Manalili v CA　(GR 113447) 

Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of
the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and
asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he
could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the
officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept
the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further
investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any
proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
respondent court.
People vs. Estrella [GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003]Facts:

Prior to 20 November 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of
Zambalesissued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of Antonio C.Estella
at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales. In the morning of 20 November 1996,Senior
Police Officer 1(SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together withSPO1
Jose Arca andseveral other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San
Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine
NationalPolice (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of
Baloganon,Masinloc for theenforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea
accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in
the search warrant. Ontheir way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair
located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, the latter's brother, and being rented
by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva. They approached Estrella and introduced themselves as police
officers. They showed Estrella the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron
asked Estrella if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he
would deserve a lesser penalty. While inside the hut, Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing
dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks off ruiting tops. The team searched the hut in
the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner. They found a

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 52 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained 4 big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .
38caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, therevolver and
ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea
andSPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1
Buloron and his companions arrested Estrella and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales. The
defense, however, alleged otherwise and claimed that on 20 November 1996 between 10:30 and 11:00
a.m., while Estrella was talking

with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres
and about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced
themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because theyhave a
search warrant issued against him. Estrella identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from
Estrellaas to where his house is located and Estrella told them that his house is located across the road.
The police did not believe him and insisted that Estrella's house is that house located about 5–8 meters
away from them. Estrella told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to
where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar
junk shop. Aftera bout half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came
out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to Estrella. They photographed Estrella and
brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Estella was investigated at San Marcelino,
Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied
by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Still, Estrella was charged for possession of prohibited drugs
and unlicensed firearms. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69), in Criminal Case
RTC 2143-I and on 25 August 1998, found Estrella guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua. The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana was ordered confiscated in favor of the government,
and the Sheriff was directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its
proper disposition. On the other hand, Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866
The .38caliber revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of the offense, were
however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms
and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Estrella appealed said decision.

Issue:

Whether the search undertaken inside the hut — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly
recovered — was legal.

Held:

 There is no convincing proof that Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibiteddrug, whether voluntarily

or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds ratherthan clarifies the
prosecution's story. Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the

search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be
invoked through Section 5(Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge off acts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases
falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall beforth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section
7 Rule 112." Never was it proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of
the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if
he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers.
Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. Assumin
garguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers,
and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was
within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section
12 (Search incident to lawful arrest), Rule 126 of

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 53 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant." However, the scope of the search should be
limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that
he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested
individual any money or property found upon the latter's person — that which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime,

or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence ores caping, or which may be
used in evidence in the trial of the case. The purpose of the exception in Chimel v. Californiais to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception,
therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Herein, searched was the
entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within Estrela's immediate control. Thus, the search
exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest
People vs. Valdez
Posted on March 2, 2017 by thecasedigester in Criminal Procedure
G.R. No. 129296,   September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused
was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and
cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all
member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector
Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut.
PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a
positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing
marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to
the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that
the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1)  Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time
to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo
to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence.
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was
error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have
relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
PEOPLE

vs.

AMINUDIN163 SCRA 402FACTS

The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a reliable informer that the accused, Aminnudin, was
on a vessel bound for Iloilo and is carryingwith him marijuana. The said vessel was to arrive few days
after such tip.On the day of the arrival, the agents then waited at the port for thevessel. Upon arrival of
the vessel and when the suspect disembarked,
they immediately frisked him and searched his bag which contained themarijuana. Subsequently, the
Aminnudin was arrested.During the trial, the accused that alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed and that his bag was confiscated without a searchwarrant.

ISSUE:

Is the marijuana found in the accused bag admissible evidence?

HELD:

No. The police agents had enough time to secure a warrant toarrest and search the accused but did not
do so. In addition to this, thearrest did not fall into any of the exceptions of a valid warrantless
arrest because the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that hehad just done so
 People vs. Saycon

FACTS:
Accused, a suspected shabu “courier,” was intercepted at a checkpoint set up by a
combined team of NARCOM and Coastguard personnel after receiving information that
the accused will be arriving aboard a boat at that moment. He obliged to the request for
him to open his bag, inside which was found a cigarette pack containing the suspected
“shabu.”

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the search of the accused’s bag was illegal.

HELD:
NO. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles —automobiles,
trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial
warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case.
 Caballes vs. CA

FACTS:

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with “kakawati”
leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was
loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared nervous.

With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked where the wires came from, appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. 

The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Theft.

The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of his vehicle by
police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain
smuggled goods,” does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.

RULING:

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. 
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior
of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against

unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is
limited to the following instances: 

(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or
visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s
vehicle.They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.

The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable
cause” as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.

Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to

the warrantless search. 

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People Vs. Musa

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.
The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the description of
Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa
the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected
it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the
living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped
away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a
‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be

admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the
object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said
object. 

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally
and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution.
CASE DIGEST : ABS- CBN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486           January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,  vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any
difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in conducting exit
polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows: These
are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, . . if the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only
by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time
element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing
instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that
the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general
has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake
here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that the interest of the state in
reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls — properly
conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.