Republic of the Philippines

Fourth Judicial Region

Regional Trial Court
Branch 90
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

-versus- Crim. Case Nos. DC-5731-18

DC-5732-18
For: Viol of Sec. 5 and 11,
Art. II of R.A. 9165

MANGOBRA SARIP y SALIM,

Accused.
x-------------------------------------------x

Motion for Bail

The accused, MANGOBRA SARIP y SALIM, by undersigned

Law firm, respectfully moves the Honorable Court to allow bail on
the ground of weak evidence.

The accused was charged with Violation of Sec. 5 & 11, Article
II of R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) in an
Information dated August 3, 2018 and no bail was recommended for
his provisional liberty.

The Information is a result of the recommendation made by

Prosecutor I Raulito A. Villar finding probable cause against accused
Mangobra Sarip y Salim for Violation of Section 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act 9165 and does not recommend bail for his provisional
liberty.
The accused was arrested on August 2, 2018 in an alleged Anti-
illegal drug (buy bust) operation conducted by Intel/City Drug

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Enforcement Unit (CDEU) Operatives of City of Dasmariñas, Cavite
and is currently detained at Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP), City of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Though the Prosecutor I Raulito A. Villar found probable cause

against herein accused Mangobra Sarip y Salim, it is submitted that
the evidence against him is not strong and therefore he may be
granted bail.

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

provides:

“All persons, except those charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended, excessive bail
shall not be required.”

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, likewise

provides:

“Capital offense or an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.-No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

Under the Revised Rules of Court, bail is the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law. To be clear about this,
the exact provision is hereby quoted as follows:

Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the

security given for the release of a person in

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 custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All

persons in custody shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognizance as prescribed by
law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial court
of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

It is submitted that the evidence of the prosecution in support

of the charge against herein accused Mangobra Sarip y Salim is not
strong as to deny his constitutional and statutory right to bail. This is
clearly shown by the following considerations:

a. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 (Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) provides:

“Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals- The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, diliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch
in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such
transactions

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 XXX”

b. Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of

life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug
in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:

 (1) 10 grams or more of opium;

 (2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
 (3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
 (4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride;
 (5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu";
 (6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil;
 (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
 (8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as,
but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid
diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine
(GHB), and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

c. It is apparent from the foregoing paragraph, that in order for

an accused to be convicted under Section 5, he must have
either: sold, traded, administered, dispensed, delivered,
gave away, distributed or transported dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; or
must have acted as a broker in any such transactions; and
the same must be proven beyond reasonable doubt based on
evidence.

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 d. In the instant case, the pieces of object evidence presented by
the prosecution are the three sachets containing a crystalline
compound, marked as “RR-BB”, “RR-2” and “RR-3” and the
color gray pouch and the P500 peso bill presented as the
marked money allegedly used in the buy-bust operation.

e. It is easy to concoct buy-bust operation. It is easy to plant

evidence in this case because the quantity involved is too
easy to procure. One sachet can be obtained for P500. Two
sachets can be secured for P1,000. Three sachets can be
procured for P1,500.00. It is easy to spare these amounts of
money for the purpose of planting evidence and extorting
from any victim. These amounts of drugs presented in
alleged buy-bust operation are common for use in “planting
operation” now common among anti-drug operatives.

f. Moreover, it is somewhat amusing to see a seller of drugs

having only three sachets in his possession. One who sells
should be having a number of sachets sufficient to say that
one is engaged in selling drugs. Thus, the claim of the
prosecution witnesses that they recovered from the accused
three sachets or sealed plastic containers diminishes the
prosecution evidence even to a minimum extent.

g. Unless the prosecution proves that the evidence of guilt

against accused Mangobra Sarip y Salim is strong, accused is
entitled to right to bail enshrined and guaranteed by our
statutes and Constitution.

In this instant case, the evidence of guilt is not strong

considering the fact that the recitals of the private complaining
witness are not sufficient since the allegations stated therein are
considered hearsay, thus, inadmissible as evidence.

In the case of Patula versus People of the Philippines, G.R.

164457, April 11, 2012, the Supreme Court held that:
“To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay
evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference

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 is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of
her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the
truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not
from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.”

It was also given emphasis that in case a witness is permitted to

testify based on what he has heard another person say about the facts
in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to
be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of
the other person giving the information to the witness without oath.

The Supreme Court also held citing Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracy’s
Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221 that the theory of the hearsay rule is
that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination.
However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to
prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the
accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The

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distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

In People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946), the

Supreme Court explained that Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing
party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.

In the case of Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243, that Court

ruled that if hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because
the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to
cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of
testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential
to the administration of justice.

In the case of Gulam v. Santos, G.R. No. 151458, August 31,

2006, 500 SCRA 463, 473, the Supreme Court held that:

“We thus stress that the rule excluding

hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation
and due to its not being subjected to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel to test
the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of
the out-of-court statement depends.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, the testimonies of the

private complaining witnesses as well as the reference thereof, their
mere conclusion of facts, and statements, should be denied and be
rejected as the prosecution’s evidence against the accused Mangobra
Sarip y Salim.

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 Summing up, all the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution are too weak to warrant a grant for the accused to post
bail in surety or cash. The right to bail is not only statutory rights of
the accused but also constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, it is prayed of the Honorable Court to grant the

motion to allow the accused to post bail in surety or cash bond.
Other relief just and equitable is also prayed for. 28 February 2020,
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

RENTA PE CAUSING & SABARRE LAW FIRM

Unit 12, 2nd Floor, Heritage Building, Mangubat
Avenue, Zone IV, City of Dasmariñas, Cavite
Tel. No. (046) 435-2987
Email Address: repecasalawfirm@yahoo.com

By:

ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

Counsel for the Accused
IBP No. 056761 / 12.12.2018 / Manila
PTR No. 7980629 /12.7.2018 / Manila
Roll No. 46952
MCLE V-0013220/01.19.2016
MCLE VI in Progress

Cc:
Office of the City Prosecutor
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

NOTICE OF HEARING

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The Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court
Branch 90
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

Office of the City Prosecutor

City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

Greetings!

Please be notified that the undersigned submits the foregoing

Motion for the consideration of the Honorable Court on December 9,
2019 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

EXPLANATION

Lack of manpower and distance compelled the service of this

Motion by personal service.

ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

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