G.R. No.

L-62626, July 18, 1984

Spouses Cayetano and Patricia Tiongson, etc. vs CA and Teodoro Macaya

Facts:
1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare land in
Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was no tenant
occupying the property at the time of the donation.

Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the Manotok and
pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent theft and to guard the property. Manotok allowed
Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners needed to take the property, Macaya and his family
must vacate, and that he could raise animals and plant according to his needs, and that the owners have no
responsibility to Macaya and he will use only 3 hectares. These conditions were not put in writing.

In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land a capital
contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for payment of taxes,
Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay every year as his contribution. Later, owners
requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that he will
contribute 10 cavans only, the owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya did not deliver
palays from then on.

1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, etc. Macaya was
informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and was asked to vacate, Macaya pleaded
that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating. However, after harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even
expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of the property also
shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one tilled by Macaya.

As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that
there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from
the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at
which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited
period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the property
while the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as
to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. 

As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the
part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for residential purposes. Thus,
together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.

There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything
from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or
expense.
G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon

Facts: The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan
Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of
the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have
agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land and they intended to
build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the opposite portion of the
land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate.
Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted as
economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1.            The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.            The subject is agricultural land;
3.            There is consent;
4.            The purpose is agricultural production;
5.            There is personal cultivation; and
6.            There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is
so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor
is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a
typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received.
This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone
at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary
purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is
more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to
have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the
criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO HILARIO, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SALVADOR BALTAZAR, respondents.

FACTS: Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the latter's two-hectare
landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of a "Kasunduan" executed between them on
January 8, 1979, He states that he erected his house and planted "halaman," the produce of which was divided at
70-30 and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas, he allegedly gave the share
pertaining to the landowner to her daughter Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December, 1980 that he came to
know that a portion of the 2 hectares or 4,000 square meters is already owned by the Hilarios.

Petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,000 square meters from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) after it had been foreclosed by virtue of a deed of sale executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The
former owner Corazon Pengzon testified that she owned only two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square
meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square meters with a total area of 1,740 square meters. She further
testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of the property, she declared the property for classification
purposes as "bakuran" located in the Poblacion and had no knowledge that there were other things planted in it
except bananas and pomelos.
CAR in determining whether or not respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in
question is not an agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the land. IAC
reversed the decision of CAR declaring plaintiff-appellant leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on the land
in question consisting of 1,740 square meters.

ISSUE: WON Salvador Baltazar is a tenant in the landholding in question.

HELD: No. Salvador Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding in question. Corazon Pengson further explained that
she did not receive any share from the produce of the land from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not
have accepted any share from the produce of the land because she knew pretty well that she was no longer the
owner of the lot since 1974 when it was foreclosed by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are the landholder
and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is agricultural production; and (4) There is
consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one
or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status as a dejure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

G.R. No. 95318. June 11, 1991.

LOURDES PEÑA QUA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Peñ a Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against private
respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Cadastre,
situated at Poblacion, Tinapi, Malinao, Albay, with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered in her name
under TCT T-70368; that inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all owned by private
respondents; and that said respondents’ stay in the land was mere tolerance and they are in fact nothing but
squatters who settled on the land without any agreement between her, paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to
the government.
In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot (home lot) because
she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots adjoining the lot in question, Lots
No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause;
that it was not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question but the former owner, Leovigildo
Peñ a who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the other two
houses.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the
use and possession of a home lot.

Held: The essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship are: (1) The parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is agricultural production; (4)
There is consideration; (5) There is consent to the tenant to work on the land; and (6) There is personal cultivation
by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvests.

Recognizing the consent to the presence of private respondents on the property as given by petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, the situation obtaining in this case still lacks three of the aforeenumerated requisites,
namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation and sharing of harvests.

The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals that “All these requisites are necessary in order to
create tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged
tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be considered an agricultural tenant.
Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home lot, a privilege granted by 20 Section 35 of RA 3844, as
amended, in relation to Section 22(3) of RA 1199, as amended, only to persons satisfying the qualifications of
agricultural tenants of coconut lands.

Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero v. CA and Apolinario Benitez

DOCTRINE: Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. The
definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the
promotion of growth and the care of the plants or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry.

FACTS: In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take
care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation in Aurora, Quezon.
Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed.

In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruit-bearing coconut trees, burn dried
leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually comes every three months,
he was also made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare
plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in defendants' copra kiln. For his
work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market.
For attending to the cows, he was paid P500 a year.

Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the
16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants
and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañ ang,
Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement whereby defendants agreed, among others, to let plaintiff work on
the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with
threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned
defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus,
making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for reinstatement with damages.

ISSUE: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Guerrero and Apolinario Benitez

RULING: YES. The law denes "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both
(Section 3, Republic Act 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended.)

With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199: Sec. 166(25) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a
farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166 (15) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In this case, the fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farm work from
clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby
cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (delos Reyes v. Espinelli, s u p r a; Marcelo
v . de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).

Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is their agreement
to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-
landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests,
taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in this case, strengthens the claim
of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant.

The petitioners entered into an agreement which in clear and categorical terms establishes respondent as a tenant,
to wit: A G R E E M E N T "This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to as
tenant." . . . The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to
mean a hired laborer or farm employee as understood and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their
relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an
employer-employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptation had been
given the word "tenant", the instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the
respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same.
Therefore, in clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is
AFFIRMED.

TALAVERA VS. LAXAMANA (G.R. NO. 77830, FEBRUARY 27, 1990)

FACTS: Jose Laxamana instituted an action for recovery of possession on July 10, 1984 against the petitioners over
a parcel of land. He had been in continuous possession of the said land until the petitioners took possession of it
and planted palay without private respondent’s knowledge. Laxamana suffered damages amounting to P500.00,
the price equivalent to sixty-five cavans of palay per agricultural year. Petitioners’ stated that the taking of the
private respondent’s possession was in accordance with their “Casunduan” executed on March 30, 1973 and that
he was not actually a tenant of the petitioners. The document states that private respondent sold his rights and
interests over the property for a consideration of P1, 000.00. The RTC ruled in favour of the private respondent to
which the petitioners appealed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision
that the Casunduan did not constitute valid surrender of the land contemplated under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was “valid surrender” contemplated by the law
HELD: No, the surrender did not constitute a valid surrender as contemplated by the law. The Decision of the RTC
and the CA is affirmed. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (R.A. No. 3844) Section 8,
agricultural leasehold shall only be extinguished based on the following grounds: (a) abandonment of the
landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (b) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (c) absence of the person
under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. Voluntary
surrender does not require any court authorization since it involves the tenant’s own volition however, it must be
shown that the surrender was voluntary through convincing and sufficiently proved evidence. It cannot be
presumed nor implied otherwise, the right of the tenant to security of tenure becomes illusory one. It was shown
that the Casunduan was prepared by petitioner and that Laxamana needed money for his wife’s illness; he could
hardly sign his own name; he continued working on the land until 1984 while the Talaveras claimed that they
cultivated the land themselves. The circumstances showed that Laxamana was forced to sign the Casunduan
without fully understanding it and continued cultivating the land after.

ENDAYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 88113 October 23, 1992

Facts: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land consisting of
20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934,
private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This fact,
petitioners do not dispute. On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of
P26,000.00. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate of Title was
duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm the land although petitioners claim that
private respondent was told immediately after the sale to vacate the land. Due to petitioners’ persistent demand
for private respondent to vacate the land, private respondent filed in April 1985 a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship between original owner and Pedro Fideli was
already terminated.

Held: No, R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law governing the
events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and established the agricultural
leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by
providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract
over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in
this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. On
the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — the agricultural
leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural
lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in
change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not terminate the right of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or
the landowner's successor in interest.

G.R. No. 135999 April 19, 2002 MILESTONE REALTY and CO., INC. and WILLIAM L. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA RAZON PEÑA and RAYMUNDO EUGENIO, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and Cristina Lorenzo were the
coowners of an agricultural land.
Carolina became the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement executed on October 17,
1976 by the heirs of Alfonso Olympia, one of whom is Francisco Olympia, on their respective shares after Alfonso's
death and by an Affidavit of Settlement executed on June 24, 1992 by the spouses Claro and Cristina Zacarias on
their shares in the property.
Anacleto Peñ a who was a tenant of the property and a holder of a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold had a house
constructed on the lot. He had several children on the first marriage, who also had their houses constructed on the
property. On February 4, 1986, Anacleto, married Delia Razon. Anacleto died intestate and was survived by Delia
and his children in his first marriage, including Emilio.
Emilio and Delia, the latter with respondent Raymundo Eugenio, her son-in-law, continued tilling and cultivating
the property. Emilio signed a handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he was returning the
landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of P1,500,000 as "disturbance compensation" After
receipt of the money, he executed a "Katibayang Paglilipat ng Pag-mamay-ari".
Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the Lot No. 616 to petitioner Milestone Title was issued in the
name of Milestone. TCT No. V-25431 was issued under the name of petitioner William Perez who subsequently
sold the same to Milestone. Thus, Milestone became the owner of the adjoining lots.
Private respondents Delia Razon Peñ a and Raymundo Eugenio filed a complaint praying inter alia to declare as null
and void the sale by Carolina to Perez and by the latter to Milestone, and to recognize and respect the tenancy of
private respondents Delia and Raymundo.
In her answer, Carolina Zacarias declared that she chose Emilio Peñ a as her tenant-beneficiary on the said property
within 30 days after the death of Anacleto.
PARAD rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. PARAD ruled that the order of preference cited in Section 9
of Republic Act 3844 is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause.6 It also took note that Emilio's two
siblings have openly recognized Emilio as the legitimate successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights.
Delia Razon Peñ a and Raymundo Eugenio appealed from the PARAD's decision to the DARAB. DARAB reversed the
decision of PARAD. DARAB noted that Carolina's affidavit did not show any categorical admission that she made
her choice within the one (1) month period except to state that "when Anacleto died, the right of the deceased was
inherited by Emilio Peñ a. Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the DARAB's decision.
CA is convinced that petitioners Carolina Olympia and Francisco Olympia failed to choose, within the statutory
period therefor, any tenant in substitution of Anacleto Peñ a, the erstwhile deceased tenant on the landholding, and
that, without prior or simultaneous notice to Private Respondent Delia Peñ a, the Petitioners made their choice of
Petitioner Emilio Peñ a as substitute tenant only in January, 1992, after they had agreed to sell the property to the
Petitioner Milestone Realty & Co., Inc.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA's decision. Said motion was denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Delia Razon Peñ a has a right of first priority over Emilio Peñ a in succeeding to the tenancy rights
of Anacleto over the subject landholding.
2. 2. Whether or not the sales of the subject lots by Carolina Zacarias to William Perez and then to Milestone are
null and void.

RULING: No dispute as to tenancy relationship between Carolina Zacarias and the late Anacleto Peñ a. The
controversy centers on who is the rightful and legal successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights
Relevant Provision
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844
SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. - In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse;
(b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of
their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the
agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the
event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in
accordance with the order herein established.
We agree with private respondents. As found by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, Carolina had failed to
exercise her right to choose a substitute for the deceased tenant, from among those qualified, within the statutory
period. Such inaction to make a choice within the time frame required by law is equivalent to waiver on Carolina's
part to choose a substitute tenant. Carolina made the choice in favor of Emilio Peñ a only by force of circumstance,
i.e., when she was in the process of negotiating the sale of the land to petitioners Perez and Milestone.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844
it provides that in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding
personally. The leasehold shall bind the legal heirs of the agricultural lessor in case of death or permanent
incapacity of the latter. It is to achieve this continuity of relationship that the agricultural lessor is mandated by law
to choose a successor-tenant within one month from the death or incapacity of the agricultural lessee from among
the following: (1) surviving spouse; (2) eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (3) the next eldest direct
descendant or descendants in the order of their age.
In Manuel vs. Court of Appeals,
Since petitioner Rodolfo Manuel failed to exercise his right of choice within the statutory period, Edwardo's widow
Enriqueta, who is first in the order of preference and who continued working on the landholding upon her
husband's death, succeeded him as agricultural lessee.
it is undeniable that respondent Delia Razon Peñ a, the surviving spouse of the original tenant, Anacleto Peñ a, is the
first in the order of preference to succeed to the tenancy rights of her husband because the lessor, Carolina
Zacarias, failed to exercise her right of choice within the one month period from the time of Anacleto's death.

Answer to 1st Issue

Petitioners cannot find succor in the declarations of Emilio Peñ a and the affidavit of Carolina Zacarias, stating that
Emilio succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto. In the first place, Carolina's affidavit and her Answer filed
before the PARAD were both executed in 1992, or almost two years after the death of Anacleto on February 17,
1990, way beyond the one month period provided for in Section 9 of Republic Act 3844. Secondly, as found by the
DARAB, a scrutiny of Carolina's declaration will show that she never categorically averred that she made her choice
within the one (1) month period. Instead, she narrated passively that "when Anacleto died, the right of the
deceased was inherited by Emilio Peñ a," prompting the DARAB to conclude it merely "connotes that she
recognized Emilio Peñ a by force of circumstance under a nebulous time frame
Petitioners further argue that Delia cannot qualify as tenant even on the assumption that she was the rightful
successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights, because she did not personally cultivate the land and did not pay rent. In
essence, petitioners urge this Court to ascertain and evaluate certain material facts which, however are not
within the province of this Court to consider in a petition for review. Determination of personal cultivation
and rental payments are factual issues beyond the reach of this petition. Well established is the rule that in an
appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.
Answer to 2nd issue
we are unable to agree with the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals and of DARAB that the sale of the land in
question should be declared null and void. it is Carolina Zacarias who is the owner of the subject land and both
Emilio Peñ a and Delia Razon Peñ a only succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto. Carolina has the right to
dispose of the property without other limitations than those established by law. 24 This attribute of ownership is
impliedly recognized in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 3844. The only right of the agricultural lessee or
his successor in interest is the right of preemption and/or redemption.
Finally, as to the question of illegal conversion of the land, suffice it to state that such determination is not within
the jurisdiction of this Court and is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari as it requires evaluation and
examination of pertinent facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED

BASBAS v ENTENA G.R. No. L-26255 June 30, 1969

FACTS:
 Basbas is the leasehold tenant of a riceland owned by Rufino.
 Rufino sent a letter to Basbas informing the latter that the land was for sale and that Basbas was given a
certain period to communicate his intention to purchase it.
 Basbas sent a reply accepting the offer, although disagreeing with the price. Basbas also mentioned that he
was enlisting the aid of the government in purchasing the land.
 Basbas sent a letter to the Land Authority asking for help to acquire the land. The Land Authority replied that
his request is being processed and action will be taken thereon once the Land Bank has been fully organized.
 Rufino executed a Deed of Sale covering the riceland in favor of Sps. Flaviano and Angelina.
 Rufino and his wife executed an affidavit stating that Basbas was notified of the sale before its conveyance,
that Basbas refused or failed to exercise the right of pre-emption granted under the Agricultural Land Reform
Code.
 The submission of the affidavit enabled the registration of the Deed of Sale in favor of Sps. Flaviano and
Angelina.
 Basbas filed a case before the CAR seeking to compel Rufino to sell the land to him.
 CAR dismissed the case because Basbas failed to make tender of payment and consignation of the purchase
price; hence, the landowner cannot be compelled to sell the land to him.

ISSUE: Whether tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are necessary before a tanant-
lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of redemption provided in Sec 11 & 12 of the Agricultural
Land Reform.

RULING:
The appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed.

Basbas’s claim to preference in purchasing the land, in case the said land is to be sold, or to his right to redeem it in
2 years should the land be sold without his knowledge, is predicated upon Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844):

SEC. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. — In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the
agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions x x x

SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: x x x

The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and
shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.
There is no showing that the Land Reform Council has proclaimed that the government machineries and agencies
in the region are already operating, as required by section 4 of Republic Act 3844.Granting that Sections 11 and 12
are operative, yet this Court has ruled in a past case that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption
requires either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof. The redemption price should either be fully
offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the
offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith.

As shown by the evidence in this case, the redemptioner has no funds and must apply for them to the Land
Authority, which, in turn, must depend on the availability of funds from the Land Bank. It then becomes practically
certain that the landowner will not be able to realize the value of his property for an indefinite time beyond the
two years redemption period.

In this case, there was neither prior tender nor did judicial consignation accompany the filing of the suit. Unless
tender or consignation is made requisite to the valid exercise of the tenant's right to redeem, everytime a
redemption is attempted, a case must be filed in court to ascertain the reasonable price. On the other hand, a prior
tender by the tenant of the price that he considers reasonable affords an opportunity to avoid litigation, for the
landowner may well decide to accept a really reasonable offer, considering that he would thereby save the
attorney's fees and the expense of protracted litigation.

Section 74 of the Land Reform Act (RA 3844) establishes a "Land Bank of the Philippines" intended "to finance the
acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and resale to small landholders, as well as the
purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from the landowner." No expression in this part of the law,
however, indicates, or even hints, that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to ran until the tenant
obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some other
source.

Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr., v. Reynalda Pollescas

Doctrine: For tenants failure to pay rental to come within the intend,ent of the law as a ground for ejectment, it is
imperative that the rental must be legal. What the law contemplates iis the deliberate failure of the tenant to pay
the legal rental, not the failure to pay an illegal rental.

Facts: Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut farmland(Land) located at Labo, Ozamis City. Esteban
Pollescas was the original tenant of the said land. Upon Esteban’s death, his son Enrique pollesca’s succeeded him
and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique Tan.

Respondent herein, Reynalda Pollesca, Esteban’s surviving spouse demanded that the Tans recognize her as
Esteban’s successor. The Tans did not accede. Thus, respondent Reynalda Pollesca’s filed with the DARAB of
Ozamis City a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and
damages.

DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the Land, and apportioned the harvests between Tan
Heirs and Reynalda based on custimary sharing which is 2/3 to the landowner, and 1/3 to the tenant.

Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such amount, but Reynalda ignored it. Tan Heirs filed a complaint of estafa
against Reynalda. The MTC found Reynalda guilty of estafa, and due to her continued failure to deliver the share of
the Tan heirs, the latter filed a complaint for ejectment against the former.

The petitioner Tan heirs argued that the leasehold agreement is extinguished due to non-payment of the lease
(2/3 of the harvest). The respondent Reyanalda contended that the petitioner’s demand for payment is excessive.
The CA ruled that there is othing in the law that makes failure to deliver a share as ground for extinguishment of
leasehold agreement.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that Reynalda is obliged to pay only 1/4 or 25% of the normal harvest
and not 2/3 when the subject land was not yet placed under the leasehold system pursuant to Sec. 12 of R.A. 6657.

Ruling: The law governning in this case is R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, which
only expressly repealed Sec. 35 of R.A. 3844. The harvest in dispute are for the years 1992-1993 after its
effectivity. In this case, the Tan Heirs seek Reynalda’s ejectment on the ground of non-payment of lease rentall. The
Court agrees with the CA that for nonpayment of the lease rental to be valid ground to disposses the agricultural
lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of the lease rental
claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-oayment of lease rental cannot be aground to disposses the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.

Sec. 43 of R.A. 3844,as amended provides that not more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute
the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs cannot validly disposses Reynalda of the
landholding for non-payment o rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.

Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Consequently, that means the DAR must first fix
the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to par. 2 of Sec. 34 of R.A. 3844. Until
DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of the lease rental since
such amount is not yet determned. There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because
it is impossible to pay such aundetermined amount.
That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully
ejected from the Land for nonpayment of rental.

Moreover, there is no ground for extinguishment of leasehold rental in this case. The case of Garchitorena v.
Panganiban was also wrongfully cited by Atty. Anonat, counselfor the Tan Heirs.

The Court denied the petition and affirms the assailed decision of the CA. It remanded the case to the DAR for
determination of teh provisional lease rental.

Hidalgo v Hidalgo
FACTS:
 This is a case reviewing the Court of Agrarian relation’s decision dismissing an action of share tenets for the
enforcement of the right to redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of sec 12 of the agricultural land
reform code (ALRC)
 Respondent, an owner of parcels of land in Batangas sold land in 2 separate cases for 4,000 and 750 pesos. In
both cases the tenets of the land sought by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the amounts of
1,500 and 750 , respectively.
 The tenants have for several years been working on the lands as SHARE TENANTS.  no 90 day notice of
intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the ALRC was
given by respondent
o Actions for redemption were timely filed on march 26, 1965 by petitioners within the 2 year
prescriptive period
 Agrarian court ruled on the issue of whether or not plaintiffs, as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the
parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by
the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did
not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale,
In other words, is the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to
share tenants?
 ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION  right of redemption is available only to leaseshold tenants but not to share
tenants
o “provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee, and
to nobody else”
o “Congress was fully aware of the existence of share tenancy and in fact provided for the abolition of the
agricultural share tenancy system “
o “if it were intention of congress to grant right of redemption to share tenants it would have
unmistakably done so.”
o “We cannot extend said right to share tenants through judicial legislation wherever our sympathies
may lie”

DECISION:
1. very essence of ALRC is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as proclaimed in its title.
a. Sec 4  agri share tenancy is contrary to public policy
b. Sec 2  policy of the state to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as
the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices; x x x and to make the small farmers more independent
c. Puwede pa share tenants but only in a transitory capacity as stated in section 4 pero temporarily
lang! (end of agri year, shorter period provided in the share tenancy expiration of contracts, the
sooner exercises option to elect to leasehold system)
2. MALI yung premise of agri court na “a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant”
a. Either way, there is vinculum juris with a corresponding set of obligations  security of tenure,
tenant’s right to continue in possession of land despite expiration of contract, pre-emptive right to
buy the land he cultivates
b. State's policy of establishing owner cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant
 existence for the small farmers that would make them a pillar of strength of our Republic
3. Agri court saying right of redemption is “available to leasehold tenants only and excludes share tenants for
the literal reason that the Code grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to nobody else.” 
WRONG
a. The code did not even mention tenants whether leasehold or share tenants, because it outlaws
share tenancy and envisions the agri leasehold system as its replacement
b. Used terms such as “agricultural lessor” and “agricultural lessee” without the slightest mention of
leasehold tenants
4. Where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory
construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit
of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
a. Look at different chapters and sections of the code!
b. the Code's intent, policy and objective to give both agricultural lessees and farmers who transitionally
continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the Code's enactment, the same priority and
preferential rights over the lands under their cultivation, in the event of acquisition of the lands, by
expropriation or voluntary sale, for distribution or resale that may be initiated by the Land Authority
or the National Land Reform Council, are clearly and expressly stated.
5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions and injustice if a share tenant would be denied the
rights of pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to exercise on his own resources,
6. Basbas v Entena not applicable (failed to tender payment plus walang pera!)
7. Wala naman mapprejudice if land owner recognized the share tenant’s right of redemption
a. Vendees will get back the amount they paid naman
8. Historical background of provisions on preemption and redemption further strengthens court’s opinion
a. Dean montemayor: It further bolsters the security of tenure of the agricultural lessee and further
encourages agricultural lessees to become owner-cultivators.
b. Dati kasi benta tas new owner ejects tenants!
9. Transitioning tenants to be given same priority as yung mga nakatransition na!
a. (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.
b. A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary,
the letter of the law
c. The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory construction that it
will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court, that would
defeat and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law’s declared policy and intent

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The 1,500 one will be remanded to agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price to be paid by
petitioners for redemption (kasi 4,000 is not the FMV). 750 one no problem

HIDALGO V HIDALGO

DOCTRINE: Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof.
Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

FACTS:
 Case jointly decided two petitions for review of decisions with the same issue involving the same
landowners and vendees which dismissed petitioner’s actions as share tenants for the enforcement of the
right to redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been working on the lands as share tenants for several
years.
1. First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with two other parcels of
land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as tenants alleged that the area of land they
worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus they seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount
by respondents-vendee in their favor by way of redemption.
 2. Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent. Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila
and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of sale for the same price by way of redemption.
 Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share
tenants. It provides that:
Lessee’s Right of Redemption—In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge
of agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration.; Provided: further, that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right
of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale,
and shall have the priority over any right of legal redemption.
 No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the pre-emption prescribed by Sex11 of
the Agricultural Land Reform was given

ISSUE: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable to share tenants also. Or, WON the
plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof
where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter’s intention to
sell their property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec13 of RA 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale.
RATIO:
The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of redemption
granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and not “shares tenants” and that
their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or coequal.
 The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. It was
error of the agrarian court to state that “the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction
are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even after the enactment of the Land Reform Code.
 The difference between share and leasehold tenancy as premised in the agrarian court’s decision refers to
the contractual relationship between the tenant and the landowner, but the Land Reform Code forges by
operation of law a vinculum juris (civil obligation)—whether for a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share
tenant. Juridical consequences coming from thus are security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant’s right
to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer
of the land to third persons, and the farmer’s pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates as well as the
right to redeem the land if sold to a third person without his knowledge.
 The Code did not mention tenants, whether leaseholds or share tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy
and envisions the agricultural leasehold system as its replacement, and the agrarian court’s literal
construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy
of the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers who invariable were all share tenants
before the enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status of the lessees.
 Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever
is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity,
injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
 Basbas v Entena is not applicable, as there, the tenant-redemptioner was shown by the evidence to have no
funds and had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet operating in the locality
and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code “indicates or even hints that the 2-year redemption
period will not commence to run until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or “stops the
tenant from securing redemption funds from some other source.” In the present case, the sole legal issue is
the right of redemption being available to the redemption of the share tenants.
 The historical background for the enactment of the Code’s provisions on pre-emption and redemption
further strengthens the Court’s opinion

RULING: Decisions appealed are REVERSED, petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are GRANTED.