LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – QUO WARRANTO
HELD: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person
TECSON VS. COMELEC
424 SCRA 227, March 3, 2004
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824)
initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth
of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit.
3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order,
a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the
offcie of the President of the Philippines.
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administra tive – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month
and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the
1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not
last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan
F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – QUO WARRANTO
MACARIO E. CESAR VS. FILOMENO GARRIDO
GR No. 30705, March 25, 1929
Francisco Zialcita for appellant.
Ciriaco K. Kangleon, Salvador K. Demeterio and Del Rosario & Del Rosario for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This proceeding is a contest over the office of president in the municipality of
Cabalian, Province of Leyte, — a sequel to the general election held on June 5, 1928.
As a result of said election the contestee, Filomeno Garrido, was proclaimed elected
with a plurality of 27 votes over the contestant, Macario E. Caesar. A third candidate
for the same office, but he has not participated in the contest. Upon hearing the case
the trial court reversed the result reached by the board of canvassers and found that
the contestant had been elected over Garrido by a plurality of 71 votes. Judicial
declaration was accordingly made to the effect that Macario E. Caesar had been
elected to the office and judgment was given against the contestee Garrido for costs
and expenses, including the fees of the commissioners. From this judgment Garrido
appealed.
The contest was instituted by a motion beginning with the statement that the contest
was a duly qualified elector in the municipality of Cabalian and was a registered
candidate who had received votes for the office of municipal president in the election
mentioned. Upon the filing of this motion, the contestee moved to dismiss on the
ground that it was not alleged in the contestant's motion that the contestant was, at
the time of the election, eligible to the office for which he was a candidate. This motion
to dismiss was overruled by the trial court on the two grounds that the allegation that
the protestant was a duly qualified elector and registered candidate should be taken
as implying that he was eligible to the office, and that, at any rate, the ineligibility of a
candidate is not proper matter of exception or defense in a contest over an election.
To this ruling the contestee excepted, and error is here assigned thereto.
To dispose of this preliminary matter at once, we may say that we concur in the
conclusion of the trial court that it was unnecessary for the contestant to allege in his
motion that he was eligible to the office of president. The allegations of the motion in
this case are in a form approved by the majority of the court in Viola vs. Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, and Adolfo (47 Phil., 859), and Tabada vs. Zandueta and
Vergara (47 Phil., 859); and we are of the opinion that no more is necessary to give
the court jurisdiction over the matter. The case of Verceles vs. Araneta Diaz (47 Phil.,
843), contains nothing in support of the contention of the appellant to the contrary.
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administra tive – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
The point decided in that case was merely to the effect that it is not necessary for the
contestant to allege in his motion that the contestee was a registered candidate who
had been voted for in the election. It is enough to make this allegation with respect to
the contestant only. Furthermore, as the trial court observed, the question of the
eligibility of a candidate for office is not properly involved in a proceeding of contest.
But of this more will be said in our discussion of the defenses set forth in the
contestee's answer.
We now proceed to inquire into the number of votes received by the two respective
opponents who are concerned in this litigation. In this connection we note that the
contestant challenges the returns from one precinct only, namely, the first precinct of
Cabalian. It is proved that, when the votes were counted in this precinct, the
inspectors counted 135 votes for the contestant, Macario E. Caesar, and these were
duly noted on the tally sheets. Nevertheless, when the official returns were made out,
two of the three inspectors, constituting a majority of the board, ruled that these votes
could not be returned for the contestant, for the reason that his name did not appear
in the official list of enrolled voters in any precinct in the municipality, it being
supposed that this fact rendered him ineligible to the office and disqualified him from
being considered a candidate. The 135 votes received by him in this precinct were
therefore treated as scattering votes cast for persons not registered as candidates.
When the contest with respect to this precinct came on to be tried in the Court of First
Instance, commissioners were appointed by the court to open the boxes from the first
precinct and count the votes found therein. When the votes were thus recounted by
the commissioners, it was discovered that the contestant had received 139 votes, and
though exception was taken to twelve of these by the contestee on some ground or
other, there remained in favor of the contestant 127 unexceptional votes. When
confronted with this report, the trial judge correctly held that these 127 votes should
be counted for the contestant; and after adjusting the votes cast for the contestee in
the same precinct, his Honor found that in the entire municipality the contestant had
gained the election over the contestee by the plurality of 71 votes.
In this ruling the trial judge was correct. While it is admitted that the name of the
contestant was not entered as that of a qualified voter in the registration list of any
precinct of the municipality of Cabalian, for the election in question, this circumstance
did not justify the election inspectors of the first precinct in discarding the votes
obtained by the contestant in that precinct. In Yra vs. Abano (52 Phil., 380), this court
held that while a candidate, in order to be eligible for municipal office, must have the
general qualifications pertaining to voters, he need not be actually enrolled in the list
of voters. It clearly appears from Exhibit A that the contestant was duly registered as
a candidate to the office of municipal president in the election in question, and the
inspectors had no right to go behind that certificate. The certificate of registration of
a candidate for municipal office must be considered conclusive of the inspectors as
regards the right of such candidate to be credited with the votes which he in fact
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – QUO WARRANTO
receives in the different precincts of the municipality. The general question of the
eligibility of the candidate for office is one with which the inspectors have no concern,
their duties being confined to the conduct of the election, the counting of the votes,
and the certification of the results in so far as relates to the certified candidates.
In the answer filed by the contestee after his motion to dismiss had been overruled it
is alleged, by way of special defense, that, prior to the election, the contestant had not
been a resident of the municipality of Cabalian either for the period of one year
necessary to make him eligible for municipal office or even for the six months
necessary to entitle him to be enrolled among the qualified voters of the municipality.
The trial judge, however, held that the issue, or issues, thus tendered were irrelevant
to the contest, and he ignored the testimony submitted by the contestee tending to
establish the fact that the contestant had not been a resident of Cabalian for the time
requisite to make him eligible to the office. In this there was no error. The ineligibility
of the mover of an election contest, supposing him to have been a duly registered
candidate, is not available as a defense in the contest proceeding. The reason is that
the contest raises merely a question as to the number of votes received by the
opposing candidates. Eligibility is a matter wholly apart from the question of the
number of votes received by a candidate, and its solution depends upon
considerations quite different from those involved in a contest. As the law formerly
stood, under section 12 of Act No. 1582 and section 2 of Act No. 1726, the ineligible
official, being a provincial officer, was removed by the Governor-General; while in the
case of municipal officers, removal was effected by the provincial board of summary
order of the Governor-General. As long as the law remained in this state, it was a rule
that the eligibility of a candidate could not be considered in an election contest
(Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238). The law concerning the removal of ineligible
officials has, however, been charged; and it is now provided that when a person,
alleged to be ineligible, is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right thereto
is to be tried, upon the relation of any elector of the province or municipality
concerned, in a special proceeding in the nature of an action of quo warranto; and this
proceeding must be instituted within the two weeks after the proclamation of the
election of the person whose right to office is questioned (Election Law, sec. 408, as
amended by Act No. 3387). The result is that, as the law now stands, the question of
eligibility may be tried in a judicial proceeding. But the proceeding in which it maybe
tried is not a contest; and the defense based on the alleged ineligibility of the
contestant is completely incongruous with the issue of an election protest.
Moreover, it is to be observed that the proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to
try the question of the eligibility of a candidate is to be instituted within the two weeks
after the proclamation of the person whose right to office is challenged. In the
proceeding now before us the contestant has never been proclaimed at all and will
not be proclaimed, in the sense of the law, until the decision of this court is published.
The issue of ineligibility which is attempted to be raised in the answer is premature.
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administra tive – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020
Another reason readily suggests itself why the ineligibility of the contestant is not
available as a defense in this contest. This consists in the fact that, if the person who
has received a majority of plurality of votes in any election is found to be ineligible,
the result is that the office is declared vacant and a new election has to be held to fill
the vacancy. In the case before us, if we should accept the defense of the ineligibility
of the contestant and adopt the course of dismissing the contest for that reason, the
result would be that the contestee would be in office though he in fact received fewer
votes than the contestant.
But it is said that the court should admit the defense in this proceeding for the
purpose of avoiding circuitry of action. The suggestion is worthy of consideration,
because it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation. But this rule cannot be applied in a case where the suggested
defense is incongruous and premature. The eligibility of the contestant must, we
think, be made the subject of a separate proceeding at the proper juncture.
In the appealed decision we find an observation to the effect that the contestant's
certificate of candidacy (Exhibit A) is conclusive of the question of the eligibility of the
contestant. His Honor no doubt intended that observation to be understood in
connection with this contest, and in that sense the statement is true. But of course
said exhibit would not be conclusive in any proper proceeding, in the nature of quo
warranto, instituted, under section 408 of the Election Law, for the purpose of testing
the eligibility of the contestant to office.
From what has been said it follows that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed,
and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GARCIA
GR No. 126252, August 30, 1999
FACTS: Garcia was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and was
sentenced to death by Judge Guzman. The judgment was promulgated on the 20th
of February. On April of the same year, the judge filed for disability retirement
and such was approved. Its effectivity was then made retroactive to the 16th of
February. Here now comes the accused assailing the judgment against him, given
that Judge Guzman had no longer authority to promulgate judgment given the
retroactivity of his judgment.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – QUO WARRANTO
HELD: Accused’s contention is without merit.

Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the judge who

signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision is
valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his
incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered:
(a) by a court legally constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and
(b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure
or de facto A judge de jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter
of right, fully invested with all the powers and functions conceded to him under
the law. A judge de facto is one who exercises the office of judge under some color
of right. He has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some
defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time.

In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although
the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.’s disability retirement was made
retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject
decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge
of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said office
and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June
1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was
promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de
facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for disability
retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where
the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his
subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the
expiration of his term are void. However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman,
Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time the decision
under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and
has a valid and binding effect on appellant.

4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Public Officers, Election, & Administra tive – Atty. Robert Raypon
XU – College of Law, 2019-2020