Title:

Moral Development. By: Kretchmar, Jennifer, Moral Development -- Research Starters Education,
4/1/2018
Database:
Research Starters - Education
Moral Development
Contents
1. Overview
2. Further Insights
3. Piaget
4. Kohlberg
5. Gilligan
6. Neo-Kohlberg
7. Viewpoints
8. Terms & Concepts
9. Bibliography
10. Suggested Reading

Educational Psychology Moral Development

This article summarizes theories of moral development - including those proposed by

Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Neo-Kohlberg theorists - as well as the central tensions that exist
in the field. Although Kohlberg is often credited with introducing the study of moral
development to the field of psychology, he arguably introduced as many questions as he did
answers. His focus on reason as the 'backbone' of moral development, his insistence that
development proceeds through a series of fixed stages, and his preoccupation with justice to the
exclusion of other 'types' of morality such as compassion and care, earned him a number of
critics.
His critics have ,subsequently, either discredited his theory or attempted to expand it.
The summary also describes some of the personalities of the people involved in this
field; Kohlberg and Gilligan have received as much attention for the supposed rivalry between
the two of them as they have for the theories themselves. Because the field has been fueled by
the nature of the people and relationships involved, their stories are worthy of mention.
Keywords Autonomous Morality; Care; Developmental Stages; Gilligan, Carol; Heteronomous
Morality; Justice; Kohlberg, Lawrence; Moral Action; Moral Judgment; Moral Motivation;
Moral Sensitivity; Piaget, Jean; Schemas
Overview
More than any other single individual, Lawrence Kohlberg is responsible for bringing the topic
of moral development to the study of psychology. Carol Gilligan, a Harvard colleague
of Kohlberg's remembers his "...courage, his determination to talk about moral values in
psychology, his bravery in countering the claim that psychology was a value-neutral social
science" (Walsh, 2000, p. 39).

Although Kohlberg was one of the first, he was certainly not the last; his work has inspired a
new generation of scholars who - either by disagreeing with the central tenets
of Kohlberg's theory or by expanding upon his ideas - have introduced new models of moral
development. What will become clear as we review the various models are the tensions that exist
in the field - is morality a function of reason, emotion, or both? Can morality be defined solely in
terms of justice, rights, and responsibility, or does it also include questions of compassion and
care? Does morality encompass more than our interpersonal relationships, such as larger
questions about how we ought to live?
Further Insights
Piaget
Just as Kohlberg inspired a generation of scholars who followed in his footsteps, so too
was Kohlberg inspired. Kohlberg had every intention of becoming a clinical psychologist, but
after reading Jean Piaget's early work on moral development and religious
experience, Kohlberg's career changed course (Walsh, 2000). Piaget is most well-known for his
work on cognitive development, but he was interested in how people learn right from wrong as
well; for Piaget, and for Kohlberg too, moral development was highly dependent on cognitive
development.

As an individual's cognitive structures changed over time, so too did that individual's ability to
reason - about both intellectual and moral matters (Thomas, 1997).
Piaget studied moral development in children ranging in age from 6 through 12 by presenting
them with moral dilemmas, as well as observing them at play. Based on their responses to the
dilemmas and his observations, he concluded that children progress from heteronomous morality
to autonomous morality; furthermore, they do so by advancing through three successive stages of
reasoning (Thomas, 1997). Younger children operate according to rules prescribed by authority
figures, such as teachers, parents, police, and/or other adults. At this stage, children adhere to
rules universally, without considering the particulars of a situation.

Eventually, moral judgment evolves, as older children begin to equate justice with equality and
then with equity. In other words, as children age they define moral judgment as rule-following,
treating everyone the same, and then treating people fairly based on the particulars of a situation.
Narvaez (2005) writes, "some believe Kohlberg was more Piagetian than Piaget."
Indeed, Kohlberg does, in many cases, apply the tenets of the cognitive-structuralist paradigm to
moral development more stringently than Piaget did himself. The differences become most
apparent when comparing the primacy each gave the role of reason. For Piaget, the relationship
between moral thought and action was not particularly troubling.

Whereas many philosophers and psychologists hoped to understand why a person's behavior was
often at odds with her understanding of what she ought to do - often dubbed the thought/action
problem - Piaget was interested in the reverse (Bergman, 2002). He believed children's behavior
and interactions with others sometimes led them to new moral understandings.

By contrast, Kohlberg believed "a right action performed without reason is not a moral action at
all" (Bergman, 2002, p. 108). Similarly, Ferrari and Okamoto (2003) argue that Piaget
recognized the role of emotion in moral development; they conclude, in fact, that Piaget believed
"moral identity is essentially affective, although structured and informed by reason" (p. 347).
Again, for Kohlberg reason was the 'backbone' of morality, not merely a periphery player.

Kohlberg
A product of the cultural milieu of the 1960s and 70s, Kohlberg was very much an activist.
Toward the end of his career especially, he was as interested in the practical applications of his
work as much as the development of theory, to the extent that his colleagues questioned whether
his work in the schools compromised his research (Walsh, 2000). From the beginning,
however, Kohlberg put his beliefs into action. As an engineer during WWII, he smuggled Jewish
refugees to safety. In his article titled 'Beds for Bananas,' "Kohlberg recounted with glee that he
and his shipmates had convinced various government inspectors that the South American
freighter's makeshift passenger beds were, in fact, banana-storing containers" (Walsh, 2000, p.
37).
As steadfast as Kohlberg was in his own beliefs, he was known equally for his willingness to
listen to other points of view. As one colleague remembers "The people that Larry brought in did
not necessarily agree with him. He would bring in critics. You never felt an 'us/them' or
'either/or' approach with him" (Walsh, 2000, p. 38).

Indeed, Kohlberg was challenged by people who resided very close to home; one of his biggest
challengers - Carol Gilligan - was a Harvard colleague. But Kohlberg didn't allow others to do all
the work; his willingness to listen to other points of view cultivated his revisionist tendencies. He
revised his original theory many times over the years.

In the end, perhaps the evolution of the theory is its most defining characteristic
- Kohlberg's work was ultimately unfinished. After more than fifteen years of intense pain and
suffering - the result of a parasitic infection contracted in Belize, incurable by both Western and
non-Western medical practices - Kohlberg committed suicide at age 59 by walking into the
Atlantic Ocean on a January day in 1987. Those who worked with him closely described him as
'a model of graceful suffering' who never once complained about his pain (Walsh, 2000).
What kind of theory did this activist, teacher and student propose? What did Kohlberg want to
contribute to the field, after returning from WWII, insistent that psychology not adopt a stance of
moral relativism? (Walsh, 2000).

Perhaps, a logical starting point is a brief review of Kohlberg's methodology, for while his
theory became a part of the vocabulary of every psychologist, the way in which he studied
morality became equally well-known. Recall that Piaget studied moral development by
observing children at play and by presenting them with brief anecdotes;
because Kohlberg believed morality is synonymous with reason, he had no interest in how
children might act. Instead, he wanted to investigate their thought processes, and thus presented a
series of moral dilemmas and follow- up questions. In other words, he primarily talked to
children, rather than observing them interact and play. Arguably the most well-known dilemma -
the story of Heinz - is presented in its entirety below.

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the
doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had
recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small
dose of the drug.

The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried
every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He
told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But
the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So, having
tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal
the drug for his wife (Kohlberg, 1981).

The series of questions following the presentation of the dilemma are as critical as the story
itself. Children are asked if Heinz should steal the drug, and if it's right or wrong for him to do
so; they are also asked how Heinz should act if the sick person is a stranger, rather than his wife.
After analyzing their responses to the ten follow-up questions, Kohlberg categorizes their moral
development into one of six stages.

Development through stages is one of the most defining characteristics of Kohlberg's theory; he
believed the stages were invariant - all people pass through each of the successive stages, in the
same order and without omission of any single stage, although the speed at which they progress
might vary (Rich and De Vitis, 1985). Importantly, each stage represents an individual's thought
structure, not specific content relevant to any particular moral or intellectual task;

Kohlberg's moral development stages were closely tied to Piaget's cognitive development
stages, such that an individual couldn't reach the highest stage of moral reasoning without also
having reached the highest stage of cognitive development. Each of the six stages is described
briefly below:
• Heteronomous morality: As its name suggests, this stage corresponds to Piaget's first level of
moral reasoning. Heteronomous moral reasoning is characterized by absolute obedience to the
letter of the law. At this stage, "a person assumes that moral judgments are so self-evident that no
justification is needed beyond simply stating the rule that has been broken" (Thomas, 1997, p.
59).
• Instrumental morality: Instrumental morality is a pragmatic, individualistic approach to moral
reasoning. People at this stage recognize that people have different perspectives of moral issues,
based largely on maximizing their self-interests while minimizing negative consequences.

• Normative morality: Recognition that people are governed by shared - rather than individual -
interests. People obey rules not because they are handed down from an authority - as they are in
stage 1 - but because they have been created by a collective community. Reasoning at this level
is characterized by the golden rule - do unto others as you would do unto yourself (Thomas,
1997).

• Social-system morality: People at this stage look beyond the informal, commonly agreed upon
rules described in normative moral reasoning. Instead, individuals recognize codified,
institutionalized norms put forth by social systems such as churches and governments.
• Social-welfare morality: Morality based on the promotion of universal values and rights.
Individuals at this stage recognize that social systems often cannot protect the rights of all people
- especially minority groups. People at this stage make decisions to uphold equity, equality, and
general welfare for all, even if such decisions go against society's rules.

• Morality of Universalizable, Reversible, and Prescriptive ethical principles: The highest stage
of moral reasoning, characterized by universal morality - applicable for all people at all times;
reversible morality - switching the places of the defendant and plaintiff in any moral incident
would not change the outcome; and prescriptive morality, based on promoting positive outcomes
(e.g. compassion, care, respect for others) rather than prohibiting negative ones (e.g. don't steal
or cheat).
Whether or not moral development proceeds through these fixed, invariant stages is one of the
more controversial aspects of Kohlberg's theory. As Thomas (1997) reports, there is some
empirical evidence for the first five stages, "however, there remains a question about whether
Stage 6 might perhaps be an idea condition never actually achieved in practice" (p. 61).

Kohlberg also suggested these stages were universal, cutting across all cultures. Snarey (1985,
as cited in Woods, 1996), however, suggests that Kohlberg's model is biased in favor of middle-
class, urban, industrialized nations. Research continues to explore cultural variations
of Kohlberg’s model (Wong, 2011). If Kohlberg's ideas about fixed stages are controversial, he
takes a bit of a more moderate line with respect to the question of causation. Labeled an
interactionist, Kohlberg suggests that both environment and heredity play a role in one's moral
development (Thomas, 1997).

He believed the level of logical reasoning a person attains is largely determined by genetics, but
that moral development is also influenced by motivation, exposure to social roles, and the type of
justice practiced in a child's immediate environment. Schools and families that allow students to
make decisions and assume responsibility encourage moral development, Kohlberg argued, more
so that autocratic, dictatorial environments.

Gilligan
Carol Gilligan has often been portrayed in academic and popular circles as Kohlberg's loudest
critic. A caricature that Kohlberg himself, Gilligan argues, helped create; the "Kohlberg-
Gilligan" debate took on a life of its own, very different from the real people who inhabited the
roles. Gilligan doesn't even like to view herself as a critic. "No doubt, Kohlberg has many critics,
but Gilligan emphatically denies that she is one of them" (Jorgensen, 2006, p. 193).

Indeed, others too are beginning to view Gilligan's theory as an extension or expansion
of Kohlberg's rather than as an attempt to discredit it. Kohlberg himself, some argue, embraced
her work. "It seems that Kohlberg did not reject Gilligan's work, but felt that her
research...enlarged the social cognitive domain and could exist alongside his justice domain"
(Jorgensen, 1993, p. 187). Either way, many scholars disagree with some fundamental tenets
of Kohlberg's theory; Gilligan, for better or worse, has been portrayed as the leader of the pack.
Gilligan first challenged the methodology Kohlberg used to develop his theory. She didn't feel
that hypothetical moral dilemmas were accurate representations of the way people grappled with
right and wrong in their everyday lives.

She writes, "His focus on hypothetical rather than real dilemmas sharpened my awareness of the
disparity between the assumptions governing research methods and the realities of people's lives.
With a group of graduate students, I set out to explore identity and moral development in actual
situations of conflict and choice" (Gilligan, 2004, p. 132).

In addition, Gilligan questioned Kohlberg's sample; he had used mostly men, causing Gilligan to
wonder if the resulting theory could accurately represent the moral development of women. "My
question was not how well can women do when measured by standards derived from studying
men, but rather, what had been lost by leaving out women?"
(Gilligan, 2004, p. 132).

Gilligan discovered that a great deal had been left out. In listening to women's voices, she
learned that issues of relationships and responsibilities, as opposed to justice and rights, were at
the center of women's moral dilemmas. Dubbed a 'morality of care', as opposed to a morality of
justice, Gilligan's theory suggested that Kohlberg was only telling half the story.

She writes, "in this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather
than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual
and narrative rather than formal and abstract" (as cited in Woods, 1996, p. 377).

Although Gilligan has often been criticized for highlighting gender differences in moral
development, her intention was to suggest a different way of thinking rather than to generalize
about either sex (Thomas, 1997). In fact, subsequent research suggests men and women use both
styles of reasoning - care and justice - in different situations, although women tend to use the
care orientation, and vice versa, more often (Woods, 1996).
If Gilligan's intention was not to prove differences between men in women in terms of their
reasoning about right and wrong, it was her intention to ensure that women's voices were no
longer excluded from theory building. Her contribution to social science is in fact larger than her
contribution to the study of moral development. She explains "I wrote In a Different Voice to
show how the inclusion of women's voices changes the voice of psychological theory" (Gilligan,
1996, p. 132). Bringing women's lives into focus, she believes, is a disruptive act, changing our
collective account of history altogether.

Neo-Kohlberg
There are many critics who regard Kohlberg's work as "outmoded, beyond repair, and too faulty
for anybody to take seriously. These critics suggest that research would advance more profitably
by taking a different approach" (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999, p. vii). Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) however, strongly disagree. While recognizing certain flaws in both
the methodology and content of Kohlberg's theory, Rest et al (1999) have reformulated his
original thesis, naming it a "Neo-Kohlbergian Approach."

The best way to introduce it is to demonstrate the ways in which it addresses the weaknesses
of Kohlberg's theory. First and foremost, Rest et al. (1999) agree with critics who suggest
that Kohlberg focuses too narrowly on moral judgment, at the expense of other psychological
processes. The neo-Kohlbergian approach includes judgment, but alongside what they suggest
are three equally important processes - moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action.
Sensitivity involves both perception - being able to recognize a problem - but also moral
imagination, the ability to empathize, take another person's perspective, and imagine all possible
outcomes.

Moral motivation involves the selection of priorities - choosing to give money to a charity, for
example, rather than buying something for oneself - and long-term motivation, fueled by one's
religious, professional, or personal code of ethics. The Neo-Kohlbergian model of moral
development also includes moral action, defined as both the 'staying power' to complete an
ethical action, as well as the 'know-how' to reach one's goal. Rest et al. argue that "to complete
an ethical action one must have skills in conflict resolution, assertiveness, leadership, and
planning" (Narvaez, 2005, p. 147).

While the Neo-Kohlbergian approach centers around the four components described above, it
also shifts perspective with respect to several other important points. Like Gilligan, Neo-
Kohlbergian theorists make room for an understanding of morality that includes more than
simply justice and rights. Narvaez (2005) explains "Although the neo-Kohlbergian perspective
also emphasizes the primacy of justice...it conceives of care as inherent in justice, becoming
more fundamentally integrated in the later stages" (p. 121).

For Rest et. al (1999) care is subsumed in what they call moral sensitivity, or the ability to
consider the needs of others. In addition, the neo-Kohlbergian perspective shares the belief
with Kohlberg critics that stage theories are "too broad-brush, missing much of development, and
underestimating early signs of change" (Narvaez, 2005, p. 120). Whereas Kohlberg adopted a
hard-line with respect to stage development, believing that they are universal and fixed, neo-
Kohlbergians adopt a "soft-stage" model of development.

More specifically, neo-Kohlbergians prefer using the terminology 'schemas' rather than 'stages',
to refer to the changes that occur in moral judgment structures as children develop (Craig & Oja,
2013). Finally, neo-Kohlbergians take issue with Kohlberg's methodology; instead of relying
solely on verbal expression - believing that people often know more than they can say - Neo-
Kohlbergians utilize methodologies that tap implicit and tacit memories. Rest, et al. (1999) have
been using the Defining Issues Test (DIT) for the past 25 years, measuring moral development
with people of all ages and nationalities.

Viewpoints
Arnold (2000) suggests the study of morality has been plagued by disagreement and controversy
to a greater extent than other topics because of the sensitive nature of the topic itself. "Perhaps
because morality, by its very nature, elicits such deeply felt convictions, its study has been
characterized by unique challenge and rampant controversy - and, as a result, a truly revisionist
spirit" (p. 365). Indeed, since Kohlberg proposed his theory a little over five decades ago, the
field has experienced tremendous growth and change. New theories have emerged, including
moral foundations theory which a social psychological theory that argues that morality and ethics
are more cross-cultural and intuitive as opposed to the developmental approaches of Piaget
and Kohlberg (Haidt, 2013). But the theories presented here paint just one small picture of the
field as a whole; almost every theory of development - from behaviorist theories to attribution
theory to social learning theory to Freud's psychoanalytic theory - has something to say about
how people learn right from wrong. Philosophers too, have been grappling with similar questions
for centuries. Moral development will likely remain a topic of great interest in the decades to
come.
Terms & Concepts
Autonomous Morality: According to Piaget, our moral development proceeds from
heteronomous morality - morality with a strict focus on rules handed down from authority
figures - to autonomous morality - morality that pays attention to issues such as equality and
equity, and the particulars of a situation.
Care: Kohlberg has been criticized for conceiving of morality as a function of justice alone, to
the exclusion of other characteristics such as compassion and care. Carol Gilligan, a Harvard
colleague, among others, has proposed alternative theories of moral development that focus on
our relationships to other people instead of more formal and abstract notions of justice.
Developmental Stages: Kohlberg's theory is based on the work of Piaget, who proposed that
children's cognitive development proceeds in a series of fixed and invariant stages.

Like Piaget, Kohlberg suggested that moral development proceeds through six stages:
heteronomous, normative, instrumental, social-system, social-welfare, and universal and
prescriptive morality. Neo-Kohlberg theorists abandon the hardline stage theory.

Heteronomous Morality: According to Piaget, our moral development proceeds from

heteronomous morality - morality with a strict focus on rules handed down from authority
figures - to autonomous morality - morality that pays attention to issues such as equality and
equity, and the particulars of a situation.
Moral Action: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for
focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning.

They suggested four components to moral development, one of which is moral action.
Action involves two skills - the perseverance to see an ethical action through to the end, and the
know-how to achieve the goal.

Moral Judgment: According to Kohlberg, judgment or reason is the backbone of morality. He

believed that a moral action performed without reason was not a moral action at all. His theory
was often criticized for focusing too narrowly on judgment, to the exclusion of psychological
processes such as affect and motivation.

Moral Motivation: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for
focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning. They suggested four components to
moral development, one of which is moral motivation. Motivation includes short-term
motivation - selection of priorities - as well as long-term motivation, fueled by one's religious,
professional, or personal code of ethics.

Moral Sensitivity: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for
focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning. They suggested four components to
moral development, one of which is moral sensitivity. Sensitivity involves the ability to
recognize a problem, and the ability to imagine all possible actions and consequences for self and
others.

Schemas: Neo-Kohlberg theorists abandon Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development.

Instead, they described changes in reasoning in terms of schemas - mental representations
actively constructed by people.

Bibliography
Arnold, M. L. (2000). Stage, sequence, and sequels: Changing conceptions of morality, post-
Kohlberg. Educational Psychology Review, 12, 365-383. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from
EBSCO Online Database Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=3648794&site=ehost-live

Bergman, R. (2004). Caring for the ethical ideal: Nel Noddings on moral education. Journal of
Moral Education, 33, 149-162. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from EBSCO online database,
Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=13460964&site=ehost-live

Bergman, R. (2002). Why be moral? A conceptual model from developmental

psychology. Human Development, 45, 104-124. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from EBSCO
online database, Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=11375816&site=ehost-live

Craig, P. J., & Oja, S. (2013). Moral judgement changes among undergraduates in a capstone
internship experience. Journal of Moral Education, 42(1), 43-70. Retrieved on December 15,
2013, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=85432515&site=ehost-live

Ferrari, M., & Okamoto, C.M. (2003). Moral development as the personal education of feeling
and reason: From James to Piaget. Journal of Moral Education, 32, 341-355. Retrieved
November 20, 2007 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=12252613&site=ehost-live

Gilligan, C. (2004). Recovering psyche: Reflections on life-history and history. Annual of

Psychoanalysis, 32, 131-147. Retrieved November 28, 2007 from EBSCO Online Database
Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=15392547&site=ehost-live

Haidt, J. (2013). Moral psychology for the twenty-first century. Journal of Moral Education,
42(3), 281-297. Retrieved on December 15, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database Education
Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=89946333&site=ehost-live

Jevti?, B. (2014). Teachers' Pedagogical Actions Affecting the Moral Development of

Personality. Problems Of Education In The 21St Century, 58, 67-81. Retrieved October 27,
2014, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=95669400
Jorgensen, G. (2006). Kohlberg and Gilligan: Duet or duel? Journal of Moral Education, 35, 179-
196. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=20855429&site=ehost-live
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1981). Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral
Development. Harper & Row. Narvaez, D. (2005). The Neo-Kohlbergian tradition and beyond:
Schemas, expertise, and character. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 51, 119-163. Retrieved
November 20, 2007 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=17792073&site=ehost-live

Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thomas, S. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A
Neo-Kohlbergian approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Rich, J.M., & DeVitis, J.L. (1985). Theories of moral development. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas, Publisher. Thomas, M. (1997). Moral development theories: Secular and religious.
Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Skoe, E. A. (2014). Measuring care-based moral development: The ethic of care

interview. Behavioral Development Bulletin, 19(3), 95-104. Retrieved October 27, 2014, from
EBSCO Online Database Education Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=98398586

Walker, L. J. (2004). What does moral functioning entail? In T.A. Thorkildsen and H.J. Walberg
(Eds.). Nurturing Morality (pp. 3-18). New York, NY: Plenum Publishers. Walsh, C. (2000). The
life and legacy of Lawrence Kohlberg. Society, 37. 38-41. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from
EBSCO Online Database Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=2655451&site=ehost-live

Wong, M. (2011). Chinese children's justifications for sharing resources: why do we have to
share? Early Child Development & Care, 181(9), 1199-1214. Retrieved on December 15, 2013,
from EBSCO Online Database Education Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=65456024&site=ehost-live

Woods, C. (1996). Gender differences in moral acquisition and development: A review

of Kohlberg'sand Gilligan's models of justice and care. Social Behavior and Personality: An
International Journal,24, 375-384. Retrieved November 28, 2007 from EBSCO Online Database
Academic Search
Premier http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&A
N=8771798&site=ehost-live
Suggested Reading
Killen, M., & Hart, D. (Eds.). (1995). Morality in everyday life: Developmental perspectives.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Krettenauer, T., Campbell, S., & Hertz, S. (2013). Moral emotions and the development of the
moral self in childhood. European Journal Of Developmental Psychology, 10(2), 159-173.
Retrieved October 27, 2014, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research
Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&
AN=86009713

Munsey, B. (Ed.). (1980). Moral development, moral education, and Kohlberg. Birmingham,
AL: Religious Education Press.

Thomas, M. (1997). An integrated theory of moral development. Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press.
Van Haaften, W., Wren, T., & Tellings, A. (Eds.). (2000). Moral sensibilities and education II:
The schoolchild. London, England: Concorde Publishing House.

Van Haaften, W., Wren, T., & Tellings, A. (Eds.). (2000). Moral sensibilities and education I:
The preschool child. London, England: Concorde Publishing House.
~~~~~~~~
Essay by Jennifer Kretchmar, Ph.D. Dr. Jennifer Kretchmar earned her Doctorate in Educational
Psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She currently works as a
research associate in undergraduate admissions.