Gerardo C. Roxas vs. Baliwag Transit, Inco. And/or Joselito S.

Tengco
G.R, No. 231859 Feb. 19, 2020

Facts:

Petitioner Gerardo C. Roxas was employed as bus driver by respondent Baliwag Transit
Inc. (BTI) since March 24, 1998 and paid on commission basis. In 2012, the bus to which he was
assigned was phased out pursuant to Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) Resolution 2013-01. Consequently, he became a reliever for BTI’s other remaining
buses and his work assignment was reduced from his regular three weeks work duty to only two
weeks per month.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed on June 5, 2014 a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-
payment of holiday pay, holiday premium, service incentive leave and 13th month pay, illegal
suspension, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against BTI and its owner Joselito
S. Tengco. He claimed he was constructively dismissed due to his reduced work assignment
which consequently affected his pay and other benefits.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining that there was no constructive dismissal
committed by the respondents and that Roxas’ subsequent termination from the work was valid.

Ruling: No.

In this case, while Roxas’ reduced work assignment did effectively result in the
diminution of his pay and other benefits, the same did not amount to a clear act of
discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of BTI so as to force him out of employment.
This is because the reason for the said work reduction was due to the phaseout of BTI’s old buses
as imposed by a government regulation, leading BTI to, in the exercise of its management
prerogative, adjust the previous work assignments of its employees assigned to the affected
buses. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals (CA), “the reduced work week which BTI
implemented in 2012 was in relation to the government’s directive to remove from the roads,
public utility vehicles which are 15 years old and above, for the safety of the riding public. The
decision to phase out BTI’s old buses was therefore not done out of the company’s whims and
caprices only but instead, a means on the part of BTI to cope with the downsizing of their
business operation as a consequence of the strict implementation of LTFRB Resolution 2013-
01.” As such, this exercise of BTI’s management prerogative appears to have been done in good
faith, and hence, should be upheld.

In this relation, it must be pointed out that the records fail to show that Roxas was the
only employee affected by the reduced work assignment scheme. In fact, as the LA observed,
“the assignment was made to apply to all other employees.” Thus, in view of the foregoing, the
Court holds that the CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in upholding the labor tribunals’
finding that Roxas was not constructively dismissed.

Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. and/or Industria Armamento Meridionale and/or Capt.
Amador P.Servillon vs. Roger P. Salacito
G.R. No.217431 Feb. 19, 2020

FACTS:
 Petitioner Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc hired respondent Roger P. Solacito as an able
seaman on board M/V Eurocardo Salerno on behalf of its principal, petitioner Industria
Armamento Meridionale. He had a contract of 8 months with a basic monthly salary of 563
dollars.
Solacito was deployed on March 22, 2009 after being declared fit to work by the
company’s physician. On June 18, 2009, Solacito was off-boarded and was diagnosed with otite
externa at the Clinica da Climed in Luanda, Africa. His condition did not improve and was again
off-boarded for treatment in Moroccan Hospital and was advised to medically repatriated for
treatment. On October 13, 2009,Solacito underwent a surgical procedure at St. Luke’s Medical
Center.
In January 2010, Solacito filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits,
sickness pay for three months and 10 days, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
other benefits under the law. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Solacito and held that Solacito’s
personal physician must be upheld as accurate, fair, and neutral medical assessment considering
the absence of any special relationship between said physician and Solacito other than a doctor-
patient relationship.
The NLRC concurred with the LA that the medical assessment made by Solacito’s
personal physician must prevail over that of the company designated physicians.
According to the CA, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the medical
assessment of Solacito’s personal physician over that of the company-designated physicians.

The CA explained that under the POEA-SEC and prevailing jurisprudence, the medical
assessment of the company-designated physicians should be recognized when the seafarer, in
this case, did not submit himself to the assessment of a third doctor. The CA further held that
under the POEA-SEC, Solacito is not entitled to Grade 1 disability benefit with a Grade 12
disability rating. According to the CA, Solacito’s disability has become permanent because his
disability lasted for more than 120 days from his repatriation, and the company-designated
physician declared him fit to work after more than 240 days. Yet, his permanent disability could
not be considered total in nature.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the CA erred in finding Solacito from permanent and partial disability
2) Whether the CA erred in the calculation of the amounts due to be returned to the
petitioners.

RULING:
1. No. Under the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall become final and executory
after 10 days from notice if no appeal is taken therefrom within said period. It is settled
that the aggrieved party may still seek reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC, and
then seasonably avail itself of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, as
shown by the records, petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Decision and a petition for certiorari thus, the NLRC decision is not yet immutable.
2. No. There is no basis for the proposition that petitioners should be deemed to have
abandoned their petition before the CA. There is no showing that the payment made by
petitioners to Solacito was by virtue of a settlement and in consideration of termination of
the case. On the contrary, records bear out that such payment was made pursuant to writ
of execution. Indeed, under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the filling of a petition
for certiorari with the CA shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a
restraining order is issued by the CA.