Regime Change in The Middle East

Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects
Author(s): DANIEL BYMAN

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 127, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 25-46
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Regime Change in the Middle East:
Problems and Prospects
DANIEL BYMAN
In December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set him

protest over petty humiliation and power abuses, improbably
Spring. Since then, in the face of peaceful protest, dictators hav
throughout the Arab world: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, an
sive protests after Tunisia's Zin el Abidine Ben Ali fell in
after smaller demonstrations erupted in other countries. Egypt
was the next dictatorial domino to fall, leading most West
hope that democracy would rain down on the Arab world. A
Obama declared, "Across the region, those rights that we tak
being claimed with joy by those who are prying loose the grip
Bloodshed, chaos, and democratic backsliding have temper
too soon to say that the Arab Spring is over. Tunisia, where
began, celebrated truly free elections in October 2011, and
Islamists there does not mean that the country is sliding into a
But Tunisia - small, ethnically and religiously homogenous
was always a more likely candidate for democratic succe
elsewhere in the Middle East paint a more complicated pict
helped orchestrate a crackdown on demonstrators in Bahra
gunned down an ever-growing numbers of protesters in S
crumbles into civil war, while al Qaeda runs rampant in th
Libya, Muammar el-Qaddafi and his loyalists were finally rou
Islamists, tribal leaders, and would-be democrats all are vyi
1 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North
accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-
and-north-africa, 7 December 2011.
DANIEL BYMAN is a professor in the Security Studies Program of the Schoo

Georgetown University and the research director of the Saban Center at Brook
A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford U
Political Science Quarterly Volume 127 Number 1 2012 25
26 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
no guarantee of unity to follow. Egypt - where the fall of President Mubarak

in February 2010 shook the world and gave viewers the defining images of the
Arab Spring - has seen a disarray within the democratic camp, the rise of
Islamists, and the military trying to keep its hands on power.
Although the ultimate outcome of the Arab Spring will not be known for years
to come, it is not too early to evaluate some of the developments that have already
shaken the region and assess those changes that may follow as time goes on.
The Arab world that emerges from the Arab Spring will be fundamentally
different. New alignments have already begun. Countries like Turkey are ascen-
dant, and power blocs that may be emerging between the newly democratic
states may be positioned against the remaining autocracies. States like Syria,
historically strong, may find themselves weak and unable to play a major role
in regional relations. Conversely, countries like Egypt, which had seemed
to steadily decline in influence since the 1960s, may again rise in importance.
The region's very stability may be shaken, as civil war and unrest break out in
previously untroubled states.
For the United States, these changes affect a broad array of interests. Sev-
eral of the powers undergoing crises are oil exporters, Libya the most promi-
nent among them. American and regional leaders are concerned that the
chaos in and weakness of some Arab states offer opportunities for Iran to
make gains. Israeli leaders also worry that the Arab Spring could usher in a
new era of radicalism or, otherwise, make the Jewish state less secure. Finally,
the weakness of area regimes and the risks of failed democratization may
offer opportunities for terrorists.
In the sections that follow, this paper first categorizes the changes going
on in the Arab world, noting the status of each regime and the extent, if
any, of reform and change. Then it describes the domestic effects of the
so-called "Arab Spring," examining how it affects political participation and
the identity of key political actors, and how it has resulted in weak governments
and civil wars. The third section explores the strategic implications of the Arab
Spring, noting how it changes regional alliances, and how it affects counter-
terrorism, and other key issues such as Israel and the peace process and the status
of Iran. The essay concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers.
Categorizing Change: How the Middle East Has

(and Has Not) Changed
The Middle East is transforming, but the transformation is occurring
different and subtle ways. Table 1 gives a rough summary of these shifts,
the extent of regime change, the presence of violence, and the role of Isla
among other factors.
So far, only one country - Tunisia - has seen complete regime chang
only has Ben Ali fallen, but Islamists gained victory in the October 20
tions, a dramatic shift for a movement that was once outlawed and opp
REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST | 27
TABLE 1
Categorizing Regime Change

Sectarian / Change
Communal / Islamic of Elite / Successful
Surviving but Civil Tribal Significant Militancy / Complete Democratic
Dictator Beleaguered War/ Militias and Islamist Military Terrorism Regime Transition
Country Fell? Leaders Chaos Violence Influence Crackdown Problem Change So Far?
Algeria ✓
Bahrain ✓ ✓ ✓
Egypt ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ?
Iran ✓ ✓ ✓
Iraq TBD ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Predates
the Arab
Spring
Jordan ✓ ✓
Lebanon ✓ Predates ✓ ✓
the Arab
Spring)
Libya ✓ ✓ S ✓ ✓ (under ?
Qaddafi)
Morocco /
Palestine ✓ ✓
Saudi ✓
Arabia
Syria ✓ ✓ ✓ TBD ✓
Tunisia ✓ ✓ / ✓
Yemen ✓ ✓ ✓ / / ✓
Still other countri

complete change in
gone but the natur
the military that u
role in the country
than a caretaker of
and puritanical sal
has also stoked fear
of leaders are vyin
nent in the regim
some change of elite
air. In Yemen, Pres
2 Shadi Hamid, "Egypt: T

20 November 2011, acce
aspx, 7 December 2011.
3 Hugh Roberts, "Who
Roberts notes that Qaddaf
but his loyalists also occupy important positions and are striving for continued
dominance of the country.4
Many countries have seen their old leaders retain power, but the current
leadership is beleaguered, witnessing widespread unrest, cracks among the
elite, or both. In Jordan, low-level unrest continues to keep the regime off
balance.5 Bahrain's regime survived mass demonstrations in February 2011
by cracking down. Thirty-five protesters died and hundreds of political leaders,
journalists, and even medical staff were arrested. The crackdown halted the
mass demonstrations, but small-scale protests continued.6 In Syria, uprisings
have led to thousands of deaths, and the prospect of a large-scale civil war
looms.7 In several cases, notably Iraq and Lebanon, regime weakness and civil
unrest predate the Arab Spring.8
Finally, a few countries have emerged, so far largely unscathed by the
Arab Spring. Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and the Palestinian territories all saw unrest to
varying degrees, but none of the governments appeared seriously shaken. As
discussed below, however, attempts even by these countries to minimize any
turmoil will still have a profound influence on themselves and the region.
Domestic Impact of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring is transforming the politics of the Middle East in myriad
ways. Some of these are positive, but the initial stages, at least, have seen many
darker moments as well. The Arab Spring has brought in new political actors;
in the past, only a handful of individuals mattered for decision making. Public
opinion has reemerged as an important force, and Islamists as a key, perhaps
the key, set of political actors. At the same time, governments throughout the
region are weaker, and some have suffered or may soon suffer civil wars.
4 BBC, "Yemen's Saleh Remains in the Spotlight as PM Named," 27 November 2011, accessed at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15913278, 7 December 2011.
5 Nicolas Pelham, "Jordan Starts to Shake," New York Review of Books, 8 December 2011, ac-
cessed at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/dec/08/jordan-starts-shake/?pagination=false,
17 December 2011.
Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh, "Bahrain: Island of Troubles" in Kenneth Pollack, et al., The
Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington, DC, Brookings,
2011), 188-195; Barbara Surk and Brian Murphy, "Bahrain: Protests Flare Up Ahead of Release of
Report," Huffington Post , 23 November 2011, accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/ll/23/
bahrain-protests-flare_n_1109564.html, 7 December 2011.
7 As of October 2011, the UN put the death toll at over 3,000. "UN: Syria Death Toll Tops 3,000,"
USA Today , 14 October 2011, accessed at http://www.usatoday.eom/news/world/story/2011-10-14/syria-
protest/50769040/1, 18 November 2011.
8 See, for example, Stephen Biddle, Michel E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Standing
Down as Iraq Stands Up: Building on Progress," Foreign Affairs 87 (September/October 2008):
40-58; Bilal Saab, "Lebanon's Unfulfilled Promise," Foreign Affairs 19 (October 2010).
New Political Actors and the Return of Public Opinion
For most Arab countries in the post-Cold War era, key decisions rested in the
hands of a small number of individuals. The Mubaraks, Qaddafis, and Asads of
the Arab world were not completely deaf to public opinion, but they were able
and willing to defy it on a regular basis; Jordan and Egypt both made peace
with Israel, for example, despite the unpopularity of this decision at home.
At times, these and other regimes ruled through a "selectorate," focusing
on gaining political capital from key actors in the military, and security ser-
vices in particular.9 Popular opinion mattered relatively little.
The Arab Spring reawakened the Arab public, even in countries where
regime change did not occur and where the leaders are not beleaguered. In
Tunisia, a more democratic regime will by definition be more likely to heed
the will of the people in decision making. And in Morocco, the regime initiated
major reforms that, in theory, promise to empower the people far more than in
the past. But even where there has not been reform, public opinion again mat-
ters. Hamas and the Palestinian Authority agreed to form a unity government
to placate the strong pro-unity sentiment among the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia
spent tens of billions to buy off dissent, showering money upon its people.
When the public mood is combustible and regimes worry about their lack of
legitimacy, they will be loath to offend their populaces on policy issues.
What do the Arab people want? Drawing on a November 2011 Gallup
survey in Egypt, scholar Dalia Mogahed found tremendous concern about
economic issues, with inflation being the top concern for a plurality of those
polled, while unemployment and a lack of food and drinking water were also
important to many.10 Such economic concerns are shared elsewhere in the
Arab world. Egyptians also want Islamic law to play an important role in
the formation of a future constitution.11
In theory, the Arab Spring could also give more-liberal forces a chance at
gaining power. Like the Islamists, liberals often faced repression under the old
elite. The strength of the liberals, however, is uncertain and probably limited.
Unlike the Islamists, they were not able to maintain strong, coherent organiza-
tions in the face of state repression, so they are often starting from scratch. In
9 For examples of works that incorporate the selectorate principle, see Susan Shirk, The Political
Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 107-115; Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logical of
Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 41-50; and Benjamin B. Smith, "Life of the
Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule," World Politics
57 (April 2005): 421-451. For a work focused on the Middle East, see Eva Bellin, "The Robustness
of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative
Politics 36 (January 2004): 139-157.
10 Dalia Mogahed, "What Egyptian Men (and Women) Want," Foreign Policy , 10 March 2011, accessed
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_images/111128_Egyptslide3.jpg, 7 December 2011.
11 Mogahed, "What Egyptian Men (and Women) Want.
addition, liberalism's association with capitalism and the West often was used
against it in the Arab world, where crony capitalism reigned and the charge of
being a foreign agent was often used to damage the credibility of liberal groups.12
The Rise of the Islamists
In part due to the weakness of liberalism, alternatives like Islamism are filling
the void. Indeed, one of the biggest shifts since the coming of the Arab Spring
has been the Islamists's shift from opposition to governing party. For years
excluded from power, often ruthlessly, Islamists now play or are poised to play
a major role in many Arab countries. In Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Tunisia, and the Palestinian territories Islamist parties are either
the dominant force in government or play a major role.
For the Islamists, the prospect, taste, or reality of power also presages
major shifts. There is a wide range of opinion within political Islam on issues
such as women's rights, social policy, and relations with the United States,
among other issues.13 Many Islamists did not focus on these differences, as
their exclusion from power meant that they had little hope of enacting change
and, simultaneously, repression served as the glue keeping them together. As
the regime's iron grip loosened, divisions grew or became more apparent.
In many countries, the question is not "will the Islamists gain influence?"
but rather " which Islamists will gain the most influence?" In Egypt, a range
of Islamist candidates emerged from Muslim Brotherhood circles, with
salafists - a more puritanical interpretation of Islam that is often at odds with
the pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood - also fielding their own candi-
dates. In Egypt's first free election, Islamists dominated the elections. The
Muslim Brotherhood won 47 percent of the parliamentary seats and the salafists
25 percent.14
In many countries, Islamists may split after taking power. In opposition to
Mubarak and other dictators, it was politically easy for them to mouth the
slogan "Islam is the solution" and unite against the repressive regime. In power,
however, myriad choices, and myriad chances for division, open themselves up.
What is the role of minorities and women? Should peace be maintained with
12 Steven Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World," Saban Center for Middle
East Policy, Brookings Institution, October 2007, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/
10arabworld.aspx, 27 December 2011.
13 For a review, see Graham Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2004); International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism" (2005), accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.
org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/037-understanding-islamism.aspx, 3 January 2006;
and Maye Kassem, "Egypt's Islamists" in Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 133-166.
14 Leila Fadel, "Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt's Elections," Washington Post ,
21 January 2012, accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_.east/final-results-confirms-
islamists-winners-in-egypts-elections/2012/01/21/gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html, 1 February 2012.
Israel? How much, if any, security cooperation with the United States is appro-
priate. Is Iran a friend or a foe? These thorny issues may pale beside the
challenges of getting stagnant economies going again.
A group's rhetoric when it is in opposition may not tell us how it would
behave once it gains power. One of the few benefits of marginalization for
Islamists was that they could criticize the regime for its unpopular choices,
such as making peace with Israel, but not have to bear the consequences of
an absolutist stance. In power, Islamists are showing signs of compromising.
Already the salafist Al Nour party declared it would respect Egypt's peace
treaty with Israel - and did so in an interview with Israeli army radio, no less.15
Ironically, the Islamists very success may further weaken their unity. In
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest competition is other Islamists.
The Brothers do not need to unify their own ranks to prevail, so there is less
pressure to work together. As a result, seemingly minor differences in dogma
and political tactics, as well as leadership rivalries, might produce splinters or
major divisions.
It is possible, however, that these divisions may lead to further extremism.
There will always be a constituency supportive of an absolutist stance on
Israel, religious minorities, or other red meat Islamist issues. So the inter-
national pressure that calls for compromise may be offset by a fear of losing
power at home.
Weaker Governments
The upheavals, both successful and failed, are likely to leave regional regimes
weak, especially in the short term. The old regimes had undermined or destroyed
the political institutions of their countries. Courts, police forces, and political
parties all responded to top-down political pressure rather than being truly inde-
pendent actors - the system was patriarchal rather than institutionalized.16
When old leaders fall, informal networks are thrown into chaos. Libya is
the extreme example of this. Qaddafi did not hold a formal position in gov-
ernment, yet he was the unquestioned dominant political force; as a result,
Libya will need to invent its government at every level.17 Other states face
less-sweeping challenges, but new regimes will need to either build strong
political institutions or establish their own patron-client relations, both of
which are difficult and time-consuming challenges.
Militaries and security services are likely to be inward looking. Arab mili-
taries have long been involved in their countries' domestic politics, and threats
15 "Egypt's Salafists Tell Israel They Will Keep the Peace Treaty," Ahram Online , 21 December 2011,
accessed at http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/29870.aspx, 26 December 2011.
16 See Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East."
17 Roberts, "Who said Gaddafi had to go?"; Dirk Vande walle, A History of Modern Libya (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 119-123.
to the status quo will make their involvement grow.18 In the Middle East, militaries
are involved in a range of economic as well as political activities. One estimate
has Egypt's military controlling over one third of the Egyptian economy - a
bigger problem is that no one really knows how big the military's role is.19
Political as well as economic reform requires paring back this influence, but
the military is likely to resist any encroachment.
Ineffably, but importantly, many regimes will lack legitimacy. In the past,
regimes gained their legitimacy through their revolutionary credentials or
through heredity, in the case of the monarchies.20 While a number of Arab
countries saw revolution, in none did it produce a leader or set of leaders
whose leadership in the struggle made them obvious post-revolutionary leaders.
There is no Nelson Mandela or Lech Walesa. Now, for some regimes, legitimacy
will come through elections. For others, however, the elections themselves will
be contested. In Egypt, there is a bitter debate over the timing of the elections
and the rules. For regimes that have withstood the Arab Spring, the lack of
elections - and these regimes' inability to offer an alternative reason for their
rule beyond force and largesse - damages their claim to rule with the support of
their people. This problem is particularly acute for the regimes in countries like
Bahrain and Syria, which had to arrest or shoot large numbers of their own
people to stay in power. As a result, these regimes will be sensitive about
any policy steps that might further damage their legitimacy.
Civil Wars
So far the bloodiest impact of the Arab Spring has been civil war. Libya fell into
civil war as regime opponents sought to topple Qaddafî. The war seesawed,
with Qaddafi's opponents scoring dramatic successes as regime loyalists
defected throughout the country once the revolutionary fervor spread from
Egypt. Then Qaddafi and his henchmen rebounded, using their superior
military power to push back the opposition, driving it to the gates of its base
in Misrata. The rebels' desperation triggered an intervention by NATO and
several Arab states, which steadily pushed Qaddafi's forces back until Tripoli
fell suddenly in August. The civil war then sputtered to an end, with Qaddafi
being killed in October.
18 For a review, see Risa Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East" in The Future
Security Environment in the Middle East , Nora Bensahel and Daniel Byman, eds. (RAND, 2004),
129-162; James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,"
International Security 24 (Fall 1999): 131-165; and Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization
and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," Political Science Quarterly 115 (Soring 2000): 67-92.
19 Sarah Topol, "Egypt's Command Economy," Slate, 15 December 2010, accessed at http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/dispatches/2010/12/egypts_command_economy.html, 21 December 2011.
20 Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom9 s Unsteady March : America's Role in Building Arab Democracy
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 30-55.
In Syria and Yemen, all-out civil war has still not occurred, but both coun-
tries are moving in that direction. Before the Arab Spring, Yemen had already
suffered three different insurgencies: the "Huthi" rebellion in the north, south-
ern secessionist groups angry over their treatment since the 1990 merger with
North Yemen, and al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Arab
Spring led to protests in major cities, with part of the regime's military forces
joining the opposition. Human Rights Watch put the casualty figures at over
2,000 from the unrest, and there is no end in sight.21
Syria's situation is even bloodier, with over 5,000 people dying since the
Arab Spring began. So far, however, most of the bloodshed has been one-
sided - mostly the regime shooting its own people, though the opposition seems
increasingly willing to use violence. As 2011 ended, Syrian opposition figures
were firing back at regime forces and are organizing an army in exile.
As governments crumble, power vacuums may develop. Such circum-
stances can be exceptionally dangerous. When citizens believe that the gov-
ernment can no longer protect them, they may organize and arm simply for
self-defense. This, in turn, could create a dangerous spiral - other groups, often
with memories of violence from past conflicts, may see this mobilization as
proof of aggressive intentions and respond in kind. Even without this sort of
historical precedent, small groups of individuals may turn to violence simply
to gain power over a local community and pillage.22
Even short of all-out civil war, sectarianism and tribal tension may grow.
Old regimes often used divide-and-rule tactics, playing minorities against the
majority to bolster their hold. As a result, social harmony frayed. Now some
regimes can no longer protect minorities as effectively and doing so would be
politically costly. In countries where elections are taking hold, politicians have
an incentive to whip up anti-minority sentiment as a political tool. In minority-
dominated regimes like Syria, and in countries where tribes play important
roles, like Yemen and Libya, communal groups that have a disproportionate
share of power may fight to preserve their position, fearing for their livelihoods
and their very Uves should power change hands. As the government in Syria has
wobbled, sectarian violence has grown.
In October 2011, Egypt saw at least 24 Copts die at the hands of a mob of
Salafi radicals while regime security forces stood by - the worst episode in a
series of attacks on priests, churches, and other Christian symbols and people.23
21 Human Rights Watch. "UN Human Rights Council: Yemen Resolution Falls Far Short,"
1 October 2011, accessed at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/01/un-human-rights-council-yemen-
resolution-falls-far-short, 26 December 2011.
22 For a statement of this problem, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,"
Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 27-47; for a critique, see John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'"
International Security 25 (Summer 2002): 42-70.
23 "Egypt: Coptic Christians See Sectarian Violence," Huffington Posty 10 October 2010, accessed at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/10/egypt-coptic-christians_n_1004320.html, 7 December 2011.
The Salafis strongly oppose the idea that Christians should play an important
role in Egypt's politics and society. Many Copts may leave Egypt as a result.24
Strategic Implications of the Arab Spring
In addition to its profound domestic implications, the Arab Spring is lik

to fundamentally change a range of strategic concerns in the Middle Eas
The Arab Spring has the potential to dramatically reshape regional allian
with the issue of democratization - whether pro or con - being a diplom
driver. The Arab Spring also may change counterterrorism: the growth of dem
racy and the role of Islamists in the new governments offer an alternative
violence, hindering al Qaeda's message, but at the same time, weaker gover
ments will be less effective at the day to day of counterterrorism. Should
wars continue or spread, regional states may also have to contend with the spil
over from these conflicts. Policy toward Israel, a frequent source of tension, m
become even more turbulent as well. In the near term at least, some things wil
not change. In particular, demographic and economic pressures will strain gove
ments, and the United States will remain an unpopular foreign policy partn
Alliance Structures and Power Blocs
The Arab Spring may recast power relations in the Arab world. Already,
unrest in Syria has led to the country's isolation among its neighbors, with
the Arab League imposing sanctions on Damascus and with key countries,
like Turkey, stepping up political and economic pressure. Conversely, the over-
throw of Qaddafi may allow Libya to reintegrate into the Arab world after years
of isolation due to the dictator's erratic and, at times, murderous foreign policy.
Much of the impact of the Arab Spring, however, will be more subtle, as it
has produced new heroes and models. For example, an October 2011 poll from
five Arab countries found that Turkey - a country whose government blends
Islamism and democracy - was the country most admired for its role in the
Arab Spring.25 Turkey may be able to expand its influence in the Arab world
more easily as a result.
Newly democratic states, or those seeking to court public opinion, may
support rebels elsewhere or at least may be critical of governments that repress
demonstrators and dissent. One poll found that there was strong popular
sympathy for opposition forces in Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, suggesting that
governments will find it harder to support repression in these countries.26
24 Andre Aciman, "After Egypt's Revolution, Copts Are Living in Fear," The New York Times,
19 November 2011, accessed 9 December 2011.
25 Shibley Telhami, "The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll," results available from a November 21
presentation at the Brookings Institution. See http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1121_arab_
public_opinion_telhami.aspx. accessed 7 December 2011.
26 Ibid.
Conversely, the forces of reaction remain strong. Saudi Arabia, in particu-

lar, is helping to beat out the democratic fires burning in the Arab world, par-
ticularly those in its immediate neighborhood. In March 2011, Saudi troops
drove across the causeway to neighboring Bahrain, backing the regime there
in its brutal crackdown against Shia protesters. At home, the Saudis have spent
tens of billions to buy off dissent. Riyadh has also pushed its fellow monarchs
in the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan, to quell any revolutionary movements,
and Saudi Arabia is offering a haven for dictators down on their luck, like
Tunisia's Ben Ali. As Middle East expert Bruce Riedel contends, "In effect,
Saudi Arabia was proclaiming a twenty-first-century equivalent of the old
Soviet Brezhnev doctrine for its own backyard: No revolution will be tolerated
in a bordering kingdom."27 The Saudi royals not only worry about maintaining
their own power, but they also fear that change elsewhere would be an opening
for their arch-rival Iran and for the Yemen-based AQAP.
Although the contours are not likely to be neat, it is possible that demo-
cratic and traditionalist blocs may emerge, similar to the Arab nationalist-
versus-monarchical rivalries of the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world.28 In
essence, two forms of legitimacy will compete, with each seeing the other as
a threat to its hold on power.
Counterterrorism
The Arab Spring is largely a good news story for counterterrorism so far, but
this could change dramatically as events unfold.
Much of the optimism comes from a view that al Qaeda draws on the
frustrations and anger of the Muslim world and that the Arab Spring will
counteract and challenge these in ways harmful to terrorism. John Brennan,
President Obama's senior adviser on counterterrorism, contended that "The
al Qaeda narrative is becoming increasingly bankrupt; there is a new wave
sweeping through the Middle East right now that puts a premium on indi-
vidual rights and freedom and dignity; and so al Qaeda, bin Laden - old
news."29 AI Qaeda exploited anger over repressive governments and corrup-
tion; genuine democracy would be a particular blow to Zawahiri and his fol-
lowers. "If you have freedom, al Qaeda will go away," claims Osama Rushdi,
a former spokesman of the Islamic Group, historically Egypt's most important
27 Bruce Riedel, "Brezhnev in the Hijaz," National Interest 115 (September/October 2011): 27-32,
accessed at http://nationalinterest.org/article/brezhnev-the-hejaz-5733, 7 December 2011.
28 For a review of this period, see Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His
Rivals, 1958-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
2 "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan," 2 May 2011, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-assistant-president-
homela, 7 December 2011.
jihadist group.30 Rushdi may be too optimistic, but the possible movement
toward a free press, free elections, and civil liberties throughout the Middle
East will highlight the least appealing part of al Qaeda's dogma, its hostility
toward democracy.
From a counterterrorism point of view, however, Arab tyranny often served
U.S. purposes. U.S. counterterrorism officials preferred to work with authori-
tarian leaders because their regimes generally had a low bar for imprisonment
and detention. The United States could send a suspect captured in Europe to
Egypt and be assured that he would be kept in jail. This low bar also meant that
many minor players and innocents were swept up in security service roundups.31
Dictatorships, like Egypt, were even willing to threaten the families of jihadists,
putting tremendous pressure on militants to inform, surrender, or otherwise
abandon the fight. If truly democratic governments come to the Arab world,
the easy incarceration and ruthless threats against militants and their families
would disappear.
Indeed, one measure of how much progress the Arab regimes are making
toward democracy will be how much their security services are purged. The
same security services that have fought al Qaeda and its affiliates have also
imprisoned peaceful bloggers, beaten up Islamist organizers to intimidate them,
and censored pro-democracy newspapers. Where purges have not occurred,
regime security services will focus first and foremost on democratic opposition
figures instead of terrorist leaders. The result will be regimes that are more
vulnerable to terrorists and to others truly outside the system.
Weak governments are prone to terrorism.32 Once-jailed terrorists now walk
the streets in Libya and Egypt, and some will exploit the lifting of the old
regime's heavy hand. For the old-guard states, their security services will focus
on democratic demonstrators and mainstream Islamists, believing them, rightly, a
bigger threat to their hold on power than the small terrorist groups.
Those who replace the current security forces will not necessarily be
friendly to Washington, and the governments they report to may also seek
an arms-length relationship with the United States. If new governments take
popular opinion into account, as democratic leaders do, cooperation will not
30 Paul Cruickshank, "Analysis: Why Arab Spring could be al Qaeda's fall," CNNWorld, 11 Feb-
ruary 2011, accessed at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-21/world/arab.unrest.alqaeda.analysis_l_
zawahiri-al-qaeda-qaeda-style?_s=PM:WORLD, 7 December 2011.
31 See the testimony of former CIA official Michael Scheuer at "Extraordinary Rendition in U.S.
Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations," House Foreign Affairs Committee,
17 April 2007, accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/rendition.pdf, 9 June 2008.
32 The point that a weak government makes the cost of using violence cheaper for various political
and economic ends is discussed considerably in the civil war literature. See in particular Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 56 (August 2004):
563-595, and Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity," Journal of Conflict Resolution
44 (December 2000): 839-853.
be as close as it once was. Many of the new political players, particularly the
Islamists, see the United States as a repressive power that aids Israel and
other enemies. It is hard to imagine an Egyptian government that includes
the Muslim Brotherhood and salafists instructing its security services to work
as closely with the CIA as Mubarak's forces did.
But excluding the Brotherhood and other Islamists from power could be
worse from a counterterrorism point of view. In 1992, the Algerian govern-
ment nullified elections that Islamists won, provoking a bloody civil war. This
war, in turn, radicalized the country's Islamist movement and dragged Algeria
into a frenzy of violence that alienated jihadists abroad and ordinary Algerians
with its horrific attacks on fellow Muslims. Osama bin Laden worked with
a faction of Algerian jihadists to establish a like-minded group there, whi
later became the core of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Although such a
extreme scenario seems unlikely in Egypt and Tunisia, excluding the Brothe
hood from power would alienate younger, less-patient Islamists. They, in tur
may find bin Laden's message attractive, believing that the new government
inherently anti-Islamic.
Here, perhaps, counterterrorism clashes with other U.S. interests. Although
the Brotherhood is mouthing all the right slogans, its commitment to tru
democracy is uncertain. In any event, it is likely to seek to restrict the righ
of women and minorities in Egypt's political life. Islamist organizations in
general are highly critical of U.S. military intervention in the Middle East
skeptical of cooperation with the CIA, and strongly opposed to anything th
suggests cooperation with Israel. Thus, supporting a strong Islamist role in
government risks creating a regime less friendly to the United States, bu
excluding the Islamists risks radicalizing the movement and reinvigoratin
al Qaeda.
Opportunities for al Qaeda will also arise if unrest turns into prolonged
civil war. In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, civil wars
began largely for local reasons, with little jihadist involvement. Over time,
however, al Qaeda and like-minded groups moved in. First they posed as
supporters of the opposition. Afterward, they spread their vitriol using their
superior resources to attract new recruits, while the surrounding violence
helped radicalize the opposition. AI Qaeda now has a strong presence in all
these countries.
Israel and the Peace Process
The Arab Spring has unsettled Israeli leaders about their security situation
Israel will remain the region's preeminent military power, but the chaos i
the region could make life harder for the Jewish state. Israel has viewed th
Arab Spring with trepidation. Addressing the U.S. Congress, Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dashed optimism about the revolutions. "Thes
hopes could be snuffed out," warned the Prime Minister, "as they were in
Tehran in 1979."33 The biggest Israeli concern, and the one that has gotten the
most attention, is the replacement of the Mubarak regime in Egypt by one led
by the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak did not win the goodwill of ordinary
Israelis as did Anwar Sadat or the late King Hussein of Jordan, but he did
maintain the peace treaty, cooperate on counterterrorism, oppose Iran, and
otherwise share strategic objectives with the Jewish state. The Brotherhood,
in contrast, often criticized Sadat and then Mubarak for making peace with
Israel, pointing to this as one (of many) factors that de-legitimized the regime.
In February, days before Mubarak stepped down, Rashad al-Bayouni, a
Brotherhood leader, declared, "After President Mubarak steps down and a
provisional government is formed, there is a need to dissolve the peace treaty
with Israel."34 Other Brotherhood leaders are more conciliatory (or evasive)
about maintaining the peace treaty, but none are stalwart defenders of the
peace treaty. Hamas's history is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, making
Israel even more leery of a Brotherhood-influenced regime in Egypt. A Pew
poll taken after Mubarak's fall found that Egyptians favored annulling the
peace treaty with Israel by a 54 percent to 36 percent margin,35 and that many
mainstream leaders have criticized it. Much of the anti-Israel rhetoric is likely
to be honored in the breach. However, in a true democracy, politicians cannot
always escape their campaign promises.
Israel fears that a more hostile regime in Egypt could aid Hamas in Gaza.
Where Israel sees a loss of an ally in Egypt, Hamas sees a potential friend,
particularly if the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys increased influence in Egypt.
Hamas can now play to the Egyptian people even if the Egyptian military
and any elected leaders prefer to avoid a confrontation with Israel. Sympathy
for Gazans in Egypt is high, and Hamas's resistance to Israel is also popular.
Rami Khoury observes that there is "widespread indignity felt by Egyptians
who see themselves as the jailers of Gaza on behalf of Israel and Washington."36
Should pressure ease, and should Hamas - as is likely - exploit this to acquire
weapons and send personnel in and out for training, Israel will be tempted to
take unilateral action. This may involve operations on or near the Egyptian side
of the border of Gaza, as well as an increased effort to take out Hamas leaders
in Gaza. Such actions, in turn, would further inflame popular sentiment in
33 Speech by Prime Minister Netanyahu to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, 24 May 2011,
accessed at http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechcongress240511 .htm,
29 May 2011.
34 Eli Lake, "Muslim Brotherhood seeks end to Israel treaty," Washington Tunes , 3 February 2011,
accessed at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-
treaty/, 7 December 7.
35 Pew Research Center, "U.S. Wins No Friends, End of Treaty With Israel Sought," Pew Global
Attitudes Project, 25 April 2011, accessed at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/04/25/egyptians-embrace-
revolt-leaders-religious-parties-and-military-as-well/, 7 December 2011.
36 Steven Erlanger, "Upheaval Jolts Israel and Raises New Worry," The New York Times,
23 February 2011.
Egypt against Israel and increase pressure on any regime in Cairo to further
aid Hamas.
Although the causes of the Arab Spring did not relate to Israel and the fate
of reform is not tied to the Jewish state, Israel can serve to divert public atten-
tion for struggling governments. In May and June 2011, as unrest swept across
Syria, the regime there encouraged (some reports say coerced) Palestinians to
march on Israel across the Syrian border into the Golan Heights, leading to
several deaths.37
Terrorist groups can put the Israel issue front and center despite the wishes
of Israeli and Arab leaders. In August 2011, terrorists crossing from Egypt
attacked Israel, killing eight people. Israeli forces pursued them into Egypt,
and six Egyptian policemen died in a clash. Crowds protested outside the Israeli
embassy in Cairo, and the following month, the embassy itself was breached by
a mob. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, but even limited terrorist violence
and subsequent Israeli reprisals could easily spark a much nastier response.
Israeli peacemakers worldwide worry that the compromises necessary for
peace would be denounced, rather than supported, in Arab capitals by public
opinion-sensitive leaders. "The ugly facts," wrote former Israeli Defense Min-
ister Moshe Arens, "are that the two peace treaties that Israel concluded so
far - the one with Egypt and the other with Jordan - were both signed with
dictators: Anwar Sadat and King Hussein."38 Even if the worst does not come
to pass and existing agreements remain in force, it is hard to imagine leaders
sitting down with their Israeli counterparts to advance peace.
An Opportunity for Iran?
Tehran greeted the Arab Spring with hope, believing that it would topple the
secular and pro-Western regimes that had long opposed Iran. In addition, oil
prices temporarily surged, and Iran judged that the United States would have
less influence with the replacement regimes. As Suzanne Maloney notes,
"Without lifting a finger, the Islamic Republic sensed that it had achieved
one of its foremost strategic objectives - weakening American influence across
the Middle East."39
Iran, however, has not moved aggressively to exploit this unrest. It has
pushed a narrative alien to the actual events: that the unrest occurred because
37 "Golan: Israel troops fire on pro-Palestinian protesters," BBC News, 5 May 2011, accessed at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13660311, 7 December 2011.
38 Isabel Kershner, "Egypt's Upheaval Hardens Israel's Stance on Peace," The New York Times ,
2 February 2011, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03israel.html,
7 December 2011.
39 Suzanne Maloney, "Iran: The Bogeyman" in Kenneth M. Pollack, et al., The Arab Awakening:
America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2011), 259.
the Arab publics reject secularism and ties to the West and thus, want a system
more like Iran's.40 Yet Iran has not intervened in any serious way in any of the
countries, including in neighboring Bahrain when Saudi forces assisted a gov-
ernment crackdown against Shia demonstrators, an instance in which both
proximity and sectarian affinity would suggest an opportunity for a high degree
of Iranian involvement.
Syria, of course, is the exception where Iran is on the side of counter-
revolution. Tehran is both actively backing the regime with financial and secu-
rity assistance. Syria was Iran's only reliable ally, and the civil war developing
there forced Iran to choose between the Bashar al- Assad regime and Tehran's
claim to be on the side of the Arab people against repressive regimes. Iran
chose the regime, but this choice made Iran deeply unpopular, not only among
Syrians but also among other Arabs seeking reform. Even Iran's Lebanese
ally, Hezbollah, suffered from its association with the Syrian regime.
Civil War Spillover
Civil wars are not only problems for the state involved, they can also spill over,
triggering instability elsewhere in the region. The social and cultural connec-
tions that bind regional states and make a democratic contagion effect more
powerful can also work in a more negative way. In Lebanon, the civil war that
began in 1975 eventually led to intervention by Israel, Iraq, Iran, and, of course,
Syria and fostered terrorism and other problems. The civil war in Iraq triggered
massive refugee flows and created political instability in neighboring states.41
Refugees are one common form of spillover.42 In addition to the humani-
tarian considerations for innocent civilians fleeing civil war, refugees can
spread violence and conflict. They represent large groupings of embittered
people who serve as a ready recruiting pool for armed groups still waging the civil
war. As a result, they frequently involve foreign countries in the civil war as the
neighboring government attempts to prevent the refugee-based militias from
returning to attack their country of origin. At the same time, the refugee host
must protect the refugees from attack by their civil war enemies. Moreover,
large refugee flows can overstrain the economies and even change the demo-
graphic balances of small or weak neighboring states.
Terrorists often find a home in states mired in civil war, as al Qaeda did
in Afghanistan. Moreover, the civil wars themselves also frequently breed new
40 Mehrun Etebari, "How Tehran Sees Tunis," Foreign Policy 28 (January 2011), accessed at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/how_tehran_sees_tunis, 30 January 2011.
41 Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from the Iraqi
Civil War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). This section draws on the findings
in this work.
42 For an assessment of the war-causing effects of refugees, see Sarah Lischer, "Collateral Damage:
Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," International Security 28 (Summer 2003): 79-109.
terrorist groups. Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas,

the Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group) of Algeria, and the Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam were all borne of civil wars. Many of these groups
start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks - usually
against those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.
In the Muslim world, foreign fighters often flock to civil wars, particularly
if they involve fighting non-Muslim forces. Not all of these fighters end up
becoming terrorists, but civil war participation is at times a gateway for indi-
viduals to join groups like al Qaeda.43 In these wars, groups and individuals
often develop networks and learn tactics from one another.44
Neighboring populations often become highly agitated and mobilized by
developments in the civil war next door. Groups in one state may identify with
co-religionists, co-ethnics, or other groups with similar identities in a state
embroiled in civil war. A civil war may also encourage groups in neighboring states
to demand, or even fight, for a reordering of their domestic political arrangements.
Secessionism is another form of spillover.45 Some civil wars are caused by
one group within a country seeking its independence, while in other cases, the
civil war itself leads one group or another to seek its independence as the
solution to its problems. Frequently, other groups in similar circumstances
(either in the imperiled country or in neighboring countries) may follow suit
if the first group appears to have achieved some degree of success.46 Thus
Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia started the first of those civil wars, but
it also provoked Croatia to declare its independence, which forced Bosnia to
follow suit, which later convinced Kosovar Albanian nationalists to try for the
same, and eventually provoked a secessionist movement among Albanians
in Macedonia. During the height of Iraq's civil war, Iraq's neighbors worried
that secessionist sentiment would grow among Iraq's Kurds and spread to
nearby Kurdish populations.
The problems created by these forms of spillover and a weakened gov-
ernment offering what seems like an easy target often provoke neighboring
states to intervene: to stop terrorism as Israel tried repeatedly in Lebanon,
to halt the flow of refugees as the Europeans tried in Yugoslavia, or to try
to calm down the passions and potential radicalization of their own population
as Syria did in the Lebanese civil war. These interventions usually turn out
badly for all involved. Local groups typically turn out to be poor proxies
43 Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters," International Security 35 (Winter
2010/11): 53-94.
On terrorist learning, see Michael Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations:
The Case of Suicide Terrorism," International Organization 64 (Winter 2010): 33-64.
Barbara Walter, "Information, Uncertainty and the Decision to Secede, International Organi-
zation 60 (Winter 2006): 105-136.
46 For a critique of partition because of this demonstration effect, see James Fearon, "Separatist
Wars, Partition, and World Order," Security Studies 13 (Summer 2004): 394-415.
and are often unable or unwilling to accomplish the objectives of their backers.
This often provokes the intervening state to use its own military forces to do
the job itself. The result is that many civil wars become regional wars because
once one country interferes, other states often do the same, if only to counter
the initial intervening power.
What Will Not Change
In the near and medium term, many of the problems that have bedeviled the
region for years are not likely to change dramatically. These issues are mostly
structural and, even with the best of governments, would take years to resolve.
Economic problems have troubled the Arab world for many years.47 One
in four young people in the Middle East is unemployed.48 The middle class in
the Arab world is small, and much of it is dependent on state largesse rather
than being a truly independent political force. Education systems are inade-
quate and of poor quality.49 While the oil states have enjoyed boom years
as prices rose, their non-oil sectors remain weak. Oil economies, in addition,
may also inhibit democratization as the top-down "rent" from oil reserves
strengthens governments and reduces their need to tax their citizens for reve-
nue, and taxation is a common driver of democratization. As Michael Ross
contends, "There is no getting around the fact that countries in the region are
less free because they produce and sell oil."50
As unrest swept the region, many economies tanked - particularly those
without oil to shore them up. Tunisia and Egypt, which were relative success
stories in the last decade, both saw their gross domestic product drop in 2011
after it had risen in 2010; tourism, in particular, plummeted; and investors are
leery of countries undergoing sudden political change.51 In Egypt, foreign capi-
tal fled, and current reserves fell in the months following Mubarak's ouster.52
Throughout the Arab world, economic grievances like the rising cost of living
47 Timur Kuran, "Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms
of Institutional Stagnation," Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (Summer 2004): 71-90; Tarik Yousef,
"Development, Growth, and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa Since 1950,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (Summer 2004): 91-115.
48 Simon Atkinson, "New Middle East, Same Old Economic Problems," BBC News, 24 October 2011,
accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15422709, 7 December 2011.
See, for example, the Arab Human Development Report 2004: Building a Knowledge Society
(United Nations Development Programme, 2004), accessed at http://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/
regionalarab.aspx, 18 September 2011.
50 Michael Ross, "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the Resource Curse," Foreign
Affairs 90 (September/October 2011), accessed at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68200/
michael-1-ross/will-oil-drown-the-arab-Spring, 28 December 2011.
51 Suzanne Maloney, "The Economic Dimension" in Pollack, et aL, The Arab Awakening, 71.
52 Robert Springborg, "The Precarious Economics of the Arab Spring," Survival 53 (December
2011-January 2012): 92.
and unemployment are top concerns.53 In Iraq, a host of economic problems

has bedeviled the country, and for many Iraqis, has overshadowed that
country's daunting security issues.54 New and old regimes alike will be under
pressure to increase public spending and otherwise try to win over voters
rather than undertake unpopular, but necessary, austerity measures. Regimes
throughout the region have announced large spending programs to placate
their populations, even though many cannot afford such largesse. This may
grant them a short-term political boost, but it will cost their economies in the
long term. There is an obvious vicious circle - unrest scares away tourists,
and the decline in tourism creates economic problems that create additional
political tension.55
Demographic pressure will compound the economic problems. As Suzanne
Maloney contends, "The only real growth industry in the Middle East has
been population."56 The Arab world has the second lowest median age.57 The
Middle East has long had one of the highest population growth rates, and
approximately two thirds of the region is under 30, placing heavy demands for
jobs on Middle East economies. The link between population growth and
political unrest is murky, with little evidence of direct correlation, but the
demand for jobs will continue unabated, and should civil wars break out,
there will be a steady supply of cheap recruits for the fighting groups.58
A final constant will be hostility toward the United States. America is still
highly unpopular in the Arab world. The good news is that favorable opinions
of the United States grew considerably as the Arab Spring went on, but the
baseline was exceptionally low in October 2011: only 26 percent of those sur-
veyed had a favorable opinion of the United States, growing from 10 percent
a year earlier.59 Nor is the United States popular with its traditional autocratic
friends. The Saudi royal family and Jordan's King Abdallah are furious that
Washington unceremoniously abandoned long-time allies like Mubarak and
worry, rightly, that the U.S. commitment to their security is feeble.
53 See "3rd Annual Burston-Marsteller Arab ASDA'A Youth Survey," Dubai UAE, 15 March 2011,
accessed at http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/files/AYS2010_Top_10_Findings_Top_5_Findings_2011 .
pdf, 20 January 2012.
54 See the National Democratic Institute, "Relative Stability in Iraq Despite Unrest," 2 June 2011,
accessed at http://www.ndi.org/files/Iraq-relative-stability-despite-unrest-2011-survey.pdf, 19 January 2012.
55 1 would like to thank a reviewer for Political Science Quarterly for making this point in his or
her review.
56 Malonev, "The Economic Dimension," 67.
57 Springborg, "The Precarious Economics of the Arab Spring," 86.
58 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers
56 (2004): 563-595; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determi-
nants of Participation in Civil War," American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 436-455.
59 Shibley Telhami, "The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll," results available from a November 21
presentation at the Brookings Institution. See http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/1121_arab_
public_opinion_telhami.aspx, accessed 7 December 2011.
The United States is likely to end up damned either way. Regional democrats
will remain skeptical of Washington because of its past ties to autocrats and con-
tinued relations with what they see as reactionary forces, while regional tyrannies
will be fearful and angry about any U.S. support for democratic movements.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
A new Middle East has emerged, but what that newness means in practice rema
unclear. This article argues that there are profound domestic changes, with new
actors, particularly Islamists, emerging to reshape politics in the region. At the
same time, many regimes will be weak, with some among them prone to civil wa
Old alliance patterns may decline and new blocs emerge as new govern
ments take power and grapple with whether they should support democra
change abroad. Policy toward Israel, for many years the province of a small
of elites, may become a flash point for domestic politics in many countrie
Israel excites popular passions, and demagogues will have a greater ability
stir up anger on this issue. Cooperation with Washington may suffer as t
unpopularity of the United States makes new leaders unwilling to risk polit
popularity. Counterterrorism and U.S. efforts to contain Iran may suffer a
result, though terrorist groups and Tehran will find their own problems in the
new Middle East.
One of the biggest changes in the Middle East is likely to be the decline in
importance of individual leaders as key decision makers.60 Taken together, the
challenges to regime legitimacy, the rise of political participation, and the
emergence of new actors will decrease the importance of the personalities
and preferences of a small set of individuals at a regime's helm ("first image")
sources of foreign policy. Strategic concerns will remain, but the new regimes
are most likely to be motivated by domestic political (or "second-image")
concerns. Regime weakness will make this particularly likely, as the greatest
threat to new leaders may come from their own societies and militaries rather
than from foreign forces.
New governments will strive to prove themselves to their own people,
exploring the limits of political space and determining, often through trial
and error, which areas are the most politically salient. As new governments rise
and new social actors come into play, the chances of misperception and unin-
tended conflict will grow. Some states may take an alarmist view of events in
neighboring countries, not realizing that the new governments are playing to
domestic constituents. Revolutionary regimes may overstate the appeal of their
60 For an argument on the importance of individual leaders in the region, see Daniel Byman, "The
Implications of Leadership Change in the Arab World," Political Science Quarterly 12 (Spring 2005):
59-83. For a broader study of this subject, see Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Let Us
Now Praise Great Men (and Women): Bringing the Statesman Back In," International Security
25 (Spring 2001): 107-146.
own model and fear counterrevolution from countries like Saudi Arabia. The
forces of reaction, in turn, may believe that they can overturn the revolutions
or easily contain them.61 Most broadly, there will simply be many new leaders
who do not know one another well and are more likely to make mistakes before
they are forced to learn the new reality.
Because of the renewed importance of domestic political drivers of foreign
policy, the United States should try to win over public opinion. This will
involve making U.S. support for democracy clear (when it is real) and, at the
same time, downplaying ties to reactionary old regimes. In some cases, where
U.S. interests are limited (for example, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco), the United
States should press regimes to undertake or continue reform as necessary. A
trickier issue involves states like Saudi Arabia, where little progress on democ-
racy is likely. In such cases, it is better for Washington to bow to the inevitable
and try to maintain a partnership with the existing regime, recognizing that the
two governments will often be on opposite sides of the democratization issue.62
Winning over public opinion will be difficult, even with the most-aggressive
and skilled effort. The good news is that the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq
removes one bone of contention. The peace process is a likely source of dis-
cord that will continue. One way to make the success of the Arab Spring more
likely is to remove one of the greatest radicalizing forces in the region - the
Palestinian question - from the agenda. And Arab publics remain angry
at Washington for its strong support of Israel.63 New governments and old
will want the United States to once again beat its head against the wall in
hopes of a breakthrough. Well before the Arab Spring began, the Obama
and Netanyahu administrations had locked horns on this issue, and now the
issue is even more volatile.
The divisions within the Palestinian camp, the rightward shift in Israeli
politics, and the coming election in the United States have already made this
peace process season unlikely to bear fruit, but the Arab revolutions mean
it will be almost impossible. The result will be the triumph of form over sub-
stance. As Aaron David Miller contends, "In the coming months we'll see a
lot of process but not much peace."64 Even an empty process, however,
61 This dynamic of how fear and opportunism can drive conflict is explained in Stephen Walt,
"Revolution and War," World Politics 44 (April 1992): 321-368.
62 F. Gregory Gause III argues that it would be better for the United States to recognize that
any special relationship is now over and that cooperation will simply reflect bargaining and mutual
advantage rather than the favors that friends do each other. See Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East
(Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), accessed at http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/
saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p26663, 18 January 2012.
63 Shibley Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion: What Do They Want?" in Pollack, et al., The Arab
Awakening , 18.
64 Aaron David Miller, "2011: The Year of the (Bad) Initiative," The New York Times, 11 March 2011,
accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/opinion/12iht-edmillerl2.html, 18 March 2011.
can lead to disputes, particularly if the Obama administration believes that

Netanyahu and company are refusing to put a serious proposal on the table.
Washington has the most influence with the region's militaries, but sup-
porting them presents a dilemma. The military was meant to be the "orderly"
part of an orderly transition to democracy in the Middle East, but as Egypt's
experience makes clear, military officers want to keep their perks and power,
and U.S. support for them can help them do that. Outside Egypt, meanwhile,
militaries are politicized by tribe (Yemen), sect (Syria), and loyalty to the
old order (everywhere), making them part of the problem, not the part of
the solution. Much of the U.S. effort will be to stress that aid will be condi-
tional on not interfering with democratization.
In general, however, the United States has few effective instruments to
encourage democratic change in the Arab world. Military force is both politi-
cally and diplomatically out of the question in most instances. Economic aid,
so often used when there is a desire to help but no easy way to do so, can often
backfire. Aid is often channeled through regional regimes, strengthening their
hold on power at the expense of society. Moreover, given the unpopularity of
the United States, many of the region's democrats will fear that accepting U.S.
support could look suspicious to constituents, reducing their popularity.
Given the dizzying pace of events and the difficulty of predicting when and
where crises will break out, the United States will often be in a reactive mode,
seeking to manage chaos rather than to shape the future environment. U.S. prob-
lems will be compounded by the multiplicity of actors and by limited U.S. famil-
iarity with many of the region's emerging leaders, particularly the Islamists.
A reactive mode, however, does not mean inaction. Managing spillover
will be an important task for the United States. U.S. actions should include
helping care for refugees and preventing them from being a source of conflict,
using diplomacy to dissuade neighboring states from intervening and exacer-
bating civil wars, and striking at terrorists to prevent them from destabilizing
area countries and using the government weakness to act against the United
States. Such efforts may reduce the scale of any violence and, simultaneously,
buy time so new governments can learn about one another and avoid misper-
ception while also undertaking the slow process of building institutions at home.
The Arab Spring began without U.S. help, and the people of the region will
be the ones to determine its future. Washington should recognize that change is
coming and should support it, especially in key power centers like Egypt, but it
inevitably will play catch-up. And while U.S. leaders should hope that democ-
ratization will continue, they should recognize that the Arab Spring may not
bring freedom to much, or even most, of the Arab world. Even as the United
States prepares to work with the region's new democracies, it also must prepare
for the chaos, stagnation, and misrule that will also mark the years to come.

Regime Change in The Middle East

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Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects

Author(s): DANIEL BYMAN

In December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set him

DANIEL BYMAN is a professor in the Security Studies Program of the Schoo

Political Science Quarterly Volume 127 Number 1 2012 25

no guarantee of unity to follow. Egypt - where the fall of President Mubarak

Categorizing Change: How the Middle East Has

Categorizing Regime Change

Still other countri

2 Shadi Hamid, "Egypt: T

Domestic Impact of the Arab Spring

New Political Actors and the Return of Public Opinion

The Rise of the Islamists

Strategic Implications of the Arab Spring

In addition to its profound domestic implications, the Arab Spring is lik

Alliance Structures and Power Blocs

Conversely, the forces of reaction remain strong. Saudi Arabia, in particu-

Israel and the Peace Process

An Opportunity for Iran?

Civil War Spillover

terrorist groups. Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas,

What Will Not Change

and unemployment are top concerns.53 In Iraq, a host of economic problems

Policy Implications and Recommendations

can lead to disputes, particularly if the Obama administration believes that

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