ARTICLE IN PRESS

Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

Market-led policy measures for urban redevelopment in Singapore

Sau Kim Lum*, Loo Lee Sim, Lai Choo Malone-Lee
Department of Real Estate, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, 4 Architecture Drive, Singapore 117566, Singapore
Received 16 January 2002; received in revised form 24 December 2002; accepted 16 January 2003

Abstract

This paper analyses the effectiveness and impacts of two market-led policy measures for stimulating private housing
redevelopment in Singapore. The first measure accorded betterment potential to sub-optimally used land through density incentives.
Subsequently, enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate site amalgamation. Using data from 1994 to 2000, the measures successfully
induced the supply of privately owned land and site assembly through en bloc sales. However, the urban intensification strategies have
resulted in unintended and adverse consequences such as infrastructural pressure, loss of environmental character and accelerated
economic obsolescence. Moreover, policy delivery that relies on private sector capital is highly dependent on market conditions.
r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Urban redevelopment; Market-led policy; Housing; En bloc sales

Introduction tions. Despite institutional differences between Singapore

Recent urban policy in many western cities has shown
a shift towards urban entrepreneurialism (Leitner, 1990)
and private sector participation (Jones, 1996). For Hong
Kong as well, public–private partnership has become a
prevalent organizing principle in urban policy imple-
mentation (Yeh, 1990). This shift reflects the state’s
increasing reliance on private sector investment deci-
sions to trigger off physical redevelopment and urban
rejuvenation. Property-led urban regeneration is then
expected to induce economic growth and bring social
benefits to the community (Jones and Watkins, 1996).
In an effort to attract private capital, two strategies
have often been adopted (Tang and Tang, 1999). These
are the formulation of development control policies that
will provide more incentives to encourage property
development and the removal of private sector supply
side constraints. Both strategies were employed recently
in the city-state of Singapore to facilitate the achieve-
ment of key planning objectives in the long-term
development of the country.
As with parallel approaches elsewhere, the Singapore
government introduced a new planning incentive in the
early 1990s that relied primarily on private investment
to stimulate urban redevelopment in central-city loca-
*Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +65-6874-6900.
E-mail address: rstlumsk@nus.edu.sg (S.K. Lum).
and other western cities, two common features of their
recent urban policy initiatives towards inner city redeve-
lopment have been an emphasis on the private sector and
an unprecedented faith in the efficiency of the market.
But while deregulation and privatization have become
dominant themes of urban policy since the Thatcher and
Reagan administrations (Gaffikin and Warf, 1993), it was
only in 1994 that pro-market planning incentive measures
were introduced in Singapore through the Development
Guide Plan (DGP) to supplement government actions.
Prior to that, government intervention and state-led
development have been largely instrumental in effecting
urban development goals despite Singapore being a
laissez faire economy (Zhu, 1997).
In particular, private sector participation in the urban
renewal of Singapore has been largely passive. Under
the Government Land Sales (GLS) program that began
in 1967, sub-optimally used land parcels were acquired
and assembled by the state for comprehensive redeve-
lopment. Developers who bought these land parcels had
to adhere to a stringent set of conditions that stipulated,
among other things, the type of development allowed
and the time-frame for completion (URA, 1995).
Initially, various financial and tax incentives were
offered to attract investors to bid for the sites. As time
went on, these incentives were gradually withdrawn.
This was because the state owned some 76% of the
aggregate land mass in Singapore and it soon became

0264-8377/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0264-8377(03)00046-2
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
2 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
apparent that the GLS program was the dominant
source of vacant or ‘‘soft land’’ for development
activities. By comparison, the supply of privately owned
land parcels was small since the ownership of these sites
was often fragmented. More importantly, there were few
incentives for private agents to market and develop the
sites, given the non-trivial land assembly and other
transaction costs involved.
This changed with the release of the first of 55 DGPs
in 1994. For privately owned sites in many of the
centrally located areas, the DGPs relaxed extant devel-
opment controls on building density in terms of the
allowable plot ratio or floor area ratio (FAR as it is called
in the US; Seyfried, 1991). The land-use planning density
bonus gave rise to attractive land value enhancement
possibilities that triggered a string of what have been
called en bloc or collective sales. In such a sale, owners of
fragmented interests in land responded to the DGP
inducement of private gains by banding together to sell
their combined sites for redevelopment collectively.
Since the assembly of interests in redevelopment land
was by means of private negotiation, the process was
time consuming and became prohibitively difficult when
more land lots or interests were involved. Particularly
after the onset of the Asian financial crisis, en bloc sales
ground to a halt. Policy-makers were convinced that the
requirement of a 100% consensus level amongst all
landowners of an en bloc redevelopment scheme frustrated
the development incentives of the DGPs. To remove this
supply side constraint, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amend-
ment) Act was passed on 11 October 1999 to allow an en
bloc sale to proceed as long as a majority, rather than all,
of the landowners are in agreement (The Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Act, 1999).
This paper aims to critically evaluate the effectiveness
and impacts of the two strategies outlined above in the
high-density urban context of Singapore. The next
section provides a brief policy background that focuses
on the rationale for the DGP planning incentives and
for the subsequent implementation of the Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Act. We then present an evalua-
tive framework and our assessment of whether the
strategies have achieved their stated policy objectives of
inducing the supply of privately owned land and
increasing private sector site amalgamation for new
urban housing redevelopment. In addition, we analyze
their unintended impacts. The paper concludes with
some implications of using market-led initiatives for
urban housing redevelopment.
The policy measures
In the early 1990s, the planning system in Singapore
underwent substantial changes. The system that had
guided the country’s development over the previous 30
years was found to be inadequate to steer future
development towards the long-term goals of the
government. In a major rationalization exercise,
the national planning and conservation authority—the
Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA)—implemented
a new two-tier planning system. The upper tier
comprised the Revised Concept Plan, a strategic plan
that mapped out the vision for the long-term physical
development of the country. With the completion of the
Revised Concept Plan in 1991, the URA proceeded to
prepare detailed plans called DGPs that formed the
lower tier of the planning system.
DGPs are essentially statutory local plans that
contain details such as land-use zones, development
intensity, transportation networks, open space and
recreational areas and conservation designations that
guide land development in a demarcated area. Singapore
is currently divided into 55 planning areas. For each of
these areas, a DGP was prepared where the broad
strategies contained in the Revised Concept Plan were
translated into operational details at the local level. As
each DGP was completed, it became the reference for
development control and provided guidelines to land-
owners and developers on the type of use to which their
land could be put (URA, 1991a).
The 1991 Revised Concept Plan sets out the overall
strategy for maximising land use in Singapore (www.
ura.gov.sg). A key objective was to increase the overall
provision of housing land (URA, 1991b). Under the new
planning system, the DGPs will support the Concept
Plan through providing new channels for growth
(Malone-Lee, 1989). More land will be rezoned for
residential use (URA, 1993) and many areas, particu-
larly parcels in locations with enhanced public infra-
structure such as improved road or rail systems and
other community amenities, will enjoy enhanced devel-
opment intensity. Given these higher intensities, sites in
the affected urban areas stood to enjoy positive market
gains in terms of higher redevelopment potential.
However, most of these urban land lots were held under
private and multiple ownership. In some of the older
housing districts in the Central Area, single-family
dwelling units were built on small sites laid out in a
narrow, compact gridlock street pattern. Multi-family
units tended to be on larger sites but many of these did
not cover land areas in excess of 1000 m2.
Prior to the implementation of the new DGP planning
system, the state would identify underutilized sites for
compulsory acquisition by eminent domain rules and
then package them for sale to the private sector through
sealed-bid auctions. This mechanism attracted criticism
on two fronts—the government paid too low a price and
sold at too high a price. Private land owners who lost
their lots felt that the compensation meted out under the
Land Acquisition Act was below market levels (The
Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152), 1985). Yet, when these
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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
sites were subsequently put out for tender, the prices
achieved often set new price benchmarks for land sales.
In addition, it was becoming increasingly difficult to
justify the expropriation of private land when the sites
would eventually be used for private development rather
than to further the ‘‘public good’’.
In line with the governmental drive towards capital
sovereignty in the late 1980s, planners in Singapore also
adopted free market principles to achieve planning
goals. Rather than have land assembly carried out by
the state alone, the private sector was offered incentives
to amalgamate diverse interests in land under the new
planning system. In doing so, private agents were able to
realize the gains from betterment potential accorded by
the planning vision articulated in the DGPs and thereby
enable redevelopment.
This situation gave rise to the en bloc redevelopment
phenomenon whereby owners of fragmented interests in
land responded to the DGP enticement of private gains
by amalgamating their combined interests for sale and
eventual redevelopment (Lum et al., 2000). The existing
properties may be in a single strata-titled building as
would be the case of multi-family housing or adjacent to
each other as with adjoining single-family units. By
pooling multiple interests in developed land to form a
more attractive redevelopment configuration, an en bloc
sale allowed real estate owners to capitalize on the
‘‘marriage value’’ of the en bloc site.
Such efforts however often encountered difficulties
especially in developments where numerous owners with
differing interests were involved. Particularly for the
older dwelling units in the central city that were often
significantly larger than the newer housing stock, many
of the existing owner-occupiers resisted en bloc sales as
comparable substitute homes in the prime areas were
scarce and very costly. Even if complete in-principle
consensus could have been secured for a joint sale,
invariably there were disagreements with regard to the
selling price, the apportionment of the sales proceeds,
the mode of disposal and the timing of events. As a
result, many en bloc sales stalled.
While there was no express statement by policy
makers when the DGPs were released, the intention of
the planning incentives was clearly to encourage private
developers to amalgamate property interests in land to
enable efficient redevelopment and urban rejuvenation.
Under similar measures undertaken by governments
elsewhere, developers had to pay for the planning gain
either by making appropriate local contributions (Bun-
nell, 1995), by providing public benefits from within
their development projects (Sagalyn, 1997) or by
building ancillary facilities (Tang and Tang, 1999).
Likewise, the private sector in Singapore was obliged to
pay for the density bonus through a development charge
that creamed off part of the enhanced value to the
government coffers. In fact, the sites that experienced
3
the greatest betterment potential were often in areas
where the state had made or was scheduled to contribute
heavy infrastructural investments. If en bloc schemes
were to fail on account of the problems involved in
acquiring properties held under multiple ownership, the
government stood to lose the ability to leverage on its
investments for an optimal level of urban renewal
(Boyle, 1985).
On 11 October 1999, the Land Titles (Strata)
Amendment Act 1999 was enacted with the intention
of facilitating en bloc sales (Sim et al., 2002). Prior to this
measure, all the owners of an estate or building had to
agree to sell because a 100% consensus level was necessary
for the passage of a collective sale. With the passing of the
Act, there is no longer a requirement for all of the owners
to agree. A majority vote is sufficient to carry the deal
through. Majority vote is defined as follows:
(a) If the development is less than 10 years old, not less
than 90% of the owners, according to share values,
must agree to the en bloc sale.
(b) If the estate is more than 10 years old, an 80%
majority will be sufficient.
Proceeds from the sale will then be apportioned
among individual owners in accordance with their
shares of the land interest or the assessable value of
their properties. Where there are disagreements, the
Strata Titles Board (STB) is the body that rules on these
disagreements or objections. The Land Titles (Strata
Titles Boards) Regulations (1999) set out the procedure
for application to the Board, the proceedings of the
Board and other matters such as appeals to the Board
and to the High Court.
By significantly altering the balance of power between
consenting and dissenting owners, the state has in-
creased the probability of success for an en bloc sale
where a minority of owners may be holding out for
financial or other reasons. Whilst this raises some
interesting questions on the issue of property rights
(Sim et al., 2002), this paper is more concerned with the
impact of the legal measure towards facilitating private
sector redevelopment efforts. The next section presents
our analysis of the effectiveness and impacts of the DGP
density bonus and the subsequent enactment of support-
ing legislation.
The effectiveness and impacts of the policy measures
The evaluative framework
We evaluate the policy initiatives in terms of their
intended and unintended impacts. First, we assess how
effective the measures have been in achieving the
government’s objectives of inducing the supply of
privately owned land and increasing private sector site
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
4 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
amalgamation for new urban housing redevelopment.
Second, we analyze the unintended consequences of the
measures for the built environment.
Typically, the success or failure of a land policy
experiment is determined by making comparisons either
on a spatial or cross-sectional basis—between affected
land parcels and parcels under a no-action alternative—
or on an inter-temporal basis—the same space before
and after policy intervention. In Singapore, both
methods are problematic. The first requires the existence
of a ‘‘control’’ area, a condition that cannot be satisfied
as the policy measures were implemented island-wide.
The second is complicated due to the long duration for
policy execution.
Our approach is to divide the study period from 1994
to 2000 into two separate time-frames coinciding with
the two policy-on situations:
* Situation I, 1994–1997: 1994 is the year in which the
first measure of a new planning density bonus was to
take effect. By late 1997, all residential land dealings
including en bloc sales had stopped as a result of the
economic slowdown triggered by the Asian financial
crisis. These activities resumed only in 1999.
* Situation II, 1999–2000: The 20-month period from
May 1999 to December 2000 is associated with the
passage of enabling legislation to facilitate land
amalgamation efforts. Although the Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Bill was gazetted only on 3
September 1999, it was evident from the well-
publicized deliberations of a specially constituted
Board (Report of the Select Committee on the Land
Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 19 April 1999) that
policy-makers would change the legal regime in
favour of collective sales (The Straits Times, 1999a,b).
For each situation, we identified all the transactions in
private residential development land that were reported
in the media as well as non-publicized deals that had
been brokered by property consultants. Existing plan-
ning parameters and redevelopment details for each land
parcel were examined based on the relevant DGPs and
Master Plans prepared by the URA. Information on
sales prices was extracted from statistics provided by the
Property Research Department of the URA, as well.
The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales
transactions are presented in Tables 3 and 4 of
Table 1
The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and non-en bloc sales
Land supplied (m2)
En bloc Non-en bloc
1994–1997 367,462.5 213,567
1999–2000 335,682.2 77,684
Total 703,144.7 291,251
Appendix A. We then attempted to answer the following
questions.
Did the measures induce the supply of privately owned
land?
Table 1 presents the quantum of land supplied
through private sector channels. Between October 1994
and November 1997, 97 en bloc deals were concluded
that yielded 90 parcels of residential redevelopment land
covering an area of 367,463 m2. During our second
policy-on period, 52 sites with 335,682 m2 of land were
sold through 54 collective sales. These quanta are
compared to the amounts of land sold by private agents
through non-collective sales. The latter provides the best
available control for contextual influences over our
study period as these transactions were also originated
by private agents in response to market forces for land
parcels of comparable tenure and use, but typically not
in response to the revised densities. During both policy-
on periods, collective sales induced a greater land supply
than non-en bloc deals with the difference being more
pronounced in Situation II.
We also compare the en bloc land supply against the
supply of state-owned land. GLS parcels tend to be
larger in size compared to en bloc sites and hence offered
developers greater development flexibility. Such land is
sold only on 99-year leases to private sector builders for
high intensity developments with plot ratios of 2.8 or
more. Although the GLS supply may not be an ideal
benchmark, state-owned sites are put up for sale only
when there is perceived demand from developers.
Table 2 presents our results. While the quantum of state
land sold in the earlier policy-on period was about 2.7
times the amount of privately held land supplied through
collective sales, the supply from the en bloc market
dominated state land provision in the second period.
Fig. 1 shows the annual quantum of land from private
sector sales, both collective and non-collective, as well as
from the GLS Program over our study period. There are
two important observations. First, both private and
public land supply are positively correlated to the
strength of the market for private residential property
as proxied by the Residential Property Price Index
(RPPI). Second, the composition of private land supply
has changed quite markedly since the introduction of
Number of sites Average size of plots (m2)
En bloc Non-en bloc En bloc Non-en bloc
90 67 4082.9 3187.6
52 22 6455.4 3531.1
142 89 4951.7 3272.5
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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19 5

Table 2
The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and government land sales

Land supplied (m2) Number of sites Average size of plots (m2)

En bloc State-owned En bloc State-owned En bloc State-owned

1994–1997 367,462.5 1,477,241 90 92 4082.9 16,057

1999–2000 335,682.2 195,519 52 13 6455.4 15,040

Total 703,144.7 1,672,760 142 105 4951.7 15,931

Fig. 1. The RPPI and the supply of land for private residential development.

the policy measures. Prior to 1994, virtually all the
privately owned land that entered the market was sold
by corporations and single-entity owners. After the
policy incentives were implemented, such land has been
increasingly supplied through collective sales.
Measured against the government’s objective of
inducing the supply of privately owned residential
development land, particularly for parcels held
under multiple interests, the first policy measure of
providing DGP density incentives was moderately
successful. However, its impact in Situation I was
limited by three supply side barriers. First, the problems
encountered in securing unanimity amongst all the
owners capped the number of estates that could be
freed for more intensive and efficient redevelopment.
Second, the difficulties in brokering larger deals where
many homeowners were involved, meant that many of
the sites in the earlier sales were small. We present
statistics on site amalgamation later. Third, the trend of
en bloc activity was initially confined mainly to the
prime areas where the revisions in planning parameters
were generally large. Due to the high cost of land in
these areas, there were sizeable capital constraints to
entry and only developers with adequate financial
resources could acquire such sites.
When some of the supply side barriers were removed
by the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act in
Situation II, the joint effect of the policy measures on
en bloc land supply was evident. In late 1998 and early
1999, the residential property market began to improve.
Fig. 2 shows the marked increase in the demand for new
residential units as the Singapore economy began its
post-crisis recovery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
this took many developers and even policy-makers by
surprise. As the housing inventories of many producers
were rapidly being depleted, developers who needed to
replenish their land banks began to source new sites.
The economic turn-around also saw demand for
development land from new entrants into the private
housing market. In the absence of GLS, these players
began to source land from private land owners.
En bloc activity began to emerge again in mid-1999.
However, the pace of collective sales gained momentum
only in the third quarter of 1999 when it became clear
that the enactment of enabling legislation to allow
majority rather than absolute consensus for a collective
sale to proceed was imminent. The Land Titles (Strata)
(Amendment) Bill was gazetted on 3 September 1999
and the amended Bill was brought into force on 11
October 1999. In essence, the law overcame site
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6 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
Fig. 2. The RPPI and turnover in the private residential market.
assembly problems and was instrumental in removing
supply side obstacles from deals that would otherwise
have stalled because of dissenting unit owners. This,
coupled with a slow response from the GLS program,
resulted in a significant supply of en bloc land in the
second policy-on period.
Did the measures induce the amalgamation of private land
sites?
Figs. 3 and 4 present the distribution of the site area
of en bloc parcels corresponding to the two policy-on
situations. For both cases, the distribution is skewed
toward the smaller size range. This is particularly so for
sites assembled in the earlier period. The average size of
these parcels was 4083 m2, a figure that was inflated by
the presence of an outlier. Once this exceptionally large
site was removed, the average size fell to 3786 m2
(Fig. 5). In the second policy-on period, the average size
of sites assembled with the passage of enabling legisla-
tion was 6216 m2.
Compared to non-en bloc sites, privately owned land
parcels that were assembled through collective sales
were generally larger (see Table 1). While this implies
that the policy package did induce the amalgamation of
private land interests, there is a clear difference in the
size of collective sales sites in the two policy-on periods.
Although the DGP planning bonus triggered a large
number of parcels into the market, the supply that
resulted from the first policy measure was dominated by
small-scale redevelopment sites. This has important
and unintended implications for the built environment,
an issue that we address below. In contrast, significantly
larger sites were assembled after the enactment of the
Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act, an instrument
that offered private agents greater leverage for
amalgamating larger tracts of land for redevelopment
purposes.
What are the potential changes in net housing stock?
Since all the collective sales sites will eventually be
developed for housing, we estimated the potential net
effect of the policy measures on the private housing
stock. The last column in Tables 3 and 4 presents the
estimated number of housing units that are likely to be
developed on each of the assembled en bloc sites. Where
there are ongoing or completed projects or in cases
where development plans have been announced, the
actual number of units is reported. Otherwise, we have
assumed that future developments on the collective sale
sites will have an efficiency factor of 87.5% (i.e. 87.5%
of the gross floor area will be saleable unit area) and
provide units with an average size of 116 m2.
Table 3 shows that the potential supply from en bloc
sites assembled in the first policy-on period is estimated
to be around 4829 private housing units. Collective sales
in Table 4 which were concluded in the second policy-on
period are expected to generate another 5512 units. The
net increase in the future housing stock will be smaller
because of the demolition of existing houses. An
estimated 1398 residential units will be lost as a result
of en bloc sales in the pre-Asian crisis period whereas
about 1773 units will be replaced from the sites
amalgamated during our second policy-on period. Thus,
the net addition to supply is some 7170 private
residential units.
Based on an average annual take-up rate of 6500
private housing units over the last 3 years, collective
sales potentially add more than 1 year’s supply to the
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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19 7

25
Series: AREA

20 No. Of Observations 90

Mean 4082.917
15 Median 3078.900
Maximum 30472.00
Minimum 462.600
10

0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 3. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 1994–1997.

25
Series: AREA

20 No. of Observations 52

Mean 6455.425
15 Median 4221.200
Maximum 26441.50
Minimum 967.4000
10

0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 4. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 1999–2000.

16
Series: AREA
14
Observations 89
12
Mean 3786.410
10 Median 3053.400
Maximum 16055.50
8 Minimum 462.6000
6

0
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 5. Size distribution of en bloc sites with outlier removed, 1994–1997.

private residential market. However, the total take-up is on privately held land is no more than 2000 units per
a composite number for units built on privately supplied annum over the past 3 years, en bloc sites could
land and state land sold on 99-year leaseholds. potentially contribute about 4 years’ worth of supply
Considering that the average take-up rate for units built to the private housing sector.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
8 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
Fig. 6. Newton and Tanglin DGP areas within the central region of Singapore.
However, the timing of this supply will depend on
market viability. Unlike state land sold under the GLS
program, developers who own en bloc sites are not
obliged to complete their residential schemes according
to a prescribed schedule. Indeed, many of the larger
players in the private housing supplier market have
bought these sites with the intention of building a
strategic prime residential land bank for future corpo-
rate expansion.
What are the unintended impacts of the policy measures?
Although the policy initiatives have had some
incipient success in achieving their targeted outcomes,
a few adverse impacts have surfaced. This section
presents an assessment of the unintended consequences
of the market-led policy measures based on our
examination of several en bloc hotspots in the Newton
and Tanglin DGPs within the Central Region of
Singapore (see Fig. 6). These areas have seen the
translation of higher FAR intensities into numerous
new developments and the impact of these developments
on the local environment is now evident.
On a positive note, many en bloc redevelopments
have brought about accelerated rejuvenation of residen-
tial areas as intended by policy makers. Older dilapi-
dated structures have given way to new and modern
developments that not only optimize land use but have
also resulted in improved amenities for local residents.
In the process of renewal, current planning standards
such as those relating to building spacing, road-
widening, landscaping and the provision of amenities
have been imposed and incorporated. Thus, apart from
higher development intensities in many of these en bloc
areas, better quality housing and housing environments
have been achieved which is in line with the overall
planning objectives.
In certain areas however, urban renewal through
private sector efforts has had other planning impacts,
some of which are less than desirable for the local
environment particularly in the short and medium term.
We identify four such impacts below. Many of these are
common consequences of property-led regeneration
efforts where comprehensive urban renewal tends to
give way to piecemeal redevelopment of urban frag-
ments (McGrew, 1992).
Timing and co-ordination
Under the en bloc sale mechanism, market forces
responding to the prospect of enhanced gains bring
about early renewal of potential sites. Here, the private
developer’s primary consideration would be based on
commercial motives and market demand, unlike the case
where redevelopment is undertaken by the public
sector. The latter would have to regard overall commu-
nity needs as well as environmental concerns. Due
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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
consideration would normally be given to the proper co-
ordination and phasing of redevelopment efforts to
ensure a smooth and gradual transition from old to new
and from low to high density. Thus, urban renewal
would be comprehensive and systematic rather than ad
hoc and uncoordinated (Healey et al., 1988). We have
found in en bloc sale areas many sites that were
sandwiched between new and more intensive develop-
ments, when they themselves for whatever reasons were
either not ready or unable to capitalize on the en bloc
schemes. The result of such unsynchronized develop-
ment is often a less than harmonious streetscape with an
incongruous mix of new and old developments of
different intensities.
In other instances, particularly in landed housing
areas, sites that were left out of the amalgamation
schemes became isolated or hemmed in by new and
more intensive developments with little opportunity for
redevelopment to similar intensities in future given their
relatively small plot sizes. This has been seen in many
areas where single old buildings sit as ‘‘environmental
misfits’’ amidst new developments.
The long-term planning implication is that optimal
land use will only be attained for certain development
sites in the area, but not for the entire planning area.
These isolated buildings will remain, not only as blots on
the landscape to the detriment of the overall environ-
mental quality of the entire renewed area, but also as
reminders to the community of lost opportunities and
sub-optimal development.
Developments not in tandem with infrastructure
improvements
When urban renewal is undertaken by the state on a
comprehensive basis, public infrastructure and support
services are usually planned and undertaken at the same
time to support the new developments. However, with
en bloc redevelopment undertaken on an ad hoc basis by
the private sector, the ability to tie in with public
infrastructure and services enhancement is rendered
more difficult. This is illustrated in the Balmoral Road
area in the Newton DGP.
One of the planning objectives of the Newton DGP
was to optimize the land use, particularly around the
Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station, by increasing the
total number of housing units by about 3200 units. Most
of the new units will be of the high density category, in
recognition of the proximity of the area to the centrally
located Orchard Road area and its good accessibility.
A closer study of some of the local areas in the DGP
revealed that many of them are quiet well-established
residential enclaves with predominantly single- or
double-storey landed housing, located in attractive local
environments well-integrated with mature vegetation
and are served by narrow local roads. In the Balmoral
Road area, the 1985 Master Plan plot ratio was 1.036.
9
However, the Newton DGP has rezoned it medium
density with a plot ratio of 1.6 although the area is more
than 200 m from the Newton MRT Station. Building
heights are to be increased to 10 storeys.
Prior to the release of the DGP, the area on both sides
of Balmoral Crescent has around 25 land plots, most of
them accommodating low-rise landed housing develop-
ments and a few small blocks of walk-up apartments.
Balmoral Crescent is a 15 m-wide dual carriageway local
access road. While the DGP envisages transportation
improvements to the area at the converging junction
between Clemenceau Avenue North and Newton Circus
as well as future local roads to serve developments on
the vacant land parcels around the Newton MRT
Station, few improvements have been proposed for the
existing local access road networks.
Fig. 7 shows the land plots in the Balmoral area as
well as extant developments on these sites. In response
to the DGP provisions, a total of five recent en bloc
deals were recorded (marked with small dots) of which
two are under construction. Over 200 new dwelling units
are envisaged from these five deals to replace the existing
40 odd dwelling units, a five-fold increase. This is in
addition to the two new developments that have already
taken place (shown with large dots). The change in the
environmental character of the area is now becoming
evident, with the existing two-storey houses sandwiched
between newly completed 10-storey buildings and those
currently under construction. The quiet local road,
which is not expected to be further widened, will carry a
substantially increased traffic load. Further, the junc-
tions with arterial roads are likely to encounter some
congestion impacts during the morning peak hours. This
will be more severe when all the sites are redeveloped.
Changing environmental character
While one of the Revised Concept Plan objectives is to
increase the proportion of private residential dwellings,
it is also intended that there should be greater variety of
housing forms. With the en bloc sales phenomenon
however, we envisage that many of the landed housing
areas will give way to medium to high-rise condominium
developments with the attendant changes in the
environmental character.
A case in point is the Walshe Road area off Stevens
Road. In the 1985 Master Plan, the Plot ratio was 1.036
with a maximum allowable height of two storeys. Prior
to the DGP changes, the area around Walshe Road had
around 20 houses, most of which were two-storey
bungalows on large sites. Walshe Road is a 15m-wide
dual carriageway local road that extends a short
distance from Stevens Road, and branches off from a
T-junction to cul-de-sacs on both sides. The area, shown
in Fig. 8, had a distinctive character with its established
residences integrated amidst greenery, mature trees and
beautiful landscape.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
10 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
Fig. 7. The Balmoral Road area within the Newton DGP area.
Under the Tanglin DGP, the plot ratio was raised to
1.6 and the height control revised to 10 storeys. Through
a series of well-conceived en bloc sales, the house plots
have been amalgamated into four large parcels for high-
rise condominium developments with over 250 new
dwelling units. With these new developments, a severe
change in the local environmental character has begun
to take place. From an informal cluster of distinctive
dwellings amidst luxuriant vegetation, a new high-rise
environment of glass and concrete monoliths has
emerged as shown in Fig. 9. The dense environment
is clearly felt at street level and rendered harsher given
the sparse vegetation and narrowness of the existing
cul-de-sac.
In other areas, particularly the River Valley belt
which saw much en bloc activity in our first policy-on
period, amalgamated sites tend to be small. Redevelop-
ment of these small sites often in the form of thin,
needle-shaped buildings with minimal communal facil-
ities is also undesirable. The resulting streetscape is often
unsightly with the densely packed buildings aggravating
traffic congestion problems.
Early obsolescence of buildings
Urban renewal is normally undertaken when build-
ings or areas are ripe for redevelopment both economic-
ally and physically. The en bloc sales phenomenon is a
market response and tends to accelerate redevelopment
for buildings or areas which are ‘‘available’’ for
redevelopment due to their higher accorded planning
intensities. In effect, their economic life is shortened.
However, they may still be relatively new physically and
therefore of sound structure and could well remain
functional for many years yet. And, if built in recent
years, they would have met the relevant current
planning standards in terms of building set-backs, open
space provision, amenities and compliance with basic
planning and technical (public health, safety, utilities,
landscaping, fire prevention, etc.) requirements.
Under these circumstances, their redevelopment,
purely in response to market factors, could be regarded
as wasteful of national resources. In an otherwise
conventional and well-conceived public sector initiated
urban renewal program, these buildings would probably
be phased in for redevelopment only after being given a
substantial run of its physical life. The more deteriorated
buildings, both physically and economically, would
normally be scheduled for redevelopment at the earlier
phases of such a program. The overall impact of the en
bloc sales phenomenon in this respect is the untimely
demolition and rebuilding of newer areas ahead of older
and more deserving areas, certainly not the most
efficient manner of managing land and building
resources.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19 11

Fig. 8. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area pre-1994.

Fig. 9. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area post-1994.

Conclusion that sought to encourage the private sector regeneration

of central city residential areas. In accordance with the
This paper evaluates the effectiveness and impacts of Revised Concept Plan, the first measure provided
two recent market-led policy initiatives in Singapore density bonuses in terms of higher plot ratios to many
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
12 S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
private urban sites through Development Guide Plans
(DGPs). Generally, sites that enjoyed betterment
potential were selected based on their proximity to
commercial areas and in line with the development
intensity of surrounding developments. This led to a
series of en bloc sales where diverse interests in land
were amalgamated and sold to private sector developers
for eventual redevelopment.
However, fragmented and multiple ownership of
many urban parcels often frustrated the realization of
the planning gain by private agents as well as the
state’s urban renewal objectives. The problems of
holdouts and minority objection to the assembly of
private interests were more acute in the central
area where prime land for higher-intensity residential
development was scarce. This resulted in a second
measure in the form of supporting legislation. Essen-
tially, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act
facilitated en bloc sales by requiring majority rather
than unanimous consent from existing land owners for a
sale to proceed.
Our evaluation shows that the first policy measure of
DGP density incentives had limited success in achieving
desired planning outcomes. While there was an increase
in the number of private residential sites supplied, the
parcels were predominantly small. This stemmed from
the difficulty in land assembly for properties held
under multiple ownership. The second measure
where facilitating legislation was enacted aided land
amalgamation efforts. When both policy initiatives were
in operation, the en bloc parcels supplied were larger
and had generally more efficient configurations. Mea-
sured in terms of high quality housing stock, the policy
measures are likely to generate about 4 years’ supply.
However, as with all market-led conversions, whether
the planning incentives will actually translate into new
developments and when this will take place depend on
effective demand and the state of the private residential
market.
Measured against a broader set of criteria, it is
unclear if the market-led redevelopment measures
are able to achieve the wider objectives of the
Revised Concept Plan effectively without imposing
significant costs on the supporting infrastructure
as well as on the environment. Some of their
adverse and unintended consequences that are already
evident in central-city locations include: the market’s
inability to organize and schedule redevelopment
efforts; the increase in traffic and infrastructure loading;
the loss of environmental character and incompatibility
with the surrounding context; and finally the accelera-
tion of economic, but not functional or physical,
obsolescence.
Several of the negative externalities of en bloc
development can be attributed to the lack of a minimum
lot size requirement. In Hong Kong for example, a FAR
bonus is only given to developers if their redevelopment
reaches a certain threshold size of 400 m2 (Tang and
Tang, 1999). This can reduce the problems associated
with small-scale redevelopment sites. The more difficult
problem is the implementation gap associated with
urban intensification efforts. In land-scarce cities,
infrastructure pressures are amplified by planning
strategies based primarily on density. Unless planners
are clear about and are able to manage the exact
consequences of piecemeal redevelopment, policy deliv-
ery will be compromised.
The larger issue is whether the private sector can be
relied upon to achieve urban renewal goals in the future.
During the building boom of the early to mid-1990s,
high values of private residential property provided
an almost ideal lever for securing private sector
participation through zoning incentives. It is unlikely
that the bubble-like conditions prevalent then will be
repeated in the future. Further, en bloc activity thus far
has been focused on much of the older stock that
comprised small low-rise structures often in dilapidated
estates where the betterment premiums have been large
(Lum et al., 1999). At the next level of replacement are
medium-rise developments but the ever more marginal
viability of redeveloping them will make it increasingly
difficult for private developers to undertake such
projects. Despite the early success of the government’s
policy measures, it is questionable whether the same
prescriptions will work in the longer term on a sufficient
scale or expeditiously enough to tackle the problems of
urban regeneration.
The Singapore planning system is still in a
period of trial and error in assessing what
strategies can work in delivering long-term develop-
ment and land use optimization objectives. While its
experiment with urban intensification through en bloc
sales is fairly unique, there are broader implications
for other market-led measures that can be learnt.
Essentially, public sector efforts to implement urban
renewal through market-led redevelopment face
a dual land-use policy challenge. On the one hand,
the state must ensure that sufficient incentives are pro-
vided to attract private sector investment. However,
such piecemeal investment by private developers
with the single perspective of profit-maximization is
largely reactionary, uncoordinated and market-deter-
mined. For market-led renewal to be sustainable,
planners must concurrently ensure that policy execution
mitigates the detrimental consequences associated with
urban intensification.
Appendix A
The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales
transactions are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3
Concluded en bloc deals in first policy-on period

No. Date of sale Address Project Name Site area Proceeds Price Price New PR No. of units
(m2) ($ million) ($psf) ($psf/ppr) (estimated)

1 Oct-94 11A & 13 Nassim Rd 7019.2 90.25 1195 853 1.4 74

2 Oct-94 2A-2R Limau Gardens Cosy Mansions 4697 24.6888 488 349 1.4 16
3 Oct-94 3 Toh Tuck Lane Toh Tuck Gardens 3757.8 16.4 405 290 1.4 40
4 Nov-94 Upper Changi Rd North/Tampines Rd Changi Heights 30472 116 354 NA NA 105
5 Dec-94 7–11 Walshe Rd 5895.7 73.6 1160 725 1.6 56
6 Jan-95 78,80,y,88 Mount Sinai Drive Gochek Apts 2950.5 31.23 983 475 2.1 60
7 Feb-95 17 Tomlinson Rd Tomlinson Mansion 3104.4 62 1855 442 4.2 29
8 Mar-95 42 & 44 Kim Yan Rd 7137.8 68.3 889 317 2.8 130
9 Mar-95 Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd 6351.3 82.38 1205 753 1.6 82

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

10 Mar-95 42 Surrey Rd Lincoln Mansion 1177.8 14.8 1167 417 2.8 25
11 Mar-95 7 & 9 Ewe Boon Rd 3153 27.88 821 513 1.6 38
12 May-95 38-38G Farrer Rd Farrer Grove 1.6

ARTICLE IN PRESS
May-95 34 Farrer Rd 1.6
May-95 AMALGAMATED SITES 4499.6 35.75 738 461 1.6 48
13 18-May-95 2A/B, 4/4A/4B & 6-6E Ewe Boon Rd 1989.2 23 1074 512 2.1 31
14 Jun-95 17 Newton Rd Miramar Mansion 2636.7 45.89 1617 577 2.8
Jun-95 21 Newton Rd 740.7 8.75 1097 392 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 3377.4 54.64 1503 537 2.8 71
15 Aug-95 Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd/Anderson Rd 7667.2 93.3 1131 707 1.6 82
16 Aug-95 Newton & Keng Lee Rd Newton Mansion 2512.3 38.2 1413 505 2.8 61
17 Sep-95 Shanghai Rd Shanghai Court 1297.7 1135 405 2.8
Sep-95 Shanghai Rd Shanghai Residence 697.8 1135 405 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 1995.4 24.38 1135 405 2.8 52
18 Sep-95 Butterworth Lane 2143.7 19.61375 850 304 2.8 49
19 Oct-95 21 Moulmein Rise Moulmein Lodge 1207.4 14.35 1104 394 2.8 25
20 Nov-95 43 & 45 Moonstone Lane 3700.5 24.5 615 293 2.1 76
21 6-Dec-95 27 Adam Rd Adam Gdn 2937.7 20.01 633 452 1.4 96
22 6-Dec-95 6/A/B/C Balmoral Crescent 2800.7 36.1752 1200 750 1.6 16
23 18-Dec-95 Stevens Drive Robin Heights & 7202 78.9 1018 727 1.4
24 Jun-96 1C, 3C & 7A Stevens Drive Fontana Gdns 1637.1 1.4
AMALGAMATED SITES 8839.1 1.4 48
25 Jan-96 11–15G Jln Mutiara 1843.4 25.85 1303 465 2.8 64
26 Jan-96 9 & 9A Balmoral Rd 1830.0 23 1168 730 1.6 22
27 9-Jan-96 15 Balmoral Rd Balmoral Court 3520.1 49.181809 1298 811 1.6 42
28 13-Jan-96 12/y/20C Brooke Rd 2454.5 20.2916668 768 366 2.1 39
29 22-Jan-96 to 5-Feb-96 8 Pulasan Rd 1434.2 8.2 531 379 1.4 15

13
Table 3 (continued)

14
No. Date of sale Address Project Name Site area Proceeds Price Price New PR No. of units
(m2) ($ million) ($psf) ($psf/ppr) (estimated)

30 25-Jan-96 10/A/B/C/12/A/B/C Moulmein Rise 1191.7 13.7 1068 381 2.8 25

31 30-Jan-96 34–38C St Thomas Walk St Thomas Apts 1059.7 13.222 1159 414 2.8 23
32 Feb-96 Balmoral Crescent 8400.6 126.6 1400 875 1.6 65
33 Mar-96 8 Balmoral Road Balmoral Lodge 2025.6 27.5 1261 788 1.6 24
34 28-Feb-96 35/35A/37/37A/y/45A Robin Rd Belville Gdns 3159.2 43 1265 790 1.6 48
35 Mar-96 10/G/12/G/14/G St. Martin’s Drive St Martin’s Place 4283.2 57.6 1249 892 1.4
36 Oct-96 4A/4B/6/6A/6B St. Martin’s Drive St. Martin’s Court 1357.3 16.05 1099 785 1.4
May-97 2 St. Martin’s Drive 1409.4 19.35 1275 911 1.4
AMALGAMATED SITES 7049.9 93 1226 875 1.4 82
37 28-Mar-96 121 Keng Lee Rd The Carmina 1667.4 27.55 1535 548 2.8 36
38 28-Mar-96 8L/y/R Tanjong Rhu Rd 1799.2 18 929 443 2.1 28

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

39 29-Mar-96 190 Moulmein Rd Zhen Sheng Mansion 1806.3 27.1 1394 498 2.8 56
40 Apr-96 17/A/B/C, 15E/F & 15G Shelford Rd 3716.4 37.4 935 668 1.4 39

ARTICLE IN PRESS
41 23-May-96 11G Shelford Rd Shelford Condo 4229.1 36.964 812 580 1.4 45
42 14-Jan-97 17E-Y Shelford Road Shelford Gdns 4129.4 37 832 595 1.4 44
43 Mar-97 11D & E Shelford Road Shelford Lodge 1765.5 15.4 810 579 1.4 19
Mar-97 406 Dunearn Rd 1373.5 12 812 580 1.4 14
AMALGAMATED SITES 3139 27.4 811 579 1.4
44 3-Apr-96 6 Sarkies Rd 1710.2 24.8 1347 842 1.6 32
45 4-Apr-96 20/A/B/C/y/26C Jln Raja Udang 1839.7 20.8 1050 375 2.8 39
46 16-Apr-96 104/y/H Holland Rd Holland Apt 2219.8 16.5 691 493 1.4 23
47 16-Apr-96 11/A/B/13/A/B/15A/15B Shanghai Rd 637.7 8.3 1209 432 2.8 13
48 26-Apr-96 2/A/B/C/4/A/B/C Jln Mutiara 930.1 12.96 1295 462 2.8
49 Development site at Jln Mutiara 921.7
AMALGAMATED SITES 1851.8 2.8 37
50 30-Apr-96 18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martin’s Drive 1114.8 15 1250 893 1.4 12
51 14-May-96 561 Upper Serangoon Rd Yardley Court 2421.5 23.6 905 323 2.8 57
52 15-May-96 1–45D Jalan Korma Thomson Court 10540.5 207.98 1833 655 2.8 276
53 24-Jun-96 to 3-Apr-97 205 Moulmein Rd Moulmein Apts 1829.9 40.4 2051 733 2.8
54 27-May-96 207 Moulmein Rd Angel Court 2040.2 39.3 1790 639 2.8
55 24-Jan-96 to 3-Apr-97 136/A/y150C Moulmein Rd Thomson Apts 1889.6 40.3 1981 708 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 5759.7 120 1936 691 2.8 136
56 Jun-96 Hullet Rd Hullet Court 997.3 31.9 2972 1061 2.8 21
57 27-Jun-96 3 Balmoral Rd 2299.8 31 1252 783 1.6 28
58 11-Jul-96 3 Peck Hay Rd Peck Hay Court 1219.9 27.82 2119 757 2.8
11-Jul-96 5 Peck Hay Rd Peck Hay View 1326.9 24.88 1742 622 2.8
59 Feb-97 7 & 7A Peck Hay Rd 824.4 18 2028 724 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 3371.2 70.7 1948 696 2.8 63
60 Jul-96 176 Keng Lee Rd & 5 Lincoln Rd Xiang Court 3182.8 57 1664 594 2.8 60
61 18-Jul-96 2 Tanjong Rhu Rd Fort Apts 2138.6 24.17 1050 500 2.1 32
62 Jul-96 17/A/B Surrey Rd & 32 Lincoln Rd 1741.7 32.08 1711 611 2.8 32
63 3-Aug-96 26 Paterson Rd Paterson View 2359 46.89 1847 660 2.8 61
64 10-Aug-96 20, 22 & 24 Shelford Rd Shelford Apts 7025.7 70.556 933 666 1.4 74
65 Aug-96 18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martin’s Drive St Martin’s Mansion 1114.8 15 1250 893 1.4
Aug-96 23 St. Martin’s Drive 2259.4 30.4 1250 893 1.4
Nov-96 16, St. Martin’s Drive 1567.7 21.09 1250 893 1.4
AMALGAMATED SITES 4941.9 66.5 1250 893 1.4 52
66 19-Sep-96 515 & 517 Dunman Rd Dunman Court 3412.4 36.25 987 352 2.8 69
67 9-Oct-96 Palm Grove Avenue Zhen Ji Gdn 11,303.1 56 460 329 1.4 111
68 4-Nov-96 8, 10, 12, 23 & 25 Grange Garden 4462.8 94.1535 1960 933 2.1 57
69 6-Nov-96 71 & 73 Paterson Rd City Mansions 7453.7 139 1733 825 2.1 116
70 9-Nov-96 130/A/y/V Cairnhill Rd Cairnhill Apts 2247.1 60.7701998 2512 897 2.8

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

9-Nov-96 134 Cairnhill Rd Galleria Apts 2057 55.6298 2512 897 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 4304.1 116.4 2512 897 2.8 46

ARTICLE IN PRESS
71 Nov-96 49 & 51 Leedon Park 9365.6 55.5 551 6
72 Nov-96 11/A/y/L Martia Rd Martia Court 5136.4 29.2 528 377 1.4 58
73 Jan-97 Yan Kit Rd 2274.6 26.45 1080 386 2.8 36
74 15-Jan-97 83 Cairnhill Rd Scotts Tower 3040.3 96.8 2958 1056 2.8 64
75 Mar-97 1 Essex Rd Essex Towers 3053.4 48 1460 522 2.8 52
76 Mar-97 140–186A Sixth Ave Avenue Park 16,055.5 165.251 956 683 1.4 169
77 Apr-97 63, 65, 67 & 69 Cairnhill Circle 1038.9 25.4 2271 811 2.8 16
78 May-97 4, 6, 8 & 10 Suffolk Rd 1624.1 23.2 1327 474 2.8 33
79 May-97 49 Devonshire Rd 1280.4 31 2249 803 2.8 23
80 May-97 114 Holland Rd Chateau de Hollande 2345.4 1.4
May-97 114A Holland Rd Spring Court 2325.5 31.8181818 1271 908 1.4
AMALGAMATED SITES 4670.9 63.3 1259 899 1.4 49
81 30-May-97 14,12A,14A Shelford Rd 4137.3 36.9 829 592 1.4 44
82 9-Jun-97 30 Farrer Rd 876 9.240851 980
10-Jun-97 36 Farrer Rd 714.4 7.5362 980
AMALGAMATED SITES 1590.4 16.777051 980 1.4 17
83 13-Jun-97 14/y/16C Palm Grove Avenue 4220.0 20.2 445 318 1.4 48
84 Jun-97 Sunset Way Clementi Park S C 12,535.6 77.1 571 408 1.4 134
85 Jul-97 14,16,20/A/B/C Lor 6 Geylang 644.6 12.36 1781 0
86 Jul-97 1–21 except 9 Taman Warna 6358 78.26 1144 817 1.4
16-Sep-97 9 Taman Warna 496.8 6.11 1144 817 1.4
AMALGAMATED SITES 6854.8 84.37 1144 817 1.4 112
87 2-Aug-97 4/A/B/C/y/10C Kay Poh Rd 1307.9 20 1421 507 2.8 28
88 7-Aug-97 36/A/B/38/A/B Draycott Drive 1465.8 39.33 2493 890 2.8 31

15
89 19-Aug-97 3A/B/C/D & 5A/B/C/D Surrey Rd Surrey Ville 703.3 9.74 1287 460 2.8 15
 16
Table 3 (continued)

No. Date of sale Address Project Name Site area Proceeds Price Price New PR No. of units
(m2) ($ million) ($psf) ($psf/ppr) (estimated)

90 Sep-97 13 Balmoral Rd Balmoral Green 3291.3 48.5 1369 856 1.6 40

91 Sep-97 23, 25, y, 37 Cairnhill Circle 3708.2 85 2130 761 2.8 78
92 16-Sep-97 56A/B/C/D/E/F/G, 58 & 60 Gilstead Rd 3013.0 28 863 617 1.4 32
93 Sep-97 Jln Mutiara 1105.2 19.2 1614 576 2.8 108
94 Jln Mutiara 2410.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 3516.0
95 17-Oct-97 6 Mar Thoma Rd 1588 12.5 731 261 2.8 34
96 3-Nov-97 11/11A/11B Suffolk Rd 462.6 5.582739 1121 400 2.8 10
97 26-Nov-97 174–188B Duchess Ave Casabella 9951.4 84.138 785 561 1.4 105
Total 367,462.5 4211.6404 4829

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 4
Concluded en bloc deals in second policy-on period
No. Date of sale Address Project name Site area Proceeds Price Price New PR No. of units
(m2) ($ million) ($psf) ($psf/ppr) (estimated)
1 Jun-99 1 & 1A Balmoral Crescent 1495.4 13.129 816 510 1.6 20
2 5-Aug-99 Duchess Rd Duchess Park 5318.1 47 1.4
5-Aug-99 24 Duchess Rd 1947 14.3 1.4
5-Aug-99 AMALGAMATED SITES 7265.1 61.3 784 560 1.4 77
3 5-Aug-99 355 Bukit Timah Rd Naga Court 4567.9 72.12 1467 698 2.1 72
4 Aug-99 40 St Michael’s Rd Amyton Court 813.1 5.95 1035
22–26 Mar Thoma Rd 2794.6
AMALGAMATED SITES 3607.7 80
5 6-Aug-99 18–28 Ipoh Lane 2566.5 28.6 1035 370 2.8 54
6 Aug-99 18 & 20 Lorong Limau Samford Mansion 1086.2

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

22, 24, 26 & 28 Lorong Limau Limau Mansion 1087.4 21.8
30–38 Lorong Limau Kim Keat Mansion 1955.6 19.42

ARTICLE IN PRESS
7 12–16 Lorong Limau Prospect Mansion 1167.4 10.78
AMALGAMATED SITES 5296.6 52.88 928 331 2.8 112
8 Aug-99 Butterworth & Ipoh Lanes 6047.3 57.84 889 317 2.8
9 25-Aug-99 8, 20–28 Butterworth Lane 3998.6 47.34 1100 393 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 10045.9 105.18 973 347 2.8 227
10 26-Aug-99 1 Sunshine Terrace Sunshine Apts 1942.7 18.8 899 321 2.8 41
11 10-Sep-99 11 Buckley Rd Buckley Mansion 4096.5 43 975 697 1.4 43
12 15-Sep-99 16, 20, 22 & 22A Duchess Rd 4345.2 37 791 565 1.4 46
13 Sep-99 17 & 19 Trevose Crescent 3001.5 17.5 542 NA NA 7
14 Sep-99 315 River Valley Close Dragon Pearl Apt 2.8
Sep-99 River Valley Close River Valley View 3749.4 73.5 2.8
15 Nov-99 1 River Valley Close Chen Yuan Bldg 1889.0 37.48 1843 658 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 5638.3 110.98 1829 653 2.8 119
16 17-Sep-99 Devonshire Rd 4036.8 92 2117 756 2.8 85
17 22-Sep-99 16, 18 & 18A Buckley Rd 4214.5 40.6 895 639 1.4 44
18 29-Sep-99 17 Evelyn Rd Ixora Court 4014.6 84 1944 694 2.8 85
19 Oct-99 4/A/y/E Balmoral Crescent Balmoral Haven 3296.4 38.3 1079 675 1.6 40
20 Oct-99 46, 48 & 50 Ewe Boon Rd 967.4 9 2.1 15
21 Oct-99 Mei Hwan View Goldenhill Condo 24,340.4 175.8 671 320 2.1 385
22 29-Oct-99 37, 39 & 41 Bedok Rd Country Park 14,791.8 65.5 411 294 1.4 156
23 Nov-99 Kim Keat Lane 2601.3 25 2.8 55
24 Nov-99 25–49A Kim Keat Lane 3453.9 35.27 949 339 2.8 73
25 Nov-99 5 Balmoral Park 5 Balmoral Park 3517.1 42 1109 693 1.6 42

17
 18
Table 4 (continued)
No. Date of sale Address Project name Site area Proceeds Price Price New PR No. of units
(m2) ($ million) ($psf) ($psf/ppr) (estimated)

26 2-Nov-99 22,26,28,30,32,34 & 36 Shanghai Rd 2376.4 23.8 930 443 2.1 38

27 10-Nov-99 Killiney Rd Devonshire Court 5405.1 123 2114 755 2.8 114
28 10-Nov-99 Meyer Rd First Mansion 10921.0 176 2.8
10-Nov-99 Meyer Rd Meyer Tower 7293.7 117 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 18,214.7 293 1494 534 2.8 384
29 12-Nov-99 2, 4 & 6 Ah Hood Rd Balestier Mansion 3272.2 33.39 948 339 2.8 69
30 12-Nov-99 Grange Rd & Paterson Rd Grange Mansion 5090.9 92 1679 799 2.1 81
31 16-Nov-99 Grange Rd Kim Lin Mansion 11,660.0 251 2000 952 2.1 184
32 17-Nov-99 6 Cuscaden Walk Cuscaden Tower 3568.6 86 2239 800 2.8 77
33 Dec-99 11 Newton Rd Newton Point 4254.4 78 1703 608 2.8 90

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19

34 Dec-99 Serangoon Ave 3 Arang Court 11,182.1 72.81 605 288 2.1 177
35 Dec-99 St. Michael’s Rd & Jln Taman 5900.7 50.35 793 283 2.8 124

ARTICLE IN PRESS
36 Dec-99 Carlisle Rd Norfolk Garden 2909.0 35.7 1140 407 2.8 61
37 Dec-99 Mandalay Rd Mandalay Court 4513.4 51.7 1064 380 2.8 95
Apr-99 Shelford Rd Mediterranean 1034.9 10.99 987 705 1.4 11
38 2-Dec-99 Shelford Rd Townhouses 4147.2 34.6 775 554 1.4 44
AMALGAMATED SITES 1.4
Dec-99 22 St. Martin’s Drive 1227.8 14.2 1074 767 1.4 13
39 10-Dec-99 51 Meyer Rd Viewpoint Condo 7495.7 123.3 1528 546 2.8 158
40 Jan-00 South Buona Vista Chwee Chian Gdn 4941.7 23.4 440 314 1.4 52
41 Jan-00 Elias Rd Pasir Ris Garden 26,441.5 175 615 293 2.1 418
42 Jan-00 13, 15 & 17 Moulmein Rise 1896.5 31.4 1538 549 2.8 40
43 Jan-00 35–101A Mt Sinai Lane Grenville Condo 19,544.4 157 746 533 1.4 206
44 Jan-00 1–21A Grange Rd Grange Garden 4227.9 80.1 1760 838 2.1 67
45 18-Jan-00 West Coast Rd Tat Lee Court 24,172.3 122 469 293 1.6 291
46 Feb-00 Cairnhill Circle Cairnhill Court 11,762.1 315 2488 889 2.8
Feb-00 4 Cairnhill Circle 2836.3 55–60 1802–1965 643–702 2.8
AMALGAMATED SITES 14,598.4 370–375 2355–2386 841–852 2.8 308
47 Feb-00 Jalan Loyang Besar Loyang Lodge 4055.0 15 344 254 1.4 120
48 Mar-00 Evelyn Rd Seedevi 2441.9 44.6 1697 606 2.8 210
49 Mar-00 3 Derbyshire Rd Derbyshire Court 1116.5 13 1082 386 2.8 25
50 Mar-00 9 & 11 Balmoral Park Balmoral Park Maisonettes 5656.5 67.2 1104 690 1.6 58
51 Apr-00 12,12A & 12B Nassim Rd 3998.8 53 1231 880 1.4 36
52 Jul-00 Mimosa Walk Mimosa Court 6159.8 21 317 305 1.04 20
53 Aug-00 20/y/26C Martaban Rd Martaban Court 1969.4 17.8 840 300 2.8 44
54 Sep-00 Bedok Rd Prospect Court 3104.9 11.2 335 323 1.04 16
Total 335,682.2 3748.569–3753.569 5512
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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1–19
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