DIVISION

[ GR No. 169711, Feb 08, 2010 ]

HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE PALMA BURGOS v. CA +

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their
personal capacities and without the Solicitor General's intervention, reversal of the trial court's
order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong evidence of guilt.

The Facts and the Case

On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos
while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor
Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of
the police was that a land transaction gone sour between Sarah's live-in partner, David So
(David), and respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.

Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin
(Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to
two others who helped them, namely, Artemio "Pong" Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to
respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 51, tried the case against Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The
three others remained at large. After trial, the RTC acquitted them both.

After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of

Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder for the deaths of
Sarah[1] and Erasmo[2] and two counts of frustrated murder committed against Oquendo [3]and
Victor.[4] Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. [5] After hearing or
on April 14, 2004, the RTC[6] granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent
Co was not strong. The RTC summarized the prosecution's evidence as follows:

1. Aman and Martin's extrajudicial confessions that pointed to Co as the one who hired them to
kill David and his family.

2. David's testimony as alleged witness to the killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly told David later
when they met that it was Co who ordered the massacre.

3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant leader of the police team that investigated the
case, said that his team conducted two operations to take Co into custody. The first was in a
restaurant where they waited for him. But Co got suspicious and when he saw the police, he
immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and sped away. The police also tried to arrest
Co at his residence but the police did not find him there. Co also offered to settle the case.

The RTC had a low estimate, however, of the above evidence. First, the extrajudicial confessions
of Aman and Martin, apart from having been irregularly executed, merely proved their
participation in the killing. Neither, however, claimed conspiracy with respondent Co. Further,
the prosecution did not present Aman or Martin during the bail hearing, reportedly because
Aman was already dead and Martin could not be located. To admit their sworn statements in
evidence would deprive Co of his constitutional right to cross-examine them.

Second, David's narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated, and self-serving,
thus lacking in evidentiary weight.

Third, police officer Vasquez's story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides, while flight is often
indicative of guilt, it requires a clear showing of the identity of the offender and his evasion of
arrest. Here, said the RTC, the prosecution failed to establish Co's identity as the assailant and
his reason for fleeing from the police.

Fourth, the prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came from Co.

Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[7] but the RTC, now presided over by
another judge,[8] denied the same in its Order of May 18, 2005.[9] This prompted the victim's
heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction[10] before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.
The CA dismissed the petition,[11] however, for having been filed without involving the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence [12] and the law, specifically, Section 35,
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code which states that:

Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.--The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.
It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

xxxx

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[13] but the CA denied it for lack of merit in
its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[14]hence, the heirs' recourse to this Court.

The Issue

The case raises one issue: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action
of certiorari, which questioned the RTC's grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in
the name of the offended parties and without the OSG's intervention.
The Court's Ruling

Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is borne of
the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. [15]

The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant,
[16]
 is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.[17]

The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits.
[18]
 Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from
such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.

But, when the trial court acquits the accused[19] or dismisses the case[20] on the ground of lack of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not
automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on
mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated
criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability. [21]

The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the
accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him
for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused.
[22]
 The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. [23] Also in this wise, only the
state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG,[24] has the sole right and authority to institute
proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.[25]

As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus--

It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor
General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be
gathered from the term "shall" x x x.

xxxx
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be
no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed,
mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer.[26]

For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by
the Solicitor General, are, as a rule,[27]summarily dismissed.[28]

Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its
denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final
judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for
civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[29] this Court allowed the offended party to challenge before it
the trial court's order granting bail. But in that case, the trial court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting bail without conducting any hearing at all. Thus, to
disallow the appeal on the basis of lack of intervention of the OSG would "leave the private
complainant without any recourse to rectify the public injustice."[30] It is not the case here. The
trial court took time to hear the parade of witnesses that the prosecution presented before
reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-

G.R. SP 90028 dated June 29, 2005 and its Resolution dated September 16, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, GR No. 102342, 1992-07-03

Facts:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990

The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990.[2]

The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October
2, 1990.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed,
but the motion was denied.

the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of
the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases:

1.                Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2.                Violations of rental law;

3.                Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4.                All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos

(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of

the civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the
fiscal by... the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and... punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Issues:

the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

Ruling:

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in... the
last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that
rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"... the instant
case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,
[8] and is thus covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure.

under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until its too late.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter,
on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.

It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done... only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Chua-Uy (2000) - G.R. No. 128046 March 7,
2000

G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000

Facts: Accused-appellant Chua Uy was convicted of drug pushing and possession in three
separate cases filed against him for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,
as amended. Accused was arrested during a buy-bust operation for the illegal sale of 5.8564
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,” and possession of 401 grams of the
same drug.

After obtaining a tip from an informant regarding the accused illegal activity a team from the
Anti-Narcotics Division planned an entrapment operation where one of the police officers will
act as a poseur-buyer. The sale was consummated and the police yielded more packets of
shabu from the attaché case of the appellant. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police
station. Subsequent search in his house yielded more packets of the illegal substance. The
appellant’s version tells that on that same evening, he just got home from tending to his
garments business and was carrying a large amount of money, P132,000 to be exact from his
collections for the sales of the day. He said that he saw a white Toyota car outside his
residence, the same being offered to him for sale. He allegedly refused but agreed to test-drive
the said car. It was then that he was allegedly stopped by the police and was ordered to give up
his attaché case and forcible taken to the police station. It was there that he was accused that
said case contained the illegal substance.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and testimony of witnesses despite
the non-presentation of the NBI forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that substance
found in the accused possession is indeed shabu. The accused interposed the defense of frame-
up and alleged that the evidence was merely ‘planted.’

Issue: Whether or not the evidence is hearsay and should not have been admitted?

(CLICK READ ME TO READ MORE)

Held: It may at once be noted that neither accused nor his counsel made express admission
that the contents of the plastic bags to “be marked” as Exhibits contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Based on the joint order, it is clear that accused and his counsel merely agreed
to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause “thereby dispensing with the testimony of
forensic Chemist Bravo. The admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed. Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his
and his counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in
evidence what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, Chua Uy did not object to the
admission of Bravo’s Preliminary Report.

In addition to the foregoing admission by the accused of the prosecution’s exhibits, he likewise
never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist Bravo. He
cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.

The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the
ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the first time, be raised on
appeal. Finally, as to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI
Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his function and duty.
In Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu,
to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the “buy-bust”
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. What is material in a prosecution
for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. There is also no doubt that the
charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN was proven beyond
reasonable doubt since accused knowingly carried with him more than 400 grams of shabu
without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. Decision of CA
affirmed in toto.

On Validity of the Buy Bust

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the
purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a
procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or
were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith
and credit.18 As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime
against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-
serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.

The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the
court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses yields no basis to overturn the trial court’s
findings on their credibility. As correctly noted by the trial court, there is no evidence of any
improper motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.
RAMON has not even tried to suggest any ulterior motive.
The court is convinced that an honest- to- goodness entrapment operation was conducted by
the team composed of the local Anti-Narcotics Unit’s Chief himself who led it.

RAMON’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than
a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness.

People of the Philippines vs Uy

G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005

Facts: The accused, Uy, Gamus and Ochoa, public officers being employed by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805, 291.25 was indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial
Documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-accused where they falsify or
cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the managers check with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). Sandigan Bayan rendered a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty
for the said crime and is ordered to pay the equal amount malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa
then appealed, He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the
sworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and upon assurance it would not be used
against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights
when he executed the affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated?

Held: The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was taken
during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into
custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot
claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he
gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn
statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.

TATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO

502 SCRA 446 (2006)

The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the
Rules.

Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a
criminal case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the
absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor
Pinote was at that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon
City.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine
the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior
proceedings conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to
have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for
“Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense
to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor

HELD:

As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case
there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief
of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject
to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this
account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no
matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to
due process, so is the State.

Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the
hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for
reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates
may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.
39. People v. Piccio

Facts: Gimenez, President of Phil. Integrated Advertising Agency, advertising arm of Yuchengco
Group of Companies, filed an affidavit for libel before Office of City Prosecutor against Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting “Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms,
AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance w/ Coalition. As alleged in the complaint, was highly
defamatory and libelous. The Office of City Prosecution of Makati City found probable cause to
indict 16 trustees, officers, and/or member of PEPCI.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners, being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of the
trial court dismissing a criminal case even without the OSG’s conformity.

Ruling: No.

It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Court and the CA is vested solely in the OSG which is the law office of the Government whose
specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the people
before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice
may require.

Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the
civil aspect of the case.1âwphi1 Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the
information in Criminal Case No. 06-875 and thereby seeking that the said court be directed to
set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is sufficiently clear that they sought
the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for libel. Being an obvious
attempt to meddle in to the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG,
their recourse, in view of the above discussed principles, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the
right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is therefore the
proper party to bring the appeal through the representation of the OSG.