Alba vs.

Dela Cruz

FACTS:

-petitioners

Manuela

Jose

Juan

Francisco

-they are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey.

-remedios grey alba was one of their sisters (married to vicente reyes) died w/o leaving any heir

-the 4 petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land
in Bulacan.

-such parcel of land was an agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane

-the petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the
court, on

-Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of
the 4 petitioners.

-after hearing the proofs presented, the court decree directing that the land described, in the petitioner
be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of
Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.

-Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a
revision of the case, including the decision,

-upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and
which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners.

-he alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the
petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands.

-for him, petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the
occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration.

-he further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state
grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)

-he therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified to exclude the two
parcels of land described in said motion.
- Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented
by both parties, rendered its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two
parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

-petitioners appealed.

- CA held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their
petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and

-that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial
court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of
1864.

ISSUE:

1.Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been
entered in February of the same year?

2. Whether or not the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

HELD:

The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in
favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908.

1. Yes. the said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud.

2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and addresses
of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known.

-the land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this contract was
duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these
rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the two small
parcels in question were not included in these contracts)

-the subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and
while he petitioners were minors.
-So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as
their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration.

-they did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their
application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land.

-they believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of
their tenants.

Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice
by registered mail.

-However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party
defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication “to all whom it may concern.”

-Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given]
exceptions.

-It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the
general description “to all whom it may concern.”

-As to whether or not the appellee can successfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

NOTES:

-the main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.

-the element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential characteristics of
actual – as distinguished from legal-fraud

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the
res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to
make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were
not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

action in rem vs. action in personam:

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that
only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in
some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud

6. Advantages of the Torrens System:

1. It has substituted security for insecurity. law library

2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days. law library

3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. law library

4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the “three R’s” can transact
his own conveyancing. law library

5. It affords protection against fraud.

6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but
depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence
of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
REPUBLIC V CA DELA ROSA

-Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) purpose other than mining."

-once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative.

- land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein.

-For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining
Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

Facts:

-these cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed by Jose de la Rosa on his
own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.

-land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,

-was divided into 9 lots

-according to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by

Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.

-application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated,

-in support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testifed that they had acquired the subject land
by virtue of prescription.

-Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim was sold to it by the successors-in-
interest of James Kelly,

who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.

-Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims located by Harrison and Reynolds

-these claims were purchased from these locators by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes

-trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered

-applicants appealed to the respondent court, ** which reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
-In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while
at the same time reserving the subsurface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claims.cdll

HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ v DE CASTRO

Facts:

-application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years apart in different branches of the
CFI; a certificate was issued in one case while the other was still pending.

-in 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an application for registration of a parcel of land in Tagaytay City, to
which the Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed; a portion of the land being leased by the municipality
to private persons had been its patrimonial property since 1930.

-applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance, but was excluded in the application for
registration since it is located in Laguna; same with the part of the land in Tagaytay which was excluded
from the proceedings in the CFI of Laguna.

-Lower court denied the motion to dismiss since the oppositor municipality had no personality to
intervene.

-Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the land had been decreed in
favor of private respondent de Castro, the land being initially owned by one Hermogenes Orte who sold
the land to the father of de Castro in 1932. However the deed of sale was destroyed during the Japanese
occupation.

-heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgment and cancellation of land titles of the
defendants, claiming that they had been unduly deprived ownership and possession of the land due to
wrongful registration by means of fraud and misrepresentation.

Issue:

Were the heirs of Pedro Lopez deprived of their ownership and possession of the contested land?

Ruling:

-No.

-petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land registration.

-in the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to have rendered
private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of notice in the land
registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of notice upon petitioners.

-petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by
private respondents, thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.

-petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier.
-they neglected or omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that
they either had abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches.

NB:

A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property.

Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the application for
registration and service of notice to affected parties.

In land registration proceeding, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to
zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to
a piece of land shall prevail. The rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of
filing of the application for registration of title.

The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequality or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration in
favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant
to such decree. Once the one-year period has elapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible.

This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not
yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree
becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree
so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action
in personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for
value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an
action for damages.

Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or
waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action;
but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties…
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.

LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

Facts:

-Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by the trial court.

-Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. however, the LRA refused.

-hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.

- LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to b eregistered by Sps. Laburada is part of
Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595has already been issued.

-Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 iscovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in
the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from TCTNo. 6595. The LRA
contended that to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would
result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
andpurpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue adecree of registration if it has
evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title?

HELD:

-NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another inan earlier land registration case.

-a second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once.

-thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in
1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle.

-the issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus.

-it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.

-WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig
City.

-the LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining withfinality
whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.6595, within sixty (60) days from notice.
After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and
judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration

Cruz v Secretary of Envi

-exception to the regalian doctrine

-petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371 (Indigenous People’s Right of 1997)’

-on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s

ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources therein,

-by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) to their m ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.

-after due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme Court voted as follows:

seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven

(7) others voted to grant the petition.

-as the votes were equallydivided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,

-thecase was redeliberated upon.

- However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.

- Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the
validity of the law, deemed upheld.

-Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that:

-Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,

Fact:

-petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers,

-assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).

-petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

-no, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,

-there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain.

-ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

-additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.

-they are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.

-however, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
BARANDA v GUSTILO

-a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo is the land
subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and
respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao).

-both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.

-however during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired.

-so the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with
the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-
25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.

-however, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the new certificate of title.

-this prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77
of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?

HELD:

-Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of
lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals.

-the function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature.

-the acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the
Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall
be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

-if the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.”
-On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard
to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the
action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest
through the Register of Deeds.”

Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

FACTS:

-petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's
certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the
request that the same be annotated on the title.

-under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the
parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds
portion thereof in favor of petitioners.

-the register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law.”

-It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers.

-mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been
presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.

-unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who
subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should present the other three duplicate copies of the certificate
of title, coming from the previous sales, before the register of deeds annotate their transaction.

HELD:

-Yes. Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from
the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with
such instrument” obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question,
namely, that of the registered owner himself,

-such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority
from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.

-In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section
43 of Act 496.
-As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of
those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction.

-there being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be
adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on
the others.

-the law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means
that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the
land covered by the title.

-If this would not be followed, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the
whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
NATURAL PERSONS

Facts:

-Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease of real properties in favor of Wong.

-the lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the
agreement.

-subsequently, she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for
P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000.

-the option imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids
in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month.

-the option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then
pending in the CFI of Rizal.

-it appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that
he was not a resident of Rizal.

-on October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that
adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship.

-the error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.

-in two wills, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a
codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart.

-claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements
practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

ISSUE:

Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid.

RULING:

-No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an
insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits.

-a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
-but if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years,

-then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it.

-Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that “When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited,

-and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is
thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.”

-the Constitutional provision that “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines” is an expression of public policy to conserve lands
for the Filipinos.

-the contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered
returned to the estate of Justina Santos.

Investor’s Lease Act (RA 7652) Section 4

RAMIREZ v VDA RAMIREZ

-usufruct land in favor of a foreigner as stated in the Filipino’s will

Facts:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain

-with only his widow (a French national living in Paris) as compulsory heir.

-his will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, Maria Luisa Palacios
who was appointed administratrix of the estate.

-the principal beneficiaries are as follows: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

-the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:

the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.

one part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime;

the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad."

-furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining
two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda (An Austrian living in Spain).

Issue:
Whether or not the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution

Held:

-No. It is not violative of the Constitution.

-appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it
violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

-1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

-the court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.

-the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.

-any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

-hence, the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

Ruling: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

- the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

-one-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

-one-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED

MULLER v MULLER

Facts:

-petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller got married and lived in Germany
owned by the respondent parents but then they decided to reside in the Philippines permanently.
-the respondent had inherit the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used to proceeds
for purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.

-due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the petitioner, the spouses eventually
separated.

-respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before RTC Quezon City.

-the court granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.

-with regard to the Antipolo property the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Held:

-No, Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

-there is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

-in the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional
prohibition.

-and to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina
wife.

-he tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.

-with this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity.

-It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

TING HO v TENG GUI

Facts:

-Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother,
respondent Vicente Teng Gui.
-controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the
estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the
siblings.

-petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his
death an estate.

-according to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the
name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese
citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines;

-and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own
exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:

-no, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated, the
sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or some other act or contract.

-the sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation.

-the law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale.

-but since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a
simulation.

Corporations

REGISTER OF DEEDS v UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

Facts:

-the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed
in due form by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal

-in favor of the unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”, operating through three
trustees all of Chinese nationality.

-donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple,
acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

-CFI upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds. Basis: sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such
citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila,

-the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration.

-not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has
appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is
authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether
incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold
land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable
institutions.

SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees
for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our
Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].

ISSUE:

whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose
founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.

HELD:

-provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the
Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, —

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines, the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.

-the fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality.

-to permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to
drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.

-the resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS INC V CA

Facts:

-national Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into
a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40
respectively.

-NIDC’s interest was later transferred to the National Government.

-pursuant to President Aquino’s Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization
(COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the disposition of the government’s non-
performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has
stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested
alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasaki’s interest in PHILSECO—a shipyard is a public
utility–and thus violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents’ act is valid.

HELD:

-No.

-a shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the
Article XII of the Constitution applies:

“Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association shall be citizens of the Philippines.”

Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal “under the same terms.”

-this phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they
can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion
of 60%-40% of the shares of stock.

-thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its
right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares
of stock of SNS or PHILSECO.
-NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares.

-As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to
prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits
only foreign capitalization.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVT CORP v RADSTOCK SECURITIES LMITED

Facts:

-the case is about a bidder of Government PNCC shares and securities, Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation (STRADEC) who has alleged its claim against PNCC (formerly Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)), a GOCC that has issued guarantee letters for a loan obtained
from Radstock Securities Limited.

-the said loan was originally made against Marubeni Corporation which was later assigned to Radstock.

ISSUE: Whether or not GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA.

HELD:

-GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA as its jurisdiction extends not only to government
"agencies or instrumentalities,"

-but also to "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other
government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters.