University of Arkansas Press

Aquinas on Individuals and Their Essences

Author(s): SANDRA EDWARDS
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 13, No. 2, The Proceedings of the Forty-Third and
Forty-Fourth: ANNUAL MEETINGS of the SOUTHWESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY (SPRING
1985), pp. 155-163
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43153937
Accessed: 13-02-2016 21:47 UTC

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Aquinas on Individuals

and Their Essences

SANDRA EDWARDS
ofArkansas
University
Did St. Thomas Aquinas believe thatthereare individualessences,
essencesuniquetotheindividuals whichhavethem,inadditiontoessences
of kindsof things?HenryVeatchhas arguedthathe did not:"... Were
one to ask whatis of theessence of thisparticular individualman such
thatwereittobe losthe wouldtherewith cease tobe thatindividual entirely,
St. Thomaswould surelyanswerthatthereis nothingwhateverthatis
essentialto thisparticular manotherthanthathe be and remaina human
being."1 Veatch goes on to explainthat"the criteriaof an individual
substance'sremaining thesameare (1) thatin termsof itssubstantial form
itremainthesamekindof a thingthatitalwayswas, and (2) thatin terms
of itsmatter it be able to lay claimto an existencemarkedby an uninter-
rupted spatio-temporal continuity."2 The essencewhichan individual must
retainthroughout its careeris thennothingbut the essence of its kind,
accordingto Veatch.My contention in thispaperis thatVeatchis partly
correctand partlyincorrect.Aquinas does have a theoryof individual
essencesoverand above theessencesof kinds,thoughas Veatchcorrectly
notesno particular traitor characteristic of an individuallike its coloris
suchthatit mustremainthroughout thatindividual'scareer.To support
mycontention I firstexaminewhatAquinashas to say aboutessencesboth
specificand individual.Next a close look at whathe has to say about
individuation and identity throughtimeformaterialobjectsrevealsthat
individualessencesare verydifferent fromwhatwe mighthave been led
toexpect.I concludethatforAquinasan individual essenceconsistslargely
of themannerin whichtheindividual'smatteris composed.
WhenAquinasuses theterm'essence' he is usuallyreferring to what
itis in a thingthatmakesitthekindofthingitis. Humanity is an essence,
thatby whicha thingis human.Whitenessis an essence (albeitof an
accidentand nota substance),thatby whicha thingis white.Thereis a
close relationbetweenessences and definitions: "An essence or nature
comprehends in itselfthosethingsonlywhichfall in thedefinition of a
species."3By making a thing a member of a kind or species its essence
makesitdefinable arecoextensive
as well. 'Essence', 'species', 'definition'

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terms(as are also 'nature',in manyof its uses, and 'quiddity')although
theydifferin meaning.Whileessencesexistin individuals,thematerial
individualis something over and above its essencesforit containsdes-
ignated matter which for Aquinasis notdefinable.Because of theirdes-
ignatedmatters, themembersofa speciesdiffer numerically whilesharing
a definition or species. Since individualscontainsomething morethanthe
essenceof thespeciesand thissomething moreis notdefinable,it would
appear that individuals qua individuals do nothave moreessence.
But we findAquinassayingthefollowing:"A singularessenceis con-
stituted fromdesignatedmatterand individuated form,as theessenceof
Socratesis constituted fromthisbodyandthissoul."4 In thesamepassage
he contrasts thesingularessencewiththeuniversalessencemanwhichis
constituted simplyfromsoul and body. Similarpassagescan be foundin
SummaTheologiaeI, q, 119, a.l, QuaestionesQuodlibetalesII, q.2, a. 2,
Compendium Theologiae, c. 154, andDe Ventateq.2, a. 7. In viewofhis
customary of term'essence' as coextensivewith'species' and 'defi-
use
nition'itsappearanceheremaybe unfortunate. Butwhathe meansis clear
-
enough overand above thespecificessenceman, Socrateshas a singular
essencewhichmakeshimthisman,Socrates.Some of theawkwardness
of thelanguagemaybe mitigated once we realizethatindividuals, though
notdefinableby us, are nonetheless definableby something else. Human
intellects can grasponlytheformsof thingsand notthedesignated matter
containedintheiressences.Suchmatter is, however,knowablebyintellects
whichlack thislimitation, especiallybythedivinebeingwhichcreatedit.
It is thendefinableby suchan intellect.5
In orderto understand Aquinas's theoryof individualessences,it is
important to look at what he thinksan individualis. An individual,he
says, is what is one or "undivided in itselfand dividedfromall others."6
In the naturalworldindividuals substancescomposedof matterand
are
form.The formalcomponentcannotfortherebeingindivdualssince in
respectof substantial formall themembersof a speciesare undivided.It
is ratherthematerialcomponentindividuates - notprimematter whichis
in itselfamorphousan unlimited, primebut matter with the additionof
dimensi ve quantity.Throughdimensi ve quantity or quantity withposition
matterbecomesdivisibleintodeterminate unitsor individuals.One com-
mentator describesthesituationas follows:"Quantityhavingpositionis
quantity whichcan be calledspread-out-ness - thatis, a realityintrinsically
constituted of mutuallyexcluding,contiguous,designableparts.Here in
themutualexclusivenessof thepartsof quantityhavingpositionlies the

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rootof its individuating vitality."7Dimensive quantitycontributes divi-
sibility,determinateness, boundaries to matter; matter contributes irre-
ceivability and limitation to dimensive quantity forthe latter is inherently
capable of beingsharedby manythingsand is notof itselfrestricted to
beinginjustthisone. (Matteris thusmorefundamentally theindividual -
both"matter"and "individual" are definedby Aquinasas "thatwhich
cannotbe in another.")8Aquinassaysthat"Matteraccordingas it stands
undersignatedimension(i.e. designatedmatteror matterwithdimensive
quantity)is theprincipleof the individuation of form."9Because of its
in
reception designated matter a form, substantialoraccidental,is theform
of thisindividualand no other.
If thisis all thatis involvedin individuation, thenindividualessences
willbe justsubstantial formsplusthedesignated matter thatreceivesthem.
And mostinterpretations of Aquinasleave it at that.Stillit is possibleto
wonderwhytheindividualmembersof a speciesdiffer in morewaysthan
byjusthaving different boundaries and positions.Conceivablytheycould
all be qualitatively identical,yetthisdoes notseem to be thecase. Ap-
parently Aquinasdid wonderaboutthisand as a resultprovidedus with
an explanation of uniquenessthatexpandsbothhis accountsof individua-
tionand individualessences.
We see thisin the relationbetweenformand matter.These mustbe
"mutuallyproportioned," i.e. a formmustbe receivedby matterappro-
priately disposed for it, and a formmustsomehowadaptto thematter that
actually receives it so as to become the form of thisparcel of matter
and
no other.10 Any formreceivedby mattermustbe receivedaccordingto
themannerof therecipient.11 If the matteressentialto an individualis
merely matter under dimensive quantity, how can we explainthismutual
proportionment? In fact something much morecomplexis involvedhere.
Substantial formswiththeirdimensivequantities arenotreceivedin prime
matter exceptfortheformsofthefourelements.12 Othersubstantial forms
require mixtures of the elements in theirreceiving matter - mixtures ap-
propriate forthekindsof individualsthatare to result - and usuallythese
mixtures are preparedby priorsubstantial formswhichthenew ones re-
place. A generalsortof mixture is foundin all themembersof a species,
butactualmixtures in individualswill differ.Any substantial formmust
accommodateitselfto theparticular individualmixture it encounters and
thusit becomesthe formof thisindividualand no other.A substantial
formwillimposeitsowngeneralstructure, forexamplea rangeof growth
in
possibilities livingthings or a range of colors, butthecomposition of

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the matterthatreceivesit will determinethe detailsof actual size at
maturity, actualcolor,etc.
Considertheexampleoffered byhumangeneration. Humanreproduction
consistsin theunionof mattersuppliedby the femalewiththeseed of the
male, thelatteractingto preparethematterforits formwhichis educed
fromthematter whenthisis sufficientlyprepared.In thefirstinstancethis
is thevegetativeformthroughwhichthematterbecomesa livingbody.
Further preparationby thevegetative formpreparesforitsreplacement by
an animalform;stillfurther preparationof theembryoby thisformleads
to its replacement by a rationalsoul directlyinfusedintothe body by
God.13Throughout theprocess,each successivesoul or formmustaccom-
modateitselfto thematterwhichreceivesit and by thisaccommodation
it is individuated.Withregardto humans,Aquinas speaks of boththe
natureof the species man, and the natureof the individualwhichhe
identifieswiththematerialcomposition (complexio- a termoftenusedby
medievaisto signifythe compositionof the fourhumors).It is implied
thatwhile the formeris commonthe latteris uniqueto the individual.
Because of itscomposition one individualmaybe sickly,anotherhealthy;
one maybe male and anotherfemale;one maybe inclinedto chastity or
temperance, another to melancholy or lasciviousness.And most signifi-
cantly,one personis moreintelligent thananotherbecauseof his or her
physicalcomposition.14
Theredoes notseem to be anyreasonto restrict thisprocessresulting
4
inuniqueindividuals to humanbeings,andin factAquinasdoes not: 'Just
as the same specificmatteris due the same specificform,so the same
numericalmatteris due thesame numericalform.Forjust as thesoul of
a cow cannotbe thesoul of a horse'sbody,so thesoul of thiscow cannot
be thesoul of anothercow."15 We shouldbe able to say thesame thing
of all substantialforms.The impactof thematerialcomposition receiving
it rendersa formunique.
Another reasonforbelievingthatAquinasheldthematerial composition
of a thingessentialto it is foundin his accountof individualaccidents.
As thespecificessenceis relatedto thepropertiesof thespecies,he says,
4
so is thesingularessencerelatedto theaccidentsof theindividual.The
intellect,in knowingtheessenceof a species,comprehends through that
all its essentialaccidents.... so also whentheessenseof a singularis
knownall itssingularaccidentsare known."16Individualaccidentssome-
how arise fromthe potentialities of matter;whyshouldtheseaccidents
differ thenexceptfordifferencesinthematerialcompositionofindividuals?

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(This would also explainAquinas's frequentreferences to "matterand
materialconditions"as theprinciplesof individuation).17
The problemof individuation is theproblemof whataccountsforthere
beingmanynumerically distinctindividuals;theproblemof identity is the
problemof whataccountsfortherebeingnumerically one and thesame
individualthoughout a stretchof time.Thereis an even closerrelation
betweensolutionsto the secondproblemand theessence of individuals
thanbetweentheseand solutionsto thefirst.Aquinassays thatforthere
to be thesame individualat twodistincttimes(or perhapsin twodistinct
possibleworlds)theessentialprinciplesof thethingmustbe thesame.18
These are theessentialprinciplesof an individualqua individual,itsdes-
ignatedmatterand the substantialformindividuated by thismatter.A
propernamelike 'Socrates'signifiestheessentialprinciples ofthespecies
manand theindividualprinciplesas well, in thiscase theindividualbody
and soul.19(Such namesare rigiddesignators).
Whatdoes it mean,however,to say thatan individualmusthave the
samedesignatedmatter at twodistinct times?Surelythematerialparticles
in a bodyare in constantfluxso thatI do notnow have thesame bodyI
dideventenminutesago. Aquinasrealizedtheproblem."In a man'sbody
whilehe lives thereare not always the same partsmaterially but only
specifically;indeedmaterially the partscome and go but a man is not
prevented becauseof thisfrombeingnumerically one fromthebeginning
of his lifeto theend."20An individualmaterialobject,a body,is notto
be identified withthecollectionof its materialparticlesat anyone time.
Rather,Aquinas says, "The same mattermakes numerically the same
thing, that is, one matter as under thedimensions terminatingit."21 The
dimensivestructure and boundariesof a thing(always governedby its
substantial form)make it one and the same materialthingat different
times.Aquinashas sometimesbeen misinterpreted as holdingthatcertain
definitedimensions - a certainlength,width,height,etc.- mustremain
constant. Butthisis wrongforsurelya thingcan retainthesameboundaries
and dimensivestructure even thoughthe actual measurabledimensions
alterthroughout time.There is still,however,a problemfordimensive
quantity althoughpartof whatmakesa thingan individualis an accident
and by no meansan essentialprinciple.Like anyformit mustbe indivi-
duatedby the matterof a thing,and its identity throughtimemustbe
dependent on theidentity of a thing'sessentialprinciples.
This wouldbe thepointat whichto introduce materialcomposition of
a thingas partof theessencethatmustbe retainedthroughout time,and

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thereare indications thatAquinashad thisin mind.The materialparticles
entering leaving thingmust,he says,alwaysretainthesamequantity,
and a
shape,position,and orderof parts.22 This is subjectto interpretationbut
4
in anothercontexthe uses theanalogyof a river: 'Justas theSeine River
is notthisriverbecause of thisflowingwaterbutbecausethisoriginand
thisbed whenceit is alwayscalledthesameriveralthoughdifferent water
is flowingdownit, so thereis thesamepeople,notbecauseof identity of
soul or of menbutbecause of the same habitator ratherbecause of the
samelaws and styleof living,. . ."23 Elsewherehe comparestheidentity
of a personthroughout timewiththeidentity of a statethrough gradual
changes of its citizenryand with theidentity a firewhichremainsthe
of
samewhileconstantly beingfednewlogsto consume.Dimensive quantity
among its otherfunctionscertainlyrelatesto the orderof parts,their
arrangement, withina whole.24We mightread such passages as saying
thattheorderand positionof particlesof elementsremainsconstant in an
individualthroughout time. Certainlythe orderas such is formaland
sharable,but the individualparticleswhichcome and go in thisorder,
whiletheyarehere,cannotalso be there.Andthequantity andproportions
of theelementsin thewholecan differ fromindividualto individual.The
quantity in factis important to Aquinas.A resurrected person,in orderto
be identicalwiththepersonwhohas died,mustin hisrestored bodyattain
his "due quantity,"thequantity he wouldhavehad at maturity ifnothing
interferred.25This quantity was latentin his matterat his origin,latentin
the compositionof his body and needingonly the properconditionsto
develop. The mentionof originhereis important forin passageswhich
foreshadow KripkeAquinas holds the origin of a thingas essentialto it:
"It is clearthatit cannotbe numerically thesame manifhe is bornfrom
anotherfather and anothermother."26 Thatthisis notmeantto applyonly
to humanscan be seen fromanotherpassage wherehe says, "it is not
numerically thesame seal ifthewax or bodyof theseal are different."27
The originsof a thingestablishitssubstantial formand designated matter,
and also itsmaterialcomposition.Finally,Aquinassuggeststhata unique
materialcomposition mustremainthroughout an individual'scareerwhen
he says thatthematerialcompositionit has in thislifemustsbe foundin
a resurrected person:"This [mixture] mustbe in theone risingbecause
fleshand bones,etc. have notone composition."28
Sir David Ross has foundwhat appearsto be a similardoctrineof
individualessencesin Aristotle:

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 It is witha certainkindof fleshand bone thatthe formof a man
unites.But, further,if two portionsof fleshand bone withwhich
theformunitesare qualitatively identical,theyare no morecapable
of producing twodistinguishable menthaniftheyhad beenportions
ofprimematter. They must incharacter,
differ i.e. inform.Socrates
andCallias, whileagreeingin theirspecificform,mustdiffer in the
formof theirmatter.By followingthisline of thoughtwe should
arriveat thenotionof an essenceof theindividual,whichincludes
besidesthespecificformsuch further permanent characteristics
as
springfromdifferences in thematterof whichdifferent individuals
are made.29
Itwouldbe difficult todetermine whether Aquinasderivedhistheory from
Aristotle or whether theirreasoningon thesubjectis similar.But Ross's
interpretationbringsto lightan important pointforAquinas.Ross speaks
of "the formof matter"ratherthanmaterialcomposition as I have done
and theredoes indeedseem to be something formal and sharableabout
suchcomposition.SometimesAquinashimselfwritesof thecomposition
as thoughitwerea matter of formalstructure. In thatcase itis notunique
butthereareindications thathethought itwas. Aquinasoffers noarguments
foruniqueness,restinghis theoryinsteadapparently on a kindof faith.It
just does not make sense to us to regard what it is thatmakesSocrates
Socratesas sharablewithotherthings.He may well have feltthatan
explanationof whythisis so wouldbe forthcoming eventuallyfromthe
sciences(and he mightfeel vindicatedtodayby developments in fields
like genetics),althoughhe sometimessoundspessimisticaboutthepos-
sibilityofourevenunderstanding specificessences.30 Atanyratehistheory
is certainlyincomplete and inadequateas itstandswhichmayexplainwhy
it has been so generallyignored.
Whateverwe finallymake of the notionof materialcomposition,it
shouldbe evidentthatAquinasdidbelievethatindividuals qua individuals
do have essences.In thefirstplace he himselfrefersto suchessencesat
manypointsin his works.In thesecondplace, suchessencesenterinto
bothhis treatment of individuation and his accountof identity of an in-
dividualthrough time.Veatchis notwrongin holdingthatno accidental
characteristicslike particularcolors or sizes are essentialto individuals
(and thatis just why Aquinas calls them"accidental"), and he is not
wrongwhenhe says thata thingmustalwaysretainits substantial form
andexhibitspatio-temporal continuityin itsexistence in order to retainits

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identity.But thisis notenoughforit does notcapturewhatit is forits
essenceto retainits identity.
Aquinasis veryemphaticthatin some way
thematterof a thingis essentialto thatthingas an individual.Socrates
does notjust have to be humanthroughout thetimehe existsin orderto
be Socrates.He has to be and remainthishumanand thatmeanshe has
to be and remaina humansoul individuated by thisbody. Aquinashas
unfortunately fallenshortin his explanationof whatbeingthisbodyor
thisdesignatedmatter entails.Buthe nonethelesshas thebeliefthatmatter
is partofan individualessenceandthatthisindividual essencecan insome
cases surviveeven thedestruction of thespatio-temporalcontinuityof the
body.31

NOTES

'Henry Veatch, "Essentialism andtheProblem ofIndividuation," Proceedings oftheAmer-

icanCatholic Philosophical Association 48(1974),68.
2Ibid.,p. 69.
3"Essentia velnatura comprehendit inse illatantum quaecadunt indefinitione speciei."
Summa Theologiae I, q.3,a.3 (Madrid: BibliotecadeAutores Cristianos, 1961),1:22.All
references tothiswork below aretothisfivevolume edition.
4ttSingularis autem essentiaconstituitur ex materia designataet forma individuata: sicut
Socratis essentia exhoccorpore ethacanima." Summa Contra GentilesI, 65.Ed.Leonine
Commission (Rome: Typographia Polyglotta, 1918-1930),13:179. Allreferences below to
thiswork aretothisthree volume edition.
5For example, Summa Contra Gentiles I, 65.
64' . . Inse indivisum etdivisum abomnibus aliis."Summa Theologiae III,q. 77,a.2,
vol.4: 635.SeealsoSumma Theologiae I, q. 13,a.9 andq. 29,a.4;Expositio super Librum
Boethii deTrinitate 1.IV,a.2, ad3.
7Joseph Bobik, "TheIndividual Body,"inReadings inthePhilosophy ofNature, ed.Henry
J.Koren (Westminster, Maryland: TheNewman Press, 1958),p. 331.
*Summa Theologiae III,q. 77,a.2, vol.4: 635;De Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 5, ad8,ed.
Keeler (Rome: UniversitasGregorianna, 1959),p. 70.
9t'Materia enim secundum quodstat subdimensionibus estprincipium
signatis, individuationis
formae." InDuodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
Expositio V,lect.8,ed.M.Cathala
(Taurino: Marietti, 1977),no.876.
ÌOSumma Contra GentilesII, 81,vol.14:505.
nForexample,, Summa Theologiae I, 84,1.
l2DeSpiritualibus Creaturis, a.l, ad 1;De Potentia Dei, q. 4, a.1,ad 13.
,3For example, Summa Contra Gentiles II,c. 84;De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a.3,ad 13;In
Duodecim . . . Metaphysicorum . . no.1090.
"Forexample, Quaesiones deAnima , q.8;Summa Theologiae I, q. 91,a. 1and3; I-II,q.
31,a.7; q. 46,a.5; q. 51,a.l; q. 63,a.l; Comm. indeAnima nos.483-485; De Ventate,
q. 25,a.6,ad4.

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ls"Sicut eidem formae secundum speciem debetur eaddem materia secundum spaciem, ita
eidem formae secundum numerum debetur aedem materiasecundum numerum: sicutenim
anima bovisnonpotest esseanima corporis equi,itaanima huius nonpotest esseanima
alteriusbovis."Compendium Theologiae I, c. 153(Taurino, Marietti, 1954),p. 72.
,64
4Intellectus autem cognoscens essentiam speciei, pereamcomprehendit omnia perse
accidentia illiusspeciei. . . unde etcognita propria essentiaalicujus singularis,cognoscuntur
omnia accidentia singularia illius." De Ventate ,q.2,a. 7 (Parma: Fiaccadori, 1873), 9:38B.
,7Forexample, Quaestiones deAnima , q.3,ad7 andq.4,ed.J.H.Robb(Toronto: Pontificai
InstituteofMediaeval Studies, 1968),pp.85and92.
x%Quaestiones Quodlibetales XI,q. VI,andSumma Contra Gentiles IV,c. 81& c.84.
19
Compendium Theologiae I, c. 154.
204
'In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, nonsemper sunteaedem partessecundum
materiam, sedsolum secundum speciem; secundum veromateriam partes fluuntetrefluunt:
necpropter hocimpeditur quinhomositunusnumero a principio vitaeusqueinfinem."
Summa Contra GentilesIV,c. 81,vol.XV,254.
4. . . Eademmateria
2,4 faciat idemnumero, . . . unamateria secundum quodestsub
dimensionibus terminantibus ipsam." Quaestiones Quodlibetales XI,,q. VI,ed.R. Spiazzi
(Taurino: Marietti, 1956),pp.217-218.
22Summa Theologiae, Supplementum q. 80,a.5; alsoq. 79,a.3, q. 80,a.4; Quaestiones
Quodlibetales VIII,q.III.
234
4Sicut fluvius Sequana nonesthiefluvius propter hancaquam fluentem, sedpropter hanc
originem ethune alveum, undesemper dicitur idemfluvius, licetsitaliaaquadefluens: ita
estidem populus, nonpropter identitatem animae authominum, sedpropter eandem habi-
tationem, velmagis propter easdem legeseteundem modum vivendi, . . ."De Spiritualibus
Creaturis, a. IX,ad 10,Keelered., p. 116.
24For exaihple, Summa Theologiae III,q. 76,a.3, ad2; Quaest. Quod.Ill,q.3,a.2.
25Summa Theologiae III,q.33,a.2, ad2; Supplementum , q. 81,a.2.
4Manifestum
264 estenim quodnonpotest esseidemhomo numero, si abaliopatře velalia
matre nascatur." Quaest. Quod. III,q. XI,Spiazzied.,p. 64.SeealsoV,q. V,a.l. On
seeSaulKripke, 4 andNecessity," inSemantics
Kripke, 'Naming ofNatural Language , ed.
Donald Davidson andGilbert Harman (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972).
4. . . Nonestidemnumero
274 sivesitaliacera,sivesitaliudcorpus ex
sigillum,, sigilli,
cuius impressione cerasigillatur." Quaest. Quod.V,q.V,a.l.
2844Quod [mixtio] oportet ponere incopore resurgentis; quiaerunt ibicarnnes etossaet
huiusmodi parts, quibusomnibus noncompetit unacomplexio." Supplementum q. 82,a.l,
voi.5: 458.
wW.D.Ross,Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co.,1923),p. 170.
^Hispessimism resembles that ofJohn Locke inhisEssay Concerning Human Understanding ,
BookIII.
31
Aquinas' s attempts tomakematter partofanindividual's essence seemtoendupwith
matter's dimensi veboundaries which areaccidental beingessential. Hisattempts tomake
material composition essential, ontheother hand, seemtoendupwith someformal aspect
ofmatter as essential.Inneither casedoesmatter comeoffas part
itself oftheessence.

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