CHAPTER V

Analysis
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Scale of Radicalization
5.3 Key Drivers of Radicalism
5.3. (a) Political Drivers
5.3. (b) Economic Drivers
5.3. (c) Social Drivers
5.3. (d) Security and Geostrategic Drivers
5.3. (e) Contributory Factors
 CHAPTER V

5. Analysis

5.1 Introduction

There is a usually observed tendency to consider of radicalization in terms only of ideology.

Religious zealotry, militancy & extremism, or whatever one wishes to call them, are often

considered as signs of lack of education, backwardness, absence of a civilized mind-set and a

reflection of a savage or barbaric worldview. The recourse to colonial binaries, such as, savage

versus civilized, backward versus modern, or illiterate versus enlightened, tends to complicate

the issues rather than simplify them. Categories such as savage, backward, barbaric or pre-

modern fail as explanations since they become reiterations: they committed the act because they

are cruel; they are cruel because they committed the act. The reliance upon ideological &

psychological categories, which refer to some type of assumed inherent proclivity among

specific people to undertake heinous acts, becomes essentialist. Such descriptions become

redundant, for they demolish history, as well as, substantial reality that form a part of the

dynamics of the radicalism. The use of overarching philosophical categories seems to be based

on some kind of biological determinism, thereby making such categories intensely racist. The

importance of locating particular actors, within particular historical material concerns &

contexts, is overlooked when there is recourse purely to ideology, mind-set or belief as

explanations for historical occurrences. Instead of typifying the perceived violence & extremism

as some kind of innate flaw within a particular religion, people, belief or cultural system, it is

more fertile to explore the political economy of radicalization, in order to lay bare the material

foundation that may have spawned it. It seems to be more fruitful to scrutinize the conflicts
between contending social classes trying to establish their supremacy and deploying religion, or

a specific form of it, to validate their position in the economic & social hierarchies. Islam seems

to offer an ideological shelter for class-based exploitation & privilege. Across many Muslim

countries, the upper strata more and more declare their attachment to Islam, in a frantic search

for an ideological guarantee for their material & social advantages. The reigning strata use Islam

to give religious endorsement to their conservative outlooks. A historic assessment of the

compacts between specific interpretations of political power & religion may serve to elucidate

radicalism and trace it back within material conflicts & history. The use of religion to achieve,

uphold and augment class power may, in turn, tend to explain the growing currency of religion

and its hegemonic rise within the state and society. This is something we are experiencing in

Pakistan and especially in Punjab.

5.2 Scale of Radicalization

Commonly, up till now FATA has been in lime light when talking about radicalization. And,

unfortunately the less-reported aspect of recent developments in Pakistan is the entrenched

radicalization of Pakistan's province of Punjab. The unending mobilization of Punjabi radicals -

the so-called "Punjabi Taliban" - is just one way that this mounting radicalization is becoming

manifest. Punjab is crucial. About 44% of Pakistan's 20,000 madrassas exist there. Of the 1,764

individuals on government "wanted" lists, 729 belong to southern Punjab alone.

To be exact, Punjab is no way near like the "lawless badlands" of the tribal regions. It is

reckoned by many to be Pakistan's most affluent province, and boasts a number of urban regions

that are well-established metropolitan centers of liberalism & modernity. On the contrary, there

is another Punjab - the rural South Punjab and some adjoining urban areas - that have usually
been the nurturing ground for militant organizations such as Jaish-i-Muhammad and Sipah

Sahaba Pakistan.

Punjabi radicalization is not something new; Punjabis have for long been an integral part of

militant outfits, & after September 11 many rushed to help their Pashtun brethren in Afghanistan.

Today, many policy formulators in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province are more apprehensive

about Punjabi militants than the indigenous Pashtun population, somewhat because the Punjabis

are less predictable.

One can almost distinguish a socio-economic arrangement in instigating radicalization in Punjab.

Among lesser-income groups, chiefly in southern Punjab, social injustices and gross inequalities

are exploited by several madrassas and networks of, militant and sectarian groups. For example,

the militant Sipah Sahaba Pakistan established 75 district-wise branches and 225 smaller units in

the days before the group was barred in 2002. It is still vibrant under changing names, and by all

accounts it is growing under the disguise of social welfare organization working to help the poor

and needy. Other groups have changing patterns of entrenchment in the area.

Radicalization is unevenly dispersed in northern and central Punjab. However, madrassas

everywhere are rich grounds for idealistic radicalization. Other key drivers of radicalization in

urban or semi-urban parts of Punjab are erroneous notions of jihad and a deep suspicion of the

West. Militant groups tend to focus on higher education imparting colleges & universities, and

middle-income groups such as traders, lawyers, and doctors.

Growing alienation from society may push upper and middle-class Punjabis to seek solace with

bodies such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which aims to instruct opinion leaders. Another organization, Al

Huda, which concentrates on women, is rapidly becoming a fad in the upper crust of society.

These groups advocate "bringing Muslims back to their roots", an ideal that reverberates among
the educated elite class. Punjabi radicalization is a volatile mix. Corruption, grinding poverty,

extremist seminaries and socio-economic disparities are a recipe for disaster.

More people live below the poverty line in western and southern Punjab than in Baluchistan

Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces combined. That may help clarify why Southern

Punjab remote villages such as Vehoa, and Taunsa are now observing incidents eerily like events

that happened when the Taliban were taking over areas in Swat and FATA: kidnapping for

ransom, extremists demanding Islamic law, denouncing the government as incompetent and

corrupt, increasing fundamentalism, suicide attacks, threats of life to those siding with

governments, and encouraging an Islamic revolution.

Furthermore, the borders of South Punjab share some topographical structures with tribal areas,

so that militants can infiltrate, even if entrance points from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are watched.

Dera Ghazi Khan, the largest district of Punjab, is a gateway between Baluchistan, central

Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Militant Punjabi groups have enrolled from there frequently

for the war against NATO, and United States in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's impact has also steadily amplified in the huge Bahawalpur district, through their

associated group Jaish-i-Muhammad. Bahawalpur was already a base for up to 20,000 trained

Punjabi militants, operating under cover of private schools, charity organizations or media

outlets after a broad ban of militant outfits by the former president, Gen Pervez Musharraf.

Radicalization of the Punjab has altered the shape of terrorism in Pakistan. Attacks by distinct

Punjabi entities were a scarcity prior to 2008; this has now drastically changed. As the

counterinsurgency work in FATA has been stepped up, the Taliban have become more vibrant in

Punjab, just as home-based radicalization was emerging. Collectively, these events suggest that
if unchecked, for the foreseeable future Punjabi extremism may remain a decisive force to be

reckoned with, along with Pashtun-driven violence.

5.3 Key Drivers of Radicalism

While analyzing drivers of radicalization in Punjab it is found that there are four main types of

drivers that caused radicalism normatively; it is apparent that this framework is useable for

explaining the upsurge of radicalism for Pakistan as a whole. The following are the significant

driving factors;

5.3. (a) Political Drivers

Lack of trust of the people in the state weakens a) when the state does not deliver basic services

to the masses in the education, health, and being meritorious in all aspects of public service, b)

faith of the people and belief in the state is further weakened if opportunity of political

participation to the masses is not ensured. This further demolishes the social contract and may

embolden the citizens to seek assistance of the radicals, c) if a state flops to deliver justice to its

citizens also encourages people to claim imposition of an Islamic system of rule that is based

upon the system of justice delivery during the reign of the four caliphs.

It is argued that the unit of the Pakistan state is weakening because of certain causes like, lack of

institutional coherence, incapacity of state to deal with issues, corruption, weaponization of

society, weak justice system, and poor over all governance.

The impact of these deficits is serious as the existence of proxies and dependence on a core

religious based character, in a sense provides a “revelatory” validation for denial of civil and

political liberties and violation of human rights by state function arise.

It is also analyzed that the ever-present tug of war between military & government, though

significantly reduced now has given vent to radicalization indirectly. Moreover, patronage given
to radical and extremist elements by state and its organs has brought cataclysmic repercussions.

The reduced influence of typical feudal lords allowed religious elements to fill the power gap

and thus advance radical thoughts. It is also observed in the study that the spiritual powers of the

shrine enabled the extremists to enter politics and consequently political power allowed them to

legitimize radicalized vested interests.

5.3. (b) Economic Drivers

It is noted that long term hopeless poverty & economic deprivation, below the national average,

offers the radicals an opportunity to censure the government for its failure to look after masses

and creates a rupture of the social contract between the sidelined population and the state. While

economic deficiency does not in itself lead to radicalism, but permits the militant groups to

contextualize their appeals to challenge the state and for popular support under the slogans of

equity, social justice, and equal opportunity. Those of the religious bent support the replication

of the Islamic model of the state as it prevailed in Islamic history during the reigns of the first

four Caliphs of Islam as their chosen model for imitation.

The study found that irregular economic development created great rifts in the province of

Punjab, leading Southern part of Punjab to stone age which compelled locals to seek refuge in

jihad, smuggling, & kidnapping for ransom along with other radical acts. Throughout the

province acute underdevelopment and weak governance resulted in crimes such as brutal

robberies, targeted killings & sectarian murders. Unemployment massively exposed the

vulnerable youth segment to radicalization. It is also observed that there is a tendency on part of

trading community in Punjab which is inherently orthodox to support fund-raising campaign of

religious organization to secure man-power and clout at the time of need and in the process the
extremists receive huge amount of money which they use to finance their agendas. Giving away

charity which tends to shape fraternities that have a social recognition is on the rise.

5.3. (c) Social Drivers

One of the major setbacks to Punjabi society is political socialization not getting materialized.

People are yet to arrive at a knowledgeable stage about politics. Then there is monstrous growth

of sects and groups which leads to various radical interpretations of Islam. Conflict also arises

when skewed education becomes part of the education sector. It is also analyzed that

radicalization has crept into elite social circle of the society which are thought to be liberal and

more learned and educated. Moreover, it was revealed in the study that Youth of Punjab is highly

susceptible towards religious and radical organizations and they are a prime target of extremists’

outfits. No wonder, so many suicide attacks are conducted by youngsters. Some of the bordering

cities from North-Eastern Punjab & Southern Punjab are assessed to be culturally more violent &

strategically placed in such a position where radicalization can easily sneak into the social fabrics

of the society. The nationalist threat is another major cause of violent acts and agitation in

Southern Punjab who demand for a separate province. In the same area, new money which is

mostly brought into the province from Middle East is going a long way in luring the masses

towards radicalization under the disguise of religious services

Another driver of radicalism is related to social cohesion. Weak social cohesion in Punjab in

general and rural-tribal South Punjab in particular emboldens the growth of radical thought that

abolishes social cohesion and without which a rural-tribal society misses its apparatuses to

prevent the waning of its protected fraternal tribal system. The absence or prevalence of social

cohesion will specify whether the situation in an area will be resistant or conducive to radicalism

and extremism. Resource usurping from its federating units for subsidizing the national agenda
based on the religious character with which Pakistan views the external world creates massive

social unrest. A recent development of radicalization creeping into higher education institutions

is major source of concern. These factors lead to the fading of national cohesion and jeopardize

the existence of the state.

5.3. (d) Security and Geostrategic Drivers

These drivers could boost the growth of radicalism by association. In 1979-88, Pakistan nurtured

a ‘Jihad’ against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. A big lot of such jihadist was recruited from

Punjab. This enlarged the number of radicals as there was a fraternity of Jihadists from all over

the globe and this amplified their effect in Afghanistan and Pakistan and mostly throughout the

world.

Pakistan's fear from a bourgeoning and radical Hindu India and Pakistan’s un-requited right on

Kashmir, still remains unsettled after 67 years of Partition of the sub-continent, paving the way

of adoption of such a policy that looks the other way when Jihadis commence radicalization of

the Kashmir population who are under Indian forced occupation. One must not forget that Punjab

is large breeding base of Jihadis operating in Indian-held Kashmir. On the other hand sectarian

groups are waging a private Jihad against other sects of Islam within Pakistan; the conflict

between the Shias & Sunnis is one good example.

5.3. (e) Contributory Factors

Other than the political, social and economic spheres, there are other contributing factors as well

that directly or indirectly instigate the process of radicalization. While Pakistan is faced with thin

layering of institutions that it inherited from the well-established part of British India with a

embryonic level of state diffusion in areas now composed of Southern Punjab, FATA, KP,

Baluchistan, and parts of interior Sindh; thus it not only exposed to the problem of founding a
viable state with a enormous web of infrastructure but had to face security issues across its

borders with India in the East and Afghanistan in the West, as the latter laid entitlements to the

Pashtun inhabited belt in FATA and KP and the uproar of establishing new provinces in

Southern region of Punjab. In spite of these challenges that would have been quite a chore for a

more gifted state, Pakistan not only handsomely met these challenges but in the course of its

growth also accomplished nuclear status, which by any criteria is a remarkable achievement.

It is observed that that radicalism and extremism grows in those countries that display the

following characteristics;

 Where societies are traditionalist with a low level of literacy/education.

 The popularity of an ideological based exclusive national narrative.

 Non-democratic attitude towards politics

 Manifestation of safe-havens outside control of state where extremists are trained and

operations planned

 Complacent attitude of State for private militias

 Feeble internal social solidity.

 Weak delivery of social services to the populace.

 Widespread corruption

 Poor application of rule of law

 Presence of criminal, land and drug Mafias that challenge the state’s governance and

are deep-rooted

 Weak local governance system

 Uneven income distribution.

With the prevalence of above mentioned menaces, certain trends are emerging in Pakistan as

consequences. They can be summarized as;

 Waning of state sovereignty.

 Strengthening of the non-state actors.

 Suspicion about legitimacy of regular state institutions like Parliament.

 Absence of rule of Law.

 Emergence of influential local Mafias in urban centers such as Lahore, Rawalpindi,

Faisalabad in Pakistan on the lines of Karachi.

 Convergence of radical, extremists and criminal syndicates

 A large percentage of national services and trade are being transacted under the mask

of legitimacy and non-payment of duties and taxes.

 The criminal enterprises veil their nefarious acts by using extremists and radicals

when the need arises. It is always fertile for their business to keep the state

functionaries away from its management.

 The syndicates with the help of the radicals and extremists have neutralized local

police and military.

 The criminal syndicates have gone regional and international to keep the unlawful

business of kidnapping, drugs, human trafficking, and even regular trade outside the

state sovereignty.

However, this analysis of primary causes has thrown up a noticeable exception, it is that a

conservative and traditional society that fears the invasion of a modernizing state as a threat to its

way of life will rely on extremism and radicalism as a protective mechanism and will thus

remain exposed to the dangers of Fascism; if a healthy society is perceived as one, that has a
great degree of social cohesion, than any modification brought into the framework grounded on

religion (with its numerous sects and variations), will deteriorate its social cohesion and

jeopardize its continuous growth through replication. If that is the case, then radicalism becomes

apparatuses for sealing that social sphere against an intrusion. It will thus create a scenario where

radicalism becomes a protective mechanism; however, while such an ideological state appears

powerful against outside interferences/influences it is prone to a higher level of internal conflict

from within and the danger of Fascism if such a society embraces a secular approach detached

from effective democratic practices.