Soriano v Laguardia

587 SCRA 79 (2009)

Velasco, Jr. J.:

FACTS:

In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of
the Iglesia ni Cristo and a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba.
Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively
suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.

Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson Consoliza Laguardia recuse
themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion followed by the filing for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order.

On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from the program Ang Dating
Daan.

ISSUES:

W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the
Constitution or the law. The authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the
possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and
grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable…” Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person
subject of the complaint.

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986
merely formalizes the power bestowed by said statute. The IRR provision on preventive suspension is
applicable not only to motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures. The MTRCB
would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner
RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia,
Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-complaint
against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition
of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to
answer the complaint and set the initial hearing.

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146
and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand
pesos.

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it.

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the
terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to
violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter
had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office
to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on
public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers.
Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no
alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
LLDA VS CA
MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839 - June 1, 1988

FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents,
however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private
respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their
unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
operators.” Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing
and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the
annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing
Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at
the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power
had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973.
They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite
the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:
Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a
step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in
Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the
Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators
for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless
drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction
under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed
purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority
given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally
necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too,
where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.