OTC 13997

A Rational Approach to FPSO Hull Configuration Selection

Mark Wang, CSOAker Engineering; Preston McNeely, CSOAker Engineering; Chris Serratella, ABS Consulting

Copyright 2002, Offshore Technology Conference

engineering principles. When the appropriate data is used, the
This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2002 Offshore Technology Conference held in method could also be used when considering between a single
Houston, Texas U.S.A., 6–9 May 2002.
skin conversion candidate and a double-sided single bottom or
This paper was selected for presentation by the OTC Program Committee following review of
information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper, as
double hull new-build.
presented, have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to
correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any
position of the Offshore Technology Conference or its officers. Electronic reproduction, Introduction
distribution, or storage of any part of this paper for commercial purposes without the written
consent of the Offshore Technology Conference is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print
is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The In general, hull configuration selection includes selection of
abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was
presented. external configuration (external hull form) and selection of
internal configuration (inner part of hull). This paper actually
addresses the selection of internal hull configuration. For the
Abstract
purpose of simplification, “hull configuration” is used here to
represent “hull internal configuration”.
An important decision in development of a new-build ship-
shaped FPSO is to decide what hull internal configuration
Selection of the most appropriate, fit-for-purpose hull
should be used. The choice can vary across the spectrum from
configuration is an important part of concept development
a conventional single skin hull to a complete double hull.
when utilizing a new, purpose-built, ship-shaped Floating
Selection of the most appropriate hull configuration requires
Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) system as part of
consideration of many factors, some with conflicting
the field development solution. It is perhaps one of the most
requirements, which makes the selection process complex.
difficult subjects that most new-build FPSO projects must deal
This topic has been discussed frequently in various segments
with. Each project may have particular features but the general
of the offshore industry with no conclusive path forward.
procedures for the decision-making are similar. Unfortunately,
to the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic
A systematic, rational methodology is presented in this paper
method or procedures published for such a decision
to assist in making decisions in the selection of hull internal
making process.
configuration. When utilizing this method, a number of factors
are considered, including regional, international and Class
The possible choices for hull configuration can be single hull
Society regulatory requirements, project’s functional needs,
(SH), double hull (DH), or double-sided single-bottom (DS-
safety, collision and grounding risks, pollution control,
SB) hull, and single-side double-bottom (SS-DB) hull. As
hydrostatic stability, structural strength, construction cost, site
shown in Figure 1, all four configurations can be found in the
environmental data, FPSO operation, inspection, maintenance,
existing FPSO fleet.
and repair requirements, historical experience with previous
FPSO projects, etc…. The paper presents a step-by-step
Figure 1 below shows the percentage of the world’s FPSO
approach that should result in the most appropriate, fit-for-
fleet by hull configuration (conversions and new-builds),
purpose hull configuration. In this method, effects of all of the
based on an ABS date base. Although SH FPSO’s still make
factors are assessed in terms of cost, with both CAPEX and
up a large portion of the total FPSO fleet in operation, they are
OPEX considered. Therefore, the selected hull configuration
mainly those that were converted from trading tankers. The
using this method is also optimally cost effective. All of the
SS-DB configuration takes a negligible percentage of the total
factors are extensively analyzed in this paper to provide
FPSO’s in operation. Table 1 presents the statistics of new-
some guidelines and useful information for the decision
build FPSOs based on a separate small date base.
making process.
Approximately 54% of these vessels were constructed with
DH configuration. The rest were built mainly as either SH or
The method provides a useful tool that can be used to assist
DS-SB hulls.
future FPSO projects in selecting a new-build hull
configuration based on a rational approach and sound
2 M. WANG, P. MCNEELY, C. SERRATELLA
FPSOs By Hull Type
Representing 73% of FPSOs - other 27% data unavailable
D S -S B
7%
DH
27%
Ref. - OPL, Infield Data, Deepstar, ABS Data
DH: Double Hull, DS-SB: Double-Side Single-Bottom
SH: Single Hull, SS-DB: Single-Side Double-Bottom
Figure 1: FPSO by Hull Type (conversion and new-builds)
SS-DB configuration has been a least popular configuration
(rarely used). So far no use of SS-DB configuration has been
reported for a ship-shaped new-build FSPO or FSO. Hence,
this configuration will be excluded in the discussion in the rest
of this paper.
Compared to the DH and DS-SB configurations, SH vessels
are easier to construct and may be cheaper to build. However,
the risk of oil outflow after a collision or grounding is much
higher due to the lower collision energies required to penetrate
the single skin. In addition, from an operability standpoint,
temperature of the produced crude in a SH FPSO can drop
more quickly due to the SH’s poor thermal barrier with the
sea, which may lead to low efficiency of cargo pumping if the
crude wax level is moderate and/or high. Because safety and
environment protection have attracted more and more
attention, SH configuration has become less and less popular
as a candidate hull configuration for new-build FPSOs.
Therefore, we will mainly consider DH and DS-SB as the
major candidate hull configurations for new-build ship-shaped
FPSOs in this paper.
A step-by-step approach has been developed for selection of
hull configuration and has been successfully applied to a
recent new-build FPSO project in the South-East Asia. This
method is generally described in the Methodology section.
The detailed considerations for each step are discussed in the
section that follows.
Factors Affecting Hull Configuration Selection
Decision Making
Many factors can affect the decision on selection of a FPSO
hull configuration. Different factors may be identified for each
individual FPSO project. As a general guideline, these factors
should, as a minimum, cover the following areas:
OTC 13997
• Regulatory Requirements: This includes International
regulations, such as IMO; Coastal state regulations, and
Classification society requirements (rules). If the FPSO is
flagged, the flag state requirements/regulations must also
S S -D B
be met.
1%
• Functional and Operational Needs: Includes the
requirements for vessel motions and green water impact;
vessel storage capacity, ballasting operations,
characteristics of the cargo to be produced; method of
loading and offloading/transportation of the cargo from
the FPSO; hydrostatic stability; heel and trim, etc. In
SH addition owners company policy(s) and preference
65% towards hull configuration should also be
fully considered.
• Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair: Includes
convenience and cost of tank cleaning/washing and
stripping, tank ventilation, repair, and inspection; etc.
These topics are also associated with safety of personnel
and the vessel, as stated below.
• Loss of Asset and Safety Issues: Covers many areas, such
as the possibility of collision with the other vessels,
grounding due to mooring failure, the possibility of
explosion from inadvertent operations, safety concerns for
inspection and repair personnel in ballast tanks, especially
the double bottom tanks.
• Constructability and Associated Cost: In addition to
consideration of the structure itself, past experience and
construction practice of the shipyard selected or
potentially to be selected for the selected hull
configuration should also be considered.
As discussed below, DH or DS-SB hull can be considered as a
better choice based one factor, but it may be a poorer
configuration if another factor is considered. For example,
• The cargo tanks of a DH FPSO are easier to clean due to
their smooth surface, but its double bottom structures are
difficult to be cleaned, inspected and maintained and more
prone to experience cracks and accelerated corrosion that
can cause oil to leak into the double bottom forming a
potentially explosive atmosphere.
• DS-SB hull is easier to be maintained and inspected and
does not have potential problems that the double bottom
of a DH may have. It can also provide better hydrostatic
stability. However, it may need the potentially higher cost
of on-site bottom repair that usually requires wet welding
or cofferdam techniques.
The above feature of the crossed influence of the factors makes
a decision based on qualitative analysis of the effect of each
factor very difficult. Such decision, if made, is also difficult to
justify. To make the hull configuration selection a rational
process, a number of key factors are identified and grouped
into three categories as follows. It should be noted that the
factors are not listed in their order of importance within each
category. These factors and the way they are grouped lay a
basis for the rational method presented in this paper.
OTC 13997 A RATIONAL APPROACH TO FPSO HULL CONFIGURATION SELECTION
Category 1: Decisive Factors
These factors are decisive because they may dictate the
decision on configuration selection regardless of risk
tradeoffs or cost benefits determined through comparisons or
risk assessment.
A. A DH configuration should be used if:
• The FPSO sometimes in its operation life must be
considered as a sailing vessel. An example in this
kind is those FPSOs that are equipped with a dis-
connectable mooring/riser system, that may
disconnect with Cargo aboard. FPSOs with such
functions should meet the IMO (MARPOL) hull
configuration requirements for tankers.
• The quantified threat to bottom collision or grounding
is quantified as a valid possibility; Bona fide
examples of this kind are those FPSOs that are
operated in a heavy ice region. Petro-Canada’s Terra
Nova FPSO in Eastern offshore Canada and Texaco’s
QHD32 FPSO in Bohai Bay of China are two
examples that adopt DH configuration.
B. A DH should be used if any applicable international,
coastal state, flag state, classification requirements for DH
cannot be waived.
C. The configuration (DH or DS-SB) must be used if only
that configuration can meet the functional requirements
and/or the requirements defined by IMO, coastal state
regulations, and classification society with which the
vessel is to be classed. Two of examples in this type are
the vessel stability requirements and the motion and green
water tolerance for the FPSO in question:
(i) Hydrostatic Stability: Both intact and damage
stability of any FPSOs must meet the regulatory
requirements, such as those defined in references [1]
through [4], the classification society rules to which
the vessel is classed, and the regulations of the
coastal state. Compared to DS-SB configuration, the
double bottom of a DH vessel has the following
negative effect on vessel’s intact stability [5]:
• Because double bottom is underneath the cargo
tanks and covers the entire cargo block, the
center of gravity of crude oil in cargo tanks is
raised by approximately the height of the double
bottom, which can lift overall center of gravity.
• Due to nature of the FPSO’s continuous loading
and offloading operations, there are always some
ballast tanks and/or cargo tanks partially filled to
meet the trim and heel control and other
operational requirements. Such partial fill
condition in double bottom spaces creates more
“free surfaces” which can significantly reduce
vessel’s intact stability.
Therefore, the DS-SB configuration can better meet
the stability requirement, and usually have a larger
3
margin of stability. A DH FPSO may have no
problem to meet the requirements but without such a
comfortable margin. For such vessels, a carefully
planned loading/offloading and ballasting and
deballasting plan must be strictly followed. To some
extent, flexibility of operations may have to
be sacrificed.
(ii) Motion Requirements: These requirements are
usually dictated by the design parameters and/or
requirements of topsides equipment and/or
operational requirements. Basically both
configurations, if appropriately designed, can meet
these requirements. It is somehow easier to adjust the
roll natural period of a DS-SB hull due to the easiness
of adjusting width of wing tanks. For the ballast
conditions and the intermediate loading conditions,
wider wing (ballast) tanks can help increase roll
moment of inertial because of greater load in the
wing tanks. This can increase roll natural period
somewhat above or near to the upper bond of wave
period ranges to avoid resonance for these loading
conditions. Because a FPSO is usually in its
intermediate loading condition for majority of
operation time, such nature of a DS-SB may be
favorable to design of a motion friendly vessel. Due
to the existence of double bottom, a DH is less
flexible in terms of variation in adjustment of
mass distribution.
Green Water Tolerance: This has become an
important issue to consider for almost all FPSOs. The
requirements are usually defined by deck layout,
equipment arrangement, and operation safety, etc.
Compared to other factors (outside hull form, vessel
motions, bow form, etc), hull inner configuration
usually has less impact of occurrence of green water.
However, for a given vessel size, DH configuration
may be somewhat helpful to reduce green water
occurrence due to the fact that the freeboard of DH
can be larger than a DS-SB hull with the same size.
Category 2: Factors whose influence on Project Expenditure
can be directly calculated.
Factors listed in this category are those whose impact can be
directly and relative easily estimated in terms of capital value.
The potential cost due to the risks to life and/or health,
associated with the factors listed under this category, is not
included in the cost calculation in this category but is
accounted in Factor K of Category 3.
D. Construction Cost, Including Material, Equipment,
Coating, and Labor Costs. Special attention should be
paid to the cost increase due to the requirements of
additional equipment because of the existence of double
bottom. Examples in this category include the ballasting
4 M. WANG, P. MCNEELY, C. SERRATELLA
and cleaning pumps, piping systems, ventilation
equipment and piping system, etc.
The difference in cost for DS-SB and DH configurations
varies from shipyard to shipyard, depending on past
experience and set-up of the shipyard. The authors have
not found statistical comparison of construction costs
directly for DH and DS-SB hulls. However, references [6]
and internal research indicates that construction of a DH
tanker can be 10% to 20% more expensive than a same
size SH tanker. Reference [5] gives some more detailed
comparison of construction cost between DH and SH
tankers. The difference in cost varies from 9.9% to 17%
for various taker sizes. For the Aframax, Suezmax, and
VLCC tankers, DH configuration can increase the
construction cost by 16.7%, 17%, and 15%, respectively.
Because the difference between DH and DS-SB is less
than the difference between DH and SH, the difference in
construction cost of DH and DS-SB hulls should also be
less. A simple survey of the shipyards in the Far East
indicates the cost difference may fall in about 5%. Most
shipyards have experience in design and construction of
both configurations but slightly prefer DS-SB.
E. Costs Associated with Crude Oil Washing, Tank
Cleaning, and Tank Stripping. In general, such operations
for a DH are easier than those for a DS-SB hull.
Although there is no data that shows significant cost
increase for a DS-SH hull, care should be taken in the
design of the Tank Cleaning system to assure it will
adequately clean the tank to minimize or eliminate the
need for manual demucking. There may be a slight
increase in the cost to increase the number and efficiency
of he tank-cleaning guns. Modification to the hull bottom
for a sump to improve the tank stripping operation is
recommended for both the DH and DS-SB hulls. .
Compared to a DH vessel, a DS-SB vessel has more
shadow areas, more exposed surfaces, and more
obstructions at its single bottom. Washing and stripping
the smooth surface of the cargo tanks of a DH vessel are
obviously easier. Cost affected by these factors covering
both CAPEX and OPEX may vary from vessel to vessel.
So far no comparable statistics have been found.
Designers should estimate the cost for the two
configurations based on cost of equipment, frequency of
such operations, and manpower required for the vessel to
be designed.
F. Ballasting, Loading and Offloading Operations Cost,
Including equipment Cost and the Operation Cost.
Compared to a DS-SB hull, the double bottom spaces of a
DH vessel require more pumps and associated piping
systems. The ballasting operation for DH vessels is also
somewhat more costly although it may provide a bit more
flexibility in trim and heel control. The actual difference
in cost of ballast system and operations depends on actual
OTC 13997
number of ballast tanks and need to ballast the bottom
spaces, tank layout, piping arrangement, ballast plan, etc.
If the costs of the loading and offloading operations for
the two candidate configurations are also significantly
different, these costs must also be taken into account in
the cost comparison.
G. Maintenance, On-site Repair and Structural Inspection.
For tankers, DH configuration generally costs more on
these factors than the DS-SB configuration. Compared to
DS-SB hull, the DH can increase the number of structural
connections by about 10% to 15%. The connections
between stiffeners and transverse floors can be prone to
cracking and thus require more attention (inspection,
maintenance, and/or even repair). The inner hull knuckles
may have similar problems. The double bottom requires
increase of exposed steel surfaces in the double bottom
ballast tanks, which significantly increases coating area.
The current coating technology can ensure quality of
coating for only about 10 years. For a FPSO to be
operated for 20 to 30 years without dry-docking,
inspection, maintenance and repair of the coating of the
double bottom surface are really a heavy and costly task.
On the other hand, the double bottom also brings some
benefits to maintenance and repair, especially when
considering hot work at the cargo tank bottom. For
instance, the smooth upper surface provided by the double
bottom reduces steel surface area exposed to the lower
layer of cargo liquid, which reduces the corrosion area on
inner surface of the cargo tank bottom and eases the
associated inspection and maintenance. In case some
repair work is required on the cargo tank bottom or the
near areas, the work can be relatively easily done as long
as the contaminates in the double bottom and other
adjacent tanks are removed and the tanks are ventilated.
However, if a similar repair work is needed at the cargo
tank bottom of a DS-SB hull, high cost wet welding
techniques or cofferdams need to be applied, which
increases not only the cost but also the difficulties in
adequately performing the repairs and may negatively
affect production. The cost due to such difficulties and
associated risks is accounted in Factor K.
Another item associated with the inspection and
maintenance costs is the ventilation of the double bottom
space of DH vessels. In the case of oil leakage, the double
bottom spaces may contain some pockets of flammable
gases that can cause fires and/or explosions. Even without
oil leakage, the double bottom space may contain some
pockets lacking of oxygen and/or H2S rich environments
due to decaying marine life in the moist environment.
Adequate ventilation must be provided to all the double
bottom spaces before inspection, maintenance, or repair
work can be done in the areas. In contrast, DS-SB vessel
and SH vessel do not require that because they do not
OTC 13997 A RATIONAL APPROACH TO FPSO HULL CONFIGURATION SELECTION
have a double bottom space. However care must still be
maintained in inspecting these spaces as pockets, which
are oxygen depleted, can still exist when moving between
spaces and bulkheads. The direct cost associated with the
inspection, maintenance and repair operations is
accounted here but the potential cost due to the risks of
potential explosion and/or fire is accounted in Factors J
and K for the potential asset loss and health and safety
risks, respectively.
The difference in cost of maintenance and repair between
SH and DH tankers is significant. Reference [6] shows
that cost for DH tankers can be 10% to 20% higher than
SH tankers. Reference [5] indicates that it is 11% for
VLCC class and 28% for Suezmax class. Because no
comparison of cost has been reported for DS-SB and DH
FPSOs, the above information may be used as a reference
for estimation of such costs.
Category 3: Potential Asset Loss, Health, Safety and
Environment Related Factors
The factors grouped within this category also strongly affect
decision for hull configuration selection but the associated cost
cannot be estimated in the same way as that applied to the pure
expenditure related factors listed in Category 2. The cost
impact of these factors is associated not only with the
consequence of the events but also the probability of
occurrence of such events as well. As shown later, cost due to
these factors can be estimated using a risk analysis approach.
H. Asset Loss and/or Oil Leakage or Spill due to Bottom
Damage: Factor A covers the cases in which the
possibility of grounding or other causes of bottom damage
is high. For such cases, a DH configuration is a natural
and logical choice. However, in most cases the probability
of occurrence of grounding or bottom collision is not
high, or even very low. Judgment of the effect of this
factor should be made based on risk analysis results. In
general, consequence of grounding for a DS-SB hull is
more severe than that for a DH vessel because the
double bottom structure provides more resistance to
bottom damage.
There are many factors affecting the possibility of
grounding, raking and the ensuing bottom damage. Major
factors include the reliability of the vessel's mooring
systems, metocean conditions and the nature of prevailing
winds following a potential mooring damaging event, the
associated amount of surrounding land mass density and
structures within proximity to the site; marine traffic,
especially the traffic posing a threat to the integrity of the
mooring system and/or its station keeping capability;
dropped objects that may damage or weaken mooring
systems, etc. All these should be considered in the
relevant risk analysis.
5
I. Asset Loss and Oil Leakage or Spill due to Side Collision
Damage: Collision energies necessary to cause hull
penetration and cargo tank breach vary between hull
configurations. Various sources have shown that a typical
SH vessel can be penetrated with an energy of
approximately 15 MJ. On the other hand, a typical DH
wing tank of 2m in width would require approximately
170 MJ to penetrate the longitudinal bulkhead storing the
oil (approximately 205 MJ for a 2.5m wing tank width).
Various vessels can produce such energies based on their
mass and typical speeds while maneuvering near the
FPSO or when errant and underway. Because both DH
and DS-SB configurations have double side structures, the
comparison of advantages of these two configurations
requires consideration of tank layout and structural
design. For a given size FPSO, the DS-SB hull can have
wider wing tanks that can considerably increase the
energies required to penetrate its longitudinal bulkhead,
which can significantly reduce the probability of oil
leakage and/or spill. An extreme example is a recently
designed DS-SB FPSO hull that has wing tank width
wider than the MARPOL required limit side collision
damage assumption of 11.5m. In theory, the energies
required to penetrate the longitudinal bulkhead are so high
that the penetration is hardly to occur in reality. However,
such increase in wing tank width may negatively impact
vessel damage stability [7], i.e., it may increase maximum
heel and in the case of a side collision damage occurred.
Therefore, these two effects must be both taken into
consideration in the design phase to optimize the wing
tank dimensions as part of hull configuration selection.
J. Cargo Tank Bottom Cracks and/or Corrosion and
Associated Problems. As discussed above under Factor G,
the cargo tank bottom of a DH configuration can be prone
to cracks. The main cause to the cracks is structural
fatigue. DH configuration tends to have a structure, which
is stiffer than a DS-SB hull configuration, which may
result in higher residual stresses induced during
fabrication and the local stresses due to the loads
in operations [7].
Compared to the bottom of a DS-SB hull, the cargo tank
bottom of DH configuration can also be more prone to
corrosion, for same level coating quality maintenance.
The main factors contributed to this include:
• The increase in the steel surface area exposed to
corrosive liquid due to the existence of the double
bottom space can result in more extensive corrosion
problems [8],
• Higher temperature of crude oil loaded in cargo tanks
due to the insulating effect of double bottom
(thermos-bottle effect), coupled with the residual
water in cargo tanks, can offer very favorable
conditions for anaerobic bacteria to proliferate and
activate accelerated surface corrosion [9][10],
6 M. WANG, P. MCNEELY, C. SERRATELLA OTC 13997

A potential result of structural cracks at the cargo tank analysis together with application of risk analysis to perform
bottom of a DH vessel is crude oil leakage into the double similar cost benefit analysis for HSE related risks. The basic
bottom spaces, which may lead to fire and/or explosions premise is as follows:
given an ignition source. Factor G accounts for only the • The requirements associated with factors in Category 1
cost of ventilation operations. The potential cost due to (Factors A and B) together with the functional
the fire and/or explosion can be estimated here as a requirements and regulatory requirements are considered
consequence of the cargo tank bottom cracks. This impact as mandatory (Factor C). For instance, if a FPSO is
can be factored into a risk assessment, as described later functionally required to have a dis-connectable
in this paper. The potential threat to personnel who mooring/riser system, a DH configuration should be used
conduct inspection, maintenance, and repair in double because once it is dis-connected it is considered as a
bottom spaces is considered in Factor K. vessel, not a platform.
• The effects of all factors in Category 2 can be reasonably
K. Risks to the operation, inspection, maintenance, and estimated either based on design information or past
repair personnel. These include the following factors: experience of the operating company.
• Access to the cargo and ballast tanks, as discussed in • Use of risk analysis techniques to estimate effects of the
Factor G. In general, access to the double bottom factors in Category 3.
spaces of a DH FPSO is an additional effort and risk,
compared to a same sized DS-SB hull. Slips, trips, This step-by-step manner approach can be described in the
and falls may cause dangers to the inspection, flow chart given in Figure 2.
maintenance, and repair personnel.
• The threat to health and safety of the personnel doing
Inspection, maintenance, and repair in double bottom Step 1: Does the yes
spaces. This should be considered even the double FPSO have factors DH
bottom is fully cleaned and ventilated. falling in Category 1 configuration
• Operations of tank cleaning associated with Factor E.
In case significant mud deposits in cargo tanks,
manual cleaning of those cargo tanks for a DS-SB No
hull may be required, which can also pose some risks
to health and safety of personnel who carry out Step 2: Identify other Yes
such tasks. factors and categorize
• The additional difficulties in hot work to repair them
bottom of a DS-SB hull can also pose certain level of
risk to the personnel on duty. Refer to Factor G for
the risk associated with this item. Step 6:
• The possibility for piracy and sabotage associated Step 3: Step 4: Does the
with the risks described in Factors H and I. Calculate Calculate DS-SB
total cost the total cost more?
It should be noted that the above listed factors are for generic of all the risk cost of
FPSOs. Each project may have some particular factors to be factors in all the
considered. These special factors may come from particular Category 2 factors in
production requirements (special feature of crude oil, gas, or for DS-SB Category 3 No
other products), special features of field metocean conditions, and DH for DS-SB
output and offload/transportation of cargo, production process, & DH
etc. Designers should identify the factors based on the actual
situations within the field and its associated requirements. The
manner in which the factors are categorized and the factors DS-SB
themselves given in this section should be used as an outline Step 5: Sum up the total
cost in Steps 3 & 4 for configuration
of the types of issues which should be considered in such
decision. DS-SB & DH,
respectively
Methodology
As shown above, there are so many factors that affect Figure 2. Hull Configuration Selection Approach
selection of hull configuration, some easily quantifiable, some
not. To accommodate all of these, a hybrid approach is
developed for the decision-making. This approach is a
combination of qualitative and quantitative cost benefit
OTC 13997 A RATIONAL APPROACH TO FPSO HULL CONFIGURATION SELECTION
Some details of each step given in the flow chart for the
approach are described below.
Step 1: Although IMO and many countries have required DH
configuration for tankers, no existing international regulation
strictly requires DH configuration for conventional FPSO that
is permanently moored at the site. However, if the FPSO is
judged as a “sailing vessel” the DH requirements may be
applicable. Definition of “sailing vessel” is not so clear and
frequently attracts some interesting debates. In the first case
(the first bullet) of Factor A, DH requirement is usually
applicable. In addition, some states may place such
requirements for FPSO in the near future. The MMS has been
working on such issues. Waiver of DH requirements from rule
requirements of some classification societies may require
some kind of applications. Designers should take necessary
actions based on the actual situation of the project.
Step 2: In identification of factors, the frame laid out in the
“Factors Affecting Hull Configuration Selection Decision
Making” section can be used. Caution should be paid to
completeness of all the major factors and avoiding duplicated
account of effects of the factors. In some cases, many factors
are involved in one issue. Each of these factors addresses a
different aspect of the issue. Let’s take the maintenance of
double bottom as an example. The cost of the maintenance
itself (e.g., material, ventilation, labor, etc.) should be
calculated in Factor G, but the cost associated with the
potential personnel risks associated with the maintenance is
calculated in Factor K. The risk due to the potential explosion
or fire in double bottom space may also be related to the
maintenance, but it should be calculated in Factor J. Basically,
calculation of the effects of each factor should not have
overlap in terms of cost. This principle is applicable to all the
factors listed in Categories 2 and 3.
Step 3: Calculation of costs associated with the factors listed
in Category 2 is somewhat straightforward. The cost should
cover both CAPEX and OPEX for each factor, i.e., cost of
equipment, structures, construction, labors, etc. that are
invested during the life of the FPSO and the cost of operations
associated with these factors. A subtle part of such cost is the
costs due to interruption or reduction of FPSO production that
is a direct result of the operations associated with these
factors. For instance, if the maintenance and repair for a DS-
SB hull requires reducing production by 20% of normal
production rate for 2 days annually. An additional annual cost
for this DS-SB of 0.4 times daily production value should be
included in the total cost of the SB-DS configuration.
Calculation of cost in this category should be based on the
design data, existing date bases, past design and/or operational
experience. The information provided in the last section may
also be used as reference.
Step 4: This step is to calculate the costs associated with the
factors grouped in Category 3. A feature of these costs is their
7
association with probability of occurrence of assumed events.
Different from the calculation of costs in step 3, risk analysis
method should be used in calculation of costs in this step. A
brief description of such risk analysis methodology is given in
Appendix A.
Step 5: After completing the cost calculation for each of the
individual factors in Categories 2 and 3, the costs for each hull
configuration (DH and DS-SB) should be summed to get the
total cost for all the factors considered.
Step 6: Comparison of the costs and decision-making. The
approach developed in this paper is a cost based decision
making approach, which accounts for both CAPEX and OPEX
and covers both certain and potential costs. In theory, the
configuration that costs less should be the one to be selected.
A difficult situation is when the costs for the two
configurations are very close to each other. If this happens,
consultation with project operation team should be made to
consider preference of operation team. Other factors should
also be considered such as proximity of the site to
environmentally sensitive areas or political risk associated
with an oil spill. The owner and/or operator’s past practice
should also be taken into consideration in dealing with such
situations, including the crew and associated parties’
familiarity with a hull configuration (particularly for
operation, inspection, maintenance, repair), and effect of
the human element on probabilities of an accident
during operations.
Hull Configurations of the Existing and the near
Future FPSOs and Relevant Experience
As mentioned in the introduction, all of the three hull
configurations, SH, DH, and DS-SB, has been used as FPSOs.
Some information on hull configurations used in past or
considered for the near future is summarized here to provide
some useful reference for the reader.
Table 1 shows the number of each configuration of part of the
new build FPSO/FSO fleet in operation, based on the Aker’s
date base (published once a year in Offshore magazine) that
covers a total of 24 FPSOs/FSOs. The data is based on early
2000 figures. Authors acknowledge that this is a small and
incomplete date base and will keep expand it. The difficulty in
including all the FPSOs/FSOs is that many date bases do not
specify hull inner configuration.
Table 1 indicates that as of early 2000;
• SH is the least popular choice.
• DH configuration is still dominant
• DS-SB is an important choice of hull configuration.
Table 1 also shows that location where a FPSO is permanently
moored has significant influence on hull configuration
selection. The data indicates that areas of heavy marine traffic
8 M. WANG, P. MCNEELY, C. SERRATELLA OTC 13997

would tend to suggest that a DS-SB FPSO is a prudent choice. Since year 2000, there have been at least 11 FPSOs with their
In areas where both mooring failure and side collision hull configuration confirmed. The hull configuration and
problems were prevalent, the use of the DH configuration associated information on these FPSOs are given in Table 2. A
would seem logical. It should also be noted that these areas are comparison of the information given in Tables 1 and 2
featured with harsh weather, which may be the strongest may reveal some information on the trend of hull
reason for the use of the DH configuration rather than any configuration choice.
other non-natural hazards.
It can be seen from Table 2 that DS-SB hull becomes a
New-build FPSOs/FSOs World Wide (up to early 2000) dominant hull configuration in these new-build FPSOs/FSOs.
Total SH DH DS-SB However, it should also be noted that all these vessels, except
No. Of FPSOs/FSOs 24 2 13 9 for the Terra Nova FPSO, are to be moored in benign
Percentage of total 100% 8.3% 54.2% 37.5% environmental conditions. Because of limitation to access
New-build FPSOs/FSOs North Sea and Canada latest information, this is not a complete list of the new-build
No. of FPSOs/FSOs 14 0 11 3 FPSOs/FSOs. There are several FPSOs under design, which
may change the ratio of the number of DH over DS-SB
Percentage of total 100% 0% 78.6% 21.4%
FPSOs, but doubt it will change the general trend. A safe
New-build FPSOs/FSOs in the Rest of the Areas
conclusion can be that both DH and SB-DS configurations
No. of FPSOs/FSOs 10 2 2 6
have been widely adopted in new-build FPSOs.
Percentage of total 100% 20% 20% 60%
An interesting common feature for the QHD32 FPSO and the
Table 1 Statistics of Hull Configuration of New-build Terra Nova FPSO is that both are equipped dis-connectable
FPSOs mooring system and both subject to ice environment during
winter times. This is very the conditions considered favorable
Statutory regulation is another factor whose influence is also to a DH configuration when considering Factor A above.
obvious. When looking at the heavily regulated areas of the
world (North Sea and Canada), overwhelming majorities of References
the FPSOs/FSOs are DH or at least DS-SB hulled. In areas
where local regulations tend to be less severe or non-existent, 1. IMO, Code on Intact Stability for all Types of Ships
use of the DS-SB configuration prevails. Coincidentally but Covered by IMO Instrument, IMO Resolution A. 749(18),
also logically, the areas with harsh weather are those where London, November 1993.
the local regulations are more complete and more severe. 2. IMO, MARPOL 73/78, Consolidated Edition, 1997.
3. Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
In general, the worldwide fleet appears more likely to utilize International Convention on Load Lines, 1966.
the DH configuration when required by regulation and in 4. IMO, Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile
harsh weather environments. Of course, the other factors that Offshore Drilling Units, 1989.
are described in this paper must also influence the decision of 5. Committee on Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Double-Hull
hull configuration selection. Tanker Legislation, an Assessment of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
Hull Configuration of the FPSO after 2000 1998.
Project Owner or Vessel Hull 6. Shashikumar, N., “Ownership and Operation of Oil
Operator Type Location Config. Tankers in the Post-OPA 90 – An Analysis of Costs,
Sahna Chevron FPSO Angola DS-SB Profits and Complication”, A Sunny Report (found in
Girasoll Elf FPSO Angola DS-SB www.rigos.com/sunny1.html), 1996.
Amenam Elf FSO Angola DS-SB 7. National Research Council, “Effect of Double-Hull
Erha Exxon FPSO Nigeria DS-SB Requirements on Oil Spill Prevention”, National
Kizomba Exxon FPSO Angola DS-SB Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996, pp36-37.
Bonga Shell FPSO Nigeria DS-SB 8. Pendexter, L.A. and Diettrich, Diana, “Design
EA Shell FPSO Nigeria DS-SB Considerations for Corrosion Control of Double Hull
Belanak Conoco FPSO Indonesia DS-SB Tankers”, NACE Corrosion93, paper No. 550, 1993.
Agbami Texaco FPSO Nigeria DS-SB 9. OCIMF, “Factors Influencing Accelerated Corrosion of
Cargo Oil Tanks, September, 1997.
QHD32 Texaco FPSO China DH
10. ABS, “Microbial Generated Corrosion of Tank Plating in
Terra Petro- FPSO Canada DH
Crude Oil Carriers”, ABS Safenet Advisory Oct. 1997,
Nova Canada
http://www.abs-ns.com/news/letters/snaoct97.htm.
Table 2 Hull Configuration of the New-build FPSOs after
year 2000
OTC 13997 A RATIONAL APPROACH TO FPSO HULL CONFIGURATION SELECTION
11. ABS, “Risk Assessment of FPSO Structural Design – A
Review”, March 2001, ABS R&D Dept. Technical Report
RD2001-04
12. ABS, “Comparative Oil Outflow Analysis Between
Conventional Single Hull Tank Vessel Based FPSO,
Using Centerline Tanks Only for Crude Storage, and Full
Double Hulled Vessel”, ABS Marine Services Report
prepared for Conoco Inc., 21 May 1997, Report
#M51203J4-01
13. Guidance Manual for Tanker Structures, Tanker Structure
Co-operative Forum, Witherby &Co. Ltd., 1997
14. William S. Peters, C.R. Cushing & Co. Inc., “Damage
Stability of Double Hull Tankers and Alternatives”,
SNAME Paper 1991
15. National Research Council, Tanker Spills – Prevention By
Design, 1991
16. Herbert Engineering Corp., “Probabilistic Determination
of Oil Outflow from Double Hull Tankers”, SNAME
Paper 14 January 1992.
17. “Cargo Tank Corrosion Awareness Guide”, Intertanko,
April 2000
Appendix A: Application of Hull Configuration
Risk Assessment Method
This appendix outlines the technical approach, which can be
employed in conducting a Hull Configuration Comparative Risk
Assessment Study. This type of study has essentially two main
components:
The first part of the study covers the performance of a
Comparative Risk Assessment on the hull configuration options
to be considered (SH, DS-SB and DH). The purpose of this
aspect of the study is to:
• Identify all major health and safety, environmental, and
financial risk contributors (Category 3 Factors) associated
with each particular hull configuration via the identification
of risk scenarios.
• Compare relative risk between hull configurations for each
of those risk scenarios identified.
• Compare the risks for each hull configuration associated
with health and safety via a risk indexing methodology
• Quantify the environmental and financial risks associated
with each hull configuration in terms of a cost per year.
The second part of the study involves the comparison of the
differences in CAPEX and OPEX associated with each hull
configuration option with the quantified “risk cost” for each
configuration (Category 3 Factors). The purpose of this aspect
of the study is to assist in determining the complete “cost”
associated with a particular selection (CAPEX + OPEX + RISK
COSTS). Through this method, the Category 3 HSE risk costs
associated with each hull configuration can be compared with the
increase in CAPEX and OPEX for each of the hull
configurations.
9
Study Methodology
The study methodology employs a classical team-based,
qualitative risk ranking process in which subject matter experts
in FPSO development, design, operations, maintenance, and
inspection are utilized in a facilitated workshop format to
identify and rank various identified hazard scenarios using an
agreed upon risk matrix. The following risk categories
are evaluated:
• Health and Safety (includes accidents, slips, trips and falls)
• Environmental Damage
• Financial Loss (associated with downtime and
lost production)
Risks are evaluated and ranked for various key hazard scenarios
associated with hull configuration risk. A Scenario Comparison
Worksheet is then used to align, side-by-side, each scenario
definition, potential consequences, factors that should be
considered in assignment of likelihood, and existing
safeguards related to the individual hull configurations.
It is important to emphasize at this point that the full list of
scenarios should only be those hazard scenarios, which are
directly affected by the choice of a particular hull configuration.
For example, risk scenarios associated with process upsets on
topside facilities are not considered germane to the study. A
table of hazard scenarios is shown in Figure 3:
The expert team agrees on finalization of the hazard scenario
list and then qualitatively assesses the likelihood and
consequence of every scenario for each hull configuration.
Preparation of such a table as in Figure 3 enables the study to
progress fairly quickly.
Prior to the study, the team also collectively agrees on
preparation of the risk matrix and assigns a frequency per year
values to each likelihood category. Next, the team is provided
with research on the proposed FPSO site location covering local
information on spill mitigation and clean-up efforts and reviews
the production requirements at the site for costs associated with
lost production. The team then assigns consensus costs to the
environmental and financial consequence categories.
No attempt is generally made to equate costs to health and
safety risks in this study. However, to compare the relative
health and safety risks between the hull configurations, a
relative risk index is used. The risk index is a simply a
multiple of the frequency category times a consequence
category. The numeric frequencies are estimated using the
risk matrix descriptions and available incident data (e.g.,
collision frequency data, oil spill data, etc.) and are normalized
to allow the comparative likelihood for the site.
10 M. WANG, P. MCNEELY, C. SERRATELLA OTC 13997

Hull Form
Risk Scenarios

1 3 4 6 7 8
Explosive Cargo Tank
Collision Tank Access Corrosion Piracy/Sabotage
Mixture in Tanks Operations

2 5
Mooring Failure Cracking

2A 2B 3A 3B 3C 6A 6B 7A 7B
Grounding Infield Cargo Ballast/ Slips, Trips Cargo Ballast/ Overpressure Over Fill
Collision Tanks Voids & Falls Tanks Void Tank Tank

1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F
Passing Attendant/ Offloading Fishing Infield Helicopter
Vessel Supply Vessel Vessel Vessel

Figure 3: Hull Configuration Hazard Scenarios

The health and safety consequence index is representative of Risk Quantification:

the estimated impact injury to personnel (e.g., minor injury,
single fatality or multiple fatalities) will have on the operating
company. The health and safety-ranking index is based on
experience drawn upon from other qualitative studies
performed on offshore installations by ABS Consulting.
The estimated environmental and financial consequence cost
categories are based on historical data and engineering
judgement. For the environmental risks, clean up costs for the
area should be collected and used. This information is based
on a world wide weighed average for environmental clean up
costs as collected from data representing over 280 spills
worldwide as collected from sources such as MMS, USCG,
IOPC, GOLOB, etc. Spill cleanup costs can vary in the
range of $1000-$5000USD per barrel depending on the
geographic location.
The estimated financial risk costs are based on the sale price per
barrel less lift costs in conjunction with an average production
rate. This equates to a loss per day of down time.
The resulting aggregate and relative risks generated by the team
are then compared between the hull configurations.
It is important to discuss some of the key HSE risk drivers and
factors, which can influence their change from low to high risk
(i.e. sensitivity).
Health and safety risks are primarily driven by personnel injuries
associated with inadvertent operations resulting in explosions, or
injuries of the slips, trips, and falls type. In general, the
frequency and physical location and conditions where the
activities are taking place have an effect on likelihood and
consequence of these hazard scenarios (scenarios 3, 6, and 7).
Hence, activities in double bottoms tend to be ranked higher than
in other spaces.
For environmental risk, the primary scenarios influencing the
hull configuration differences are grounding and collision (1 and
2). For the grounding scenario, the DH will typically have a
lower likelihood of loss of containment as well as lower
consequences. This is because of the redundant shell plating and
voids/ballast tanks separating the outer bottom shell and cargo
tanks. The weight of such an event factoring into the decision of
hull configuration is dependant on the changes in estimated
consequences as well as likelihood at the site in question.
The collision scenarios also demonstrate the benefits of having a
large buffer between the outer side shell and cargo tanks. Marine
traffic and buffer width between cargo and sea can be factored
into how many of the potential colliding vessels which are likely
OTC 13997 A RATIONAL APPROACH TO FPSO HULL CONFIGURATION SELECTION 11

to be in the area (see scenario Table 3) can cause a collision of
sufficient energy to result in a cargo spill. Also factoring into
this ranking is the arrangement of the cargo in the wing tanks and
the probability of vessels being in a particular area near
the FPSO.
Grounding probability is estimated based on several factors and
accounts for prevailing winds at the site, proximity to land
masses and structures, etc. The estimates used in the risk study
account for prevailing winds following a storm event of
sufficient magnitude as to cause mooring failure as well as the
prevailing currents and winds and thus drift directions towards
nearby land masses and structures capable of causing bottom
damage. Likelihood of recovery is also factored into the
probability calculations.
Comparative Risk Assessment Conclusions:
Finally, Category 3 HSE risk costs for each hull configuration
are compared. The range of costs associated with each hull
configuration is then used by the team in comparing the relative
risk merits and benefits of each configuration. The comparative
information generated in this study can then be used in
conjunction with other information such as provided in the
Category 1 and 2 Factor categories, to assist in the decision
making process identified in the main section of this paper for a
logical selection of the FPSO hull configuration.

It should be pointed out that collision and grounding event risk

costs are driven by site-specific criteria and their effect on
likelihood. The grounding risk costs are driven by the cost
consequences. The likelihood may be very low, but the
consequences are very high and hence drive the risk costs
differentials. Hence, for very low grounding probabilities and
very low collision probabilities, the associated risk costs are also
low and the gaps between hull configurations not very wide.
Thus, for a particularly benign and low marine traffic site
location, the risk cost benefit of a more expensive double hull
(CAPEX plus NPV of OPEX) may not be justified when
comparing this hull vs. a cheaper alternative such as a SB-DH or
a SH configuration.

However, these conclusions can be changed by simply moving

the vessel to a different site with different characteristics
mentioned above. The risk cost models are exercised for various
factors such as:
• Changing spill clean-up costs;
• Increased large vessel marine traffic;
• Increased grounding hazards;
• Etc…
It can be shown that the risk cost differences begin to widen
between hull configurations when varying the above parameters
(i.e. likelihood or consequence changes and thus total risk
cost/savings per year) and the selection of a relatively more
expensive configuration which has better damage protection
becomes justified through cost-benefit.