Accepted Manuscript

How structural and procedural features of managers' performance appraisals facilitate

their politicization: A study of Canadian university deans’ reappointments

Eric Lavigne

PII: S0263-2373(18)30067-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2018.06.001
Reference: EMJ 1857

To appear in: European Management Journal

Received Date: 30 March 2017

Revised Date: 27 April 2018
Accepted Date: 8 June 2018

Please cite this article as: Lavigne E., How structural and procedural features of managers' performance
appraisals facilitate their politicization: A study of Canadian university deans’ reappointments, European
Management Journal (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.emj.2018.06.001.

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Running head: POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 1

How structural and procedural features of managers’ performance appraisals facilitate their
politicization: A study of Canadian university deans’ reappointments

Eric Lavigne

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Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education, University of Toronto,
252 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6, Canada

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Abstract

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Performance appraisal politics are driven by human behaviour, yet human behaviour is in turn
facilitated by processual features. Processes understood as easily politicized are more likely to
become so. Accordingly, beyond the role of individuals, organizations must understand the role

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of processes in facilitating organizational politics. Drawing from the findings of a multiple-case
study of deans’ reappointments in Canadian universities, I develop a framework to analyze the
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politicization of managers’ performance appraisals from a processual perspective. Structural
features were found to facilitate politicization through hierarchical inversion and coalition-
building mechanisms, while procedural features were associated with role and performance
reframing mechanisms. The framework reframes performance appraisal politics within the realm
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of policymaking, with important implications for research and practice.

Keywords: Organizational politics, performance appraisal, management, decanal reappointment.

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Acknowledgements

This study was undertaken as part of my doctoral research. I am grateful to my supervising

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committee and my faculty's Ethics Board for their guidance. I also thank the reviewers and the
guest editors, whose comments greatly enriched the manuscript.
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POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 2

How structural and procedural features of managers’ performance appraisals facilitate their

politicization: A study of Canadian university deans’ reappointments

1. Introduction

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Performance appraisals are widespread human resource management processes used to

control and improve individual and organizational performance (Luecke, 2006). In recent years,

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the research literature on performance appraisals has moved beyond the study of their statistical

and cognitive aspects to include organizational context, with a growing number of studies

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investigating the impact of distal and proximal variables on performance appraisals (Elbanna,
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Thanos, & Papadakis, 2014; Ellington & Wilson, 2017; Ferris, Munyon, Basik, & Buckley,

2008, Ferris, Perrewé, Daniels, Lawlong, & Holmes, 2017; Levy & Williams, 2004). Among
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these, studies of political context and political behaviour of ratees and raters have shown that
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supervisors either take politics into account when rating employees (Du Plessis & Van Niekerk,
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2017; Longenecker, Sims, & Gioia, 1987; Rosen, Kacmar, Harris, Gavin, & Hochwarter, 2017;

Swanepoel, Botha, & Mangonyane, 2014) or experience political pressure when evaluated (Gioia
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& Longenecker, 1994).

These studies lend credence to broader models of organizational politics where agents
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engage in political behaviour based on goals (Mayes & Allen, 1977), will (Kapoutsis,
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Papalexandris, Treadway, & Bentley, 2017; Treadway, 2012), frustrations (Rosen, Harris, &

Kacmar, 2009), power (French & Raven, 1959; Ouimet, 2008), skills (Ferris et al., 2007;

Kimura, 2015), and organizational culture (Mintzberg, 1985). However, to this date, studies of

political behaviour in performance appraisals have mostly concentrated on raters and ratees
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POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 3

effects (Rosen et al., 2017). As a result, the link between performance appraisals’ politicization

and their processual features has not been sufficiently investigated (Bol, Kramer, & Maas, 2016).

In this article, I draw from the findings of a case study of Canadian university deans’

reappointments to explore how the features of organizational processes participate in their

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politicization. To do so, I combine two seemingly ill-matched frameworks: Kannengiesser &

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Gero’s (2012) situated structure-behaviour-function framework, which posits that the features of

designed objects shape their use, and Ouimet’s (2008) framework of organizational politics,

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which identifies uncertainty, complexity, and limited resources as the cornerstones of political

behaviour. Specifically, I argue that politics have to do also with the design of organizational

processes, and not only with people.

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The primary contribution of this article is to provide a link between two important areas

of performance appraisal research, research on instruments and research on politics, to introduce

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the concept of political affordances. Political affordances are the processual features that signal
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to agents, through their specific design, how and to what extent they may be used for political
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purposes. By looking at how the features of performance appraisals facilitate their political use,

this study links the two fields and explores their relation. The article makes another meaningful
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contribution by providing a framework of managers’ appraisal types to study, evaluate, and

design managers’ performance appraisals.

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2. Literature review: Political behaviour in managers’ performance appraisals

It has been many years since McGregor (1957) described his uneasiness towards the

unwarranted assumptions behind performance appraisals. One such assumption is that appraisal
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POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 4

participants are neutral and that their goal is only to appraise. However, even appraisal goals take

many shapes, which in turn impact ratings (Murphy, Cleveland, Skattebo, & Kinney, 2004;

Smith, Craig Wallace, & Jordan, 2016). Furthermore, other goals, unrelated to the measure of

performance, also explain to an extent why performance ratings have little to do with

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performance (Bernardin, Thomason, Buckley, & Kane, 2016; Judge & Ferris, 1993;

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Longenecker et al., 1987; Murphy, 2008).

Both employees (Poon, 2004; Salimäki & Jämsén, 2010; Swanepoel et al., 2014; Tziner,

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Murphy, Cleveland, Yavo, & Hayoon, 2008) and managers (Du Plessis & Van Niekerk, 2017;

Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al., 1987) perceive performance appraisals as

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highly politicized processes and use political skills to their advantage when navigating them
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(Hochwarter et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2017; Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006; Wihler, Blickle,

Ellen, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2014). When evaluating their employees, managers are often
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influenced by broader considerations (Bol, 2011; Du Plessis & Van Niekerk, 2017; Longenecker
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et al., 1987; Mero, Guidice, & Brownlee, 2007; Shore & Strauss, 2008; Spence & Keeping,
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2009, 2011, 2013; Wang, Wong, & Kwong, 2010). Foremost, managers take into account, in

addition to performance, other factors such as long-term relations with employees, employees’
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working conditions and career development, and the lasting impact written evaluations may have

for their employees. Managers’ experiences with past performance appraisals also affect their
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attitudes towards performance appraisals (Du Plessis & Van Niekerk, 2017) and their ratings
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(Spence & Keeping, 2009), alongside their perceptions of politics (Rosen et al., 2017).

Managers’ own performance appraisals are steeped in politics as well. Managers’ work is

ill-defined and hard to describe and appraise with performance criteria or rating rubrics (Redman

& Snape, 1992). Comparisons between managers are also hard to make, in part because similar
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titles do not per se entail similar tasks or similar contexts (Ellington & Wilson, 2017).

Furthermore, managers’ performance cannot be easily distinguished from their units’

(Mintzberg, 2009). Finally, it can be argued that what managers do is as important as how they

do it. Results matter, but methods do too (Hammons & Guillory, 1990). As a result, managers’

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performance appraisals have often been found wanting (Hammons & Guillory, 1990; Redman &

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Snape, 1992) and used to further their supervisors’ personal agendas (Longenecker et al., 1987).

The purpose of managers’ appraisals generally guides how the appraisals are conducted.

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Generally, 360-degree schemes (see Bracken, Rose, & Church, 2016), which include upward

appraisals by employees, are used to provide feedback to their managers, and supervisors’

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appraisals are used for pay and continuation purposes. The use of upward appraisals is
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contentious, especially when performance appraisals have high stakes, and even more so when

appraisals are anonymous (Antonioni, 1994; Bracken et al., 2016; Redman & Snape, 1992).
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Though holding managers accountable may serve to hinder their darker impulses (Rus,
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van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012; Smith et al., 2016), managers report several issues with their
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performance appraisals. Chief among them are unclear criteria, poor working relationships with

their supervisors, remote supervisors with no opportunities to witness performance, conflictual

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reviews, and, for more than half of the managers interviewed, political interference

(Longenecker, 1997). Regarding this political interference, managers see more political abuse as
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they move up the ladder. Supervisors misuse their managers’ performance appraisals and
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overemphasize selfishness as well as the achievement of targets at all costs (Kanyangale &

Zvarevashe, 2013). Managers further note that the ambiguous nature of their work facilitates that

abuse, and that their supervisors often confuse performance for supporting their personal agenda
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(Longenecker, 1997). In other words, managers view their performance appraisals as political

tools of control (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994).

As for university deans, their reappointments and performance appraisals have largely

been ignored. Hodges & Christ (1987) conducted a survey of the different schemes used to

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evaluate American nursing deans’ performance. Two other studies examined the validity of

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potential appraisal schemes with discouraging results: the first examined the validity of faculty

survey and concluded that the variance between deans’ performance ratings had more to do with

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the identity of the rater than the identity of the ratee (Heck, Johnsrud, & Rosser, 2000; Rosser,

Johnsrud, & Heck, 2003), while the second examined the validity of deans’ self-evaluations and

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concluded that deans were mostly unable to accurately evaluate their own performance (Vieira
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da Motta & Bolan, 2008).

This review of the literature suggests that, though the politics of employees’ performance
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appraisals have received increased attention, the politics of managers’ performance appraisals
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remain understudied. In particular, studies have explored managers’ perceptions of politics and
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rating biases, but have ignored the possible link between performance appraisals politics and

their processual features. Dhiman & Singh (2007) posit that perceptions of politics are related to
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processual features, but do not organize these ideas into a framework. The present article

investigates the link between performance appraisals’ politics and processes and proposes a
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framework to guide research and practice.

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3. Conceptual framework
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The present study combines organizational politics and design to conceptualize the role

played by processes in facilitating their own politicization. More precisely, the concept of

affordance is borrowed from the field of design and applied to organizational processes to

explain why some processes are more likely to become politicized. By bringing to the fore the

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role played by performance appraisals’ features in facilitating their own politicization, the

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framework shifts the attention away from the role of agents in organizational politics.

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3.1. Political context of performance appraisals

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The study of power, influence, and politics in organizations serves as a contrasting lens to
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rational organizational models (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Ferris & Treadway, 2012). In the case of

performance appraisals, political models allow for mechanisms other than statistical and
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cognitive limitations to explain their limitations and outcomes (Bernardin et al., 2016; Judge &
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Ferris, 1993; Longenecker et al., 1987; Murphy, 2008).

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Performance appraisal models usually locate politics within a broader social context,

which in turn shapes raters’ and ratees’ behaviour. Levy & Williams (2004) organize
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performance appraisals’ social context using three categories of variables: distal, processual

proximal, and structural proximal. Distal variables, for example economic context or
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organizational goals, are broad and remote, and influence not only performance appraisals, but
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most human resource management systems within an organization. Proximal variables, on the

other hand, are closely related to performance appraisals. Levy & Williams distinguish between

two types of proximal variables: processual and structural. Processual variables shape how

performance appraisals are conducted, and include rater or ratee issues and dyadic or group
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issues, while structural variables describe the structure of performance appraisal systems and

include, for example, performance appraisal frequencies, purpose, and performance dimensions.

Distal variables influence both processual and structural variables, which in turn influence

behaviour.

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Ferris et al. (2008) propose a slightly different framework. Drawing from Levy &

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Williams (2004), they model the context of performance appraisals by distinguishing between its

social, emotional, cognitive, and political components, describing these components as

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intricately related to one another. However, by reorganizing the context of performance

appraisals in such a way, Ferris et al. narrow their context to people and interactions, drawing

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attention away from Levy & Williams’s (2004) distal and structural proximal variables. Also,
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neither Levy & Williams (2004) nor Ferris et al. (2008) consider the possible connection

between politics and the features of performance appraisal processes. This omission limits our
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understanding of the role of context in performance appraisals. To remedy, this article examines
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the relationship between the features of performance appraisals and their politicization.
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3.2. Politicization of organizational processes: uncertainty, complexity, and resource

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dependency
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Political behaviour in organizations is defined as the use of sanctioned and unsanctioned

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means to pursue unsanctioned ends, or the use of unsanctioned means to pursue sanctioned ends

(Mayes & Allen, 1977). Sanctioned means in organizations typically include formal tools found

in policies and regulations. Unsanctioned means, on the other hand, are deemed unacceptable or

viewed with suspicion.

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Three components facilitate political behaviour: complexity, uncertainty, and resource

dependency (Ouimet, 2008). Complexity results from the great number of organizational

activities contributing to different extents towards performance, while uncertainty describes the

limits of knowing. Uncertainty is tied to complexity: the more complex an organization, the

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harder it becomes to measure who did what, how, and what outcomes can be related to these

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actions. As complexity rises, so does uncertainty. This uncertainty with regards to processes and

outcomes can be reduced, but never removed. Complexity and uncertainty alone provide ample

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support for political behaviour in organizations, but it is the limited amount of resources

available that provides momentum for political behaviour (Ouimet, 2008). If complexity is the

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opportunity and uncertainty the means, then resource dependency is the motive. Scarcity forces
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organizations to allocate resources, but complexity and uncertainty impede rational distribution.

Accordingly, each unit must argue for resources. Thereby, complexity, uncertainty, and limited
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resources together create the conditions for political behaviour. Whether these conditions are
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perceived and acted upon may depend on the will and the skills of those involved, but also how
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the process as designed is perceived and understood.

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3.3. Affordances of designed objects

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With the increasing complexity of machine systems, design-oriented research fields have
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shifted from machine-centered to user-centered approaches (Norman, 1986). The question no

longer is whether the tool can do it, but whether the user can make the tool do it. This new

approach profited greatly from importing the concept of affordance, first developed by Gibson

(1979), and extending it to the perceived features of designed objects (Norman, 1999).
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The situated structure-behaviour-function framework (Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004)

defines relations between a designed object’s structure, its behaviour, and its function. Structure

refers to the components of an object and their relations, behaviour describes what an object

does, in relation to its structure, and function refers to the intended purpose of an object. In short,

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an object, through its structure, behaves in certain ways, which fulfill intended or unintended

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functions. In addition, how agents understand and interact with an object changes as they interact

with it. Their understanding is situated. They interpret the world, have expectations. As they

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interact with the world, these interpretations and expectations are modified. Kannengiesser &

Gero (2012) further expand this model by including Norman’s (2013) perceived affordances

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(Kannengiesser & Gero, 2012). Perceived affordances describe the potential for action of objects
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as perceived by agents. Affordances explain why users do not always produce the intended

behaviour from an object or encounter difficulties when using an object. As such, the framework
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shifts the onus of responsibility from the agent to the object, and ultimately to its designer. The
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resulting framework distinguishes between three types of affordances: reflexive, reactive, and
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reflective (Kannengiesser & Gero, 2012). Reflexive affordances match structure directly to

behaviour and function. They are highly intuitive and require little or no processing from users.
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Reactive affordances, on the other hand, offer multiple options and force some level of

exploration to obtain the desired behaviour. Finally, reflective affordances allow users to shift
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their goals and use objects in new ways, depending on the situation. For example, when lost at
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sea, a person may think of using a small mirror to signal a plane for help. The mirror’s

affordances are interpreted differently because the situation and the goals are different.

3.4. Political affordances of managers’ performance appraisals

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Affordances provide us with a new lens to study organizational politics. Processes, as

objects, are designed, and their structures are perceived and interpreted by agents. Objects have

structures, behaviours, and functions. Correspondingly, processes have features, outcomes, and

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goals. The relation between features, outcomes, and goals depends in part on how these features,

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or affordances, are perceived and interpreted in a particular situation. Whether a process is used

as intended depends on the agents’ characteristics, but also on the process’s perceived

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affordances.
The different features of organizational processes involved in signalling possible

unintended uses can be grouped in two broad categories: structural and procedural. Structural

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features describe the participants involved, their roles, and their organizations into groups, while
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procedural features describe what counts as evidence, how it is gathered, and how it leads to a
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decision. Simply put, structural and procedural perspectives evaluate whether the right people are

doing the right things using the right tools.

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Managers’ performance appraisals assign to their participants appraisal roles that

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combine with their organizational roles. In the case of managers’ performance appraisals,

organizational roles generally include: supervisor, other managers, direct reports, indirect
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reports, and externals. Supervisors are higher ranking managers overseeing appraised managers,

other managers include all managers generally interacting with appraised managers, direct
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reports are employees reporting directly to appraised managers, indirect reports are employees
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from other units, and externals are participants from outside organizations.

In addition to their organizational roles, performance appraisal participants also have

appraisal roles: ratees, raters, analysts, and decision-makers. Ratees are the appraised managers,

raters provide performance feedback, analysts combine and analyze performance data, and
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decision-makers evaluate the data and make recommendations. Organizational and appraisal

roles coexist and may conflict with one another. In addition, appraisal roles imply a temporary

hierarchy between participants that may be at odds with the usual one.

Managers’ performance appraisals also include procedures: data collection, analysis, and

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decision-making. Data collection is the gathering of information from different sources. The

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nature of the data collected is related to how performance is defined within the organization,

though sometimes these criteria are implicit. Sources often include employee surveys, unit

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performance measurements, budget reports, and supervisors’ evaluations. Analysis uses the data

collected to produce a general portrait of the performance. Analysis is based on priorities,

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sources’ validity, and appropriate weighing of sources of evidence. As such, analysis determines
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what matters, but also to what extent it matters. The focus of the analysis is generally related to

the purpose of the performance appraisal. Finally, decision-making evaluates and judges the
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overall performance portrait and makes a recommendation, taking into account the purpose of
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the appraisal.
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To sum, the extent to which organizational processes become politicized depends not

only on the characteristics of agents, but also on the features of processes. These features act as
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political affordances. They signal possible uses, intended and unintended.

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4. Methods
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The study examined fourteen Canadian university deans’ reappointments in eight

universities across four provinces and used a multiple-case study method (see Yin, 2013) to

structure its analyses. Table 1 summarizes the salient characteristics of the cases. Of note, of the
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fourteen participating deans, five were women, none belonged to a racialized group, and one did

not get reappointed. Also of note, two participants had occupied higher level positions between

their reappointments and the time of the interview. These promotions likely resulted in a shift of

perspective, which was taken into account during the analysis.

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[Table 1 about here.]

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To protect the identity of the participants, I present all information on cases and findings

in an aggregated format. The number of deans in Canadian universities is relatively small, and

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the number of reappointed or non-reappointed deans even smaller. Revealing any set of factual
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data for any single dean, for example female dean of science in a research university, could

easily lead to their identification. For the same reasons, I also opted not to interview other
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stakeholders such as faculty members or provosts. Instead, I relied on documents and cross-
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analyses to corroborate my findings.

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For each case, I interviewed deans about their experience and sensemaking of their

reappointments. To build the interview guide, I borrowed from phenomenological interviewing

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techniques (see Seidman, 2012), but took into account the realities of interviewing executives

(see Conti & O’Neil, 2007; Harvey, 2011) and limited the interviews to two hours. The interview
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guide starts with a review of the career paths of deans and their decision to seek reappointments.
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In the second part of the interview, the questions are more factual. They ask about sequences of

events and procedures followed. In the third section, I ask deans what they make of the process

and what they would do differently. The last part of the interview follows Pawson’s (1996)

prescriptions and tests some of my theoretical assumptions. In this last section, the deans are
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asked directly about the politics surrounding their reappointments and the impact of coalitions.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim, then coded using the QSR International NVivoTM

software.

To corroborate my findings, I have collected documents related to deans’ reappointments.

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To protect the deans’ identities, I only used public documents and the documents they provided.

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The public documents included the reappointment policies and the participants’ biographies.

Participants also provided an interview questionnaire, a provostial performance report, a non-

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public reappointment policy, and a list of performance goals.

Data analysis focused first on the process. It sought to identify the general structure of

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deans’ reappointments and the extent to which individual reappointments shared similarities.
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Drawing from the conceptual framework, the analysis differentiated between structural and

procedural features. This meant differentiating between who participates in the process, what
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activities are performed, and how they are performed. Since deans were not always aware of all
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of these dimensions, policy documents were helpful in completing and validating their
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depictions, as well as the results from other deans’ interviews, in particular when more than one

case covered the same university.

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The second part of the analysis focused on politics in two different ways. Firstly, the

analysis identified the extent to which political behaviour was observed and experienced by
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deans. Secondly, the analysis took on a more theoretical turn and identified the extent to which
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the structural and procedural features of deans’ reappointments facilitated their politicization.

5. Background
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In Canada, higher education falls under the jurisdiction of the provinces, leading to

different provincial arrangements (Austin & Jones, 2015). Canadian colleges and universities are

for the most part public institutions, but remain independent not-for-profit entities. Their

existence and governance are defined by provincial laws and their funding comes in great part

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from the provinces (Jones, 2014).

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5.1. Canadian university deans

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In Canadian universities, deans are responsible for academic units, such as faculties or

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schools, or for central activities related to academics, such as students, research, or graduate
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studies. Deans report to the provost, who generally oversees the university’s internal affairs. The

deanship is a short-term appointment of three to five years, generally renewable once. In most
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cases, appointees come from the faculty or are granted a full tenured professor status as part of
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their hiring conditions (Boyko & Jones, 2010).

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The Canadian deanship is best described as a balancing act (Gmelch, 2002). Deans are

expected to fill multiple leadership roles for a variety of interest groups (Montez, Wolverton, &
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Gmelch, 2002). Universities harbour a great number of formal and informal communities with

often conflicting interests (Kerr, 2001). Within their faculties, deans not only find themselves at
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the nexus of these lines of conflict, but also at the connecting point between the central
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administration of the university and the faculty (Montez et al., 2002).

5.2. Canadian university deans’ reappointments

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Canadian university deans’ reappointments are processes by which universities decide to

reappoint deans to another term in office. Reappointments are performance appraisals taking

place during the last year of a dean’s first term, which is usually of three to five years. The

process takes a few months and leads, in most cases, to a recommendation to the provost, then to

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the president, and then to the governing board of the university. In some rare cases, decisions are

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made ultimately by the faculty members instead of the university.

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6. Findings and analysis

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The purpose of the study was to investigate Canadian university deans’ reappointments
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using a framework combining organizational politics with processual features. In doing so, the

study aimed to bring to the fore the features of managers’ performance appraisals facilitating
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their politicization. The analysis of the fourteen cases identified several features facilitating
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deans’ reappointments’ politicization, which are categorized as either structural or procedural.

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These features were then organized into a generalized framework.

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6.1. Overview of shared characteristics across cases

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Despite each case being unique, several patterns emerge from their cross-analysis.
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Table 2 summarizes the cases’ characteristics relevant to the study and shows the extent to

which these are found across cases. As some universities are associated with more than one case,

the table has two parts. The first part presents characteristics by universities and focuses on how
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reappointments are organized. The second part of the table focuses instead on deans’ experiences

and presents the characteristics by cases.

Overall, the table shows three important findings: reappointments are loosely organized

performance appraisals, what counts as performance is contested, and reappointments are

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politicized processes. Also, results are more polarized when it comes to processes. Either almost

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all of the universities share a characteristic, or none of them do, suggesting that the universities

under study use similar reappointment practices, though they are not required to. Results are

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more ambiguous for deans, suggesting that they experience reappointments quite differently. For

some deans, all went well during their reappointments. For them, the process works as intended.

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Other deans have experienced various levels of political interference and their perceptions are
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more nuanced, even negative. Also, an important number of deans reported being aware of

political interference during other deans’ reappointments. In every case, they described these
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situations as very difficult and draining for the deans, but also for their faculties.
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Deans understood performance differently. For some of them, performance related

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mainly to quantifiable goals, while for others, performance was about intangibles. Some deans

emphasized maintaining collegiality, others saw it as not causing problems for central
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administration and keeping the peace, others still saw it as having the support of the faculty and

the provost.
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[Table 2 about here.]

6.2. General sequence of reappointments

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The fourteen cases of deans’ reappointments investigated took place in eight different

universities. In each university, reappointments followed a similar sequence of events (see

table 2). Figure 1 summarizes this sequence. In broad strokes, reappointments start with deans

signalling to their provosts their intention to seek reappointment. Their provosts then put together

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reappointment committees composed minimally of faculty members, staff members, and

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students. In most cases, alumni, members of the community, professionals from affiliated

organizations, and other academic administrators also sit on these committees. These committees

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count between twelve and twenty members. Most committees are responsible for deciding the

specifics of the evaluation process.

U
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[Figure 1 about here.]
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Once the committee is put together, the next steps are concerned with data collection.
D

They include at least a broad call for input and an interview with the dean seeking
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reappointment. The reappointment committees then analyze the data collected and make a

recommendation. This is often done in one sitting. Recommendations are then conveyed in turn
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to provosts, who sit on reappointment committees and often chair them, to presidents, and

ultimately to governing boards. In rare cases, recommendations are instead conveyed to faculty
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councils, composed in majority of faculty members, who vote on the recommendations. The
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faculty councils have final say, as their support is required for the recommendations to be

forwarded to presidents and boards.

6.3. Political affordances of Canadian university deans’ reappointments

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POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 19

This section examines the political affordances emerging from the analysis. Canadian

university deans’ reappointments involve very high stakes. They determine if deans keep their

position or return to the faculty. Yet, they rely on loosely collected data, which are analyzed by

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committee members with little experience and no training. Furthermore, there are no set

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procedures to collect or analyze data, nor are there criteria or performance standards to judge or

compare performance. In addition, most committees are free to determine what data are

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collected, how they are analyzed, and how much weight they have in the decision. Finally, raters,

analysts, and decision-makers are comprised in majority of direct reports, faculty and staff

members.
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6.3.1. Structural features facilitating politicization
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The structural features of processes clarify who does what. This section analyzes the
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appraisal roles held by organizational participants during reappointments. Deans’ reappointments

involve a majority of faculty stakeholders and some university and community stakeholders.
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Provosts are the cornerstones of deans’ reappointment structures. They are responsible

for the process and pilot its sequence of activities. Deans’ interviews reveal the decision-making
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role provosts play before and after appraisals take place. They provide deans with personal
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assessments and influence their decisions to seek reappointment, they lead their committees and

receive their recommendations. Provosts also, in most cases, determine who sits on

reappointment committees. In addition, their recognized experience in conducting

reappointments means that they can more easily shape discussions.

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Faculty members also shape the outcomes of reappointment processes, though through

different means. Faculty members participate as raters, analysts, and decision-makers. They join

their deans’ reappointment committees by being selected by their provosts or their peers,

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depending on the institution. As committee members, they can shape procedures, when those are

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loosely defined, and participate in deliberations and votes. As a result, they can shape how

deans’ roles are understood and what counts as performance. Staff members, students, other

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managers, and external stakeholders play roles similar to those of faculty members. However,

they usually have fewer representatives on reappointment committees.

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Deans are provided with subtler forms of power, as they are invited to participate as
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raters, analysts, and even decision-makers. First deans can withdraw from the process at any

time. Often, it is preferable to withdraw from the process than to be denied their reappointments.
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Deans are also provided with some measure of power as they are asked to describe their past
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term to their faculties and their reappointment committees. This opportunity allows them to
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reframe their roles and performance and provide committees with their version of performance

criteria. They get to participate in defining what their role is and what counts as performance. In
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the absence of any other clear source of definition, this reframing plays an important role.

Finally, despite their efforts to be inclusive and representative, reappointment committees

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fail to seek the perspectives of those working closest to deans. Members of the Office of the
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Dean, be they staff, directors, associate or vice deans, are included as staff members or faculty

members. Their privileged perspectives on deans’ roles and performance are neither sought nor

considered in any particular way, despite the fact that they witness deans’ performance first-hand

and daily.
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Overall, the structure of Canadian university deans’ reappointments is open and

inclusive, though it fails at being representative and ensuring expertise. Raters are not trained,

nor are they presented with criteria or expectations regarding roles and performance. As a result,

raters, analysts, and decision-makers participate in the process of their own will, often in small

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proportions, and bring with them personal definitions and expectations regarding their dean.

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These structural features participate in offering participants opportunities to politicize the

process, that is, to lead the process away from its intended purpose and towards personal ones.

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6.3.2. Procedural features facilitating politicization

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Canadian university deans’ reappointments rely on the same procedural features as most

performance appraisals. Data collection is followed by analysis, then decision. However, the
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procedures stray from usual performance appraisal assumptions in significant ways, which
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further facilitate their politicization.

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Formal reappointment processes start with data collection. This first procedure provides

every stakeholder with an opportunity to comment on their deans’ performance. However, data
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collection rarely provides raters with a prescribed format for input. Furthermore, calls for input

rarely provide raters with criteria, expectations, job descriptions, or relevant projects and
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achievements. What deans are expected to do is not made clear to raters. The calls for input also
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fail to target specific groups who have had more opportunities to witness their deans’

performance. By allowing for fluid participation, data collection fails to ensure sample

representativeness. These particular feature of deans’ reappointment processes allow every rater
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to define their deans’ role and performance as they see fit. They also make it easier for smaller

coalitions to gain leverage.

Taking place after data collection, data analysis is performed by the same committees

responsible for making reappointment decisions. In most universities, committees simply go over

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the data and form an opinion by discussing what they make of the evidence collected. Committee

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members are ill-equipped and ill-prepared to judge deans’ performance. The majority of them

have no prior experience as deans, in evaluating deans, and are not provided training.

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Also, committee members are not provided with a procedure to weigh the different

sources of evidence available to them. Assuming that committee members have received a

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number of deans’ evaluations from faculty and staff members, an official position letter from the
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faculty association, annual review reports from the provost, enrolment and financial reports, and

the dean’s report, how are they to categorize, compare, weigh, and evaluate all these sources? In
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all the cases investigated, there were very few set definitions of expectations to which data could
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be compared. In the absence of pre-defined criteria, committee members not only deliberate
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about roles and performance, but also on what those roles should be and what should count as

performance.
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The analytical procedures facilitate the use of influence tactics to sway and convince

committee members. Each member, as a result of the lack of credible evidence, the lack of a
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shared method of analysis, and a lack of criteria, can use information, status, expertise, and
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representations to sway other members and paint a picture of the deanship that suits their goals.

Provosts are in a better position than other members to do so, as they have status, information,

expertise, and, in most cases, final authority over the process. However, other members can still
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leverage power, in particular by forming coalitions. The lack of valid data also limits the power

of expertise, as evidence can easily be dismissed or ignored.

In the case of Canadian university deans’ reappointments, decision-making is hard to

separate from analysis. Reappointment committees often meet only once to go over the evidence,

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analyze it, and come to a decision. As such, decision-making procedures facilitate politicization

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in a similar way that analysis procedures. In addition, as mentioned above, decision-making

relies on analysis, which relies on data collection. This scaffolding implies that issues in the first

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stages also impact subsequent stages.

Second, the absence of criteria or clear role descriptions implies the absence of explicit

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performance standard. Not only what counts as performance, but also what counts as acceptable
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performance is determined by committee members based on their personal views and goals.

Also, reappointment decisions are made by committees in a collegial manner, through consensus
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building, and consensus building implies the use of influence.

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Finally, in the absence of consensus, a vote is generally taken. As discussed earlier,

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reappointment committees are composed in majority of faculty and staff members. Decisions by

votes first imply that individuals’ opinions take precedence over performance standards, but also
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that the groups with the largest representation or the greatest influence can control the outcomes.

Though reappointment committees’ recommendations may, in most cases, be vetoed by provosts,

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presidents, or governing boards, such vetoing have a political price and are generally avoided.
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Reappointments run parallel with yearly provostial evaluations. Every year, provosts

review their deans’ performance. These reviews involve provosts and their deans only, and tend

to focus on quantitative data, such as enrolment targets, budgets, and issues within faculties. As a

result, deans participate in two separate appraisal processes. One takes place every year and
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relies on criteria relevant to central administration, while the other runs every five years and

relies on the same criteria, by way of provosts as they sit on reappointment committees, but also

on criteria relevant to members of their faculties, students, and external members.

Also invisible to reappointment processes is the informal discussion between provosts

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and their deans regarding their upcoming reappointments. Provosts’ preliminary advice influence

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to a great extent whether deans seek reappointments. It is likely that deans seldom seek

reappointments without the support of their provosts. Yet, this work behind the scenes also

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remains invisible to reappointment committees.

Overall, this study of Canadian university deans’ reappointments brings to light the

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troubling ease with which they can become politicized. Their structural and procedural features
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are a far cry from the rational assumptions of performance appraisals. Instead, reappointment

processes present their participants obvious political affordances to shift the purpose of
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reappointments in unintended directions.

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TE

6.4. Performance appraisal political affordances: A framework

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The findings drawn from the investigation of Canadian university deans’ reappointments

are here generalized and organized into a coherent framework. Four mechanisms explain how
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structural and procedural features facilitate performance appraisals’ politicization: hierarchical

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inversion, coalition-building, role reframing, and performance reframing.

Hierarchical inversion occurs when processes not only give participants new appraisal

roles, but more importantly when the new roles have different hierarchical relations with one

another, such as when direct reports are provided with decision-making power about their
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managers’ careers. Coalition-building is the grouping of individuals based on shared goals. Its

purpose is to increase the political leverage individuals have on a process by aligning efforts.

While the structural features of managers’ performance appraisals facilitate their

politicization through hierarchical inversion and coalition-building mechanisms, procedural

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features do so through role and performance reframing mechanisms. Role reframing is the

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redefinition of what a manager’s role is, while performance reframing is the redefinition of what

counts as performance in one’s role.

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Figure 2 presents a framework for the political affordances of managers’ performance

appraisals. These are organized in three ways. First, the framework distinguishes between

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structural and procedural features, where structural features describe who does what and
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procedural features what gets done. These two categories are further separated into three

components: raters and data collection, analysts and analysis, and decision-makers and decision-
M

making. Finally, the affordances are located within the broader contextual features shaping them.
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For structural features, these include the purpose of the appraisal, the manager’s
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performance, and the policies and instruments used for the appraisal. For procedural features, the

contextual features include the political context, the appraisal participants’ selection process, and
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the organizational roles of the participants.

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[Figure 2 about here.]

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6.4.1. Political affordances in structural features


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Who participates in the appraisal is the first source of political affordances. Appraisal

roles are assigned to organizational members through a selection process determining who acts

as rater, analyst, and decision-maker. Assigning analyst or decision-maker appraisal roles to

employees normally reporting to their managers supports hierarchical inversion, while

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broadening participation by limiting selection requirements supports coalition-building. Whether

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participants must volunteer or their roles are assigned early on, whether training is required or a

minimum level of competency, or whether there are no set limits to the number of participants all

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contribute to facilitating politicization through hierarchical inversion and coalition-building

mechanisms.

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Each appraisal role provides its users with political affordances. For raters, analysts, and
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decision-makers, low levels of role competency, low accountability, as well as conflicts of

interests participate in facilitating appraisals’ politicization. Role competency describes whether

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raters, analysts, and decision-makers have been trained or are competent to fulfill their roles.
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Accountability clarifies the extent to which appraisal participants are held accountable for their
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activities in the process. Anonymity, while protecting raters, removes by the same extent

accountability. Finally, conflicts of interests describe whether participants’ organizational roles

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conflict with their appraisal roles.

Decision-maker roles provide participants with an additional political affordance.

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Organizational discretion describes the extent to which the decision-makers can simply be
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ignored by their organizations. In cases where organizations cannot easily do as they please and

ignore appraisal decisions, decision-makers are provided with greater political influence over

processes’ outcomes.
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6.4.2. Political affordances in procedural features


Performance appraisals’ procedures provide users with political affordances when they

allow for role reframing and performance reframing. What data is collected, how it is collected,

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and how it is used, all these procedural features of performance appraisals send signals to

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participants regarding not only their intended use, but also regarding the extent to which they can

be politicized.

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The political affordances of data collection procedures include implicit criteria, indirect

evidence, informal collection procedures, and no defined collection format. Criteria, by drawing

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on role and performance expectations, provide an explicit grid upon which data collection
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instrument can be built or at least compared. Their absence allows raters to reframe managers’
M

roles and performance. Related, the use of indirect evidence, data that is not directly linked to

managers’ performance, again allows for participants to develop a narrative of their choice about
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the relationship between the indirect evidence and performance. Informal collection procedures
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describe procedures that either allow loose participation without ensuring appropriate

representativeness, or fail to privilege the reporting by raters closer to managers’ daily work.
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Finally, the absence of collection formats, for example a form or a survey, allows raters to

control how their information is presented.

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Analysis procedures provide participants with political affordances when they present the
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following characteristics: implicit constructs, informal methods, and informal weighing. Implicit

constructs relate to how the different role and performance criteria are brought together to

represent overall performance. It goes beyond defining what is part of performance and clarifies

what counts as performance. Informal methods describe analytical processes that are different for
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each analyst or analytical processes that rely on holistic impressions or intuitive heuristics.

Again, the use of informal methods provides analysts with opportunities to reframe managers’

roles and performance. Related to constructs and methods, informal weighing describes more

particularly the lack of clear weighing of role and performance dimensions in constructs. To the

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extent that those dimensions are quantifiable, the relative ratios should be explicit.

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Finally, the political affordances provided by decision-making procedures involve

implicit standards, large groups, votes, and lack of veto and recourse procedures. Implicit

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standards describe the extent to which measured performance is associated with satisfaction

standards to guide decisions. They define the minimum level for which performance is deemed

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satisfactory. Group size refers to the number of decision-makers, with larger groups offering
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more political affordances. Also, larger groups tend to imply voting procedures, which again

tend to facilitate politicization. Finally, the possibility that decisions can be challenged, either by
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veto or through a recourse procedure, also curtails to an extent political maneuvering.

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7. Discussion
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The study’s findings support the existing literature on managers’ performance appraisals.

As other managers’ most Canadian university deans perceive their reappointments as politicized
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processes (Du Plessis & Van Niekerk, 2017; Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al.,
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1987) and are witness to subtle and overt political behaviour (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994;

Kanyangale & Zvarevashe, 2013; Longenecker, 1997; Longenecker et al., 1987). As well, deans

are not passive and they too use political skills to shape their appraisals’ outcomes (Hochwarter

et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2017; Semadar et al., 2006; Wihler et al., 2014). However, the present
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study differs from the previous studies in that it emphasizes the role played by performance

appraisals’ features. In the study, many instances of political behaviour, such as faculty members

trying to control the process or deans reframing their performance, were enabled and facilitated

by the process. As such, the study confirms not only that perceptions of politics (Dhiman &

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Maheshwari, 2013; Dhiman & Singh, 2007), but also political behaviour is shaped by the

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features of performance appraisals.

The application of Kannengiesser & Gero’s (2012) situated structure-behaviour-function

SC
model to organizational processes proves useful in broadening our understanding of

organizational politics by clarifying the role of processual features. As this study shows, the

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specifics of performance appraisals, how they are implemented, who does what, and how things
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are done, shape politics. In Kannengiesser & Gero’s (2012) model, objects provide users with

affordances of three types: reflexive, reactive, and reflective (see section 3.3). Within that
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framework, research concerned with instrumentation tends to view performance appraisals’

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affordances as reflexive or reactive. It assumes processes behave as intended. A political

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perspective allows us instead to view these affordances as reflective, that is, interpreted

differently based on the user’s goals and the situation.

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Further, uncertainty, complexity, and resource-dependency (Ouimet, 2008) proved useful

in guiding the analysis and establishing facilitation mechanisms. Uncertainty and complexity are
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essential components of role and performance reframing mechanisms. However, the role of
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resource-dependency in hierarchical inversion and coalition-building mechanisms remains less

obvious. The link becomes clearer when resources are understood broadly. Hierarchical

inversion provides agents with access to authority to shape decisions and coalition-building

gathers the power of multiple agents to exercise leverage.

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The study extends existing theoretical models of performance appraisal politics in two

ways. First, they confirm the relevance of including processual features in the context of

performance appraisals, as in Levy & Williams’s (2004) model. Ferris et al. (2008) clarify their

interpersonal dimensions greatly, but in doing so, they also shift the attention away from other

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contextual variables. Second, the findings clarify the link between processes and organizational

RI
politics. Both in Ferris et al.’s (2008) and in Levy & Williams’s (2004) models, political

behaviour appears only in relation to interaction between agents. This study shows, however, that

SC
performance appraisal politics cannot be isolated from the features of the process itself.

Accordingly, the social context of performance appraisals must remain broad and

U
inclusive, as in Levy & Williams (2004), but it also requires specific frameworks, such as Ferris
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et al.’s (2008) and the one presented here, to guide research and understanding in each of its

components. In addition, such a broader model must link the proximal components related to
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processes to the ones related to people, as processual features shape social dynamics.
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TE

8. Implications for practice

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This study suggests that managers’ performance appraisals are politicized processes.

However, it also suggests that performance appraisal politics are shaped by processual features.
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In other words, that design matters. The findings demonstrate that organizational politics belongs
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in part in the realm of policy and processes. Policymakers therefore can play an important part in

shaping these politics through policy design.

Foremost, the study provides new tools with which performance appraisal politics can be

understood and processes evaluated or designed. The structural and procedural features of
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performance appraisals signal to agents uses other than those intended. By allowing for

hierarchical inversions and coalition-building, a process can facilitate its politicization. Similarly,

an implicit understanding of managers’ roles and performance expectations allows agents to

freely reframe what performance appraisals measure. Measuring performance then resembles

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painting a target once the arrow has landed. Practitioners and policymakers can use the

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framework and the identified political affordances to evaluate their processes and determine the

extent to which they can easily be derailed.

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9. Limitations and future research directions

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AN
The study used a qualitative approach to investigate the link between politics and process

in Canadian university deans’ reappointments. As such, several opportunities for future research
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remain. First, the study relied on a qualitative approach. Accordingly, the study does not clarify
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the extent to which politicization occurs in managers’ performance appraisals, nor does it
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endeavour to quantify the link between the presence of features and the presence of politics.

Quantitative studies focusing on these issues can serve to better understand the scope of
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performance appraisal politics and refine the framework.

Second, this article proposes a framework generalized from the study of Canadian
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university deans’ reappointments. Given the specificity of the study, other studies investigating
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other types of managers, in other organizational settings, and in other countries will clarify the

relevance and usefulness of the framework.

Third, the investigation relied on the perspectives of deans. The perspectives of other

stakeholders, such as faculty members and provosts, could not be gathered. To understand the
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POLITICIZATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 32

role played by performance appraisals’ features in facilitating their politicization, multiple and

varied perspectives must be sought.

Finally, the study interviewed a single non-reappointed dean and thirteen reappointed

ones. As such, the present study emphasizes the perspectives of those who were successful.

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These participants are more likely to have more positive attitudes towards the process, which

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may skew their answers. Accordingly, seeking the perspectives of managers with negative

experiences of their performance appraisals, in particular managers who left or were asked to

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leave their positions, is indispensable to keep a balanced view.

10. Conclusion
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This investigation of Canadian university deans’ reappointments reveals that the
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structures and procedures of performance appraisals act as political affordances. They signal to
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organizational agents the ways by and extent to which they can be used for political purposes.
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The article introduces a framework to understand how processes facilitate organizational politics,

shifting the emphasis away from the role of individuals and towards the role of processes.
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That being said, curtailing politics can in turn lead to other issues, for example measuring

what is measurable instead of measuring what matters. Accordingly, policymakers need to

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properly assess the role of politics in performance appraisals and determine the measure of
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ambiguity and room for maneuver that best serves their purpose, while protecting raters and

ratees.
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Table 1: Distribution of Case Characteristics

Cases
(n = 14)
Case characteristics n %
Appointment type
From the faculty 5 36

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From outside 9 64
Deanship experience
First deanship 9 64
Subsequent deanship 5 36

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Faculty type
Professional 9 64
Arts and sciences 4 29

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Campus 1 7
Gender
Female 5 36
Male 9 64

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Previous reappointment experience
First reappointment 11 79
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Reappointed elsewhere 3 21
Reappointment outcome
Reappointed 13 93
Not reappointed 1 7
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Time between reappointment and interview

Less than one year 5 36
Between one and three years 7 50
Between three and five years 2 14
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University type
Comprehensive 2 14
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Research intensive 11 79
Undergraduate 1 7
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Table 2: Shared Characteristics Across Cases, for Universities and for Deans

Universities
(n = 8)
Shared characteristics for universities n %

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Policy describing process 4 50
Policy describing criteria 1 13
Parallel yearly evaluations by provost 8 100
Parallel evaluation by faculty union 1 13

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Committee responsible for evaluation 8 100
Committee including members from faculty, staff, and students 8 100
Committee members having training or experience 0 0

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Call for input going beyond the faculty 8 100
Call for input providing role or criteria 3 38
Call for input including a quantitative component 1 13
Anonymous appraisals 6 75

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Committee interviewing dean 8 100
Dean providing self-appraisal 8 100
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Dean presenting to their faculty 3 38
Analysis following a set procedure 0 0
Recommendation based on performance standards 0 0
Recommendation made to the president 7 8
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Cases
(n = 14)
Shared characteristics for deans n %
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Knowledge of political interference from provost 5 36

Knowledge of political interference from faculty or staff members 6 42
Knowledge of political interference in other deans’ reappointments 7 50
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Feedback provided post-process 8 57

Feedback considered useful 3 21
Process following regulations 12 86
Process considered to evaluate performance 9 64
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Process considered to emphasize the voice of the malcontents 9 64

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Figure 1: General Sequence of Reappointments

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Figure 2: Political Affordance Framework for Managers’ Performance Appraisals

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