G.R. No.

192074               June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner,

vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of its
original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of the
Civil Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal:

We are asked in this petition for review1 filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned and
-controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commission’s finding that respondent was guilty only of simple
dishonesty.

This case developed as follows:

On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order
No. 119, series of 2006.2 The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvañ a’s designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
LRTA Administrative Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects and perform such other
duties and functions as may be assigned to her"3 by the Administrator.

Atty. Salvañ a was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued on May 22, 2006 by
Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative department. Instead of complying,
Salvañ a questioned the order with the Office of the President.4

In the interim, Salvañ a applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006.5 In
support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate6 issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen or treated
Salvañ a on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate.7 On June 23, 2006, Administrator Robles issued
a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvañ a to explain in writing within 72 hours from her
receipt of the notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]"8 for not complying with Office
Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical certificate.9

Salvañ a filed her explanation on June 30, 2006.10 She alleged that as a member of the Bids and Awards Committee,
she "refused to sign a resolution"11 favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No. 119 was issued by
Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness"12 over her refusal to sign.

The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006, it issued a formal
charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.13

On August 5, 2006, "Salvañ a tendered her irrevocable resignation."14 None of the pleadings alleged that this
irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded to
Administrator Robles’ acceptance of the resignation letter.

In the meantime, the investigation against Salvañ a continued, and the prosecution presented its
witnesses.15 Salvañ a "submitted a manifestation dated September 6, 2006, stating that the Committee was biased
and that [Administrator] Robles was both the accuser and the hearing officer."16
On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvañ a guilty of all the charges
against her and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory penalties."17 The
LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee18

Salvañ a appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she was denied due process
and that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against her."19

On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364.The Civil
Service Commission found that Salvañ a was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of
suspension for three months.20

LRTA moved for reconsideration21 of the resolution. This was denied in a resolution dated May 26, 2008.22 LRTA
then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.23

On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals24 dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commission’s
finding that Salvañ a was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles
had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right only
belonged to respondent in an administrative case.25 LRTA moved for reconsideration26 of this decision but was
denied.27

Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before the
Court of Appeals.28 It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia29 as basis for its argument that it can be considered a
"person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of administrative cases.30 It
also argues that respondent’s falsification of the medical certificate accompanying her application for sick leave
was not merely simple but serious dishonesty.31

Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file the appeal
since it was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that Administrator Robles had no
authority to file the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the Board of Directors authorizing him
to do so.32 She also agrees with the Civil Service Commission’s finding that she was merely guilty of simple
dishonesty.33

In its reply,34 petitioner points out that it presented a secretary’s certificate35 dated July 17, 2008 and which it
attached to the petitions before the Civil Service Commission, Court of Appeals, and this court. It argues that the
certificate authorizes the LRTA and its Administrator to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or appeal
regarding this case, and this authorization has yet to be revoked.36

Both parties filed their respective memoranda before this court on May 23, 201237 and December 6, 2012.38

The legal issues that will determine the results of this case are:

1. Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the modification by
the Civil Service Commission of its decision

2. Whether Salvañ a was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only

We grant the petition.

The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service

It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."39 If it is not
granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it.40 When made available by law
or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of
the constitutional requirement of due process of law.

Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central
personnel agency of the Government."41 In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a
public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants."42

Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process."43 Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the
Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to "[h]ear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal."

The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service
Law of 1959, appeals "by the respondent"44 were allowed on "[t]he decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees."45

Presidential Decree No. 807, while retaining the right to appeal in administrative cases, amended the phrasing of
the party allowed to appeal. Section 37, paragraph (a), and Section 39, paragraph (a),of Presidential Decree No. 807
provide:

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days. (Emphasis
supplied)

Additionally, Section 47, paragraph (1), and Section 49, paragraph (1), of the Administrative Code provide:

SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

SECTION 49. Appeals.—(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days….(Emphasis supplied)

The phrase, "person adversely affected," was not defined in either Presidential Decree No. 807 or the
Administrative Code. This prompted a series of cases46 providing the interpretation of this phrase.

The first of these cases, Paredes v. Civil Service Commission,47 declared:

Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the
respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The
decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases
where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days salary.48 (Emphasis supplied)

This ruling was repeated in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission49 where this court stated that:
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

....

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found
guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there
is no occasion for appeal.50 (Emphasis supplied)

The same ratio would be reiterated and become the prevailing doctrine on the matter in Magpale, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission,51 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone,52 University of the Philippines v.
Civil Service Commission,53 and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.54

In these cases, this court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed of
by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions prescribing a
penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected are the respondents that are
charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that may only be granted by
statute, a government party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to its power, since the right to
appeal does not form part of due process.55

In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein the State
or the complainant would have no right to appeal.56 When the Civil Service Commission enacted the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied this court’s
definition. Thus, Section 2, paragraph (l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the URACCS defined "party adversely
affected" as follows:

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.

....

(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered.

For some time, government parties were, thus, barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants they had
previously sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy57 on
April 29, 1999 that the issue would be revisited.

Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoyand Philippine National Bank v. Garcia

In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,58 an administrative complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and
nepotism was filed against the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade in Allen,
Northern Samar. The Civil Service Commission found Dacoycoy guilty, but the Court of Appeals overturned this
finding and exonerated Dacoycoy of all charges. The Civil Service Commission then appealed the ruling of the
appellate court. This court, in addressing the issue of the Commission’s standing, stated that:

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not
guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not
the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a
witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected
by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule
extant jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases
where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other
words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission;
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and
Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.59 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

In his concurring opinion, then Chief Justice Puno summed up the rationale for allowing government parties to
appeal, thus:

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law
declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary.

But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They
are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their
multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and
defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a
petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The
objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given
immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions
exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government
official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.60 (Emphasis supplied)

The decision in Dacoycoy would be reiterated in 2002 when this court promulgated Philippine National Bank v.
Garcia.61 Philippine National Bank categorically allowed the disciplining authority to appeal the decision
exonerating the disciplined employee.

In that case, the bank charged Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., one of its check processors and cash representatives, with
gross neglect of duty when he lost ₱7 million in connection with his duties. Both the Civil Service Commission and
the Court of Appeals reversed the bank and exonerated Garcia from all liability.

This court, however, upheld Philippine National Bank’s right to appeal the case. Citing Dacoycoy, this court ruled:

Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar
appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which
acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent
appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this
constitutional grant.

Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA’s exoneration
of the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and
safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to
appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of
his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27,
1996. Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him
back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select
honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in
our country.62 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 021600 published on
December 29, 2002, which amended the URACCS, to allow the disciplining authority to appeal the decision
exonerating the employee:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. –

....

(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.

Subsequent decisions continued to reiterate the rulings in Dacoycoy and Philippine National Bank.

In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,63 this court explained the rationale of allowing the Civil Service
Commission to appeal decisions of exonerations as follows:

That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its resolutions
which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[,]
this Court held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party who
may appeal the decision to this Court.

The situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for
administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a
witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the
Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and
unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the
integrity of the civil service system.

The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional
mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen
the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to
appeal the adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly
elevating the decision for review.64

Then in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan,65 this court declared:

At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel
agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of
those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of
the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at
this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for reconsideration.66

The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission.

In Pastor v. City of Pasig,67 this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of the Civil
Service Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city government having
reassigned her to another unit.

In Geronga v. Varela,68 this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City had the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of a decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating a city employee on the ground that "as
the appointing and disciplining authority, [he] is a real party in interest."69

In Department of Education v. Cuanan,70 this court ruled that the Department of Education "qualifie[d] as a party
adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative
case."71
There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal.

In National Appellate Board v. Mamauag,72 an administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed by Quezon
City Judge Adoracion G. Angeles against several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Central
Police District Command (CPDC) of Quezon City, upon investigation, dismissed the complaint. Dissatisfied, Judge
Angeles moved for a reinvestigation by then PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II.

PNP Chief Sarmiento issued a decision finding the accused police officers guilty of the offenses charged. Some were
meted the penalty of suspension while others were dismissed from service. Upon motion for reconsideration by
Judge Angeles, Chief Sarmiento modified his ruling and ordered the dismissal of the suspended police officers.

One of the officers, Police Inspector John Mamauag, appealed the decision with the National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission. The National Appellate Board, however, denied the appeal. Mamauag appealed the
denial with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the National Appellate Board and
ruled that it was the Philippine National Police, not Judge Angeles, which had the right to appeal the decision of
PNP Chief Sarmiento, as it was the party adversely affected. The National Appellate Board then appealed this
decision with this court.

This court, while citing Dacoycoy, declared that Judge Angeles, as complainant, had no right to appeal the dismissal
by CPDC of the complaint against Mamauag. It qualified the right of government agencies to appeal by specifying
the circumstances by which the right may be given, thus:

However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard
the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must
be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will
result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached,
becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after
Dacoycoy, the Court declared:

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the
Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service
Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review."

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and
became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices
and agencies," not to litigate.73 (Emphasis supplied)

The ruling in National Appellate Boardwas applied in Montoya v. Varilla,74 Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG,75 and Ombudsman v.
Liggayu.76

The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal provided that the
government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case.

Despite the limitation on the government party’s right to appeal, this court has consistently upheld that right in
Dacoycoy. In Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela,77 we stated that:

More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to appeal the CA’s
decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the
ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has remained the same:
the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA’s decisions modifying or reversing the CSC’s
rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the government’s
central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper
disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling
absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of
the charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the
public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the
decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled
Dacoycoy doctrine.78 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government parties. Notably, the
government parties’ right to appeal in these cases was not brought up as an issue by either of the parties.

In Civil Service Commission v. Yu,79 this court allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal the Court of Appeals’
decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been revoked by the
Commission.

In National Power Corporation v. Civil Service Commission and Tanfelix,80 the National Power Corporation had
previously filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting in his
dismissal from service. When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the exoneration, the National Power Corporation was allowed to appeal.

These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the said
employee. In this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was modified. This
court previously stated that:

If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged,
the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty
remains the same.81

Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil Service
Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not exonerated, and
the finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be allowed to appeal the
modification of the decision.

The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision

The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees."82 When the government office
disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion
is inherent in the constitutional principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives."83 This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the government office
employing the public officer.

Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that
challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision that
lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs
only those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.

Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial
bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect, show
tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens
would end up suffering for it.
During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party
adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. –

....

k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has
been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original
decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:84

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they
are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL
in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

....

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation
of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes.

Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that
effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.85 (Emphasis supplied)

Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only operate to
further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of remedial rights
will not adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in
nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the
right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original decision of dismissal.

Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal
was not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before the promulgation
of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In Civil Service Commission v. Clave,86 the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one of its
employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS’s
findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the penalty. Both
the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In GSIS v. Chua,87 the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court of Appeals, while affirming
the findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS was then allowed to bring an
appeal of the modification of the penalty with this court.
Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may appeal shall
include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or modified by
the Civil Service Commission.

The offense committed was less serious dishonesty, not simple dishonesty

Dishonesty has been defined "as the ‘disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity’ . . . ."88 Since the utmost integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only frowned upon but
punished severely.

Section 52, Rule IV of the URACCS provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into
grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense – Dismissal

....

In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,89 this court explained the rationale for the severity of the penalty:

It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense
under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that
dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the
person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of
oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his
right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his
duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to
commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than
the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power
which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist
and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public
life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline
and morale of the service.90 (Emphasis supplied)

However, on April 4, 2006, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.

Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service.91 It,
however, also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty are not constitutive of an offense so grave as to warrant the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service."92

Recognizing the attendant circumstances in the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission issued
parameters "in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense"93 and to impose the proper
penalty.

The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple. Serious
dishonesty is punishable by dismissal.94 Less serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for six months and
one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.95 Simple dishonesty is punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense, six months and one day to one year for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.96
The medical certificate respondent submitted to support her application for sick leave was falsified. The question
remains as to whether this act could be considered serious dishonesty, less serious dishonesty, or simple
dishonesty.

According to the Civil Service Commission’s finding in its resolution:

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by Salvañ a was
spurious or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she did not examine/treat
the appellant nor did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was on sick leave of absence on that
particular day. Worthy [of] mention is that the appellant never bothered to submit any evidence, documentary or
otherwise, to rebut the testimony of Blanco.

Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the
aforementioned CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple Dishonesty as
the same did not cause damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation to or did not involve the
duties and responsibilities of the appellant. The same is true with the falsification she committed, where the
information falsified was not related to her employment.97 (Emphasis supplied)

In Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit,98 this court previously ruled that "it is the general policy of this Court to sustain
the decisions of administrative authorities ‘not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
for their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.’"99 The same
case also stated that:

. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings off acts must be respected, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.100

Petitioner insists that respondent committed serious dishonesty when she submitted the falsified medical
certificate. Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious dishonesty comprises the following acts:

Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. – The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.

b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.

c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable
forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit
material gain, graft and corruption.

d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.

e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the
dishonest act related to his/her employment.

f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.

g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as,
but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.

h. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

Simple dishonesty, on the other hand, comprises the following offenses:

Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act
would constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.

b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the
respondent.

c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her
employment.

d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.

e. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

This court previously ruled that "[f]alsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly
making false statements in official or public documents."101 Respondent, in her defense, states that she merely
relied on her Health Maintenance Organization’s (HMO) advice that it was going to issue her a medical certificate
after she had gone to the hospital complaining of hypertension.102 She maintains that she did not know that her
medical certificate was falsified. We do not find this defense credible.

Respondent knew that she was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificate’s signatory. She knew that she
would not be able to fully attest to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite this, she still
submitted the certificate in support of her application for leave.

The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco repudiated the
certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to defend its validity. Her application for sick leave, therefore,
should not have been granted since it was unaccompanied by the proper documents. The Commission correctly
found respondent guilty of dishonesty.

However, it would be wrong to classify this offense as simple dishonesty.

By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with or
without pay.103 Under Section 1, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code,
government employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.

The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to
compensation only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled out and
filed accordingly. Section 16, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code
provides the rules for an application for sick leave:

SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed form and
shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent
to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be
accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

Respondent’s application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any
deductions from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries coming
from government funds.

Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly
filed, which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during
this period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would have received
compensation she was not entitled to receive.

This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information falsified had
no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a matter that has no
relation to the functions of her office.

Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Under
Section 4 of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:

Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act
would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify
under the immediately preceding classification.

b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.

c. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvañ a is guilty of less serious dishonesty.

A final note

The records showed that respondent tendered her irrevocable resignation on August 5, 2006. Petitioner’s
acceptance of respondent’s resignation was not mentioned in any of the pleadings. However, the resolution by the
Fact-finding Committee stated that "[o]n 16 August 2006, the Office of the Administrator received the
resignation."104 On the issue of whether respondent’s resignation mooted its proceedings, it concluded that:

[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no unconditional
acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is "without prejudice to any
appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure[."]There can [sic] be no other
conclusion from the above that her resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any
charge/s appropriate under the circumstances.105 (Emphasis in the original)

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority. In
Republic v. Singun,106 this court stated:

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the
term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.

....

In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without
acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the
successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is
subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a
resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine
the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.107 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was evidence to show that petitioner did not, in fact, accept respondent’s resignation, her resignation
would have been ineffective. Respondent’s continued absence from her post would have been deemed
abandonment from her office, of which she could be criminally charged.

Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be concluded from the
resolution of the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification that it be
"without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure."108

The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of respondent’s
resignation.1âwphi1 Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of
1998, as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999, requires:

Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:

a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is relinquishing
his position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,

b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which shall indicate
the date of effectivity of the resignation.

An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without prejudice
to the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.

The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondent’s resignation any
less valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while the administrative case is pending
provided that the proceedings will still continue.

We also note that the unauthorized absences were incurred after the issuance of Office Order No. 119.
Atrespondent’s refusal to comply, she was administratively charged, which prompted her resignation from office. If
there were irregularities in the issuance of Office Order No. 119, what respondent should have done would be to
occupy the new position and then file the proper remedies. She should not have defied the orders of her superiors.

Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension became moot.
Her permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty. Considering that she is also a
member of the Bar, this court furnishes the Office of the Bar Confidant with a copy of this decision to initiate the
proper disciplinary action against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvañ a, is found guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty. The Civil
Service Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of this decision to respondent's permanent employment record.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvañ a.

SO ORDERED.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the
person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly
in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina,
Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6

On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to
be Butukan S. Malang.7

Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November
23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8

Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9

To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and
other documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to
December 19, 2009.11

The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12

Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced
his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for
about three (3) days.13

The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he
was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly
made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14

On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15

On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang.18

In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the
Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of
Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one
day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27,
2010.21

Proceedings before the trial court

On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. The
Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the
hearing.22

Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23

On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing
on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24

Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the
Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus
proceeding.25

The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to
October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26

The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf
of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be
dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus
was "no longer availing."27

Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest
referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that
he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo
pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention.28

The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan
Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of
Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process
issued by a court.30

The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27,
2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport
bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."32

Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to
December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's
departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration
and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36

Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordered his immediate release from detention.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were
made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang
named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of
Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41

Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6,
2011.

Proceedings before this court

On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a
Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46

Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang
Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy
is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47

Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority
to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.48

As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is
not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the
ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49

The issues for our resolution are:

First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is
to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary

Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court
or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody
of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.54

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the
writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to
determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57

In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo
B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of
the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.60

After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.61

Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not
by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say
regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63

This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a
superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be
ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained
or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as
allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory
body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a
decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.

In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial
on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be
released from detention.68

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.69

Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to
the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70

This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme
Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals.73

In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial
court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.

Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision
of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.cralawlawlibrary

II

Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty."80

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83

The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient
remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of
the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a
remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87

In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol),
Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion
perpetua.89

While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this court
promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91

Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must
retroactively apply to them.92

This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas
corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917.
The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently
settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish
themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.97

An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being
held in the reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the
other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a
Return of the Writ.99

A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo
Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these
brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and
deported to Davao without their consent.102

On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed
to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.103

This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the
legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to
Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the women, "despite their being in a
sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality."107

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the
writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.

Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ
that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on
[its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of
invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110

III

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not
be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty.
Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115

Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left
Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116

Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest
papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave.
He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118

This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the
Writ.119 This court set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120

In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-
A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123

Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General
Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court
dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.125

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was
conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to
due process. Consequently, the Information was void.126

This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic with the filing of the
Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of
an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy
of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya,
Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.130

During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them were filed before this
court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and
academic, thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the
usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.134

At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by
law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
 was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him
[or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits
the facts alleged in the information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial
court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.141

IV

However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People
of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on- personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and
to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an
escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like
petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then
and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio
Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and
Arellano, of his right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146

The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the
exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous
premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested
without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the
rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and
caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the
President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant
by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the
offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the
law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules
more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy
in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how
long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed
it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly,
then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and preliminary
investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the
defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S.
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.

A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang
but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.

Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his identification card from the Office on Muslim
Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all
bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents
showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."

Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when the
Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian
Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on
November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20,
2009.cralawlawlibrary

People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case pending in our courts.
The case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses.155 As of November
23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already
been resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his
liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S.
Malang.

In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a
citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government
that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so,
we will rule in favor of the citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as
provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for
Habeas Corpus must be granted.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19,
2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang
Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves the Petition1 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure praying that respondent Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 96742 dated April 23, 2013 be
nullified and set aside and that the Commission on Elections be permanently enjoined from enforcing the same
Resolution, as well as prosecuting Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. for violating it or otherwise
compelling compliance with it.3

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse
Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey firms of similar circumstance"4 to submit to COMELEC the names of
all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of
their "subscribers."5

SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their activities is the conduct of pre-
election surveys.6

As recounted by SWS and Pulse Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013, SWS conducted a pre-election survey
on voters' preferences for senatorial candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings.7 The following question was
asked in the survey:

Kung ang eleksyon ay gaganapin ngayon, sino ang pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto bilang mga SENADOR ng
PILIPINAS? Narito ang listahan ng mga kandidato. Paki-shade o itiman po ang naaangkop na oval katabi ng
pangalan hg mga taong pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto. Maaari po kayong pumili ng hanggang labindalawang
(12) kandidato.

(LIST OF CANDIDATES OMITTED)

If the elections were held today, whom would you most probably vote for as SENATORS of the PHILIPPINES? Here is
a list of candidates. Please shade the oval beside the name of the persons you would most likely vote for. You may
choose up to twelve (12) candidates.

(LIST OF CANDIDATES OMITTED)8 (Emphasis in the original)

On March 20, 2013, Representative Tobias M. Tiangco (Tiangco), Secretary-General of the United Nationalist
Alliance (UNA), wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra, Director of COMELEC's Law Department.9 In his letter,10 Tiangco
asked COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC
Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the [pre-election survey
conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the violation thereof, an act constitutive of an
election offense."11

Tiangco recounted that on February 28, 2013, he wrote to SWS requesting, among others, that he "be furnished the
identity of persons who paid for the [pre-election survey conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013] as
well as those who subscribed to it."12 Sometime in March 2013, SWS supposedly replied to Tiangco, "furnishing
[him] with some particulars about the survey but [without] disclosing] the identity of the persons who
commissioned or subscribed to the survey."13

Acting on Tiangco's letter and on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation, the COMELEC En Bane issued
the Order14 dated April 10, 2013 setting the matter for hearing on April 16, 2013. The same Order directed SWS to
submit its Comment within three (3) days of receipt.15 On April 12, 2013, Pulse Asia received a letter from
COMELEC "requesting its representative to attend the COMELEC hearing on 16 April 2013."16

SWS and Pulse Asia recounted that during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. (COMELEC
Chairman Brillantes) stated that the proceeding was merely a clarificatory hearing and not a formal hearing or an
investigation.17

On April 23, 2013, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674. The entire dispositive portion of this
Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commis[s]ion RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DIRECT the SWS,
Pulse Asia and other survey firms of similar circumstance to submit within three (3) days from receipt of this
Resolution the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys published from February 12, 2013 to the date of
the promulgation of this Resolution for copying and verification by the Commission. The submission shall include
the names of all "subscribers" of those published surveys. Such information/data shall be for the exclusive and
confidential use of the Commission;

RESOLVED FURTHER, that all surveys published subsequent to the promulgation of this Resolution must be
accompanied by all the information required in Republic Act no. 9006, including the names of commissioners,
payors and subscribers.

This resolution shall take effect immediately after publication.

A violation of these rules shall constitu[t]e an election offense as provided in Republic Act no. 9006, or the Fair
Election Act.18 (Emphasis in the original)

As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1)19 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections
5.1 to 5.320 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, as implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615.21

SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of Resolution No. 9674 and as of their filing before this
court of the present Petition, they had not been furnished copies of Resolution No. 9674.22 (They emphasized that
while a certified true copy of this Resolution was attached to their Petition, this was a copy which they themselves
secured "for the purpose of complying.with the requirement that Rule 65 petitions must be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the assailed order or resolution[.]"23)

In the letter24 dated April 30, 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes that they had not
received a copy of Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated their view that Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with
irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e., in excess of what the Fair Election Act allows) and in violation of
the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution. They also expressed their intention to bring the matter
before this court on account of these supposed irregularities. Thus, they requested that COMELEC defer or hold in
abeyance Resolution No. 9674's enforcement.25
On May 8, 2013, the COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice26 to SWS (and also to Pulse Asia) directing it to
furnish COMELEC with a list of the names of all "commissioners, subscribers, and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 until April 23, 2013."27 SWS was warned that failure to comply with the Notice shall constitute
an election offense punishable under the Omnibus Election Code.28

On July 1, 2013, COMELEC issued a Subpoena29 notifying SWS and Pulse Asia that a Complaint "for violation of
Section 264[,] par. 1 and 2 of the Omnibus Election Code30 in relation to R.A. 9006"31 was filed against them. (This
was docketed as E.O. Case No. 13-222). They were also directed to appear and to submit their counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents at the hearing set on August 6, 2013.32

SWS and Pulse Asia maintained that before receiving the Subpoena, they were never informed that a criminal case
had been filed against them. They added that they were never furnished copies of the relevant criminal
Complaint.33

On July 26, 2013, petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. filed the present Petition.34 They
assail Resolution No. 9674 as having been issued ultra vires. They are of the position that Resolution No. 9674, in
requiring the submission of information on subscribers, is in excess of what the Fair Election Act
requires.35 Likewise, they, assert that Resolution No. 9674 transgresses the Fair Election Act in making itself
executory immediately after publication.36 Moreover, they claim that it violates the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the Constitution,37 and was enforced in violation of their right to due process (as they were charged with
its violation despite not having been properly served with copies of the complaint filed against them).38 Petitioners
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the interim.39

In this court's July 30, 2013 Resolution,40 COMELEC was required to file a Comment on the Petition. In the same
Resolution, this court issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining the enforcement of COMELEC Resolution No.
9674 with respect to submission of the names of regular subscribers but not to the submission of (1) the names of
specific subscribers for the limited period of February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013 who have paid a substantial
amount of money for access to survey results and privileged survey data; and (2) the names of all commissioners
and payors of surveys published within the same period."41

On October 10, 2013, COMELEC filed its Comment.42 On February 12, 2014, petitioners filed their Joint Reply.43

In this court's February 18, 2014 Resolution,44 the present Petition was given due course, and the parties were
directed to file their memoranda. Petitioners complied on May 16, 201445 and COMELEC on June 25, 2014.46

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in that it requires the disclosure of the names of "subscribers" of
election surveys;

Second, whether the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement to submit the names
of their subscribers;

Third, whether Resolution No. 9674, insofar as it compels petitioners to submit the names of their subscribers,
violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts (Article II, Section 10);

Fourth, whether at the time petitioners were required by COMELEC to reveal the names of the subscribers to their
election surveys, Resolution No. 9674 was already in force and effect; and

Lastly, whether COMELEC deprived petitioners of due process of law when it:

a) failed to provide them with a copy of Resolution No. 9674 and the criminal complaint for an election offense; and

b) refused to specify the election offense under which they were being prosecuted.
We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys,
including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This
requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of
"guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"47 Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing
subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts.

However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated in violation of the period set by the Fair Election
Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy of Resolution No. 9674 with which they were asked to comply. They
were neither shown nor served copies of the criminal Complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222. Petitioners' right
to due process was, thus, violated.

Petitioners assail Resolution No. 9674's requirement of submission of names of subscribers, including those who
did not commission or pay for a specific survey or cause its publication, for being ultra vires. They maintain that the
Fair Election Act "as it was written by Congress covers only those who commission or pay for a particular election
survey, and requires disclosure of their names only when that particular survey is published."48 From this, they add
that COMELEC exceeded its authority — "creating] an election offense where there was none before"49 — in
considering as an election offense any violation of Resolution No. 9674.

COMELEC, for its part, insists on the "wide latitude of discretion"50 granted to it in the performance of its
constitutional duty to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election[.]"51 It adds that "as the specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration
of election laws,"52 its contemporaneous construction of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act is "entitled to great
weight and respect."53 Citing the supposed legislative intent of Section 5.2 as "broaden[ing] the subject of
disclosure,"54 COMELEC claims that Section 5.2(a) "draws no distinction between the direct payors and the indirect
payors of the survey."55 It adds that requiring the disclosure of survey subscribers addresses the requirement of
reporting election expenditures by candidates and political parties, thereby helping COMELEC check compliance
with this requirement.56

Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, read in a manner consistent not only with its text but also with the purpose
for which it, along with the Fair Election Act, was adopted, sustains COMELEC's position.

Republic Act No. 9006 was adopted with the end in mind of "guarantee[ing] or ensuring] equal opportunity for
public service"57 and to this end, stipulates mechanisms for the "supervision] or regulation of] the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information[.]"58 Hence, its
short title: Fair Election Act.

Situated within the constitutional order, the Fair Election Act provides means to realize the policy articulated in
Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"
Article II, Section 26 models an understanding of Philippine political and electoral reality. It is not merely hortatory
or a statement of value. Among others, it sums up an aversion to the perpetuation of political power through
electoral contests skewed in favor of those with resources to dominate the deliberative space in any media.

Apart from making real Article II, Section 26's constitutional policy, the Fair Election Act represents the
legislature's compliance with the requirement of Article XIII, Section 1: "Congress . . . give[s] highest priority to the
enactment of measures that. . . reduce . . . political inequalities ... by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good."59

Moreover, the constitutional desire to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service"60 is the same
intent that animates the Constitution's investiture in COMELEC of the power to "supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation
or its subsidiary."61
Specific provisions in the Fair Election Act regulate the means through which candidates for elective public office,
as well as political parties and groups participating in the party-list system, are able to make themselves known to
voters, the same means through which they earn votes.

Section 3 permits the use of lawful election propaganda.62 Section 4 regulates published or printed, and broadcast
election propaganda.63 Section 6 governs access to media time and space.64 Sections 7 and 8 provide for COMELEC's
competencies (i.e., affirmative action, and the so-called "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time") that enable it to
equalize candidates' exposure to voters.65 Section 9 regulates venues for the posting of campaign
materials.66 Section 10 provides for parties' and candidates' right to reply.67 Section 11 requires media outlets to
make available the use of their facilities for election propaganda at discounted rates.68

The Fair Election Act also governs published surveys during elections.

Section 5.1 defines election surveys-as "the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election,
including voters' preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period[.]" Sections 5.2
and 5.3 provide regulations that facilitate transparency with respect to ' election surveys. Section 5.469 is no longer
in effect, having been declared unconstitutional in this court's May 5, 2001 Decision in Social Weather Stations and
Kamahalan Publishing Corp. v. COMELEC.70 Section 5.571 pertains to exit polls.

Section 5.2 enumerates the information that a person publishing an election survey must publish along with the
survey itself:

5.2 During the election period, any person, natural as well as juridical, candidate or organization who publishes a
survey must likewise publish the following information:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. The name of the person, candidate, party or. organization who commissioned or paid for the
survey;
b. The name of the person, polling firm or survey organization who conducted the survey;
c. The period during which the survey was conducted, the methodology used, including the
number of individual respondents and the areas from which they were selected, and the
specific questions asked;
d. The margin of error of the survey;
e. For each question for which the margin of error is greater than that reported under
paragraph (d), the margin of error for that question; and
f. A mailing address and telephone number, indicating it as an address or telephone number
at which the sponsor can be contacted to obtain a written report regarding the survey in
accordance with Subsection 5.3. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5.3 facilitates the inspection, copying, and verification not only of an election survey but also of the raw
data used as bases for its conclusions:

5.3 The survey together with raw data gathered to support its conclusions shall be available for inspection, copying
and verification by the COMELEC or by a registered political party or a bona fide candidate, or by any COMELEC-
accredited citizen's arm. A reasonable fee sufficient to cover the costs of inspection, copying and verification may
be charged.

As with all the other provisions of the Fair Election Act, Section 5 is a means to guarantee equal access to the
deliberative forums essential to win an elective public office. Any reading of Section 5 and of its individual
components, such as Section 5.2(a), cannot be divorced from this purpose.

The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Election Act is a recognition that election
surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing surveys are a means to shape the preference of
voters, inform the strategy of campaign machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys
have a similar nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.

II

Views vary on the precise extent to which surveys or "polls" shape voter preferences, if at all.

Election surveys have been critiqued for amplifying the notion of an election as a "horse race"72 and for reducing
elections to the lowest common denominator of percentage points or a candidate's erstwhile share in the vote
market rather than focusing on issues, principles, programs, and platforms.

Several possible, albeit conflicting, effects of surveys on voter behavior have been postulated:

First, there is the bandwagon effect where "electors rally to support the candidate leading in the polls."73 This
"assumes that knowledge of a popular 'tide' will likely change voting intentions in [favor] of the frontrunner, that
many electors feel more comfortable supporting a popular choice or that people accept the perceived collective
wisdom of others as being enough reason for supporting a candidate."74

Second, there is the underdog effect where "electors rally to support the candidate trailing in the polls."75 This
shift can be motivated by sympathy for the perceived underdog.76

Third, there is the motivating effect where "individuals who had not intended to vote are persuaded to do
so,"77 having been alerted to the fact of an election's imminence.78

Fourth, there is also the demotivating effect where "voters abstain from voting out of certainty that their
candidate or party will win[.]"79

Fifth, there are reports of a behavior known as strategic voting where "voting is influenced by the chances of
winning[.]"80

Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]"81

Election surveys published during election periods create the "politics of expectations."82 Voters act in accordance
with what is perceived to be an existing or emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are faring.

Of the six (6) effects, the bandwagon effect has a particular resonance and has been of concern. Surveys, or opinion
polls, "by directly influencing individual-level support . . . , can be self-fulfilling prophecies and produce opinion
cascades."83 "[A] poll's prediction may come to pass not only because it measures public opinion but also because it
may influence public opinion."84

The bandwagon effect is of particular concern because of the observed human tendency to conform. Three (3)
mechanisms through which survey results may induce conformity have been posited:

(1) normative social influence, or people's desire to adopt the majority position in order to feel liked and accepted
or believe they are on the winning team;

(2) informational social influence, or people learning from the 'wisdom of crowds' via social proof because they
'believe that others' interpretation of an ambiguous situation is more accurate . . . and will help [them] choose an
appropriate course of action'; and

(3) people resolving cognitive dissonance by switching to the side they infer is going to win based on the
poll.85cralawlawlibrary
Likewise, it has been argued that the bandwagon effect is but the obverse of the so-called false-consensus effect or
false-consensus bias:

The bandwagon effect, a form of conformity, is the mirror image of the false consensus effect, where people
misperceive that their own behaviors and attitudes are more popular than they actually are. In the political
domain, one mechanism underlying the false consensus effect is wishful thinking - people gaining utility from
thinking their candidate is ahead or their opinions are popular.86

The bandwagon effect induced by election surveys assumes even greater significance in considering the health of a
democracy.

Integral to our appreciation of democracy is the recognition that democracy is fundamentally deliberative. It is
rooted in the exchange and dialogue of ideas. Accordingly, free expression, not least of all from the minority and
from those who do not conform, i.e., those who dissent and criticize, is indispensable:

Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical
dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity." This theory may be considered broad, but it
definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision."
It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To
ensure order in running the state's affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or
nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative
democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the
right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.

Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be
protected and encouraged.

Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies."

In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand
a full discussion of public affairs." This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."87cralawlawlibrary

However, "conformity pressures can suppress minority opinion."88 The bandwagon effect conjures images of an
impregnable majority, thereby tending to push farther toward the peripheries those who are already marginalized.
Worse, the bandwagon effect foments the illusion of a homogenous monolith denying the very existence of those in
the minority. This undermines the "normative conceptions of democracy"89 substituting the democratic dialogue
with acquiescence to perceived or projected orthodoxy.

Surveys, far from being a passive "snapshot of many viewpoints held by a segment of the population at a given
time,"90 can warp existing public opinion and can mould public opinion. They are constitutive. Published election
surveys offer valuable insight into public opinion not just because they represent it but more so because they also
tend to make it.

Appreciating this tendency to both entrench and marginalize is of acute relevance in the context of Philippine
political reality. This is the same reality that our policymakers, primarily the framers of the Constitution, have seen
fit to address.

III

The constitutional dictum to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service"91 and (even more
specifically and explicitly) to "prohibit political dynasties"92 does not exist in a vacuum.

Politics in the Philippines has been criticized as "a lucrative means of self-aggrandizement."93 Ours is an exclusive
system that perpetuates power and provides sanctuary to those who have already secured their place. Traditional
Filipino politics connotes elite families that, with the state, are "engaged in a reciprocal relationship that constantly
defines and redefines both."94 As recounted by Alfred McCoy, this reciprocal relationship, typified by rent-seeking
(i.e., "taking advantage of their access to state privileges to expand proprietary wealth"95), is a vicious cycle
propagated for as long as the Philippines has been a republic: "The emergence of the Republic as a weak
postcolonial state augmented the power of rent-seeking political families — a development that further weakened
the state's own resources."96

The Philippines, as it emerged in the wake of Ferdinand Marcos' presidency and the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, saw the "celebritification"97 of political office. On the legislature and studying emerging contrasts in
the composition of its two chambers — the Senate and the House of Representatives — it has been noted:

The old political families, however are not as strong in the Senate as they are in the House. This could be read, if
not as a total repudiation by voters of family power, then at least as an attempt by them to tap other sources of
national leadership. Celebrities and military and police officers have emerged as alternatives to traditional
politicians. It could be that these new men and women have captured the popular imagination or that they are
more in tune with the public pulse. But their emergence could very well be seen as an indication of the paucity of
choices: Political parties, for one, have not succeeded in proffering a wider range of options to an electorate weary
of trapos.98

This celebritification nurtures misleading notions of an enhanced or healthier democracy, one that opens avenues
to a crop of political leaders not belonging to oligarchic families. Viewed critically however, this is nothing more
than a pipe dream. New elites now share the political stage with the old. The tension between two contrary
tendencies actually serves to preserve the status quo of elitism — an expanded elitism perhaps, but elitism no less.
To evoke a truism, "the more things change, the more they stay the same":

But the "celebritification" of the Senate can also be interpreted as the democratization of an exclusive body once
reserved only for the very rich, the politically experienced, and the intellectually brilliant. In a sense, the bar of
entry has been lowered, and anyone with national renown can contest a seat in a chamber once famous for sharp
debates and polysyllabic peroration.

The main criterion for a Senate seat is now name recall. This is where celebrities have the edge even over older
political families with bankable names. . . .

....

The diminishing clout of old families in the Senate—and their continued dominance in the House—shows the push
and pull of two contrary tendencies. The first tendency is toward the new: The importance of name recall in
national elections taking place in a media-inundated environment makes it easier for movie and media
personalities, and harder for old-style politicians, to be elected. The second tendency is veering toward the old: At
the district level, trapo-style patronage and machine politics remain deeply entrenched, giving political families the
edge in elections."99

Thus, where once there was elitism solely along lines of kinship — Alfred McCoy's so-called "anarchy of families"
— now there is also elitism demarcated by name recall, populist projection, and media exposure, arguably, an
"anarchy of celebrities."

Certainly, it is not the business of this court to engage in its own determination of the wisdom of policy.
Nevertheless, having to grapple with the tasks of adjudication and interpretation, it has become necessary to bring
to light the intent that underlies the disputed statutory provision, as well as the constitutional regime and social
context, in which this provision is situated.
To reiterate, the inclusion of published election surveys in a statute that regulates election propaganda and other
means through which candidates may shape voter preferences is itself telling of the recognition that published
election surveys, too, may influence voter preferences. This inclusion is similarly telling of a recognition that, left
unregulated, election surveys can undermine the purposes of ensuring "fair" elections. These recognitions are
embedded in the Fair Election Act; they are not judicial constructs. In adjudicating with these' as bases, this court is
merely adhering to the legislative imperative.

IV

It is necessary that the Fair Election Act be appreciated for what it is: a mechanism for ensuring equality. The Fair
Election Act is a means to effect the "necessary condition" to a genuine democratic dialogue, to realizing a
deliberative democracy. The concept of this "necessary condition" was previously considered by this court
in Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC:100

In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation
as merely "protecting] the already established machinery of discrimination." In his view, any improvement "in the
normal course of events" within an unequal society, without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of
those in power and control.

In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become meaningless if
not taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:

Liberty is selfi-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a whole
series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine one's own life: to be able to determine what to
do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is never the contingent,
private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is
capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making possible such a harmony between every
individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a compromise between competitors, or between freedom and
law, between general and individual interest, common and private welfare in an established society, but of creating
the society in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning.
In other words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing societies.

Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the people —
"implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis
of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be
the result of autonomous thought'." He submits that "[different opinions and 'philosophies' can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the 'marketplace of ideas' is organized and delimited
by those who determine the national and the individual interest."

A slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a 'natural right' of resistance for oppressed and
overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate." Marcuse, thus,
stands for an equality that breaks away and transcends from established hierarchies, power structures, and
indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as "repressive tolerance."101

What is involved here is petitioners' freedom of speech and of expression, that is, to publish their findings. More
specifically, what is involved here is their right to political speech, that which "refers to speech 'both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,' 'foster[ing] informed and civic-minded
deliberation."102

The nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into
operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities. As
explained in Diocese of Bacolod:103
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation
promoting political equality prevails over speech." This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or
equalize 'speaking power,' such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often
systematically subdued within society's ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant
political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out
the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian
world like ours.

...

The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human
potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate.
On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will have in a deliberative
democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect
of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have its
effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will have better access to
media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas will
have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society. To be really heard and understood, the
marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.

The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her expression.
This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such
viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some
expression during electoral campaigns.104

The required judicial temperament in appraising speech in the context of electoral campaigns which is principally
designed to endorse a candidate, both by candidates and / or political parties, on the one hand, and private citizens,
on the other, has thus been articulated:

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of
their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of
our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the
public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of
according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze
candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an election
paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time,
place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private
property.105 [Emphasis in the original]

V
Concededly, what is involved here is not election propaganda per se. Election surveys, on their face, do not state or
allude to preferred candidates. As a means, election surveys are ambivalent. To an academician, they are an
aggrupation of data. To a journalist, they are matters for reportage. To a historian, they form part of a chronicle.
Election surveys thus become unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the end for which they are employed.
To those whose end is to get a candidate elected, election surveys, when limited to their own private consumption,
are a means to formulate strategy. When published, however, the tendency to shape voter preferences comes into
play. In this respect, published election surveys partake of the nature of election propaganda. It is then declarative
speech in the context of an electoral campaign properly subject to regulation. Hence, Section 5.2 of the Fair Election
Act's regulation of published surveys.

We thus proceed to evaluate Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing the names of subscribers to election
surveys in light of the requisites for valid regulation of declarative speech by private entities in the context of an
election campaign:

First, the text of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act supports the inclusion of subscribers among those persons
who "paid for the survey[.]"106 Thus, Resolution No. 9674 is a regulation finding basis in statute.

COMELEC correctly points out that in Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, those who "commissioned" and those
who "paid for" the published survey are separated by the disjunctive term "or."107 This disassociates those who
"commissioned" from those who "paid for" and identifies them as alternatives to each other.108 Section 5.2(a) thus
requires the disclosure of two (2) classes of persons: "[first,] those who commissioned or sponsored the survey;
and [second,] those who paid for the survey."109

The second class makes no distinction between those who pay for a specific survey and those who pay for election
surveys in general. Indeed, subscribers do not escape the burden of paying for the component articles comprising a
subscription. They may pay for them in aggregate, but they pay for them just the same. From the text of Section
5.2(a), the legislative intent or regulatory concern is clear: "those who have financed, one way or another, the
[published] survey"110 must be disclosed.

Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one reasonably grounds
Resolution No. 9674's inclusion of subscribers to election surveys. Thus, regardless of whether an intermediate or
a strict standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes scrutiny.

It is settled that constitutionally declared principles are a compelling state interest:

Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example,
that "the welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast."111

Here, we have established that the regulation of election surveys effects the constitutional policy, articulated in
Article II, Section 26, and reiterated and affirmed in Article IX-C, Section 4 and Article XIII, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution, of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"112

Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey is formative as it is descriptive. It can be a means
to shape the preference of voters and, thus, the outcome of elections. In the hands of those whose end is to get a
candidate elected, it is a means for such end and partakes of the nature of election propaganda. Accordingly, the
imperative of "fair" elections impels their regulation.

Lastly, Resolution No. 9674 is "narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression"113 and is "demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object."114

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners' publication of election surveys), it does not go so far as to
suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor censorship specifically aimed at election surveys.
The freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards
the manner of publication, that is, that the disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys must be made.cralawlawlibrary

VI

Petitioners harp on what they claim to be Section 5.2(a)'s "plain meaning" and assert that there is no room to
entertain COMELEC's construction of Section 5.2(a).115

It has been said that "[a] cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application."116

Clarifications, however, are in order.

First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule applies only when the law is completely clear, such that there
is absolutely no room for interpretation. Its application is premised on a situation where the words of the
legislature are clear that its intention, insofar as the facts of a case demand from the point of view of a
contemporary interpretative community, is neither vague nor ambiguous. This is a matter of judicial appreciation.
It cannot apply merely on a party's contention of supposed clarity and lack of room for interpretation.

This is descriptive of the situation here.

Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident
from Section 5.2(a)'s text: on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction
between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that
Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its
contemplation.117 The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim
to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of
inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are
by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are
fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire'
approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to
bolster.118

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and
uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and
the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of
which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that
describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse
provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing
the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present
authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the
Constitution.cralawlawlibrary

VII

We note with favor COMELEC's emphasis on the "wide latitude of discretion"119 granted to it in the performance of
its constitutional duty to "[e]nforce and administer all laws arid regulations relative to the conduct of an
election[.]"120 But this is with the caution that it does not reach "grave abuse of discretion[.]121

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v. COMELEC122 had the following to say regarding factual findings made by
COMELEC, an independent constitutional organ:

[T]he rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there
is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater
force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC—created
and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs.123

Proceeding from this, we emphasize that this norm of deference applies not only to factual findings. This applies
with equal force to independent constitutional organs' general exercise of their functions. The constitutional
placing of independent constitutional organs on a plane higher than those of administrative agencies created only
by statute is not restricted to competence in fact-finding. It extends to all purposes for which the Constitution
created them.

We reiterate, however, that our recognition of this deferential norm is made with caution. This rule of deference
does not give independent constitutional organs, like COMELEC, license to gravely abuse their discretion. With
respect to rule-making, while the wisdom of "subordinate legislation" or the rule-making power of agencies tasked
with the administration of government is acknowledged, rule-making agencies are not given unfettered power to
promulgate rules. As explained in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,124 it is imperative that subordinate legislation
"be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law."125 A regulation that purports to effect a statute but goes
beyond the bounds of that statute is ultra vires; it is in excess of the rule-making agency's competence. Thus, it is
void and ineffectual.

This is not the case here. There is no grave abuse of discretion. Resolution No. 9674 serves a constitutional purpose
and works well within the bounds of the Constitution and of statute.cralawlawlibrary

VIII

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 constitutes a prior restraint in that:

Resolution No. 9674 makes it an election offense for a survey firm not to disclose the names of subscribers who
have paid substantial amounts to them, even if ihe survey portions provided to them have not been published. 1'his
requirement is unduly burdensome and onerous and constitutes a prior restraint on the right of survey firms to
gather information on public opinion and disseminate it to the citizenry.

. . . If Resolution No. 9674 is allowed to stand, survey firms will no longer be able to operate because they will not
have enough clients and will not be financially sustainable. COMELEC will finally be able to do indirectly what it
could not do directly, which is to prohibit the conduct of election surveys and the publication or dissemination of
the results to the public.126

Petitioners' assertions are erroneous.

Chavez v. Gonzales127 explained the concept of prior restraint as follows:

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship
of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a
proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for
the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing
offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as
previous restraint or censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before
publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the
courts.128 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The very definition of "prior restraint" negates petitioner's assertions. Resolution No. 9674 poses no prohibition or
censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. Apart from regulating the manner of publication, petitioners
remain free to publish election surveys. COMELEC correctly points out that "[t]he disclosure requirement kicks
in only upon, not prior to, publication."129

In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is neither unduly burdensome nor onerous. Prior to the
promulgation of Resolution No. 9674, survey firms were already understood to be bound by the requirement to
disclose those who commissioned or paid for published election surveys. Petitioners have been complying with
this without incident since the Fair Election Act was enacted in 2001. After more than a decade of compliance, it is
odd for petitioners to suddenly assail the disclosure requirement as unduly burdensome or onerous.

Petitioners' claim that "[i]f Resolution No. 9674 is allowed to stand, survey firms will no longer be able to operate
because they will not have enough clients and will not be financially sustainable"130 is too speculative and
conjectural to warrant our consideration. The assumption is that persons who want to avail of election survey
results will automatically be dissuaded from doing so when there is a requirement of submission of their names
during the campaign period. This is neither self-evident, nor a presumption that is susceptible to judicial notice.
There is no evidence to establish a causal connection.

Petitioners' free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political
equality and, therefore, the speech of others who want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one
hand, there are petitioners' right to publish and publications which are attended by the interests of those who can
employ published data to their partisan ends. On the other, there is regulation that may effect equality and, thus,
strengthen the capacity of those on society's margins or those who grope for resources to engage in the democratic
dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of deliberative democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides
the environment where the survey group's free speech rights should reside.cralawlawlibrary

IX

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 violates Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution.131 They claim
that it "unduly interferes with [their] existing contracts . . . by forcing [them] to disclose information that, under the
contracts, is confidential or privileged."132

For its part, COMELEC argues that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier
purposes sought to be achieved by the government."133 It adds that "[petitioners' existing contracts with third
parties must be understood to have been made in reference to the possible exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory
powers."134

It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare."135 "It is a basic rule in contracts that
the law is deemed written into the contract between the parties."136 The incorporation of regulations into contracts
is "a postulate of the police power of the State."137

The relation of the state's police power to the principle of non-impairment of contracts was thoroughly explained
in Ortigas and Co. V. Feati Bank:138

[W]hile non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as
"the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute
of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company
vs. City of Davao, et al. police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress
of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et
al, when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property
should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."139 (Citations omitted)

This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable"140 regulation. We have demonstrated
that not only an important or substantial state interest, but even a compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674's
requirement of disclosing subscribers to election surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing]
equal access to opportunities for public service"141 and is impelled by the imperative of "fair" elections.

As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is correctly deemed written into
petitioners' existing contracts.

Parenthetically, the obligations of agreements manifested in the concept of contracts are creations of law. This
right to demand performance not only involves its requisites, privileges, and regulation in the Civil Code or special
laws, but is also subject to the Constitution. The expectations inherent in a contract may be compelling, but so are
the normative frameworks demanded by law and the provisions of the Constitution.cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners point out that Section 13 of the Fair Election Act provides that "[r]ules and regulations promulgated by
the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at
least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation." In contrast, Resolution No. 9674 provides that it "shall take
effect immediately after publication."142 Thus, they assert that Resolution No. 9674's effectivity clause is invalid.
From this, they argue that Resolution No. 9674 has not taken effect and cannot be enforced against them or against
other persons.143

COMELEC counters that Section 13 of the Fair Election Act's provision that rules shall take effect "on the seventh
day after their publication" applies only to Resolution No. 9615, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
the Fair Election Act, and not to Resolution No. 9674, which "merely enforces Section 26144 of Resolution No.
9615."145

Noting that Resolution No. 9674 was nevertheless published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine
Star both on April 25, 2013, COMELEC adds that, in any case, "the lapse of the seven-day period from the date of its
publication has rendered the instant issue moot and academic."146

It is COMELEC which is in error on this score. Section 13 of the Fair Election Act reads:

Section 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses. - The COMELEC shall promulgate and
furnish all political parties and candidates and the mass media entities the rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and
Section 86 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881).

Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section shall take effect on the
seventh day after their publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. Prior to effectivity of
said rules and regulations, no political advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate or political party
shall be published or broadcast through mass media.

Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement this Act shall be an election
offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bldg. 881). (Emphasis supplied)

Resolution No. 9615 is denominated "Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known
as the 'Fair Election Act', in connection to [sic] the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent
Elections[.]"

The only conceivable reason that would lead COMELEC to the conclusion that it is only Resolution No. 9615 (and
not the assailed Resolution No. 9674) that needs to comply with the requirement of Section 13 of the Fair Election
Act is Section 13's use of the phrase "rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act[.]" That is, since
Resolution No. 9615 is the Resolution which, by name, is called the "Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic
Act No. 9006," COMELEC seems to think that other rules named differently need not comply.

It is an error to insist on this literal reasoning.

Section 13 applies to all rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election Act, regardless of how they are
denominated or called. COMELEC's further reasoning that what Resolution No. 9674 intends to implement is
Resolution No. 9615 and not the Fair Election Act itself is nothing but a circuitous denial of Resolution No. 9674's
true nature. COMELEC's reasoning is its own admission that the assailed Resolution supplements what the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Fair Election Act provides. Ultimately, Resolution No. 9674 also
implements the Fair Election Act and must, thus, comply with the requirements of its Section 13.

Accordingly, Resolution No. 9674 could not have become effective as soon as it was published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star on April 25, 2013. Taking into consideration the seven-day period required
by Section 13, the soonest that it could have come into effect was on May 2, 2013.

This notwithstanding, petitioners were not bound to comply with the requirement "to submit within three (3) days
from receipt of this Resolution the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys published from February 12,
2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution[.]"147 As shall be discussed, COMELEC's (continuing) failure
to serve copies of Resolution No. 9674 on petitioners prevented this three-day period from even
commencing.cralawlawlibrary

XI

Petitioners point out that they were never served copies of Resolution No. 9674. Thus, they claim that this
Resolution's self-stated three-day period within which they must comply has not begun to run and that COMELEC's
insistence on their compliance violates their right to due process. They add that COMELEC has also failed to
provide them with copies of the criminal complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222 for which the Subpoena dated
July 1, 2013 was issued against them.

COMELEC, however, insists that "[petitioners were given fair notice of the Resolution"148 in that:

[t]he-Notice dated 08 May 2013 sent to and received by petitioners not only makes reference to the Resolution by
its number and title but also indicates its date of promulgation, the two newspapers of general circulation in which
it was published, it date of publication, and, more important [sic], reproduces in full its dispositive portion[.]149

COMELEC adds that, in any case, petitioners were "able to secure a certified true copy of the [assailed]
Resolution."150 On the filing of a criminal complaint, COMELEC asserts that attached to the Subpoena served on
petitioners was a copy of Resolution No. 13-0739 of the COMELEC En Bane which "provides a verbatim
reproduction of the Memorandum of the Director of the Law Department detailing petitioners' failure to comply
with the assailed Resolution and of the Memorandum of Commissioner [Christian Robert S.] Lim submitting the
matter for the appropriate action of the COMELEC en bane."151

COMELEC relies on infirm reasoning and reveals how, in criminally charging petitioners, it acted arbitrarily,
whimsically, and capriciously, and violated petitioners' right to due process.

By its own reasoning, COMELEC admits that petitioners were never actually served copies of Resolution No.
9674 after it was promulgated on April 23, 2013. It insists, however, that this flaw has been remedied by service to
petitioners of the May 8, 2013 Notice which reproduced Resolution No. 9674's dispositive portion.
Dismembering an official issuance by producing only a portion of it (even if the reproduced portion is the most
significant, i.e., dispositive, portion) is not the same as serving on the concerned parties a copy of the official
issuance itself. Petitioners may have been informed of what the dispositive portion stated, but it remains that they
were never notified and served copies of the assailed Resolution itself. In Resolution No. 9674's own words,
compliance was expected "within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution[,]"152 not of its partial,
dismembered, reproduction.

Not having been served with copies of Resolution No. 9674 itself, petitioners are right in construing the three-day
period for compliance as not having begun to run. From this, it follows that no violation of the requirement "to
submit within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys
published from February 12, 2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution[.]"153 could have been
committed. Thus, there was no basis for considering petitioners to have committed an election offense arising from
this alleged violation.

It is of no consequence that the May 8, 2013 Notice warned petitioners that failure to comply with it "shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code."154 It is true that the Omnibus Election Code has been in force and effect long before Resolution No.
9674 was promulgated; nevertheless, the supposed violation of the Omnibus Election Code rests on petitioners'
alleged non-compliance with Resolution No. 9674. This is a matter which, as we have demonstrated, is baseless, the
three-day period for compliance not having even commenced.

It is similarly inconsequential that petitioners were subsequently able to obtain certified true copies of Resolution
No. 9674. Petitioners' own diligence in complying with the formal requirements of Rule 65 petitions filed before
this court cannot possibly be the cure for COMELEC's inaction. These certified true copies were secured precisely
to enable petitioners to assail COMELEC's actions, not to validate them. It would be misguided to subscribe to
COMELEC's suggestion that petitioners' diligence should be their own undoing. To accede to this would be to
effectively intimidate parties with legitimate grievances against government actions from taking the necessary
steps to comply with (formal) requisites for judicial remedies and, ultimately, prevent them from protecting their
rights.

COMELEC's error is compounded by its failure to provide petitioners with copies of the criminal complaint subject
of E.O. Case No. 13-222. COMELEC has neither alleged nor proven that it has done so. Per its own allegations, all it
did was serve petitioners with the May 8, 2013 Notice and the July 1, 2013 Subpoena.

These facts considered, it was not only grave error, but grave abuse of discretion, for COMELEC to pursue
unfounded criminal charges against petitioners. In so doing, COMELEC violated petitioners' right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 is upheld, and
respondent Commission on Elections is ENJOINED from prosecuting petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and
Pulse Asia, Inc. for their supposed violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 in respect of their non-submission of
the names of all commissioners and payors, including subscribers, of surveys published during the campaign
period for the 2013 elections.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA, Petitioner, v. HILARIO M. MARCO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to
appointments made by local chief executives.

Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to professionalize
the civil service. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local chief executives from making appointments
during the last days of their tenure. Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules
and regulations in order to be valid.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals Decision2 that denied the appeal of the
Provincial Government of Aurora (the Province). The Province appealed the Resolution3 of the Civil Service
Commission granting the Motion for Execution filed by Hilario M. Marco (Marco). The Civil Service Commission had
earlier reversed and set aside the disapproval of Marco's permanent appointment as Cooperative Development
Specialist II.4

Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed5 Marco as Cooperative Development Specialist
II on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province.6 On June 28, 2004,
Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field
Office-Aurora (the Field Office). Annexed to Marco's appointment papers was a certification from Provincial Budget
Officer Norma R. Clemente (Provincial Budget Officer Clemente) and Provincial Accountant Wilfredo C. Saturno
(Provincial Accountant Saturno) stating that funds from the Province's 2004 Annual Budget were available to
cover the position.7

On June 30, 2004, newly elected Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo assumed office. The next day, she called to an
executive meeting all the department heads of the Province.8

During the executive meeting, Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested that the Province had no
funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's 26 appointees.9 She subsequently issued a Letter recalling
the previously issued certification of the availability of funds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the result of the dialogue of the concerned offices regarding the financial status of the Provincial
Government of Aurora, we hereby recall/retrieve our previously issued certification of availability of funds relative
to the appointments issued by Governor Ramoncita P. Ong.10cralawlawlibrary
Provincial Budget Officer Clemente's Letter was submitted to the Province's Human Resource Management-Office.
It was then forwarded to the Field Office.11

Due to the recall of the certification, the Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment in the Letter12 dated July 5,
2004.13

The Province, through Human Resource Management Officer Liwayway G. Victorio, served Marco a copy of the
Letter dated July 5, 2004. Marco was, thus, advised to refrain from reporting for work beginning July 8, 2004, the
day he received notice of the disapproval of his appointment.14

Marco wrote the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (Regional Office), moving for the reconsideration
of the disapproval of his appointment.15 The Regional Office, however, denied reconsideration in its
Decision16 dated April 6, 2005 and affirmed the disapproval of Marco's appointment. It said that "[t]he lack of funds
for the [26 appointments Governor Ong issued] was established during the meeting of the different department
heads of Aurora Province and their new governor."17
Through the Letter dated May 17, 2005, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission.18 The Province,
through its Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of Marco's Letter on May 23, 2005.19 However, it
failed to comment on the appeal within 10 days from receipt as required by Section 73 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.20

In the Resolution21 dated April 14, 2008, the Civil Service Commission granted Marco's appeal and set aside the
Regional Office's Decision dated April 6, 2005. It ruled that Marco's appointment was valid since it was
accompanied by a certification of availability of funds.22 As to the Letter withdrawing the certification, the Civil
Service Commission ruled that it did not affect the validity of Marco's appointment because the Province "failed to
submit documentary evidence to support its claim [that it had no funds to pay for the services of Governor Ong's
appointees]."23

The Civil Service Commission added that the Province's withdrawal of the certification was "unfair to
Marco":24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is unfair to Marco who applied for the said position believing in good faith that funds were available, passed the
screening conducted by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) on February 12 & 13, 2004, was appointed on June
25, 2004 and was later told to stop reporting for work as his appointment was disapproved by [the Civil Service
Commission Field Office-Aurora] simply because the provincial government under the new governor realized that
it has no funds to pay for his services.25cralawlawlibrary
Thus, the Civil Service Commission ordered the Regional Office to investigate whether Provincial Budget Officer
Clemente and Provincial Accountant Saturno were administratively liable for certifying that funds were available
to cover the positions filled by Governor Ong's appointees but subsequently withdrawing this certification.26 It
ordered the. Field Office to reflect the Resolution in Marco's appointment papers and in his Service Record.27

The Province received a copy of the April 14, 2008 Resolution on May 21, 2008.28

On July 22, 2008, Provincial Administrator Alex N. Ocampo (Provincial Administrator Ocampo), on behalf of the
Province, filed before the Civil Service Commission a Petition for Relief29 on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
According to him, the Civil Service Commission deprived the Province of an opportunity to be heard when it failed
to implead the Province as an indispensable party.30 He reiterated that Marco's appointment was void since the
Province had no funds to pay for Marco's salaries.31

The Civil Service Commission denied outright the Petition for Relief in the Resolution32 dated November 4, 2008. It
ruled that Provincial Administrator Ocampo had no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief absent an
authorization from the Provincial Governor. Moreover, a petition for relief was not allowed under the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Thus, Provincial Administrator Ocampo erred in filing a Petition
for Relief.33

Provincial Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,34 this time with a written authority35 to file
from Governor Bellafior Angara-Castillo annexed to the Motion.36

The Civil Service Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution37 dated September 8, 2009.
It ruled that its April 14, 2008 Resolution had become final and executory considering that the Province did not file
a motion for reconsideration of this Resolution within the reglementary period.38

Consequently, Marco requested the Civil Service Commission to implement the April 14, 2008
Resolution.39 Through the Resolution40 dated July 6, 2010, the Commission granted Marco's request.

Provincial Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash "Execution,"41 arguing
that the April 14, 2008 Resolution had already been implemented. As the Civil Service Commission had ordered,
the Province reflected the April 14, 2008 Resolution.in Marco's appointment papers and in his Service Record.42

In the Resolution43 dated January 24, 2011, the Civil Service Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Quash "Execution." It noted that the Province still refused to reinstate Marco despite the April 14,
2008 Resolution and thus clarified that this Resolution necessarily resulted in the approval of Marco's appointment
and his reinstatement as Cooperative Development Specialist II.44 The January 24, 2011 Resolution
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ocampo, et al. nonchalantly tries to sweep away what is obvious in the ruling of the Commission in [the April 14,
2008 Resolution], i.e., the reversal of the disapproval by [the Regional Office] and [the Field Office] of Marco's
appointment. The reversal of the two (2) decisions mean[s] that Marco's appointment as Cooperative Development
Specialist II is in order and should be approved. Consequently, the approval of Marco's appointment is legal proof
that he is entitled to perform the duties and functions of the said position and receive the salaries and benefits
attached to the position.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash of Alex N. Ocampo, Provincial Administrator,
and Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, Legal Counsel, Provincial Government of Aurora, is DENIED. Accordingly, [the
July 6, 2010 Resolution] which grants the Motion for the Implementation of [the April 14, 2008 Resolution] filed by
Hilario M. Marco, STANDS.

The Provincial Governor of Aurora is directed to reinstate Marco to his Cooperative Development Specialist II
position and pay his back salaries and other benefits from the time that Marco was actually prohibited from
reporting for work up to his actual reinstatement.45cralawlawlibrary
A Petition for Review46 under Rule 43 with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order47 was filed before
the Court of Appeals. For the first time, the Province argued that Marco was a midnight appointee since Governor
Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her tenure. Therefore, Marco's appointment was void.48

In the Decision dated March 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review and affirmed the
implementation of the Civil Service Commission's April 14, 2008 Resolution.49

The Court of Appeals ruled that the April 14, 2008 Resolution already became final and executory since there was
no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period. Although the Province filed a Petition for
Relief before the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals held that the remedy of a petition for relief is not
allowed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover, the Province failed to
prove the extrinsic fraud that allegedly prevented it from filing a motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Civil Service
Commission correctly denied the Petition for Relief.50

On the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed Marco's appointment. The Province had earlier certified that it had
funds to pay for his salary as Cooperative Development Specialist II.51 It found that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
even passed a "Supplemental Budget for 2004 appropriating P54,014,127.01 in provincial funds."52 Therefore, the
issuance of the Letter recalling the certification "[did] not change the fact that there [were] funds available for
[Marco's] appointment."53

On the claim that Marco was a midnight appointee, the Court of Appeals said that Marco's case fell within the
exception provided under Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 030918.54 He was fully qualified for the position
and underwent a screening process on February 12 and 13, 2004, long before the election ban.55 Therefore, he was
validly appointed.

The Province filed a Motion for Reconsideration,56 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution57 dated June
13, 2012.

The Province filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. Marco filed his Comment,58 after which the
Province filed its Reply.59

In the Resolution60 dated January 30, 2013, this court ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. The
Province filed its Memorandum61 on April 25, 2013, while Marco filed his Memorandum62 on May 2, 2013.

The Province maintains that Marco's appointment was void on the ground that he was a midnight appointee.
Marco was appointed by Governor Ong five (5) days before the end of her term, in violation of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 030918,63 paragraph 2.1 of which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.1. All appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved,
 except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes
before the Election Ban as shown in the Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.
On Marco's claim that he underwent a regular screening process, which exempted his appointment from the
prohibition on midnight appointments, the Province counters that Marco failed to present convincing evidence to
prove this claim. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Promotion Selection Board showed that Marco was among the
201 applicants allegedly screened by the Board within two (2j days. According to the Province, two days is a period
too short for the Personnel Selection Board to have carefully considered all the applications.64

As to the claim that the April 14, 2008 Resolution is final and executory and may no longer be reversed, the
Province argues that nothing prevents this court from setting aside this Resolution. It argues that the promulgation
of Nazareno, et al. v. City of Dumaguete65 was a supervening event warranting the reversal of the final and
executory decision.66

In Nazareno, this court voided 89 appointments made by a city mayor within the month that he left office, ruling
that they were mass appointments prohibited under Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 010988.67 The
Province argues that Governor Ong's appointments were analogous to the Nazareno appointments; hence,
Governor Ong's appointments should likewise be voided.68

Finally, the Province insists that Marco's appointment was void due to lack of funds to pay for the position.69 In
ordering the Province to uphold Marco's appointment despite the lack of funds, the Civil Service Commission
allegedly "interfered with [the Province's] prerogative to draw up its own budget and to spend its ... revenues as it
deems fit."70

For his part, Marco maintains that the Civil Service Commission's Resolution dated April 14, 2008 has long become
final and executory. Therefore, the Resolution may no longer be disturbed.71

On the claim that he was a midnight appointee, Marco pointed out that the Province belatedly raised this claim. The
Province never raised it before the Civil Service Commission but only did so before the Court of Appeals.72 By
belatedly raising this claim, the Province should be deemed to have "implicitly recognized"73 that he was not a
midnight appointee.

In any case, Marco asserts that he was qualified for the position and that he underwent a selection process as
required by Resolution No. 030918. Thus, his appointment was an exception to the prohibition on midnight
appointments.74

On the alleged interference of the Civil Service Commission with the Province's discretionary power to appoint,
Marco argues that it "merely upheld the validity of an existing appointment[.]"75 The Civil Service Commission did
not "[substitute] its own appointee for the one chosen by the appointing authority."76 Therefore, it correctly upheld
his appointment.

Lastly, Marco argues that Nazareno does not apply in this case. This court in Nazareno voided the 89 appointments
of the appointing authority based on the criteria set in Resolution No. 010988.77 However, Nazareno had been
promulgated even before he was appointed in office. Moreover, Resolution No. 010988 did not set any new criteria
for appointments made during the last days of the appointing authority in office. Therefore, the promulgation
of Nazareno is not a supervening event that can set aside the final and executory April 14, 2008 Resolution.78

The issues for this court's resolution are:

First, whether the Resolution dated July 6, 2010, which ordered the implementation of the April 14, 2008
Resolution, was void for varying the terms of the April 14, 2008 Resolution;

Second, whether the withdrawal of the certification of sufficiency of funds voided Marco's appointment; and

Lastly, whether Marco's appointment was void on the ground that he was a midnight appointee.
This Petition must be denied.cralawlawlibrary

We note that the Province filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals against the Civil Service Commission's
Resolution that ordered the execution of the April 14, 2008 Resolution.79

The Province erred in filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals, as no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution.80 Instead, it should have filed a petition for certiorari — the appropriate special civil action under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.81

The Court of Appeals, therefore, should have dismissed the Province's appeal outright. Rule 50, Section 1(i) of the
Rules of Court allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal where the order appealed from is not appealable.82

The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it."83 The judgment remains immutable even if it is later
on discovered to be erroneous.84 The doctrine "is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite
date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final [and executory] judgments will result in endless litigation."85

The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to decisions rendered by the Civil Service Commission. A
decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory if no motion for reconsideration is filed
within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule VI, Section 80 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 80. Execution of Decision. - The decisions of the Commission Proper or its Regional Offices shall be
immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, in which case the execution of the decision shall be held in abeyance.
In Mendiola v. Civil Service Commission,86 Teodorico Mendiola (Mendiola) occupied the position of Budget Examiner
III when the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau terminated his employment.87 On Mendiola's appeal,
the Civil Service Commission ordered his reinstatetment in the resolution dated September 21, 1988.88

The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau failed to file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period. Consequently, Mendiola filed a motion for execution of the September 21, 1988 resolution.89

Unknown to Mendiola, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau belatedly filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Civil Service Commission granted despite having been filed out of time.90

This court reversed the Civil Service Commission's grant of the motion for reconsideration and ordered Mendiola's
reinstatement as the Commission previously ordered in the September 21, 1998 resolution. This court held that
the September 21, 1998 resolution had become final and executory when the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau failed to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. Thus, the Civil
Service Commission may no longer reverse the resolution.91

In Obiasca v. Basallote,92 Jeane O. Basallote (Basallote) was appointed Administrative Officer II by the Department
of Education and was assigned to work in Tabaco National High School in Albay. Basallote had assumed the duties
of her office as Administrative Officer II when she learned that Arlin B. Obiasca (Obiasca) was subsequently
appointed to the same position. Obiasca's appointment was attested to by the Civil Service Commission, while
Basallote's appointment papers were not even forwarded to the Civil Service Commission.93

Basallote protested Obiasca's appointment before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office V. The Regional
Office dismissed the protest. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission reversed the Regional Office's Decision, thus
approving Basallote's appointment and recalling that of Obiasca.94
Without filing a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission, Obiasca directly filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission's Decision.95

Obiasca's Petition for Review on certiorari was likewise denied by this court.96 This court held that Obiasca's
failure to file a motion for reconsideration rendered the Civil Service Commission's Decision approving Basallote's
appointment final and executory. Thus, the Civil Service Commission's Decision may no longer be
disturbed:97ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Obiasca] did not file a petition for reconsideration of the [Civil Service Commission's resolution] before filing a
petition for review in the [Court of Appeals]. Such fatal procedural lapse on [Obiasca]'s part allowed the [Civil
Service Commission's resolution] to become final and executory. Hence, for all intents and purposes, the [Civil
Service Commission's resolution] has become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. A final and
definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed. Thus, in praying for the
reversal of the assailed Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the final and executory [Civil Service Commission
resolution], [Obiasca] would want the Court to reverse a final and executory judgment and disregard the doctrine
of immutability of final judgments.98 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In this case, the Province, through its Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of the Civil Service
Commission's April 14, 2008 Resolution on May 21, 2008.99 Thus, the Province had until June 5, 2008 to file a
motion for reconsideration.

However, the Province failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the April 14, 2008 Resolution within the 15-day
reglementary period. With no motion for reconsideration seasonably filed, the April 14, 2008 Resolution-became
final and executory on June 6, 2008.

In addition, the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment is not among those provided under the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This means that the remedy is not allowed under civil service
rules.100 Even assuming that a petition for relief may be filed before the Civil Service Commission, the party must
show that the assailed judgment became final through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.101

Here, the Province failed to refute that it received a copy of the Civil Service Commission's April 14, 2008
Resolution. It was given an opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of administrative due process.103 It did
not even justify why it failed to file a motion for reconsideration despite its receipt of the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution. Contrary to the Province's claim, there was no extrinsic fraud since the Province was not
prevented "from fully and fairly presenting [its] defense[.]"104 The Civil Service Commission correctly denied the
Province's Petition for Relief.

Since the April 14, 2008 Resolution already became final and executory, it may no longer be reversed. The Civil
Service Commission correctly granted Marco's request for the Resolution's implementation.cralawlawlibrary

II

In implementing the April 14, 2008 Resolution, the Civil Service Commission ordered the Province to reinstate
Marco and to pay him back salaries and other benefits:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the request of Hilario M. Marco, Cooperative Development Specialist II, Provincial Government of
Aurora, for the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 08-0656 dated April 14, 2008 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Provincial Government of Aurora is directed to reinstate Marco to his former position and the payment of his back
salaries and other benefits starting from the date he was advised to stop reporting for work on July 8, 2004 up to
his actual reinstatement.105cralawlawlibrary
According to the Province, the Civil Service Commission went beyond the order sought to be implemented and
"varie[d] the term of the judgment."106 The Province claims that nothing in the April 14, 2008 Resolution ordered
the reinstatement of Marco. The dispositive portion of the resolution stated:107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Hilario M. Marco is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision No. 05-0212 dated April 6,
2005 of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV, Quezon City, affirming the disapproval of the appointment
of Marco for lack of certification of availability of funds is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora is directed to reflect this decision in the appointment of Marco
and in his Service Record.108cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, the Province claims that the order implementing the April 14, 2008 Resolution must be set aside.

We rule that the Civil Service Commission did not vary the terms of the April 14, 2008 Resolution.

Under Rule IV, Section 1 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40-98, an appointment takes effect
immediately upon issuance by the appointing authority. Once the appointee has assumed the duties of the position,
he or she is entitled to receive the salaries corresponding with the position though the Civil Service Commission
has not yet approved the appointment.

Should the appointment be initially disapproved, it nevertheless remains effective if a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal of the disapproval is seasonably filed with the proper office.109 Therefore, during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration, the appointee remains entitled to his or her salaries until the appointment is finally
disapproved by the Civil Service Commission.110

Marco's appointment immediately took effect on June 25, 2004 when Governor Ong appointed him as Cooperative
Development Specialist II. Although his appointment was initially disapproved by the Field Office, Marco
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission. Thus, Marco's appointment
remained effective during the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration.

Because the Civil Service Commission granted his Motion for Reconsideration and set aside the disapproval of his
appointment, Marco remained entitled to his position. The necessary consequence of granting reconsideration is
his reinstatement as Cooperative Development Specialist II.

The Civil Service Commission correctly implemented the April 14, 2008 Resolution by ordering Marco's
reinstatement and the payment of his back salaries and other benefits.cralawlawlibrary

III

The Province contends that the Civil Service Commission erred in approving Marco's appointment as Cooperative
Development Specialist II. It allegedly had no funds to cover the position. Therefore, the appointment was void,
having been issued in violation of Rule V, Section 1(e)(ii) of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 40-98. The rule states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 1. In addition to the common requirements and procedures, the following requirements and guidelines
shall also be observed and the necessary documents submitted, when applicable.

....

e. LGU Appointment. Appointment in local government units for submission to the Commission shall be
accompanied, in addition to the common requirements, by the following

....

ii. Certification by the Municipal/City/Provincial Accountant/Budget Officer that funds are available.
The certification ensures that the appointee shall occupy a position adequately covered by appropriations as
required by Section 325(e) of the Local Government Code:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 325. General Limitations. - The use of the provincial, city, and municipal funds shall be subject to the
following limitations:

....

(e) Positions in the official plantilla for career positions which are occupied by incumbents holding permanent
appointments shall be covered by adequate appropriations[.]
As required by Rule V, Section 1 (e)(ii) of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40-98, Marco's
appointment was accompanied by a certification from the Province, through the Provincial Budget Officer and the
Provincial Accountant, that funds were available under the 2004 Annual Budget of the Province for the 26
positions issued by Governor Ong. Therefore, there was no violation of Rule V, Section 1(e)(ii) of the Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40-98. There was no violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. Marco's appointment remains effective.

That the Province suddenly had no funds to pay for Marco's salaries despite its earlier certification that funds were
available under its 2004 Annual Budget does not affect his appointment.

None of the grounds for disapproval, of an appointment under Rule V, Section 7111 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Civil Service Law exists in this case. The appointment remains effective, and the local
government unit remains liable for the salaries of the appointee.112

Moreover, the earlier certification, if proven false, constitutes intentional misrepresentation of a material fact
concerning a civil service matter. This is an offense punishable by fine, or imprisonment, or both as provided under
Section 67 of the Civil Service Law:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 67. Penal Provision. — Whoever makes any appointment or employs any person in violation of any provision
of this Title or the rules made thereunder or whoever commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of
material facts concerning other civil service matters, or whoever violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any of
such provisions or rules, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
We, therefore, agree with the Civil Service Commission in ordering the Regional Office to commence appropriate
administrative proceedings against Provincial Budget Officer Norma R. Clemente and Provincial Accountant
Wilfredo C. Saturno for issuing the certification of availability of funds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Commission disapproves of the conduct of the officials of the Provincial Government of Aurora in issuing a
certification dated June 25, 2004 that funds are available in the 2004 Annual Budget to support the appointments
issued by outgoing Governor Ong and then later [withdrawing] the same when a new governor assumes office. As
such, the CSCRO No. IV is directed to conduct the appropriate administrative proceedings to determine whether
Norma R. Clemente (Provincial Budget Officer) and Wilfredo C. Saturno (Provincial Accountant) violated Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations.113cralawlawlibrary
IV

The Province claims that Marco was a midnight appointee. Moreover, he was among those appointed "en
masse"114 by Governor Ong before the end of her term. Thus, the Civil Service Commission should have
disapproved Marco's appointment.

A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next
presidential election."115 Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts which he [or she] ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her] successor."116 An outgoing President should not "deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."117

However, the constitutiona prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It
does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.

In De Rama v. Court of Appeals,118 Mayor Conrado L. de Rama (Mayor de Rama) of Pagbilao, Quezon sought to recall
14 appointments made by former Mayor Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja on the sole ground that they were midnight
appointments.119 The Civil Service Commission denied Mayor de Rama's request, ruling that the prohibition on
midnight appointments only applies to outgoing Presidents.120 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil
Service Commission's decision.121

This court agreed with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals. In denying Mayor de Rama's petition
for review on certiorari, this court said that the prohibition on midnight appointments "applies only to presidential
appointments."122 This court noted that "there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure."123

Nonetheless, the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,124 may "establish
rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service."125 Although it conceded that
no law prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure, this court
in Nazareno upheld Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 010988, which prohibited local elective officials from
making appointments immediately before and after elections.126 In addition, Resolution No. 010988 prohibited
"mass appointments," or those "issued in bulk or in large number after the elections by an outgoing local chief
executive and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance." Resolution No. 010988
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREAS, the May 14, 2001 national and local elections have just concluded and the Commission anticipates
controversies that would arise involving appointments issued by outgoing local chief executives immediately
before and after elections;

WHEREAS, the Commission observed the tendency of some outgoing local chief executives to issue appointments
even after the elections, especially when their successors have already been proclaimed;

WHEREAS, this practice of some outgoing local chief executives causes animosities between the outgoing and
incoming officials and the people who are immediately affected and made to suffer the consequences thereof are
the ordinary civil servants and eventually, to a larger extent, their constituents themselves;

WHEREAS, one of the reasons behind the prohibition in issuing appointments or hiring of new employees during
the prohibited period as provided for in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 2001 is to prevent the
occurrence of the foregoing, among others;

WHEREAS, local elective officials, whose terms of office are about to expire, are deemed as "caretaker"
administrators who are duty bound to prepare for the smooth and orderly transfer of power and authority to the
incoming local chief executives;

WHEREAS, under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President or Acting President is prohibited from
making appointments two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety;

WHEREAS, while there is no equivalent provision in the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
or in the Civil Service Law (Book V of Executive Order No. 292) of the above-stated prohibition, the rationale
against the prohibition on the issuance of "midnight appointments" by the President is applicable to appointments
extended by outgoing local chief executives immediately before and/or after the elections; and

WHEREAS, the Commission also deems it fit to issue guidelines that would assist processors in their actions on
appointments issued by theses outgoing local chief executives immediately before and/or after the elections;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government, hereby issues and adopts the following guidelines:

1. The validity of an appointment issued immediately before or after the elections by outgoing local
chief executives is to be determined on the basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual
appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding the same.
....

3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or

demotion, except in cases of renewal and reinstatement, regardless of status, which are issued
AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the
Commission, including its Regional or Field Offices, of said appointments or the Report of Personnel
Actions (ROPA), as the case may be, shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur
relative to their issuance:

a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) before the
prohibited period on the issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting;
b) That the appointee is qualified;
c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service and/or endanger
public safety;
d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the elections.

4. The term "mass appointments" refers to those issued in bulk or in large number after the elections
by an outgoing local chief executive and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance.

This court said that the rationale behind Resolution No. 010988 "is not difficult to
see":127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the
appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this
end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related
issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances
mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow
the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and
promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local
officials.128 (Citation omitted)
In Nazareno, this court affirmed the disapproval of 89 appointments Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Mayor
Remollo) of Dumaguete City made within the month that he left office. This court found that the appointments
were issued in violation of Resolution No. 010988. Particularly, it found no evidence that the Personnel Selection
Board carefully deliberated on the qualifications of Mayor Remollo's appointees.129 Moreover, the timing and the
large number of appointments "indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing
administration."130

The Province argues that the 26 appointments Governor Ong issued during the last days of her tenure were similar
to those Mayor Remollo issued in Nazareno. Governor Ong allegedly issued mass appointments, the immediate
issuance of which the Province had no apparent need.

We note, however, that Resolution No. 010988 — the Resolution effective when Mayor Remollo issued the
appointments in Nazareno — was superseded by Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003.131 Resolution No.
030918 on "midnight appointments" by local chief executives was effective at the time Governor Ong issued the
disputed appointments. Resolution No. 030918 states, in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREAS, under Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission, as the central personnel agency
of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, among others;

WHEREAS, the Constitution further mandates the Commission to issue its own rules and regulations for effective
and efficient personnel administration in the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 12(1) and (2), Book V of the Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) mandates
the Commission to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
ranks and levels in the Civil Service and to prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provision of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
WHEREAS, problems and controversies inevitably arise involving appointments issued by outgoing elective and
appointive officials just before and after election periods;

WHEREAS, personnel morale, office operations, and delivery of public services are inevitably disrupted by such
problem's and controversies;

WHEREAS, there is a need to forestall such problems by defining and making more stringent the restrictions on
personnel appointments to be observed by outgoing appointing officials, elective or appointive, before they leave
office;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to its constitutional and statutory mandates as the central
personnel agency of the government, hereby issues and adopts the following guidelines:

....

2. Action on Appointments issued by Elective and Appointive Officials After the Elections Up to June 30

2.1. All appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved,
except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes
before the Election Ban as shown in the Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.

....

This Resolution supersedes CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001 and shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Quezon City, August 28, 2003.

Since Resolution No. 030918 was effective at the time Governor Ong issued the 26 appointments, we must decide
this case based on Resolution No. 030918. Nazareno is not applicable, as it was decided based on Resolution No.
0109888.

We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that Governor Ong issued Marco's
appointment in accordance with Resolution No. 030918. Although his appointment was made five (5) days before
the end of Governor Ong's term, Marco was fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening
processes before the election ban. As the Civil Service Commission found, Marco "applied for the [position of
Cooperative Development Specialist II] [and] passed the screening conducted by the Personnel Selection Board
(PSB) on February 12 & 13, 2004[.]"132 The Court of Appeals reiterated this finding in its Decision dated March 2,
2012.133 Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the findings of fact of the Civil
Service Commission,134 especially since it has acquired "specialized knowledge and expertise"135 in the field of civil
service law.

Assuming without conceding that Governor Ong's 26 appointments were issued in bulk, this per se does not
invalidate the appointments. Unlike Resolution No. 010988, Resolution No. 030918 does not prohibit
appointments that are large in number. Moreover, 26 appointments can hardly be classified as "mass
appointments," compared with the 89 appointments this court invalidated in Nazareno.

Marco's appointment was valid. The Civil Service Commission correctly approved his appointment.

Considering that Marco had already accepted his appointment by the time the Province prevented him from
assuming his office, his appointment remains effective up to the present.136 Consequently, the Civil Service
Commission correctly ordered the Province to reinstate Marco as Cooperative Development Specialist II and to pay
him his back salaries from July 8, 2004 when the Province prevented him from reporting for work up to his actual
reinstatement.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 2, 2012
is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 180745, August 30, 2017

ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GEORGE M. JEREOS, ROBERTO

G. GEOTINA, JUAN T. TAN, KRISTINE MORALES, AND ALBERTO LINA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

In observing administrative due process, it is essential that the accused be accorded the right to be informed of the
accusations against him or her. Fair play requires that the accused be equipped with the necessary information for
the preparation of his or her defense.

This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the December 22, 2006
Decision2 and November 21, 2007 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89585 be nullified and set
aside.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Office of the Ombudsman February 7, 2005 Resolution5 and the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon February 21, 2005 Joint Order6 in OMB L-C-04-0083-B and OMBL-A-04-0057-B,
dismissing petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias (Iglesias) from service.7 Petitioner prays that judgment be rendered
absolving her of any criminal and administrative liability and reinstating her to her former position as Acting
District Collector in the Port of San Fernando.8

Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector by the Bureau of Customs on October 1, 2002. She was
assigned at the Port of San Fernando, La Union by Commissioner Antonio Bernardo.9

On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance, through Atty. Leon L. Acuñ a (Atty. Acuñ a) and Troy Francis C.
Pizarro (Pizarro), filed a Complaint-Affidavit10 against Iglesias before the Office of the Ombudsman.11 Atty. Acuñ a
and Pizarro claimed that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to
the year 2000.12

They also alleged that Iglesias made false entries in her 2000, 2001, and 2002 SALNs with respect to two (2) real
properties in Quezon City and Pangasinan. The Quezon City property's tax declarations revealed that Iglesias
purchased the property on August 1, 1996 from the spouses Rosario and Elpidio Ablang. Likewise, the Pangasinan
property's Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by virtue of a deed of sale showing that she purchased a portion
of this property from Marina Lopez de Joya (Marina). However, in her SALNs, Iglesias indicated that these
properties were acquired through inheritance.13

Atty. Acuñ a and Pizarro also discovered three (3) real properties in Pangasinan under Iglesias' name that were not
declared in her SALNs.14 They further asserted that Iglesias acquired several real and personal properties from
1999 to 2002 amounting to P15,230,000.00, which was disproportionate to her lawful source of income. They
contended that the following properties were unlawfully acquired:15

Kind of Property Year Purchased Acquisition Cost

Parañ aque
 Residential Property 1999 [P]3 Million
Novaliches
 Residential Property 1997 [P]3.5 Million
Baguio Residential
  Property 1995 [P]2 Million
Baguio Residential Property 1994 [P]2 Million
Dump Trucks 1991 [P]1.6 Million
Elf 1991 [P]800,000
Van 1999 [P]680,000
Van 1999 [P]850,000
Car 2002 [P]800,00016
Finally, Atty. Acuñ a and Pizarro averred that Iglesias made false representations when she dechtred in her letter to
then President Gloria Macapagat-Arroyo that she was taking up Masters in Customs Administration, instead of
Masters in Management.17 They also alleged that Iglesias falsified her Personal Data Sheet when she antedated its
execution.18

They charged Iglesias with the following:

a) Making untruthful statements in her SAL[N]s a,nd failing to disclose all of her properties in her SAL[N]s
(Article 171(4)19 of the Revised Penal Code);
b) Failing to submit her SAL[N]s as required by Sections (sic) 11 in relation to Section 820 of Republic Act No.
6713 and Section 721 of Republic Act No. 3019;
c) Engaging in acts of dishonesty and misconduct by making false representations about her education to Her
Excellency, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and by indicating a false date on her Personal Data Sheet; and
d) [A]cquiring, during her incumbency an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to her
salary and to her other lawful income (Section 8,22 [Republic Act No.] 3019); and
e) [C]oncealing unlawfully acquired property (Sections 2 and 12 in relation to Section 1(b)(1-3)23 of Republic
Act No. 1379)[.]24
The administrative case was docketed as OMB-L-A-04-0057-B, while the criminal case was docketed as OMB-L-C-
04-0083-B.25

On April 12, 2004, Iglesias filed her Counter-Affidavit with CounterComplaint26 in the administrative case. She
produced copies of her filed annual SALNs since 1989 and attached them to her Counter-Affldavit.27

Iglesias countered that she did not falsify the mode of acquisition of the Pangasinan and Quezon City properties in
her SALNs.28 Iglesias and her sister, Rosario de Joya-Ablang (Rosario), inherited the Quezon City property from
their parents.29 She "merely bought out her sister's share of their joint inherited property[.]"30 Regarding the
Pangasinan property, Iglesias reasoned that she acquired the property through purchase and donation when her
mother, Marina, sold it to her for an amount well below its true value.31

Iglesias explained that she did not declare the three (3) Pangasinan properties because these were classified as
public lands and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had yet to award the properties to her.
She contended that she was merely considered an applicant for the grant of the public lands.32

On the alleged illegally acquired properties, Iglesias disclosed that she acquired these properties either by
purchase or inheritance. She obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from Philippine National Bank to buy out Rosario's
share and to purchase the Novaliches and Baguio properties. She also sold a property in Baguio to purchase the
Parañ aque property. To pay her obligations, she leased her Quezon City property from July 15, 2000 to January
2004. She acquired another loan of P2,000,000.00 from Philippine National Bank-Dagupan Branch to start her
trucking business.33

Iglesias asserted that the foreclosure of the Quezon City property for non-payment of her loan "belies the false
accusation . . . that [she] is a corrupt government official[.]"34

Iglesias argued that her educational attainment was correctly stated in her resume. She initially took up a master's
degree in Customs Administration but was not able to finish the degree and eventually shifted to
Management.35 Lastly, the false date on her Personal Data Sheet was a typographical error.36

She claimed that the allegations against her were false and baseless and that Atty. Acuñ a and Pizarro should be
held "criminally liable for malicious prosecution" and "for making unbuthful statements under oath in their
Complaint-Affidavit."37

Iglesias filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File CounterAffidavit in the criminal case. However, she was still
unable to file her counter-affidavit.38

On April 15, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an Order39 in connection with the
administrative case, preventively suspending Iglesias for six (6) months while the investigation was ongoing.40

On August 27, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an Order requiring the parties to
present their arguments in their respective position papers. Iglesias submitted her position paper on September
20, 2004 reiterating her arguments. The Department of Finance submitted its position paper on October 5, 2004
and disclosed new information regarding the business interest of Iglesias in Golden Grove Realty and Development
Corporation. Its position paper also included recorqs of cases filed against lglesias.41

On October 12, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Robert C. Reñ ido (Prosecution Officer Reñ ido) of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution42 resolving the administrative and
criminal cases. Prosecution Officer Reñ ido considered Iglesias' Counter-Affidavit in the administrative cae as her
counter-affidavit in the criminal case "[f]or purposes of exigency and in the interest of justice and due process."43

Prosecution Officer Reñ ido found that Atty. Acuñ a and Pizarro did not conduct an intensive investigation before
they filed the complaint against Iglesias,44 who was able to submit uthentic copies of her filed SALNs from 1989 to
1999.45

He gave merit to Iglesias' explanation that the Quezon City and Pangasinan propertis were part of her inheritance
from her parents Since Iglesias inherited a great portion of the Quezon City property from her parent, she did not
err in declaring the property as acquired through inheritance.46 Meanwhile, the Pangasinan property was intended
to be donated to Iglesias by her mother. They relied on the credibility of the lawyer who made a deed of sale
instead of a deed of donation to facilitate the transaction.47

Prosecution Officer Reñ ido held that Iglesias was correct in not declaring the three (3) Pangasinan properties in
her SALNs, as she had not yet acquired them,48 On thalleged illegally acquired properties, he stated that Iglesias
"was able to shed light on how she was able to lawfully acquire [these] assets."49

On the alleg tion that Iglesias falsified her educational attainment, Prosecution Officer Reñ ido ruled that Iglesias
had sufficiently proven that she shifted to Management upon learning that the Civil Service Commission did not
require a specific geme of a master's degree.50 He also found that the alleged falsification of Iglesias' Personal Data
Sheet was a mere typographical error.51

Prosecution Officer Reñ ido recommended the dismissal of both cases.52 Likewise, he recommended that the
preventive suspension be lifted upon the Joint Resolution's approval.53

Director Emilio A. Gonzalez III of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution.
However, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez recommended its disapproval.54

On February 7, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution55 reviewing the October 12, 2004 Joint
Resolution. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) held that Iglesias failed to justify the
substantial increase in her net worth. In just one (1) year, her net worth as declared in her SALN increased from
P245,000.00 in 1989 to P1,685,000.00 in 1990.56

Ombudsman Marcelo ciiscovered that Iglesias' cash declaration escalated from P250,000.00 in her 1991 SALN to
P1,770,000.00 in her 1992 SALN. She also acquired the Baguio, Parañ aque, and Novaliches properties from 1994 to
2000.57

In examining Iglesias' SALNs, Ombudsman Marcelo found that she obtained housing loans of P14,000,000.00 in
1994, P26,000,000.00 in 1998, and P29,000,000.00 in 1999.58 Since the housing loans were not supported by
evidence, Ombudsman Marcelo considered them "spurious or non-existent, meant only to cover up the rapidly
increasing assets of [Iglesias]."59

According to Ombudsman Marcelo, Iglesias also falsified her Personal Data Sheet "when she denied having any
criminal charges ever filed against her . . . despite evidence to the contrary."60 Iglesias had two (2) pending estafa
cases and three (3) dismissed cases before the lower courts, as stated in the National Bureau of Investigation's May
22, 2001 Certification.61 She likewise committed falsification when she did not declare the true value of the
Pampanga property and reported its worth at only P50,000.00.62

As for Iglesias' allegation of leasing her Quezon City property and starting a trucking business, Ombudsman
Marcelo stated that there was np evidence presented to support her claims. She also failed to declare the alleged
trucking business in her SALN.63

Ombudsman Marcelo held that the acts of Iglesias constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from service under Rule IV, Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, in relation to Book V, Sections 9 and 22 of the Administrative Code of 1987.64

The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:

WHEREFORE, the 12 October 2004 Joint Resolution is DISAPPROVED. Respondent ALBERTA DE JOYA-IGLESIAS is
hereby found guilty of the administrative offense of DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Thus, she is ordered
DISMISSED from the service, with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification for reemployment in the government service.

Moreover, sufficient probable cause exists to hold respondent ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS liable for violation of
Art. 171 (Falsification) and Art. 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code. Let the Infonnations charging her with the
said offenses be forthwith filed against her before the appropriate court.

Additionally, let a Petition for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Properties be filed before the proper court against
respondent in view of the herein found accumulation of unexplained wealth.

The Field Investigation Office (FIO) is hereby ordered to investigate the matter regarding the false valuation made
on the Deed of Sale covering the Pampanga property transferred in favor of respondent and secure the necessary
documentary evidence for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint for Falsification against her.

SO ORDERED.65 (Emphasis in the original)

Iglesias moved for reconsideration,66 which was denied by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in its
February 21, 2005 Joint Order.67

Iglesias appealed the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and the February 21, 2005 Joint
Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon before the Court of Appeals.68

Iglesias argued that she was denied administrative due process. She claimed that there was failurto meet the
substantial evidence requirement in administrative proceedings.69 Further, she asserted that her defense of denial
and the presence of mitigating circumstances should have been considered by the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.70

In its December 22, 2006 Decision,71 the Court of Appeals affinned the assailed February 7, 2005 Resolution and
February 21, 2005 Joint Order.72 It held that there was no denial of due process since Iglesias was able to explain
her side in her Counter-Affidavit and her Motion for Reconsideration of the February 7, 2005 Resolution.73
The Court of Appeals declared that the assailed Resolution and Joint Order rest on substantial evidence; hence, the
Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon did not cmnmit any grave abuse of
discretion.74 It added that Iglesias' defense of denial and the alleged mitigating circumstances were bereft of
merit.75

Iglesias moved for reconsideration, which was denied76 by the Court of Appeals in its November 21, 2007
Resolution.77

Hence, on January 17, 2008, Iglesias filed this Petition for Review78 with an application for temporary restraining
order against the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Finance officers, namely, Commissioner George
M. Jereos (Commissioner Jereos), Deputy Commissioner Roberto G. Geotina (Deputy Commissioner Geotina),
Acting Collector Juan T. Tan (Tan), Acting Disbursement Officer Kristine Morales (Morales), and Commissioner
Alberto Lina (Commissioner Lina) (collectively, respondents).

Petitioner alleges that respondent Tan took her place as Acting District Collector during her preventive suspension.
However, after the termination of her six (6)-month suspension, she was not automatically reinstated to her
position and respondent Tan was confirmed as Acting District Collector. Petitioner claims that she was demoted as
Deputy Collector for Operations without due process.79

Petitioner asserts that respondents Commissioner Jereos and Deputy Commissioner Geotina immediately
implemented the dismissal order while her motion for reconsideration of the February 7, 2005 Resolution was stiil
pending before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Thus, respondent Morales immediately withheld
her salary and other benefits.80 Respondent Commissioner Lina was included as a nominal party-respondent.81

Petitioner prays that the December 22, 2006 Decision and November 21, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
be nullified and set aside. Petitioner likewise prays that judgment be rendered absolving her of any criminal and
administrative liability and reinstating her to her former position as Acting District Collector at the Port of San
Femando.82

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW

III.

WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF HER RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HER83
Petitioner argues that she was not given an opportunity to refute the new accusations and charges against her
which were not stated in the Complaint-Affidavit. Her filing of a Motion for Reconsideration did "not address the
fact that she was never informed of the true allegations against her."84 Thus, she claims that "her right to be
informed of the accusations against her and to be afforded with due process of law has been violated."85

On April 25, 2000, respondents officers of the Department of Finance, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed their Comment86 and prayed for the denial of the Petition.87 They assert that petitioner was properly informed
of the charges against her.88 Moreover, her right to due process was not violated since she was given enough
opportunity to counter the allegations:
In this case, petitioner was able to file her Counter-Affidavit dated April 6, 2004 in OMB-L-A-04-0057-B. She was
likewise given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit in OMB-L-C-04-0083-B but she failed to do so despite her
having filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit dated March 19, 2004. Based on the Comment
dated September 21, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner even filed a Motion for Early Resolution
and Lifting of Preventive Suspension, and a Position Paper. Moreover, she likewise filed her Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 14, 2005.

Clearly, petitioner was given opportunity to explain her side and she moved for reconsideration of the challenged
Resolution dated February 7, 2005. She was never denied her right to due process.89 (Emphasis in the original)
On May 5, 2008, respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed its Comment90 and likewise prayed for the denial of the
Petition. It argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling "that petitioner was afforded due process by the
Office of the Ombudsman and [that] the questioned resolutions were supported by substantial evidence and based
on the records and evidence at hand."91

The Office of the Ombudsman counters that petitioner was not denied due process since "petitioner had the
opportunity to present her side, submit countervailing evidence to refute the Department of Finance's claims and
even move for a reconsideration of the decision."92 Further, it asserts that "petitioner was sufficiently informed of
the charges against her as shown in her Counter-Affidavit, Motion for Early Resolution and Lifting of Preventive
Suspension, Position Paper and the assailed Resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman."93

On May 14, 2008, petitioner filed her Reply and reiterated that she was denied due process since she was not
informed of the offenses charged against her.94

On July 8, 2009, this Court issued a Resolution95 requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Petitioner filed her Memorandum96 on September 18, 2009, while respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed its
Memorandum97 on October 1, 2009. Both parties reiterated their arguments in their earlier pleadings. Respondents
officers of the Department of Finance failed to file their memorandum.

On September 30, 2010, petitioner also filed a Supplement to the Supplemental Memorandum.98

On October 17, 2011, petitioner again filed a Supplemental Memorandum.99 She stated that Branch 45,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City issued a Joint Decision100 acquitting her of three (3) counts of perjury in
Criminal Case Nos. 05-1160, 05-1161, and 05-1162.101 The perjury cases alleged that petitioner made untruthful
statements in connection with three (3) real properties on her December 31, 2000 SALN.102 Petitioner contends
that since she was able to counter the anomalies in her statements, she "should only be held liable for simple
neglect of duty."103

On January 21, 2015, petitioner filed her last Supplemental Memorandum.104 Petitioner informed this Com1 that
the other falsification and perjury cases related to the present case were dismissed by the trial courts, particularly:

a. Criminal Case No. Q-05-137 (pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77) -
dismissed on 30 January 2008;

b. Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 05-1160 to 1162 (For Perjury, pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 45) - acquitting the accused on 21 June 2011[;]

c. Criminal Case Nos. (sic) 421447-62-CR (For Perjury, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 1) - acquitting the accused on 30 April 2014[;]

d. Criminal Case No. 05-238700 (For Falsification of Public Document, pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30) acquitting the accused on 23 July 2014[;] [and]

e. Criminal Case Nos. 40970 to 72 (For Perjury, pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
San Fernando City, La Union) - acquitting the accused on 17 October 2014.105

This Court resolves the main issue of whether or not petitioner was denied of administrative due process when the
Resolution dismissing her appeal was based on allegations that were not contained in the Complaint. Resolving this
main issue will pass on the issues of whether or not petitioner was denied of her right to be informed of the
charges against her and whether or not petitioner was denied of her right to due process. Since these issues are
interrelated, they will be addressed jointly.

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an opportunity to be heard.106 Due
process is complied with "if the party who is properly notified of allegations against him or her is given an
opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal
in arriving at its own independent conclusions."107

In F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:108

Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an o£portunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.109
An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charges
against him or her.110 A proper appraisal of the accusations would give the accused an opportunity to adequately
prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined.111

In this case, petitioner insists that the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was based on
new accusations that were not included in the Complaint Affidavit filed by Atty. Acuñ a and Pizarro. She anchors her
argument on the findings of the Ombudsman:
"In her first year in the government service, respondent reported a net worth of P245,000.00 in her 1989 SALN,
which swiftly grew to P1,685,000.00 during her second year (1990 SALN). The additional P1,440,000.00
accumulated by respondent is a 60% jump from her 1989 net worth. During that same period, respondent was
able to purchase a property in Paco, Manila, in the amount of P800,000.00, acquired additional jewelry worth
P250,000.00, and maintained cash in the bank in the amount of P400,000.00. This sudden upsurge in respondent's
net worth, within the short period of one (1) year, is unjustified considering that she had no other employment,
business activity or financial interests from which the acquisitions can be funded other than her employment in the
Bureau of Customs.

"Respondent's 1991 and 1992 SALN likewise reflected the meteoric rise of her assets. From the declared cash of
P250,000.00 in 1991, the same soared high to the amount of P1,770,000.00 which was not sufficiently justified or
explained by her income from the government, or her reported total new loans of P610,000.00, consisting of
jewelry loan in the amount of P110,000.00 and an agricultural loan in the amount of P500,000.00.

"Apart from the properties in New Manila, Quezon City, and Pampanga which respondent justified as to have been
inherited by her from her parents, respondent is likewise the owner of several properties located in Baguio City,
Parañ aque City, and Novaliches, Quezon City, which she acquired beginning 1994 to 2000."112 (Emphasis in the
original)
Considering the above, this Court finds that there was a violation of due process with respect to the other charges
which were not in the original complaint. This Court sternly reminds the Ombudsman that he cannot add new
findings which were not part of the original complaint. To do so would violate the right of the accused to due
process.

However, there were charges in the original complaint which should prosper. A reading of the Office of the
Ombudsman Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from service not solely on the irregularities found in her
1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs, which she was informed of
and was given the opportunity to refute. Petitioner conveniently left out in her pleadings the following findings of
the Office of the Ombudsman:
It should be noted, however, that respondent has two (2) Baguio properties indicated in her 2000-2002 SALNs.
The first Baguio property was acquired in 1995, thus, its declaration in her 1996 SALN. From 1996-1999, she had
been maintaining that same property. However, as evidenced by her 2000 SALN, she acquired another property in
Baguio. Presuming that, as claimed by respondent, the PNB loan paid for the acquisition of the first Baguio
property, with what funds did she acquire the second Baguio property?
Moreover, on the same year, respondent also acquired the Para[ñ ]aque property. Although respondent claims that
she sold one of the Baguio properties to buy the Para[ñ]aque property, she continued to declare the Baguio properties
as her own in her SALN for 2000-2002. This, therefore, would belie any assertion of sale . . .

Incidentally, it should be noted that during the years 2000-2002, respondent was no longer declaring any cash in bank
as part of her assets. She did not declare the proceeds received from the sale of the Baguio property to Mario
Nicolas despite her admission that she was given the initial payment of P1,100,000.00. Granted that she used
P1,000,000.00 thereof to make the [down payment] on the Para[ñ ]aque property, this would still leave her with
P100,000.00 cash in hand, not to forget the balance of P1,100,000.00 still owing her, which should have been
declared as patt of her assets.

As for the monthly amortization for the Para[ñ ]aque property that had to be paid to BPI, the claim that the rentals
on the New Manila property answered for it does not seem to hold water. First, respondent claims that in view of
the fact that she has defaulted on the payments on the PNB loan, the PNB has since foreclosed the property. The
inscription at the back of the title states that the property was foreclosed in 1999. This, thus, precludes respondent
from having the place rented. Second, assuming that the said foreclosure is being contested and is now the subject of
pending litigation, it is a puzzle how the lease was effected and why it was made for a lengthy period of time. Third,
respondent did not specify how much the lease rental was and if it were sufficient to pay for the monthly mortgage
owing BPI, and, most importantly, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate the claim of lease by JIM-Mar
Enterprises.
....
As for the trucks and vans, respondent justifies that the same were acquired by virtue of a loan from PNB-Dagupan
Branch in the amount of Two Million Pe os (P2,000,000.00). She claims that the same loan was used to buy the
dump trucks, van, and other equipment, and as operating capital for her trucking business. Respondent, however,
failed to present evidence regarding the said loan and the security used to obtain it. She also did not present any
evidence regarding the trucking business. Also, she did not disclose this in her SALN as one of her business interests.

Further, respondent admitted to committing another act of falsific:ation. In explaining the classification of the
Pampanga property as an inheritance/donation inter vivos, respondent admitted that she misdeclared the true value
of the said land as merely P50,000.00 in the Deed of Sale conveying the said property in her favor. This scheme was
obviously resorted to in order to evade the payment of higher taxes.113 (Emph[lsis supplied)
Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999 SALNs were disregarded, petitioner would still be liable
for the discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs. These discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit and
were given clarification by petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move
for reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman February 7, 2005 Resolution. These circumstances preclude
petitioner from claiming that she was denied her right to due process.

On a final note, this Court endeavors to strike a balance between the accountability of public officers as a result of
public office being a privilege, on the one hand, and their right to privacy as protected in the Bill of Rights, on the
other. Although this Court has held that the requirement of submitting a SALN does not violate the right to privacy
of public officers,114 it does not mean that they should completely shed this right. Therefore, minor or explainable
errors in the SALN, which cannot be related to an attempt to conceal illicit activities should not be punishable. This
Court may relax the rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where minor errors were committed since
these may simply be used to harass and obstruct public officers in the performance of their duties. However, the
errors in this case were so substantial and glaring that they should not escape prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 22, 2006 and the Resolution dated November 1, 4007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 89585 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias is GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT based on the anomalies

found in her 2000 to 2002 Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Thus, she is DISMISSED from service,
which includes the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government service.
Accordingly, the criminal case against petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias shall proceed on the basis of the
anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.

This is without prejudice to other administrative and criminal charges that may be filed against her.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208243, June 05, 2017

EDWIN GRANADA REYES, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PAUL
JOCSON ARCHES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Edwin Granada Reyes
(Reyes), together with Rita Potestas Domingo (Domingo) and Solomon Anore de Castilla (de Castilla).2 This
Petition assails the Office of the Ombudsman's March 20, 2013 Resolution3 in Case No. OMB-M-C-11-0005-A and
the June 26, 2013

Memorandum4 denying their motion for reconsideration. The assailed March 20, 2013 Resolution found probable
cause to indict petitioner Reyes, Domingo, de Castilla, and Gil C. Andres (Andres) for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and directed that an information against them be filed before the Sandiganbayan.5

On November 21, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357,
prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics products allowed
by law, commonly called 'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public
Market."6 On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell
firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010.7

On December 27, 2009, a fire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused extensive damage and destroyed fire
hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a
complaint dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao (Ombudsman-
Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. He claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year.8

By order of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, Chief of Police de Castilla, Fire Marshall Andres,9 and Permits and
Licensing Officer Designate Domingo were made respondents in the case, considering that they recommended the
approval of the mayor's permit's.10

The respondents a quo filed their respective counter-affidavits. Reyes alleged that Andres filed two (2) different
counter-affidavits, and Reyes was not furnished a copy of the second counter-affidavit (Andres' affidavit).11

After concluding the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution12 dated March 20,
2013 and found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo with violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were public officers
during the questioned acts.13 Both the government and private stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at
the Bansalan Public Market.14 While the mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless,
"gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors . . . [to sell] firecrackers in the public market
despite existing prohibition."15 The issuance of the mayor's permit was "patently tainted with bad faith and
partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence."16 The Ombudsman appreciated the evidence
presented and found that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were aware of Municipal Ordinance No.
357.17 Despite this, Reyes approved and issued a mayor's permit stating, "Permit is hereby granted to sell
firecrackers on December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at Public Market, Bansalan, Davao del Sur."18 The assailed
Resolution read:

WHEREFORE, this Office finds probable cause to indict respondents Edwin G. Reyes, Solomon A. De Castilla, Gil C.
Andres, and Rita P. Domingo for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). Let an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 be filed against the
respondents before the Sandiganbayan.

The other charges against the respondents are dismissed.19

Thus, an Information20 was filed against Reyes, together with his corespondents a quo Domingo, de Castilla, and
Andres for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. It read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 14, 2009, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, EDWIN GRANADA
REYES, RITA POTESTAS DOMINGO, SOLOMON ANORE DE CASTILLA, GIL CURAMENG ANDRES, public officers
being then the Mayor, Permits and Licensing Officer Designate, Chief of Police, and Fire Marshall, respectively, of
the Municipality of Bansalan, while in the discharge of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with
one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefit to a group of firecracker vendors by
approving and issuing them a mayor's permit "to sell firecrackers on December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at
Public Market, Bansalan, Davao del Sur" despite fully knowing the existence of a municipal ordinance expressly
prohibiting the storing, displaying, selling and blowing-up of firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market and the
non-issuance of the requisite Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC) to the firecracker vendors, thereby giving the
said firecracker vendors the unwarranted benefit and advantage of holding the business of selling firecrackers at
the Bansalan Public Market.

CONTRARY TO LAW.21
The Ombudsman denied a motion for reconsideration of its March 20, 2013 Resolution.22

Thus, petitioner filed this petition, arguing that public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
considering there was no legal basis to support the finding of probable cause against petitioner.23

Petitioner argues that there was no probable cause, insisting that there was not enough basis for the finding of bad
faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence in this case.24 There was no unwarranted advantage or
preference given to the firecracker vendors because the mayor's permit was granted based on a long-standing
practice to allow them to sell their wares during the Christmas season.25 All firecracker vendors received similar
treatment and were allowed to sell their wares, provided they submitted the requirements.26 Acts done in a public
official's performance of official duty are presumed to have been done in good faith, and mistakes committed are
not actionable unless malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith is shown.27

Petitioner insists that public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it relied solely on
Andres' affidavit, which was not furnished to petitioner, to indict him.28 Petitioner did not know of Andres'
affidavit, which contained accusations against petitioner, until he received the assailed Resolution.29 Thus,
petitioner's right to due process was violated. Petitioner imputes bad faith in the filing of the complaint against
him.30

In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner claims that he and his family will suffer financial, emotional,
and psychological hardship. The issuance of injunctive relief is necessary because the Sandiganbayan has already
set the arraignment date of petitioner.31

In his Comment,32 private respondent Arches argues that there was probable cause,33 that none of the grounds for
enjoining a criminal prosecution exists,34 and that the assailed Resolution was not based solely on Andres'
affidavit.35
The Office of the Ombudsman argues in its Comment36 that petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman. There were sufficient bases to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. The findings of the Ombudsman were based on the evidence presented.37 In the absence of
grave abuse of discretion, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the Ombudsman's exercise of
its mandate.38 The Ombudsman opposes petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief, as no invasion of any clear or legal
right has been established by the petitioner.39

In his Reply,40 petitioner Reyes argues that conspiracy could not be present, considering that the respondents did
not even agree with one another, as shown by Andres' affidavit.41 Further, it was not shown that petitioner
intentionally disregarded the Fire Safety Inspection Certificate requirement as mandated by law. Without this, only
administrative liability would attach. The Ombudsman also did not show that the vendors enjoyed any undue
benefit or that the government suffered any undue disadvantage.42 Lastly, there was no showing of manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable neglect without which petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable.43

Petitioner avers that during the preliminary investigation, he was not clearly informed of the nature of the charge
against him, in violation of his constitutional right to due process.44 The findings of the Ombudsman were
confusing,45 and petitioner was not provided a copy of co-respondent a quo Andres' affidavit, upon which the
Ombudsman relied in its finding of probable cause against petitioner.46

Petitioner insists that this Court can interfere with the findings of the investigatory powers of the Ombudsman in
this case, considering that "this is a case of persecution, [not] prosecution."47 Private respondent Arches was
compelled by vengeance in filing the complaint.48

The sole issue for resolution of this Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
determining that probable cause against petitioner exists.

We dismiss the Petition.

This Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman's findings of probable cause. In Dichaves v. Office of
the Ombudsman:49
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional
mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman
wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-
interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"

An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine
whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function
is executive in nature.

The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the "existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted."

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess
the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is
not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause. Republic v. Ombudsman Desierto explains:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise
of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.50 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Despite this well-established principle, petitioner would have this Court interfere with the Ombudsman's
assessment on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. However, disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is
not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal
hostility.51 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Thus, for this Petition to prosper, petitioner would have to show this Court that the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.
Petitioner has failed to do this. "A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable
cause."52 Further, probable cause is:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation.
Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief.
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which
would justify a conviction.53 (Citations omitted)
Here, the Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his
co-respondents a quo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Section 3(e)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

....

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Based on opinion, reasonable belief, and the evidence on record, the Ombudsman found that the elements of the
crime punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 existed.54 Petitioner and his co-respondents a
quo did not deny that they were public officers when the alleged acts were committed.55 There was "unwarranted
benefit and advantage [given] to the firecracker vendors."56 The issuance of the mayor's permit was "tainted with
bad faith" or gross inexcusable negligence.57

Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman failed to show the undue benefit given to the vendors,58 but the Resolution
sufficiently explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nevertheless, respondents' approval and issuance of the subject mayor's permit gave unwarranted benefit and
advantage to the [firecracker] vendors. "Unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified,
unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons; while "advantage" is defined as "a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind." The approval and issuance of the mayor's permit was
clearly without basis as it was, in fact, in violation of a municipal ordinance and the Fire Code of the Philippines. It
gave a group of vendors the benefit and advantage of holding the business of selling firecrackers in the public
market despite existing prohibition.59 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner's claim that the Ombudsman did not explain the evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect60 also
cannot be countenanced. The Ombudsman likewise sufficiently explained the finding of bad
faith:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
. . . Respondents' action was patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable
negligence. "Bad faith" refers to a conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; "partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are; while "gross negligence" is negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.

Based on their respective counter-affidavits, respondents were well aware of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 which
expressly prohibits "the storing, displaying, selling and blowing up ("pagbubuto") of those pyrotechnics products
allowed by law, commonly called as "firecrackers" or "pabuto" within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of Bansalan
Public Market." In clear violation of this ordinance, respondents approved and issued a mayor's permit stating[,]
"Permit is hereby granted to sell firecrackers on December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at Public Market, Bansalan,
Davao del Sur." Furthermore, as respondent Andres narrated in his counter-affidavit, the firecracker vendors were
not issued a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC) because they did not comply with fire safety requirements.
The issuance of a FSIC by the Bureau of Fire [Protection] is a prerequisite to the grant of permits by local
governments. According to Andres, he expressly informed respondent Reyes of the lack of the safety requirements
and objected to the issuance of the mayor's permit because of the fire risk involved in such sale of firecrackers.
Nevertheless, despite the absence of the required FSIC, respondents Domingo, Castilla, and Andres himself
recommended for approval the application for the subject mayor's permit. Respondent mayor, for his part, cannot
claim that he merely relied on the other respondents' recommendation for approval since he knew of an existing
ordinance prohibiting such sale of firecrackers and was apprised of the fact that the firecracker vendors were not
given a FSIC.61 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner may insist on his innocence and the absence of bad faith, but the presence or absence of bad faith is a
matter of evidence, best threshed out during trial. In any case, petitioner has failed to show how the Ombudsman's
determinations constituted grave abuse of discretion.

II

Petitioner avers that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner points out that the initial complaint against
him and his co-respondents a quo did not mention giving unwarranted benefit to the firecracker vendors. Yet, he
was charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit to the firecracker
vendors. Petitioner states that this charge was based on co-respondent a quo Andres' affidavit, which he was not
given. Because he had no opportunity to respond to Andres' affidavit, he asserts that he was deprived of due
process.62 This argument is untenable.

Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable cause exists.
Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present during trial. In Webb v.
De Leon:63
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we also hold
that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory
questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been
adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.64
A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law.65 Rule 112,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

....
(b) . . .

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to
specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

....

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents,
the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied
upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be
allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant,66 but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-
respondents.

This issue is not novel. This Court has held that during preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman is not required
to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. In Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman:67
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his corespondents.

....

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a
respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supports Sen. Estrada's claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to
submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4 (b), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits . . . ." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4 (b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman
for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada's Request.

Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent
"shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4 (a) and
(b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4 (a) states that "the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint."
The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.

Second, Section 4 (b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent" to submit his counter-affidavit. The
affidavits referred to in Section 4 (b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4 (a). Clearly, the affidavits to be
furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in
the immediately succeeding Section 4 (c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have "access to the evidence
on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4 (a and b) of the same
Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the "affidavits and other supporting
documents" submitted by "the complainant or supporting witnesses." Thus, a respondent's "access to evidence
on record" in Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4 (a) of the same Rule II.

Third, Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent shall
have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished
and to copy them at his expense." A respondent's right to examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the
complainant."

Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsman's
Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the corespondents should
be furnished to a respondent.68 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Thus, petitioner's non-receipt of Andres' affidavit did not violate his procedural rights during preliminary
investigation.

Moreover, petitioner was fully accorded due process in the preliminary investigation proceedings.

In Resurreccion v. People:69
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. For as
long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their cause of defense, their interest in due course as in this
case, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
Here, petitioner was able to file a counter-affidavit to explain his side and to respond to the complaint filed against
him. He was not denied due process.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman's March 20, 2013 Resolution
in Case No. OMB-M-C-11-0005-A and its June 26, 2013 Memorandum: Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration70 in relation to Criminal Case No. SB-13-CRM-0596 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.