for the complainant was
US$18,132.43.
The respondent lawyers tendered the
amount of US$20,756.05 (representing the
US$18,132.43) to complainant, but the
complainant refused to accept the amount and
contested the amount comprised of the
expenses and attorney’s fees deducted.
On September 12, 2005, the lawyer
respondents filed an ACTION FOR PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION (Civil Case No.
05113475 or consignation case) to compel the
complainant to receive the amount tendered.
This case was eventually dismissed.
On September 22, 2005, the
complainant filed an action against the lawyer
respondents for accounting, remittance of
settlement amounts and damages (Civil Case
No. 2401 or accounting case). The complainant
eventually won this case.
On March 28, 2007, the complainant
filed a letter-complaint against the lawyer
respondents with the IBP-CBD. He alleged the
following matters:
1. The lawyers refused to remit
the amount collected in the
Singapore case worth US$95,000,
and in offering only
US$20,756.05;
2. Depositing complainant’s
money into their own account; and
3. Engaging in “ambulance
chasing” by deploying their agents
to convince complainant to hire
respondents’ services while the
complainant was still bedridden in
the hospital.
The lawyer respondents then answered
the complaint of the complainant:
1. The complainant unjustly
refused to accept the amount of
US$20,756.05, and even refused
their tender of payment before the
RTC (Civil Case No. 05113475 or
 consignation case; eventually
dismissed).
2. They denied that they deposited
the amount into their own account.
They claimed that the
US$20,756.05 has been placed for
safekeeping in the vault located
inside their office ever since. They
alleged that upon their receipt of
the complainant’s complaint in the
IBP-CBD, they decided to deposit
the money with BPI in an interest
savings account, in trust for
complainant.
3. As to the allegations of
ambulance chasing, respondents
averred that they provide free legal
advice to the public. It was in the
course of this public service when
they met complainant.
IBP-CBD ruled that respondents
violated the CPR:
1. In soliciting legal business
through their agents while
complainant was in the hospital
2. In failing to account for, and
deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand;
3. In hiring the services of a
foreign law firm and another lawyer
without prior knowledge and
consent of complainant of the fees
and expenses to be incurred.
The IBP-CBD found that all 3 lawyer
respondents connived and thus recommended
that all respondents be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. It also directed the
respondent lawyers to comply with the Decision
in the accounting case (Civil Case No. 2401).
The IBP-BOG adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
After the respondent lawyer’s MR, the IBP-BOG
modified the penalty and increased
respondents’ suspension for 2 years with
warning, and ordered the respondents to return
the 5% of the amount assessed to the
complainant as attorney’s fees.
Issues:
WON the respondent lawyers violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes.
Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.03; Canon 2,
Rule 2.03, Canon 3.
A lawyer in making known his legal services
must do so in a dignified manner (Canon 3).
They are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers. The CPR explicitly states
that "[a] lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business." (Canon 2, Rule 2.03). Corollary to
this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit
or proceeding for any corrupt motive or interest
(Canon 1, Rule 1.03). Thus, "ambulance
chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind
of business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent, in order to gain employment,
is proscribed.
Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that
respondents violated these rules. No less than
their former paralegal Jesherel admitted that
respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan came with
her and another paralegal named Moises, to
Manila Doctors Hospital several times to
convince complainant to hire their services. This
is a far cry from respondents' claim that they
were merely providing free legal advice to the
public. Moreover, while respondents deny
Jesherel's connection with their law firm, this
was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when
he presented Jesherel's resignation letter as
received by respondents' firm. In employing
paralegals to encourage complainant to file a
lawsuit against his employers, respondents
indirectly solicited legal business and
encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious
sanctions.
Violation of Canon 16.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client
is highly fiduciary. This relationship holds a
lawyer to a great degree of fidelity and good
faith especially in handling money or property of
his clients. Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind
a lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession; (2) deliver the funds and property
of his client when due or upon demand subject
to his retaining lien; and (3) account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from his client.
Here, respondents claim that they promptly
accounted for the total award of US$95,000.00,
and after deducting their fees, tendered the
amount of US$20,756.05. Complainant,
however, refused to accept the amount because
he contested both the expenses and the
separate deduction of attorney's fees by
respondents and Gurbani & Co.
We find that while respondents gave prompt
notice to complainant of their receipt of money
collected in the latter's favor, they were amiss
in their duties to give accurate accounting of the
amounts due to complainant, and to return the
money due to client upon demand.
The Attorney-Client Contract between the
parties states: "We/I hereby voluntarily agree
and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay
Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and his collaborating
Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to
thirty-five [35%] percent of any recovery or
settlement obtained." Clearly, the stipulated
rate referred to the combined professional fees
of both respondents and their collaborating
Singapore counsel, Gurbani & Co. Nevertheless,
respondents proceeded to deduct separate fees
on top of the amount already deducted by
Gurbani & Co. Complainant contested this
deduction and refused to accept the amount
being tendered by respondents. Since a claim
for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services of a lawyer had
been rendered, or in a separate action,
respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their
share, should have moved for the judicial
determination and collection of their attorney's
fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for
his attorney's fees on money in his hands
collected for his client does not entitle him to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself.
Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money
inside the firm's vault for two years until they
were made aware of the disciplinary complaint
against them before the IBP-CBD. However, as
noted by the IBP-CBD in its Report and
Recommendation:
[T]he defense of respondents that they kept in
their office vault the share of complainant as
computed by them in the amount of
US$18,132.43, hence, they forgot the same and
remembered it only when they received the
Order of this Commission for them to file an
Answer to complainant's Complaint [which is
more than 2 years] is rather highly incredible
considering that it involves a substantial
amount, the series of communications between
the parties, and the Civil cases subsequently
filed.
Even if we give credence to this explanation, it
is improper for the lawyer to put his client's
funds in his personal safe deposit vault. 62
Funds belonging to the client should be
deposited in a separate trust account in a bank
or trust company of good repute for
safekeeping.
Complaint against Atty. Glenda Linsangan-
Binoya is dismissed.
While we find respondents Attys. Pedro
Linsangan and Gerard Linsangan to have
violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03 of the CPR, the
records do not support respondent Atty. Glenda
Linsangan-Binoya's participation in their
unethical activities. Complainant himself admits
that he only dealt with respondents Attys. Pedro
and Gerard Linsangan. Thus, we hold that the
case against Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya be
dismissed.
Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and Atty.
Gerard M. Linsangan were declared suspended
from the practice of law for two years. As for the
recommendation of the IBP-BOG for
respondents to return to the complainant 5% of
the amount assessed, the Supreme Court didn’t
adopt the recommendation on the basis of the
principle of immutability of judgments. The
accounting case or Civil Case No. 2401 has long
attained finality and was already set for
execution.
22. PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO G.R. No.
207041, November 09, 2015
Topic: Failure to indicate MCLE compliance
number and date thereof is a cause for dismissal
of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records
Facts: Facts: Jesus Arrojado was charged with
Murder in an Information filed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Roxas City and filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Information against him
on the ground that the investigating prosecutor
who filed the Information did not indicate
therein the number and date of issue of her
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliace, as required by Bar
Matter No. 1922 promulgated by the Court on
June 3, 2008. The RTC dismissed the
Information without prejudice. The CA also
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON the failure to indicate her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance would cause the
dismissal of the case. - YES
RULING: The City Prosecutor contends that the
term “pleadings” as used in BM No. 1922 does
not include criminal informations filed in court.
An information is considered an initiatory
pleading because it is a written statement that
contains the cause of action of a party, which in
criminal cases is the State as represented by the
prosecutor, against the accused. Like a
pleading, the Information is also filed in court
for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly, an
Information falls squarely within the ambit of
Bar Matter No. 1922.
B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that
“failure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.”
As such, the CA properly dismissed the case.
NOTE: The SC eventually issued an En Banc
Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which
amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records"
and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the
required information would subject the counsel
to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action."
23. CERILLA VS, LEZAMA A.C. No. 11483,
October 3, 2017
Topic: Canon 5 – Duty to keep abreast of
legal developments
FACTS:
Cerilla, complainant, filed an administrative
complaint for gross misconduct against Atty.
Lezama, respondent, before the IBP.
Respondent entered into a Compromise
Agreement on the basis of the SPA granted to
him by the complainant. The SPA authorized
respondent to represent complainant in filing
the ejectment case. Nowhere is it expressly
stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized
to compromise on the sale of the property or to
sell the property of complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that
he entered into the compromise agreement with
the defendant in the unlawful detainer case and
stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant
herein, was willing to sell the property to the
defendant in the amount of P350,000.00 even if
the complainant did not instruct or authorize
him to sell the property, and he merely acted
upon his own belief. As the SPA granted to him
by the complainant did not contain the power to
sell the property.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct?
RULING:
YES.
The respondent is found guilty of violating
Canons 5, 15, and 17 of the CPR.
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve
high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence.
CANON 15 – _A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 17- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent’s justification does not persuade,
because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his
client, since the property she was not willing to
sell was sold at a price decided upon by
respondent on his own, which caused his client
and her co-owners to file further cases to
recover their property that was sold due to
respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact
that he was not authorized by his client to
sell the property.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is imperative
that lawyers be conversant with basic legal
principles. Here, nowhere it is expressly stated
in the SPA that respondent is authorized to
compromise on the sale of property. Hence, he
clearly acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the
suspension from the practice of law for a period
of 2 years. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
imperative that lawyers be aware with basic
legal principles. Here, nowhere it is expressly
stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized
to compromise on the sale of property. Hence,
he clearly acted beyond the scope of his
authority.
24. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari
III, A.C. No. 10525, 1 September 2015
Topic: Canon 5 – Duty to keep abreast of legal
developments
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by
complainant Wilson Uy, designated
administrator of the estate of Jose Uy, against
respondent (Maghari III) charging the latter in
engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the
lawyer’s oath, on the ground that he used
information that is false and/or appropriated to
another lawyer in signing certain pleadings.
Conflict arises between Wilson Uy and other
heirs of the deceased. At the course of the
proceeding, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena
ad testificandum be issued against Magdalena
Uy as she was alleged to be a treasurer of
several businesses of Jose Uy. As Magdalena’s
counsel, Maghari III filed several pleadings
starting from 2010 to 2012. Wilson Uy’s counsel
noticed that since 2010, respondent had been
changing the professional details indicated in
the pleadings he had signed and has been
copying the details of another lawyer (Atty.
Natu-el). Thus, Wilson Uy filed a complaint for
disbarment. Pointing out that Maghari’s act of
repeatedly changing and copying another
lawyer’s professional information violates the
lawyer’s oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
Issue: Whether the Respondent violated the
CPR when he failed to put his correct Attorney
Details in his pleadings?
Held:
Yes, A counsel’s signature is such an integral
part of a pleading that failure to comply with this
requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap
of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus,
faithful compliance with this requirement
is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to
a court but is as much a matter of fidelity
to one’s client. A deficiency in this respect can
be fatal to a client’s cause. As with the signature
itself, these requirements are not vain
formalities: The inclusion of a counsel’s Roll of
Attorneys number, PTR number, and IBP receipt
(or lifetime membership) number is intended to
preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice. They seek to ensure that only
those who have satisfied the requisites for
legal practice are able to engage in it. With
the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily
verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has,
in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With
the PTR, they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the place
where he or she principally discharges his or her
functions. With the IBP receipt number, they
can ascertain if the same person remains in
good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of
information protect the public from bogus
lawyers. Paying professional taxes (and the
receipt that proves this payment) is likewise
compliance with a revenue mechanism that has
been statutorily devolved to local government
units.
The inclusion of information regarding
compliance with (or exemption from) MCLE
seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserved only for those who have complied
with the recognized mechanism for
“keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of
the profession[,] and enhancing] the
standards of the practice of law.”
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel’s address and
contact details is designed to facilitate the
dispensation of justice. These pieces of
information aid in the service of court
processes, enhance compliance with the
requisites of due process, and facilitate better
representation of a client’s cause.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M.
Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer’s
Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) years
25. VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR. vs. ATTY.
ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ A.C. No. 10911. June
6, 2017.
Topic: Mandatory Continuing Legal Education,
Bar Matter No. 850; Number and Date of MCLE
Certificate of Completion required in all
pleadings, motions, Bar Matter No. 1922
Facts: Complainant alleged that in an action for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
complainant was one of the plaintiffs while
respondent was the defendants’ counsel
therein. As the said case was decided in favor of
the plaintiffs, respondent indicated his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating
the date of issue thereof. On appeal, respondent
filed the appellants' brief, again only indicating
his MCLE Compliance Number.
Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant
discovered that respondent had no MCLE
compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a
Certification, stating that respondent had not
yet complied with his MCLE requirements for the
First and Second Compliance Period.
Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that
respondent's act of deliberately and unlawfully
misleading the courts, parties, and counsels
concerned into believing that he had complied
with the MCLE requirements when in truth he
had not, is a serious malpractice and grave
misconduct. The complainant, thus, prayed for
the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment
to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be
administratively disciplined?
Ruling: YES. It was clearly established that
respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. No less
than the MCLE Office had issued a certification
stating that respondent had not complied with
the first and second compliance period of the
MCLE.
Despite such non-compliance, respondent
repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance
number in his pleadings before the trial courts.
In indicating patently false information in
pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only
once but four times, as per records, the
respondent acted in manifest bad faith,
dishonesty, and deceit. Respondent's act of
filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain
false information is a mockery of the courts.
Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise
states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
In using a false MCLE compliance number in his
pleadings, respondent also put his own clients
at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal
to the client's cause as pleadings with such false
information produce no legal effect. In so doing,
respondent violated his duty to his clients.
Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide:

CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause

of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.

CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with

competence and diligence.

Respondent's act of ignoring the court orders

despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and
runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his
repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for
the authority of the Court.

Respondent in this case is DISBARRED from the

practice of law.