LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP CASE
1. PARDELL V. BARTOLOME
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912
FACTS: Vicenta Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural
daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula,respectively; that Calixta
Felin, prior to her death, executed a nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four
children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole
and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before
his mother and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and
therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the
defendant Matilde Ortiz.
1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products
thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the
different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the
aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicenta and to deliver to the latter the one-half
thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said
defendant and her husband had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkept promises
and other excuses.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgment be rendered in restoring and
returning to them one half of the of the total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and
damages for the properties. However, Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the
plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilda and her husband,
Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the
house in Escolta Street.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING: Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing,
the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor
that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her
rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the
rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff,
and Matilde Ortiz, defendant and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband,
on the right of co-ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
administration and care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
DIGESTS
and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half
of the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the story of the said
house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom
thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership
between the litigants.
Relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper
story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved
that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a
room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an
office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province,
strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent
which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person.
This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of
the defendant co-owner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the
said part of the lower floor of the house in question.
2. IGNAO V. IAC
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro
Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 534 square meters situated in
Barrio Tabon, Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by
petitioner the Court of First Instance of Cavite, directed the partition of the aforesaid land,
alloting 133.5 square meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and
giving the remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to petitioner
Florencio.However, no actual partition was ever effected.
On July 17, 1978, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real
property against private respondents Juan and Isidro. In his complaint petitioner alleged
that the area occupied by the two (2) houses built by private respondents exceeded the
133.5 square meters previously alloted to them by the trial court.
Consequently, the lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was found that the houses
of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land
belonging to Florencio.
In its decision, the trial court ruled that although private respondents occupied a portion of
Florencio's property, they should be considered builders in good faith. The trial court took
into account the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in the action for partition2
and quoted:
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
. . . . Hence, it is the well-considered opinion of the Court that although it turned out that the
defendants had, before partition, been in possession of more than what rightfully belongs to
them, their possession of what is in excess of their rightful share can at worst be possession in
good faith which exempts them from being condemned to pay damages by reason thereof.
Furthermore, the trial court stated that pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, the owner
of the land should have the choice to either appropriate that part of the house standing on
his land after payment of indemnity or oblige the builders in good faith to pay the price of
the land. However, the trial court observed that based on the facts of the case, it would be
useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option since this would render the
entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless. The trial court then applied the ruling in the
similar case of Grana vs. Court of Appeals,4 where the Supreme Court had advanced a more
"workable solution".
Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively
occupied by the latter. Petitioner Florencio Ignao appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. On August 27, 1985, the Appellate Court, Second Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision, affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence the instant petition for review which
attributes to the Appellate Court.
ISSUE/s:
 Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder in good
 faith on a property held in common.
 Whether or not the trial court and the Appellate Court erred when they peremptorily
adopted the "workable solution" in the case of Grana vs. Court of appeals.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Petitioner
Florencio Ignao is directed within thirty (30) days from entry of judgment to exercise his
option to either appropriate as his own the portions of the houses of Juan and Isidro Ignao
occupying his land upon payment of indemnity
in accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, or sell to private respondents the
101 square meters occupied by them at such price as may be agreed upon. Should the value
of the land exceed the value of the portions of the houses that private respondents have
erected thereon, private respondents may choose not to buy the land but they must pay
reasonable rent for the use of the portion of petitioner's land as may be agreed upon by the
parties. In case of disagreement, the rate of rental and other terms of the lease shall be
determined by the trial court. Otherwise, private respondents may remove or demolish at
their own expense the said portions of their houses encroaching upon petitioner's land. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
CASE DIGESTS
 The ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the home of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of
the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-ownership if good faith
has been established. When co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears
that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article
448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.
 Both the trial court and the Appellate Court erred when they peremptorily adopted the
"workable solution" in the case of Grana vs. Court of appeals, and ordered the owner of
the land, petitioner Florencio, to sell to private respondents, Juan and Isidro, the part of
the land they intruded upon, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose. Such
ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "the owner of
the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . .or to oblige the one who built . . . to pay
the price of the land . . . ." The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. Thus, in Quemuel
vs. Olaes,13 the Court categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the
landowner.
3. INING V. VEGA
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
FACTS: Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Mendez is the owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo,
Aklan. When both died, they were survived by Leon’s siblings, Ramona
and Gregoria. Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property. Leonardo, Ramona’s
surviving grandson claims that one-half of the subject property belongs to him as Ramona’s
surviving heir. Leonardo claimed ownership and possession with damages against
Gregoria’s heirs. Gregoria’s heirs claim that they became sole owners of the subject property
when Leon sold the property to one Juan Enriquez and was bought by Lucimo Sr. (Husband
of one of Gregoria’s heir). They claim that they even paid taxes thereof and claims that
Lucimo Sr.’s purchase and possession of the property amounted to repudiation of the co-
ownership.That the respondent, Leonardo is barred by laches for his inaction—from
Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943 up to 1995.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate
2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim is barred by laches or estoppel
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The decision to award 1/2 portion of the
land to the heirs of Ramona and 1/2 portion of the land to the heirs
of Gregoria is AFFIRMED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Prescriptive period shall begin to run from the time a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership and not from the death of the decedent.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. Leonardo was
well within the prescription period.
The alleged deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr. are found to
be spurious
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate.
However, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. He is merely a son-in-law.
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription
did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has
not been lost. Since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
4. ARAMBULO v. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother and
six other siblings are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land. When
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
CASE DIGESTS
one of the siblings, Iraida, passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent
Genaro Nolasco and their children. Petitioners allege that all of the co-owners, except for
respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject
properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of their share
and that since the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration, they are entitled to relief
to the court. The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON withholding of consent of sale by the respondents is prejudicial to the
petitioners and will grant them adequate relief to the court.
RULING No. The petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of an action for partition.
RATIO:
1. Although alienation of the thing by sale of the property is an act of strict dominion the
ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that if a co-owner withholds consent to
the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest, may, as
adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. Insofar as the sale of co-owned
properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or
more of the co-owners refuse to sell the co-owned property.
When respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual ownership
rights. Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-
owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the
petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part
that belongs to them. Therefore, sale of the entire property by one co- owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
5. PLASABAS v. CA
G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009
FACTS: Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with
damages before CFI. The subject property was a parcel of coconut land declared in the name
of Plasabas. They pray for their rights over the land be confirmed and for Lumen and Aunzo
to vacate the land. Aunzo and Lumen interposed that they inherited the land from their
common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. In the course of trial, it was found out that Nieves
was not the absolute owner of the land. Aunzo and Lumen then raised the argument that
the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioner's failure to implead
indispensable parties (Jose, Victor and Victoria). CFI dismissed the case.
ISSUE: WON the co-owners are indispensable parties.
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
2. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of
the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is
adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded
co-owners.
6. MARMO V. ANACAY
G.R. No. 182585, November 27, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title
with Damages against the petitioners and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite.
The complaint states, among others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner,
together with his wife Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land
and the house built thereon, located at Blk. 54, Lot 9, Regency Homes, Brgy. Malinta,
Dasmarias, Cavite.
They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner Josephine sold
the subject property to petitioner Danilo, payable in monthly installments; petitioner Danilo
defaulted in his installment payments; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT
No. 815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephine’s
name by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale; petitioner Josephine subsequently
transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
991035 was issued in petitioner Danilo’s name. The respondent sought the annulment of
the Deed of Absolute Sale and the cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he
demanded petitioner Danilo’s payment of the balance of his defaulted payments with
interest, and the payment of moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondent’s children,
as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs because they
are indispensable parties. Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner Josephine’s submission in his
Answer.
Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for the
respondents failure to include his children as indispensable parties. The respondent filed
an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable parties because the issue in
the case can be resolved without their participation
in the proceedings.
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
CASE DIGESTS
ISSUE: WON the respondent’s children are indispensable parties to the resolution of this
case.
RULING: No. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as
parties-ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who,
for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. When the controversy
involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Where the suit is brought by a
co-owner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the
benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-owners.
However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of
the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are
indispensable parties and must be implead ed as party-defendants, as the suit affects the
rights and interests of these other co-owners.
7. RAMIREZ V. RAMIREZ
GR No L-22621, September 29, 1967
FACTS: Plaintiff brought an action against defendants for the partition of a parcel of land
belonging pro indiviso to both parties, to which the defendants objected to, upon the theory
that said partition is "materially and legally" impossible and "would work great harm and
prejudice to the co-owners." The lower court granted the partition, and that the expenses
incident thereto be paid by both parties proportionately.
ISSUES:
1. WON a physical division of the property will cause "inestimable damage" to the interest
of the co-owners.
2. WON the expenses of division will be expenses be borne exclusively by the petitioner.
RULING: The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. NO, the division was proper. Where no evidence was introduced in support of the claim
that a physical division of the property will cause inestimable damage to the interest of the
co-owners thereby rendering it unserviceable, a court order requiring its division was
proper.
2. NO, the expenses shall be borne by the defrayed by parties benefited. Since the
segregation of the property in question inured to the benefit, not only of plaintiff, but also
of defendants, both parties must defray the incidental expenses.
 LAW ON PROPERTY – CO-OWNERSHIP
8. TORRES VS LAPINID
GR No. 187987, November 26, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are co-owners of some parcels of
land which is located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. On 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of
the parcels of land against the petitioners and other co-owners.
On August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the
parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell
the said properties and receive the proceeds and distribute them to all the co-owners.
CASE DIGESTS
perfected, the validity of sale subsists. Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of
an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection
of contract on November 9 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

However, the agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. The
petitioners inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific 9. MAGSANO V. PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK
portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed by GR No. 215038, OCTOBER 17, 2016
Jesus in favor of Lapinid.

A forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid. The complainants prayed for payment of
rental fees amounting to P1,000.00 per month from January 2004 (from the time of
deprivation of property.) Jesus admitted that there was a partition between him and the
petitioners filed in 1993 involving several parcels of land including Lot No. 4389. He insisted
that on November 6, 1997, a motion was signed by the co-owners that the lot was agreed to
be adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other lots to be
divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of Torres. Lapinid admitted that a
deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land with an
area of 3000 square meters. However, he insisted on the validity of sale since Jesus showed
him several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of Lot No. 4389.

Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but
the same was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court. It was ruled that the buyers,
including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to them
by Jesus.

ISSUE: WON Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in
favor of another person.

RULING: Wherefore the petition is denied. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2009 and May 14, 2009 are hereby affirmed.

RATIO:
Yes, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned propert in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of
Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent of any proof that the sale was not

5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020