December 2010

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence; alibi. Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi. To establish alibi, the
accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime. In this case, accused Webb supported his alibi by presenting
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that he was in the U.S. at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, i.e., among others, his travel preparation to the U.S., details of his U.S.
sojourn, and several immigration records. The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb
was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from
March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned
before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from
the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and
into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992.  But this ruling practically
makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the
Philippines.  Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm. If one is cynical about the
Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange
for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October
27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same.  But this is pure speculation since there had been no
indication that such arrangement was made.  Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’
passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his
name on them?  How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates
in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the
U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there?  No one has come up with a
logical and plausible answer to these questions. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No. 176389/G.R.
No. 176864, December 14, 2010.

Evidence; alibi. The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of
departures and arrivals from airports.  They claim that it would not have been impossible for
Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit
the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. 
Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to
fourteen hours. If the Supreme Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might
as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or
speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence.  It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack.  They are not.  That presumption
can be overcome by evidence.  Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back.  The prosecution’s rebuttal
evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower court’s minds. Antonio Lejano vs.
People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No.
176389/G.R. No. 176864. December 14, 2010.
Evidence; conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all accused acted in
concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it was shown by such acts that they had
the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the records clearly prove that there was
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. The initial hacking by the accused followed by the
multiple stabbing by his co-accused proves that they acted in concert at the time of the brutal
killing. The fact that each one of them carried a deadly bladed weapon shows that they acted
pursuant to the singular purpose of killing the victim.  It is not important who delivered the fatal
blow.  In conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim.  The act of
one is the act of all. Each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. People of the
Philippines vs. Alex Lingasa, et al, G.R. No. 192187, December 15, 2010.

Evidence; corpus delicti in drug cases. To successfully prosecute an accused for selling and/or
possession of illegal drugs, the State has to prove as well the corpus delicti, the body of the crime.
It must be shown that the suspected substance the police officers seized from the accused is the
same thing presented in court during the trial.  Thus, the chain of custody rule is essential to
ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and
tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic
chemist, and finally to the court. The witnesses should be able to describe these movements to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and that no one who did not
belong in the chain had access to the same. People of the Philippines vs. Efren Ditona y
Montefalcon, et al, G.R. No. 189841, December 15, 2010.

Evidence; credibility of testimony. The Supreme Court ruled that Jessica Alfaro’s testimony as
eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying accused Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is not entitled to belief.
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies.  An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people
will help expose a lie.  And it has an abundant presence in this case.

First, in her (Alfaro’s) desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart,
who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that
Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him.  And twice, they
(including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. 
But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the
house. Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car,
which was parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next.  Some of these men sat on
top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone
who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house.  Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a
planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Second, Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and
his friends in a parking lot by a mall.  So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using
her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home.  More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro
to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends? They were practically strangers to her
and her boyfriend Estrada.  When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-
rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro.  Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a
police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an
“asset” then.  If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a
drug-free mind can?

Third, when Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight.   Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car.  And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s
boyfriend.  Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense
since she was on limited errand.  But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for
Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Fourth, according to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around
midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left
open.  Now, this is weird.  Webb was the gangleader who decided what they were going to do. 
He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her.   Why
would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play
in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house?  It made no sense.  It would
only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Fifth, Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, “Sino yan?”  On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went
to her car.  Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly.  Someone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house.  Alfaro walked away
because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation.  This was
supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business. But if that
were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? 
Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity.  So that is
what she next claimed.  She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the
floor of the master’s bedroom.  He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed.  Now, Alfaro testified that she got
scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave
her a meaningful look. Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk.  She did not speak to
them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend.  She entered her car and turned on the engine but she
testified that she did not know where to go.  This woman who a few minutes back led Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela,
was suddenly too shocked to know where to go!  This emotional pendulum swing indicates a
witness who was confused with her own lies.  Antonio Lejano vs. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No. 176389/G.R.
No. 176864, December 14, 2010.

Evidence; credibility of witness. Truth-telling witnesses are not expected to give flawless
testimonies, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.  The Court has
stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from
their essential credibility as long as their testimonies on the whole are coherent and intrinsically
believable.  Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not
been rehearsed. Instead, they may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any
suspicion that their testimonies have been fabricated or rehearsed. People of the Philippines vs.
Alex Lingasa, et al, G.R. No. 192187, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. Etched in Philippine jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim
of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of
every lurid detail of a frightening experience – a verity born out of human nature and experience. 
This is especially true with a rape victim who is required to utilize every fiber of her body and
mind to repel an attack from a stronger aggressor. It is only human for AAA to not be able to
readily narrate the exact details of her experience when questioned.  People of the Philippines vs.
Rene Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, December 15, 2010.

Evidence; credibility of witness. The Supreme Court has in the past observed that it would not
really be unusual for one to recollect a good number of things about an eventful incident but what
should be strange is when one can put to mind everything. This error cannot impair the credibility
of AAA especially since first, the imputed inconsistency or incredible testimony was later
explained and clarified by no less than the RTC itself, and second, the RTC, who was in the best
position to determine if AAA were indeed credible, believed her to be so. The Supreme Court
once again reiterate the time-honored maxim that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect.  People of the Philippines vs. Rene Celocelo, G.R. No.
173798, December 15, 2010.

Evidence; failure to present DNA evidence. Accused Webb filed a motion before the Supreme
Court asking his outright acquittal given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen
that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his
innocence. In his motion, Webb cited the case of Brady vs. Maryland, contending that he is
entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the
State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela. The Supreme Court ruled that Webb is not entitled to
acquittal solely for the reason that the State failed to produce the semen specimen at this late
stage of the proceedings.  For one thing, the ruling in Brady vs. Maryland that he cited has long
been overtaken by the decision in Arizona vs. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police.  Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For, another, when
Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did
not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence.  Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure
even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up.  Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the
trial court in rendering its decision in the case.  None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal.  This, even when
the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.  Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable
notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time. Antonio
Lejano vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al,
G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010.
Evidence; inadmissibility. Acting on a tip from a concerned citizen that a pot session was being
conducted in the house of one of the accused, the police officers raided the house and arrested the
accused herein. However, the Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt, one of the principal reasons being that the evidence against the accused
were inadmissible as they proceeded from an illegal warrantless arrest. The Supreme Court ruled
a warrantless arrest based solely on an informer’s tips is insufficient to support probable cause to
effect a warrantless arrest since the instant case did not involve a buy-bust operation or drugs in
transit. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the
identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. It has been held that personal knowledge of
facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts,
that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested.  The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof
is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. The
subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus
precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused. People of the Philippines vs.
Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.

Evidence; inconsistency of testimony with physical evidence. The Supreme Court did not give
much weight to the alleged inconsistency between the physical evidence and AAA’s version of
the rape incident.  The Supreme Court noted that Dr. Edaño was able to examine AAA only on
December 10, 2001, two days after the rape.  During cross-examination, Dr. Edaño explained that
the two old lacerations she found on AAA’s vagina could have happened several weeks or days
before the examination.  Hence, the old lacerations could still have been caused by and is not
irreconcilably inconsistent with the rape of AAA two days earlier.  As the Court of Appeals
observed, the improbabilities or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant refer to minor details
that do not directly pertain to the elements of the crime of rape or to the identification of accused-
appellant as the rapist; and do not detract from the proven fact that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with AAA through force, intimidation, and grave abuse of authority. People of the
Philippines vs. Andres Fontillas alias Anding, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010.

Evidence; use of evidence obtained through a search warrant in another. The Rules of Court
provides that “a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.” Thus, a
search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses.  Accordingly, petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the
search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident. Romer Sy Tan vs. Sy Tiongs, et al,
G.R. No. 174570, December 15, 2010.

Information, motion to quash. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy
were rendered incomplete after respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the trial
court believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid marriage,
i.e.,  the respondent presented proof that he later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the
first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage. According to the Court, the
motion to quash filed by respondent was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Information for which reason, thus the trial court cannot consider allegations contrary to those
appearing on the face of the information. The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed
that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such
judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent
contracted a subsequent marriage. These should not have been considered at all because matters
of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. Myrna P. Antone vs. Leo Beronillar, G.R. No.
183824, December 8, 2010.

Judgment; when rendered by judge other than the original trial court judge. Accused contends
further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard the
testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not
observe firsthand their demeanor during trial. The Supreme Court did not agree ruling that the
fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not
render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its
conclusion. The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who
heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory
perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and
that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as
questions from the Court carefully passed upon. Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to
decide the case. People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Alfredo y Norman, G.R. No. 188560,
December 15, 2010.

Mandamus; filing of information. The Rules provided that mandamus will lie if (1) any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or unlawfull excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled; and (2) there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked. In the present case, petitioners insist that mandamus is proper since Villordon
committed grave abuse of discretion by unreasonably refusing to file an information despite the
fact that the evidence indicates otherwise. The Supreme Court disagreed with petitioners. The
matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative of the prosecutor. In Hipos v. Judge Bay, the
Supreme Court held that the remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The only time the discretion of the
prosecutor will stand review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely abuses his discretion.
Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames vs. Rafael R. Villordon, Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, G.R. No. 173081, December 15, 2010.
January 2011

Arraignment; suspension. The grounds for suspension of arraignment under section 11, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court are the following: (a) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and,
if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) there exists a prejudicial question; and (b) a
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Spouses
Trinidad, et al vs. Victor Ang, G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011.

Arraignment; suspension. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension
of the arraignment, the same rule limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.  It follows therefore that after
the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion
to defer arraignment. Spouses Trinidad, et al vs. Victor Ang, G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011.

Arrest; warrantless arrest. An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a
warrant.  Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113,  section 5(a)
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.  Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants:  (1) the
police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband;
(2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay
II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50
meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a
white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable
cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when
Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan
as their leader.  Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants – who were caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA
6425, as amended – is valid. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452.
January 10, 2010.

Arrest; warrantless arrest. The appellant questioned the validity of his arrest and the search
conducted inside his car in the absence of a warrant. The Supreme Court ruled that the arrest was
valid pursuant to section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a
“peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: . . . (b) when an offense
has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.” Item (b), which is the second instance provided under the
foregoing rule when a lawful warrantless arrest can be made, necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed;
and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. The records of the case here show that both requirements are
present.  The police officers present at the Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness
the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping.  They all saw appellant take
the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police
officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. It is sufficient for
the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for
them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper.  This is equivalent to
personal knowledge based on probable cause.  People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Uyboco y
Ramos, G.R. No. 178039, January 19, 2011.

Custodial Investigation. Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from
him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner
and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with
his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement
that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the constitutional
procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case. Benjamin Jesalva vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011.

Evidence; admissibility of extrajudicial confession. Nagares challenges the admissibility of his

extrajudicial confession, claiming that it was made under duress and that he was not assisted by
an independent counsel during the custodial investigation. Nagares maintains such flaws in the
investigation violated his right guaranteed under section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
However, based on the records, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, and thus
admissible. The Court of Appeals made the following findings: (1) there is no evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the
officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any
criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no
marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a
physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details, which
makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given. Moreover, photographs taken during
the signing, thumbmarking, and swearing of the extrajudicial confession negate Nagares’ claims
as all these pictures depicted a “cordial and pleasant atmosphere” devoid of any sign of torture,
threat, duress or tension on Nagares’ person. Based on the foregoing, there is clearly no basis for
Nagares’ plea that his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence.
People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12,
2010.

Evidence; alibi. Appellant’s denial and alibi are not worthy of belief.  It is an oft-quoted doctrine
that positive identification prevails over denial and alibi.  Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission
of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission. Morales testified that
at the time of the killing, he was in his house, not far from the house of the victim, around 20
arm’s-lengths, as per his reckoning. There is, thus, the possibility of him being physically present
at the place of the crime; indeed, as per his testimony, he was in the immediate vicinity.   He
presented no corroborating evidence to show that he was elsewhere at the time of the killing, nor
did he present any witnesses to his whereabouts.  There is only his word that he was not there,
against Santiago’s credible testimony.  His defense, thus, cannot prosper. People of the
Philippines vs. Hemiano De Jesus and Rodelo Morales, G.R. No. 186528, January 26, 2011.

Evidence; conspiracy. Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interests.  Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. 
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. In
this case, the Supreme Court held that a conspiracy by and among accused-appellants was present
as it may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants. As shown, the three accused left
Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a while, left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to
Manila thereafter.  They were together when the apprehending police officers pounced on them
near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each of them carrying a travelling bag which
contained marijuana. People of the Philippines vs. Nelida Dequina, Joselito Jundoc and Nora
Jingabo, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of witnesses. The Supreme Court in this case gave due weight and respect to
the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the positive testimonies of witnesses in
pointing to the appellant as one of the kidnappers.  The witnesses testified in a clear and
categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a
better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render
a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes
taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Uyboco y
Ramos, G.R. No. 178039, January 19, 2011.

Evidence; denial. The Supreme Court has consistently held that “denials unsubstantiated by
convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the
prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt,” as in the instant case. The sachet
containing the dangerous drug was positively identified by PO3 Villamor during trial as the very
sachet containing the white crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by Quiamanlon. Thus,
appellant’s denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. People of the Philippines vs. Nene
Quiamanlon y Malog, G.R. No. 191198, January 26, 2011.

Evidence; mere denial cannot overcome presumption of regularity. A bare denial is an inherently
weak defense and has been invariably viewed by the Supreme Court with disfavor, for it can be
easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165. In the absence of any intent on the part of the
police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty stands. The Supreme Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and found that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines vs. Nene Quiamanlon y
Malog, G.R. No. 191198, January 26, 2011.

Evidence; mere denial cannot overcome presumption of regularity. The sachet containing the
dangerous drug was positively identified by MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the
very sachet with white crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by accused-appellants.
Thus, accused-appellants’ denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. A bare denial is an
inherently weak defense, and has been invariably viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily
concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions
arising from violations of RA 9165. Denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not
enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently
telling proof of guilt. In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against the accused-appellants, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty stands, especially here, where an astute analysis of MADAC operative
Bilason’s testimony does not indicate any inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication. People of
the Philippines vs. Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo and Melchor Austriaco y Aguila, G.R. No.
185163, January 17, 2011.

Evidence; seized items not photographed. As a last ditch effort of the appellant exculpate himself,
he claimed that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as the seized items were not photographed
in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus, an
evident violation thereof. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument and ruled that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 allows flexibility in complying
with the express requirements under Section 21 of the said law. Indeed, the evident purpose of the
procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the
proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. People of the Philippines vs. Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello, G.R. No. 185166, January
26, 2011.

Evidence; seized items not photographed. Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to
show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to the aforesaid guidelines, the same is not fatal and does not
automatically render appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.  What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as it would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. The prosecution has adequately shown the continuous and unbroken possession and
subsequent transfers of the three plastic sachets of marijuana from the time appellant handed to
PO3 Lowaton the one plastic sachet of marijuana to consummate the sale thereof, then the
subsequent recovery by PO3 Lowaton of two more plastic sachets of marijuana from appellant
followed by the markings made by PO3 Lowaton of his initials on the said three plastic sachets of
marijuana at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence  until they were sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination that yielded positive result for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S, and up
to the time that the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were offered in court. Such fact
persuasively proves that the three plastic sachets of marijuana presented in court were the same
items seized from appellant during the buy-bust operation.  The integrity and evidentiary value
thereof was duly preserved. People of the Philippines vs. Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello, G.R.
No. 185166, January 26, 2011.

Evidence; proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti — the body of the crime
whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must
be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as
it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. People of the
Philippines vs. Erlinda Capuno y Tison, G.R. No. 185715, January 19, 2011.

Information; test for sufficiency. The fundamental test in determining the adequacy of the
averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. Matters extrinsic or evidence aliunde should not be
considered. The following are the essential elements for an offense punishable under Section 3(e)
of RA 3019: (a) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them; (b) that said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions; (c) that they caused undue injury to any
party, whether the Government or a private party; (c) that such injury was caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (d) that the public officers
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. People of the
Philippines vs. Robert P. Balao, et al, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011.

Information; test for sufficiency. Clearly, the allegations in the 5 March 2001 information, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information
stated that (1) Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and Dacalos were the general manager, team head of
the Visayas Management Office, and Visayas division manager, respectively, of the National
Housing Authority; (2) they committed the prohibited acts “in or about the month of March,
1992,” “while in the performance of their official functions;” (3) they caused undue injury to the
Government in the amount of P232,628.35, “supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works
were undertaken”; (4) they gave “unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused
Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves;” and (5) they acted “with deliberate intent,
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith.” People of the Philippines vs. Robert P. Balao, et
al, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011.

Judgment; absence of accused at promulgation. The accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of
Court against the judgment — (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule
121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).  However, the Rules allow
the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by:  (a) his
surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating
therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment.  If
the trial court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to
avail of the said remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified and
allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of conviction. Edward Garrick Villena
and Percival Doroja vs. People of the Philippines, Nomar B. Degeron, et al, G.R. No. 184091,
January 31, 2011.

Judgment; absence of accused at promulgation. Petitioners’ mere filing of notices of appeal

through their new counsel, therein only explaining their absence during the promulgation of
judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender despite the fact that said notices were filed
within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when their new counsel personally
secured a copy of the judgment of conviction from the Regional Trial Court.  The term
“surrender” under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a
convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to
suffer the consequences of the verdict against him.  The filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice
as a physical and voluntary submission of petitioners to the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.  It
is only upon petitioners’ valid surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can avail of the
remedy of appeal.  Absent compliance with these requirements, their notices of appeal, the
initiatory step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied due course. Edward Garrick
Villena and Percival Doroja vs. People of the Philippines, Nomar B. Degeron, et al, G.R. No.
184091, January 31, 2011.

Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases

involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or
-controlled corporations. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and employees, including
presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. Antonio M.
Carandang vs. Hon. Desierto, Office of the Ombudsman/Antonio M. Carandang vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148076/G.R. No. 153161, January 12, 2011.

Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. The respective jurisdictions of the respondents as expressly defined

and delineated by the law are lacking in this case. A corporation is considered a government-
owned or -controlled corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or
controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Although it is true that the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of Benedicto’s shares that
represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of
Benedicto’s shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedicto’s timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had
accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. With the extent of
Benedicto’s holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government
held the majority of RPN’s capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled
corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis. Antonio M. Carandang vs. Hon.
Desierto, Office of the Ombudsman/Antonio M. Carandang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148076/G.R. No. 153161, January 12, 2011.

Warrantless searches and seizures; when allowed. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.   The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Nevertheless,
the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal
and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. People of the
Philippines vs. Nelida Dequina, Joselito Jundoc and Nora Jingabo, G.R. No. 177570, January
19, 2011.

Warrantless searches and seizures; when allowed. “Transport” as used under the Dangerous
Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from one place to another.” The evidence in
this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags.  PO3 Masanggue and SPO1
Blanco need not even open Dequina’s traveling bag to determine its content because when the
latter noticed the police officers’ presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally
dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks
therein.  Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their
warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling
bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest. People of the Philippines vs. Nelida
Dequina, Joselito Jundoc and Nora Jingabo, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011.
May 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Appeal; criminal cases. It is the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case that the appeal
throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. Michael San
Juan y Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177191, May 30, 2011.

Appeal; relaxation of prohibition against new issues. Elementary principles of due process forbid
the pernicious procedural strategy of adopting new theories for the first time before the Supreme
Court – it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges the analytical
benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly raised
theories.  This rule would have been applied in this case were it not for the fact that petitioner’s
liberty is at stake and the Office of the Solicitor General partially views his cause with favor.
Santiago Paera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011.

Criminal procedure; aggravating circumstances. The Regional Trial Court erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery which were not specifically alleged in
the information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they
cannot be considered against the accused even if they are proven during the trial. People of the
Philippines v. Ricky Ladiana y Davao and Antonio Manuel Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011.

Evidence; circumstantial evidence. While there was no direct evidence to establish appellant’s
participation in the commission of the crime, direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.  The rules of evidence allow a trial court
to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference.  At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist
on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection
to the community.  People of the Philippines v. Ricky Ladiana y Davao and Antonio Manuel Uy,
G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011.

Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Thus, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on
circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
People of the Philippines v. Ricky Ladiana y Davao and Antonio Manuel Uy, G.R. No. 174660,
May 30, 2011.

Probable cause; definition. Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.  George Miller v. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, et al, G.R. No. 165412, May 30,
2011.

Probable cause; determination. To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to
conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case.  Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 
It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime. It
is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in
court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then
to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. George Miller v. Secretary
Hernando B. Perez, et al, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011.

Jurisdiction; Ombudsman.The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized

agencies. In this case, the Supreme Court debunked petitioners’ argument that because they are
not presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them. The
Supreme Court ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government in relation to the offense charged.   Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the
Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an investigation concerning administrative
charges against them with other agencies. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et
al/Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, G.R. No.
165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489, May 30, 2011.

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that since respondent stands
charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in his capacity as president of ExpoCorp — a
private corporation and not a government-owned or controlled corporation –he (respondent) is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  People of the Philippines v. Luis J. Morales, G.R.
No. 166355, May 30, 2011.

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan.  Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan “shall have jurisdiction over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law. R.A. 8249 (which amended P.D. 1606),
delineated the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. which reads in part – “The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27′ and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(i)Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;(ii) City mayors,
vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other city department heads;(iii)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;(iv)Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank; (v)Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (vi) City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (vii)   Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27′ and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national
and local officials classified as Grade ’27′ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

(b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.

(c) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.  People of the Philippines v. Luis J. Morales, G.R. No. 166355, May
30, 2011.
June 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Administrative cases; res judicata. Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of
an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.  Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of
action.  Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be
considered a valid and final judgment.  On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the
power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.  Hon. Waldo Q.
Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011.

Appeal; respect for trial court’s findings of fact. Since the prosecution and the defensein this case
presented very different facts of the case, it was obligatory upon the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”) to determine which of these facts should be given great weight and credence. The RTC
gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, which the Court of Appeals
(“CA”) found to be without grave abuse of discretion.  The CA likewise did not make any finding
that the RTC overlooked or misinterpreted a material fact.  In fact, the CA affirmed the factual
determination made by the RTC.  As explained and discussed in a multitude of cases, the trial
court judge is in the best position to make this determination as the judge was the one who
personally heard the accused and the witnesses, as well as observed their demeanor and the
manner in which they testified during trial.  Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of facts and its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses will not be disturbed or interfered with. People of
the Philippines v. Darius Bautista y Orsino @ Dada, G.R. No. 191266, June 6, 2011.

Criminal procedure; motion to dismiss or withdraw Information. Well-entrenched is the rule that
once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court.
In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should
not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.  It
is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment
must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.  By
relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law.  The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated
the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no
effect whatsoever.  Joseph C. Cerezo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185230, June 1,
2011.

Criminal procedure; probable cause.  Jurisprudence has established rules on the determination of
probable cause. In Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), it was held that a finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is
not a pronouncement of guilt.The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Moreover,
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman found sufficient reason to believe
that a violation of R.A. 3019 has been committed and that the petitioners are probably guilty
thereof. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al v. The Hon. Office of the Ombudsman, et al,  G.R. No.
169359-61, June 1, 2011.

Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before
a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.  None of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only
conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent public
officer.  The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double
jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty.
Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011.

Evidence; reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the prosecution showed that appellant is
guilty of only one count of rape, and not four counts.  The Informations charged appellant with
having raped “AAA” on the first week, second week, and third week, of March 2001, and on
March 23, 2001.  However, as argued by the defense, the testimony of “AAA” with regard to the
first three incidents particularly on the dates when and the places where the offenses were
supposedly committed contains disturbing discrepancies.  “AAA” testified that she was raped
inside their tent in “BBB”.  However, in her re-direct examination, “AAA” testified that she was
raped elsewhere.The inconsistencies in the testimony of “AAA” regarding the first three rape
incidents are not inconsequential.  These inconsistencies create a reasonable doubt as to whether
appellant did in fact rape “AAA” during those occasions.  Consequently, appellant must be
acquitted of the charges of rape allegedly committed during the first week, second week, and
third week, of March 2001 based on reasonable doubt.  People of the Philippines v. Rosauro
Asetre y Duran, G.R. No. 175834, June 8, 2011.

Prejudicial publicity; totality-of-circumstances test. Respecting the possible influence of media

coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial
publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances”
test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.  Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition
for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao
Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-
SC, June 14, 2011.
July 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Criminal cases; burden of proof. Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has
the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once
the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as
a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence
for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has
admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
People of the Philippines vs. Bingky Campos, et al, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011.

Criminal procedure; mandatory institution of civil and criminal actions in the Sandiganbayan. In
their Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioners contend that the
Regional Trial Court or any other court no has jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 00-00089 given
that in cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan, there is a mandatory simultaneous institution and
joint determination of the civil liability with the criminal action and the express prohibition to file
the said civil action separately from the criminal action as provided under Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject civil case (i.e., Civil Case No.
00-00089) does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.   P/Chief Inspector
Fernando Billedo, et al vs. Wilhemina Wagan, et al, G.R. No. 175091, July 13, 2011.

Criminal procedure; mandatory institution of civil and criminal actions in the Sandiganbayan.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 contemplates only two (2) situations and these were correctly pointed
out by the public respondent as follows: First, a criminal action has been instituted before the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the
corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it; and second, the civil case,
filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending when the criminal action was filed, in which case,
the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint
determination. Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case since no
criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is
no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as
mandated by the said provision. P/Chief Inspector Fernando Billedo, et al vs. Wilhemina Wagan,
et al, G.R. No. 175091, July 13, 2011.

Criminal procedure; mandatory institution of civil and criminal actions in the Sandiganbayan. It
is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against
petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending
criminal case and the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint
determination. The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the
preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted
prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as the complainants can prove
their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence. P/Chief Inspector
Fernando Billedo, et al vs. Wilhemina Wagan, et al, G.R. No. 175091, July 13, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of rape victim’s testimony. Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a
crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus,
in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is
settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if
the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of
rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even
conclusive and binding. People of the Philippines vs. Noel Dion, G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011.

Evidence; positive identification. An eyewitness account established that the petitioner’s vehicle
actually hit Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor
Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioner’s cause, saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus
provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. Victor
positively identified the petitioner as the person who drove the car that ramped on an island
divider along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street, and hit Rochelle. The positive
identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense to impute any ill-motive on the
eyewitness works to dispel reasonable doubt on the fact that the petitioner’s car had in fact hit
Rochelle. The eyewitness account provides the necessary link between the petitioner’s failure to
exercise precaution in operating his vehicle and Rochelle Lanete’s death. Edwin Tabao y Perez
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011.

Appeal of criminal case; extent of review. An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties. The Supreme Court cited the
ruling in U.S. v. Abijan, 1 Phil 83 (1902), now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: “The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and
increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial
Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.” The reason behind this rule is that when an
accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant. People of the Philippines vs. Felipe Mirandilla Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011.  
August 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Absence of preliminary investigation waived. The absence of a proper preliminary investigation

must be timely raised and must not have been waived.  This is to allow the trial court to hold the
case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence
already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable
cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary
investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation.  When the Ombudsman denied the motion, he
never raised this issue again.  It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that
he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.  Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted.  By entering his plea, and actively
participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.  
Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175289,  August
31, 2011.

Alibi; requisites.  Alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly exculpate a person accused
of a crime.  However, this is true only if the accused’s alibi strictly meets the following requisites:
(a) his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. Here, neither Cleofe nor Leonardo was
able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that not only was he somewhere else when
Nelson was killed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime.  People of the Philippines v. Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva, et al, G.R. No. 184960,
August 24, 2011.

Alibi; requisites.  Physical impossibility is the distance and the facility of access between the situs
criminis and the place where he says he was when the crime was committed. Noting the distances
between Bagong Silang, where Nelson was killed, and the respective locations of Leonardo and
Cleofe at the time the crime was committed, given the relative proximity of the places, the
availability of transportation, and the physical fitness of both accused to travel, it was not
impossible for them to have traversed to and from the scene of the crime and their alleged
locations that fateful evening of January 10, 2001. People of the Philippines v. Cleofe Baroquillo
y Villanueva, et al, G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011.

Alibi; requisites.  The Supreme Court debunked accused-appellant’s defense of alibi and rejected
his argument that his alibi should be given credence because it was corroborated by credible and
disinterested witnesses. In People v. Estoya, the Supreme Court laid down the jurisprudential
guidelines in assessing the proffered defense of alibi as follows: (a) alibis and denials are
generally disfavored by the courts for being weak; (b) they cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime; (c) for alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that
it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission; (d) alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by
credible and disinterested witnesses; (e) alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court – unless patently and clearly inconsistent –
must be accepted. Measured against the foregoing yardstick, accused-appellant’s defenses of alibi
and denial cannot prosper. People of the Philippines v. Juanito Appattad, G.R. No.
193188,  August 10, 2011.

Alibi; requisites.  Alibis and denials are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so
because said defenses can be easily fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability.
Likewise, it was stated in People v. Estoya that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Notably, these defenses crumble in
light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. An alibi is evidence negative in nature and
self-serving, and, thus, cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. In the present case, AAA positively
identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime of rape
committed against her. People of the Philippines v. Juanito Appattad, G.R. No. 193188,  August
10, 2011.

Defense of denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.  Appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded
credence for lack of evidentiary support.  Appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to
corroborate her story is fatal to her cause. People of the Philippines v. Virginia Baby P.
Montaner, G.R. No. 184053,  August 31, 2011.

Evidence; conspiracy; quantum of proof. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the
crime. People of the Philippines v. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No. 187536, August
10, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of witnesses.The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses regarding petitioner’s illegal sale and possession of shabu to be
credible since they are consistent with the documentary and object evidence submitted by the
prosecution.  When it comes to the credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.  The trial court is in the best position to evaluate
testimonial evidence properly because it has the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying.  This rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Radito Aurelio Reyes v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174980,  August 31, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of witnesses. It must be emphasized that when the credibility of a witness is
in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.  This is more true if such findings
were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon Supreme Court.
People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562,  August 17, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of witnesses; inconsistencies in testimonies. The inconsistencies in private

complainant’s testimony are not as serious or damaging. The Supreme Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the purported inconsistencies in private complainant’s testimony pertain to
details which are inconsequential to the credibility of his overall testimony. While there may be
some inconsistencies in private complainant’s testimony, these incompatible declarations do not
pertain to the essential elements of the crime of which the accused-appellant was convicted.  They
refer only to minor matters and are inconsequential as they do not impair the credibility of the
prosecution witness.  People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562,
August 17, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of witnesses; inconsistencies in testimonies.  In fact, inaccuracies may

suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed.  This is because a witness
is not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.
Questions on whether or not private complainant had actually seen accused-appellant load the
shotgun with a bullet, or whether or not private complainant was already on board his motorcycle
when he was shot by accused-appellant, would have no bearing on the fact that private
complainant was shot by accused-appellant with the service shotgun turned-over by the former to
the latter.  The Supreme Court stressed that accused-appellant himself admitted the fact of
shooting, and only disputed any intent to kill private complainant.  The conclusion of the
Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court that the
accused-appellant intended to kill private complainant was not based entirely on accused-
appellant deliberately loading the shotgun, but also on the existence of motive on accused-
appellant’s part, the location and severity of private complainant’s injury, and accused-appellant’s
behavior immediately after the shooting. People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan,
G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011.

Evidence; presumption of innocence. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused – in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charged laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required.  To repeat, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must
not rely on the weakness of the defense.  And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount
of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf.  In which
case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. In this case, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the two accused. The rule that
high respect must be accorded the lower courts in their findings of facts cannot be misused to
diminish the required evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused as
guaranteed by the Constitution. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Fermin y Gregorio and Job
Madayag Jr. y Balderas,G.R. No. 179344, August 3, 2011.

Evidence; presumption of regularity of official duties vis-à-vis presumption of innocence. In

convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity, it must be emphasized, obtains only
when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise. In the present case, the
procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the handling of the seized items – from their
failure to mark it immediately upon confiscation, to their failure to inventory and photograph it in
the presence of the accused, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the DOJ, and any elected public official, without offering any justifiable ground – effectively
negated the presumption of regularity. People of the Philippines v. Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y Dela
Cruz, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011.
Evidence; proof of age in statutory rape; guidelines. In People v. Pruna, the Court set out the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance: (a) the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party; (b) in the absence of a certificate
of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age; (c) if the certificate of live birth
or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: [i] if the victim is alleged to be
below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; [ii] if the
victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old; [iii] if the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old; (d)  in the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s
age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused; (e) it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party
and the failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him; (f) the trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim. In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any
similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated.  Neither did
the appellant expressly admit AAA’s age. In this case, the accused-appellant was found guilty of
simple rape. People of the Philippines v. Terecio Funesto y Llospardas, G.R. No. 182237, August
3, 2011.

Evidence; rape. In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be
made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. Nonetheless, it also bears stressing that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact
of forced coitus. The prosecution’s evidence here established the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Juanito Appattad, G.R. No.
193188.  August 10, 2011.

Evidence; res inter alios acta rule.   Inasmuch as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated
the latter as a cohort.  Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.  Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet.  Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant; it
is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.  
People of the Philippines v. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No. 187536, August 10,
2011.

Evidence; res inter alios acta rule; exception.  An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator.  Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than by such act or declaration.  Since there was no sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of conspiracy, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in
evidence against Col.  People of the Philippines v. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No.
187536, August 10, 2011.

Evidence; statutory rape; elements. In People v. Orillosa, the Supreme Court held that in
incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice. Thus, in order for the accused to be
found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this jurisdiction, only two (2) elements must concur:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve
(12) years old. In the present case, it is undisputed that the victim, AAA, was below twelve (12)
years old when the crime was committed. A copy of AAA’s birth certificate to prove her age was
duly presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October 14,
1994. Concomitantly, AAA was only seven (7) years old when the crime of rape was first
committed against her in 2001, and was only nine (9) years old when the accused once again
succeeded in committing the same crime in 2003. Also, it is undisputed that accused-appellant is
the father of AAA, as stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference and as also
indicated in AAA’s birth certificate. Thus, what only remains to be proved is the fact of carnal
knowledge by the accused of the victim.

When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of how she was
sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old
girl to concoct. Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently established the foregoing element, thus
proving that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape.
People of the Philippines v. Juanito Appattad, G.R. No. 193188,  August 10, 2011.

Non-appearance at the pre-trial conference; sanctions. Under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at
the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the
court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the court
may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur: (1) counsel does not
appear at the pre-trial conference; and (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.  There is
no cavil that petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial conference in Davao City on April 27,
2006.  The crux of the matter in this case then is, did petitioners present an acceptable or valid
excuse for said non-appearance? Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court ruled that
petitioners failed to present an acceptable or valid excuse for their non-appearance during the pre-
trial conference. The petitioners here were fined as a sanction of their non-appearance during the
pre-trial conference. Atty. Emelia H. Garayblas and Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz v. Hon. Gregory
Ong, et al, G.R. No. 174507-30, August 3, 2011.
September 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Appeal; legal personality to appeal Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of case. The crucial issue in this
case concerns petitioner’s legal personality to challenge before the Supreme Court the dismissal
by the Sandiganbayan of the criminal cases against respondent. Petitioner is not the proper party
to file the present action.  Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that “in all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.” A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal
only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court.  Petitioner is not even
the offended party or private complainant in the main case. While petitioner’s name was included
in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-
investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, it is the City of Tuguegarao which
suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by respondent and, hence, is
the private complainant in the main case. City Government of Tuguegarao, represented by Robert
P. Guzman v. Randolph S. Ting, G.R. Nos. 192435-36, September 14, 2011.

Conviction; only moral certainty required. What is necessary for the prosecution to ensure
conviction in criminal cases is not absolute certainty but only moral certainty that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged.  Here, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.  The victim’s testimony is worthy of belief, she having no ill motive to
fabricate what she said against her stepfather. More, contrary to the claims of the accused, there is
nothing in the testimony of the victim that would elicit suspicion as to the veracity of her story.  
For one thing, the fact that she did not shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the accused
does not disprove the fact that he raped her. People of the Philippines v. Alejo Taroy y Tarnate,
G.R. No. 192466, September 7, 2011.

Criminal cases; venue is jurisdictional. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases.  It can neither be
waived nor subjected to stipulation.  The right venue must exist as a matter of law.  Thus, for
territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court
of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients took place. The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the
crimes were committed in the victim and the offender’s house in City Limit, Tuding,
Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet.  This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction
over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.  People of the Philippines vs.Alejo
Taroy y Tarnate, G.R. No. 192466,  September 7, 2011.

Evidence; affidavits of desistance. Courts look with disfavor on affidavits of desistance and/or
retraction. In People v. Bation, it was ruled that: “[A]n affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge.” Accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on AAA’s affidavit of
desistance, complemented by her testimony for the defense, as an exonerating vehicle for his
dastardly act. Other than the retraction or desistance affidavit, nothing in the records would show
any other circumstance of substance accepted by the trial court that would becloud the veracity of
AAA’s earlier inculpating testimony. Thus, as long as the complaining witness musters the test of
credibility and consistency, her testimony deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. And if such testimony is clear and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, a conviction of rape based on it may lie even if she subsequently retracted her earlier
testimony.   So it must be here. People of the Philippines v. Joselito Orje y Borce, G.R. No.
189579, September 12, 2011.

Evidence; defense of denial and alibi. In the face of witness’ positive identification of the accused
as the victim’s stabber, the accused merely interposed an uncorroborated denial as his defense.  
Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated,
regresses to blatant impotence.  Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. People of the Philippines v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412,
September 7, 2011.

Evidence; credibility of testimonial evidence. Testimonial evidence to be believed, must not only
come from credible lips but must be credible in substance.  A story that defies reason and logic
and above all runs against the grain of common experience cannot persuade.  Here, the
prosecution’s account failed to pass these tests.  In her Affidavit, MJ said that Rodel sought to
walk her home because he wanted to talk to her about fixing their relationship.  In her testimony,
however, MJ insisted that she had no conversation with Rodel prior to his showing up at her
house near midnight of December 23, 2003. And when Rodel left, MJ did not see him off at the
door to lock it as he went out.  Her excuse in not locking the door was that her mother was still
out.  But notably, when Rodel supposedly came and knocked at the door after she got home at
11:30 p.m., she had to let him in because it was already locked.  MJ also said that she was no
longer naked when she woke up and heard her brother screaming by the bedroom window, with
Rodel in a tight grip.  If this were true, somebody must have slipped her clothes back on while
she was out cold.  This contradicts LK’s testimony that her son had to wrap MJ in a blanket
before taking her out of the room.  The sequence of events that the prosecution tried to establish
did not also make sense.  With so many inconsistencies and incompatibilities with common
experience, the unfiltered truth was not seen.  Hence, the evidence failed to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.  People of the Philippines v. Rodel
Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011.

Evidence; trial court’s determination of credibility of witnesses respected on appeal . It is

fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when
affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect.   Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses’
credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor. In this case, both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Mendeja.  The Court of Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts to impugn Mendeja’s testimony.
People of the Philippines v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011.

Motion to quash; procedure when motion to quash denied.  In the usual course of procedure, a
denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered
and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of
his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter’s ruling.  In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory
order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section
1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari
which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy
remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial
as stated above. A direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than
the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons.  Joel
Galzote y Soriaga v. Jonathan Briones and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164682,
September 14, 2011.

Petition for certiorari; the Supreme Court is a court of last resort. The Supreme Court is a court of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.  It cannot and should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance.   Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor.  Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals.   Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court
of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the
writ’s procurement must be presented.   This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. Churchille V. Mari and People of
the Philippines v. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern
Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011.

Petition for certiorari; rule that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort relaxed. In this case,
although the petition is dismissible since petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts, the Supreme Court finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case since it also
involves the issue of double jeopardy, necessitating it to look into the merits of the petition. The
Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition. In Pacoy v. Cajigal, the Supreme Court opted not to
strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy which is considered to be
one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Churchille V. Mari and People
of the Philippines v. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern
Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011.

Petition for transfer of venue. Petitioners in this case are mistaken in their notion that mere
pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial
court.  Such a situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts. 
In People v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court ruled that “delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders” must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the “[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.” Churchille V.
Mari and People of the Philippines v. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39,
Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011.

Right of accused to speedy trial.     In this case, the Supreme Court debunked petitioners’
argument that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too hurriedly,
despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now
incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which provides that “[a]ny period of
delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused” such as “delays resulting from
orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other
courts” shall “be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence.”       A
careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the
time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning the
accused.  The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same.  Hence, in this case,
the time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is
pending cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial
order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. An accused’s right to speedy trial is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. Churchille V. Mari and People of the Philippines v. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728,
September 12, 2011.

Right of accused to speedy trial. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of the right to
speedy trial, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such
delay. Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his
liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he
was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months;
then again, when an Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense,
he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or
a period of over 6 months.  Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any
duration of time is quite oppressive.  Because of private respondent’s continued incarceration,
any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice.  Thus, it was absolutely vexatious
and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners’
petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from
further proceeding in the case. Churchille V. Mari and People of the Philippines v. Hon. Rolando
L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y
Torres, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011.
October 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Alibi.  Alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by
truthful witnesses.  Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at
the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim. In this case, Jose unequivocally
testified that he saw the appellant at the vicinity of Caran-caran on October 9, 2000, the day of the
murder.  More importantly, Jose testified that he saw the appellant, together with four (4) other
men, walking with Resuelo Sr. – while the latter was hog-tied – on the day of the murder.  Jose’s
testimony not only establishes a strong circumstance to establish the appellant’s culpability –
since the victim was last seen with the appellant and his companions – but also strongly negates
the appellant’s alibi that he was not in Caran-caran at the time of the murder.  In this case, the
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and clearly merits the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law. People of the Philippines
v. Edwin Villamor, et al,  G.R. No. 187497, October 12, 2011.

Conspiracy.   Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony.  Conspiracy which

determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.  It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. 
The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole as ruled in People v. Mateo Jr.  Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-
accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed. Ho Wai Pang v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011.

Credibility of witnesses; findings of trial court respected.   The findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would
have affected the result of the case.  The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of
an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame,
the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it; the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage
and mien. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011.

Credibility of witnesses; findings of trial court respected.  The settled rule is that the trial court’s
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and
respect, and at times even finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances
of weight and value which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case. Since the trial judge had the direct and singular
opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of the complaining
witnesses while testifying, it was truly competent and in the best position to assess whether the
witness was telling the truth.  People of the Philippines v. Marciano Dollano Jr., G.R. No.
188851, October 19, 2011.
Credibility of witnesses; findings of trial court respected. It has been held that in a prosecution for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies. Since it was the trial court that had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and deportment while testifying, the rule is that the trial court’s assessment of their
credibility is entitled to great respect, and even finality, unless facts of weight and substance
bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. Here,
while accused-appellant was not conclusively shown to have contradicted himself as regards the
time when the plastic sachet was shown to him by the police, the perception of the trial court on
the matter has to be relied upon. The court a quo cites this as only one of several material
inconsistencies and incredible statements made by accused-appellant during the trial. In fine,
there is no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s
conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. People of the Philippines
v. Ricardo Mondejar y Bocarili, G.R. No. 193185, October 12, 2011.

Credibility of witnesses; recantation of private complainants in rape case insufficient.  In this
case, the trial and appellate courts gave credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB when they
were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. They found that their clear narration of how the
offenses were committed and their categorical statement that appellant committed them, are
sufficient to warrant the conviction of the appellant for four counts of rape. The recantation of
both private complainants are insufficient to warrant the reversal of appellant’s conviction.
People of the Philippines v. Marciano Dollano Jr., G.R. No. 188851, October 19, 2011.

Demurrer to evidence; when not equivalent to an acquittal. As a general rule, an order granting
the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions,
however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment
is considered void. Hon. Judge Jesus B. Mupas, et al v. People of the Philippines, thru its duly
authorized representative, the Legal Service, DSWD, Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 189365,
October 12, 2011.

Demurrer to evidence; when not equivalent to an acquittal. In this case, the Supreme Court agrees
with the Court of Appeal’s disquisition that the lower court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence of
petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution’s evidence was prima
facie sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against her for her inexcusable negligence,
subject to the defense that she may present in the course of a full-blown trial. The lower court
improperly examined the prosecution’s evidence in light of only one mode of committing the
crimes charged; that is, through positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that the
crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of
public funds or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. In the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the accused’s
demurrer to evidence, as such, the Supreme Court deem the trial court’s consequent order of
acquittal void. Hon. Judge Jesus B. Mupas, et al v. People of the Philippines, thru its duly
authorized representative, the Legal Service, DSWD, Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 189365,
October 12, 2011.

Demurrer to evidence; Office of the Solicitor General. The acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General acting on behalf
of the State.  The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. People v. Santiago states:
“It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. . . . The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.” Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. v. Sally Go Bangayan/Resally De AsisDelfin v. Sally Go
Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777/G.R. No. 172792, October 19, 2011.

Demurrer to evidence; Office of the Solicitor General. A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed
by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the
case.  Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial court’s order granting petitioners’
demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal case.  It is apparent that
her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners.  Because
bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal.  
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. v. Sally Go Bangayan/Resally De AsisDelfin v. Sally Go Bangayan, G.R.
No. 172777/G.R. No. 172792, October 19, 2011.

Mandamus; proper remedy when individuals arbitrarily excluded from information.  Mandamus
is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised. In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining
who must be charged.  He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what
constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for
the filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack
thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the
courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside
the contemplation of law. If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily
excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of
mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who
appear responsible for the offense involved.  Erdito Quarto v. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon
Marcelo, et al, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011.

Positive Identification of perpetrator. When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive

and reliable enough for establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt? The
identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where
there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the
identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the
Supreme Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to
wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b)
that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim
immediately before or after the crime. People of the Philippines v. Delfin Caliso, G.R. No.
183830, October 19, 2011.
Positive Identification of perpetrator.  Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso
because she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such
assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As
matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct
evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single
thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator
did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and
sufficient.  People of the Philippines v. Delfin Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011.

Positive Identification of perpetrator.  The test to determine the moral certainty of an

identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve
such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or
characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the
body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of
humanity.  A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive
identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake. 
People of the Philippines v. Delfin Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011.

Positive Identification of perpetrator.  A positive identification which is categorical and consistent

and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. In this case,
Beatriz Raguirag positively identified the accused as the one who had shot her husband. She was
firm and consistent throughout her testimony. The Supreme Court did not see any ill motive on
her part in testifying against her own relative regarding the death of her husband. Thus, there is
no reason to question her credibility as a witness. On the other hand, the accused miserably failed
to satisfy the requirements for an alibi to be considered plausible. Republic of the Philippines v.
Arnold T. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, October 11, 2011.

Promulgation of judgment; presence of accused mandatory. Perjury is not a light felony or

offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present
at the promulgation of the judgment. Despite notice, however, petitioner was absent when the
MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only
when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy
was the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August
2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should
not have entertained petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days
from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his motion for probation. The motion for
probation filed on 5 November 2009 was filed out of time. Anselmo De Leon Cuyo v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 192164, October 12, 2011.
November 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Alibi and denial. As his main defenses, appellant puts forward denial and alibi which has
consistently been regarded as inherently weak defenses and must be rejected when the identity of
the accused is satisfactorily and categorically established by the eyewitnesses to the offense,
especially when such eyewitnesses have no ill motive to testify falsely.  People of the Philippines
v. Arnel Manjares, G.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011.

Alibi and denial. In the instant case, the defense failed to show that the victim and sole
eyewitness to the crimes of rape was motivated by ill will. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
delicti or within its immediate vicinity.  Appellant’s own categorical admission that he regularly
went to the alleged boarding house of the victim and his two other children to give them their
provisions for food and other expenses cast major doubt on his defense of alibi because, even if it
were true, this only demonstrates that it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at
the locus delicti when the victim was repeatedly raped.  People of the Philippines v. Arnel
Manjares, G.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011.

Appeal. It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and
it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not.People of the
Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan y Crisostomo, G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011.

Arrests; warrantless arrests.  Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the following are the instances when a peace officer can effect a lawful warrantless arrest: (a)
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112 of the Rules. People of the Philippines v. PO1
Froilan L. Trestiza, G.R. No. 193833, November 16, 2011.

Evidence; crucial nature of testimony of victim in rape cases. In almost all cases of sexual abuse,
the credibility of the victim’s testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
where only the persons involved can testify as to its occurrence. In this case, the Supreme Court
found no reason to disturb the findings of the Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. People of the Philippines v. Avelino Subesa y Moscardon, G.R. No. 193660, November
16, 2011.

Evidence; trial court’s evaluation of witnesses highly respected on appeal. Time and again, it has
been emphasized that the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses at the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who has the unique and
unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility. In
essence, when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and
the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial court is generally given the highest
degree of respect, if not finality.  The assessment made by the trial court is even more enhanced
when the Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this case. The prosecution successfully proved
beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape and acts of lasciviousness against Subesa. All his
four children positively identified him as their molester.People of the Philippines v. Avelino
Subesa y Moscardon, G.R. No. 193660, November 16, 2011.

Petition for review on certiorari; when filed. Under the Rules of Court, a petition for review
oncertiorari must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment. In the instant case, the petition for review on certiorariwas not
filed on time.  The petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the August 20, 2008 Decision
of the Court of Appeals on February 10, 2009. Thus, the petitioners had only until February 25,
2009 to assail the August 20, 2008 Decision of the CA via a petition for review on certiorari.
However, the petitioners were only able to file the instant petition on April 27, 2009. Clearly, the
instant petition was filed out of time. People of the Philippines, Felix Florece, et al v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011.
December 2011

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Defense; alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable.  To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in
the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the
crime. People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011.

Defense; alibi. In the instant case, the distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers
and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for
the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working hours while working in
Tacloban.  Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in
[XXX], Leyte. The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually
molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years
up to August 1999.  She cannot be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first
sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her
uncle, the brother of her mother. People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon, G.R. No. 183563,
December 14, 2011.

Witnesses; credibility. Basic is the rule that the trial court’s factual findings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal.  When the issue is one of credibility, the Supreme Court will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the outcome of the case. The reason therefore is not hard to discern. The
trial courts are in a better position to decide questions of credibility having heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. People of the Philippines
v. Lino L. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, December 7, 2011.

Witnesses; credibility. Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself.   Hence, the
test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in
conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind.  Based on
the findings of the trial court and the CA, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are
more credible in itself than the self-serving defense of appellant. People of the Philippines v. Lino
L. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, December 7, 2011.

Witnesses; presentation of informant.  The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is

not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his
testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In this case, if Amansec felt that the
prosecution did not present the informant because he would testify against it, then Amansec
himself should have called him to the stand to testify for the defense.  The informant’s testimony
is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the
prosecution.  People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Amansec y Dona, G.R. No. 186131,
December 14, 2011.
Witnesses; presentation of informant.  In People v. Ho Chua, the Supreme Court ruled that the
presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.  In People v.
Nicolas, the Supreme Court also ruled that “police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of
confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness
will be over the moment they are presented in court.”  Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly
upon squealers and informants.  It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities
are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely
corroborative. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Amansec y Dona, G.R. No. 186131,
December 14, 2011.
January 2012

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE