CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

1. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

FACTS: Imelda, a Filipino citizen, and Erich, a German national, married in 1979. However, after about
3 and a half years of marriage, a divorce was instituted by Erich. He claimed that there was a failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since 1982. The marriage was thereafter dissolved. 1n
1986, around 5 months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed 2 complaints for
adultery against Imelda. He argued that during their marriage, Imelda has illicit affairs with other men.

Imelda filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery” since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint.

ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of complaint for adultery

RULING: Yes. American jurisprudence yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders for the prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

As cited in the Loftus case, 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of
the husband or wife.' In such case, though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint.

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

2. People vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989

FACTS: The spouses Julio Rizare and Partricia Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa City. They were
survived by the following children - accused Mizpah and the complainants Cristina, Julieta, and Aurora.
In 1983, the complainants allegedly discover that the title for the land has been transferred in the name of
Mizpah through a notarized deed of sale with forged signature of their parents. They then filed a
complaint for the falsification of public document. The accused argued that the registration of the title to
the public registry constitutes a constructive notice to the world from which prescription will start to run.
Thus, in this case, the criminal action or liability has already been extinguished by prescription. On their

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part, the complainants insisted that the prescription of crimes is founded on a principle different from that
of the law on prescription in civil actions.

ISSUE: W/N the action is barred by prescription

RULING: Yes. The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on
practical and equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding
circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be
presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a particular
right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a precarious
balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party. After a certain period of time fixed
by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be accorded respect by prohibiting adverse claims the factual
basis of which can no longer be verified with certainty. Hence, the law on prescription of civil suits is
properly called a statute of repose.

However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental principle. Being more than a
statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time,
surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law on
prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.
In this case, the application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised
Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused

3. People vs. Pitoc, G.R. No. 18513, September 18, 1922

FACTS: Before his marriage to Petronila Roque, the defendant and his coaccused were living together
for a number of years in illicit relations. The defendant, Pedro Pitoc, legally married Petronila Roque in
the city of Manila on February 21, 1921, and together they went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to live. In a short
time he left his wife there and came to Manila, promising to return on March 15, twenty-three days after
their marriage. He never did return. On March 17, his wife came to Manila where she found the defendant
living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and
keeping company with her, under circumstances which strongly tend to show that they had resumed their
former relation.

ISSUE: W/N within the meaning of the law, the defendant cohabited “with a woman who is not his wife”

RULING: Yes. The word cohabit has many different meanings, each depending upon the sense in which
it is used. Here, we have a law intended to prohibit a married man from keeping a mistress in his dwelling
or anywhere else under "scandalous circumstances." Hence, the meaning of the word cohabit here must
relate and be confined to the subject-matter of the law itself. When used in that sense, it should be
construed to mean "to dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live together as husband and wife
although not legally married; to live together in the same house, claiming to be married; to live together at
bed and board.

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 4. Ocampo vs. People, G.R. No. 47756, June 10, 1941

FACTS: The illicit relations between petitioner Luis Ocampo and his co-accused Igmedia Refe began in
1937. In September of that year, petitioner with Igmedia went to Naga where they dwelt together as
husband and wife in the same house and were often seen together attending shows and dances. In October
of the same year, they went for a thermal bath in Tiwi, Albay, where, in the first visit, they stayed for
three days, and in the second, for four days. During their entire stay, they dwelt together as husband and
wife in the house of one Alfonsa Toledo, occupying one room where they slept alone.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be properly held guilty of concubinage

RULING: Yes. Under the provisions of article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, concubinage may be
committed in either of the following ways:(1) by keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; (2) by
having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife; and (3) by
cohabiting with such woman in any other place.

We are here concerned only with the third way of committing the offense under which petitioner was
convicted. The term "cohabit" means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for some
period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse. (People vs.
Pitoc, 43 Phil., 758.) And, whether an association, for illicit intercourse, has been such as to constitute an
unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation, is, in every case a question of fact (74 A. L. R., 1363), and
the extent of such association as to constitute a cohabitation within the meaning of the law, is a matter of
court's appreciation.

In the instant case, petitioner's conduct with his coaccused was not confined to isolated interviews for
unlawful intercourse. He and his coaccused dwelt together as husband and wife in the same house both in
Naga and Albay.

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