ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR.
, Petitioner, petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed
decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to
vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001
and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and
enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting
further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the
complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue.
The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the
appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003
denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages
against the American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President
and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said
court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein
petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and
a member of the House of Representatives and a resident
of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On
the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX,
Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines
and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th
floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents
Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX,
and may be served with summons and other court
processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the
alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his
daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner
Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to
pay her purchases in the United States some time in
April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he
was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr.
Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly
unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral
act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his
failure to pay its balance covering the period of March
2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was
allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June
2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its
supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on
July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great
inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political
and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts
which were committed in gross and evident bad faith,
and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus
prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly
and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the
allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and
improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that
the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid because none of the parties
was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents
were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner
Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced
by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was
presented when he executed the complaint's verification
and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at
Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents
pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was
prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the
said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte
Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense
of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation
refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless
and unfounded considering that he was the congressman
of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his
complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial
notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress,
he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution including that of being a resident of his
district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been
such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community
tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he
has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained
the same in the said city. In any event, the community
tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo
denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was
improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he
filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte
with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual
residence. As a high-ranking government official of the
province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice
of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation
or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in
some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the
case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for
purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous
with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home,
the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts
and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.
A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man
can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
(Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the
court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January
2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of
the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a
bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a
temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding
judge of the court a quo from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
pg. 2
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It
directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders
dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and
enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by
petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according
to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was
a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The
appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue,
the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in
Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished
the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in
legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an]
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile
refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a
person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very
well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory
in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence.
Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile,
but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length
of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred
to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it
referred to the same community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against
respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act
No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in
the place of residence of the individual, or in the place
where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law
office, which was also representing him in the present
case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were
considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions
of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and
no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating
that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of
Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact
of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had
yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the
congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of
Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint,
petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It
faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo
when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the
case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices
of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in
the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of
petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to
plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot
deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by
the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law
governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing
real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest possible convenience to the party
litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and
defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo
should have given due course to respondents' affirmative
defense of improper venue in order to avoid any
suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his
complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and
unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield
influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo
being a powerful and influential figure in the said
province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a
"specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned
that the filing of the civil action before the court in
Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping"
considering that plaintiff therein was an influential
person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May
22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS,
the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are,
VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge,
or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and
enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case,
except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order
earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by
petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days
from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all
damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may
sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction
should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not
entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded,
may refile his case for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the
Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial
Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said
decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated
August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration.
Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the
Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in
promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way
probably not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking
judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein
petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the
lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is
a residence (sic) of said district;
 (b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint on the basis of improper venue due to
the alleged judicial admission of herein
petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
complaint ignored applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that
herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and
even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in
filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to
vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's
resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly
laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because
not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as
plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against
respondents before the court a quo is a personal action.
As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case
of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by
the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice
because the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is
designed to insure a just and orderly administration of
justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of
every action and proceeding. 15 The option of plaintiff in
personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the
place where defendant resides or may be found, or the
place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the
latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had
opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is
in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his
complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
pg. 4
Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents'
theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a
resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact
that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate,
indicated in his complaint's verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That
his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the
appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of
residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and
consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in
the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at
length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of
venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term
"resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal
actions filed with the courts of first instance means the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the
plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions
(Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing
real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-
litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is,
likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term
residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of
Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a
temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where
the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the
Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50
O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand
in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence.
Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile,
but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length
of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First
Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in
referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may
be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case,
We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's
protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
based on his manifested intention to return there after the
retirement of his wife from government service to justify
his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner
in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment
since what is of paramount importance is where he
actually resided or where he may be found at the time he
brought the action, to comply substantially with the
requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on
venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals,
supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in
Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was
enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R.
No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus,
this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the
term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence
or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We
lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides'
connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished
from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,'
like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In
other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the
congressman or the representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with
the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact
as it states that "it may be conceded that private
respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the
lower house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner
Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as
possessing the requirements for the said
position,20 including that he was then a resident of the
district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte.
Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence"
are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of
"residence" for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile."
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence"
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed,
therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements:
(1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court
elucidated, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law." 23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less
technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone
representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed
in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also
deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of
venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner,
Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo,
was also his residence, as the term is understood in its
popular sense. This is because "residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of
Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding, 26 the
facts of the present case are not similar to the facts
therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court
of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff
who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon
City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return
there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not
established that he was actually a resident therein at the
time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he
establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after
retirement, the element of personal presence in that place
was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the
terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of
pg. 6
his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence
to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the
qualifications for the said position, including that he was
a resident therein. And following the definition of the
term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner
Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern
Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter
element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in
Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to
be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the
physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence
and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz.
156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol.
1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living
in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in
Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon
City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the
City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his
business in the City of Manila, he would have residence
in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990
Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can
also be his actual, personal or physical residence or
habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati
City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or
political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have
residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern
Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such
residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax
certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a
resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A
man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at
the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a
fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court
a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are
allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound
to take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the
context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as
to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly
known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable
men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common
knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that
they be known in the local community where the trial
court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo
being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte
at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by
the court a quo, the same being a matter of common
knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte
could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the
Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman
or representative to the House of Representatives is
having a residence in the district in which he shall be
elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint
with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie
of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because,
under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this
option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for
review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo
deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not
be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-
forum shopping states that he has "read the contents
thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true
and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief
and on the basis of the records at hand." The same
clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above
requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case
No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Garcia vs Fule
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of
what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by
Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging,
inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the
same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix
over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge
Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been
no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the
appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in
the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due
hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending
resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional
ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May
8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through
erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself
unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for
letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was
published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a
"Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in
four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna;
(2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3)
the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply
listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly
renounced her preferential right to the administration of
the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that
Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular
administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
pg. 8
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition
to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue,
lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of
Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G
Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on
August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the
hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances
from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar
on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties
making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already
issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on
July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia
to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting
the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to
dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been
acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she
is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G.
Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a
supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia
G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a
full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate
son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado
G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in
the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another,
to remove the special administratrix for acting outside
her authority and against the interest of the estate; and
still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B.
Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of
action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the
pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving
the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided
for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject
only to the previous qualification made by the court that
the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with
the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973
to take custody and possession of all papers and
certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B.
Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any
qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does
not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already
been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to
allege in her original petition for letters of administration
in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing
order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order
limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked
for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions
for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf
of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix was
likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two
separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28,
1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained
or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue;
(c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the
special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in
the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first
questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion
for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19,
1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix,
copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of
Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word
"single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case
(Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia
showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented
the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his residence
was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at
the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of
Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B.
Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP.
primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar
in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned
four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974,
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and
supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special
administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo
A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31,
1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to
Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia
urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B.
Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January
30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to
withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the
Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C
have not yet become final, it being the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension
of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B.
Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special
Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed
their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending
before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who
succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
pg. 10
Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to
Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for
the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of
doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE
instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order
was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if
need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon,
and the right of the person who seeks administration, as
next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The
fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the
estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant
of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as
the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate
of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not
have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not
amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision
in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter
of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts
of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of
residence of the deceased in settlement of estates,
probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration
does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the
term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule
and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule
measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court."
Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper
laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no
domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to
her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia
claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the
Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her
amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged
that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at
Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G.
Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land
to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8,
1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's
last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed
of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's
appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will,
the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the
appointment of a special administrator was only proper
when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under
appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for
appointment and such appointment is now allowed when
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to
appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
pg. 12
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason
why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides
all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such
reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other
next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of
Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains
that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with
Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate
sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but
who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be
the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter
Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on
January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First
District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote
therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the
late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down
in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and
that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of
special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved
and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna
be disauthorized from continuing with the case and
instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of

December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R.
No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate
to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations
is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of

petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and
in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.