LACSON V. EXEC. SECRETARY justice.
Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng
gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies,
were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually
transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to
investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the
panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner,
charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner
was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the “principal accused” are government
officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank
of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under
said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A.
8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase
“principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to
all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof.
Issues: 
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced
for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the
Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post
facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of
the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office
of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial
Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7
of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the
party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the
following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is
not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is
not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must
be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of
the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement
that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that
the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge
of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
BUSTOS V. LUCERO
The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation
before the Justice of Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after
being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her
evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and
cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of
rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case
to the court of first instance.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI
praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of
peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with
their testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason the
present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. Petitioner
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule
108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary
to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is an infringement to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial legislation
that diminishes the right of the accused.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108,
like its predecessors is an adjective law and not a substantive law
or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is
the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Evidence — which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified
with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights
are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section
11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not
believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a
preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had
given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend
against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the
beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due
process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be
done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder
cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process
comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an
accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently
waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules
should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be
presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not
affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him
of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial
manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to
compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time
of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which
is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive
system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard
to their source.
PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
Santiago was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles/hour on
a highway 6-meter-wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to
pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the
road and a heap of stones on the other side where there were 2
young boys.
Santiago did not take the precaution required by the circumstances
by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with vigilant care that
under the circumstances, an ordinary prudent man would take in
order to avoid possible accidents that might occur.
Unfortunately, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo
who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence. (Sentenced to 1 year and 1-day imprisonment)
Santiago petitioned the decision alleging that he was prosecuted in
conformity with Act no. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature which is
unconstitutional for amending G.O.58 which it is not authorized to
amend for having a constitutional character.
o G.O. No. 58, Sec. 2  All prosecutions for public offenses
shall be in the name of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses.
o Act No. 2886, Sec. 2  All prosecutions for public offenses
shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands
against the persons charged with the offense
Issue: WON Act No. 2886 is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. General Order No. 58 has no constitutional character
but rather has statutory character. The power of the Philippine
Legislature to amend it is self-evident. It is empowered to legislate
matters relating to criminal procedure. The right to prosecute and
punish crimes is delegated to the Philippine Government by the
Federal Government. Philippine Legislature, which has enacted
Act No. 2886, is the legal successor to the Military Government as
a legislative body. Sentenced is affirmed
PEOPLE V. ROLUNA
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were
charged with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. They were
Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto
Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido
Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them
reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of
Baybay, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the
use of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and kidnap
one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place unknown up
(to) this time whereat said victim was killed.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted.
The other seven (7) accused remain at large. The prosecution
presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and
Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of
barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte. At the trial, accused Roluna
hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Accused Roluna charged
that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-
feelings against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the
disappearance of Anatalio Moronia.
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, finding
Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. According the the
court, As kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death and murder with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, under Article 48 of the
Code, the herein accused should be punished with the maximum
of the more serious crime, hereat the supreme penalty of death.
Considering that the Constitution of 1987 does not allow the
imposition of the death penalty, however, herein accused is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of
Anatalio Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with the
full period of his detention in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not sign an
agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and regulations at the
inception.
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses
that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He
submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio
Moronia was never found, Moronia's questionable and unexplained
absence and disappearance should not be blamed on him for the
alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
ISSUE:
(a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the prosecution
are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and;
(b) if in the affirmative, whether or not accused-appellants and his
companions could be held liable therefor.
RULING: Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or
substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact
that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a
particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged.
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was
last seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and
accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his
life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia
has been absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of
this case (or a total of six years), a presumption of death was
sufficiently raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would
not be enough to hold accused-appellant responsible for the death
of Moronia. At no point during the trial was it ever established that
any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a
violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not hear
any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused so as to
warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed by
accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the
possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for abducting
Moronia was not definitively established. To be sure, the
circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with
murder.

There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable

presumption under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive
death of Moronia.

Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the

Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention)
was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia
was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.

Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal

detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

PEOPLE V. QUIMZON

PEOPLE V. VIDAL
 and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
1972] PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. 

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court
judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as
a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion
by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag
and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine
Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or
Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.)
The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed
judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.  TRIAL COURT.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven
that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt
acts. 
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused
under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the
 

The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is

an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to
the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor
by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in
court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence.
Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized
by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation
of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9
declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of

1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without

the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination
to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be
measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be
present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) The statute
is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder
relatively is also an ex post facto law.) 

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an

organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not
only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same
purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct
not person. 

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be U.S. V. SWEET, 1 PHIL. 18 (1901)

shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who
of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is committed an offense against a prison of war. His case is filed with
the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for
is membership punished. Membership renders aid and which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was
party to its unlawful acts.  “acting in the line of duty.”

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 ISSUES:

prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given
an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute
applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made.  more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are
given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty
be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders
charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial
limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The
defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI
because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee
upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the penal code?

Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the
RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offense under the penal code, whether or
not the military character sustained by the person charged with the
offense at the time of its commission exempts him from the
ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of
the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was in line with service but
this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of
the case.”
Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed “An offense charged
against a military officer in consequence of an act done in
obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where
such offense is against the military law, is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.” ––Per
Cooper, J., concurring
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865
January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from
the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to
the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. T
he latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City
which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the
SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was
held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity
from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was
imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity.
Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA
that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding
effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process
not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
SCHENECKERBURGER VS. MORAN, 63 Phil. 249 (1943)
FACTS: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay
at Manila was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime
of falsification of a private document.
He objected to this saying that under the US and Philippine
Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him.
After his objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him.
Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively upon
the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction
over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al and such
jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.
No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic
immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for
violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935
caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and effect.
This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution
provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.”
2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines
“The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction
as may be possessed and exercised by them Supreme Court of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution.”
According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction
to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition
and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFI’s. As a result,
the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted
was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The
original jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution
was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
Judgment: CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
for a writ of prohibition must be denied. States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct

surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as

the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.

MIQUIBAS VS. COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 Phil. 267 (1948)

NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003)
FACTS
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against
Minucher following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine
police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of
his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a
Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
FACTS:
Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US
army in the Philippines who had been charged of disposing in the
Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the US army in violation
of the 94th article of War of the US. He was arrested and a
General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found guilty. As a
rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over
all offenses committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by
agreement, consent that the US shall exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed within said portions of territory.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offense has been committed within a US
base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case.
No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is
not within a US base for it is not names in Annex A or B of Article
XXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of
the temporary quarters located within presented limits of the city of
Manila. Moreover, extended installations and temporary quarters
are not considered to have the same jurisdictional capacity as
permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII paragraphs 2
and 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the beyond the
jurisdiction of military courts.
2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces
No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a
member of the US armed forces. Even under the articles of war,
the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the US
Army does not make him a member of the armed forces.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic

immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with

immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the

activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however,
can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

1. The official exchanges of communication between

agencies of the government of the two countries
2. Certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
3. Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the

latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
 within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of
their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned.

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of

UNITED STATES V. BULL, 15 PHIL. 7 (1910)
FACTS:
Accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila,
aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head
of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering.
the information does not charge him with failure to provide
"sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios
suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and
"conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we
determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of
the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and
that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."

Animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,

and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and
on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls,
and all without bedding

Neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for

securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly
wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901,
provides that —The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry
with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient
forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of
such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in
passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and
shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time
that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation.

Bull (Norwegian): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was

not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the
laws thereof so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this

character when the neglect and omission which constitutes the
offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial
waters of the United States

HELD: The defendant was found guilty.

YES.
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses
or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters
of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila
Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable.

Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to

prosecute or not.

If it choose to prosecute must be justified.

2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them

1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the
country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the
crew against another.
2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that
when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has
by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented
to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
UNITED STATES V. LOOK CHAW, 18 PHIL. 573 (1910)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law
FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came
from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports
of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the
inspection and search of the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of
the ship where the firemen habitually sleep

The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to The firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted
the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not
sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then be taken shore so it was returned
 guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary
2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium

Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in

Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in
Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been
searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen
to keep the sack.

The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced him to 5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency xxx It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
Insular Government.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine

imposed to six months and P1,000

GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,

aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, in general,
does NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country,
on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its
own nationality the same rule DOES NOT APPLY when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine
soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court established
in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Original sanction: 5 years imprisonment and 10, 000 fine, w/

additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though
not exceed 1/3 of principal penalty

Revised penalty: 6 months, 1,000 fine, affirming all the judgment

appealed from.

WONG CHENG, 46 PHIL. 729

G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel
was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores
of the city.

Lower court dismissed the case.

US VS AH SING, 36 PHIL 978 ISSUE:

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction
FACTS: waters

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign HELD:

vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8
cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in
his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were
found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by
authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of
Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the
opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,
however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say
that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.
ISSUE:
YES. The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law
French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the
Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines. territory

HELD: English rule

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any
person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this
person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances
are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory
they were committed.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or
otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find
nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed
belongs.
The mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of
this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in
our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO AND SARAW, 43 PHIL. 19
Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which
were on its way in the midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed
Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and
children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on
the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo,
attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the
women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, except the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women
were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in
the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of
piracy alleged in this case.
HELD:
Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a
villainy not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no
territorial limits.
PROSPECTIVE
PEOPLE VS. RINGOR, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)
FACTS:
The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen
entering People’s Restaurant.
A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where
the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the
latter’s throat.
After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun,
entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the
victim from behind and shot him six times successively.
The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his
possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp
Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder
and that the gun was not licensed.
Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful
aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery
and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate
charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of
17 to 20 years.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect
in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable
No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an
unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in
murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294
cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes
an ex post facto law.
2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.
Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for
the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. It is
simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a
separate offense.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be
applied if it is favorable to the accused.
3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder
No. For self-defense to prosper, unlawful aggression,
proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack of
sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case,
defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement
that the victim approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the
witness’ statement of the victim being in a prone position in the
table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of proof for
unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the last
two requisites have no basis.
4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder
which was not proven and that the alleged murder committed by
the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion
perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.
Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to
a crime of murder as described by art 248 of RPC, a lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed in according to
article 63(2) of RPC
In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
FACTS:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-
profit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it
violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression
and is an ex post facto law
ISSUES:
1. WON it violates three rights?
No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal
protection of laws.
2. Whether or not it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and
punishes act innocent when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when
committed
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon
less or different tests
e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was
lawful
Petition denied. Constitutional act.
Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law
imposed to acts committed after approval of law.
GUMABON VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under
Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code. Their offense was complexed
with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were
all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become
final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was
promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Hernandez Doctrine
simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion
because murder, a regular crime, is necessarily absorbed by
rebellion. Hence, without such complexion, the penalty must be
lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon asserted that a non-
application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection.
Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First
Instance but they were convicted for the very same rebellion for
which Hernandez and others were convicted – (The law under
which they [Gumabon et al] were convicted is the very same law
under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were convicted.) It had not
and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under
the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow Gumabon et
al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision
mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of
the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The
continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is
the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That
is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the
only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being
before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly
sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different
penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure
imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to equal protection,
people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest.
GUMABON VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
FACTS:
Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two
petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec.
5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with
reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have
been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez
which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed
down until after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery
was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such
complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than
the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he
is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal
judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON
judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must
be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC,
which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil
Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even
raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that
Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the
only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character
of a favorable decision.
PEOPLE v. PIMENTEL (supra)
[288 SCRA 542 (1998), G.R. No. 100210]
Ponente: Martinez, J.
Date: April 1, 1998
Topic/Subject Matter:
Article 22 ² Retroactivity, Effect of Repeal of Penal Laws
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as
amended before the RTC of Manila, and a warrant of arrest was
issued on July 29, 1983, but was not carried out due to his
disappearance. After seven years, on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan
was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion
case, and was likewise found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber
special revolver and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of
this, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866
before the RTC in Makati.
Contention of the People:
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD
No.1866 on the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of
being convicted for Subversion, based on Sections 3(H) and 7,
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore,
Tujan contends that common crimes such as illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition should be absorbed in subversion. The
present case is the twin prosecution of the earlier subversion case,
and therefore he is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
Contention of the State:
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second
timebecause: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the
subversion case, and (b) the previousoffense charged against him
is for Subversion, punishable under RA 1700, while the
presentcase is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion,punishable under PD 1866, a different
law.
Issue/s to be Solved:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double
jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under
RA1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as
amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of RA 7636 on
Sept. 22, 1992, totally repealing RA 1700, as amended, has
substantially changed the complexion of the present case,
inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable to the
accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect. With the enactment of RA 7636,
the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent
has no more legal basis, and should be dismissed. It would be
illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private
respondent for an offense that no longer exists. Subversion charge
against Tujan was dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same
accused is deemed amended. Accused was ordered to be
released immediately from detention, since he was already
detained for 7years, whereas the amended charge has a penalty
of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years
PEOPLE VS. PIMENTEL, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
FACTS:
1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant
of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught
with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking
protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v.
Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in
subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of
appeals.
ISSUE:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double
jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ratio:
No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of
Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction
or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case,
first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion
while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.
However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700,
and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer
charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue.
PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of
firearms without furtherance of subversion
Held:
RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed.
PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.